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16, 2021
Relations with the United States
Derek E. Mix
Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress view the United Kingdom (UK) as the United States'
Specialist in European
States’ closest and most reliable ally. This perception stems from a combination of factors,
Affairs
including a sense of shared history, values, and culture; a large and mutually beneficial economic
relationship; and extensive cooperation on foreign policy and security issues. The UK'’s January 2020 withdrawal from the European Union (EU), often referred to as Brexit, is likely to change
its international role and outlook in ways that affect U.S.-UK relations.
Conservative Party Wins December 2019 Election
Leads UK Government The government of the UK is led by Prime Minister Boris Johnson of the Conservative Party. Since 2016,Brexit has dominated UK domestic politics have been dominated by Brexit, the UK's decisionsince the 2016 referendum on whether to leave the EU. In an early election held in December 2019—called in order to break a political deadlock over how and when the UK would exit the EU—the Conservative Party secured a sizeable parliamentary majority, winning 365 seats in the 650-seat House of Commons. The election results paved the way
for Parliament'’s approval of a withdrawal agreement negotiated between Johnson'’s government and the EU.
UK Leaves the EU, Transition Period Begins
UK Is Out of the EU, Concludes Trade and Cooperation Agreement On January 31, 2020, the UK'’s 47-year EU membership came to an end. The UK-EU withdrawal agreement sets out the terms of the UK'addresses several main issues in the UK’s departure from the EU. It addresses several key issues, including UK and EU citizens'’ rights and financial obligationsthe UK’s financial obligations to the EU. A key stumbling block in the withdrawal negotiations related toconcerned arrangements for the border between Northern Ireland (part of the UK) and the Republic of Ireland (a member of the EU). The withdrawal agreement essentially establishes a customs border in the Irish Sea, with Northern Ireland maintaining regulatory alignment with the EU in order to preserve an open border on the island of Ireland and protect the Northern Ireland peace process. Since taking effect in January 2021, these new arrangements for Northern Ireland have posed some difficulties for trade between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK and have contributed to heightened tensions in Northern Ireland and between the UK and the EU.
In December 2020, UK and EU negotiators concluded a Trade and Cooperation Agreement that sets out terms of the future relationship, including on trade, economic relations, and cooperation on a range of other issues. The agreement left numerous questions and issues unresolved, however, meaning many aspects of the UK-EU relationship may evolve over time and through subsequent negotiations. On January 1, 2021, the entire UK, including Northern Ireland, left the EU customs union and now conducts its own national trade policy.
and protect the Northern Ireland peace process.
The withdrawal agreement includes a transition period, currently scheduled to last through the end of 2020, during which the UK is expected to continue following EU rules while it attempts to negotiate with the EU on a free trade agreement and a range of other issues. At the conclusion of the transition period, the UK, including Northern Ireland, is expected to leave the EU customs union, allowing the UK to pursue an independent national trade policy.
Economic and Trade Issues
As industries face continuing uncertainty regarding the terms of the UK's trade and economic relationship with the EU, many economists suggest that Brexit is likely to pose a drag on the UK's economic growth through the medium term. Advocates of Brexit argue that the ability to diverge from EU regulations, combined with an emphasis on concluding new international trade deals, including with the United States, will ultimately benefit the UK economy.
U.S.-UK Relationship
U.S.-UK Relationship Since deciding to leave the EU, the UK has soughts ought to reinforce its close political and economic ties with the United States and reaffirm its place as a leading country in NATO. Most analysts believe that the two countries will remain close allies that cooperate on many diplomatic, security, and economic issues. Nevertheless, Brexit has fueled a debate about whether the UK’s global role and influence are likely to be enhanced or diminished. President Biden and top officials in the Biden Administration have generally maintained a skeptical view of Brexit, but many observers expect the Administration to seek pragmatic cooperation with both the UK and the EU. Members of Congress hold mixed views on the merits of Brexit.
The United States and the UK conducted five rounds of negotiations on a bilateral free trade agreement in 2020. If the Biden Administration continues the negotiations, Congress may actively monitor and shape them and could consider implementing legislation for any final agreement. The Biden Administration and some Members of Congress also are concerned about developments in Northern Ireland and Brexit’s possible implications for Northern Ireland’s peace process, stability, and economic development.
Given the UK’s role as a close U.S. ally and partner, developments in the UK, in UK-EU relations, and in the UK’leading country in NATO. President Trump has expressed a largely positive view of the UK and strongly supported Brexit. At the same time, President Trump remains a controversial figure in the UK, and polls indicate that a large percentage of the British public views him negatively.
Most analysts believe that the two countries will remain close allies that cooperate on many diplomatic, security, and economic issues. President Trump and some Members of Congress have expressed support for the idea of concluding a bilateral free trade agreement with the UK. The UK is the world's sixth-largest economy and remains a major financial center. The UK also has the world's sixth-largest defense expenditure, but U.S. officials have expressed concerns about past UK defense cuts and the UK military's ability to generate and sustain capabilities.
Given its role as a close U.S. ally and partner, developments in the UK, post-Brexit negotiations between the UK and the EU, and the UK's relations with the United States are of continuing interest to the U.S. Congress. This report provides an overview and assessment of some of the main dimensions of these topics. For additional information, see CRS Report R45944, Brexit: Status and Outlook, coordinated by Derek E. MixFor additional information, see CRS Report R46730, Brexit: Overview, Trade, and Northern Ireland, coordinated by Derek E. Mix; CRS Report R46259, Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests, by Kristin Archick; and CRS In Focus IF11123, Brexit and Outlook for a U.S.-UK Free Trade Agreement, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.
I. Akhtar, Rachel F. Fefer, and Andres B. Schwarzenberg .
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 Domestic Political Situation.............................................................................................. 2 Brexit ............................................................................................................................ 5
The Withdrawal Agreement......................................................................................... 6 The Trade and Cooperation Agreement ......................................................................... 7 UK-EU Relations Post-Transition .............................................................................. 10
Brexit and the UK Economy ........................................................................................... 11 Brexit and UK Foreign and Defense Policy ....................................................................... 11 Counterterrorism........................................................................................................... 13 U.S.-UK Relations ........................................................................................................ 14
Security and Defense Relations.................................................................................. 17
Counterterrorism and Intel igence Cooperation ............................................................ 18 Economic Relations ................................................................................................. 18 Northern Ireland ...................................................................................................... 18
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 19
Figures Figure 1. United Kingdom at a Glance: Map and Basic Facts ................................................. 2 Figure 2. December 2019 UK General Election Results ........................................................ 3
Contacts Author Information ....................................................................................................... 20
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Introduction The modern relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) was forged during the Second World War. It was cemented during the Cold War, as both countries worked together bilaterally
together bilateral y and within NATO to counter the threat of the Soviet Union.
The United States and the UK are two of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and both are founding members of NATO. In the early 1990s, the UK was an important U.S. allyal y in the first Gulf War, and the two countries later worked together in stabilization stabilization and peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. The UK was the leading U.S. ally in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent stabilization operations and remains a leading contributor to
the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. The UK also remains an important U.S. partner in numerous other ongoing global security challengeschal enges, such as combatting international terrorism, countering the Islamic State terrorist group and affiliates,
and opposing Russia'’s annexation of Crimea and actions destabilizing Ukraine, including by supporting strong sanctions in response to these actions.
other destabilizing actions.
The UK is the sixth-largest economy in the world and a major financial center (see Figure 1). The United States and the UK share an extensive and mutuallymutual y beneficial trade and economic
relationship, and each is the other'’s largest foreign investor.
U.S. and UK officials, from the Cabinet level down, consult frequently and extensively on many global issues. In recent decades, American and British diplomats have often turned to each other first when seeking to build support for their respective positions in multilateral institutions or during times of crisis, as in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the United States.
British input has often been cited as an element in shaping U.S. foreign policy debates.
Some observers assert that a common language and cultural similarities, as well wel as the habits of cooperation that have developed over the years, contribute to the ease with which U.S. and UK
policymakers interact with each other. The term special relationship has often been used to describe the high degree of mutual trust between the two countries in cooperating on diplomatic and political issues. The relationship also encompasses close intelligenceintel igence-sharing arrangements
and unique cooperation in nuclear and defense matters.
The government of the UK is led by Prime Minister Boris Johnson of the Conservative Party (see Figure 2). He
Members of Congress may have a broad interest in a range of issues related to the UK and U.S.-UK relations. Members of Congress have expressed interest in the implications of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (commonly known as Brexit) for the global economy; U.S.-UK and U.S.-EU political, economic, and trade relations; transatlantic cooperation on foreign
policy and security issues; and peace and stability in Northern Ireland. Members of Congress also
have expressed an interest in a prospective U.S.-UK free trade agreement (FTA).
This report provides an overview and assessment of some of the main dimensions of these issues.
For additional information on issues discussed in this report, also see
CRS Report R46730, Brexit: Overview, Trade, and Northern Ireland, coordinated
by Derek E. Mix;
CRS Report R46259, Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing
Challenges, and U.S. Interests, by Kristin Archick; and
CRS In Focus IF11123, Brexit and Outlook for a U.S.-UK Free Trade Agreement,
by Shayerah I. Akhtar, Rachel F. Fefer, and Andres B. Schwarzenberg.
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Figure 1. United Kingdom at a Glance: Map and Basic Facts
Overview Area: approximately 94,058 square miles, about twice the size of Pennsylvania. Population: approximately 67.1 mil ion. Constituent Countries Percentage of Population: England 84%, Scotland 8%, Wales 5%, N. Ireland 3%. Languages: English, recognized regional languages are Scots, Scottish Gaelic, Welsh, Irish, and Cornish. Religions: Christian (Anglican, Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist) 59.5%, Muslim 4.5%, Hindu 1.3%, other/none/unspecified 34.9%. Currency: British pound sterling, £1=$1.37.
Economy Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 2020 (current prices): approximately $2.71 tril ion. Per Capita GDP: approximately $40,406.
Political Leaders Head of State: Queen Elizabeth II Prime Minister: Boris Johnson Foreign Secretary: Dominic Raab Defense Secretary: Ben Wal ace Home Secretary: Priti Patel International Trade Secretary: Elizabeth Truss
Sources: Created by CRS using data from the U.S. Department of State and ESRI. Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database (April 2021), and CIA World Factbook.
Domestic Political Situation The government of the UK is led by Prime Minister Boris Johnson of the Conservative Party. He became prime minister in July 2019, following the resignation of Theresa May after she was unable to secure Parliament'the UK Parliament’s approval for the withdrawal agreement her government
negotiated with the European Union (EU).1 Seen by many as a colorful and polarizing figure who was one of the leading voices in the campaign for the UK to leave the EU, Johnson previously served as UK foreign secretary in the May government from 2016 to 2018 and mayor of London
from 2008 to 2016.
Johnson inherited a Conservative minority government that controlled a one-seat parliamentary majority by virtue of support from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the largest unionist
party in Northern Ireland.2 The Conservative-DUP arrangement lost its parliamentary majority in September 2019, however, after discord over the government's approach to leaving the EU (commonly termed Brexit) resulted in the defection or expulsion from the party of more than 20 Conservative Members of Parliament (MPs).party in Northern Ireland.1 The Johnson government renegotiatednegotiated a new withdrawal agreement with the EU in October 2019 but faced political deadlock after the UK Parliament required the
government to request a three-month extension to the Brexit deadline. In order to break the
deadlock, Parliament agreed to set an early general election for December 12, 2019.
1 T he arrangement was not a formal coalition but rather a “confidence and supply” arrangement allowing the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) certain concessions in return for its support in passing the budget and backing the government in any no-confidence votes, with legislation supported on a case-by-case basis.
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With Brexit the defining issue of the campaign, the Conservative Party achieved a decisive victory, winning 365 out of 650 seats in the House of Commons, an increase of 47 seats
compared to the 2017 election (seesee Figure 1). 2).
The opposition Labour Party, unable to present a clear alternative vision of Brexit to the electorate and unable to gain sufficient traction with voters on issues beyond Brexit, suffered a substantial defeat with the loss of 59 seats.3 The Scottish National Party gained 13 seats to hold 48 of the 59 constituencies in Scotland, a result likely to recharge the pro-independence movement in Scotland, where more than 60% of voters in the 2016 Brexit referendum had 2 The Scottish National Party (SNP), which supports Scotland becoming independent from the UK and joining the EU, gained 13 seats to hold 48 of the 59 constituencies in Scotland. More than 60% of 2016 referendum voters in Scotland had
supported remaining in the EU. With the gains made by Johnson’s Conservative Party, the DUP
lost its outsized influence in Parliament over the Brexit withdrawal agreement.
Figure 2supported remaining in the EU.4
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Source: |
The election outcome put the UK on course to withdraw as a member of the EU by the new deadline of January 31, 2020. After the election, the UK government introduced a revised European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill, which became law on January 23, 2020.5 The UK government subsequently ratified the withdrawal agreement. The European Parliament voted its consent to the agreement on January 29, 2020, and the Council of the EU completed the EU's ratification the following day.6 On January 31, 2020, the UK concluded its 47-year membership in the EU. Brexit remains a predominant issue in UK politics, however, as the UK and the EU have entered new negotiations to determine their future relationship.
2019/results.
Following the election, in late January 2020, the UK Parliament adopted implementing legislation that transposed the withdrawal agreement into UK law; the UK government and the EU institutions subsequently completed ratification of the agreement.3 On January 31, 2020, the UK
concluded its 47-year membership in the EU.
The aftermath of Brexit remains a predominant issue in UK politics, however, as the UK seeks to manage its new relationship with the EU. In December 2020, the UK and the EU concluded a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) that establishes a partial framework for the future
relationship.
Polling in April 2021 indicates support levels for the Conservative Party at 41% and support
levels for the Labour Party at 34%.4 After polls indicated a 20-point lead for the Conservatives in early 2020, support for the two parties ran nearly even during the second half of the year. Support for the Conservatives declined with public backlash over the government’s handling of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic (see text box below) but bounced back with the
2 BBC News, “General election 2019: Blair attacks Corbyn’s ‘comic indecision’ on Brexit,” December 18, 2019. 3 UK Parliament website, European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020; and Council of the European Union, Brexit: Council Adopts Decision to Conclude the Withdrawal Agreem ent, January 30, 2020. 4 YouGov, Voting Intention: Con 41%, Lab 34% (7-8 Apr).
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rollout of COVID-19 vaccines and the conclusion of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with
the EU.
Brexit has triggered a renewed push by the SNP for a second independence referendum in
Scotland. In a legal y binding referendum held in 2014, 55% of voters in Scotland supported remaining part of the UK. After gaining seats in the UK Parliament in the 2019 general election, the SNP argues that returning another pro-independence majority in the Scottish Parliament in regional elections scheduled for May 6, 2021, would provide a mandate for holding a second independence referendum.5 (In the 2016-2021 Scottish Parliament, the SNP holds 61 of 129 seats
and the pro-independence Scottish Green Party holds five seats.)
The UK government has consistently rejected cal s to al ow a second referendum, with Prime Minister Johnson maintaining that the 2014 referendum was a “once in a generation” vote to
settle the question of Scottish independence.6 Analysts interpret the Scotland Act 1998, the legislation creating a devolved Scottish Executive and Parliament with control over policies in
delegated areas, as requiring the consent of the UK government for an independence referendum.7
Coronavirus Disease 2019 in the United Kingdom (UK)
In March 2020, the UK, like Sources: Michael Savage, "Boris Johnson To Warn UK: Tougher Lockdown May Be Necessary," Guardian, March 29, 2020; Ed Yong, "The U.K.'s Coronavirus 'Herd Immunity' Debacle," The Atlantic, March 16, 2020; Ailbhe Rea, "Why Aren't We On Lockdown For Coronavirus Yet?," New Statesman, March 12, 2020. |
The UK' The government eased restrictions as cases declined during the summer, but re-imposed a four-week nationwide lockdown in November 2020 to address a resurgence in case numbers. The second lockdown drew strong criticism from many sources, with some arguing that the government again waited too long and failed to heed expert advice to act earlier. Others criticized the lockdown as economical y devastating and an infringement on civil liberties, and critics on both sides maintained that the government continued to lack a coherent strategic plan to deal with the virus. In January 2021, Prime Minister Johnson announced a third nationwide lockdown. In February 2021, the government announced a four-step plan to lift al restrictions in England by June 2021, as long the country meets criteria regarding vaccinations and case rates. As of April 2021, there have been nearly 4.4 mil ion COVID cases in the UK and approximately 150,000 deaths due to the virus. The so-cal ed UK variant of the virus (B.1.1.7), initial y detected in the UK in September 2020 and in the United States in December 2020, appears to be more significantly more contagious than the original strain of the virus. Observers view the UK’s vaccination program as a national success story; as of April 2021, more than half of the adult population had received at least their first dose (nearly 40 mil ion vaccinations given as of April 10, 2021), giving the UK one of the highest vaccination rates in the world. Since the start of the pandemic, the UK government has al ocated more than £407 bil ion (approximately $558 bil ion) in fiscal support to assist affected businesses and individuals. Support measures include loan guarantees, grants, and tax cuts for businesses, tax deferments for the retail, hospitality and leisure sectors, and a job retention scheme paying up to 80% of the wages of furloughed workers. Sources: HM Treasury, Budget 2021 Sets Path for Recovery, March 3, 2021; UK Coronavirus Dashboard, https://coronavirus.data.gov.uk/; “Lockdown: Boris Johnson Unveils Plan to End England Restrictions by 21 June,” BBC News, February 22, 2021; Alex Wickham, “Timeline: How the UK Responded to the Coronavirus,” Politico, January 27, 2021; Mark Landler and Stephen Castle, “U.K.’s Johnson Faces a Growing Revolt Over his Coronavirus Policy,” New York Times, December 25, 2020.
5 BBC News, “Scottish Independence: Will T here Be a Second Referendum?,” January 28, 2021. 6 Letter from PM Boris Johnson to First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, January 14, 2020, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/857586/Nicola_Sturgeon_20200114.pdf.
7 Akash Paun and Jess Sargeant, A Second Referendum on Scottish Independence, Institute for Government, November 23, 2020.
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Polling in Scotland during the second half of 2020 indicated support for independence rising to 54%, the highest level since 2014.8 Amid a backdrop of internal feuding among SNP leadership in early 2021, polls indicated a decline in support for independence, with a March 2021 poll
indicating 51% support for remaining in the UK.9
Post-Brexit arrangements (see “The Withdrawal Agreement” section, below) also have sparked dissatisfaction among the unionist community in Northern Ireland and have exacerbated frictions between the unionist and nationalist communities and their respective political parties in Northern Ireland’s devolved government. Many unionists view the post-Brexit arrangements as treating
Northern Ireland differently from the rest of the UK and undermining the union, exacerbating unionist concerns that their British identity is under threat and enhancing a sense of unionist disenfranchisement. Growing unionist unhappiness with post-Brexit arrangements could increasingly threaten stability in Northern Ireland, as seen by the riots and unrest occurring in
parts of Belfast and elsewhere in Northern Ireland in April 2021.
Experts assert, however, that a complex combination of factors beyond Brexit is contributing to the recent turmoil in Northern Ireland.10 Although strong rhetoric against the Brexit arrangements from unionist politicians may have fueled tensions in the unionist community, other factors may
include frustration over public health lockdowns, anger at authorities’ recent decision not to prosecute violations of public health protocols at a high-profile republican funeral held in 2020, and the influence of criminal organizations seeking to retaliate against police crackdowns on drug trafficking. Observers also point to economic and class factors, with many of the rioters consisting of youth from impoverished areas that have not felt the economic benefits of the 1998
Northern Ireland peace accord (known as the Good Friday Agreement or the Belfast Agreement).
Brexit The UK’s history with the EU has been characterized by ambivalence since the start of the EU project. Fearing a loss of national sovereignty and influence, the UK stood aside in the 1950s when the six founding countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and West Germany) launched the first steps of European integration. The UK joined the precursor of the
modern-day EU in 1973, largely to derive the economic benefits of membership but also to have
a political voice on the inside as integration took shape.
Nevertheless, many British leaders and citizens (perhaps most notably including former Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher) remained skeptical about the EU. The UK "opted out" of several major elements of European integration, such as the euro currency and the passport-free Schengen Area. British "euro-skeptics" haveBritish euro-skeptics frequently expressed frustration that the EU tends to focus too much on internal treaties and process rather than taking a pragmatic approach to priorities such as boosting economic competitiveness, promoting a common energy policy, or improving European defense capabilities.
capabilities.
In a national referendum held in June 2016, 52% of UK voters favored leaving the EU. The referendum exposed significant regional and demographicsdemographic fault lines in the UK and its result was
8 Ben Riley-Smith, “Boris Johnson Will Not Grant a Second Scottish Independence Referendum,” Telegraph, March 11, 2021.
9 YouGov, Scottish Voting Intention (4-8 Mar) and Adam Forrest, “Why Is the SNP in a State of Civil War and Will It Damage Support for Scottish Independence?,” Independent, February 24, 2021. 10 Harry Yorke, “'Grossly Irresponsible’ to Blame Brexit for Northern Ireland Unrest, Says Former T op Government Adviser,” The Telegraph, April 8, 2021.
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fault lines in the UK and its result was divisive, with large segments of the population remaining opposed to Brexit. In March 2017, the UK official yUK officially notified the EU of its intention to leave the bloc, and the UK and the EU began negotiations on the terms of the UK'’s withdrawal.811 Brexit was originallyoriginal y scheduled to occur on March 29, 2019, but the UK Parliament was unable to agree on a way forward due to divisions over what type of Brexit the UK should pursue and challengeschal enges related to the future of the border
between Northern Ireland (part of the UK) and the Republic of Ireland (an EU member state).
The lack of an apparent solution to the Irish border question, with both sides intent on avoiding a hard border with customs checks and physical infrastructure between Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland, led Theresa May'’s government to agree to a backstop provision in the withdrawal agreement. The backstop provision, which would have kept the UK in the EU customs union until the two sides agreed on their future trade relationship, was intended to protect cross-border trade and preserve the peace process between parties to Northern Ireland'’s long sectarian conflict.912 The EU also viewed the backstop as necessary to ensure that Brexit would not violate the rules and structure of the EU single market. Additionally, Additional y, the backstop arose in the
context of the DUP'’s adamant rejection of a Northern Ireland-only provision, which the DUP contended would create a regulatory barrier in the Irish Sea between Northern Ireland and the rest
of the UK;, and thus would threaten the UK'’s constitutional integrity.10
13
The backstop provision became one of the main obstacles to securing Parliament'’s approval of the withdrawal agreement. Fearing that negotiations on the future relationship with the EU could take as long as 5 to 10 years, many Members of Parliament strongly opposed the backstop arrangement, viewing it as potential y curbing the UK’s sovereignty and limiting its ability to
conclude free-trade deals.
The the withdrawal agreement. Critics noted that the UK would be unable to conduct an independent national trade policy, one of the main selling points for Brexit's supporters, as long as the UK remained a member of the EU customs union.
Withdrawal Agreement After taking office, Prime Minister Johnson began renegotiating the withdrawal agreement with the goal of discarding the contentious Northern Ireland backstop provision. On October 17, 2019, the European Council (the leaders of the current 27 member states (EU27)) endorsed a new
withdrawal agreement negotiated by the European Commission and the UK government.11 The new agreement replicates most of the main elements from the original agreement reached in November 2018 between the EU and the government of then-Prime Minister May, including
The main difference in the new withdrawal agreement compared with the November 2018 original is in the documents' respective Protocols on Ireland/Northern Ireland (i.e., the backstop). Under the new withdrawal agreement, Northern Ireland remains legally in the UK customs territory but practically in the EU customs union, which essentially will create a customs border in the Irish Sea. (The DUP also opposed the revised protocol for this reason.) Main elements of the new protocol include the following:
The political declaration attached to the withdrawal agreement envisions a future UK-EU relationship consisting of "an ambitious, broad, deep, and flexible partnership across trade and economic cooperation with a comprehensive and balanced Free Trade Agreement at its core."12
With the UK's formal exit from the EU on January 31, 2020, an 11-month transition period began. During the transition period, the UK is expected to continue following all EU rules and remain a member of the EU single market and customs union. The withdrawal agreement allowsal owed for a one- or two-year extension of the transition period, but Prime Minister Johnson strongly opposesopposed the idea of an extension. The Johnson government inserted language in the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 and inserted language in the implementing legislation that the transition period willwould conclude at the
end of 2020 without an extension.16
During the transition period, the UK and the EU engaged in complex negotiations on the future UK-EU relationship. In keeping with the political declaration accompanying the withdrawal agreement, the two sides sought to discuss “an ambitious, broad, deep, and flexible partnership”
centered on the trade and economic relationship but also including “wider areas of cooperation.”17
15 Matthew Keep, Brexit: The Financial Settlement – In Detail, House of Commons Library, December 30, 2020. 16 Alasdair Sandford, “What Has Changed with Boris Johnson’s New Brexit Bill?” Euronews, December 20, 2019. 17 HM Government, Political Declaration Setting out the Framework for the Future Relationship Between the European Union and the United Kingdom , October 19, 2019, p. 2.
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The talks were relatively contentious, especial y on trade and economic issues, and delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic further slowed progress. By late 2020, conclusion of a deal remained stal ed by disputes over fishing rights for EU vessels in British waters, the principle of a level playing field (due to concerns over potential future UK state aid to British industries), and mechanisms for enforcing the agreement.18 Observers braced for a potential y chaotic no-deal
scenario, in which the transition period ended without a new framework for bilateral relations.
One week before the end of the transition period, on December 24, 2020, UK and EU negotiators concluded an approximately 1,200-page Trade and Cooperation Agreement, along with two other
accords on nuclear cooperation and the protection of classified information.19 The UK Parliament approved the TCA at the end of December 2020, and the deal applies provisional y pending a
vote on formal ratification by the European Parliament (expected by the end of April 2021).20
Although most UK and EU officials, stakeholders, and outside experts regard the TCA as better than a no-deal outcome, the TCA is relatively narrow in scope compared to the comprehensive partnership some observers had envisioned at the start of negotiations. Key elements of the
agreement include the following:21
The TCA maintains tariff- and quota-free trade in goods, provided those goods
meet certain rules of origin criteria. It does not include mutual recognition of product standards.
Although the agreement contains some trade facilitation measures that streamline
the customs process, it does not waive customs requirements or cabotage rules, nor does it prevent new trade barriers in the form of regulatory and customs checks.
The agreement addresses trade in services in a more limited fashion. It does not
include mutual recognition of professional qualifications.
While both sides reserve the right to set their own policies and priorities on
subsidies, environmental protection, and labor rules, regulatory divergence by the UK could lead to the imposition of tariffs by the EU (and vice versa under level playing field commitments).
The agreement left decisions on equivalency for financial services and data
protection for a later date. (On February 19, 2021, the European Commission released two draft adequacy decisions finding that the UK ensures a level of personal data protection equivalent to that provided under EU law to permit the continued transfer of personal data between the UK and the EU in both the
18 See Chris Morris, “Brexit: What Is a Level Playing Field?,” BBC News, December 31, 2020, stating, “The level playing field is a trade-policy term for a set of common rules and standards that prevent businesses in one country gaining a competitive advantage over those operating in other countries.” 19 See European Commission, T rade and Cooperation Agreement Between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the One Part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the Other Part, December 24, 2020, at https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/eu-uk-trade-and-cooperation-agreement_en.
20 See UK Parliament website, European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020, at https://services.parliament.uk/Bills/2019-21/europeanunionfuturerelationship.html; and Maïa de la Baume and David M. Herszenhorn, “ European Parliament to Ratify UK T rade Deal in Late April, President Says,” Politico, March 23, 2021 . 21 Stefano Fella et al., The UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement: Summary and Implementation , House of Commons Library, December 30, 2020.
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commercial and law enforcement sectors. If approved by the EU member states, the decisions would apply for a period of four years, subject to renewal.22)
The TCA establishes frameworks for cooperation on energy, fisheries, aviation,
and road transport.
The agreement establishes a framework for law enforcement and judicial
cooperation, but not foreign policy or defense cooperation.
The two sides agreed to review the TCA every five years, and either side can
terminate the agreement with 12 months’ notice.
Analysts observe that the TCA reflects the UK government’s prioritization of reclaiming sovereignty over maintaining economic integration with the EU.23 The agreement satisfies a
number of objectives promoted by advocates of Brexit, such as:
Ending the free movement of people. Maintaining more seamless ties with the
EU single market would likely have required the UK to continue granting EU citizens the right to freely enter, reside, and work in the UK. Reciprocal treatment of member states’ citizens is one of the fundamental principles of the EU. The UK government viewed ending the free movement of people as essential to regaining sovereignty over immigration policy. Guarantees of certain rights apply
to those with pre-existing residency status, and EU citizens may continue to apply for residency in the UK. (Brexit also introduced new requirements for UK citizens living in EU member states to apply for residency or work authorizations in those countries.)
Freedom from EU rules. Although the UK agreed to the principles of a level
playing field, full departure from the EU single market and customs union frees the UK to set its own national regulations and conduct its own national trade policy. While the UK may choose to diverge from the EU where advantageous, doing so could have consequences for UK-EU trade and economic relations, potential y including the imposition of tariffs by the EU. Freedom from EU courts. With the end of the transition period, most decision making in the UK is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). A UK-EU Partnership Council oversees the operation of the TCA, with decisions made by mutual consent and an
independent arbitration tribunal handling dispute settlement. European courts have no role in settling disputes over the TCA. Failure to comply with an arbitration decision could result in economic retaliation or partial suspension of the agreement. The UK is not completely clear of the CJEU, however. The court retains jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of the operational elements of the withdrawal agreement, including citizens’ rights issues and the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. The CJEU also retains jurisdiction over any cases pending before the end of the transition period, including appeals, and the
withdrawal agreement gives the EU four years from the end of the transition
22 European Commission, Data Protection: European Commission Launches Process on Personal Data Flows to UK, February 19, 2021.
23 Charles Grant, Ten Reflections on a Sovereignty-First Brexit, Centre for European Reform, December 28, 2020.
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period to bring cases against the UK for infringements al eged to have occurred during the transition period.24
UK-EU Relations Post-Transition The relatively limited scope of the TCA means that continued negotiations about unresolved issues may be a feature of UK-EU relations for years to come. Negotiations may seek to adjust or deepen aspects of the TCA or establish a framework for areas not covered in the agreement. Analysts note there is no guarantee the two sides wil develop a deeper and more robust formal
framework;25 instead, they may choose not to expand upon the foundation established by the
TCA, or tensions in the UK-EU relationship could limit cooperation.
In December 2020, UK and EU officials reached agreement on how to apply the provisions of the
Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland at the end of the transition period.26 Since the protocol took effect on January 1, 2021, some implementation difficulties have affected trade between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. Such difficulties have given rise to significant UK-EU tensions,
which have put pressure on the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland.
In addition, in January 2021, the protocol was affected by EU efforts to control the export of COVID-19 vaccines outside the bloc. Concerned that Northern Ireland would be a route to circumvent export controls and export vaccines to the UK, the EU initial y approved triggering an emergency override mechanism of the protocol that would have al owed the EU to block vaccine
exports to Northern Ireland.27 Invoking the mechanism could have resulted in border checks between Northern Ireland and Ireland. Although the EU almost immediately reversed itself amid a diplomatic outcry from UK, Irish, and Northern Ireland officials, the incident is widely viewed
as cal ing into question Northern Ireland’s post-Brexit arrangements.28
In March 2021, in response to a unilateral decision by the UK to extend the grace periods for regulatory checks on certain goods transferred between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK, the EU launched a formal process accusing the UK of breaching the withdrawal agreement.29 If not resolved by negotiation, the process could end up in the CJEU for a ruling or move to binding
arbitration under the dispute settlement mechanism of the withdrawal agreement. A ruling against the UK in either forum could result in a financial penalty. If the EU determines that the process has failed to bring the UK into compliance with the withdrawal agreement, it could suspend some of its obligations under the agreement, suspend parts of the TCA (and impose tariffs on the UK),
or delay a decision on financial services equivalency.30
24 Sylvia de Mars, Brexit Next Steps: The Court of Justice of the EU and the UK, House of Commons Library, February 7, 2020. 25 Sam Lowe, The EU-UK Trade and Co-operation Agreement: A Platform on Which to Build?, Centre for European Reform, January 12, 2021.
26 Jess Sargeant and Maddy T himont Jack, Northern Ireland Protocol: Agreement in the UK–EU Joint Committee, Institute for Government, December 14, 2020.
27 John Campbell, “Brexit: EU Introduces Controls on Vaccines to NI,” BBC News, January 29, 2021. 28 David M. Herszenhorn and Jakob Hanke Vela, “EU Drops Irish Border Move in Plan to Curb Vaccine Exports,” Politico, January 30, 2021; and John Curtis, “ Northern Ireland Protocol: Article 16 and EU Vaccine Export Controls,” UK Parliament House of Commons Library, February 2, 2021.
29 European Commission, Withdrawal Agreement: Commission Sends Letter of Formal Notice to the United Kingdom for Breach of Its Obligations Under the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland , March 15, 2021. 30 John Campbell, “Brexit: EU Legal Action Imminent over UK Extension to Grace Periods,” BBC News, March 5, 2021; and Philip Blenkinsop, “Explainer: How the EU Will Respond to Britain’s Northern Ireland Move,” Reuters, March 5, 2021.
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Brexit and the UK Economy end of 2020 without an extension.13
The UK intends to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU, with the aim of concluding an agreement by the end of the transition period. Negotiations are also expected to address the numerous other areas related to the broader economic relationship, such as financial services regulation, environmental and labor standards, state aid, fisheries, transportation, and aviation. The extent to which the Johnson government intends to maintain regulatory alignment with the EU on many of these issues, or whether it seeks to diverge from EU regulations and set its own standards, is expected to be a key sticking point in negotiations on the trade and economic relationship.14 Beyond trade and economic relations, negotiations on the future UK-EU relationship are expected to seek a comprehensive partnership covering issues including security and defense, foreign policy, energy, judicial and law enforcement cooperation, and data sharing.
Officials and analysts have expressed doubts that such comprehensive negotiations can be concluded within an 11 month period.15 The two sides could temporarily address some areas, such as road transportation and aviation, through side deals granting interim provisions. Although the UK and EU opened talks in early March 2020, the spread of the Coronavirus Disease 2019, or COVID-19, has forced a pause in negotiations. In light of the pandemic, some analysts suggest that Prime Minister Johnson may be forced to seek an extension of the transition period.16
An outcome in which the transition period ends without an agreement on the UK-EU relationship could resemble many aspects of a no-deal Brexit; assessments of the potential impact of a no-deal Brexit, a scenario in which the UK exited the EU without a negotiated withdrawal agreement, concluded that it could have caused considerable disruption, with negative effects on the economy, trade, security, and other issues.17 Should the transition period end without a UK-EU FTA or other agreement on the future economic relationship, UK-EU trade and economic relations would be governed by World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.
The provisions of the revised protocol on Ireland-Northern Ireland are expected to take effect at the end of the transition period. Observers have questioned how exactly the revised protocol will be implemented, including where and how customs checks will take place.18 Such issues are to be decided by a joint committee (of UK and EU officials) during the transition period. Implementation is likely to remain a work in progress. Both parties seek to protect the Good Friday Agreement; the EU seeks to safeguard its single market, and the UK seeks to preserve its constitutional integrity.
UK Trade and Economy: Basic Facts The "service sector" accounts for approximately 80% of the UK's GDP. Trade with the EU: In 2018, trade with EU member countries accounted for approximately 49.4% of the UK's goods and services trade. Top 5 Export Destinations (2018): United States, Germany, Netherlands, France, Ireland. Top 5 Import Sources (2018): Germany, United States, Netherlands, China, France. Sources: UK Office for National Statistics; UK Department for International Trade, UK Trade in Numbers, September 2019. |
Many economists expressed concerns that Brexit would cause an economic shock that could leave the UK facing weaker economic growth, higher inflation, job losses, and depreciation of the
pound, with potentiallypotential y significant negative consequences for the U.S. and global economies.
Advocates of Brexit have maintained that such economic fears are greatly exaggerated and that, free from EU regulations, "Global Britain" will the UK wil be able to forge new trade relationships with dynamic,
emerging economies while remaining a preeminent international banking and financial center.
Although the most dire predictions appear to
UK Trade and Economy: Basic Facts
have subsided, concerns remain that Brexit will pose a long-term drag on the UK economy. Economic growth was approximately 1.4% in 2018 and 1.2% in 2019, the UK's lowest annual economic growth since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. Unemployment has remained low, at approximately 3.8% in 2019. Forecasts from late 2019 expected growth to be approximately 1.5% in 2020,19 but in March 2020, the Bank of England warned that the COVID-19 pandemic was likely to result in a sharp downturn.20
Observers have noted considerable unease among some of the many multinational corporations that have chosen the UK as their EU headquarters; these corporations continue to face uncertainty about the UK's trade and economic arrangements and the corresponding legal and regulatory frameworks. The uncertainty and potential risks of Brexit have led some such large companies to either move or consider moving their EU base, along with attendant jobs and capital, elsewhere. Of particular consequence, with half of the world's financial firms basing their European headquarters in London and employing one million people, is the loss of the UK's EU "passporting" rights, whereby a financial company incorporated in one member state can carry out activities in all other member states without establishing a separate entity or obtaining a separate authorization.21
The UK has emphasized a desire both to preserve the trade arrangements it currently has through EU agreements with approximately 70 countries by transitioning the deals to a bilateral basis and to negotiate new trade agreements with other international partners.22 The UK government has not conducted trade negotiations at the national level since transferring competence over a common commercial policy to the EU in 1973, but it has been building up the capacity of a new Department for International Trade created in 2016. During the transition period, the UK can negotiate trade deals, but it may not conclude or implement any such agreements until after any transition period has ended.
Brexit has forged opposing viewpoints about the potential trajectory of the UK'’s international influence in the coming years. The Conservative Party-led government has outlined a post-Brexit
vision of a Global Britain that benefits from increased economic dynamism; remains heavily engaged internationally international y in terms of trade, foreign policy, and security issues; maintains close foreign and security policy cooperation with both the United States and the EU; and retains "all “al the capabilities of a global power."23”33 Other observers contend that Brexit reduces the UK's ability is likely to reduce the
31 Economic statistics in this section are from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2021.
32 Annabelle Dickson, “Rishi Sunak T argets Corporations to Fill UK’s Coronavirus Black Hole,” Politico, March 3, 2021. 33 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Cabinet Office, and Prime Minister’s Office, Global Britain: Delivering on Our International Am bition, September 23, 2019, at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/global-britain-delivering-
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UK’s ability to influence world events and that, without the ability to help shape EU foreign policy, the UK will wil have less influence in the rest of the world.24
34 Rather than striving to be a “miniature great power,” one expert proposal suggests that the UK instead could sustain international influence by leveraging its strengths to act as a “broker of solutions” to a range of global chal enges.35 The UK has opportunities to assert an international leadership role post-Brexit, as it holds the Group of 7 (G7) presidency in 2021 and is expected to host the 2021 United
Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) in November.
NATO remains the preeminent transatlantic security institution, and in the context of Brexit, UK
leaders have emphasized their continued commitment to be a leading country in NATO. The UK has taken a strong role in efforts to deter Russian aggression. As part of NATO'’s Enhanced Forward Presence, the UK leads a multinational battlegroup in Estonia with 800 troopsapproximately 830 soldiers, augmented by 330 troopsapproximately 340 soldiers from France.2536 The unit is based in Tapa, about 100 miles from the Russian border. The UK additionally additional y contributes 140 troopspersonnel to the U.S.-led multinational battlegroup in Poland. The UK also remains a leading contributor to
Operation Resolute Support, the NATO-led training and assistance mission in Afghanistan, with 1,100
750 UK soldiers taking part as of February 2020.26
In 2019, the UK's defense expenditures were sixth-largest in the world2021.37
The UK has been a leading contributor to the international coalition formed in 2014 to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and maintains more than 1,000 personnel in the region in continued support of that mission.38 UK armed forces participating in coalition efforts against the Islamic State have conducted airstrikes (by Typhoon and Tornado aircraft and unmanned Reaper drones) and engaged in surveil ance, intel igence gathering, logistical support, and training of
Iraqi forces.
In 2020, the UK had the world’s fourth-largest military expenditure (behind the United States, China, and India), spending approximately $61.5 bil ion.39China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and India), approximately $54.8 billion.27 The UK is also one of nineten NATO
countries to meet the alliance'or exceed the al iance’s defense spending benchmark of 2% of GDP (according to NATO, the UK'’s defense spending was expected to be 2.322.14% of GDP in 2019).28
In February 2020, the UK government formally launched an Integrated Review of Security, Defense, Development, and Foreign Policy.29 The purpose of the review is to define the government's "ambition for the UK's role in the world and the long-term strategic aims for … national security and foreign policy"; examine how to work more effectively with allies; determine risks and threats likely to be faced over the coming decade and the capabilities needed to address them; identify necessary government reforms; and set out a plan for implementation and evaluation.30 Underpinning the report are continued commitments for the UK to maintain at least 2% of GDP on defense spending and 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) on international development aid and to maintain its nuclear deterrent. The report, expected to be released in late 2020, is to be compiled by a cross-government team, in consultation with nongovernment experts, reporting to the prime minister and the National Security Council.
A Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) published in 2015 committed the UK to maintaining a minimum defense spending level of 2% of GDP; increasing defense spending by 0.5% above inflation annually through 2021; increasing the budget for equipment acquisition over the ensuing 10 years (totaling £178 billion, or approximately $210 billion); and devoting considerably greater resources to the country's intelligence and security agencies.31 Among the acquisitions set out in the SDSR are 2 new aircraft carriers (HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales), 138 F-35s, new warships, and the renewal of the Trident nuclear deterrent. (With 65,000 tons displacement, the Queen Elizabeth class carriers are the largest ships ever built for the Royal Navy. By comparison, the new U.S. Gerald R. Ford class carriers have 100,000 tons displacement.) The SDSR was published in the wake of defense spending cuts over the period 2011-2015, taking place in the context of a broad national austerity program, which reduced the size of the armed forces by 17%.32 Experts assert that the cuts, combined with other associated decisions about personnel, equipment, and operational readiness, reduced the UK's conventional military combat capability by 20%-30%.33
Despite the subsequent recommitment to maintaining defense spending, the International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance 2020 concluded that the UK "will likely continue to struggle to fund its current capabilities, arrest a decline in personnel numbers, and manage the risk to its equipment-modernisation," notwithstanding a two-year £2.2 billion (approximately $2.6 billion) increase in the 2019 defense budget.34 2020).40 Annual defense spending increases since 2016 have sought to address concerns about declining UK military capabilities following several years of cuts that reduced the size of the armed forces and
their combat capabilities.
The UK government’s March 2021 Integrated Review document sets out ambitions for the UK to remain a world leader in security and defense issues, diplomacy and development, science and technology, cyber capabilities, and action to combat climate change.41 The strategic framework on-our-international-ambition and Jeremy Hunt, “ Britain Has Been Shaping the World for Centuries. T hat Won’t Change with Brexit,” Washington Post, March 28, 2019. 34 Reuters, “Britain to Become ‘Second Rate’ in the World After Brexit: EU’s T usk,” November 13, 2019 and Emilio Casalicchio, “UK Will Be ‘Diminished’ After Brexit, Rutte Warns T ory Leadership Hopefuls,” Politico, June 20, 2019. 35 Robin Niblett, Global Britain, Global Broker, Chatham House, January 11, 2021. 36 NAT O, “ NAT O’s Enhanced Forward Presence,” factsheet, March 2021. Also as part of NAT O’s Enhanced Forward Presence, the United States leads a multinational battlegroup in Poland, Canada leads in Latvia, and Germany leads in Lithuania.
37 NAT O, Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures, February 2021. 38 UK Government, UK Action to Combat Daesh, at https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/daesh/about. 39 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 23. 40 NAT O Public Diplomacy Division, Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2013-2020), March 16, 2021. 41 Cabinet Office, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, March 16, 2021, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy.
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provided in the Integrated Review portrays NATO as central to the UK’s efforts to address security chal enges, while also signaling an intention to pursue deeper engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. The document describes Russia as the “most acute direct threat to the UK” while framing China as a “systemic competitor.”42 The Integrated Review reversed a 2010 decision to reduce the UK’s nuclear warheads stockpile from a ceiling of 225 to 180 by the mid-2020s; the
UK now intends to increase its nuclear weapons stockpile to a ceiling of 260 warheads.43
Negative economic effects from Brexit or the COVID-19 pandemic, including a decline in the value of the pound, could exacerbate concerns about the UK'’s ability to maintain defense
spending, investment, and capabilities.
In November 2020, the UK government sought to al eviate such concerns with the announcement of a £16.5 bil ion (approximately $22.6 bil ion)
defense spending increase over the next four years.44
Counterterrorism Counterterrorism remains a national security priority for the UK. In the decade after four suicide bombers killedkil ed 52 people and injured more than 700 in central London on July 7, 2005,
authorities reportedly disrupted about 40 major terrorist plots against the UK.3545 Between 2017 and 2019, there were at least seven terrorist incidents in the UK perpetrated by Islamist extremists, including car and knife attacks in London and Manchester and a suicide bombing at a music concert in Manchester.46 As of March 2021, authorities reported that they had stopped 28 terrorist plots since 2017, although terrorism-related arrests in 2020 dropped to a nine-year low.47
UK counterterrorism authorities are reportedly monitoring approximately 3,000 potential suspects.48 In addition to violent Islamist extremism, far-right terrorism also hasmusic concert in Manchester.36 The capacity of the Islamic State terrorist group to direct or inspire attacks in Europe remains a top concern. Experts have estimated that approximately 850 people traveled from the UK to train or fight with the Islamic State or other terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq, and that approximately 425 such individuals have returned home.37 Like their European counterparts, UK officials have been reluctant to repatriate captured Islamic State fighters who are UK citizens.38 Far-right terrorism has also been a growing concern in the UK, following the murder of Member of Parliament Jo Cox in 2016 and an attack
on a mosque in London in 2017.
The UK adopted a new Counter-Terrorism and Security Act in 2015 that enhanced the country's ’s already relatively extensive body of counterterrorism legislation. Among other provisions, the act broadened the powers of police and border officials to confiscate the passports of terrorism suspects; introduced new powers to ban suspected terrorists with British passports from the
country; required mobile phone and internet service providers to retain data for use in terrorism investigations; and placed a new legal duty on relevant institutions (e.g., prisons, universities, schools, and mosques) to report extremism and develop policies to deal with radicals and
extremist speakers.39
49
In 2016, in response to concerns raised by civil liberty and privacy groups, the UK adopted a new Investigatory Powers Act intended to update the legal framework governing surveillance surveil ance activities and clarify authorization procedures, privacy constraints, transparency requirements,
42 Cabinet Office, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, p. 26. 43 Cabinet Office, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, p. 76. 44 BBC News, “What Has Happened to Army Spending and Size?,” March 22, 2021; and Andrew Chuter, “UK to Boost Defense Budget by $21.9 Billion. Here’s Who Benefits—And Loses Out,” DefenseNews, November 19, 2020. 45 Reuters, “UK Faces Biggest T errorism T hreat in Its History - T heresa May,” November 24, 2014. 46 Sky News, “T error In T he UK: T imeline Of Attacks,” February 2, 2020. 47 BBC News, “Covid-19: T hree UK T error Plots Foiled During Pandemic,” March 4, 2021. 48 BBC News, “UK T errorism T hreat Level Lowered to ‘Substantial,’” February 8, 2021. 49 See UK Home Office, Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, February 12, 2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/counter-terrorism-and-security-bill.
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activities and clarify authorization procedures, privacy constraints, transparency requirements, and other safeguards.40and other safeguards.50 Critics have brought legal challengeschal enges against the law, charging that it also granted the government sweeping new powers to collect and retain data and force technology
companies to share information.41
In February51
In 2019, the UK adopted the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act. The act includes provisions increasing the maximum penalty for certain offenses related to preparing a terrorist attack; updating the offense of downloading material useful to a terrorist to cover material that is viewed or streamed; and requiring those convicted of terrorism offenses to provide police with additional registry information after release.4252 In the context of the 2018 Skripal attack, in which
UK officials charge that Russian intelligenceintel igence operatives poisoned a Russian dissident and his daughter with a nerve agent in Salisbury, England, the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act grants authorities enhanced powers to stop and search individuals at ports and borders
suspected of carrying out hostile activity on behalf of a foreign country.
In February 2020, the UK adopted the Terrorist Offenders Act blocking the automatic early release of prisoners convicted of terrorism offenses.53 The legislation was prompted by a November 2019 terrorist attackterrorist attacks in November 2019 and February 2020 in London committed by a prior offenderoffenders who had been released after serving half his sentence.43from prison on parole.54 Prior to the new act, convicted terrorists had been automatically
automatical y released at a fixed point in their sentence with no parole board assessment or oversight.55 In May 2020, the UK introduced a new Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bil that would increase prison sentences for terrorism offenses and strengthen the government’s powers to
monitor convicted offenders after their release.56
U.S.-UK Relations The UK’s special relationshipoversight.44
The UK's "special relationship" with the United States has been a cornerstone of British foreign
policy, to varying degrees and with some ups and downs, since the 1940s. The UK is often is perceived to be thea leading allied al ied voice in shaping U.S. foreign policy debates, and observers assert that the UK'’s status as a close allyal y of the United States has often served to enhance its global influence. British support, in turn, has often helped add international credibility and weight to U.S. policies and initiatives, and the close U.S.-UK partnership has served common interests in
bodies such as the U.N., NATO, and other multilateral institutions.
The UK continues to look to the United States for close partnership and has sought to reinforce its U.S. ties following Brexit. Post-Brexit developments in relation to the UK's global role and influence are likely to have consequences for perceptions of the UK as either an effective or a diminished partner for the United States. President Trump has expressed a largely positive view of the UK and made his first official state visit there in June 2019 (he also visited in July 2018). Since 2016, President Trump has been outspoken in repeatedly expressing his support for Brexit.45 President Trump counts leading Brexit supporters, including Boris Johnson and Brexit Party leader Nigel Farage, among his personal friends.46 He publicly criticized Theresa May's handling of Brexit and stated during the most recent Conservative leadership race that Boris Johnson would "make a great prime minister."47 President Trump repeated his support for Johnson prior to the December 2019 UK election and celebrated Johnson's win, writing on social media that the election outcome would allow the United States and UK to reach a new trade deal.48
At the same time, President Trump remains a highly controversial figure in the UK, and polls indicate that a large percentage of the British public views him negatively.49 There have been various tensions in the bilateral relationship over substantive policy differences between the UK government and the U.S. Administration and backlash from the UK side over several incidents and statements made by the President.50
During the Trump Administration, the United States and the UK have maintained close cooperation on major foreign policy issues, such as counterterrorism, combating the Islamic State, and seeking to deter Russian aggression. U.S.-UK divisions exist on several other key issues, however. Successive UK governments have’s global role and
50 See UK Home Office, Investigatory Powers Act, December 18, 2017, at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/investigatory-powers-bill.
51 BBC News, “Rights Group Loses Mass Surveillance Appeal In High Court,” July 28, 2019. 52 See UK Home Office, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill Given Royal Assent, February 12, 2019, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/counter-terrorism-and-border-security-bill-given-royal-assent.
53 UK Ministry of Justice, Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill, February 11, 2020, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/terrorist -offenders-restriction-of-early-release-bill. 54 Elian Peltier, “U.K. Promises Stronger T errorism Laws After Knife Attack by Convict,” New York Times, January 21, 2020.
55 BBC News, Jamie Grierson, “UK Freed 42 T errorists In Year Before Law T o Detain Extremists For Longer,” March 5, 2020.
56 UK Parliament, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill, March 16, 2021, at https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/2740 and UK Government, Counter Terrorism and Sentencing Bill Fact Sheet, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/886136/cts-factsheet.pdf.
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influence are likely to have consequences for perceptions of the UK as either an effective or a
diminished partner for the United States.
Former President Trump was outspoken in repeatedly expressing his support for Brexit and a
U.S.-UK trade deal.57 During the Trump Administration, the United States and the UK remained broadly aligned on many foreign policy and security concerns. The two countries maintained close cooperation, for example, on issues such as counterterrorism, combating the Islamic State, and seeking to end the conflict in Syria. Prime Minister Johnson also expressed support for the Trump Administration’s Middle East Peace Plan, reversing Theresa May’s earlier criticism of the
Administration’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.58
Despite the close relationship between President Trump and Prime Minister Johnson, however, there also were substantive U.S.-UK policy differences and backlash from the UK side over
various statements made by the former president.59 The UK government defended both the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement (known as the "Iran nuclear deal") and the Paris Agreement to combat climate change, for example,Agreement (known as the "Paris climate agreement") and disagreed with the Trump Administration'Administration’s decisions to withdraw the United States from those agreements.5160 UK officials have also expressed concerns about U.S. policies and lack of consultation in instances such as the
January 2020 U.S. strike that killedkil ed Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in Iraq and U.S. troop
withdrawals in advance of Turkey’s October 2019 military operation in northern Syria.61
UK policy toward Chinese telecommunications equipment company Huawei was a target of U.S.
advocacy during the Trump Administration. In Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in Iraq and the October 2019 Turkish incursion into Syria.52
Despite the close relationship between President Trump and Prime Minister Johnson, there are no clear indications that a post-Brexit UK might reverse course on either the Iran nuclear deal or climate change to align with the views of the Trump Administration.53 Additionally, in January 2020, the UK government announced that it would al owit would allow Chinese telecom equipment company Huawei to build parts of the UK's 5G cellular’s 5G cel ular network, despite U.S. callscal s to boycott Huawei due to security risks.62 The UK position on Huawei moved toward a stricter ban over the course of 2020, however. Following new U.S. sanctions against Huawei in May 2020, the UK government announced in July 2020 that UK telecommunications providers should cease
to procure any new equipment from Huawei after the end of 2020 and remove al Huawei equipment from 5G networks by the end of 2027.63 In November 2020, the UK announced that no
57 Sam Levin, “Donald T rump Backs Brexit, Saying UK Would Be ‘Better Off’ Without EU,” Guardian, May 5, 2016 and Justin Wise, “T rump Says He Supports UK Leaving EU Without a Brexit Deal,” The Hill, June 2, 2019. 58 Rowena Mason, “Boris Johnson Praises T rump’s Middle East Peace Plan at PMQs,” Guardian, January 29, 2020. 59 See, for example, Alexander Smith, “T rump Is So Unpopular in the U.K. T hat Some Are Lining Up for a Fight,” NBC News, December 3, 2019; BBC News, “ Sir Kim Darroch: UK Ambassador to US Resigns in T rump Leaks Row,” July 10, 2019; Peter Baker, “Trump Renews Feud with London Mayor, Calling Him a ‘Disaster,’” New York Times, June 15, 2019; T om Embury-Dennis, “ UK Government’s Spy Agency Condemns T rump Statement as ‘Utterly
Ridiculous’ and Says President ‘Should Be Ignored,’” Independent, April 23, 2019; Guy Faulconbridge, “T rump Says He ‘Would Apologize’ for Sharing British Far-Right Videos,” Reuters, January 26, 2018; and Karla Adam and Jennifer Hassan, “T rump Blames ‘Bad Deal’ for London T rip Cancellation. But Brits T hink T hey Scared Him Away,” Washington Post, January 12, 2018.
60 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Foreign Secretary’s Statement on the Iran Nuclear Deal Following Brussels Meeting, January 11, 2018; and Rob Merrick, “ T heresa May Rebukes Donald T rump For Pulling Out of Paris Agreement,” Independent, September 20, 2017. 61 Mark Landler, “Boris Johnson’s Balancing Act with T rump and Europe on Iran” New York Times, January 6, 2020; and Dan Sabbagh, “UK Voices Concerns over a T urkish Invasion of Kurdish -Run Syria,” Guardian, October 8, 2019. 62 Jack Arnholz, “US Senators Urge UK to Boot T ech Giant Huawei from 5G Deal,” ABC News, March 4, 2020; BBC News, “ Huawei: US ‘to Work with’ UK over Chinese Firm,” January 30, 2020; and Max Colchester, “ U.K. Allows Huawei to Build Parts of 5G Network, Defying T rump,” Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2020. 63 Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, Factsheet 5: Policy Context and Background, November 24, 2020, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/telecommunications-security-bill-factsheets/factsheet-5-policy-context -and-background.
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Huawei equipment could be instal ed after September 2021 (i.e., equipment that was purchased
and stockpiled prior to the end of 2020).64
President Biden and top officials in the Biden Administration maintain a skeptical view of
Brexit.65 (Prior to the 2016 Brexit referendum, then-President Obama conveyed his perspective that the UK leaving the EU was not in the U.S. interest.)66 President Biden also has expressly stated the position that Brexit must not harm the Good Friday Agreement, and that any U.S.-UK free trade agreement is contingent on avoiding the establishment of a hard border on the island of
Ireland.67
The U.S. presidential transition from President Trump to President Biden caused some advocates of close U.S.-UK ties to express anxiety about the relationship.68 There have been some concerns in the UK that Prime Minister Johnson’s close relationship with former President Trump, as wel
as past comments about former President Obama, might hurt his standing with the Biden Administration.69 Some observers suggest that the Biden Administration is likely to place relatively strong emphasis on seeking to renew U.S.-EU ties, and that relations with the post-Brexit UK, including a trade deal, may not be a top U.S. priority.70 Nevertheless, President Biden and Prime Minister Johnson have conveyed an intention to establish a pragmatic working
relationship, and analysts suggest the two leaders are likely to move any personal differences
aside and find common ground for cooperation on numerous issues.71
The Johnson government is likely to miss the Trump Administration’s strong support for Brexit
and a U.S.-UK free trade agreement, but the Biden Administration’s emphasis on al iances and multilateralism, maintaining international norms, and combatting climate change appear more aligned with UK foreign policy preferences.72 The Biden Administration’s decision to rejoin the Paris Agreement appears to offer a particular opportunity for U.S.-UK cooperation, as Prime Minister Johnson seeks to promote ambitious climate policies and highlight UK leadership on
climate issues.73 Combatting the COVID-19 pandemic, potential y reengaging in diplomacy with Iran, and addressing a range of chal enges posed by China are likely to be additional focal points for U.S.-UK cooperation. Following the April 2021 announcement that U.S. forces would withdraw from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021, the UK joined al the NATO al ies in
64 BBC News, “Huawei Ban: UK to Impose Early End to Use of New 5G Kit,” November 30, 2020. 65 Vincent Wood, “Biden’s Secretary of State Pick Compared Brexit to ‘A Dog Being Run over by a Car,’” The Independent, November 24, 2020; and U.S. Embassy in Ireland, Rem arks by the Vice President to the Irish People, June 24, 2016, at https://ie.usembassy.gov/vice-president -biden-speech-dublin-castle/. 66 T om McT ague, “9 T akeaways from Barack Obama’s Brexit Intervention,” Politico, April 22, 2016. 67 George Parker and Katrina Manson, “Joe Biden Warns Boris Johnson Not to Let Brexit Upend Northern Ireland Peace Process,” Financial Tim es, November 9, 2020. 68 Mo Abbas, “Britain Courted T rump. T he Biden Era May Be a More ‘Challenging T ime,’” NBC News, February 13, 2021.
69 George Parker, Jasmine Cameron-Chileshe, and Katrina Manson, “Boris Johnson on Back Foot as UK T ries to Reset Relationship with US,” Financial Times, January 15, 2021. 70 Ryan Heath, “Britain Braces for Not -So-Special Relationship with Biden,” Politico, December 31, 2020. 71 James Politi, “Biden T alks Up T ransatlantic T ies in First Call with Boris Jo hnson,” Financial Times, January 23, 2021; and Jon Allsop, “Why Boris Johnson Won’t Clash with Joe Biden,” Foreign Policy, January 20, 2021. 72 Melissa Quinn, “British PM Boris Johnson Welcomes “Incredibly Encouraging” Early Moves from Biden,” CBS News, February 14, 2021.
73 Danielle Sheridan and Asa Bennett, “Britain Has a ‘Responsibility’ to Lead the Charge on Climate Change, Boris Johnson Says,” The Daily Telegraph, February 4, 2020.
Congressional Research Service
16
The United Kingdom: Background, Brexit, and Relations with the United States
deciding to begin withdrawing their remaining forces from Afghanistan by May 1, 2021, and to
complete the drawdown of al forces from the country within several months.74
Security and Defense Relations U.S. defense planners have long viewed the UK as one of the most capable European al ies—if not the most capable, alongside France—in terms of wel -trained combat forces and the ability to deploy them. Observers note that the United States and the UK have long tended to have similar outlooks on issues such as the use of force, the development of military capabilities, and the role
of NATO. Analysts believe that close U.S.-UK cooperation wil boycott Huawei due to security risks.54 Some observers note that on such issues, and despite Brexit, UK foreign policy positions remain closer to those of its former EU partners than the United States. On the other hand, Prime Minister Johnson has expressed support for the Middle East Peace Plan announced by the Trump Administration in January 2020, reversing May's earlier criticism of the Administration's recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital.55
The UK and the United States have a particularly close defense relationship and a unique intelligence-sharing partnership. U.S. defense planners have long viewed the UK as one of the most capable European allies—if not the most capable, alongside France—in terms of well-trained combat forces and the ability to deploy them. Observers note that the United States and the UK have long tended to have similar outlooks on issues such as the use of force, the development of military capabilities, and the role of NATO. Analysts believe that close U.S.-UK cooperation will continue for the foreseeable future in areas such as counterterrorism, intelligence, and the future of NATO, as well as numerous global and regional security challenges.
Despite consternation in the UK about U.S. troop withdrawals in advance of Turkey's October 2019 military operation in northern Syria, analysts also expect the UK to remain a key U.S. partner in operations to combat the remaining elements of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. UK armed forces participating in U.S.-led coalition efforts against the Islamic State have conducted airstrikes (by Typhoon and Tornado aircraft and unmanned Reaper drones) and engaged in surveillance, intelligence gathering, logistical support, and training of Iraqi forces.
The UK hosts about 9,500 U.S. military personnel as well as airbases, equipment, radar sites, and intelligence centers. The U.S. Air Force plans to increase personnel at RAF Lakenheath, the largest U.S. base in the UK with approximately 5,500 personnel and home to an F-15 fighter wing, in anticipation of basing two squadrons of F-35s there by 2021.
A 1958 U.S.-UK Mutual Defense Agreement established unique cooperation with regard to nuclear weapons, allowing for the exchange of scientific information and nuclear material. Additionally, since the signing of the 1963 U.S.-UK Polaris Sales Agreement, the United States has sold the UK equipment and associated services for a submarine-launched strategic weapons delivery system. The UK's nuclear deterrent consists of several Vanguard class submarines, each armed with up to 16 Trident missiles.
The United Kingdom and the United States are key partners in terms of defense industry cooperation and defense sales. The two countries are engaged in more than 20 joint equipment programs, including the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Most major U.S. defense companies have a UK presence; numerous British companies, most notably BAE Systems, operate in the United States. British defense companies' U.S. operations tend to be part of a larger supply chain, with sales consisting mostly of components and niche equipment rather than entire platforms.
In 2007, in an effort to address long-standing British concerns about U.S. technology-sharing restrictions and export controls, the countries signed a Treaty Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation.56 The treaty eliminates individual licensing requirements for certain defense articles and services controlled under the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations. The agreement is reciprocal and is intended to cover defense equipment for which the U.S. and UK governments are the end-users. It also calls for the creation of "approved communities" of companies and individuals in each country with security clearances to deal with technological transfers.
While maintaining close defense cooperation with the UK, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about UK defense spending and reductions in the size and capabilities of the British military in recent years.57
Most analysts and officials agree that U.S.-UK intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation is close, well established, and mutually beneficial. UK agencies routinely cooperate with their U.S. counterparts in sharing information, and U.S. and British law enforcement and intelligence agencies regularly serve as investigative partners. The United States and the UK also cooperate through the Five Eyes partnership, an intelligence alliance that includes Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Although many of the details and achievements remain secret, U.S.-UK intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation reportedly has disrupted multiple terrorist operations against both countries in recent years, including a series of major plots in the decade following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.58 In a January 2020 visit to the UK, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo asserted that U.S.-UK intelligence cooperation would continue despite past suggestions by U.S. officials that including Huawei equipment in the UK's mobile network could result in limitations on intelligence sharing.59
The U.S.-UK bilateral investment relationship is the largest in the world. In 2018 (latest data available), U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in the UK was $758 billion, and UK FDI in the United States was $561 billion.61 U.S.-based affiliates of UK-owned companies employed approximately 1.2 million U.S. workers in 2018, and UK-based affiliates of firms employed 1.5 million people in the UK.62 The UK is also a major U.S. trading partner. In 2018, U.S. exports of goods and services to the UK were worth $140.8 billion, and U.S. imports of goods and services from the UK were worth $122.1 billion.63
President Trump has repeatedly indicated he favors reaching a U.S.-UK FTA quickly. Some Members of Congress also have backed negotiating an FTA with the UK. On October 16, 2018, the Trump Administration formally notified Congress under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) of its intent to enter into negotiations with the UK on a bilateral trade agreement. Some experts view a U.S.-UK FTA as relatively easy to conclude, given the two countries' close relationship and broadly similar outlooks with regard to trade. Others suggest that a number of obstacles and concerns on both sides could make negotiations on a comprehensive FTA more difficult and prolonged than proponents suggest.64
Many Members of Congress have supported the Northern Ireland peace process for decades. Over the last several years, congressional hearings have focused on the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, policing reforms, and human rights in Northern Ireland. Some Members have been interested in the status of public inquiries into several past murders in Northern Ireland in which collusion between the security forces and paramilitary groups is suspected. Some Members also urged the Trump Administration to name a special envoy for Northern Ireland to signal continued U.S. commitment to the region; in March 2020, President Trump appointed then-acting White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney to the position.66
Some Members of Congress have demonstrated an interest in how Brexit might affect Northern Ireland and expressed continued support for the Good Friday Agreement. Although many Members back a future U.S.-UK FTA post-Brexit, some Members also have tied their support to protecting the Northern Ireland peace process.67 On December 3, 2019, the House passed H.Res. 585, reaffirming support for the Good Friday Agreement in light of Brexit and asserting that any future U.S.-UK trade agreement and other U.S.-UK bilateral agreements must include conditions to uphold the peace accord. Other Members of Congress have not directly tied their support for a bilateral U.S.-UK FTA to protecting Northern Ireland post-Brexit.68
The UK is likely to remain a strong U.S. partner, and Brexit is unlikely to cause a dramatic makeover in most aspects of the U.S.-UK relationship. Analysts believe that close U.S.-UK cooperation will continue for the foreseeable future in areas such as counterterrorism, intelligence, economic issuesintel igence, and the future of NATO, as well as on numerous global and regional security challenges. NATO remains the preeminent transatlantic security institution, and UK leaders have indicated their continued commitment as a leading country in NATO. UK officials have emphasized that Brexit does not entail a turn toward isolationism and that the UK intends to remain a global leader in international diplomacy, security issues, trade and finance, and development aid.
The future of the relationship still faces a number of broad concerns and uncertainties. As discussed above, observers hold differing views as to whether Brexit will ultimately reinvigorate or diminish the UK's global power and influence in foreign policy, security, and economic issues. UK officials have also had concerns about the direction of U.S. foreign policy during the Trump Administration, including with regard to views toward NATO and multilateralism, as well as a lack of consultation and coordination in a number of decisions. In January 2020, UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace expressed the view that the UK may be forced to rethink the assumption that its armed forces would always fight as part of a U.S.-led coalition, and that the upcoming UK defense review should be used to make the UK less dependent on U.S. assets.69
Brexit could have a substantial impact on U.S. strategic interests in relation to Europe and with respect to possible implications for future developments in the EU. With the UK commonly regarded as the strongest U.S. partner in the EU, a partner that commonly shares U.S. views, and an essential voice in efforts to develop stronger EU foreign and defense policies, some U.S. officials have conveyed concerns that the UK's withdrawal could make the EU a less capable and less reliable partner on foreign policy and security issues.
Brexit appears to be a factor in prompting the EU to place renewed emphasis on moving ahead with developing shared capabilities and undertaking military integration projects under the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). In the past, the UK has irritated some of its EU partners by essentially vetoing initiatives to develop a stronger CSDP, arguing that such efforts duplicate and compete with NATO. In recent years, U.S. officials generally have supported EU initiatives aimed at increasing European defense capabilities; but they continue to urge that such efforts do not duplicate or compete with NATO activities and warn against excluding U.S. industry from participating in EU defense projects.70
More broadly, U.S. officials have long urged the EU to move beyond what is often perceived as a predominantly inward focus on treaties and institutions, in order to concentrate more effort and resources toward addressing a wide range of shared external challenges (such as terrorism and instability to Europe's south and east). Some observers note that Brexit has pushed Europe back into another prolonged bout of internal preoccupation, consuming a considerable degree of UK and EU time and personnel resources in the process.
The COVID-19 pandemic in the UK, Europe, and the United States since March 2020 appears likely to overtake all previous concerns in terms of scale and urgency. The societal and economic effects of the pandemic appear likely to become the predominant global challenge for the near-term future.
Author Contact Information
Acknowledgments
The author thanks CRS Visual Information Specialists Mari Lee and Brion Long and CRS Geospatial Information Systems Analyst Calvin DeSouza for their work in creating the graphics for this report.
1. |
Theresa May became prime minister in July 2016, after David Cameron resigned in the wake of leading the unsuccessful campaign for the United Kingdom (UK) to remain in the European Union (EU). She remained prime minister at the head of a minority government after the Conservative Party lost its parliamentary majority in an early election held in June 2017. |
2. |
The arrangement was not a formal coalition but rather a "confidence and supply" arrangement allowing the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) certain concessions in return for its support in passing the budget and backing the government in any no-confidence votes, with legislation supported on a case-by-case basis. |
3. |
"General election 2019: Blair attacks Corbyn's 'comic indecision' on Brexit," BBC News, December 18, 2019. |
4. |
Severin Carrell, "Sturgeon demands Scottish independence referendum powers after SNP landslide," Guardian, December 13, 2019. |
5. |
Chris Morris, "What is the Withdrawal Agreement Bill?," BBC News, January 23, 2020. Also see Parliament website, European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, at https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2019-20/europeanunionwithdrawalagreement.html. |
6. |
Council of the European Union, Brexit: Council Adopts Decision to Conclude the Withdrawal Agreement, January 30, 2020. |
7. |
For additional background information about Brexit, including additional information on trade issues and Northern Ireland, see CRS Report R45944, Brexit: Status and Outlook, coordinated by Derek E. Mix. |
8. |
The UK notified the EU by formally invoking Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, the legal mechanism under which a member state may withdraw from the EU. |
9. |
See CRS Report R46259, Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests, by Kristin Archick. |
10. |
See Office of the Prime Minister, Commitments to Northern Ireland, December 8, 2017. |
11. |
Department for Exiting the EU, New Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, October 19, 2019, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-withdrawal-agreement-and-political-declaration (hereafter cited as Department of Exiting the EU, New Withdrawal Agreement). |
12. |
Department for Exiting the EU, New Withdrawal Agreement. |
13. |
Alasdair Sandford, "What Has Changed With Boris Johnson's New Brexit Bill?" Euronews, December 20, 2019. |
14. |
George Parker and Jim Brunsden, "UK and EU Set to Table Competing Draft Trade Deals," Financial Times, March 9, 2020. See also Sam Lowe, The Future EU-UK Relationship and the (Relative) Case for Optimism, Centre for European Reform, March 2, 2020. |
15. |
William James and Marc Jones, "'Basically Impossible' to Agree Full EU-UK Deal by Year End: EU Head," Reuters, January 8, 2020. |
16. |
Amanda Sloat, Brexit Is Not Immune To Coronavirus, Brookings Institution, March 26, 2020. |
17. |
In September 2019, a parliamentary motion forced the UK government to publish a secret document outlining its planning assumptions for a no-deal Brexit. Among other possibilities, the document discussed border delays for travelers and transport services; a potential decrease in the availability of certain types of fresh food; price increases for food, fuel, and electricity; disruption in the supply of medicines and medical supplies; and a potential rise in public disorder and community tensions. Government officials stressed that the document represented "reasonable worst case planning assumptions" rather than a base scenario. See Cabinet Office, Government Response to Humble Address Motion, September 11, 2019 and The UK in a Changing Europe, No Deal Brexit: Issues, Impacts, Implications, September 4, 2019. |
18. |
Tony Connelly, "EU and UK are Poles Apart on the Irish Protocol," RTÉ News, February 15, 2020. |
19. |
Economic statistics are from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2019. |
20. |
Chris Giles and Valentina Romei, "Bank Of England Warns Of 'Very Sharp' Economic Downturn," Financial Times, March 26, 2020. |
21. |
Sam Fleming et al., "Can the UK and EU Reach a Compromise on Financial Services?," Financial Times, February 11, 2020. Also see European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Brexit: The United Kingdom and EU Financial Services, December 9, 2016. |
22. |
Overall, a 2017 analysis by the Financial Times found that Brexit would test the UK's bureaucratic capacity with the need to renegotiate 759 separate international agreements with over 160 countries (including 295 agreements related to trade, 202 on regulatory cooperation, 69 on fisheries, 65 on transport, 49 on customs, 45 on nuclear issues, and 34 on agriculture). See "After Brexit: The UK Will Need to Renegotiate At Least 759 Treaties," Financial Times, May 30, 2017. |
23. |
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Cabinet Office, and Prime Minister's Office, Global Britain: Delivering on Our International Ambition, September 23, 2019, at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/global-britain-delivering-on-our-international-ambition and Jeremy Hunt, "Britain Has Been Shaping the World for Centuries. That Won't Change with Brexit," Washington Post, March 28, 2019. |
24. |
Emilio Casalicchio, "UK Will Be 'Diminished' After Brexit, Rutte Warns Tory Leadership Hopefuls," Politico, June 20, 2019, and "UK to Lose Global Influence After Brexit - Lord Hague," BBC News, July 6, 2017. |
25. |
NATO, "NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence," factsheet, October 2019. Also as part of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence, the United States leads a multinational battlegroup in Poland, Canada leads in Latvia, and Germany leads in Lithuania. |
26. |
NATO, Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures, February 2020. |
27. |
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020, p. 21. |
28. |
NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2013-2019), November 29, 2019. |
29. |
See UK Parliament, Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy: Written Statement - HCWS126, February 26, 2020. Also see Peter Roberts, Britain's Integrated Defence and Security Review: Which Shibboleths?, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), February 13, 2020. |
30. |
UK Parliament, op. cit. |
31. |
HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-security-review-2015. |
32. |
UK Ministry of Defence, UK Defence Statistics Compendium 2014, November 27, 2014. |
33. |
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2016, pp. 68. |
34. |
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020, pp. 82. |
35. |
"UK Faces Biggest Terrorism Threat in Its History - Theresa May," Reuters, November 24, 2014. |
36. |
"Terror In The UK: Timeline Of Attacks," Sky News, February 2, 2020. |
37. |
"How Many IS Foreign Fighters Are Left In Iraq And Syria?," BBC News, February 20, 2019. |
38. |
H.J. Mai, "Why European Countries Are Reluctant To Repatriate Citizens Who Are ISIS Fighters," NPR, December 10, 2019. |
39. |
See UK Home Office, Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, February 12, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/counter-terrorism-and-security-bill. |
40. |
See UK Home Office, Investigatory Powers Act, December 18, 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/investigatory-powers-bill. |
41. |
"Rights Group Loses Mass Surveillance Appeal In High Court," BBC News, July 28, 2019. |
42. |
See UK Home Office, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill Given Royal Assent, February 12, 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/counter-terrorism-and-border-security-bill-given-royal-assent. |
43. |
Elian Peltier, "U.K. Promises Stronger Terrorism Laws After Knife Attack by Convict," New York Times, January 21, 2020. |
44. |
Jamie Grierson, "UK Freed 42 Terrorists In Year Before Law To Detain Extremists For Longer," BBC News, March 5, 2020. |
45. |
Sam Levin, "Donald Trump Backs Brexit, Saying UK Would Be 'Better Off' Without EU," Guardian, May 5, 2016 and Justin Wise, "Trump Says He Supports UK Leaving EU Without a Brexit Deal," The Hill, June 2, 2019. |
46. |
Steve Holland and Guy Faulconbridge, "Ahead of UK Visit, Trump Praises Brexit-Supporting 'Friends' Johnson and Farage," Reuters, May 30, 2019. |
47. |
Max Greenwood, "Trump: Boris Johnson Would 'Make a Great Prime Minister'," The Hill, July 12, 2019. |
48. |
Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump, Twitter, December 13, 2019. |
49. |
Alexander Smith, "Trump Is So Unpopular In The U.K. That Some Are Lining Up For A Fight," NBC News, December 3, 2019. |
50. |
See, for example, "Sir Kim Darroch: UK Ambassador to US Resigns in Trump Leaks Row," BBC News, July 10, 2019, Peter Baker, "Trump Renews Feud With London Mayor, Calling Him a 'Disaster'," New York Times, June 15, 2019, Tom Embury-Dennis, "UK Government's Spy Agency Condemns Trump Statement as 'Utterly Ridiculous' and Says President 'Should Be Ignored'," Independent, April 23, 2019, Guy Faulconbridge, "Trump Says He 'Would Apologize' for Sharing British Far-Right Videos," Reuters, January 26, 2018, and Karla Adam and Jennifer Hassan, "Trump Blames 'Bad Deal' For London Trip Cancellation. But Brits Think They Scared Him Away," Washington Post, January 12, 2018. |
51. |
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Foreign Secretary's Statement on the Iran Nuclear Deal Following Brussels Meeting, January 11, 2018. |
52. |
Mark Landler, "Boris Johnson's Balancing Act With Trump And Europe On Iran" New York Times, January 6, 2020 and Dan Sabbagh, "UK Voices Concerns Over A Turkish Invasion Of Kurdish-Run Syria," Guardian, October 8, 2019. |
53. |
Danielle Sheridan and Asa Bennett, "Britain Has a 'Responsibility' to Lead the Charge on Climate Change, Boris Johnson Says," The Daily Telegraph, February 4, 2020 and "UK Open to Broader Iran Deal That Tackles Destabilizing Behavior: Raab," Reuters, January 14, 2020. |
54. |
Jack Arnholz, "US Senators Urge UK To Boot Tech Giant Huawei From 5G Deal," ABC News, March 4, 2020, "Huawei: US 'To Work With' UK Over Chinese Firm," BBC News, January 30, 2020 and Max Colchester, "U.K. Allows Huawei to Build Parts of 5G Network, Defying Trump," The Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2020. |
55. |
Rowena Mason, "Boris Johnson Praises Trump's Middle East Peace Plan at PMQs," Guardian, January 29, 2020 and Prime Minister's Office, PM Statement on US Decision to Move Embassy to Jerusalem, December 6, 2017. |
56. |
The U.S. Senate passed a resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the treaty in 2010. The treaty is numbered 110-7. |
57. |
See, for example, Steven Erlanger, "Austerity-Battered U.K. 'Retreating Behind a Nuclear Shield,'" New York Times, April 27, 2019 and Ewen MacAskill, "US Defence Secretary Intervenes in UK Military Budget Row," Guardian, July 2, 2018. |
58. |
|
59. |
William James, "Pompeo backs 'Five Eyes' Intelligence Sharing Despite UK Decision On Huawei," Reuters, January 30, 2020. |
60. |
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF11123, Brexit and Outlook for U.S.-UK Free Trade Agreement, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and CRS Report R45944, Brexit: Status and Outlook, coordinated by Derek E. Mix. |
61. |
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data. |
62. |
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. |
63. |
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. |
64. |
Emre Peker and Jason Douglas, "Trump-Backed U.S.-British Trade Deal Faces Hurdles," Wall Street Journal, August 27, 2019. |
65. |
See CRS Report R46259, Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests, by Kristin Archick. |
66. |
U.S. Department of State, "Announcement of Mick Mulvaney as Special Envoy to Northern Ireland," press statement, March 11, 2020. |
67. |
In April 2019, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi reportedly said there would be "no chance whatsoever" for a U.S.-UK trade agreement if Brexit were to weaken the Northern Ireland peace process. Simon Carswell, "Pelosi Warns No US-UK Trade Deal if Belfast Agreement Weakened by Brexit," Irish Times, April 15, 2019. |
68. |
Senator Chuck Grassley, "Grassley Joins Colleagues in Letter Pledging to Back Britain After Brexit," press release, August 6, 2019. |
69. |
"Ben Wallace: UK 'Must Be Prepared To Fight Wars Without US'," BBC News, January 12, 2020. |
70. |
Valerie Insinna, "US Officials Threaten Retribution For European Union's Restrictions On Defense Fund," DefenseNews, June 19, 2019 and Aaron Mehta, "US Cautiously Watching EU Military Proposal," DefenseNews, February 13, 2018. |