U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and
December 4, 2020January 7, 2021
the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations
Peter J. Meyer
The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to
The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to
Specialist in Latin
Specialist in Latin
support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different
support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different
American and Canadian
American and Canadian
strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the
strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the
Affairs
Affairs
Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets
Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets
since , as well as countering illicit narcotics, since
the 1990s. The Trump Administration the 1990s. The Trump Administration
has sought to reduce foreign aid significantly and refocus U.S. sought to reduce foreign aid significantly and refocus U.S.
assistance efforts in the region to
Rachel L. Martin
address U.S. domestic concerns, such as irregular migration and transnational crime. To date,
Research Assistant
however, Congress has opted not to adopt many of
Rachel L. Martin
assistance efforts in some parts of the region to address U.S. domestic concerns, such as irregular
Research Assistant
migration. For the most part, however, Congress did not adopt the Administration’s proposals. the Administration’s proposals.
FY2021 Budget Request
For FY2021, the Trump Administration requested $1.4 billion for Latin America and the
For FY2021, the Trump Administration requested $1.4 billion for Latin America and the
Caribbean through foreign assistance accounts managed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Caribbean through foreign assistance accounts managed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID). That amount would Development (USAID). That amount would
behave been $314 million, $314 million,
or 18%, less than the estimated $1.7 billion of U.S. assistance or 18%, less than the estimated $1.7 billion of U.S. assistance
allocated to the region in FY2020. The proposal would allocated to the region in FY2020. The proposal would
have cut funding for every type of assistance and for most Latin American cut funding for every type of assistance and for most Latin American
and Caribbean countries. For a fourth consecutive year, the Trump Administration also proposed eliminating the Inter-and Caribbean countries. For a fourth consecutive year, the Trump Administration also proposed eliminating the Inter-
American Foundation—a small, independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that promotes grassroots development in the American Foundation—a small, independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that promotes grassroots development in the
region—and consolidating its programs into USAID. region—and consolidating its programs into USAID.
Legislative Developments
On October 1, 2020, President Trump signed into law a short-term continuing resolution (P.L. 116-159), which funds foreign aid programs at the FY2020 level until December 11, 2020. As Congress considers appropriations for the remainder of FY2021, it may draw from the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2021 (Division A of H.R. 7608; H.Rept. 116-444), which the House passed on July 24, 2020, and the draft Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measure that the Senate Appropriations Committee released on November 10, 2020. Although the bills and their accompanying reportsSimilar to prior years, Congress did not conclude action on appropriations for FY2021 until several months into the fiscal year. Although the House passed a foreign aid appropriations measure (Division A of H.R. 7608; H.Rept. 116-444) in July 2020 and the Senate Appropriations Committee released a draft bill in November 2020, neither was enacted. Instead, Congress passed a series of continuing resolutions that funded foreign aid programs in the region at the FY2020 level from October 1, 2020, until December 27, 2020, when President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260). The act and the accompanying explanatory statement do not specify appropriations levels for every Latin do not specify appropriations levels for every Latin
American and Caribbean country, American and Caribbean country,
but the amounts they designate for several U.S. initiatives differ significantly from the the amounts they designate for several U.S. initiatives differ significantly from the
Administration’s request. Administration’s request.
H.R. 7608 would provide $519.9 Among other appropriations, the act provides
$505.9 million to address the underlying factors driving irregular migration from million to address the underlying factors driving irregular migration from
Central America, whereas the Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft bill would provide $505.9 million; the Administration requested $376.9 million.
H.R. 7608 would provide $457.3 Central America ($129
million more than the Administration requested but $27 million less than allocated to the region in FY2020);
$461.4 million to support the peace process and security and development efforts million to support the peace process and security and development efforts
in Colombia, whereas the Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft bill would provide $455.4 million; the Administration requested $412.9 million.
H.R. 7608 would provide $159.9 in Colombia ($48.5
million more than requested and nearly $10 million more than allocated to the country in FY2020);
$158.9 million to support security and rule-of-law efforts in Mexico ($95 million more than requested and
$1 million more than allocated to the country in FY2020);
$33 million to support a democratic transition in Venezuela ($172 million less than requested and $2
million less than allocated to the country in FY2020); and
$38 million for the Inter-American Foundation ($34 million more than requested and $500,000 more than
Congress appropriated for the agency in FY2020).
Congress considered a variety of policy issues during the FY2021 appropriations process, includingmillion to support security and rule-of-law efforts in Mexico, whereas the
Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft bill would provide $157.9 million; the Administration requested $63.8 million.
H.R. 7608 would provide $30 million to promote democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela, whereas the
Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft bill would provide $35 million for Venezuela; the Administration requested $205 million.
As Congress continues the appropriations process, it may consider how to respond to the effects of the how to respond to the effects of the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) COVID-19 pandemic pandemic
on Latin on Latin
AmericanAmerica and the Caribbean and whether to provide additional assistance to the region beyond the $141 million and the Caribbean and whether to provide additional assistance to the region beyond the $141 million
allocated as of August 2020. allocated as of August 2020.
Congress also may consider whether to exert greater congressional control overIn response to the Trump
Administration’s decision to suspend and reprogram U.S. assistance U.S. assistance
to Central America in response to the Trump Administration’s decisions to suspend and reprogram aid appropriated in prior years. In addition to those funding decisions, Congress may assess how the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation might complement foreign assistance efforts in to Central America, Congress reexamined some of the authorities it has granted to the executive branch. Congress also tracked the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation’s operations in Latin America and the Caribbean and assessed how they complement foreign assistance in promoting development and other U.S. foreign policy objectives promoting development and other U.S. foreign policy objectives
in Latin America and the Caribbeanin the region. Many of these policy issues may remain subjects of debate, legislation, and oversight in the 117th Congress. .
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2829 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean ............................................... 3
Trump Administration’s FY2021 Foreign Assistance Budget Request ..................................... 4
Foreign Assistance Categories and Accounts .................................................................. 5
Major Country and Regional Programs ......................................................................... 7
Inter-American Foundation ....................................................................................... 10
Legislative Developments .............................................................................................. 10
Policy Issues for Congress .............................................................................................. 12
COVID-19 Response ............................................................................................... 13
Central America Funding Directives ........................................................................... 16
Role of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation.................................... 18
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean............................................................... 2
Figure 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY1946-FY2019 ...................... 3
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Account:
FY2016-FY2021 Request .............................................................................................. 6
Table 2. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Country or
Regional Program: FY2016-FY2021 Request ................................................................... 8
Table 3. Inter-American Foundation (IAF) Appropriations: FY2016-FY2021 Request ............. 10
Table 4. U.S. Foreign Assistance for SelectSelected Countries and Initiatives:
FY2021 Appropriations Legislation .............................................................................. 11
Table 5. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean to Respond to the
COVID-19 Pandemic.................................................................................................. 14
Table 6. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2019 ...................... 2021
Table 7. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2020 Estimate ......... 2223
Table 8. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Request .......... 2425
Appendixes
Appendix A. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Account
and Country or Regional Program: FY2019 .................................................................... 2021
Appendix B. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Account
and Country or Regional Program: FY2020 Estimate ....................................................... 2223
Appendix C. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Account
and Country or Regional Program: FY2021 Request ........................................................ 2425
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3031 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations
Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 2627
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Introduction
Foreign assistance is one of the tools the United States employs to advance U.S. interests in Latin Foreign assistance is one of the tools the United States employs to advance U.S. interests in Latin
America and the Caribbean. The focus and funding levels of aid programs change along with America and the Caribbean. The focus and funding levels of aid programs change along with
broader U.S. policy goals.1 Current aid programs reflect the diverse needs of the countries in the broader U.S. policy goals.1 Current aid programs reflect the diverse needs of the countries in the
region, as wel as the broad range of these countries’ ties to the United States (seregion, as wel as the broad range of these countries’ ties to the United States (se
e Figure 1 for a for a
map of Latin America and the Caribbean). Some countries receive U.S. assistance across many map of Latin America and the Caribbean). Some countries receive U.S. assistance across many
sectors as they struggle with political, socioeconomic, and security chal enges. Others have made
sectors as they struggle with political, socioeconomic, and security chal enges. Others have made
major strides in consolidating democratic governance and improving living conditions; these major strides in consolidating democratic governance and improving living conditions; these
countries no longer receive traditional U.S. development assistance but typical y receive some countries no longer receive traditional U.S. development assistance but typical y receive some
U.S. support to address shared security chal enges, such as transnational crime.
U.S. support to address shared security chal enges, such as transnational crime.
Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for foreign assistance to the region and conducts
Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for foreign assistance to the region and conducts
oversight of aid programs and the executive branch agencies that administer them. The Trump oversight of aid programs and the executive branch agencies that administer them. The Trump
AdministrationAdministration
has proposed significant reductions to the foreign assistance budget to decrease proposed significant reductions to the foreign assistance budget to decrease
government expenditures and shift resources to other Administration priorities. The government expenditures and shift resources to other Administration priorities. The
Administration also
Administration also
has sought to modify some U.S. foreign assistance objectives, including sought to modify some U.S. foreign assistance objectives, including
those in Latin America and the Caribbean. those in Latin America and the Caribbean.
To dateFor the most part, however, Congress , Congress
has not adopted many ofdid not adopt the the
Administration’s proposed changes.
Administration’s proposed changes.
This report provides an overview of U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. It
This report provides an overview of U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. It
examines historical and recent trends in aid to the region; the Trump Administration’s FY2021 examines historical and recent trends in aid to the region; the Trump Administration’s FY2021
budget request for aid administered by the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International budget request for aid administered by the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), and the Inter-American Foundation (IAF); and FY2021 foreign aid Development (USAID), and the Inter-American Foundation (IAF); and FY2021 foreign aid
appropriations legislation. It also analyzes several issues appropriations legislation. It also analyzes several issues
that Congress considered when
deliberating on FY2021 appropriationsCongress may consider during the
appropriations process, including how to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) , including how to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic, whether to exert greater congressional control over U.S. assistance to Central America, pandemic, whether to exert greater congressional control over U.S. assistance to Central America,
and how the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation might and how the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation might
complement U.S. complement U.S.
assistance efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean. assistance efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Report Notes
To more accurately compare the
To more accurately compare the
Trump Administration’s FY2021 foreign assistance requestAdministration’s FY2021 foreign assistance request
with previous years’ with previous years’
appropriations, most aid figures in this report refer only to bilateral assistance that is managed by the State appropriations, most aid figures in this report refer only to bilateral assistance that is managed by the State
Department or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and is requested for individual countries Department or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and is requested for individual countries
or regional programs. Approximately 63% of the aid obligated by al U.S. agencies in Latin America and the or regional programs. Approximately 63% of the aid obligated by al U.S. agencies in Latin America and the
Caribbean in FY2019 was provided through the foreign assistance accounts examined in this report. Caribbean in FY2019 was provided through the foreign assistance accounts examined in this report.
Several other sources of U.S. assistance to the region exist. Some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean Several other sources of U.S. assistance to the region exist. Some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
receive U.S. assistance to address humanitarian needs through USAID- and State Department-managed foreign receive U.S. assistance to address humanitarian needs through USAID- and State Department-managed foreign
assistance accounts, such as Food for Peace Act Title II, International Disaster Assistance, and Migration and assistance accounts, such as Food for Peace Act Title II, International Disaster Assistance, and Migration and
Refugee Assistance. Likewise, some countries receive assistance from other U.S. agencies, such as the Refugee Assistance. Likewise, some countries receive assistance from other U.S. agencies, such as the
Department of Defense, Mil ennium Chal enge Corporation, and Peace Corps. Moreover, multilateral Department of Defense, Mil ennium Chal enge Corporation, and Peace Corps. Moreover, multilateral
organizations that the United States supports financial y, such as the Organization of American States, the Inter-organizations that the United States supports financial y, such as the Organization of American States, the Inter-
American Development Bank, and the Pan American Health Organization, provide additional aid to the region. American Development Bank, and the Pan American Health Organization, provide additional aid to the region.
Except where indicated, those accounts, agencies, and organizations are excluded from this analysis, because they Except where indicated, those accounts, agencies, and organizations are excluded from this analysis, because they
do not request assistance for individual countries and because country-level funding figures are not publicly do not request assistance for individual countries and because country-level funding figures are not publicly
available until after the fiscal year has passed. available until after the fiscal year has passed.
Source: USAID, USAID,
Foreign Aid Explorer: The Official Record of U.S. Foreign Aid, at https://explorer.usaid.gov/at https://explorer.usaid.gov/
data.html. data.html.
1 For more information on U.S. policy in the region, see CRS Report R46258, 1 For more information on U.S. policy in the region, see CRS Report R46258,
Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S.
Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress, coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan. , coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan.
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations
Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean
Source: Map Resources, edited by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). Map Resources, edited by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations
Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America and
the Caribbean
The United States has long been a major contributor of foreign assistance to countries in Latin The United States has long been a major contributor of foreign assistance to countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Between 1946 and 2019, the United States provided nearly $94 America and the Caribbean. Between 1946 and 2019, the United States provided nearly $94
bil ion ($195 bil ion in constant 2017 dollars) of assistance to the region.2 U.S. assistance to the
bil ion ($195 bil ion in constant 2017 dollars) of assistance to the region.2 U.S. assistance to the
region spiked in the early 1960s, following the introduction of President John F. Kennedy’s region spiked in the early 1960s, following the introduction of President John F. Kennedy’s
Al iance for Progress, an anti-poverty initiative that sought to counter Soviet and Cuban influence Al iance for Progress, an anti-poverty initiative that sought to counter Soviet and Cuban influence
in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s 1959 seizure of power in Cuba. After a period of decline, U.S. in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s 1959 seizure of power in Cuba. After a period of decline, U.S.
assistance to the region increased again following the 1979 assumption of power by the leftist assistance to the region increased again following the 1979 assumption of power by the leftist
Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Throughout the 1980s, the United States provided considerable support
Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Throughout the 1980s, the United States provided considerable support
to Central American governments battling leftist insurgencies to prevent potential Soviet al ies to Central American governments battling leftist insurgencies to prevent potential Soviet al ies
from establishing political or military footholds in the region. U.S. aid flows declined in the mid-from establishing political or military footholds in the region. U.S. aid flows declined in the mid-
1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Central American civil 1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Central American civil
conflicts (s
conflicts (s
ee Figure 2). ).
Figure 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY1946-FY2019
Source: CRS presentation of data from U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), CRS presentation of data from U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
Foreign Aid
Explorer: The Official Record of U.S. Foreign Aid, at https://explorer.usaid.gov/data.html. at https://explorer.usaid.gov/data.html.
Notes: Includes aid obligations from al U.S. government agencies. Data for FY2020 are not yet available. Includes aid obligations from al U.S. government agencies. Data for FY2020 are not yet available.
U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase again in the late
U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase again in the late
1990s and remained on a general y upward trajectory through 2010. The higher levels of 1990s and remained on a general y upward trajectory through 2010. The higher levels of
2 T hese figures include aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies to the 33 independent Latin American and 2 T hese figures include aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies to the 33 independent Latin American and
Caribbean countries (identified iCaribbean countries (identified i
n Figure 1) and regional programs. U.S. Agency for International Development and regional programs. U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), (USAID),
Foreign Aid Explorer: The Official Record of U.S. Foreign Aid , accessed December 2020accessed December 2020
, at at
https://explorer.usaid.gov/data.html. https://explorer.usaid.gov/data.html.
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assistance were partial y the result of increased spending on humanitarian and development
assistance were partial y the result of increased spending on humanitarian and development
assistance. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided extensive assistance. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided extensive
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to several countries in Central America. The humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to several countries in Central America. The
establishment of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in 2003 and the Mil ennium establishment of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in 2003 and the Mil ennium
Chal enge Corporation in 2004 also provided many countries in the region with new sources of Chal enge Corporation in 2004 also provided many countries in the region with new sources of
U.S. assistance.3 In addition, the United States provided significant assistance to Haiti in the U.S. assistance.3 In addition, the United States provided significant assistance to Haiti in the
aftermath of a massive earthquake in 2010.
aftermath of a massive earthquake in 2010.
Increased funding for counter-narcotics and security programs also contributed to the rise in U.S.
Increased funding for counter-narcotics and security programs also contributed to the rise in U.S.
assistance. Beginning with President Bil Clinton and the 106th Congress in FY2000, successive
assistance. Beginning with President Bil Clinton and the 106th Congress in FY2000, successive
Administrations and Congresses provided significant amounts of foreign aid to Colombia and its Administrations and Congresses provided significant amounts of foreign aid to Colombia and its
Andean neighbors to combat drug trafficking and end Colombia’s long-running internal armed Andean neighbors to combat drug trafficking and end Colombia’s long-running internal armed
conflict. Spending received another boost in FY2008, when President George W. Bush joined conflict. Spending received another boost in FY2008, when President George W. Bush joined
with his Mexican counterpart to announce the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. counter-drug with his Mexican counterpart to announce the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. counter-drug
and anti-crime assistance for Mexico and Central America. In FY2010, Congress and the Obama and anti-crime assistance for Mexico and Central America. In FY2010, Congress and the Obama
Administration split the Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative into a separate Central
Administration split the Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative into a separate Central
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and created a similar program for the countries of America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and created a similar program for the countries of
the Caribbean known as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).
the Caribbean known as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).
U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to decline again in FY2011. Although
U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to decline again in FY2011. Although
the decline was partial y due to reductions in the overal U.S. foreign assistance budget in the the decline was partial y due to reductions in the overal U.S. foreign assistance budget in the
aftermath of a U.S. recession, it also reflected changes in the region. Due to stronger economic aftermath of a U.S. recession, it also reflected changes in the region. Due to stronger economic
growth and more effective social policies, the percentage of people living in poverty in Latin growth and more effective social policies, the percentage of people living in poverty in Latin
America fel from 45% in 2002 to an estimated 30% in 2019.4 Some countries, such as Argentina, America fel from 45% in 2002 to an estimated 30% in 2019.4 Some countries, such as Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay, were able to provide assistance to others in the
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay, were able to provide assistance to others in the
region. Other countries, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, expel ed U.S. personnel and opposed U.S. region. Other countries, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, expel ed U.S. personnel and opposed U.S.
assistance projects, leading to the closure of USAID field missions.5 Collectively, these changes assistance projects, leading to the closure of USAID field missions.5 Collectively, these changes
resulted in the U.S. government concentrating foreign assistance resources for Latin America and resulted in the U.S. government concentrating foreign assistance resources for Latin America and
the Caribbean in fewer countries and sectors.
the Caribbean in fewer countries and sectors.
Trump Administration’s FY2021 Foreign
Assistance Budget Request6
The Trump Administration requested $1.4 bil ion for Latin America and the Caribbean through The Trump Administration requested $1.4 bil ion for Latin America and the Caribbean through
foreign assistance accounts managed by the State Department and USAID in FY2021. That
foreign assistance accounts managed by the State Department and USAID in FY2021. That
amount would amount would
behave been $314 mil ion, $314 mil ion,
or 18%, less than the estimated $1.7 bil ionor 18%, less than the estimated $1.7 bil ion
of assistance of assistance
al ocated for the region in FY2020 (seal ocated for the region in FY2020 (se
e Table 1). The Administration also proposed eliminating . The Administration also proposed eliminating
the IAF—a smal , independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that promotes grassroots the IAF—a smal , independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that promotes grassroots
development in Latin America and the Caribbean—and consolidating its programs into USAID. development in Latin America and the Caribbean—and consolidating its programs into USAID.
3 For more information on the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, 3 For more information on the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Millennium Challenge Corporation,
see CRS In Focus IF10797, see CRS In Focus IF10797,
PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act: Expiring Authorities, by T iaji Salaam-Blyther; , by T iaji Salaam-Blyther;
and CRS Report RL32427, and CRS Report RL32427,
Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues, by Nick M. Brown. , by Nick M. Brown.
4 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean,4 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean,
Social Challenge in Times of COVID-19, May 12, , May 12,
2020, p. 2. 2020, p. 2.
5 USAID is reestablishing a field mission in Ecuador, but the process has been delayed by the Coronavirus Disease
5 USAID is reestablishing a field mission in Ecuador, but the process has been delayed by the Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
6 Unless otherwise noted, data and information in this section are drawn from U.S. Department of State,
6 Unless otherwise noted, data and information in this section are drawn from U.S. Department of State,
Congressional
Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2021 , February 20, 2020, at , February 20, 2020, at
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FY21-CBJ-Appendix-2-FINAL-2.pdf. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FY21-CBJ-Appendix-2-FINAL-2.pdf.
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The Administration’s proposed reductions for foreign assistance to the region
The Administration’s proposed reductions for foreign assistance to the region
arewere slightly lower slightly lower
than the nearly 26% cut proposed for foreign operations global y.7 than the nearly 26% cut proposed for foreign operations global y.7
Although comprehensive al ocations are not yet available, it appears as though Congress opted not adopt most of the
Administration’s proposed cuts (see “Legislative Developments,” below).
Foreign Assistance Categories and Accounts8
The Administration’s proposed FY2021 foreign aid budget for Latin America and the Caribbean The Administration’s proposed FY2021 foreign aid budget for Latin America and the Caribbean
requestsrequested $760.9 mil ion (54% of the total) through a new Economic Support and Development $760.9 mil ion (54% of the total) through a new Economic Support and Development
Fund (ESDF). As proposed, the ESDF foreign assistance account would Fund (ESDF). As proposed, the ESDF foreign assistance account would
consolidatehave consolidated aid that aid that
currently is provided through the Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Fund currently is provided through the Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Fund
(ESF) accounts to support democracy, the rule of law, economic reform, education, agriculture, (ESF) accounts to support democracy, the rule of law, economic reform, education, agriculture,
and natural resource management.9 Whereas administrations often have used the DA account for and natural resource management.9 Whereas administrations often have used the DA account for
long-term projects to foster broad-based economic progress and social stability in developing long-term projects to foster broad-based economic progress and social stability in developing
countries, the ESDF account, like the ESF account, would countries, the ESDF account, like the ESF account, would
focushave focused more on countries and more on countries and
programs programs
deemed critical to short-term U.S. security and strategic objectives. The FY2021 request deemed critical to short-term U.S. security and strategic objectives. The FY2021 request
includes included $74.5 mil ion$74.5 mil ion
(9%) less funding for the ESDF account than was al ocated to the (9%) less funding for the ESDF account than was al ocated to the
region through region through
the DA and ESF accounts combined in FY2020. the DA and ESF accounts combined in FY2020.
Another $132.8 mil ion (9%) of the Administration’s FY2021 request for the region would
Another $132.8 mil ion (9%) of the Administration’s FY2021 request for the region would
be
have been provided through two Global Healthprovided through two Global Health
Programs (GHP) accounts. This amount Programs (GHP) accounts. This amount
includesincluded $96.8 $96.8
mil ion requested through the State Department GHP account for HIV/AIDS programs and $36 mil ion requested through the State Department GHP account for HIV/AIDS programs and $36
mil ion requested through the USAID GHPmil ion requested through the USAID GHP
account to combat malaria and support maternal and account to combat malaria and support maternal and
child health, nutrition, and family planning programs. Under the FY2021 request for the region, child health, nutrition, and family planning programs. Under the FY2021 request for the region,
funding for the State Department GHP account would funding for the State Department GHP account would
declinehave declined by $60.9 mil ion by $60.9 mil ion
(39%) and (39%) and
funding for the USAID GHP account would funding for the USAID GHP account would
declinehave declined by $17.3 mil ion (32%) compared with by $17.3 mil ion (32%) compared with
the
the FY2020 estimate. FY2020 estimate.
The remaining $508.5 mil ion (36%) of the Administration’s FY2021 request for Latin America
The remaining $508.5 mil ion (36%) of the Administration’s FY2021 request for Latin America
and the Caribbean would
and the Caribbean would
supporthave supported security assistance programs, including the following security assistance programs, including the following
$452.9 mil ion requested through the International Narcotics Control and Law
$452.9 mil ion requested through the International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) account for counter-narcotics, civilian law enforcement
Enforcement (INCLE) account for counter-narcotics, civilian law enforcement
efforts, and projects intended to strengthen judicial institutions. INCLE funding efforts, and projects intended to strengthen judicial institutions. INCLE funding
for the region would for the region would
declinehave declined by $102.3 mil ion by $102.3 mil ion
(18%) compared with the FY2020 (18%) compared with the FY2020
estimate. estimate.
$24 mil ion requested through the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining,
$24 mil ion requested through the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining,
and Related Programs (NADR) account to help countries in the region carry out
and Related Programs (NADR) account to help countries in the region carry out
humanitarian demining programs, strengthen conventional weapons stockpile humanitarian demining programs, strengthen conventional weapons stockpile
management, develop strategic trade controls and border security measures, and management, develop strategic trade controls and border security measures, and
enhance their counterterrorism capacities. NADR funding would decline by $3.3 mil ion (12%) compared with the FY2020 estimate.
7 For more information on the global foreign aid budget, see CRS Report R46367, 7 For more information on the global foreign aid budget, see CRS Report R46367,
Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Program s: FY2021 Budget and Appropriations, by Cory R. Gill, Marian L. Lawson, and , by Cory R. Gill, Marian L. Lawson, and
Emily M. Morgenstern. Emily M. Morgenstern.
8 For more information on the various foreign assistance accounts and the programs they fund, see CRS Report
8 For more information on the various foreign assistance accounts and the programs they fund, see CRS Report
R40482, R40482,
Departm ent of State, Foreign Operations Appropriations: A Guide to Com ponent Accounts, by Nick M. , by Nick M.
Brown and Cory R. Gill. Brown and Cory R. Gill.
9 T he Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF) account also would consolidate aid currently provided 9 T he Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF) account also would consolidate aid currently provided
through the Democracy Fund and Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia accounts, which are not major through the Democracy Fund and Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia accounts, which are not major
sources of funding for the region. T he Administration requested funding through the proposed ESDF accoun t in sources of funding for the region. T he Administration requested funding through the proposed ESDF accoun t in
FY2018, FY2019, and FY2020, but Congress did not support the consolidation of existing foreign assistance accounts. FY2018, FY2019, and FY2020, but Congress did not support the consolidation of existing foreign assistance accounts.
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations
enhance their counterterrorism capacities. NADR funding would have declined by $3.3 mil ion (12%) compared with the FY2020 estimate.
$11.6 mil ion requested through the International Military Education and $11.6 mil ion requested through the International Military Education and
Training (IMET) account to train Latin American and Caribbean military
Training (IMET) account to train Latin American and Caribbean military
personnel. IMET funding would personnel. IMET funding would
decreasehave decreased by $2.8 by $2.8
millionmil ion (19%) compared with (19%) compared with
the FY2020 estimate. the FY2020 estimate.
$20 mil ion requested through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account to
$20 mil ion requested through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account to
provide U.S. military equipment and services to Colombia. FMF funding for the
provide U.S. military equipment and services to Colombia. FMF funding for the
region would region would
declinehave declined by $52.7 mil ion by $52.7 mil ion
(72%) compared with the FY2020 (72%) compared with the FY2020
estimate. estimate.
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Account:
FY2016-FY2021 Request
(mil ions of current U.S. dol ars)
(mil ions of current U.S. dol ars)
Account
FY2016
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
% Change
(est.)
(req.)
FY20E-
FY21R
DA
DA
484.4
484.4
484.4
484.4
386.2
386.2
385.3
385.3
457.8
457.8
0.0
0.0
—a
ESF
ESF
402.9
402.9
352.
352.
0b
419
419
.1b
402
402
.3b
377
377
.6b
0.0
0.0
—a
ESDF
ESDF
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
760.9
760.9
-9
-9
%a
GHP
GHP
66.4
66.4
64.4
64.4
63.4
63.4
53.3
53.3
53.3
53.3
36.0
36.0
-32%
-32%
(USAID)
(USAID)
GHP
GHP
123.0
123.0
117.7
117.7
136.7
136.7
170.5
170.5
157.7
157.7
96.8
96.8
-39%
-39%
(State)
(State)
INCLE
INCLE
524.4
524.4
533.2
533.2
542.2
542.2
564.3
564.3
555.2
555.2
452.9
452.9
-18%
-18%
NADR
NADR
8.6
8.6
25.4
25.4
23.5
23.5
25.8
25.8
27.3
27.3
24.0
24.0
-12%
-12%
IMET
IMET
13.0
13.0
13.4
13.4
11.2
11.2
9.9
9.9
14.4
14.4
11.6
11.6
-19%
-19%
FMF
FMF
69.4
69.4
82.7
82.7
86.0
86.0
82.8
82.8
72.7
72.7
20.0
20.0
-72%
-72%
Total
1,691.9
1,673.2b
1,668.4bc
1,694.1b
1,716.0bd
1,402.3
-18%
Sources: U.S. Department of StateU.S. Department of State
, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2018-FY2021, at , at
https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/; and U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/; and U.S. Department of State,
FY2020 estimate data, June 15, 2020. FY2020 estimate data, June 15, 2020.
Notes: DA = Development Assistance; ESDF = Economic Support and Development Fund; ESF = Economic DA = Development Assistance; ESDF = Economic Support and Development Fund; ESF = Economic
Support Fund; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; GHP = Global Health Programs; IMET = International Military Support Fund; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; GHP = Global Health Programs; IMET = International Military
Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR =
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; State = Department of State; USAID = U.S. Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; State = Department of State; USAID = U.S.
Agency for International Development. Agency for International Development.
a. The FY2021 request would consolidate several foreign assistance accounts, including DA and ESF, into a a. The FY2021 request would consolidate several foreign assistance accounts, including DA and ESF, into a
new ESDF account. The table compares the FY2021 ESDF request with the combined FY2020 DA and ESF
new ESDF account. The table compares the FY2021 ESDF request with the combined FY2020 DA and ESF
estimates. estimates.
b. Congress appropriated an additional $9 mil ion of ESF for the region each year from FY2017 to FY2019, and
b. Congress appropriated an additional $9 mil ion of ESF for the region each year from FY2017 to FY2019, and
an additional $5 mil ion of ESF for the region in FY2020. Those funds are not included in this table, because
an additional $5 mil ion of ESF for the region in FY2020. Those funds are not included in this table, because
they were appropriated as multilateral assistance through the Organization of American States. they were appropriated as multilateral assistance through the Organization of American States.
c. FY2018 totals represent al ocations as of the end of that fiscal year. The Trump Administration
c. FY2018 totals represent al ocations as of the end of that fiscal year. The Trump Administration
subsequently reprogrammed approximately $
subsequently reprogrammed approximately $
405396 mil ion of FY2018 aid Congress had appropriated for El mil ion of FY2018 aid Congress had appropriated for El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, real ocating some of those funds outside the Latin American and Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, real ocating some of those funds outside the Latin American and
Caribbean region. Caribbean region.
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d. FY2020 totals do not include any of the funding made available for Latin America and the Caribbean through d. FY2020 totals do not include any of the funding made available for Latin America and the Caribbean through
supplemental emergency appropriations to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.
supplemental emergency appropriations to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Major Country and Regional Programs
The Trump Administration’s FY2021 budget request would The Trump Administration’s FY2021 budget request would
reducehave reduced U.S. assistance for U.S. assistance for
most
most countries and regional programs in Latin America and the Caribbean (secountries and regional programs in Latin America and the Caribbean (se
e Table 2).
The FY2021 request includesCaribbean Basin Security Initiative. The FY2021 request included $32 mil ion for the CBSI, which would have been a $28 mil ion (47%) cut compared with the FY2020 estimate. The CBSI
funds maritime and aerial security cooperation, law enforcement capacity building, border and
port security, justice sector reform, and crime prevention programs in the Caribbean.10
Central America. The FY2021 request included $376.9 mil ion to address the underlying
$376.9 mil ion to address the underlying conditions driving conditions driving
irregular migration from irregular migration from
Central America to the United States by promoting good governance, to the United States by promoting good governance,
economic prosperity, and improved security in the region. That would economic prosperity, and improved security in the region. That would
behave been a $156.3 mil ion (29%) a $156.3 mil ion (29%)
cut compared with the FY2020 estimate. The request cut compared with the FY2020 estimate. The request
doesdid not include any foreign aid specifical y not include any foreign aid specifical y
for El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras (the “Northern Triangle” of Central America). However, for El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras (the “Northern Triangle” of Central America). However,
the Administration the Administration
assertsasserted that those countries could receive a that those countries could receive a
portion of the assistance requested portion of the assistance requested
for CARSI and the USAID Latin America and Caribbean Regional Program if their governments for CARSI and the USAID Latin America and Caribbean Regional Program if their governments
continuecontinued to take action to stem migration to the United to take action to stem migration to the United
States.States.
1011
Colombia would remain. Colombia would have remained the single largest recipient of U.S. assistance in Latin America and the the single largest recipient of U.S. assistance in Latin America and the
Caribbean under the Administration’s FY2021 request; however, aid would Caribbean under the Administration’s FY2021 request; however, aid would
fal have fal en to $412.9 to $412.9
mil ion—amil ion—a
$38.8 mil ion (9%) reduction compared with the FY2020 estimate. Colombia has $38.8 mil ion (9%) reduction compared with the FY2020 estimate. Colombia has
received significant U.S. assistance to support counter-narcotics and counterterrorism efforts received significant U.S. assistance to support counter-narcotics and counterterrorism efforts
since FY2000, and the FY2021 request would since FY2000, and the FY2021 request would
providehave provided continued continued
support for Colombia’s drug support for Colombia’s drug
eradication and interdiction efforts. The request also would eradication and interdiction efforts. The request also would
supporthave supported the ongoing implementation the ongoing implementation
of the Colombian government’s peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia of the Colombian government’s peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC), including with aid intended to foster reconciliation within Colombian society, expand (FARC), including with aid intended to foster reconciliation within Colombian society, expand
state presence to regions historical y under state presence to regions historical y under
FARC control, and support rural economic FARC control, and support rural economic
development in marginalized communities.development in marginalized communities.
11
Venezuela is one of the few countries in the region for which the Administration has requested increased assistance. Although the country continues to contend with interrelated political, economic, and humanitarian crises, the Administration’s request assumes there wil be progress toward the reestablishment of democracy by FY2021. The request would provide $205 mil ion to support the transitional government, improve food security, strengthen the health system, stabilize
the energy sector, and foster economic growth. Total aid to Venezuela would increase by $170
mil ion (486%) compared with the FY2020 estimate.12
12
Haiti. Haiti, which has received high levels of aid for many years due to its significant development , which has received high levels of aid for many years due to its significant development
chal enges, would chal enges, would
behave been the third-largest recipient of U.S. assistance in the region in FY2021 under the third-largest recipient of U.S. assistance in the region in FY2021 under
the Administration’s request. U.S. assistance increased significantly after the Administration’s request. U.S. assistance increased significantly after
a massive earthquake a massive earthquake
struck Haiti in 2010 but has struck Haiti in 2010 but has
declined gradual y gradual y
declined from those elevated levels. The Administration’s from those elevated levels. The Administration’s
FY2021 request would FY2021 request would
providehave provided $128.2 mil ion to Haiti to help address health chal enges $128.2 mil ion to Haiti to help address health chal enges
(particularly HIV/AIDS), support credible elections, strengthen government and police capacity, (particularly HIV/AIDS), support credible elections, strengthen government and police capacity,
improve food security, and increase economic opportunity. This improve food security, and increase economic opportunity. This
would be
would have been a $44.4 mil ion a $44.4 mil ion
(26%) (26%)
cut compared with the FY2020 estimate.13 cut compared with the FY2020 estimate.13
10 For more information10 For more information
on the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, by Mark P. Sullivan. 11 For more information on U.S. policy toward Central America, see CRS In Focus IF10371, on U.S. policy toward Central America, see CRS In Focus IF10371,
U.S. Strategy for
Engagem ent in Central Am erica: An Overview, by Peter J. Meyer. , by Peter J. Meyer.
11
12 For more information on U.S. policy toward Colombia, see CRS Report R43813, For more information on U.S. policy toward Colombia, see CRS Report R43813,
Colombia: Background and U.S.
Relations, by June S. Beittel, by June S. Beittel
.
12 For more information on U.S. policy toward Venezuela, see CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S.
Relations, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke. .
13 For more information on U.S. policy toward Haiti, see CRS Report R45034,
13 For more information on U.S. policy toward Haiti, see CRS Report R45034,
Haiti’s Political and Economic
Conditions, by Maureen T aft -Morales. , by Maureen T aft -Morales.
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1314 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations
Mexico would receive. Mexico would have received $63.8 mil ion $63.8 mil ion
of assistance under the FY2021 request, which would of assistance under the FY2021 request, which would
be a have been a $94.2 mil ion (60%) cut compared with the FY2020 estimate. Mexico traditional y was not a $94.2 mil ion (60%) cut compared with the FY2020 estimate. Mexico traditional y was not a
major U.S. aid recipient due to its middle-income status, but it began receiving larger amounts of major U.S. aid recipient due to its middle-income status, but it began receiving larger amounts of
counter-narcoticscounternarcotics and anti-crime assistance through the Mérida Initiative in FY2008. The and anti-crime assistance through the Mérida Initiative in FY2008. The
Administration’s FY2021 request for Mexico would Administration’s FY2021 request for Mexico would
fund have funded efforts to strengthen the rule of law; efforts to strengthen the rule of law;
secure borders and ports; and combat transnational organized secure borders and ports; and combat transnational organized
crime, including opium poppy crime, including opium poppy
cultivation and heroin and fentanyl production.14 cultivation and heroin and fentanyl production.14
The FY2021 request includes $32 mil ion for the CBSI, which would be a $28 mil ion (47%) cut
compared with the FY2020 estimate. The CBSI funds maritime and aerial security cooperation, law enforcement capacity building, border and port security, justice sector reform, and crime
prevention programs in the CaribbeanVenezuela. Venezuela is one of the few countries in the region for which the Administration
requested increased assistance. Although the country continues to contend with interrelated political, economic, and humanitarian crises, the Administration’s request assumed there would be progress toward the reestablishment of democracy by FY2021. The request would have provided $205 mil ion to support a transitional government, improve food security, strengthen the health system, stabilize the energy sector, and foster economic growth. Total aid to Venezuela
would have increased by $170 mil ion (486%) compared with the FY2020 estimate.15 .15
Table 2. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Country or
Regional Program: FY2016-FY2021 Request
(thousands of current U.S. dol ars)
(thousands of current U.S. dol ars)
FY2016
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
% Change
(est.)
(req.)
FY20E-
FY21R
Argentina
Argentina
579
579
624
624
2,918
2,918
3,089
3,089
3,100
3,100
600
600
-81%
-81%
Bahamas
Bahamas
207
207
173
173
138
138
196
196
200
200
200
200
—
—
Belize
Belize
1,243
1,243
1,241
1,241
1,143
1,143
235
235
1,250
1,250
200
200
-84%
-84%
Bolivia
Bolivia
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
—
—
Brazil
Brazil
12,858
12,858
11,690
11,690
11,423
11,423
11,619
11,619
15,800
15,800
625
625
-96%
-96%
Chile
Chile
670
670
689
689
357
357
487
487
600
600
400
400
-33%
-33%
Colombia
Colombia
293,081
293,081
384,248
384,248
384,312
384,312
421,180
421,180
451,703
451,703
412,900
412,900
-9%
-9%
Costa Rica
Costa Rica
1,819
1,819
5,718
5,718
5,725
5,725
8,180
8,180
8,225
8,225
400
400
-95%
-95%
Cuba
Cuba
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
10,000
10,000
-50%
-50%
Dominican
Dominican
21,615
21,615
13,736
13,736
20,174
20,174
36,777
36,777
28,661
28,661
15,500
15,500
-46%
-46%
Republic
Republic
Ecuador
Ecuador
2,000
2,000
1,789
1,789
1,789
1,789
12,000
12,000
19,450
19,450
17,200
17,200
-12%
-12%
El Salvador
El Salvador
67,900
67,900
72,759
72,759
57,65
57,65
6a
0b
72,700
72,700
0
0
-100%
-100%
Guatemala
Guatemala
127,515
127,515
125,493
125,493
108,45
108,45
3a
0b
79,450
79,450
0
0
-100%
-100%
Guyana
Guyana
243
243
277
277
239
239
176
176
200
200
200
200
—
—
Haiti
Haiti
185,076
185,076
164,552
164,552
181,319
181,319
193,752
193,752
172,520
172,520
128,155
128,155
-26%
-26%
Honduras
Honduras
98,250
98,250
95,260
95,260
79,67
79,67
8a
0b
65,800
65,800
0
0
-100%
-100%
Jamaica
Jamaica
5,065
5,065
10,597
10,597
1,335
1,335
1,598
1,598
1,600
1,600
600
600
-63%
-63%
Mexico
160,156
138,566
151,263
162,410
157,910
63,750
-60%
Nicaragua
10,000
9,679
10,000
11,610
10,000
10,000
—
14 For more information on U.S. policy toward Mexico, see CRS Report R42917, 14 For more information on U.S. policy toward Mexico, see CRS Report R42917,
Mexico: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Clare Ribando Seelke. , by Clare Ribando Seelke.
15 For more information on 15 For more information on
the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative, by Mark P. SullivanU.S. policy toward Venezuela, see CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke. .
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1314 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations
FY2016
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
% Change
(est.)
(req.)
FY20E-
FY21R
Mexico
160,156
138,566
151,263
162,410
157,910
63,750
-60%
Nicaragua
10,000
9,679
10,000
11,610
10,000
10,000
—
Panama Panama
3,346
3,346
3,271
3,271
3,086
3,086
1,162
1,162
3,225
3,225
1,100
1,100
-66%
-66%
Paraguay
Paraguay
8,620
8,620
6,150
6,150
4,297
4,297
4,397
4,397
4,400
4,400
4,400
4,400
—
—
Peru
Peru
74,898
74,898
64,473
64,473
74,814
74,814
75,396
75,396
77,200
77,200
68,600
68,600
-11%
-11%
Suriname
Suriname
215
215
269
269
167
167
195
195
200
200
200
200
—
—
Trinidad and
Trinidad and
325
325
343
343
341
341
326
326
350
350
300
300
-14%
-14%
Tobago
Tobago
Uruguay
Uruguay
499
499
498
498
401
401
385
385
400
400
300
300
-25%
-25%
Venezuela
Venezuela
6,500
6,500
7,000
7,000
15,000
15,000
22,500
22,500
35,000
35,000
205,000
205,000
+486%
+486%
Barbados and
Barbados and
26,425
26,425
26,629
26,629
24,027
24,027
3,456
3,456
13,950
13,950
3,550
3,550
-75%
-75%
Eastern
Eastern
Caribbean Caribbean
USAID
USAID
4,000
4,000
3,000
3,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
10,000
10,000
0
0
-100%
-100%
Caribbean
Caribbean
Development Development
USAID
USAID
39,761
39,761
38,316
38,316
19,93
19,93
1a
181,39
181,39
0b
5,000
5,000
0
0
-100%
-100%
Central
Central
America America
Regional Regional
USAID South
USAID South
12,000
12,000
14,000
14,000
18,065
18,065
18,000
18,000
15,000
15,000
15,500
15,500
+3%
+3%
America
America
Regional Regional
USAID Latin
USAID Latin
28,360
28,360
26,700
26,700
51,600
51,600
68,300
68,300
39,978
39,978
199,650
199,650
+399%
+399%
America and
America and
Caribbean Caribbean
Regional Regional
State
State
478,668
478,668
425,471
425,471
414,795
414,795
431,313
431,313
402,135
402,135
242,926
242,926
-40%
-40%
Western
Western
Hemisphere Hemisphere
Regional Regional
[CARSI]
[348,500]
[329,225]
[319,225]a
[290,000]
[270,000]
[185,000]
[-31%]
[CBSI]
[57,721]
[57,700]
[57,700]
[58,000]
[60,000]
[32,000]
[-47%]
Total
1,691,894
1,673,211
1,668,446a
1,694,129
1,716,007c
1,402,256
-18%
Sources: U.S. Department of StateU.S. Department of State
, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2018-FY2021, at , at
https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/; and U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/; and U.S. Department of State,
FY2020 estimate data, June 15, 2020. FY2020 estimate data, June 15, 2020.
Notes: CARSI = Central America Regional Security Initiative; CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. CARSI CARSI = Central America Regional Security Initiative; CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. CARSI
and CBSI are funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program. USAID and State Department and CBSI are funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program. USAID and State Department
regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as wel as activities that cross borders or take place in regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as wel as activities that cross borders or take place in
nonpresence countries. nonpresence countries.
a. FY2018 totals represent al ocations as of the end of that fiscal year. The Trump Administration a. FY2018 totals represent al ocations as of the end of that fiscal year. The Trump Administration
subsequently reprogrammed approximately $
subsequently reprogrammed approximately $
405396 mil ion of FY2018 aid Congress had appropriated for El mil ion of FY2018 aid Congress had appropriated for El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
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b. Due to the Trump Administration’s suspension of aid to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, $181.4 b. Due to the Trump Administration’s suspension of aid to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, $181.4
mil ion of FY2019 assistance had yet to be al ocated when the Administration released its FY2021 request.
mil ion of FY2019 assistance had yet to be al ocated when the Administration released its FY2021 request.
c. FY2020 totals do not include any of the funding made available for Latin America and the Caribbean through
c. FY2020 totals do not include any of the funding made available for Latin America and the Caribbean through
supplemental emergency appropriations to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.
supplemental emergency appropriations to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Inter-American Foundation
In addition to the proposed reductions to State Department and USAID-managed assistance for In addition to the proposed reductions to State Department and USAID-managed assistance for
the region, for the fourth consecutive year, the Trump Administration’s FY2021 budget request
the region, for the fourth consecutive year, the Trump Administration’s FY2021 budget request
proposed eliminating the IAF and consolidating its programs into USAID.16 The IAF is an proposed eliminating the IAF and consolidating its programs into USAID.16 The IAF is an
independent U.S. foreign assistance agency established through the Foreign Assistance Act of independent U.S. foreign assistance agency established through the Foreign Assistance Act of
1969 (22 U.S.C. §290f). Congress created the agency after conducting a comprehensive review of 1969 (22 U.S.C. §290f). Congress created the agency after conducting a comprehensive review of
previous assistance efforts and determining that programs at the government-to-government level previous assistance efforts and determining that programs at the government-to-government level
had not promoted significant social and civic change in the region despite fostering economic
had not promoted significant social and civic change in the region despite fostering economic
growth.17 The IAF provides grants and other targeted assistance directly to the organized poor to growth.17 The IAF provides grants and other targeted assistance directly to the organized poor to
foster economic and social development and to encourage civic engagement in their communities. foster economic and social development and to encourage civic engagement in their communities.
The IAF is active in 24 countries in the region—including 8 countries where USAID no longer The IAF is active in 24 countries in the region—including 8 countries where USAID no longer
has field missions—and has focused particularly on migrant-sending communities in Central has field missions—and has focused particularly on migrant-sending communities in Central
America since 2014.
America since 2014.
The Trump Administration
The Trump Administration
assertsasserted that merging the IAF’s smal grants programs into USAID that merging the IAF’s smal grants programs into USAID
would “better integrate [those smal grants] with USAID’s existing global development programs, would “better integrate [those smal grants] with USAID’s existing global development programs,
more cohesively serve U.S. foreign policy objectives, and increase organizational efficiencies
more cohesively serve U.S. foreign policy objectives, and increase organizational efficiencies
through reducing duplication and overhead.”18 The FY2021 request through reducing duplication and overhead.”18 The FY2021 request
includesincluded $3.9 mil ion to $3.9 mil ion to
conduct an orderly closeout of the IAF (seconduct an orderly closeout of the IAF (se
e Table 3). Opponents of the merger . Opponents of the merger
notenoted that Congress that Congress
specifical y created the IAF as an alternative to other U.S. agencies. They specifical y created the IAF as an alternative to other U.S. agencies. They
argueargued that USAID that USAID
would not be able to maintain the IAF’s distinct model and flexibility, which have would not be able to maintain the IAF’s distinct model and flexibility, which have
al owed the al owed the
IAF to invest in innovative projects and work with groups that otherwise would be IAF to invest in innovative projects and work with groups that otherwise would be
unable or unable or
unwil ing to partner with the U.S. government.unwil ing to partner with the U.S. government.
Table 3. Inter-American Foundation (IAF) Appropriations: FY2016-FY2021 Request
(mil ions of current U.S. dol ars)
(mil ions of current U.S. dol ars)
FY2016
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
% Change
(est.)
(req.)
FY20-FY21
22.5
22.5
22.5
22.5
30.0
30.0
22.5
22.5
37.5
37.5
3.9
3.9
-90%
-90%
Source: U.S. Department of StateU.S. Department of State
, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2018-FY2021, at , at
https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/. https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/.
Legislative Developments
On October 1, 2020, President Trump signed into law a short-term continuing resolution (P.L.
116-159), which funds foreign aid programs at the FY2020 level until December 11, 2020. As Congress considers appropriations for the remainder of FY2021, it may draw from the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2021 (Division A of H.R. 7608), which the House passed on July 24, 2020, and the draft Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measure that the Senate
Similar to prior years, Congress did not conclude action on appropriations for FY2021 until several months into the fiscal year. Although the House passed a foreign aid appropriations measure (Division A of H.R. 7608; H.Rept. 116-444) in July 2020 and the Senate Appropriations 16 T he T rump Administration is not the first to propose elimination of the Inter-American Foundation. In 1999, 16 T he T rump Administration is not the first to propose elimination of the Inter-American Foundation. In 1999,
Congress passed legislation (P.L. 106-113, later amended by P.L. 106-429) that authorized the President during Congress passed legislation (P.L. 106-113, later amended by P.L. 106-429) that authorized the President during
FY2000-FY2001 to abolish the Inter-American Foundation. However, the President did not exercise FY2000-FY2001 to abolish the Inter-American Foundation. However, the President did not exercise
thatth at authority. authority.
17 H.Rept. 91-611, p. 57.
17 H.Rept. 91-611, p. 57.
18 U.S. Department of State, 18 U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Program s, Fiscal Year 2021, February 10, 2020, p. 85. , February 10, 2020, p. 85.
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Appropriations Committee released Committee released
ona draft bil in November November
10, 2020. Although H.R. 7608, the accompanying report (H.Rept. 116-444), and the Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft bil and explanatory statement do not specify comprehensive 2020, neither was enacted. Instead, Congress passed a series of continuing resolutions that funded foreign aid programs in the region at the FY2020 level from October 1, 2020 until December 27, 2020, when President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260). The act and the accompanying explanatory statement do not specify appropriations levels for every Latin appropriations levels for every Latin
American and Caribbean country, American and Caribbean country,
but the amounts they designate for several the amounts they designate for several
key U.S. initiatives U.S. initiatives
differ significantly differ significantly
from the Administration’s request (sefrom the Administration’s request (se
e Table 4).19 .19
Table 4. U.S. Foreign Assistance for SelectSelected Countries and Initiatives:
FY2021 Appropriations Legislation
(mil ions of current U.S. dol ars)
(mil ions of current U.S. dol ars)
Senate
Committee
FY2020 (est.)
FY2021 (req.)
H.R. 7608
Committee DraftDraft
P.L. 116-260
Caribbean Basin
Caribbean Basin
60.0
60.0
32.0
32.0
74.8
74.8
60.0
60.0
74.8
Security Initiative Security Initiative
Central America
Central America
533.2
533.2
376.9
376.9
519.9
519.9
505.9
505.9
505.9
Colombia Colombia
451.7
451.7
412.9
412.9
457.3
457.3
455.4
455.4
461.4
Haiti Haiti
172.5
172.5
128.2
128.2
51.
51.
0a
172.5
172.5
51.0a
Inter-American Inter-American
37.5
37.5
3.9
3.9
41.
41.
5b
37.5
37.5
38.0
Foundation Foundation
Mexico
Mexico
157.9
157.9
63.8
63.8
159.9
159.9
157.9
157.9
158.9
Venezuela Venezuela
35.0
35.0
205.0
205.0
30.0
30.0
35.0
35.0
Source33.0
Sources: H.R. 7608H.R. 7608
,; H.Rept. 116-444 H.Rept. 116-444
, and; the Senate Appropriations the Senate Appropriations
Committee’s draft bil and explanatory Committee’s draft bil and explanatory
statementstatement
. Notes: a. The bil , available at https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/news/committee-releases-fy21-bil s-in-effort-to-advance-process-produce-bipartisan-results; P.L. 116-260; and the explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-260, available at https://docs.house.gov/bil sthisweek/20201221/BILLS-116RCP68-JES-DIVISION-K.pdf. Notes: a. P.L. 116-260, like H.R. 7608, designates $51 mil ion of DA for Haiti, but does not specify appropriations designates $51 mil ion of DA for Haiti, but does not specify appropriations
levels for other foreign levels for other foreign
assistance accounts. assistance accounts.
b.
b.
The bil also providesH.R. 7608 would have provided an additional $10 mil ion of emergency funding for the IAF to respond to an additional $10 mil ion of emergency funding for the IAF to respond to
the COVID-the COVID-
19 pandemic. 19 pandemic.
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. .
H.R. 7608 would provideP.L. 116-260 provides “not less than” $74.8 mil ion for “not less than” $74.8 mil ion for
the CBSI. H.Rept. 116-444 states that “not less than” $10 mil ion of those funds would be to strengthen Caribbean countries’ resilience to emergencies and disasters. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft explanatory statement would provide $60 mil ion for the CBSI as wel as $17.5 mil ion of DA to “enhance island disaster recovery and resilience, and to assist
the Caribbean region in adapting to, and mitigating the effects of, climate change.”
Central America. H.R. 7608 would provide “not less than” $519.9 mil ion for Central America, including “not less than” $420.8 mil ion for the Northern Triangle. The Senate Appropriations
Committee’s draft bil and explanatory statement would provide $505.9 mil ion for Central America, including at least $203 mil ion for the Northern Triangle. Both bil s would direct U.S. agencies to prioritize “programs and activities that address the key factors that contribute to the
migration of unaccompanied, undocumented minors to the United States.”
19 T he Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft bill is available at https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SFOPSFY2021.pdf; the draft explanatory statement is available at https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SFOPSRept.pdf.
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Colombia. H.R. 7608 would provide “not less than” $457.3 mil ion for Colombia. According to
H.Rept. 116-444, that assistance would support the Colombian government’s efforts to
implement the peace accord; assist communities with significant migrant, refugee, and internal y displaced
populations;
combat drug trafficking and illegal armed groups; assist farmers in eradicating and replacing coca; promote economic and social development; strengthen governance and the rule of law; enhance the security and stability of Colombia and the broader region; and protect human rights defenders and communities at risk.
The Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft bil would provide “not less than” $455.4 mil ion
for Colombia. The draft explanatory statement notes particular support for programs to reintegrate demobilized combatants, land restitution and land titling efforts, and Colombia’s Special Unit for the Search of Persons Considered Disappeared and the Commission for the
Elucidation of Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition.
Haiti. H.Rept. 116-444 would provide $51 mil ion of DA for Haiti butthe CBSI, which is nearly $43 mil ion more than the Trump Administration requested and nearly $15
mil ion more than was al ocated to the initiative in FY2020.
Central America. P.L. 116-260 states that $505.9 mil ion “should be made available” for Central America and that such assistance “shal be prioritized for programs and activities that address the key factors that contribute to the migration of unaccompanied, undocumented minors to the United States.” That amount is $129 mil ion more than the Administration requested but $27
mil ion less than was al ocated to the region in FY2020. As in prior years, the act requires the State Department to withhold some assistance for the Northern Triangle countries until it can certify the Northern Triangle governments are addressing certain congressional concerns. The
19 T he Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft bill is available at https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SFOPSFY2021.pdf; the draft explanatory statement is available at https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SFOPSRept.pdf.
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explanatory statement accompanying the act designates country-by-country funding levels, as wel as al ocations for certain priorities, including $45 mil ion to support Offices of Attorneys General and other entities to combat corruption and impunity and $25 mil ion to combat sexual
and gender-based violence in the region.
Colombia. P.L. 116-260 provides “not less than” $461.4 mil ion for Colombia, which is $48.5 mil ion more than the Administration requested and nearly $10 mil ion more than al ocated to the country in FY2020. As in previous years, the act requires the State Department to withhold some security assistance for Colombia until it can certify the Colombian government is taking action to
address counternarcotics and human rights concerns. The explanatory statement accompanying the act specifies funding levels for certain congressional priorities, including $46 mil ion for rule-of-law and human rights programs and $20 mil ion for Afro-Colombian and indigenous
communities.
Haiti. The explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-260 al ocates $51 mil ion of DA for Haiti. It does not specify does not specify
appropriations levels for other foreign assistance accountsappropriations levels for other foreign assistance accounts
. The Senate Appropriations
Committee’s draft explanatory statement would provide $172.5 mil ion for Haiti.
Inter-American Foundation. H.R. 7608 would provide $41.5 mil ion for the IAF. H.Rept. 116-444 stipulates that $10 mil ion of those funds would be for programs in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and that the agency’s increased appropriation should support a pilot exchange
program between indigenous IAF grantees and Native American tribes. The House bil also would provide an additional $10 mil ion of emergency funding for the IAF “to prevent, prepare for, and respond to” the COVID-19 pandemic. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft bil
would provide $37.5 mil ion for the IAF.
Mexico. According to H.Rept. 116-444, the House bil would provide $159.9 mil ion for Mexico. The report would direct U.S. agencies to prioritize efforts to improve the capacities of Mexican security and justice sector institutions to combat transnational criminal organizations and “keep communities safe on both sides of the border.” The Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft
explanatory statement would provide $157.9 mil ion for Mexico.
Venezuela. H.R. 7608 and the Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft bil both would provide “not less than” $30 mil ion for democracy programs in Venezuela. H.Rept. 116-444 would urge
the Secretary of State and the USAID Administrator to al ocate additional funds to support a peaceful democratic transition in Venezuela “as conditions permit.” The Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft explanatory statement would provide an additional $5 mil ion for health
programs in Venezuela.
Policy Issues for Congress
Congress may examine a number of policy issues as it continues to consider, however, so the total amount of aid to be provided to Haiti remains unclear. The act maintains a certification requirement from prior years that directs the State Department to withhold some assistance for
Haiti until the Haitian government takes steps to strengthen the rule of law, combat corruption,
and increase government revenues.
Inter-American Foundation. P.L. 116-260 provides $38 mil ion for the IAF, rejecting the
Administration’s proposal to close the agency and increasing the IAF’s annual appropriation by $500,000 compared with FY2020. The explanatory statement accompanying the act designates $10 mil ion of the funds appropriated for Central America to be provided through the IAF and notes that the act provides funding to support a pilot exchange program between indigenous IAF
grantees and Native American tribes.
Mexico. The explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-260 al ocates $159.9 mil ion for Mexico, which is $95 mil ion more than the Administration requested and $1 mil ion more than was al ocated to the country in FY2020. The explanatory statement also directs the State
Department to withhold some FMF from Mexico until it can certify the Mexican government is
cooperating on counternarcotics efforts and addressing human rights concerns.
Venezuela. P.L. 116-260 provides “not less than” $33 mil ion for democracy programs in
Venezuela. That amount is $172 mil ion less than the Administration requested and $2 mil ion
less than was al ocated to the country in FY2020.
Policy Issues for Congress The 116th Congress examined a variety of policy issues as it considered FY2021 appropriations for appropriations for
foreign operations in Latin America and the Caribbean. These issues foreign operations in Latin America and the Caribbean. These issues
includeincluded how to respond how to respond
to to
the COVID-19 pandemic, whether to exert greater congressional control over U.S. assistance to the COVID-19 pandemic, whether to exert greater congressional control over U.S. assistance to
Central America, and how the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation Central America, and how the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation
might
may complement U.S. assistance efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean. complement U.S. assistance efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Many of these policy
issues could be subject to further debate, legislation, and oversight in the 117th Congress.
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COVID-19 Response20
Conditions in Latin America and the Caribbean Conditions in Latin America and the Caribbean
have changed significantly changed significantly
since the between the Trump
Administration
Administration
released’s release of its FY2021 budget request in February 2020 its FY2021 budget request in February 2020
and the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), on December 27, 2020. The region emerged as an . The region emerged as an
epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic in late Mayepicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic in late May
, and it now accounts for 20 and accounted for 19% of total cases and % of total cases and
3028% of deaths recorded worldwide% of deaths recorded worldwide
by the end of the year. As of December . As of December
331, 2020, , 2020,
the region had recorded the region had recorded
more than
13some 15.6 mil ion mil ion
cases and more than cases and more than
451507,000 deaths.21 ,000 deaths.21
Most analysts expect the pandemic’s economic impact to be severe. The U.N. Economic
Most analysts expect the pandemic’s economic impact to be severe. The U.N. Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), for example, Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), for example,
projects a regional average decline of more than 9% in gross domestic product in 2020, leaving an additional 45 mil ion people in poverty and an additional 28 mil ion inestimates the region’s average gross domestic product contracted by 7.7% in 2020—the largest decline in 120 years.22
Based on an earlier projection of a 9.1% contraction, ECLAC estimated the pandemic would push an additional 45 mil ion people into poverty and an additional 28 mil ion into extreme poverty. As a result, the extreme poverty. As a result, the
regional poverty rate would climb from 30% to 37% and the extreme poverty rate regional poverty rate would climb from 30% to 37% and the extreme poverty rate
would climb would climb
from 11% to nearly 16%.22 ECLAC expects the living standards of middle-income households to
deteriorate sharply and income inequality to increase throughout the region.from 11% to nearly 16%.23
A number of Latin American and Caribbean countries have enacted substantial economic support
A number of Latin American and Caribbean countries have enacted substantial economic support
measures intended to mitigate the pandemic’s impact and reactivate their economies. Othersmeasures intended to mitigate the pandemic’s impact and reactivate their economies. Others
, however, lack the resources to protect vulnerable households. Guatemala, Honduras, and El lack the resources to protect vulnerable households. Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador, for example, are struggling with acute food insecurity crises, in part, due to the Salvador, for example, are struggling with acute food insecurity crises, in part, due to the
pandemic and pandemic and
government containment measures, which have reduced earnings and contributed government containment measures, which have reduced earnings and contributed
to higher food prices.to higher food prices.
2324 Hurricanes Eta and Iota, which struck Central America in November Hurricanes Eta and Iota, which struck Central America in November
2020, have exacerbated the situation. The USAID-funded Famine Early Warning Systems 2020, have exacerbated the situation. The USAID-funded Famine Early Warning Systems
Network projects al three countries wil have higher than typical emergency food assistance Network projects al three countries wil have higher than typical emergency food assistance
needs into mid-2021.needs into mid-2021.
24 25 Given those humanitarian needs and the potential threats to U.S. interests Given those humanitarian needs and the potential threats to U.S. interests
posed by a prolonged posed by a prolonged
pandemic and economic downturn in the region, some analysts pandemic and economic downturn in the region, some analysts
arguehave argued that that
the United States the United States
should scale up assistance for Latin American and Caribbean countries.should scale up assistance for Latin American and Caribbean countries.
2526
In March 2020, Congress enacted two FY2020 supplemental appropriations measures (P.L. 116-
In March 2020, Congress enacted two FY2020 supplemental appropriations measures (P.L. 116-
123 and P.L. 116-136) that provided nearly $1.8 bil ion in U.S. foreign assistance to prevent, 123 and P.L. 116-136) that provided nearly $1.8 bil ion in U.S. foreign assistance to prevent,
prepare for, and respond to COVID-19 global y. USAID and the State Department have begun prepare for, and respond to COVID-19 global y. USAID and the State Department have begun
addressing needs in the Latin American and Caribbean region using those supplemental funds and addressing needs in the Latin American and Caribbean region using those supplemental funds and
prior appropriations. As of August 21, 2020prior appropriations. As of August 21, 2020
(latest information made available), the Administration said it was providing more than , the Administration said it was providing more than
$141 mil ion in new and previously announced $141 mil ion in new and previously announced
assistance to help countries in the region respond assistance to help countries in the region respond
to the pandemic. That total includes $69.5 mil ion of International Disaster Assistance, $33.8
mil ion of Migration and Refugee Assistance, $27.6 mil ion of health assistance, and $10.5 mil ion of ESF (see Table 5). Among other activities, U.S. assistance is funding efforts to improve water, sanitation, and hygiene; reduce food insecurity; communicate risks through to the pandemic. That total includes $69.5 20 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11581, 20 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11581,
Latin America and the Caribbean: Impact of COVID-19, by Mark , by Mark
P. Sullivan et al. P. Sullivan et al.
21 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,” 21 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,”
January 1, 2021, at at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality. COVID-19-related data may be expected to evolve rapidly. https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality. COVID-19-related data may be expected to evolve rapidly.
22
22
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Preliminary Overview of the Econom ies of Latin Am erica and the Caribbean, 2020 , December 16, 2020.
23 United Nations, United Nations,
Policy Brief: The Impact of COVID-19 on Latin America and the Caribbean, July 2020. , July 2020.
2324 Famine Early Warning Systems Network, “Central America and Caribbean: Crisis (IPC Phase 3) Persists Despite Famine Early Warning Systems Network, “Central America and Caribbean: Crisis (IPC Phase 3) Persists Despite
Recent Harvests and Seasonally High Labor Demand,” October 2020. Recent Harvests and Seasonally High Labor Demand,” October 2020.
2425 Famine Early Warning Systems Network, “Food Assistance Outlook Brief: Projected Food Famine Early Warning Systems Network, “Food Assistance Outlook Brief: Projected Food
Assistanc eAssistance Needs for Needs for
MayJune 2021,” 2021,”
NovemberDecember 2020. 2020.
2526 See, for examples, T revor Sutton, Dan Restrepo, and Joel Martinez, See, for examples, T revor Sutton, Dan Restrepo, and Joel Martinez,
Getting Ahead of the Curve: Why the United
States Needs to Plan for the Coronavirus in the Am ericas, Center for American Progress, May 5, 2020; “ Congress , Center for American Progress, May 5, 2020; “ Congress
Should Approve Aid for COVID-19’s New Epicenter: Latin America and the Caribbean,” joint statement from 34 civil Should Approve Aid for COVID-19’s New Epicenter: Latin America and the Caribbean,” joint statement from 34 civil
society groups, Washington Office on Latin America, June 8, 2020; and Walter Kerr, “Latin America Can’t Survive the society groups, Washington Office on Latin America, June 8, 2020; and Walter Kerr, “Latin America Can’t Survive the
Coronavirus Crisis Alone,” Coronavirus Crisis Alone,”
Foreign Policy, August 3, 2020. , August 3, 2020.
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mil ion of International Disaster Assistance, $33.8 mil ion of Migration and Refugee Assistance, $27.6 mil ion of health assistance, and $10.5 mil ion of ESF (see Table 5). Among other activities, U.S. assistance is funding efforts to improve water, sanitation, and hygiene; reduce food insecurity; communicate risks through community engagement; strengthen laboratories, clinical management, and disease surveil ance; community engagement; strengthen laboratories, clinical management, and disease surveil ance;
support migrants, asylum-seekers, refugees, and support migrants, asylum-seekers, refugees, and
host communities; and address the second-order host communities; and address the second-order
economic and social impacts of the pandemic. economic and social impacts of the pandemic.
Table 5. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean to Respond to
the COVID-19 Pandemic
(as of August 21, 2020, in thousands of current U.S. dol ars)
(as of August 21, 2020, in thousands of current U.S. dol ars)
International
Migration and
Health
Economic
Total
Disaster
Refugee
Assistance
Support
Assistance
Assistance
Assistance
Funds
Argentina
Argentina
—
—
300
300
—
—
—
—
300
300
Bahamas
Bahamas
—
—
—
—
750
750
—
—
750
750
Belize
Belize
—
—
—
—
300
300
—
—
300
300
Bolivia
Bolivia
—
—
130
130
750
750
—
—
880
880
Brazil
Brazil
6,000
6,000
4,800
4,800
2,000
2,000
950
950
13,750
13,750
Chile
Chile
—
—
20
20
—
—
—
—
20
20
Colombia
Colombia
15,500
15,500
8,100
8,100
—
—
—
—
23,600
23,600
Costa Rica
Costa Rica
—
—
880
880
800
800
—
—
1,680
1,680
Cuba
Cuba
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0
0
Dominican
Dominican
Republic
—
—
275
275
1,400
1,400
2,000
2,000
3,675
3,675
Republic
Ecuador Ecuador
11,000
11,000
5,000
5,000
2,000
2,000
—
—
18,000
18,000
El Salvador
El Salvador
2,000
2,000
—
—
2,600
2,600
2,000
2,000
6,600
6,600
Guatemala
Guatemala
6,000
6,000
—
—
2,400
2,400
1,500
1,500
9,900
9,900
Guyana
Guyana
—
—
350
350
—
—
—
—
350
350
Haiti
Haiti
10,000
10,000
—
—
3,200
3,200
—
—
13,200
13,200
Honduras
Honduras
3,000
3,000
700
700
2,400
2,400
—
—
6,100
6,100
Jamaica
Jamaica
—
—
—
—
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
2,000
2,000
Mexico
Mexico
—
—
2,100
2,100
—
—
—
—
2,100
2,100
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
—
—
—
—
750
750
—
—
750
750
Panama
Panama
—
—
1,100
1,100
750
750
—
—
1,850
1,850
Paraguay
Paraguay
—
—
95
95
1,300
1,300
—
—
1,395
1,395
Peru
Peru
7,000
7,000
3,800
3,800
2,500
2,500
3,000
3,000
16,300
16,300
Trinidad and
Trinidad and
—
250
—
—
250
Tobago250
—
Tobago
—
—
250
Uruguay
Uruguay
—
—
100
100
500
500
—
—
600
600
Venezuela
Venezuela
9,000
9,000
4,700
4,700
—
—
—
—
13,700
13,700
Central America
—
1,100
—
—
1,100
(regional)a
Caribbean (regional)b
—
—
2,200
—
2,200
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International
Migration and
Health
Economic
Total
Disaster
Refugee
Assistance
Support
Assistance
Assistance
Assistance
Funds
Central America
—
1,100
—
—
1,100
(regional)a
Caribbean (regional)b
—
—
2,200
—
2,200
Total
69,500
33,800
27,600
10,450
141,350
Sources: U.S. Department of State, “Update: The United States Continues to Lead the Global Response to U.S. Department of State, “Update: The United States Continues to Lead the Global Response to
COVID-19,” fact sheet, August 21, 2020, at https://www.state.gov/update-the-united-states-continues-to-lead-COVID-19,” fact sheet, August 21, 2020, at https://www.state.gov/update-the-united-states-continues-to-lead-
the-global-response-to-covid-19-6/; and CRS communication with USAID, August 2020. the-global-response-to-covid-19-6/; and CRS communication with USAID, August 2020.
Notes: Health assistance is provided through USAID’s Global Health Emergency Reserve Fund for Contagious Health assistance is provided through USAID’s Global Health Emergency Reserve Fund for Contagious
Infectious-Disease Outbreaks and the Global Health Programs account. Infectious-Disease Outbreaks and the Global Health Programs account.
a. Central America regional assistance is funding projects in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. a. Central America regional assistance is funding projects in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
b. Caribbean regional assistance is funding projects in Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, b. Caribbean regional assistance is funding projects in Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada,
Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad a nd
Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad a nd
Tobago. Tobago.
Although the Latin American and Caribbean region is expected to experience the deepest
Although the Latin American and Caribbean region is expected to experience the deepest
economic downturn in the world,economic downturn in the world,
2627 it has received less than 9% of the $1.6 bil ion of pandemic- it has received less than 9% of the $1.6 bil ion of pandemic-
related assistance that USAID and the State Department have announced thus far.related assistance that USAID and the State Department have announced thus far.
2728 USAID and USAID and
the State Department work with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and other the State Department work with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and other
interagency partners to determine assistance al ocations. According to USAID, the prioritization interagency partners to determine assistance al ocations. According to USAID, the prioritization
process is based on a series of factors that include caseload and extent of community process is based on a series of factors that include caseload and extent of community
transmission, connectivity to a COVID-19 hotspot, unstable political situations or displaced transmission, connectivity to a COVID-19 hotspot, unstable political situations or displaced
populations, health system weaknesses, and the potential impact of U.S. assistance.
populations, health system weaknesses, and the potential impact of U.S. assistance.
2829
Congress
Congress
may considerdeliberated on whether to provide additional whether to provide additional
pandemic response assistance for Latin American and Caribbean countries in funding for international pandemic response during the FY2021 appropriations FY2021 appropriations
measures. Theprocess. Whereas the House-passed House-passed
FY2021 foreign aid appropriations measure (Division A of H.R. 7608) would FY2021 foreign aid appropriations measure (Division A of H.R. 7608) would
providehave provided $9.1 bil ion $9.1 bil ion
of of emergency foreign aid to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and related economic and
stabilization requirements around the world. The bil would not designate any pandemic response funding specifical y for Latin America and the Caribbean, with the exception of $10 mil ion for the IAF. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft bil would not provide any emergency funding for pandemic response, but the draft explanatory statement asserts that the committee continues to monitor agency needs and “wil seek to address them in future supplemental
appropriations vehicles.”
Congress also may assess the appropriate level of funding for the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), which is the specialized international health agency of the Americas and
the World Health Organization’s regional office.29 PAHO is providing direct emergency response assistance to health ministries throughout the region to strengthen surveil ance, testing, and laboratory capacity; bolster health care services; and support infection prevention control, clinical management, and risk communications.30 The Trump Administration requested $16.3 mil ion for PAHO in FY2021, which would leave 75% of the U.S. government’s assessed contribution
26emergency foreign aid to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic—including $10 mil ion to be provided through the IAF—the Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft bil would not have provided any such funding. Congress ultimately appropriated $4 bil ion of emergency global
health assistance in P.L. 116-260 to be provided to GAVI, the Vaccine Al iance, to procure and deliver coronavirus vaccines worldwide. Ten low- and lower-middle-income countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are eligible for assistance in obtaining vaccines through the GAVI COVID-19 Vaccines Advance Market Commitment.30 Analysts caution, however, that vaccines
may not be widely available in much of the region until 2022.31
Congress also assessed funding for the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), which is the specialized international health agency of the Americas and the World Health Organization’s
27 International Monetary Fund, International Monetary Fund,
World Economic Outlook, October 2020: A Long and Difficult Ascent, October 2020. , October 2020.
2728 U.S. Department of State, “Update: T he United States Continues to Lead the Global Response to COVID-19,” fact U.S. Department of State, “Update: T he United States Continues to Lead the Global Response to COVID-19,” fact
sheet, August 21, 2020. sheet, August 21, 2020.
2829 USAID, “COVID-19 – Global Response,” fact sheet #1, April 21, 2020. USAID, “COVID-19 – Global Response,” fact sheet #1, April 21, 2020.
29 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), founded in 1902 as part of the inter-American system, predates the World Health Organization.
30 For more information, see PAHO’s COVID-19 situation reports at https://www.paho.org/en/tag/covid-19-situation-reports.
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30 T he 10 countries eligible for assistance under the COVAX AMC are Bolivia, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
31 “Latam Faces Drawn-out Vaccine Rollout,” Economist Intelligence Unit, December 17, 2020.
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regional office.32 PAHO has been providing direct pandemic response support to health ministries throughout the region to strengthen surveil ance, testing, and laboratory capacity; bolster health care services; support infection prevention control, clinical management, and risk communications; and prepare for vaccine distribution.33 The Trump Administration requested $16.3 mil ion for PAHO in FY2021, which would have left 75% of the U.S. government’s assessed contribution (membership dues) for FY2021 unpaid. The Administration also withheld
(membership dues) for FY2021 unpaid. The Administration also withheld the U.S. government’s the U.S. government’s
FY2020 assessed contribution until July 2020, due to concerns about the organization’s FY2020 assessed contribution until July 2020, due to concerns about the organization’s
participation in a 2013-2018 program that paid Cuba to send doctors to underserved areas of participation in a 2013-2018 program that paid Cuba to send doctors to underserved areas of
Brazil.Brazil.
3134 The Administration’s decision to withhold the $65.8 mil ion assessment reportedly left The Administration’s decision to withhold the $65.8 mil ion assessment reportedly left
PAHO on “the brink of insolvency” at the same time the organization was trying to contain the PAHO on “the brink of insolvency” at the same time the organization was trying to contain the
COVID-19 pandemic.COVID-19 pandemic.
3235 It appears as though It appears as though
both H.R. 7608 and the Senate Appropriations
Committee’s draft bil would fully fund P.L. 116-260 fully funds
the U.S. government’s $65.2 mil ion assessed the U.S. government’s $65.2 mil ion assessed
contribution to PAHO for FY2021. contribution to PAHO for FY2021.
Neither bil would designate any additional voluntary contributions for the organization; USAID provided $18.6 mil ion of voluntary contributions to
PAHO in FY2019.33
Central America Funding Directives34
Since FY2016, Congress has
In addition to overseeing the funds appropriated for FY2021, the 117th Congress may consider providing additional aid or approving other support for pandemic recovery in Latin America and
the Caribbean. A bil introduced in the final weeks of the 116th Congress (S. 4997), for example, would have authorized $24 bil ion for a capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank to increase the organization’s lending capacity to support immediate recovery efforts as
wel as long-term sustainable development in the region.
Central America Funding Directives36 From FY2016 to FY2020, Congress appropriated more than $3.1 bil ion to improve security, appropriated more than $3.1 bil ion to improve security,
governance, and socioeconomic conditions in Central America as part of a whole-of-government governance, and socioeconomic conditions in Central America as part of a whole-of-government
initiative to address the drivers of irregular migration. However, in March 2019—less than two
initiative to address the drivers of irregular migration. However, in March 2019—less than two
years into the initiative’s on-the-ground implementation—the Trump Administration suspended years into the initiative’s on-the-ground implementation—the Trump Administration suspended
most foreign aid to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The Administration proceeded to most foreign aid to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The Administration proceeded to
reprogram approximately $396 mil ion of aid appropriated for the Northern Triangle countries in reprogram approximately $396 mil ion of aid appropriated for the Northern Triangle countries in
FY2018, real ocating the funds to other foreign policy priorities within, and outside of, the Latin FY2018, real ocating the funds to other foreign policy priorities within, and outside of, the Latin
American and Caribbean region.
American and Caribbean region.
3537 The Administration also withheld most of the assistance The Administration also withheld most of the assistance
Congress appropriated for Central America in FY2019 while it negotiated a series of agreements Congress appropriated for Central America in FY2019 while it negotiated a series of agreements
intended to stem the flow of migrants and asylum-seekers from the Northern Triangle to the intended to stem the flow of migrants and asylum-seekers from the Northern Triangle to the
United States.
United States.
The aid suspension resulted in USAID and the State Department closing down projects and
The aid suspension resulted in USAID and the State Department closing down projects and
cancel ing planned activities. In Honduras, for example, the total number of beneficiaries of cancel ing planned activities. In Honduras, for example, the total number of beneficiaries of
USAID activities fel from 1.5 mil ion in March 2019 to 700,000 in March 2020.USAID activities fel from 1.5 mil ion in March 2019 to 700,000 in March 2020.
36 Some Members of Congress criticized the aid suspension as counterproductive, arguing that
withholding assistance “erodes the capacity of USAID to improve conditions on the ground—the very conditions driving people to leave for safer lives in the United States.”37 The Administration began releasing some targeted aid to the Northern Triangle in late 2019, and it had programmed al of the previously suspended assistance for the region as of mid-June 2020. The Administration asserts that continued assistance to the Northern Triangle depends on the Salvadoran,
3138 Some 32 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), founded in 1902 as part of the inter-American system, predates the World Health Organization. 33 For more information, see P AHO’s COVID-19 situation reports at https://www.paho.org/en/tag/covid-19-situation-reports.
34 Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “Pan American Health Organization T ransparency,” U.S. Department of Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “Pan American Health Organization T ransparency,” U.S. Department of
State, July 15, 2020; and CRS communication with the U.S. Department of State, July 21, 2020. State, July 15, 2020; and CRS communication with the U.S. Department of State, July 21, 2020.
3235 PAHO, “Current Financial Situation and Adjustments to the Pan American Health Organization Strategic Priorities,” PAHO, “Current Financial Situation and Adjustments to the Pan American Health Organization Strategic Priorities,”
CESS1/2, May 21, 2020. CESS1/2, May 21, 2020.
33 U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on U.S. Contributions to International Organizations, Fiscal Year
2019, Section 4(b) of the United States Participation Act, 22 USC 287b(b), August 14, 2020.
3436 For more information on U.S. policy in Central America, see CRS Report R44812, For more information on U.S. policy in Central America, see CRS Report R44812,
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in
Central Am erica: Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer. , by Peter J. Meyer.
35
37 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State,
Progress Report to Congress on the Plan for Monitoring and Evaluation of Assistance in
Support of the United States Strategy for Engagem ent in Central Am erica , October 8, 2020, p. 2. , October 8, 2020, p. 2.
3638 USAID/Honduras briefing documents, provided to CRS, August 22, 2019 USAID/Honduras briefing documents, provided to CRS, August 22, 2019
.
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Members of Congress criticized the aid suspension as counterproductive, arguing that withholding assistance “erodes the capacity of USAID to improve conditions on the ground—the very conditions driving people to leave for safer lives in the United States.”39 The Administration began releasing some targeted aid to the Northern Triangle in late 2019, and it had programmed al of the previously suspended assistance for the region as of June 2020. The Administration asserted that continued assistance to the Northern Triangle would depend on the Salvadoran,. 37 Letter from Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Albio Sires, Chairman, House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and T rade, to Honorable Michael Pompeo, Secretary of State, December 4, 2019.
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Guatemalan, and Honduran governments continuing to “take actions to stem il egal immigration
Guatemalan, and Honduran governments continuing to “take actions to stem il egal immigration
to the United States.”
to the United States.”
3840
Congress
Congress
has provided the Administration with significant authority to modify assistance provided the Administration with significant authority to modify assistance
al ocations for Central America inal ocations for Central America in
recent annual appropriations measures. The Consolidated appropriations measures. The Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141), provided “up to” $615 mil ionAppropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141), provided “up to” $615 mil ion
of assistance for the of assistance for the
region.region.
3941 However, the act also required the Administration to withhold some assistance for El However, the act also required the Administration to withhold some assistance for El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and authorized the Administration to suspend and reprogram Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and authorized the Administration to suspend and reprogram
that assistance if the Northern Triangle governments failed to meet certain conditions related to that assistance if the Northern Triangle governments failed to meet certain conditions related to
border security, border security,
corruption, and human rights, among other issues.corruption, and human rights, among other issues.
4042 Although the act directed the Although the act directed the
Administration to abide by the funding al ocations included in the accompanying explanatory Administration to abide by the funding al ocations included in the accompanying explanatory
statement, it also authorized the Administration to deviate from those al ocations by more than statement, it also authorized the Administration to deviate from those al ocations by more than
4% “to respond to significant, exigent, or unforeseen events or to address other exceptional 4% “to respond to significant, exigent, or unforeseen events or to address other exceptional
circumstances directly related to the national interest.”circumstances directly related to the national interest.”
4143 The Administration The Administration
ultimately used that used that
deviation authority to reprogram deviation authority to reprogram
the vast majority of assistance Congress appropriated for Central the vast majority of assistance Congress appropriated for Central
America in FY2018. Among the “significant, exigent, or unforeseen events” cited by the America in FY2018. Among the “significant, exigent, or unforeseen events” cited by the
Administration were “the failure of the Northern Triangle countries to address il egal Administration were “the failure of the Northern Triangle countries to address il egal
immigration,” “the rapidly evolving crisis in Venezuela and the need to support the immigration,” “the rapidly evolving crisis in Venezuela and the need to support the
democratical y elected National Assembly,” and “an democratical y elected National Assembly,” and “an
opportunity to support Caribbean leaders in opportunity to support Caribbean leaders in
the wake of the devastating 2017 hurricane season.”the wake of the devastating 2017 hurricane season.”
4244
Congress included similar suspension, reprogramming, and deviation authorities in the
Congress included similar suspension, reprogramming, and deviation authorities in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), but added some limitations to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), but added some limitations to the
Administration’s flexibility in FY2020. The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. Administration’s flexibility in FY2020. The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L.
116-94),
116-94),
statesstated that “not less than” $519.9 mil ion “should be made available” for Central that “not less than” $519.9 mil ion “should be made available” for Central
America and America and
stipulatesstipulated specific funding levels for each country in the accompanying explanatory specific funding levels for each country in the accompanying explanatory
statement.statement.
4345 The act also significantly The act also significantly
restrictsrestricted the Administration’s authority to deviate below the Administration’s authority to deviate below
those funding levels by more than 10%.those funding levels by more than 10%.
4446 At the same time, the act once again At the same time, the act once again
requiresrequired the the
Administration to withhold some aid for the Northern Triangle and Administration to withhold some aid for the Northern Triangle and
authorizesauthorized the Administration the Administration
to reprogram that aid if the Northern Triangle governments
to reprogram that aid if the Northern Triangle governments
failfailed to meet certain conditions. to meet certain conditions.
45
As the FY2021 appropriations process continues, Congress may consider whether to exert greater control over U.S. assistance to Central America. H.R. 7608 would direct that “not less than”
$519.9 mil ion “shal be made available” for assistance to Central America, including “not less than” $420.8 mil ion for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.46 The bil would once again restrict the Administration’s authority to deviate below the country al ocations specified in H.Rept. 116-444, limiting such changes to 5%.47 The bil also would tighten the FY2020 funding
3847
39 Letter from Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Albio Sires, Chairman, House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and T rade, to Honorable Michael Pompeo, Secretary of State, December 4, 2019. 40 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2021 , p. , p.
220. 220.
3941 P.L. 115-141, §7045(a)(1). P.L. 115-141, §7045(a)(1).
4042 P.L. 115-141, §7045(a)(3) and 7045(a)(4). P.L. 115-141, §7045(a)(3) and 7045(a)(4).
4143 P.L. 115-141, §7019. P.L. 115-141, §7019.
4244 USAID, CN #195, August 16, 2019; CN #157, July 11, 2019; and CN #166, July 19, 2019. USAID, CN #195, August 16, 2019; CN #157, July 11, 2019; and CN #166, July 19, 2019.
43
45 P.L. 116-94, §§7019(a) and 7045(a)(1)(A). P.L. 116-94, §§7019(a) and 7045(a)(1)(A).
4446 P.L. 116-94, §7019(b). P.L. 116-94, §7019(b).
4547 P.L. 116-94, §7045(a)(2)(A). P.L. 116-94, §7045(a)(2)(A).
46 H.R. 7608, §7045(a)(1)(A). 47 H.R. 7608, §7019.
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The House-passed foreign aid appropriations measure (H.R. 7608) would have exerted greater control over U.S. assistance to Central America in FY2021. The bil would have directed that “not less than” $519.9 mil ion “shal be made available” for assistance to Central America, including “not less than” $420.8 mil ion for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.48 Likewise, the bil would have tightened the FY2020 funding directive for Central America enacted in P.L. 116-94, changing $519.9 mil ion “should be made directive for Central America enacted in P.L. 116-94, changing $519.9 mil ion “should be made
available” to $519.9 mil ion “shal be made available”available” to $519.9 mil ion “shal be made available”
for assistance to the region.for assistance to the region.
48 The 49 The bil also would have further restricted the Administration’s authority to deviate below the country al ocations specified in H.Rept. 116-444, limiting such changes to 5%.50 In contrast, the Senate Senate
Appropriations Committee’s draft bil would Appropriations Committee’s draft bil would
providehave directed that $505.9 mil ion $505.9 mil ion
for“should be made available” for assistance to Central America in Central America in
FY2021FY2021
, and would and would
restricthave maintained the Administration’s authority to deviate below that funding the Administration’s authority to deviate below that funding
level by
more than 10%.49
Nevertheless, both H.R. 7608 and the Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft bil would provide some flexibility to the Administration to withhold and reprogram assistance appropriated for the Northern Triangle. Like each appropriations measure enacted since FY2016, the bil s
would require the Administration to
level by 10%.51 Both bil s would have maintained Northern Triangle-specific withholding and
reprogramming authorities similar to those enacted in prior years.52
The relevant provisions enacted in P.L. 116-260 are more similar to those that were included in
the Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft bil than those that were included in H.R. 7608. The act states that $505.9 mil ion “should be made available” for assistance to Central America and authorizes the Administration to deviate below that funding level by “not more than” 10%.53 Like each appropriations measure enacted since FY2016, the act requires the State Department to withhold some aid that would support the central withhold some aid that would support the central
governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras until the Secretary of State certifies Honduras until the Secretary of State certifies
that those governments have met a series of conditions. If the Secretary is unable to certify the those governments have met a series of conditions. If the Secretary is unable to certify the
governments’ compliance with the legislative conditions, governments’ compliance with the legislative conditions,
the act directsthe bil s direct the Administration to the Administration to
reprogram that assistance to other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.reprogram that assistance to other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
5054 With a change in Administrations, the 117th Congress may reexamine the
amount of flexibility it delegates to the executive branch.
Role of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation51Corporation55
In addition to appropriating foreign aid for Latin American and Caribbean countries, In addition to appropriating foreign aid for Latin American and Caribbean countries,
Congress
may assessthe 116th
Congress assessed how other development tools, such as the new U.S. International Development how other development tools, such as the new U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation (DFC), may supplement U.S. assistance efforts in the region. Finance Corporation (DFC), may supplement U.S. assistance efforts in the region.
The 115th Congress Congress
authorized the establishment of the DFC in the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to authorized the establishment of the DFC in the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to
Development Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254, Division F). According to the act, the DFC aims to Development Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254, Division F). According to the act, the DFC aims to
“facilitate the participation of private sector capital and skil s in the economic “facilitate the participation of private sector capital and skil s in the economic
development of development of
less developed countries … and countries in transition from nonmarket to market less developed countries … and countries in transition from nonmarket to market
48 H.R. 7608, §7045(a)(1)(A). 49 H.R. 7608, §7045(a)(1)(B). 50 H.R. 7608, §7019. 51 Senate Appropriations Commit tee draft State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Appropriations Act, 2021, §§7019 and 7045(a)(1).
52 H.R. 7608, §7045(a)(2); and Senate Appropriations Committee draft State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Appropriations Act, 2021, §7045(a)(2).
53 P.L. 116-260, §§7019 and 7045(a)(1).
54 P.L. 116-260, §7045(a)(2). 55 For more information on the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), see CRS In Focus IF11436, U.S. International Developm ent Finance Corporation (DFC) , by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Nick M. Brown .
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economies in economies in
order to complement the development assistance objectives, and advance the order to complement the development assistance objectives, and advance the
foreign policy foreign policy
interests, of the United States.”interests, of the United States.”
5256
Official y launched in December 2019, the DFC is authorized to provide direct loans and loan
Official y launched in December 2019, the DFC is authorized to provide direct loans and loan
guarantees, equity financing, political risk insurance, feasibility studies, and technical assistance. guarantees, equity financing, political risk insurance, feasibility studies, and technical assistance.
Those products, backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, aim to provide private Those products, backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, aim to provide private
sector entities with the liquidity and assurances needed to invest in projects that otherwise would sector entities with the liquidity and assurances needed to invest in projects that otherwise would
be unable to attract sufficient capital due to the risks associated with investing in less developed be unable to attract sufficient capital due to the risks associated with investing in less developed
countries. The DFC is expected to be self-sustaining, generating sufficient funds from service countries. The DFC is expected to be self-sustaining, generating sufficient funds from service
fees, interest earnings, and investment returns to cover its annual operating and program
fees, interest earnings, and investment returns to cover its annual operating and program
expenses.
expenses.
The DFC’s ability to operate in Latin America and the Caribbean is somewhat constrained by a
The DFC’s ability to operate in Latin America and the Caribbean is somewhat constrained by a
statutory requirement to prioritize support for low- and lower-middle-income economies, as statutory requirement to prioritize support for low- and lower-middle-income economies, as
defined by the World Bank. As of 2020, five Latin American and Caribbean countries fel into defined by the World Bank. As of 2020, five Latin American and Caribbean countries fel into
those categories: Haiti, Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The World Bank classifies those categories: Haiti, Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The World Bank classifies
20 countries in the region as upper-middle-income economies, which are restricted from receiving 20 countries in the region as upper-middle-income economies, which are restricted from receiving
48 H.R. 7608, §7045(a)(1)(B). 49 Senate Appropriations Committee draft State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Appropriations Act, 2021, §§7019 and 7045(a)(1).
50 H.R. 7608, §7045(a)(2); and Senate Appropriations Committee draft State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Appropriations Act, 2021, §7045(a)(2).
51 For more information on the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), see CRS In Focus IF11436, U.S. International Developm ent Finance Corporation (DFC) , by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Nick M. Brown .
52 P.L. 115-254, §1412 (b).
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations
DFC support unless the President certifies that such support “furthers the national economic or DFC support unless the President certifies that such support “furthers the national economic or
foreign policy interests of the United States” and “is designed to produce significant foreign policy interests of the United States” and “is designed to produce significant
developmental outcomes or provide developmental benefits to the poorest” sectors of their developmental outcomes or provide developmental benefits to the poorest” sectors of their
populations.populations.
5357 Eight other countries in the region are ineligible for DFC support because the Eight other countries in the region are ineligible for DFC support because the
World Bank classifies them as high-income economies.
World Bank classifies them as high-income economies.
5458
Despite those limitations, the DFC Board of Directors
Despite those limitations, the DFC Board of Directors
has approved nearly $2.approved nearly $2.
15 bil ion of bil ion of
commitments for projects in Latin American and Caribbean countries in 2020.commitments for projects in Latin American and Caribbean countries in 2020.
5559 These These
commitments include a $25 mil ion investment to boost cobalt and nickel production in Brazil’s commitments include a $25 mil ion investment to boost cobalt and nickel production in Brazil’s
northeastern state of Piauí, $100 mil ion in political risk insurance to support marine conservation northeastern state of Piauí, $100 mil ion in political risk insurance to support marine conservation
in St. Lucia, a loan of up to $150 mil ion to expand lending to women-owned and -led businesses in St. Lucia, a loan of up to $150 mil ion to expand lending to women-owned and -led businesses
in Ecuador, and a loan of up to $241 mil ion to support the development and construction of four in Ecuador, and a loan of up to $241 mil ion to support the development and construction of four
solar power plants in Mexico. The DFC also inherited approximately $9.5 bil ion of active solar power plants in Mexico. The DFC also inherited approximately $9.5 bil ion of active
projects from its predecessor—the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
projects from its predecessor—the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
56
Congress may assess60
There was some debate in the 116th Congress regarding whether the DFC whether the DFC
iswas devoting sufficient resources to Latin America and the devoting sufficient resources to Latin America and the
Caribbean and whether it Caribbean and whether it
iswas striking the right balance between fostering development and striking the right balance between fostering development and
supporting U.S. strategic interests. Some Members supporting U.S. strategic interests. Some Members
of Congress would likeurged the DFC to expand its the DFC to expand its
operations in the region to counter China, which has provided more than $137 operations in the region to counter China, which has provided more than $137
bil ionbil ion
in state-in state-
backed finance to Latin American and Caribbean countries since 2005.backed finance to Latin American and Caribbean countries since 2005.
57 For example, the61 The Advancing Competitiveness, Transparency, and Security in the Americas Act (ACTSA; S.
56 P.L. 115-254, §1412 (b). 57 P.L. 115-254, 1412(c). 58 Advancing Competitiveness, Transparency, and Security in the Americas Act (S. 4528/H.R. 8716) would designate al Caribbean countries—with the exception of Cuba—as priorities for DFC support. The measure also would dedicate “not less than” 35% of the DFC’s development financing and equity investments to Latin American and Caribbean countries for a 10-year period.
Some development advocates have voiced concerns that shifting the DFC’s funding toward upper-middle- and high-income countries to advance U.S. national security interests would erode the DFC’s development mandate and could jeopardize its effectiveness and domestic support.58 Others maintain that the World Bank’s classifications, based on per capita income, may not accurately reflect the development needs of smal and highly unequal societies, such as many of
those in Latin America and the Caribbean.59
53 P.L. 115-254, 1412(c). 54 T he high-income economies are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Chile, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, T he high-income economies are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Chile, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis,
T rinidad and T obago, and Uruguay. World Bank, “ World Bank Country and Lending Groups,” T rinidad and T obago, and Uruguay. World Bank, “ World Bank Country and Lending Groups,”
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups. https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups.
55
59 DFC, “DFC Approves Nearly $900 Million for Global Development Projects,” press release, DFC, “DFC Approves Nearly $900 Million for Global Development Projects,” press release,
MarchMa rch 12, 2020; DFC, 12, 2020; DFC,
“DFC Approves $1 Billion of Investments in Global Development,” press release, June 4, 2020; “DFC Approves $1 Billion of Investments in Global Development,” press release, June 4, 2020;
an d DFC, “DFC DFC, “DFC
Approves $3.6 Billion of New Investments in GlobalApproves $3.6 Billion of New Investments in Global
Development in Largest Quarter Ever,” press release, September Development in Largest Quarter Ever,” press release, September
9, 2020.
569, 2020; and DFC, “DFC Approves Over $2.1 Billion in New Investments for Global Development,” press release, December 10, 2020.
60 DFC, “Active Projects Database,” accessed October 2020, at https://www.dfc.gov/our-impact/all-active-projects. DFC, “Active Projects Database,” accessed October 2020, at https://www.dfc.gov/our-impact/all-active-projects.
5761 Kevin P. Gallagher and Margaret Myers, “China-Latin America Finance Database,” Inter-American Dialogue, 2020, Kevin P. Gallagher and Margaret Myers, “China-Latin America Finance Database,” Inter-American Dialogue, 2020,
at https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/. at https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/.
58Congressional Research Service
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations
4528/H.R. 8716) would have designated al Caribbean countries—with the exception of Cuba—as priorities for DFC support. The measure also would have dedicated “not less than” 35% of the DFC’s development financing and equity investments to Latin American and Caribbean countries for a 10-year period. Some development advocates voiced concerns that shifting the DFC’s funding toward upper-middle- and high-income countries to advance U.S. national security
interests would erode the DFC’s development mandate.62
Congress ultimately did not pass ACTSA, but the explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-260 states that the DFC “shal expand engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean that
catalyzes private sector investment in initiatives to increase distributed energy generation systems, and expands economic opportunities with partners in the region, including with minority and women-owned businesses.” The DFC’s operations in the region, including the extent to which they support development and U.S. strategic interests, may receive additional scrutiny in
the 117th Congress.
62 T he 116th Congress previously eased the DFC’s development requirements for energy infrastructure projects in T he 116th Congress previously eased the DFC’s development requirements for energy infrastructure projects in
Europe and Eurasia with the European Energy Security and Diversification Act of 2019, enacted as part ofEurope and Eurasia with the European Energy Security and Diversification Act of 2019, enacted as part of
the Further the Further
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94, Division P, T itle XX). T odd Moss and Erin Collinson, “ Russia, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94, Division P, T itle XX). T odd Moss and Erin Collinson, “ Russia,
DFC, and the T errible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Idea Buried in the Spending Law,” Center for Global DFC, and the T errible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Idea Buried in the Spending Law,” Center for Global
Development, January 15, 2020; and Adva Saldringer, “What the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation Development, January 15, 2020; and Adva Saldringer, “What the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation
Needs to Do in Year 1,” Needs to Do in Year 1,”
Devex, January 14, 2020. , January 14, 2020.
59 Andrea Clabough and David L. Goldwyn, “Secure the Caribbean —with a Modest Addition to the BUILD Act,” The
Hill, January 9, 2019.
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2526 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations
Appendix A. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean by Account and Country
or Regional Program: FY2019
Table 6. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2019
(mil ions of current U.S. dol ars)
(mil ions of current U.S. dol ars)
DA
ESFa
GHP-
GHP-
INCLE
NADR
IMET
FMF
Total
USAID
State
Argentina
Argentina
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
2.5
2.5
—
—
0.6
0.6
—
—
3.1
3.1
Bahamas
Bahamas
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
0.2
—
—
0.2
0.2
Belize
Belize
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
Bolivia
Bolivia
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.0
0.0
Brazil
Brazil
11.0
11.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.6
0.6
—
—
11.6
11.6
Chile
Chile
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.5
0.5
—
—
0.5
0.5
Colombia
Colombia
—
—
187.3
187.3
3.0
3.0
—
—
170.0
170.0
21.0
21.0
1.3
1.3
38.5
38.5
421.2
421.2
Costa Rica
Costa Rica
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
0.7
7.5
7.5
8.2
8.2
Cuba
Cuba
—
—
20.0
20.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
20.0
20.0
Dominican
Dominican
7.8
7.8
2.0
2.0
—
—
26.5
26.5
—
—
—
—
0.5
0.5
—
—
36.8
36.8
Republic
Republic
Ecuador
Ecuador
5.0
5.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
7.0
7.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
12.0
12.0
El Salvado
El Salvado
rb
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.0
0.0
Guatemal
Guatemal
ab
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.0
0.0
Guyana
Guyana
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
0.2
—
—
0.2
0.2
Haiti
Haiti
51.0
51.0
—
—
24.5
24.5
103.0
103.0
15.0
15.0
—
—
0.2
0.2
—
—
193.8
193.8
Hondura
Hondura
sb
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.0
0.0
Jamaica
Jamaica
1.0
1.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.6
0.6
—
—
1.6
1.6
Mexico
Mexico
—
—
45.0
45.0
—
—
—
—
110.0
110.0
1.2
1.2
1.3
1.3
5.0
5.0
162.4
162.4
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
11.6
11.6
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
11.6
11.6
Panama
Panama
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.5
0.5
0.7
0.7
—
—
1.2
1.2
Paraguay
Paraguay
4.0
4.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
0.4
—
—
4.4
4.4
Peru
Peru
40.0
40.0
1.0
1.0
—
—
—
—
32.0
32.0
—
—
0.6
0.6
1.8
1.8
75.4
75.4
Suriname
Suriname
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
0.2
—
—
0.2
0.2
Trinidad &
Trinidad &
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.3
0.3
—
—
0.3
0.3
Tobago
Tobago
Uruguay
Uruguay
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
0.4
—
—
0.4
0.4
Venezuela
Venezuela
—
—
17.5
17.5
5.0
5.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
22.5
22.5
Barbados &
Barbados &
3.0
3.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.5
0.5
—
—
3.5
3.5
Eastern
Eastern
Caribbean Caribbean
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2526 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations
DA
ESFa
GHP-
GHP-
INCLE
NADR
IMET
FMF
Total
USAID
State
USAID
USAID
4.0
4.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
4.0
4.0
Caribbean
Caribbean
DevelopmenDevelopmen
tc
USAID Central
USAID Central
168.4
168.4
—
—
13.0
13.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
181.4
181.4
America
America
RegionaRegiona
lbc
USAID South
USAID South
18.0
18.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
18.0
18.0
America
America
RegionaRegiona
lc
USAID Latin
USAID Latin
60.5
60.5
—
—
7.8
7.8
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
68.3
68.3
America and
America and
Caribbean Caribbean
RegionaRegiona
lc
State Western
State Western
—
—
129.5
129.5
—
—
41.0
41.0
227.8
227.8
3.2
3.2
—
—
30.0
30.0
431.3
431.3
Hemisphere
Hemisphere
RegionaRegiona
lc
[CARSI]d
[—]
[100.0]
[—]
[—]
[190.0]
[—]
[—]
[—]
[290.0]
[CBSI]d
[—]
[25.3]
[—]
[—]
[25.3]
[—]
[—]
[7.5]
[58.0]
Total
385.3
402.3a
53.3
170.5
564.3
25.8
9.9
82.8
1,694.1
Sources: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2021, April 2020, p. 19; and Congressional Research Service April 2020, p. 19; and Congressional Research Service
(CRS) communication with the State Department and USAID, June 2020. (CRS) communication with the State Department and USAID, June 2020.
Notes: DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; INCLE DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; INCLE
= International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation , Anti-terrorism, Demining, = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation , Anti-terrorism, Demining,
and Related Programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; and Related Programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing;
USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; CARSI = Central America Regional Security Initiative; and USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; CARSI = Central America Regional Security Initiative; and
CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.
a. This amount does not include an additional $9 mil ion of ESF for the region that Congress appropriated in a. This amount does not include an additional $9 mil ion of ESF for the region that Congress appropriated in
FY2019 as multilateral assistance through the Organization of American States.
FY2019 as multilateral assistance through the Organization of American States.
b. Due to the Trump Administration’s suspension of aid to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, $181.4
b. Due to the Trump Administration’s suspension of aid to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, $181.4
mil ion of FY2019 assistance had yet to be al ocated when the Administration released its FY2021 request.
mil ion of FY2019 assistance had yet to be al ocated when the Administration released its FY2021 request.
c. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as wel as activities that cross
c. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as wel as activities that cross
borders or take place in nonpresence countries.
borders or take place in nonpresence countries.
d. CARSI and CBSI are funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
d. CARSI and CBSI are funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
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2728 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations
Appendix B. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean by Account and Country
or Regional Program: FY2020 Estimate
Table 7. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2020
Estimate
(mil ions of current U.S. dol ars)
(mil ions of current U.S. dol ars)
GHP-
GHP-
DA
ESFa
USAID
State
INCLE
NADR
IMET
FMF
Totala
Argentina
Argentina
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
2.5
2.5
—
—
0.6
0.6
—
—
3.1
3.1
Bahamas
Bahamas
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
0.2
—
—
0.2
0.2
Belize
Belize
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.3
0.3
1.0
1.0
1.3
1.3
Bolivia
Bolivia
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.0
0.0
Brazil
Brazil
15.0
15.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
0.8
—
—
15.8
15.8
Chile
Chile
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.6
0.6
—
—
0.6
0.6
Colombia
Colombia
61.0
61.0
146.3
146.3
3.0
3.0
—
—
180.0
180.0
21.0
21.0
1.9
1.9
38.5
38.5
451.7
451.7
Costa Rica
Costa Rica
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
0.7
7.5
7.5
8.2
8.2
Cuba
Cuba
—
—
20.0
20.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
20.0
20.0
Dominican
Dominican
7.0
7.0
—
—
—
—
21.2
21.2
—
—
—
—
0.5
0.5
—
—
28.7
28.7
Republic
Republic
Ecuador
Ecuador
12.2
12.2
—
—
—
—
—
—
7.0
7.0
—
—
0.3
0.3
—
—
19.5
19.5
El Salvador
El Salvador
70.0
70.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
0.8
1.9
1.9
72.7
72.7
Guatemala
Guatemala
65.7
65.7
—
—
13.0
13.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
0.8
—
—
79.5
79.5
Guyana
Guyana
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
0.2
—
—
0.2
0.2
Haiti
Haiti
51.0
51.0
—
—
24.5
24.5
78.8
78.8
18.0
18.0
—
—
0.3
0.3
—
—
172.5
172.5
Honduras
Honduras
65.0
65.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
0.8
—
—
65.8
65.8
Jamaica
Jamaica
1.0
1.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.6
0.6
—
—
1.6
1.6
Mexico
Mexico
—
—
50.0
50.0
—
—
—
—
100.0
100.0
1.2
1.2
1.8
1.8
5.0
5.0
157.9
157.9
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
10.0
10.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
10.0
10.0
Panama
Panama
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.5
0.5
0.7
0.7
2.0
2.0
3.2
3.2
Paraguay
Paraguay
4.0
4.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
0.4
—
—
4.4
4.4
Peru
Peru
34.8
34.8
—
—
—
—
—
—
40.0
40.0
—
—
0.6
0.6
1.8
1.8
77.2
77.2
Suriname
Suriname
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
0.2
—
—
0.2
0.2
Trinidad &
Trinidad &
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
0.4
—
—
0.4
0.4
Tobago
Tobago
Uruguay
Uruguay
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
0.4
—
—
0.4
0.4
Venezuela
Venezuela
30.0
30.0
5.0
5.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
35.0
35.0
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2728 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations
GHP-
GHP-
DA
ESFa
USAID
State
INCLE
NADR
IMET
FMF
Totala
Barbados &
Barbados &
2.0
2.0
—
—
—
—
11.3
11.3
—
—
—
—
0.7
0.7
—
—
14.0
14.0
Eastern
Eastern
Caribbean Caribbean
USAID
USAID
7.0
7.0
3.0
3.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
10.0
10.0
Caribbean
Caribbean
DevelopmenDevelopmen
tb
USAID Central
USAID Central
5.0
5.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
5.0
5.0
America
America
RegionaRegiona
lb
USAID South
USAID South
15.0
15.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
15.0
15.0
America
America
RegionaRegiona
lb
USAID Latin
USAID Latin
32.2
32.2
—
—
7.8
7.8
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
40.0
40.0
America and
America and
Caribbean Caribbean
RegionaRegiona
lb
State Western
State Western
—
—
128.3
128.3
—
—
46.5
46.5
207.7
207.7
4.6
4.6
—
—
15.0
15.0
402.1
402.1
Hemisphere
Hemisphere
RegionaRegiona
lb
[CARSI]c
[—]
[100.0]
[—]
[—]
[170.0]
[—]
[—]
[—]
[270.0]
[CBSI]c
[—]
[27.3]
[—]
[—]
[25.2]
[—]
[—]
[7.5]
[60.0]
Total
457.8
377.6a
53.3
157.7
555.2
27.3
14.4
72.7
1,716.0
Sources: U.S. Department of State, FY2020 estimate data, June 15, 2020; and CRS communication with the U.S. Department of State, FY2020 estimate data, June 15, 2020; and CRS communication with the
State Department and USAID, June 2020. State Department and USAID, June 2020.
Notes: These totals do not include any of the assistance made available for Latin America and the Caribbean These totals do not include any of the assistance made available for Latin America and the Caribbean
through supplemental emergency appropriations to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. DA = Development through supplemental emergency appropriations to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. DA = Development
Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; INCLE = International Narcotics Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; INCLE = International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs;
IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; USAID = U.S. Agency for IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; USAID = U.S. Agency for
International Development; CARSI = Central America Regional Security Initiative; and CBSI = Caribbean Basin International Development; CARSI = Central America Regional Security Initiative; and CBSI = Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative. Security Initiative.
a. This amount does not include an additional $5 mil ion of ESF for the region that Congress appropriated in a. This amount does not include an additional $5 mil ion of ESF for the region that Congress appropriated in
FY2020 as multilateral assistance through the Organization of American States.
FY2020 as multilateral assistance through the Organization of American States.
b. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as wel as activities that cross
b. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as wel as activities that cross
borders or take place in nonpresence countries.
borders or take place in nonpresence countries.
c. CARSI and CBSI are funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
c. CARSI and CBSI are funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
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2930 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations
Appendix C. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean by Account and Country
or Regional Program: FY2021 Request
Table 8. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean:
FY2021 Request
(mil ions of current U.S. dol ars)
(mil ions of current U.S. dol ars)
ESDFa
GHP-
GHP-
INCLE
NADR
IMET
FMF
Total
USAID
State
Argentina
Argentina
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.6
0.6
—
—
0.6
0.6
Bahamas
Bahamas
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
0.2
—
—
0.2
0.2
Belize
Belize
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
0.2
—
—
0.2
0.2
Bolivia
Bolivia
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.0
0.0
Brazil
Brazil
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.6
0.6
—
—
0.6
0.6
Chile
Chile
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
0.4
—
—
0.4
0.4
Colombia
Colombia
140.0
140.0
—
—
—
—
237.5
237.5
14.0
14.0
1.4
1.4
20.0
20.0
412.9
412.9
Costa Rica
Costa Rica
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
0.4
—
—
0.4
0.4
Cuba
Cuba
10.0
10.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
10.0
10.0
Dominican
Dominican
5.0
5.0
—
—
10.0
10.0
—
—
—
—
0.5
0.5
—
—
15.5
15.5
Republic
Republic
Ecuador
Ecuador
10.0
10.0
—
—
—
—
7.0
7.0
—
—
0.2
0.2
—
—
17.2
17.2
El Salvador
El Salvador
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.0
0.0
Guatemala
Guatemala
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.0
0.0
Guyana
Guyana
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
0.2
—
—
0.2
0.2
Haiti
Haiti
25.5
25.5
22.0
22.0
75.0
75.0
5.4
5.4
—
—
0.3
0.3
—
—
128.2
128.2
Honduras
Honduras
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.0
0.0
Jamaica
Jamaica
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.6
0.6
—
—
0.6
0.6
Mexico
Mexico
20.3
20.3
—
—
—
—
41.0
41.0
1.0
1.0
1.5
1.5
—
—
63.8
63.8
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
10.0
10.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
10.0
10.0
Panama
Panama
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
0.4
0.7
0.7
—
—
1.1
1.1
Paraguay
Paraguay
4.0
4.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
0.4
—
—
4.4
4.4
Peru
Peru
27.0
27.0
—
—
—
—
40.0
40.0
1.0
1.0
0.6
0.6
—
—
68.6
68.6
Suriname
Suriname
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
0.2
—
—
0.2
0.2
Trinidad &
Trinidad &
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.3
0.3
—
—
0.3
0.3
Tobago
Tobago
Uruguay
Uruguay
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.3
0.3
—
—
0.3
0.3
Venezuela
Venezuela
200.0
200.0
5.0
5.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
205.0
205.0
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2930 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations
ESDFa
GHP-
GHP-
INCLE
NADR
IMET
FMF
Total
USAID
State
Barbados &
Barbados &
3.0
3.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.6
0.6
—
—
3.6
3.6
Eastern
Eastern
Caribbean Caribbean
USAID
USAID
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Caribbean
Caribbean
DevelopmenDevelopmen
tb
USAID Central
USAID Central
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
America
America
RegionaRegiona
lb
USAID South
USAID South
15.5
15.5
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
15.5
15.5
America
America
RegionaRegiona
lb
USAID Latin
USAID Latin
190.7
190.7
9.0
9.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
199.7
199.7
America and
America and
Caribbean Caribbean
RegionaRegiona
lb
State Western
State Western
100.0
100.0
—
—
11.8
11.8
122.0
122.0
7.6
7.6
1.5
1.5
—
—
242.9
242.9
Hemisphere
Hemisphere
Regional Regional
[CARSI]c
[75.0]
[—]
[—]
[110.0]
[—]
[—]
[—]
[185.0]
[CBSI]c
[20.0]
[—]
[—]
[12.0]
[—]
[—]
[—]
[32.0]
Total
760.9
36.0
96.8
452.9
24.0
11.6
20.0
1,402.3
Sources: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2021, April 2020, p. 19; and U.S. Department of State, Budget April 2020, p. 19; and U.S. Department of State, Budget
Rol out Presentation, February 2020. Rol out Presentation, February 2020.
Notes: ESDF = Economic Support and Development Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; INCLE = ESDF = Economic Support and Development Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; INCLE =
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation , Anti-terrorism, Demining, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation , Anti-terrorism, Demining,
and Related Programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; and Related Programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing;
USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; CARSI = Central America Regional Security Initiative; and USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; CARSI = Central America Regional Security Initiative; and
CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.
a. The FY2021 request would consolidate several foreign assistance accounts, including DA and ESF, into a a. The FY2021 request would consolidate several foreign assistance accounts, including DA and ESF, into a
new ESDF account. The table compares the FY2021 ESDF request with the combined FY2020 DA and ESF
new ESDF account. The table compares the FY2021 ESDF request with the combined FY2020 DA and ESF
estimates. estimates.
b. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as wel as activities that cross
b. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as wel as activities that cross
borders or take place in nonpresence countries.
borders or take place in nonpresence countries.
c. CARSI and CBSI are funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
c. CARSI and CBSI are funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
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Author Information
Peter J. Meyer Peter J. Meyer
Rachel L. Martin
Rachel L. Martin
Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs
Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs
Research Assistant
Research Assistant
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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