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Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations
July 6, 2020
Occupying almost half of South America, Brazil is the fifth-largest and fifth-most-populous country in the world. Given its size and tremendous natural resources, Brazil has long had the
Peter J. Meyer
potential to become a world power and periodically has been the focal point of U.S. policy in
Specialist in Latin
Latin America. Brazil'’s rise to prominence has been hindered, however, by uneven economic
American Affairs
performance and political instability. After a period of strong economic growth and increased
international influence during the first decade of the 21st21st century, Brazil has struggled with a series of domestic crises in recent years. Since 2014, the country has experienced a deep
recession, record-high homicide rate, and massive corruption scandal. Those combined crises contributed to the controversial impeachment and removal from office of President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). They also discredited much of Brazil'’s political class, paving the way for right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro to win the presidency in October 2018.
Since taking office in January 2019, President Jair Bolsonaro has begun to implement economic and regulatory reforms favored by international investors and Brazilian businesses and has proposed hard -line security policies intended to reduce crime and violence. Rather than building a broad-based coalition to advance his agenda, however, Bolsonaro has sought to keep the electorate polarized and his political base mobilized by taking socially conservative stands on cultural issues and verbally attacking perceived enemies, such as the press, nongovernmental organizations, and other branches of government. This confrontational approach to governance has alienated potential allies within the conservative-leaning congress and hindered Brazil’s ability to address serious challenges, such as the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and
accelerating deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. It also has placed additional stress on the country’s already strained democratic institutions. With the novel coronavirus spreading rapidly throu ghout the country and the economy projected to contract 9.1% in 2020, Brazilians have taken to the streets both in opposition to, and in support of, Bolsonaro. According to a
poll conducted in late June 2020, 32% of Brazilians consider Bolsonaro’s performance in office “good” or “great,” 23%
consider it “average,” and 44% consider it “bad” or “terrible.”
In international affairs, the Bolsonaro Administration has moved away from Brazil’October 2018.
Brazil at a Glance Population: 210.7 million (2019 est.) Race/Ethnicity: White—47.7%, Mixed Race—43.1%, Black—7.6%, Asian—1.1%, Indigenous—0.4% (Self-identification, 2010) Religion: Catholic—65%, Evangelical Christian—22%, None—8%, Other—4% (2010) Official Language: Portuguese Land Area: 3.3 million square miles (slightly smaller than the United States) Gross Domestic Product (GDP)/GDP per Capita: $1.85 trillion/$8,797 (2019 est.) Top Exports: oil, soybeans, iron ore, meat, and machinery (2019) Life Expectancy at Birth: 76 years (2018) Poverty Rate: 11.2% (2017) Leadership: President Jair Bolsonaro, Vice President Hamilton Mourão, Senate President Davi Alcolumbre, Chamber of Deputies President Rodrigo Maia Sources: Population, race/ethnicity, religion, land area, and life expectancy statistics from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística; GDP estimates from the International Monetary Fund; export data from Global Trade Atlas; and poverty data from Fundação Getúlio Vargas. |
Since taking office in January 2019, President Bolsonaro has maintained the support of his political base by taking socially conservative stands on cultural issues and proposing hard-line security policies intended to reduce crime and violence. He also has begun implementing economic and regulatory reforms favored by international investors and Brazilian businesses. Bolsonaro's confrontational approach to governance has alienated many potential congressional allies, however, slowing the enactment of his policy agenda. Brazilian civil society groups also have pushed back against Bolsonaro and raised concerns about environmental destruction and the erosion of democratic institutions, human rights, and the rule of law in Brazil.
In international affairs, the Bolsonaro Administration has moved away from Brazil's traditional commitment to autonomy and toward alignment with the United States. Bolsonaro has coordinated closely with the Trump Administration on regional challenges such as the crisis in Venezuela. On other matters, such as commercial ties with China, Bolsonaro has adopted a pragmatic approach intended to ensure continued access to Brazil'’s major export markets. The Trump Administration has welcomed Bolsonaro'’s rapprochement and sought to strengthen U.S.-Brazilian relations. In 2019, the Trump Administration took steps to bolster bilateral cooperation on counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts and designated Brazil as a major non-NATO allymajor non-NATO ally. The United States and Brazil also agreed to several measures intended to facilitate trade and investment. Nevertheless, some Brazilians have questioned the benefits of partnership with the United States, as the Trump Administration has maintained certain import restrictions and threatened to impose tariffs on other key Brazilian products.
The 116thBrazilian analysts and former officials have questioned whether alignment with the United States is the most effective way to advance Brazil’s national interests.
The 116th Congress has expressed renewed interest in Brazil and U.S.-Brazilian relations. Environmental conservation has been a major focus, with Congress appropriating $15 million for foreign assistance programs in the Brazilian Amazon, including $5 million to address fires in the region, in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94). Likewise, Members introduced legislative proposals that would express support for Amazon conservation efforts (S.Res. 337337) and restrict U.S. defense and trade relations with Brazil in response to deforestation (H.R. 4263). Congress also has expressed concerns about the state of democracy and human rights in Brazil. A provision of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2020 (P.L. 116-92) directs) directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to submit a report to Congress regarding Brazil'’s human rights climate and U.S.-Brazilian security cooperation. Another resolution (H.Res. 594) would express concerns about threats to human rights, the rule of law, democracy , and the environment in Brazil.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 Brazil’s Political and Economic Environment ...................................................................... 3
Background .............................................................................................................. 3 Recession, Insecurity, and Corruption (2014-2018) ......................................................... 4 Bolsonaro Administration (2019-Present) ...................................................................... 6
Pandemic Response .............................................................................................. 7 Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law....................................................... 8
Economic Policy ................................................................................................ 10 Security Policy................................................................................................... 10
Amazon Conservation and Climate Change....................................................................... 11
Brazilian Policies and Deforestation Trends ................................................................. 12 Paris Agreement ...................................................................................................... 14
U.S.-Brazilian Relations................................................................................................. 15
Commercial Relations .............................................................................................. 17
Recent Trade Negotiations ................................................................................... 17 Trade and Investment Flows................................................................................. 19
Security Cooperation................................................................................................ 20
Counternarcotics ................................................................................................ 21 Counterterrorism ................................................................................................ 21
Defense Cooperation........................................................................................... 22
U.S. Support for Amazon Conservation....................................................................... 24
Outlook ....................................................................................................................... 25
Figures Figure 1. Map of Brazil .................................................................................................... 2 Figure 2. Confirmed Cases of COVID-19 ........................................................................... 8 Figure 3. Deforestation in Brazil’s Legal Amazon: 2004-2019 ............................................. 13 Figure 4. U.S. Trade with Brazil: 2008-2019 ..................................................................... 20
Contacts Author Information ....................................................................................................... 26
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Introduction
As the fifth-largest country and the ninth-
Brazil at a Glance
As the fifth-largest country and the ninth-largest economy in the world, Brazil plays an important role in global governance (see
Population: 211.6 mil ion (2020 est.)
an important role in global governance (see
Race/Ethnicity: White—47.7%, Mixed Race—43.1%,
Figure 1 for a map of Brazil). Over the past
Black—7.6%, Asian—1.1%, Indigenous—0.4% (Self-
20 years, Brazil has forged coalitions with
identification, 2010)
other large, developing countries to push
Religion: Catholic—65%, Evangelical Christian—22%,
for changes to multilateral institutions and
None—8%, Other—4% (2010)
to ensure that global agreements on issues
Official Language: Portuguese
ranging from trade to climate change
Land Area: 3.3 mil ion square miles (slightly smal er than
adequately protect their interests. Brazil
the United States)
also has taken on a greater role in
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)/GDP per Capita:
promoting peace and stability, contributing
$1.85 tril ion/$8,797 (2019 est.)
to U.N. peacekeeping missions and
Top Exports: oil, soybeans, iron ore, meat, and
other large, developing countries to push for changes to multilateral institutions and to ensure that global agreements on issues ranging from trade to climate change adequately protect their interests. Brazil also has taken on a greater role in promoting peace and stability, contributing to U.N. peacekeeping missions and mediating conflicts in South America and mediating conflicts in South America and
machinery (2019)
further afield. Although recent domestic challenges have led Brazil
Life Expectancy at Birth: 76 years (2018)
chal enges have led Brazil to turn inward
Poverty Rate: 11.0% (2018 est.)
to turn inward and weakened its appeal globally, the country continues to exert considerable influence on international policy issues that affect the United States.
U.S. policymakers have often viewed Brazil as a natural partner in regional and global affairs, given its status as a fellow global y, the
Leadership: President Jair Bolsonaro, Vice President
country continues to exert considerable
Hamilton Mourão, Senate President Davi Alcolumbre,
influence on international policy issues that
Chamber of Deputies President Rodrigo Maia
affect the United States.
Sources: Population, race/ethnicity, religion, land area, and life expectancy statistics from the Instituto
U.S. policymakers have often viewed
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística; GDP estimates
Brazil as a natural partner in regional and
from the International Monetary Fund; export data from Global Trade Atlas; and poverty data from
global affairs, given its status as a fel ow
Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Centro de Políticas Sociais.
multicultural democracy. Repeated efforts
multicultural democracy. Repeated efforts to forge a close partnership have left both countries frustrated, however, as their occasionallyoccasional y divergent interests and policy approaches have inhibited cooperation. The Trump Administration has viewed the 2018 election of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro as a fresh opportunity to deepen the bilateral relationship. Bolsonaro has begun to shift Brazil'’s foreign policy to bring the country into closer alignment with the United
States, and President Trump has designated Brazil a major non-NATO allymajor non-NATO ally. Nevertheless, ongoing differences over trade protections and relations with China threaten to leave both the United
States and Brazil with unmet expectations once again.
The 116th
The 116th Congress has expressed renewed interest in Brazil, recognizing Brazil'’s potential to affect U.S. initiatives and interests. Some Members view Brazil as a strategic partner for addressing regional and global challenges chal enges. They have urged the Trump Administration to forge stronger economic, security, and military ties with Brazil to bolster the bilateral relationship and counter the influence of extra-hemispheric powers, such as China and Russia.11 Other Members
have expressed reservations about a close partnership with the Bolsonaro Administration. They are concerned that Bolsonaro is presiding over an erosion of democracy and human rights in Brazil Brazil and that his environmental policies threaten the Amazon and global efforts to mitigate
1 See, for example, Letter from Senator Marco Rubio to President Donald J. T rump, December 20, 2019, at https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/e6199a08-c4d2-424b-9e48-676585575e34/035E152B8835E8734AA978266554751D.20191220 -letter-to-potus-re-brazil-.pdf.
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Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations
climate change.2climate change.2 Congress may continue to assess these differing approaches to U.S.-Brazilian relations as it carries out its oversight responsibilities and considers FY2021 appropriations and
other legislative initiatives.
Figure 1. Map of Brazil
Source: Map Resources. initiatives.
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS Graphics. |
Brazil declared independence from Portugal in 1822, initially initial y establishing a constitutional monarchy and retaining a slave-based, plantation economy. Although the country abolished slavery in 1888 and became a republic in 1889, economic and political power remained
concentrated in the hands of large rural landowners and the vast majority of Brazilians remained outside the political system. The authoritarian government of Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945) began the incorporation of the working classes but exerted strict control over labor as part of its broader push to centralize power in the federal government. Vargas also began to implement a state-led development model, which endured for much of the 20th20th century as successive governments
supported the expansion of Brazilian industry.
Brazil
Brazil experienced two decades of multiparty democracy from 1945 to 1964 but struggled with political and economic instability, which ultimately led the military to seize power. A 1964 military
military coup, encouraged and welcomed by the United States, ushered in two decades of authoritarian rule.33 Although repressive, the military government was not as brutal as the dictatorships established in several other South American nations. It nominally allowednominal y al owed the judiciary and congress to function during its tenure but stifled representative democracy and civic action, carefully preserving its influence during one of the most protracted transitions to
democracy to occur in Latin America. Brazilian security forces killed more than 8,000 indigenous people andkil ed at least 434 political dissidents
during the dictatorship, and they detained and tortured an estimated 30,000-50,000 others.4
Brazil 4
Brazil restored civilian rule in 1985, and a national constituent assembly, elected in 1986,
promulgated a new constitution in 1988. The constitution established a liberal democracy with a strong president, a bicameral congress consisting of the 513-member chamber of deputies and the 81-member senate, and an independent judiciary. Power is somewhat decentralized under the country'country’s federal structure, which includes 26 states, a federal district, and some 5,570 municipalities.
Brazil
municipalities.
Brazil experienced economic recession and political uncertainty during the first decade after its political transition. Numerous efforts to control runaway inflation failed, and two elected presidents did not complete their terms; one died before taking office, and the other was
impeached on corruption charges and resigned.
The situation began to stabilize, however, under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) of the
center-right Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, or PSDB). Initially Initial y elected on the success of the anti-inflation Real Plan that he implemented as finance minister under President Itamar Franco (1992-1994), Cardoso ushered in a series of market-oriented economic reforms. His administration privatized some state-owned enterprises, graduallygradual y opened the economy to foreign trade and investment, and adopted the three main pillars pil ars of Brazil'’s macroeconomic policy: a floating exchange rate, a primary budget surplus, and an
3 For information on U.S. policy prior to and following the coup, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, eds. David C. Geyer and David H. Herschler (Washington: GPO, 2004), Documents 181-244, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/ch5. 4 At least 8,350 indigenous Brazilians also were killed during the dictatorship, either directly by government agents or indirectly as a result of government policies. Ministério Público Federal, Procuradoria Federal dos Direitos do Cidadão, “PFDC Contesta Recomendação de Festejos ao Golpe de 64,” press release, March 26, 201 9; and Relatório da Com issão Nacional da Verdade, December 10, 2014, at http://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/.
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s macroeconomic policy: a floating exchange rate, a primary budget surplus, and an inflation-targeting monetary policy. Nevertheless, the Brazilian state maintained an influential
role in the economy.
The Cardoso Administration'’s economic reforms and a surge in international demand
(particularly from China) for Brazilian commodities—such as oil, iron, and soybeans—fostered a period of strong economic growth in Brazil during the first decade of the 21st21st century. The center-left Workers'’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT) administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula, 2003-2010) used increased export revenues to improve social inclusion and reduce inequality. Among other measures, the PT-led government expanded social welfare
programs and raised the minimum wage by 64% above inflation.55 Between 2003 and 2010, the Brazilian Brazilian economy expanded by an average of 4.1% per year and the poverty rate fell fel from 28.2% to 13.6%.66 The growth of the middle class fueled a domestic consumption boom that reinforced Brazil'Brazil’s economic expansion. Although the poverty rate initially initial y continued to decline under the PT-led administration of President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016)—reaching a low of 8.4% in
2014—socioeconomic conditions deteriorated during Rousseff'’s final two years in office.7
After nearly two decades of relative stability, Brazil has struggled with a series of crises since 2014. The country fell fel into a deep recession in late 2014, due to a decline in global commodity prices and the Rousseff Administration'’s economic mismanagement.88 Brazil'’s real gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 8.2% over the course of 2015 and 2016.99 Although Brazil emerged from recession in mid-2017, recovery has been slow. The economy expanded by just over 1% in 2017 and 2018, and unemployment, which peaked at 13.7% in the first quarter of 2017, has
remained above 1011% for nearly four years.1010 Largely due to the weak labor market, the real incomes of the bottom half of Brazilian workers have declined by 17% sincebetween the onset of the recession, pushing more than 6 million and mid-2019, pushing an estimated 6 mil ion people into poverty.1111 The downturn has disproportionately affected Afro-Brazilians, who comprise about halfcomprised an estimated 56% of the Brazilian population but 64% of the unemployed.12 in 2018.12 Large fiscal deficits at all al levels of government have exacerbated the
situation, limiting the resources available to provide social services.
The deep recession also has hindered federal, state, and local government efforts to address serious challengeschal enges such as crime and violence. A record-high 64,000 Brazilians were killed kil ed in 2017, and
5 Cristiano Romero, “O Legado de Lula na Economia,” Valor Online, December 29, 2010. 6 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database October 2019, October 11, 2019. T he poverty line is defined as the income necessary to cover basic expenses, such as food, clothing, housing, and transit. Marcelo Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Centro de Políticas Sociais, August 2019, p. 15. Hereinafter, Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade.
7 Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade. 8 Alfredo Cuevas et al., “An Eventful T wo Decades of Reforms, Economic Boom, and a Historic Crisis,” in Brazil: Boom , Bust, and the Road to Recovery, IMF, 2018; and Pedro Mendes Loureiro and Alfredo Saad-Filho, “ T he Limits of Pragmatism: T he Rise and Fall of the Brazilian Workers’ Party (2002-2016),” Latin American Perspectives, vol. 46, no. 1 (2019).
9 IMF, Staff Report for the 2018 Article IV Consultation, June 20, 2018. 10 IMF, “World Economic Outlook Database: October 2019,” October 11, 2019; and Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), “ PNAD Contínua: T axa de Desocupação é de 12,6% e T axa de Subutilização é de 25,6% no T rimestre Encerrado em Abril de 2020,” press release, May 28, 2020.
11 Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade, pp. 5, 15. 12 In 2018, 46.5% of Brazilians self-identified as mixed race and 9.3% self-identified as black. IBGE, Desigualdades Sociais por Cor ou Raça no Brasil, 2019, p. 2.
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in 2017, and the country'’s homicide rate of 30.9 per 100,000 residents was more than five times the global average. Although homicides declined by nearly 11% in 2018, feminicide (gender-motivated murders of women) and reports of sexual violence increased.1313 The deterioration in the security situation, like the economic crisis, has disproportionately affected Afro-Brazilians, who account for more than 75% of homicide victims, 75% of those killed by police, and 61% of feminicide victims.14
were the
victims of more than 75% of homicides and 61% of feminicides in 2017 and 2018.14
A series of corruption scandals have further discredited the country'’s political establishment. The so-calledcal ed Car Wash (Lava Jato) investigation, launched in 2014, has implicated politicians from across the political spectrum and many prominent business executives. The initial investigation revealed
that political appointees at the state-controlled oil company, Petróleo BrasileiroBrasileiro S.A. (Petrobras), colluded with construction firms to fix contract bidding processes. The firms then provided kickbacks to Petrobras officials and politicians in the ruling coalition. ParallelParal el investigations have discovered similar practices throughout the public sector, with businesses providing bribes and illegal il egal campaign donations in exchange for contracts or other favorable government treatment. The scandals sapped President Rousseff'’s political support, contributing to her controversial
impeachment and removal from office in August 2016.1515 Michael Temer, who presided over a center-right government for the remainder of Rousseff'’s term (2016-2018), was entangled in several corruption scandals but managed to hold on to power. Several other high-level politicians, including former President Lula, have been convicted for corruption and face potential yand face potentially lengthy
prison sentences (see the text box, below).
Lula’prison sentences (see the text box, below).
The inability of Brazil's political leadership to overcome these crises has undermined Brazilians' confidence in their democratic institutions. As of mid-2018, 33% of Brazilians expressed trust in the judiciary, 26% expressed trust in the election system, 12% expressed trust in congress, 7% expressed trust in the federal government, and 6% expressed trust in political parties. Moreover, only 9% of Brazilians expressed satisfaction with the way democracy was working in their country—the lowest percentage in all of Latin America.16
Lula's Imprisonment and Release s Imprisonment and Release
Brazilian prosecutors
Sources: Letter from |
Brazilian voters registered their intense dissatisfaction with the situation in the country in the 2018 elections. In addition to ousting 75% of incumbents running for reelection to the senate and 43% of incumbents running for reelection to the chamber of deputies, they elected as president, Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right congressman and retired army captain.1717 Prior to the election, most
observers considered Bolsonaro to be a fringe figure in the Brazilian congress. He exercised little influence over policy and was best known for his controversial remarks defending the country's ’s military dictatorship (1964-1985) and expressing prejudice toward marginalized sectors of Brazilian society.18Brazilian society.18 Backed by the small smal Social Liberal Party (PSL), Bolsonaro also lacked the finances and party machinery of his principal competitors. Nevertheless, his social media-driven campaign and populist, law-and-ordertough-on-crime message attracted a strong base of support. He outflanked
his opponents by exploiting anti-PT and antiestablishment sentiment and aligning himself with the few institutions that Brazilians still generally stil general y trust: the military and the churches.1919 Bolsonaro largely remained off the campaign trail in the weeks leading up to the election after being stabbed in an assassination attempt, but he easily defeated the PT'’s Fernando Haddad 55%-45% in a
second-round runoff. Bolsonaro'’s PSL also won the second-most seats in the lower house.
Since Bolsonaro began his four-year term on January 1, 2019, he has struggled to advance portions of his agenda due to cabinet infighting and the lack of a working majority in Brazil's ’s fragmented congress, which includes 24 political parties.2020 Whereas previous Brazilian presidents stitched together
stitched governing coalitions together by distributing control of government jobs and resources to parties in exchange for their support, Bolsonaro has refusedinitial y was unwil ing to enter into such arrangements. Moreover, he generallygeneral y has avoided negotiating the details of his proposed policies policy proposals with legislators. Instead, Bolsonaro has sought to keep his political base mobilized by frequently taking sociallytaking social y conservative stands on cultural issues and verballyverbal y attacking perceived enemies, such as
the press, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other branches of government.21 Bolsonaro's confrontational approach to governance has21 Bolsonaro’s attacks have grown more strident since March 2020, as he has faced widespread scrutiny over his erratic response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and his al eged attempts to interfere in law enforcement investigations to protect his family and al ies (see
“Pandemic Response” and “Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law,” below).
Bolsonaro’s confrontational approach to governance and recent scandals have alienated many of his potential alliesal ies within the conservative-leaning congress, as wel as some former supporters. . In November 2019, for example, Bolsonaro abandoned the PSL after a series of disagreements with the party's leadership; he intends to create a new Alliance In November 2019, for example, Bolsonaro abandoned the PSL after a series of disagreements 16 Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe 2018, November 2018. 17 Sylvio Costa and Edson Sardinha, “O que Você Precisa Saber para Entender o Novo Congresso Brasileiro,” Congresso em Foco, October 9, 2018.
18 See, for example, Brian Winter, “System Failure: Behind the Rise of Jair Bolsonaro,” Americas Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 1, (January 2018). 19 Matias Spektor, “It’s Not Just the Right T hat’s Voting for Bolsonaro. It ’s Everyone.” Foreign Policy, October 26, 2018. As of mid-2018, 58% of Brazilians expressed trust in the military and 73% expressed trust in the churches, according to Corporación Latinobarómetro.
20 Câmara dos Deputados, “Bancada Atual,” accessed in June 2020. 21 See, for example, Andres Schipani, “Brazil: Jair Bolsonaro Pushes Cult ure War over Economic Reform,” Financial Tim es, August 24, 2019; and Paulo T revisani, “ Brazil’s President Hits the Street, Railing Against the Media,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2020.
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with the party’s leadership; he intends to create a new Al iance for Brazil party to contest future elections. In May 2020, Bolsonaro reportedly began distributing government positions to several large patronage-based parties in an attempt to ward off impeachment.22 Although Bolsonaro appears to have sufficient congressional support to hold onto the presidency for the time being, he stil lacks a working majority to advance his policy agenda (see “Economic Policy” and “Security Policy,” below). Public opinion remains polarized, with Brazilians taking to the streets both in
opposition to, and in support of, Bolsonaro. According to a poll conducted in late June 2020, 32% of Brazilians consider Bolsonaro’s performance in office “good” or “great,” 23% consider it
“average,” and 44% consider it “bad” or “terrible.”23
Pandemic Response
Brazil’s federal health ministry recognized the COVID-19 pandemic as a public health
emergency of national importance on February 3, 2020—nearly a month before Brazil confirmed its first coronavirus infection. By mid-March, the Bolsonaro Administration had begun to close Brazil’s international borders and had cal ed on the Brazilian Congress to declare a state of public
calamity in order to free up resources to address the pandemic’s health and economic effects.
Since then, however, President Bolsonaro has consistently downplayed the threat posed by COVID-19. He has criticized Brazilian states and municipalities for imposing containment measures and has argued that restrictions on economic activity are more damaging than the virus itself. He has issued several decrees to overturn local restrictions, but these decrees have been
blocked in court. Bolsonaro has repeatedly flouted public health guidelines, wading into crowds of supporters without a mask, even as nearly two dozen top officials in his government have tested positive for the virus.24 Bolsonaro also has clashed with members of his own administration, dismissing one health minister and provoking the resignation of another, due to his opposition to social distancing measures and his promotion of chloroquine and
hydroxychloroquine—two antimalarial drugs that have yet to be proven effective for treating
COVID-19.25
To date, Brazil’s efforts to contain the virus have been unsuccessful. As of July 5, 2020, Brazil
had recorded more than 1.6 mil ion cases and nearly 65,000 deaths from COVID-19 (see Figure 2).26 An epidemiological study based on antibody tests suggests the total number of Brazilians who have been infected by the virus may be six times higher than the number of official y confirmed cases. The study also found significant regional, socioeconomic, and ethnic/racial disparities in infection rates. For example, 1.1% of self-identified white Brazilians tested positive
for antibodies, compared to 2.1% of Brazilians of Asian descent, 2.5% of black Brazilians, 3.1% of mixed-race Brazilians, and 5.4% of indigenous Brazilians.27 Although Brazil has one of the strongest public health systems in Latin America, hospitals have been overwhelmed in some 22 André Shalders, “Bolsonaro terá ‘Centrão’, mas Impeachment pode Avançar se houver Apoio Popular, Dizem Autores de Pedido,” BBC News Brasil, May 7, 2020. 23 Datafolha, “Bolsonaro é Reprovado por 44%,” June 26, 2020. 24 “Unsealed Exams Confirm Bolsonaro Did Not Catch COVID-19,” Valor International, May 13, 2020; and “Bolsonaro Rallies with Supporters Amid Virus Surge,” Agence France Presse, May 24, 2020. 25 Mauricio Savarese, “Brazil’s Health Minister Resigns After One Month on the Job,” Associated Press, May 15, 2020; and Ernesto Londoño and Mariana Simões, “Defying Science, Brazil’s Leader T rumpets Unproven ‘Cure’,” New York Tim es, June 14, 2020.
26 Ministério da Saúde do Brasil, “Painel Coronavirus,” July 6, 2020, at https://covid.saude.gov.br/. 27 Universidade Federal de Pelotas, Centro de Pesquisas Epidemiológicas, “EPICOVID19-BR Divulga Novas Resultados Sobre o Coronavírus no Brasil,” July 2, 2020.
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cities, and the virus is now spreading rapidly throughout the interior of the country.28 The politicization of the pandemic and the lack of coordination among different levels of government
may have contributed to the country’s ineffective response.
Figure 2. Confirmed Cases of COVID-19
(new cases by date reported [February 26, 2020 – July 5, 2020])
Source: CRS presentation of data from the Brazilian government’s Ministério da Saúde, “Painel Coronavirus,” July 6, 2020, at https://covid.saude.gov.br/.
Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law
Many analysts argue there has been an erosion of democracy in Brazil under Bolsonaro.29 Since taking office, the president has continued to celebrate Brazil’s military dictatorship, and his
sons—who play an influential role in his government—have questioned democracy and suggested authoritarian measures may be necessary in certain circumstances.30 Bolsonaro also has attended ral ies in which some of his supporters have cal ed on the military to close congress and
the supreme court.31
28 Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, Nuclear T hreat Initiative, and Economist Intelligence Unit, Global Health Security Index, 2019; and “ Cidades do Interior já Respondem por quase 60% dos Casos de Covid no País,” Folha de São Paulo, June 22, 2020. 29 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, Autocratization Surges – Resistance Grows: Democracy Report 2020, March 20, 2020; and “ Brasil está em Processo de Erosão, Dizem Brasilianistas,” Valor, June 12, 2020.
30 Rodrigo Borges Delfim and T hais Arbex, “Carlos Bolsonaro Diz que País Não T erá T ransformação Rápida por Vias Democráticas,” Folha de São Paulo, September 9, 2019; and “ Eduardo Bolsonaro Fala em Novo AI-5 ‘se Esquerda Radicalizar’,” UOL, October 31, 2019 31 T errence McCoy and Heloísa T raiano, “As Brazil’s Challenges Multiply, Bolsonaro’s Fans Call for a Military T akeover,” Washington Post, May 11, 2020.
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Civil-military relations have shifted as Bolsonaro has appointed retired and active-duty military officers to lead more than a third of his cabinet ministries and to approximately 3,000 other positions throughout the government.32 The Brazilian armed forces are now more involved in governance than they have been at any time since the end of the dictatorship. Although some analysts maintain that the officers have had a moderating influence on Bolsonaro, others are concerned about politicization of the armed forces. On several occasions, Bolsonaro and members
of his administration have appeared to suggest that the armed forces would back the president if
the Brazilian congress or judiciary sought to remove him from office.33
Bolsonaro also has exerted political influence over law enforcement agencies, potential y hindering investigations and cal ing into question the independence of Brazilian institutions. Minister of Justice and Public Security Sérgio Moro resigned in April 2020 after Bolsonaro dismissed the director-general of the Brazilian federal police, al egedly to push for certain appointments within the force and gain access to confidential information regarding ongoing investigations. Bolsonaro denied the al egations, but his newly appointed director-general
immediately replaced the head of the federal police office in Rio de Janeiro, which reportedly is investigating potential corruption and money laundering by two of Bolsonaro’s sons. The federal police also are investigating dozens of Bolsonaro’s political al ies—and reportedly at least one of his sons—for their al eged involvement in an il egal digital disinformation campaign.34 In addition to his federal police appointments, observers have questioned changes Bolsonaro has
made to Brazil’s tax collection agency, financial intel igence unit, and antitrust regulator, as wel as his decision to disregardelections.
During its first year in office, the Bolsonaro Administration began implementing key aspects of its market-oriented economic agenda. As part of a far-reaching privatization program, the Brazilian government began selling off assets, including subsidiaries of state-owned enterprises, stakes in private companies, and infrastructure and energy concessions, yielding revenues of approximately $66 billion in 2019.22 The Brazilian congress also enacted a major pension reform expected to reduce government expenditures by at least $194 billion over the next decade.23 Those policies build on a 2016 constitutional amendment that froze inflation-adjusted government spending for 20 years. Although the Bolsonaro Administration has proposed additional measures to simplify the tax system, cut and decentralize government expenditures, and decrease compensation and job security for government employees, political parties may be reluctant to enact austerity measures in the lead-up to Brazil's October 2020 municipal elections. The International Monetary Fund estimates that the Brazilian economy expanded by 1.2% in 2019 and will expand by 2.2% in 2020, due to improved business sentiment following recent market-oriented policy changes.24 About 11% of Brazilians remain unemployed,25 however, and some economists argue that rather than reducing the size of the state, Brazil should reorient expenditures to programs that protect the most vulnerable and to productivity-enhancing investments, such as education, training, and infrastructure.26
Bolsonaro has had difficulty advancing the hard-line security platform that was the centerpiece of his campaign. The Brazilian congress has blocked Bolsonaro's proposal to shield from prosecution police who kill suspected criminals and has pushed back against Bolsonaro's decrees loosening gun controls. Other Bolsonaro Administration proposals, including measures to modernize police investigations and impose stricter criminal sentences, were enacted in December 2019. Preliminary data suggest that security conditions in Brazil improved in 2019, but the number of individuals killed by police in states such as Rio de Janeiro increased significantly.27 The Bolsonaro Administration has claimed credit for falling crime rates, but some security analysts argue the situation has been improving since late 2017 due to state and municipal initiatives and reduced conflict between the country's largest criminal groups.28 (See the "Counternarcotics" section for more information.)
Anti-corruption efforts in Brazil have experienced a series of recent setbacks. Although President Bolsonaro campaigned on an anti-corruption platform, he has repeatedly interfered in law enforcement agencies, potentially hindering investigations and calling into question the political independence of Brazilian institutions. In August 2019, he dismissed the head of the Brazilian federal police office in Rio de Janeiro, which is investigating potential corruption and money laundering by Bolsonaro's son, Flávio. In September 2019, Bolsonaro disregarded a norm in place since 2003 of selecting an attorney general from a a norm in place since 2003 of selecting an attorney general from a
shortlist approved by the public prosecutors' association. Observers also have questioned changes Bolsonaro has made to Brazil's tax collection agency, financial intelligence unit, and antitrust regulator. At the same time, the Brazilian congress has been reluctant to adopt anti-corruption reforms and the supreme court has issued a series of rulings that could jeopardize convictions obtained in the Car Wash investigation and make it more difficult to investigate and prosecute corruption cases.29
Many analysts argue there has been an erosion of democracy in Brazil under Bolsonaro.30 During his first year in office, the president continued to celebrate Brazil's military dictatorship and those installed in other South American countries, and his sons and members of his administration occasionally suggested they could impose authoritarian measures under certain circumstances. Bolsonaro also took steps to weaken the press, exert control over civil society, and roll back rights previously granted to marginalized groups.31 Civil-military relations have shifted as Bolsonaro has appointed retired and active-duty officers to lead more than a third of his cabinet ministries and to dozens of other positions throughout the government. The Brazilian military is now more involved in politics than it has been at any time since the end of the dictatorship. Some analysts maintain, however, that the military has had a moderating influence on the government.32 Brazil's civil society, congress, and judiciary also have served as checks on Bolsonaro. Nevertheless, human rights advocates argue the president's statements and actions have fueled attacks against journalists and activists.33
Polls conducted at the conclusion of his first year in office suggest Brazilian public opinion toward Bolsonaro remains divided. About 32% of Brazilians consider Bolsonaro's government "good" or "great," 32% consider it "average," and 35% consider it "bad" or "terrible."34
A 30% increase in fires in the Brazilian Amazon in 2019 compared to the previous year led many Brazilians Brazilians and international observers to express concern about the rainforest and the extent to which its destruction is contributing to regional and global climate change.3548 Covering nearly 2.7 million
mil ion square miles across seven countries, the Amazon Basin is home to the largest and most biodiverse tropical forest in the world.3649 Scientific studies have found that the Amazon plays an important role in the global carbon cycle by absorbing and sequestering carbon. Although findings vary, one recent study estimated the forest absorbs 560 millionmil ion tons of carbon dioxide per year and its biomass holds 76 billion bil ion tons of carbon—an amount equivalent to seven years of
global carbon emissions.3750 The Amazon also pumps water into the atmosphere, affecting regional rainfall rainfal patterns throughout South America.3851 An estimated 17% of the Amazon basin has been deforested, however, and some scientists have warned that the forest may be nearing a tipping point at which it is no longer able to sustain itself and transitions to a drier, savanna-like ecosystem.39
ecosystem.52
45 “Número de Pessoas Mortas pela Polícia Cresce no Brasil em 2019; Assassinatos de Policiais Caem pela Met ade,” G1, Monitor da Violência, April 16, 2020; and Karina Nascimento, “ Principais Crimes Registraram Queda no Estado em 2019,” Governo do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Segurança Pública, January 21, 2020. 46 Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, “Violence Against Black People in Brazil,” infographic, 2019. 47 André Cabette Fábio, “A Queda da Criminalidade no Brasil. e o Discurso de Moro,” Nexo Jornal, January 6, 2020. 48 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE), “Monitoramento dos Focos Ativos por Bioma,” at http://queimadas.dgi.inpe.br/queimadas/portal-static/estatisticas_estados/. For more information on the fires, see CRS In Focus IF11306, Fire and Deforestation in the Brazilian Am azon , by Pervaze A. Sheikh et al.
49 Portions of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Venezuela are located in the Amazon Basin. T he rainforest extends beyond the Amazon Basin into Suriname and French Guiana. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Global International Waters Assessm ent: Am azon Basin, GIWA Regional Assessment 40b, Kalmar, Sweden, 2004, p. 15.
50 Edna Rödig et al., “T he Importance of Forest Structure for Carbon Fluxes of the Amazon Rainforest,” Environmental Research Letters, vol. 13, no. 5 (2018), p. 9; Hemholtz Centre for Environmental Research, “ The Forests of the Amazon Are an Important Carbon Sink,” press release, November 8, 2019; and Pierre Friedlingstein et al., “Global Carbon Budget 2019,” Earth System Science Data, vol. 11, no. 4 (2019), p. 1803. 51 D. C. Zemp et al., “Deforestation Effects on Amazon Forest Resilience,” Geophysical Research Letters, vol. 44, no. 12 (2017).
52 T homas Lovejoy and Carlos Nobre, “Amazon T ipping Point: Last Chance for Action,” Science Advances, vol. 5, no. 12 (2019).
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Efforts to conserve the forest often focus on Brazil, since the country encompasses about 69% of the Amazon Basin.4053 Within Brazil, the government has established an administrative zone known as the Legal Amazon, which includes nine states: Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima, and Tocantins (seeTocantins, and most of Maranhão (see Figure 1). Although rainforest covers most of the Legal Amazon, savanna (Cerrado) and wetlands (Pantanal) are present in portions of the region. The Legal Amazon was largely undeveloped until the 1960s, when the military-led
government began subsidizing the settlement and development of the region as a matter of national security. PartiallyPartial y due to those incentives, the human population in the Legal Amazon grew from 6 million mil ion in 1960 to 25 million mil ion in 2010. Forest cover in the Legal Amazon has declined by approximately 20% as settlements, roads, logging, ranching, farming, and other
activities have proliferated in the region.41
In 2004, the Brazilian government adopted an action plan to prevent and control deforestation in
the Legal Amazon.4255 It increased surveillancesurveil ance in the Amazon region, began to enforce environmental laws and regulations more rigorously, and took steps to consolidate and expand protected lands. Nearly 20% of the Brazilian Amazon now has some sort of federal or state protected status, and the Brazilian government has recognized an additional 22% of the Brazilian Amazon as indigenous territories.4356 Brazil'’s forest code also requires private landowners in the
Legal Amazon to maintain native vegetation on 80% of their properties.
Other Brazilian initiatives have sought to support sustainable development in the Amazon while limiting limiting the extent to which the country'’s agricultural sector drives deforestation. In 2008, the Brazilian
Brazilian government began conditioning credit on farmers'’ compliance with environmental laws; in 2009, the government banned new sugarcane plantations in the Legal Amazon. The Brazilian Brazilian government also supported private sector conservation initiatives. Those included a 2006 voluntary agreement among most major soybean traders not to purchase soybeans grown on lands deforested after 2006 (later revised to 2008) and a 2009 voluntary agreement among
meatpackers not to purchase cattle raised on lands deforested in the Amazon after 2008.
Brazil'
Brazil’s public and private conservation efforts, combined with economic factors that made agricultural commodity exports less profitable,4457 led to an 83% decline in deforestation in the
Legal Amazon between 2004 and 2012. Deforestation has been trending upward in recent years, however, rising from a low of 1,765 square miles in 2012 to 3,769911 square miles in the 12-month monitoring period that ended in July 2019 (seesee Figure 2)3). Analysts have linked the increase in deforestation to a series of policy reversals that have cut funding for environmental enforcement, reduced the size of protected areas, and relaxed conservation requirements.45 Market incentives, 58 Market incentives, 53 UNEP, Global International Waters Assessment: Amazon Basin, GIWA Regional Assessment 40b, Kalmar, Sweden, 2004, p. 16. 54 Eric A. Davidson et al., “ T he Amazon Basin in T ransition,” Nature, vol. 481 (2012), p. 321. 55 Presidência da República, Casa Civil, Plano de Ação para a Prevenção e Controle do Desmatamento na Amazônia Legal, March 2004. 56 Amazon Network of Georeferenced Socio-Environmental Information, “Amazonia 2019 – Protected Areas and Indigenous T erritories,” map, 2019. 57 Philip Fearnside, “Business as Usual: A Resurgence of Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon,” Yale Environment 360, April 18, 2017. Hereinafter, Fearnside, “ Business as Usual.”
58 Fearnside, “Business as Usual”; and William D. Carvalho et al., “Deforestation Control in the Brazilian Amazon: A Conservation Struggle Being Lost as Agreements and Regulations Are Subverted and Bypassed,” Perspectives in Ecology and Conservation, vol. 17, no. 3 (2019).
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such as the growth in Chinese imports of Brazilian beef and soybeans, also have contributed to recent deforestation trends.4659 For example, China purchased nearly 76% of its soybean imports from Brazil in 2018, up from roughly 50% in prior years, after imposing a retaliatory tariff on
U.S. soybeans.60
Figure 3U.S. soybeans.47
Although changes that weakened Brazil'’s environmental policies began under President Rousseff and continued under President Temer, some analysts argue that the Bolsonaro Administration's ’s approach to the Amazon has led to further increases in deforestation.4861 Bolsonaro has fiercely
defended Brazil'’s sovereignty over the Legal Amazon and its right to develop the region. Since taking office, his administration has lifted the ban on new sugarcane plantations in the Legal Amazon and calledcal ed for an end to the soy moratorium. It also has proposed measures to allowprovide property titles to individuals il egal y occupying public lands and to al ow commercial agriculture, mining, and hydroelectric projects in indigenous territories, arguing that such economic activities will . The Bolsonaro
59 Gustavo Faleiros, “China’s Brazilian Beef Demand Linked to Amazon Deforestation Risk,” Diálogo Chino, October 23, 2019; and Richard Fuchs et al., “U.S.-China T rade War Imperils Amazon Rainforest,” Nature, vol. 567 (March 28, 2019). 60 Marcos Caramuru de Paiva, “Brazil and China: A Brief Analysis of the State of Bilateral Relations,” in Brazil-China: The State of the Relationship, Belt and Road, and Lessons for the Future (Rio de Janeiro: Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, 2019), p. 122. Also see Fred Gale, Constanza Valdes, and Mark Ash, Interdependence of China, United States, and Brazil in Soybean Trade, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, June 2019.
61 Kathryn Hochstetler, “This Isn’t the First T ime Fires Have Ravaged the Amazon,” Foreign Policy, August 29, 2019; and Rubens Ricupero et al., Com unicado dos Ex-Ministros de Estado do Meio Am biente, May 8, 2019.
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Administration argues that such economic activities wil benefit those living in the region and
benefit those living in the region and reduce incentives for illegal il egal deforestation.
At the same time, Bolsonaro has questioned the Brazilian government' government’s deforestation data and
scaled back environmental enforcement. He has removed several high-level officials from Brazil’s environmental monitoring and enforcement agencies, replacing them with appointees who al egedly have hampered enforcement efforts.62 In 2019, Brazil’s primary environmental enforcement agency reportedly issued 34% fewer environmental fines, reported 51% fewer
environmental crimes, and seized 61% less il egal y logged timber than it had in 2018.63
Thoses deforestation data and repeatedly criticized the agencies responsible for enforcing environmental laws.
Those statements and actions reportedly have emboldened some loggers, miners, and ranchers, contributing to the surge in fires in 2019 and a 3034% increase in deforestation in the annual monitoring period that included the first seven months of Bolsonaro'’s term.64 Bolsonaro initial ys term.49 Bolsonaro initially dismissed dismissed
environmental concerns about the Amazon, asserting that deforestation and burning are cultural practices that will wil never end.5065 In January 2020, however, he announced the creation of a new security force to protect the environment and a new Amazon Council, headed by Vice President Hamilton Mourão, to coordinate conservation and sustainable development efforts. As of the close of 2019, a majority (54%) of Brazilians disapproved of Bolsonaro's environmental policies.51
The rising levels of Amazon deforestation call cal into question whether Brazil will wil meet its Paris Agreement commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 37% below 2005 levels (to 1.3 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO₂e) by 2025.5267 According to a 2018 assessment by the U.N. Environment Program, Brazil'’s greenhouse gas emissions declined by 12% per year
from 2006 to 2016, as significant declines in deforestation offset slight increases in emissions from other sources.5368 Those reductions had put Brazil on track to meet its Paris Agreement commitment, but emissions have begun to rise again due to increased deforestation. In 2018, Brazil'
62 Jack Spring and Stephen Eisenhammer, “Exclusive: As Fires Race through Amazon, Brazil’s Bolsonaro Weakens Environment Agency,” Reuters, August 28, 2019. 63 Danielle Brant and Phillippe Watanabe, “Sob Bolsonaro, Multas Ambientais Caem 34% para Menor Nível em 24 Anos,” Folha de São Paulo, March 9, 2020; and Ernesto Londoño, Manuela Andreoni, and Letícia Casado, “Amazon Deforestation Soars as Pandemic Hobbles Enforcement,” International New York Times, June 12, 2020. 64 Fabiano Maisonnave, “Declarações Antiambientalistas de Políticos Aceleram Desmatamento, Diz Estudo,” Folha de São Paulo, December 16, 2019; Stephen Eisenhammer, “ ‘Day of Fire’: Blazes Ignite Suspicion in Amazon T own,” Reuters, September 11, 2019; Marina Lopes, “ Illegal Miners, Feeling Betrayed, Call on Bolsonaro to End Environmental Crackdown in Amazon,” Washington Post, September 10, 2019; and INPE, “A T axa Consolidada de Desmatamento por Corte Raso para os Nove Estados da Amazônia Legal (AC, AM , AP, MA, MT , PA, RO, RR e T O) em 2019 é de 10.129 km2,” press release, June 9, 2020.
65 “Bolsonaro Diz que Desmatamento é Cultural no Brasil e Não Acabará,” Folha de São Paulo, November 20, 2019. 66 Claudia Safatle, Fernando Exman, and Malu Delgado, “Society Reacts to Crisis and Mourão Rules Out Coup,” Valor International, May 31, 2020.
67 Federative Republic of Brazil, Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, September 21, 2016. “CO₂e” is a metric used to express the impact of emissions from differing greenhouse gasses in a common unit by converting each gas to the equivalent amount of CO₂ that would have the same effect on increasing global average temperature.
68 UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2018, November 2018, p. 9.
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Brazil’s greenhouse gas emissions increased by an estimated 0.3% (to 1.9 GtCO₂e), even as
s greenhouse gas emissions increased by an estimated 0.3% (to 1.9 GtCO₂e), even as emissions from the energy sector declined by nearly 5%.54
69
President Bolsonaro had pledged to withdraw from the Paris Agreement during his 2018 election
campaign, but he reversed course following his inauguration, stating that Brazil would remain in the agreement "“for now."55”70 At the 25th25th Conference of Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 25), Brazil pushed developed countries to meet their 2009 goal to mobilize $100 billion mobilize $100 bil ion from public and private sources, annuallyannual y, by 2020, to help developing countries mitigate and adapt to climate change. Brazil'’s environmental minister has asserted that Brazil
Brazil should receive at least 10% of those funds.5671 Brazil also insisted that carbon credits developed under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol should carry over into the Paris Agreement'’s new international carbon markets and that countries that host emissions-cutting projects should not have to report the transfers of those credits to other countries. Many other negotiators expressed concern that Brazil'’s proposals could allowal ow poorly validated credits from the Kyoto mechanisms to undermine the new Paris Agreement markets, as well wel as risk double-counting the credits both internationally
international y and toward the host countries'’ domestic mitigation goals. Those disagreements
reportedly impeded efforts to finalize rules for new carbon markets under the Paris Agreement.57
72
Even as the Brazilian government has calledcal ed for greater international financial support, it has deprioritized domestic efforts to combat climate change. During Bolsonaro's first year in office, his administration In 2019, the Bolsonaro Administration closed the climate change departments within the environment and foreign ministries and cut funding for the implementation of Brazil's National Plan on Climate Change by 95%.58 reduced spending on climate change initiatives by about 10% compared to 2018. Brazil’s 2020 federal budget authorizes 37% less funding for climate change initiatives than was expended in 2019.73 Moreover, the Bolsonaro Administration lost one of Brazil'’s primary sources of international
assistance when it unilaterallyunilateral y restructured the governance of the Amazon Fund—a mechanism launched in 2008 to attract funding for conservation and sustainable development efforts. In response, the governments of Norway and Germany, which have donated nearly $1.3 billionbil ion to the fund since 2009, suspended their contributions in August 2019.59 State74 Vice President Hamilton Mourão and state governments in the Legal Amazon have sought to negotiate directlyare negotiating with Norway and Germany
to restore the funding.
The United States and Brazil historicallyhistorical y have enjoyed robust political and economic relations, but the countries'’ divergent perceptions of their national interests have inhibited the development of a close partnership. Those perceptions have changed somewhat under President Bolsonaro. over the past year and a half.
Whereas the past several Brazilian administrations sought to maintain autonomy in foreign affairs, Bolsonaro has calledcal ed for close alignment with the United States. Within Latin America, for example, the Bolsonaro Administration has adopted a more confrontational approach toward
69 Observatório do Clima, “Estimativas de Emissões de Gases de Efeito Estufa do Brasil 1970-2018,” November 5, 2019.
70 “Brazil to Remain in Paris Agreement ‘for Now,’ Bolsonaro Says,” Valor International, January 22, 2019. 71 Luciana Amaral and Gustavo Uribe, “Ricardo Salles: Brasil Cobrará no Mínimo US$10 bi ao Ano dos Países Ricos,” UOL, November 29, 2019. 72 Simon Evans and Josh Gabbatiss, “COP25: Key Outcomes Agreed at the U.N. Climate T alks in Madrid,” Carbon Brief, December 15, 2019; and Jean Chemnick, “ U.N. T alks Limp to a Close with No D eal on Carbon T rading,” E&E News, December 16, 2019.
73 Senado Federal, “SIGA Brasil,” accessed in June 2020. 74 Amazon Fund, “Donations,” at http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/en/donations/.
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for example, the Bolsonaro Administration has adopted a more confrontational approach toward Cuba and has closely coordinated with the Trump Administration on measures to address the crisis in Venezuela. The Trump Administration has welcomed Bolsonaro’s rapprochement, designating Brazil as a major non-NATO al y and concluding several smal -scale bilateral commercial agreements in 2019. The Trump Administration also has sought to support Brazil’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, providing the country with more than $12.5 mil ion of health and humanitarian assistance and—more controversial y—2 mil ion doses of
hydroxychloroquine.75
Bolsonaro’s realignment of Brazilian foreign policy has been contentious domestical y. Some
analysts argue thatcrisis in Venezuela. The Bolsonaro Administration also has expressed support for controversial U.S. actions outside the region, such as the killing of Iranian military commander Qaasem Soleimani.
Bolsonaro's realignment of Brazilian foreign policy has been controversial domestically, with some analysts arguing it has not resulted in many concrete benefits for Brazil.6076 They note, for example, that the Trump Administration maintained—has maintained, and threatened to impose—, trade barriers on key Brazilian exports despite recent bilateral agreements (see “Recent Trade Negotiations”). on key Brazilian exports, such as beef and steel, despite having signed several bilateral commercial agreements during Bolsonaro's official visit to the White House in March 2019 (see "Recent Trade Negotiations"). Likewise, U.S. officials reportedly have warned Brazil that the closer defense ties implied by President Trump's designation of Brazil as a major non-NATO allycloser bilateral defense ties could be in jeopardy if Brazil allows al ows Chinese telecommunications company Huawei to participate in Brazil's 5G cellularBrazil’s 5G cel ular network (see the "“Defense Cooperation"” section). Some Brazilian analysts
also argue that abandoning the country'’s commitment to autonomy in foreign affairs has weakened Brazil'’s international standing and caused tensions in its relations with other important partners, such as fellowfel ow members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) group.6177 There does not appear to be public support for the Trump Administration'’s foreign policy within Brazil; in 2019, 60% of Brazilians expressed no confidence in President Trump to "“do the
right thing regarding world affairs."62
”78
In some cases, domestic opposition has prevented Bolsonaro from aligning Brazilian foreign policy more closely with the United States. For example, during his 2018 presidential campaign,
Bolsonaro indicated he would follow President Trump'’s lead in withdrawing from the Paris Agreement on climate change and taking a more confrontational approach toward Chinese trade and investment. He has backed away from those positions since taking office, reportedly due to concerns about losing access to foreign markets, particularly within the powerful agribusiness sector, which accounts for 21% of Brazil'’s GDP and is a major component of Bolsonaro's political base.63
’s
political base.79
Although some Members of the 116th116th Congress have urged the Trump Administration to seize on Bolsonaro's goodwill Bolsonaro’s goodwil to develop a strategic partnership with Brazil, others have expressed
reservations about the current Brazilian administration. They are concerned about Bolsonaro's ’s commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, as well wel as about changes to Brazil's ’s environmental policies that appear to have contributed to fires and deforestation in the Brazilian
Amazon (see "“U.S. Support for Amazon Conservation").
Trade policy often has been a contentious issue in U.S.-Brazilian relations. Since the early 1990s, Brazil'”).
75 U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Brazil, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Brazil to Combat COVID-19,” May 31, 2020; and White House, “Joint Statement from the United States of America and the Federative Republic of Brazil Regarding Health Cooperation,” May 31, 2020. 76 T errence McCoy, “In Brazil, T rump T ariffs Show Bolsonaro’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy Has Backfired,” Washington Post, December 2, 2019; and Oliver Stuenkel, “ Bolsonaro Placed a Losing Bet on T rump,” Foreign Policy, December 6, 2019. 77 Maria Herminia T avares, “Rumo a Lugar a Nenhum,” Folha de São Paulo, January 23, 2020; and “Alinhamento Automático do Brasil com EUA Causa Atritos na Cúpula dos BRICS,” Folha de São Paulo, November 13, 2019. 78 Richard Wike, “T rump Ratings Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay Mostly Favorable,” Pew Research Center, January 8, 2020.
79 Centro de Estudos Avançados em Economia Aplicada, PIB do Agronegócio Brasil, 2020; Oliver Stuenkel, “Bolsonaro Fans the Flames,” Foreign Affairs, August 30, 2019; and “No 1º Ano de Bolsonaro, China Vai de Ameaça Comunista a Aliada Estratégica,” Folha de São Paulo, January 1, 2020.
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Commercial Relations Trade policy often has been a contentious issue in U.S.-Brazilian relations. Since the early 1990s,
Brazil’s trade policy has prioritized integration with its South American neighbors through the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO).6480 Brazil is the industrial hub of Mercosur, which it established in 1991 with Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Although the bloc was intended to advance incrementally incremental y toward full economic integration, only a limited customs union has been achieved thus far.
Mercosur also has evolved into a somewhat protectionist arrangement, shielding its members from external competition rather than serving as a platform for insertion into the global economy, as original y as originally envisioned. Within the WTO, Brazil traditionally traditional y has joined with other developing nations to push the United States and other developed countries to reduce their agricultural tariffs and subsidies while resisting developed countries' calls’ cal s for increased access to developing countries'countries’ industrial and services sectors. Those differences blocked conclusion of the most recent
round of multilateral trade negotiations (the WTO'’s Doha Round), as well wel as U.S. efforts in the
1990s and 2000s to establish a hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas.65
The Bolsonaro and Trump Administrations have negotiated several agreements intended to strengthen the bilateral commercial relationship. During Bolsonaro'’s March 2019 official visit to
Washington, the United States and Brazil agreed to take steps toward lowering trade barriers for certain agricultural products. Brazil agreed to adopt a tariff rate quota—implemented in November 2019—to allowal ow the importation of 750,000 tons of U.S. wheat annuallyannual y without tariffs. Brazil Brazil also agreed to adopt "“science-based conditions"” that could enable imports of U.S. pork. In exchange, the United States agreed to send a U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) team to Brazil to audit the country'’s raw beef inspection system.66
82
The United States had suspended imports of raw beef from Brazil in June 2017, after Brazilian investigators discovered that some of the country'’s top meat processing companies, including
JBS and BRF, had bribed food inspectors to approve the sale of tainted products. FSIS began inspecting all al meat products arriving from Brazil and refused entry to 11% of Brazilian fresh beef products in the months leading up to the suspension.6783 The Bolsonaro Administration had hoped an FSIS audit would quickly reopen the U.S. market to Brazilian beef and expressed frustration that U.S. import restrictions remained in place through the end of 2019.68 On February 21, 2020,
however, the Trump Administration reportedly lifted the suspension after determining that "Brazil'“Brazil’s food safety inspection system governing raw intact beef is equivalent to that of the [United States]."69 Some”84 Nevertheless, some consumer advocates, industry groups, and Members of Congress remained remain concerned about Brazilian meat. A bill bil introduced in April 2019 (S. 1124, Tester) would suspend all
80 João Augusto de Castro Neves, Brazil’s Slow and Uncertain Shift from Protectionism to Free Trade, Inter-American Dialogue, working paper, January 2014.
81 For background on the stalled negotiations, see CRS In Focus IF10002, The World Trade Organization, by Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Rachel F. Fefer, and Ian F. Fergusson; and CRS Report RL33162, Trade Integration in the Am ericas, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
82 White House, “Joint Statement from President Donald J. T rump and President Jair Bolsonaro,” March 19, 2019. 83 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), “Perdue: USDA Halting Import of Fresh Brazilian Beef,” press release, June 22, 2017; and “Scandal Could Spoil Brazil’s Meat Industry,” Latin News Daily, March 20, 2017. 84 David Pitt, “US Lifts Brazilian Beef Import Ban Amid Quality Concerns,” Associated Press, February 21, 2020; and USDA, Food Safety and Inspection Service, “Eligibility of Brazil to Export Raw Intact Beef to the United States,” FSIS Notice 09-20, February 24, 2020.
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al beef and poultry imports from Brazil while a working group evaluates the extent to which
beef and poultry imports from Brazil while a working group evaluates the extent to which those imports pose a threat to food safety.
The United States and Brazil announced several other agreements during Bolsonaro'’s March
2019 official visit. A technology safeguards agreement, which the Brazilian congress ratified in November 2019, will wil enable the launch of U.S.-licensed satellitessatel ites from Alcântara space center in Brazil'Brazil’s northeastern state of Maranhão. The United States also endorsed Brazil'’s accession to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in exchange for Brazil agreeing to graduallygradual y give up its "“special and differential treatment"” status, which grants special rights to
developing nations at the WTO.
Building on those measures
In 2020, U.S. and Brazilian officials reportedly hope to conclude agreements on customs administration, e-commerce rules, regulatory practices, and anti-corruption measures while
consulting with domestic stakeholders regarding “how best to expand trade and develop the bilateral economic relationship.”85 U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer asserts that the Trump Administration does not have any plans to pursue a comprehensive free-trade agreement with Brazil at this time but is negotiating smal -scale accords to address chal enges faced by U.S. businesses.86 A majority of Members on the House Committee on Ways and Means signed a letter
in June 2020 expressing strong opposition to “pursuing any type of trade agreement with the
Bolsonaro government” due to human rights, labor, and environmental concerns.87
officials reportedly have begun discussing a more comprehensive trade agreement.70 Barring changes to Mercosur's rules, any agreement to reduce tariffs would need to be negotiated with the broader bloc. In 2019, Mercosur signed free trade agreements with the European Union and the European Free Trade Association. Those agreements have yet to be ratified, however, and the recent political shift in Argentina could make the negotiation of new agreements more difficult.71
It is not clear that the Bolsonaro and Trump Administrations would be willing to expose their domestic producers to increased foreign competition. Industry associations in Brazil reportedly have been lobbying the Bolsonaro Administration to focus on reducing costs for domestic business before pursuing trade liberalization.72 U.S. businesses also have sought protections, and President Trump has occasionally threatened to impose tariffs on Brazilian products (see the text box, below).
Potential U.S. Tariffs on Brazilian Steel
Sources: White House, |
U.S.-Brazilian trade has increased significantly over the past two decades but has suffered from economic volatility, such as the 2007-2008 global financial crisis and Brazil'’s 2014-2017
recession (seesee Figure 34). In 2019, total bilateral merchandise trade amounted to $73.9 billion. bil ion. U.S. goods exports to Brazil totaled $43.1 billionbil ion, and U.S. goods imports from Brazil totaled $30.9 billionbil ion, giving the United States a $12.2 billionbil ion trade surplus. The top U.S. exports to Brazil were mineral fuels, aircraft, machinery, and organic chemicals. The top U.S. imports from Brazil included mineral fuels, iron and steel, aircraft, machinery, and wood and wood pulp. In 2019, Brazil was the 14th
Brazil was the 14th-largest trading partner of the United States.7390 The United States was Brazil's ’s second-largest trading partner, accounting for 14.8% of Brazil'’s total merchandise trade,
compared to 24.4% for China.74
Brazil 91
Brazil benefits from the Generalized System of Preferences program, which provides nonreciprocal, duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from designated developing countries. Brazil was the fourth-largest beneficiary of the program in 2019, with duty-free imports to the United States valued at $2.3 billionbil ion—equivalent to 7.4% of all al U.S. merchandise
imports from Brazil.92
U.S.-Brazilian imports from Brazil.75
U.S.-Brazilian services trade is also significant. In 2018 (the most recent year for which data are available), total bilateral services trade amounted to $34.4 billionbil ion. U.S. services exports to Brazil totaled $28.2 billionbil ion, and U.S. services imports from Brazil totaled $6.1 billion, bil ion, giving the United
States a $22.1 billion bil ion surplus. Travel, transport, and telecommunications were the top categories of U.S. services exports to Brazil, and business services was the top category of U.S. imports from Brazil.76 In 2018, more than 2.2 million Brazilians 93 Brazil began exempting U.S. citizens from the country’s tourist and business visa requirements in June 2019, which could increase U.S. travel to Brazil in the coming years. In 2019, more than 2.1 mil ion Brazilians visited the United States, spending $11.5 billion3 bil ion on travel
and tourism.94 Due to widespread person-to-person transmission of the novel coronavirus in
88 For more information on Argentina, see CRS In Focus IF10932, Argentina: An Overview, by Mark P. Sullivan. 89 “Brazil Economy: T rade Liberalisation Advances, but Slower T han Guedes Wants,” Economist Intelligence Unit, November 25, 2019.
90 U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau data, as made available by Global Trade Atlas, February 2020. 91 Brazilian Foreign T rade Secretariat (SECEX) data, as made available by Global Trade Atlas, February 2020. 92 U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau data, as made available by the U.S. International T rade Commission, “Interactive T ariff and T rade DataWeb,” accessed in February 2020. 93 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. T rade in Services, by Country or Affiliation and by T ype of Service,” October 15, 2019. 94 U.S. Department of Commerce, International T rade Administration, National T ravel and T ourism Office, Market Profile: Brazil, March 2020.
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Brazil, however, the United States has denied entry to most Brazilian citizens and other foreign
nationals who have been present in Brazil in the previous 14 days since May 28, 2020.95
Figure 4. U.S. Trade with Brazil: 2008-2019
Source: CRS presentation of U.S. Department of Commerce data, as made available through Global Trade Atlas and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, accessed February 2020. Note: Services data are not yet available for 2019.
and tourism.77 Brazil began exempting U.S. citizens from the country's tourist and business visa requirements in June 2019, which could increase U.S. travel to Brazil in the coming years.
U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Brazil has increased by more than 60% since 2008. As of 2018 (the most recent year for which data are available), the accumulated stock of U.S. FDI in Brazil Brazil was $70.9 billionbil ion, with significant investments in manufacturing, finance, and mining,
among other sectors.78
Although U.S.-Brazilian cooperation on security issues traditionallytraditional y has been limited, law enforcement and military ties have grown closer in recent years. In 2018, the countries launched a
new Permanent Forum on Security that aims to foster "“strategic, intense, on-going bilateral cooperation"cooperation” on a range of security challengeschal enges, including arms and drug trafficking, cybercrime, financial crimes, and terrorism.7997 The United States and Brazil also engage in high-level security discussions under the long-standing Political-Military Dialogue and a new Strategic Partnership
Dialogue, which met for the first time in September 2019.
Brazil is not a major drug-producing country, but it is the world'
95 White House, “Proclamation on Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Certain Additional Persons Who Pose a Risk of T ransmitting Novel Coronavirus,” May 24, 2020. 96 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position Data,” accessed in January 2020. 97 U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Brazil, “U.S.-Brazil Permanent Security Forum,” March 19, 2019.
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Counternarcotics
Brazil is not a major drug-producing country, but it is the world’s second-largest consumer of cocaine hydrochloride and likely the world'’s largest consumer of cocaine base-derivative products. It is also a major transit country for cocaine bound for Europe.8098 Organized crime in Brazil has increased in scope and scale over the past decade, as some of the country'’s large, wellwel -organized,
and heavily armed criminal groups—such as the Red Command (Comando Vermelho, or CV) and the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital, or PCC)—have increased their transnational operations. Security analysts have attributed much of the recent violence in Brazil, particularly in the northern portion of the country, to clashes among the CV, PCC, and their local
affiliates over control of strategic trafficking corridors.81
99
The Brazilian government has responded to the challengeschal enges posed by organized crime by bolstering security along the 9,767-mile border it shares with 10 nations, including the region's ’s cocaine producers—Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Under its Strategic Border Plan, introduced in
2011, the Brazilian government has deployed interagency resources, including unmanned aerial vehicles, to monitor illicit il icit activity in high-risk locations along its borders and in the remote Amazon region. It also has carried out joint operations with neighboring countries. More recently, the Brazilian government has begun acquiring low-altitude mobile radars and other equipment to support its Integrated Border Monitoring System. That system was initiallyinitial y scheduled to be operational along the entire Brazilian border in 2022, but the Brazilian government now estimates
that the system may not be completely in place until 2035 due to budget constraints.82
100
The United States supports counternarcotics capacity-building efforts in Brazil under a 2008
U.S.-Brazil Memorandum of Understanding on Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement. In 20182019, the United States trained nearly 1,000 Brazilian police officers on combatting money
laundering and community policing, among other topics.83
101
Counterterrorism
Despite having little history of terrorism, Brazil began working closely with the United States and
other international partners to assess and mitigate potential terrorist threats in the lead-up to hosting the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. Among other support, U.S. authorities trained Brazilian law enforcement on topics such as countering international terrorism, preventing attacks on soft targets, and identifying fraudulent documents. The Brazilian government also enacted legislation that criminalized terrorism and terrorist financing in 2016,
closing a long-standing legal gap that reportedly had hindered counterterrorism investigations and prosecutions.84102 Brazil further strengthened its legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist assets in 2019 to address deficiencies identified by the intergovernmental Financial
Action Task Force.85
Brazilian 103
98 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volum e I: Drug and Chem ical Control, March 2, 2020, p. 109. Hereinafter: INCSR, 2020.
99 See, for example, Bruno Paes Manso, “A Cena Criminal Brasileira Mudou; Compreendê-la Ajuda Entender as Novas Dinâmicas do Homicídio,” in Anuário Brazileiro de Segurança Pública 2019 (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, 2019); and Carolina Sampó, De la Reclusión en las Prisiones al Control del Tráfico de Cocaína: la Evolución de las Organizaciones Crim inales Brasileñas, Real Instituto Elcano, working paper, June 10, 2019. 100 Nelza Oliveira, “Brazil Invests in Border Surveillance Radars,” Diálogo, January 3, 2019. 101 INCSR, 2020, p. 111. 102 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, July 2017. 103 Financial Action T ask Force (FAT F), “Outcomes FAT F Plenary, 16 -18 October 2019,” press release, October 18,
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Brazilian officials have used the new legal framework several times in recent years. In the weeks leading up to the 2016 Olympics, they dismantled a loose, online network of Islamic State sympathizers; 12 individuals were detained, and 8 ultimately were convicted and sentenced to between 5 and 15 years in prison for promoting the Islamic State and terrorist attacks through social media.86104 In 2018, Brazilian prosecutors charged 11 individuals with planning to establish an Islamic State cell cel in Brazil and attempting to recruit fighters to send to Syria.87105 Although some
observers have applauded such efforts, others argue that Brazilian authorities are improperly surveilling
surveil ing, and stoking prejudice toward, the country's small ’s smal Muslim population.88
Brazil historically106
Brazil historical y had been reluctant to adopt specific antiterrorism legislation due to concerns about criminalizing the activities of social movements and other groups that engage in actions of political dissent. President Bolsonaro has reinvigorated those concerns by comparing Brazil'labeling protestors and Brazil’s Landless Workers'’ Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra, or MST) and protesters in Chile to terrorists.89 Theas terrorists.107 In December 2019, the Brazilian congress recently restricted the ability of the country's ’s financial intelligence intel igence unit to report on terrorist financing, reportedly to prevent Bolsonaro from
targeting political and social activists. That restriction could jeopardize Brazil'’s compliance with
global anti-money laundering and antiterrorism financing standards.90
108
In December 2019, the U.S. Department of State allocatedal ocated $700,000 of FY2019 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs aid to Brazil to improve Brazilian law enforcement' law enforcement’s capability to deter, detect, and respond to terrorism-related activities.109 The assistance will wil fund border security training and other initiatives, with a particular focus on preventing suspected terrorists and terrorist facilitators from transiting the so-calledcal ed Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.91 The TBA, which has long been a haven for smuggling, money laundering, and other illicit activities. In September 2018, for example, Brazilian police arrested an alleged Hezbollah financier in the TBA who the U.S. Department of the Treasury had previously sanctioned as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist il icit activities.110 U.S.
Customs and Border Protection officers also are working with Brazilian authorities at Guarulhos International Airport in São Paulo to identify high-risk travelers and contraband moving through
Brazil.111
Defense Cooperation
U.S.-Brazilian military ties have grown considerably over the past decade but have faced
occasional setbacks. In the aftermath of a massive January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, U.S. and
2019. For more on the FAT F, see CRS Report RS21904, The Financial Action Task Force: An Overview, by James K. Jackson. 104 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2017, September 2018. 105 “Brazil Charges 11 People with T rying to Set Up Islamic State Cell,” Reuters, May 17, 2018. 106 T ulio Kruse, “Brazilian Muslims Face a Wave of Persecution and Prejudice Stoked by New Government,” Intercept, October 4, 2016. 107 “A Empresários, Bolsonaro Defende Ação Armada contra Movimentos Sociais,” Agência Estado, May 22, 2018; “Bolsonaro Says Brazil Is Prepared in Case of Protests, But Not Worried,” Reuters, November 23, 2019; and “Brazil: Gov’t Dismisses Critics as ‘T errorists’,” Latin News Daily, June 4, 2020. 108 Isabela Cruz, “Como o Novo COAF vai Impactar o Combate ao T errorismo,” Nexo Jornal, December 18, 2019; and Bryan Harris, “Brazil Criticised for Backtracking on T error Funding Fight,” Financial Times, February 3, 2020. 109 U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Notification 19-324,” December 5, 2019. 110 In September 2018, for example, Brazilian police arrested an alleged Hezbollah financier in the T ri-Border Area who the U.S. Department of the T reasury had previously sanctioned as a Specially Designated Globa l T errorist pursuant to Executive Order 13224. Brazil does not consider Hezbollah a terrorist organization, but the Bolsonaro Administration reportedly is considering measures to designate it as such.
U.S.-Brazilian military ties have grown considerably over the past decade but have faced occasional setbacks. In the aftermath of a massive January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, U.S. and Brazilian
111 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019, June 2020, at https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/brazil/.
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Brazilian military forces providing humanitarian assistance engaged in their largest combined operations since World War II.92112 Later in 2010, the countries signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement and a General Security of Military Information Agreement intended to facilitate the sharing of classified information. The Brazilian congress did not approve those agreements until 2015, however, due to a cooling of relations after press reports revealed that the U.S. National Security Agency had engaged in extensive espionage in Brazil. A Master Information Exchange
Agreement, signed in 2017, implemented the two previous agreements and enabled the countries
to pursue bilateral defense-related technology projects.
In July 2019, President Trump designated Brazil as a major non-NATO allyal y for the purposes of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).93113 Among other benefits, that designation offers Brazil privileged access to the U.S. defense industry and increased joint military exchanges, exercises, and training.94114 In FY2019, the U.S. government provided an estimated $666,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance to Brazil to strengthen military-to-military relationships, increase the professionalization of Brazilian forces, and enhance the Brazilian military'
Brazilian military’s capabilities. The U.S. government also delivered to Brazil $11.2 million of mil ion of equipment under the Excess Defense Articles program and $96.7 millionmil ion of equipment and services under the Foreign Military Sales program.95 The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), does not specifically allocate any military assistance for Brazil, but115 The U.S. government is providing an estimated $800,000 of IMET to Brazil in FY2020, and the Trump Administration requested has requested
$625,000 inof IMET for Brazil in FY2021.116
IMET for Brazil in FY2020.96 The Trump Administration's FY2021 budget proposal also includes $625,000 in IMET for Brazil.97
Although recent bilateral agreements and the U.S. designation of Brazil as a major non-NATO ally have laid a foundation for closer military ties, the long-term trajectory of the defense relationship may depend on broader geopolitical considerations. For example, U.S. officials
reportedly have warned that bilateral military and intelligence intel igence cooperation could be in jeopardy if Brazil allowsBrazil al ows the Chinese telecommunications company Huawei to participate in Brazil's5G cellular network.98 Brazil may be reluctant to exclude Huawei, however, since the financial and economic benefits of using the company's lower cost components to deploy Brazil's 5G network more quickly may outweigh the less tangible benefits of closer defense ties with the United States. Moreover, the Bolsonaro Administration generally has sought to avoid confrontations with China—Brazil'company Huawei to participate in Brazil’s 5G cel ular network.117 The U.S. government reportedly is offering financing through the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation for Brazilian telecommunications companies to purchase 5G equipment from other providers, such as Sweden’s Ericsson or Finland’s Nokia. Some Brazilian officials are
concerned, however, that excluding Huawei could delay the technology’s rollout and make it more expensive for consumers.118 More broadly, the Bolsonaro Administration general y has sought to avoid confrontations with China—Brazil’s top trade partner and an important source of foreign investment—and influential sectors of Brazil’s military and foreign policy establishments
are wary of becoming embroiled in global power rivalries.119
112 Brazil was the only Latin American nation to deploy forces to Europe during World War II. T he 25,000 -strong Brazilian Expeditionary Force fought as a division within the United States Fifth Army in Italy.
113 White House, “Designation of the Federative Republic of Brazil as a Major Non -NAT O Ally,” Presidential Determination No. 2019-21 of July 31, 2019, 84 Federal Register 43035, August 19, 2019. 114 U.S. Embassy Brazil, “Major Non-NAT O Ally,” press release, March 19, 2019. 115 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Fiscal Year 2019 Military Assistance Report, February 10, 2020.
116 U.S. Department of State, FY2020 estimate data provided to CRS, June 15, 2020; and Congressional Budget Justification for the Departm ent of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Program s, Fiscal Year 2021, February 10, 2020, p. 132. 117 “EUA Pressionam Brasil Contra Entrada da Chinesa Huawei no Mercado de 5G,” Folha de São Paulo, November 19, 2019.
118 “U.S. Offers Brazil Funding to Buy 5G Gear from Huawei Rivals – Diplomat,” Reuters, June 23, 2020; and “Maia in Favor of Chinese Suitors for 5G T echnology,” Valor International, June 16, 2020. 119 Benoni Belli and Filipe Nasser, “Brazil: Coupling Multipolarity with Multilateralism,” in The Road Ahead: The 21st-Century World Order in the Eyes of Policy Plann ers (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2018), p. 108; and
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foreign investment. During his first year in office, Bolsonaro shifted from expressing concern that China was exerting too much control over key sectors of the Brazilian economy to lauding the strategic partnership between Brazil and China and calling for closer bilateral cooperation in various areas, including science and technology.99 More broadly, influential sectors of Brazil's military and foreign policy establishments are wary of becoming embroiled in global power rivalries or becoming technologically dependent on any one country.100
Congress has expressed interest in ensuring that U.S. military engagement with Brazil does not contribute to human rights abuses. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 ((P.L. 116-92) directs) directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to submit a report to Congress regarding U.S.-Brazilian security cooperation. The report is to assess the capabilities of Brazil'’s military forces and describe the U.S. security cooperation relationship with Brazil, including U.S. objectives, ongoing or planned activities, and the Brazilian military
capabilities that U.S. cooperation could enhance. The report is also to assess the human rights climate in Brazil, including the Brazilian military' military’s adherence to human rights and an identification of any Brazilian military or security forces credibly allegedal eged to have engaged in human rights violations that have received or purchased U.S. equipment or training. Moreover, the report is to describe ongoing or planned U.S. cooperation activities with Brazil focused on
human rights and the extent to which U.S. security cooperation with Brazil could encourage accountability and promote reform through training on human rights, rule of law, and rules of engagement.
engagement.
Some Members of Congress also have calledcal ed for changes to U.S. security cooperation with Brazil. A resolution introduced in September 2019 expressing profound concerns about threats to human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and the environment in Brazil (H.Res. 594, Grijalva) would call cal for the United States to rescind Brazil'’s designation as a major non-NATO allyal y and suspend assistance to Brazilian security forces, among other actions. In contrast, other Members have called
cal ed for closer U.S. security ties with Brazil, including its inclusion in NATO partnership programs.101
The U.S. government has supported conservation efforts in Brazil since the 1980s. Current U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) activities are coordinated through the U.S.-Brazil Brazil Partnership for the Conservation of Amazon Biodiversity (PCAB). Launched in 2014, the PCAB brings together the U.S. and Brazilian governments, private sector companies, and NGOs
to strengthen protected area management and promote sustainable development in the Amazon. In addition to providing assistance for federallyfederal y and state-managed protected areas, USAID works with indigenous and quilombola communities to strengthen their capacities to manage their resources and improve their livelihoods.102 USAID also supports the private sector-led Partnership Platform for the Amazon, which facilitates private investment in innovative conservation and
sustainable development activities.103121 In November 2019, USAID helped establish the Athelia Biodiversity Fund, a Brazilian equity fund that aims to raise $100 million mil ion of mostly private capital to invest in similar efforts. In addition to those long-term development programs, USAID'USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance deployed a team of wildfire experts to assist Brazilian
Brazilian fire investigators in 2019.
Several other U.S. agencies are engaged in Brazil, often in collaboration with or with funding transferred from USAID. The U.S. Forest Service, for example, provides technical assistance to the Brazilian government, NGOs, and cooperatives intended to improve protected area
management, reduce the threat of fire, conserve migratory bird habitat, and facilitate the
“Bolsonaro Wants Closer Security T ies with Washington. Does Brazil’s Military?” World Politics Review, April 5, 2019.
120 Letter from Senator Marco Rubio to President Donald J. T rump, December 2 0, 2019. 121 U.S. Agency for International Development, “Brazil: Bilateral Biodiversity Conservation,” September 6, 2019, at https://www.usaid.gov/brazil/our-work/environment al-partnerships.
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establishment of sustainable value chains for forest products.establishment of sustainable value chains for forest products.104 NASA also has provided data and
technical support to Brazil to help the country better monitor Amazon deforestation.105
President Trump has not requested funding for environmental programs in Brazil in any of his
budget proposals. Nevertheless, Congress has continued to fund conservation activities in the country. In the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), Congress appropriated $15 million mil ion for the Brazilian Amazon, including $5 million mil ion to address fires in the region.
region.
Some Members of Congress have calledcal ed on the Brazilian and U.S. governments to do more to conserve the Amazon. For example, a resolution introduced in the Senate in September 2019 ((S.Res. 337, Schatz) would express bipartisan concern about fires and illegalil egal deforestation in the Amazon, call cal on the Brazilian government to strengthen environmental enforcement and reinstate
protections for indigenous communities, and back continued U.S. assistance to the Brazilian government and NGOs. The Act for the Amazon Act (H.R. 4263, DeFazio), introduced in September 2019, would take a more punitive approach. It would ban the importation of certain fossil fuels and agricultural products from Brazil, prohibit certain types of military-to-military engagement and security assistance to Brazil, and forbid U.S. agencies from entering into free
trade negotiations with Brazil.
Outlook More than five years after the country fell fel into recession and more than three years after the controversial impeachment and removal from office of President Rousseff, Brazil remains mired in difficult domestic circumstances. There are some signs that economic growth may be accelerating slowly, but tens of millions of Brazilians continue to struggle with poverty and precarious employment conditionsThe COVID-19 pandemic abruptly halted the country’s slow economic recovery and now threatens to wipe out the modest employment gains achieved since
the last downturn. Repeated budget cuts have reduced social services for the most vulnerable and have weakened the Brazilian government' government’s capacity to address other challengesrespond to the pandemic and other chal enges, such as high levels of crime and increasing deforestation. President Bolsonaro was elected, in part, on his pledge to clean up the political system, but his interference in justice sector agencies and frequent attacks on the press, civil society groups, and other branches of government
have placed additional stress on the country'’s already-strained democratic institutions. Brazilian policymakers are likely to remain focused on these internal challengeschal enges for the next several years, limiting Brazil'
limiting Brazil’s ability to take on regional responsibilities or exert its influence internationally.
international y.
U.S.-Brazilian relations have grown closer since 2019, as President Bolsonaro'’s foreign policy has prioritized alignment with the Trump Administration. In addition to coordinating on international affairs, the U.S. and Brazilian governments have taken steps to bolster commercial ties and enhance security cooperation. Nonetheless, policy differences have emerged over sensitive issues, such as bilateral trade barriers and relations with China, which affect the
economic and geopolitical interests of both countries. Those disagreements suggest the Trump and Bolsonaro Administrations may need to engage in more extensive consultations and confidence-building measures if they intend to avoid the historic pattern of U.S.-Brazilian
relations, in which heightened expectations give way to mutual disappointment and mistrust.
The 116th
The 116th Congress may continue to shape U.S.-Brazilian relations using its legislative and oversight powers. Although there appears to be considerable support in Congress for forging a long-term strategic partnership with Brazil, many Members may be reluctant to advance major bilateral commercial or security cooperation initiatives in the near term, given their concerns
about the erosion of democracy, human rights, and environmental protections under Bolsonaro.
For the time being, Congress may continue appropriating funding for programs with broad
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support, such as Amazon conservation efforts, while Members continue to advocate for divergent
policy approaches toward the Bolsonaro Administration.
Author Information
Peter J. Meyer
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
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26 bilateral commercial or security cooperation initiatives in the near term, given their concerns about democracy, human rights, and the environment in Brazil. For the time being, Congress may continue appropriating funding for programs with broad support, such as Amazon conservation efforts, while Members continue to advocate for divergent policy approaches toward the Bolsonaro Administration.
Author Contact Information
1. |
See, for example, Letter from Senator Marco Rubio to President Donald J. Trump, December 20, 2019. |
2. |
See, for example, "Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on Pending Nominations," CQ Transcriptions, December 17, 2019; and Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, "Climate Change," Remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 165, part 148 (September 16, 2019), p. S5496. |
3. |
For information on U.S. policy prior to and following the coup, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, eds. David C. Geyer and David H. Herschler (Washington: GPO, 2004), Documents 181-244, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/ch5. |
4. |
Ministério Público Federal, Procuradoria Federal dos Direitos do Cidadão, "PFDC Contesta Recomendação de Festejos ao Golpe de 64," press release, March 26, 2019. |
5. |
Cristiano Romero, "O Legado de Lula na Economia," Valor Online, December 29, 2010. |
6. |
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database October 2019, October 11, 2019. The poverty line is defined as the income necessary to cover basic expenses, such as food, clothing, housing, and transit. Marcelo Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Centro de Políticas Sociais, August 2019, p. 15. Hereinafter, Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade. |
7. |
Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade. |
8. |
Alfredo Cuevas et al., "An Eventful Two Decades of Reforms, Economic Boom, and a Historic Crisis," in Brazil: Boom, Bust, and the Road to Recovery, IMF, 2018; and Pedro Mendes Loureiro and Alfredo Saad-Filho, "The Limits of Pragmatism: The Rise and Fall of the Brazilian Workers' Party (2002-2016)," Latin American Perspectives, vol. 46, no. 1 (2019). |
9. |
IMF, Staff Report for the 2018 Article IV Consultation, June 20, 2018. |
10. |
IMF, "World Economic Outlook Database: October 2019," October 11, 2019; and Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), "PNAD Contínua: Taxa de Desocupação é de 11,0% e Taxa de Subutilização é de 23,0% no Trimestre Encerrado em Dezembro," press release, January 31, 2020. |
11. |
Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade, pp. 5, 15. |
12. |
According to Brazil's 2010 census, 43.1% of Brazilians self-identify as mixed race and 7.6% self-identify as black. IBGE, Censo Demográfico 2010, November 2011; and IBGE, Desigualdades Sociais por Cor ou Raça no Brasil, 2019. |
13. |
Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, 2019; and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Study on Homicide, 2019. |
14. |
Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, "Violence Against Black People in Brazil," infographic, 2019, at http://www.forumseguranca.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/infografico-consicencia-negra-2019-FINAL_ingl%C3%AAs_site.pdf. |
15. |
Felipe Nunes and Carlos Ranulfo Melo, "Impeachment, Political Crisis and Democracy in Brazil," Revista de Ciencia Política, vol. 37, no. 2 (2017). |
16. |
Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe 2018, November 2018. |
17. |
Sylvio Costa and Edson Sardinha, "O que Você Precisa Saber para Entender o Novo Congresso Brasileiro," Congresso em Foco, October 9, 2018. |
18. |
See, for example, Brian Winter, "System Failure: Behind the Rise of Jair Bolsonaro," Americas Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 1, (January 2018). |
19. |
Matias Spektor, "It's Not Just the Right That's Voting for Bolsonaro. It's Everyone." Foreign Policy, October 26, 2018. As of mid-2018, 58% of Brazilians expressed trust in the military and 73% expressed trust in the churches, according to Corporación Latinobarómetro. |
20. |
Câmara dos Deputados, "Bancada Atual," accessed in January 2020. |
21. |
See, for example, Andres Schipani, "Brazil: Jair Bolsonaro Pushes Culture War over Economic Reform," Financial Times, August 24, 2019; and Paulo Trevisani, "Brazil's President Hits the Street, Railing Against the Media," Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2020. |
22. |
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Brazil-U.S. Business Council, "What Can Brazil Expect from Concessions and Privatizations in 2020?," Brazil Investment Monitor, February 14, 2020. |
23. |
Andres Schipani and Bryan Harris, "Can Brazil's Pension Reform Kick-Start the Economy?," Financial Times, October 22, 2019. |
24. |
IMF, Tentative Stabilization, Sluggish Recovery?, World Economic Outlook Update, January 20, 2020. |
25. |
IBGE, "PNAD Contínua: Taxa de Desocupação é de 11,0% e Taxa de Subutilização é de 23,0% no Trimestre Encerrado em Dezembro," press release, January 31, 2020. |
26. |
See, for example, Gray Newman, "Was It All Her Fault? An Economist Re-examines Brazil's Crisis," Americas Quarterly, October 13, 2016; and "Analysis – Brazil's Growth at Mercy of Hotly Disputed 'Expansionary Austerity,'" Reuters, January 21, 2020. |
27. |
"Número de Assassinatos Cai 19% no Brasil em 2019 e é o Menor da Série Histórica," G1, February 14, 2020; and Karina Nascimento, "Principais Crimes Registraram Queda no Estado em 2019," Governo do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Segurança Pública, January 21, 2020. |
28. |
André Cabette Fábio, "A Queda da Criminalidade no Brasil. E o Discurso de Moro," Nexo Jornal, January 6, 2020. |
29. |
Ryan C. Berg, "Brazil's Bolsonaro Continues to Be His Own Worst Enemy," American Enterprise Institute, September 24, 2019; and Guilherme France, Brazil: Setbacks in the Legal and Institutional Anti-Corruption Frameworks, Transparency International, 2019. |
30. |
See, for example, Naiara Galarraga Gortázar, "El Deterio de la Democracia en Brasil se Agrava Bajo el Mandato de Bolsonaro," El País, January 13, 2020. |
31. |
See, for examples, "Brazil: Print Media Threatened by Presidential Decree," Latin News Daily, August 8, 2019; Mauricio Savarese, "Brazil's Bolsonaro Targets Minorities on 1st Day in Office," Associated Press, January 3, 2019; and Gabriel Stargardter, "Bolsonaro Presidential Decree Grants Sweeping Powers over NGOs in Brazil," Reuters, January 2, 2019. |
32. |
Brian Winter, "'It's Complicated': Inside Bolsonaro's Relationship with Brazil's Military," Americas Quarterly, December 17, 2019; and Nathalia Passarinho, "Atuação de Militares é 'Surpresa Positiva' do Governo Bolsonaro, Dis Professor de Harvard que Estuda Brasil há 30 Anos," BBC News Brasil, April 14, 2019. |
33. |
See, for examples, "Brazil: Journalists Denounce Increased Attacks," Latin News Daily, January 17, 2020; Maria Elena Bucheli, "Bolsonaro 'Turned Me into a Pariah,' Says Gay Lawmaker Who Fled Brazil," Agence France Presse, March 20, 2019; and "Brazil: Indigenous Violence on the Rise," Latin American Security & Strategic Review, January 2020. |
34. |
Figures based on an average of three polls. Datafolha, "Avaliação do Presidente Jair Bolsonaro," December 2019; Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI), "Avaliação do Governo," Pesquisa CNI-Ibope, December 2019; and Confederação Nacional do Transporte (CNT), "Pesquisa CNT/MDA," January 2020. |
35. |
|
36. |
Portions of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Venezuela are located in the Amazon Basin. The rainforest extends beyond the Amazon Basin into Suriname and French Guiana. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Global International Waters Assessment: Amazon Basin, GIWA Regional Assessment 40b, Kalmar, Sweden, 2004, p. 15. |
37. |
Edna Rödig et al., "The Importance of Forest Structure for Carbon Fluxes of the Amazon Rainforest," Environmental Research Letters, vol. 13, no. 5 (2018), p. 9; Hemholtz Centre for Environmental Research, "The Forests of the Amazon Are an Important Carbon Sink," press release, November 8, 2019; and Pierre Friedlingstein et al., "Global Carbon Budget 2019," Earth System Science Data, vol. 11, no. 4 (2019), p. 1803. |
38. |
D. C. Zemp et al., "Deforestation Effects on Amazon Forest Resilience," Geophysical Research Letters, vol. 44, no. 12 (2017). |
39. |
Thomas Lovejoy and Carlos Nobre, "Amazon Tipping Point: Last Chance for Action," Science Advances, vol. 5, no. 12 (2019). |
40. |
UNEP, Global International Waters Assessment: Amazon Basin, GIWA Regional Assessment 40b, Kalmar, Sweden, 2004, p. 16. |
41. |
Eric A. Davidson et al., "The Amazon Basin in Transition," Nature, vol. 481 (2012), p. 321. |
42. |
Presidência da República, Casa Civil, Plano de Ação para a Prevenção e Controle do Desmatamento na Amazônia Legal, March 2004. |
43. |
Amazon Network of Georeferenced Socio-Environmental Information, "Amazonia 2019 – Protected Areas and Indigenous Territories," map, 2019. |
44. |
Philip Fearnside, "Business as Usual: A Resurgence of Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon," Yale Environment 360, April 18, 2017. Hereinafter, Fearnside, "Business as Usual." |
45. |
Fearnside, "Business as Usual"; and William D. Carvalho et al., "Deforestation Control in the Brazilian Amazon: A Conservation Struggle Being Lost as Agreements and Regulations Are Subverted and Bypassed," Perspectives in Ecology and Conservation, vol. 17, no. 3 (2019). |
46. |
Gustavo Faleiros, "China's Brazilian Beef Demand Linked to Amazon Deforestation Risk," Diálogo Chino, October 23, 2019; and Richard Fuchs et al., "U.S.-China Trade War Imperils Amazon Rainforest," Nature, vol. 567 (March 28, 2019). |
47. |
Marcos Caramuru de Paiva, "Brazil and China: A Brief Analysis of the State of Bilateral Relations," in Brazil-China: The State of the Relationship, Belt and Road, and Lessons for the Future (Rio de Janeiro: Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, 2019), p. 122. Also see Fred Gale, Constanza Valdes, and Mark Ash, Interdependence of China, United States, and Brazil in Soybean Trade, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, June 2019. |
48. |
See, for example, Kathryn Hochstetler, "This Isn't the First Time Fires Have Ravaged the Amazon," Foreign Policy, August 29, 2019; and Rubens Ricupero et al., Comunicado dos Ex-Ministros de Estado do Meio Ambiente, May 8, 2019. |
49. |
Fabiano Maisonnave, "Declarações Antiambientalistas de Políticos Aceleram Desmatamento, Diz Estudo," Folha de São Paulo, December 16, 2019; Stephen Eisenhammer, "'Day of Fire': Blazes Ignite Suspicion in Amazon Town," Reuters, September 11, 2019; Marina Lopes, "Illegal Miners, Feeling Betrayed, Call on Bolsonaro to End Environmental Crackdown in Amazon," Washington Post, September 10, 2019; and INPE, "Taxa PRODES Amazônia – 2004-2019," November 18, 2019. |
50. |
"Bolsonaro Diz que Desmatamento é Cultural no Brasil e Não Acabará," Folha de São Paulo, November 20, 2019. Humans intentionally set the majority of fires in the Amazon to burn recently cleared trees and woody debris, crop residue, overgrown pastures, and roadside vegetation. This practice, sometimes referred to as "slash and burn agriculture," transfers nutrients to poor tropical soils and helps prepare land for pastures and crops. |
51. |
Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI), "Avaliação do Governo," Pesquisa CNI-Ibope, December 2019, p. 6. |
52. |
Federative Republic of Brazil, Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, September 21, 2016. "CO₂e" is a metric used to express the impact of emissions from differing greenhouse gasses in a common unit by converting each gas to the equivalent amount of CO₂ that would have the same effect on increasing global average temperature. |
53. |
UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2018, November 2018, p. 9. |
54. |
Observatório do Clima, "Estimativas de Emissões de Gases de Efeito Estufa do Brasil 1970-2018," November 5, 2019. |
55. |
"Brazil to Remain in Paris Agreement 'for Now,' Bolsonaro Says," Valor International, January 22, 2019. |
56. |
Luciana Amaral and Gustavo Uribe, "Ricardo Salles: Brasil Cobrará no Mínimo US$10 bi ao Ano dos Países Ricos," UOL, November 29, 2019. |
57. |
Simon Evans and Josh Gabbatiss, "COP25: Key Outcomes Agreed at the U.N. Climate Talks in Madrid," Carbon Brief, December 15, 2019; and Jean Chemnick, "U.N. Talks Limp to a Close with No Deal on Carbon Trading," E&E News, December 16, 2019. |
58. |
Isadora Peron and Cristiano Zaia, "Changes Could End Up Gutting Environment Ministry," Valor International, January 20, 2019; and "Ministério do Meio Ambiente Bloqueia 95% da Verba para o Clima," Globo, May 7, 2019. |
59. |
|
60. |
Terrence McCoy, "In Brazil, Trump Tariffs Show Bolsonaro's 'America First' Foreign Policy Has Backfired," Washington Post, December 2, 2019; and Oliver Stuenkel, "Bolsonaro Placed a Losing Bet on Trump," Foreign Policy, December 6, 2019. |
61. |
Maria Herminia Tavares, "Rumo a Lugar a Nenhum," Folha de São Paulo, January 23, 2020; and "Alinhamento Automático do Brasil com EUA Causa Atritos na Cúpula dos BRICS," Folha de São Paulo, November 13, 2019. |
62. |
Richard Wike, "Trump Ratings Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay Mostly Favorable," Pew Research Center, January 8, 2020. |
63. |
Centro de Estudos Avançados em Economia Aplicada, PIB do Agronegócio Brasil, March 20, 2019; Oliver Stuenkel, "Bolsonaro Fans the Flames," Foreign Affairs, August 30, 2019; and "No 1" Ano de Bolsonaro, China Vai de Ameaça Comunista a Aliada Estratégica," Folha de São Paulo, January 1, 2020. |
64. |
João Augusto de Castro Neves, Brazil's Slow and Uncertain Shift from Protectionism to Free Trade, Inter-American Dialogue, working paper, January 2014. |
65. |
For background on the stalled negotiations, see CRS In Focus IF10002, The World Trade Organization, by Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Rachel F. Fefer, and Ian F. Fergusson; and CRS Report RL33162, Trade Integration in the Americas, by M. Angeles Villarreal. |
66. |
White House, "Joint Statement from President Donald J. Trump and President Jair Bolsonaro," March 19, 2019. |
67. |
U.S. Department of Agriculture, "Perdue: USDA Halting Import of Fresh Brazilian Beef," press release, June 22, 2017; and "Scandal Could Spoil Brazil's Meat Industry," Latin News Daily, March 20, 2017. |
68. |
Ricardo Della Coletta, "Em Novo Revés, EUA Mantêm Veto à Carne Bovina do Brasil e Frustram Bolsonaro," Folha de São Paulo, November 4, 2019. |
69. |
David Pitt, "US Lifts Brazilian Beef Import Ban Amid Quality Concerns," Associated Press, February 21, 2020. |
70. |
Anthony Boadle, "Brazil Kicks Off Complex U.S. Trade Deal Talks," Reuters, July 31, 2019. |
71. |
For more information on Argentina, see CRS In Focus IF10932, Argentina: An Overview, by Mark P. Sullivan. |
72. |
Economist Intelligence Unit, "Brazil Economy: Trade Liberalisation Advances, but Slower Than Guedes Wants," November 25, 2019. |
73. |
U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau data, as made available by Global Trade Atlas, accessed in February 2020. |
74. |
Brazilian Foreign Trade Secretariat (SECEX) data, as made available by Global Trade Atlas, accessed in February 2020. |
75. |
U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau data, as made available by the U.S. International Trade Commission, "Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb," accessed in February 2020. |
76. |
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, "U.S. Trade in Services, by Country or Affiliation and by Type of Service," October 15, 2019. |
77. |
U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office, Market Profile: Brazil, March 2019. |
78. |
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, "Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position Data," accessed in January 2020. |
79. |
U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Brazil, "U.S.-Brazil Permanent Security Forum," March 19, 2019. |
80. |
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, March 2019. |
81. |
See, for example, Bruno Paes Manso, "A Cena Criminal Brasileira Mudou; Compreendê-la Ajuda Entender as Novas Dinâmicas do Homicídio," in Anuário Brazileiro de Segurança Pública 2019 (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, 2019); and Carolina Sampó, De la Reclusión en las Prisiones al Control del Tráfico de Cocaína: la Evolución de las Organizaciones Criminales Brasileñas, Real Instituto Elcano, working paper, June 10, 2019. |
82. |
Nelza Oliveira, "Brazil Invests in Border Surveillance Radars," Diálogo, January 3, 2019. |
83. |
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, March 2019. |
84. |
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, July 2017. |
85. |
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), "Outcomes FATF Plenary, 16-18 October 2019," press release, October 18, 2019. For more on the FATF, see CRS Report RS21904, The Financial Action Task Force: An Overview, by James K. Jackson. |
86. |
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2017, September 2018. |
87. |
"Brazil Charges 11 People with Trying to Set Up Islamic State Cell," Reuters, May 17, 2018. |
88. |
See, for example, Tulio Kruse, "Brazilian Muslims Face a Wave of Persecution and Prejudice Stoked by New Government," Intercept, October 4, 2016. |
89. |
"A Empresários, Bolsonaro Defende Ação Armada contra Movimentos Sociais," Agência Estado, May 22, 2018; and "Bolsonaro Says Brazil Is Prepared in Case of Protests, But Not Worried," Reuters, November 23, 2019. |
90. |
Bryan Harris, "Brazil Criticised for Backtracking on Terror Funding Fight," Financial Times, February 3, 2020. |
91. |
U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Notification 19-324," December 5, 2019. |
92. |
Brazil was the only Latin American nation to deploy forces to Europe during World War II. The 25,000-strong Brazilian Expeditionary Force fought as a division within the United States Fifth Army in Italy. |
93. |
White House, "Designation of the Federative Republic of Brazil as a Major Non-NATO Ally," Presidential Determination No. 2019-21 of July 31, 2019, 84 Federal Register 43035, August 19, 2019. |
94. |
U.S. Embassy Brazil, "Major Non-NATO Ally," press release, March 19, 2019. |
95. |
U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Fiscal Year 2019 Military Assistance Report, February 10, 2020. |
96. |
U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2020, March 11, 2019. |
97. |
U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2021, February 10, 2020, p. 132. |
98. |
"EUA Pressionam Brasil Contra Entrada da Chinesa Huawei no Mercado de 5G," Folha de São Paulo, November 19, 2019. |
99. |
Ministério das Relações Exteriores, "Deeclaração Conjunta entre a República Federativa do Brasil e a República Popular da China – 24 a 26 de Outubro de 2019," October 25, 2019; and "No 1" Ano de Bolsonaro, China Vai de Ameaça Comunista a Aliada Estratégica," Folha de São Paulo, January 1, 2020. |
100. |
Benoni Belli and Filipe Nasser, "Brazil: Coupling Multipolarity with Multilateralism," in The Road Ahead: The 21st-Century World Order in the Eyes of Policy Planners (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2018), p. 108; and "Bolsonaro Wants Closer Security Ties with Washington. Does Brazil's Military?" World Politics Review, April 5, 2019. |
101. |
Letter from Senator Marco Rubio to President Donald J. Trump, December 20, 2019. |
102. |
Quilombolas are a self-declared ethno-racial group, some of whom are the descendants of freed or escaped slaves. For more information, see Mariana Nozela Prado, "Quilombola Communities of Brazil," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Brazil Institute, infographic, August 13, 2018, at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/quilombola_communities.pdf. |
103. |
U.S. Agency for International Development, "Brazil: Bilateral Biodiversity Conservation," September 6, 2019, at https://www.usaid.gov/brazil/our-work/environmental-partnerships. |
104. |
U.S. Forest Service, "Latin America, Caribbean and Canada Program," at https://www.fs.usda.gov/about-agency/international-programs/where-we-work/latin-america-caribbean-canada. |
105. |
NASA Earth Observatory, "Tracking Amazon Deforestation from Above," December 19, 2019. |