U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

Changes from November 16, 2020 to February 18, 2022

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel
~~November 16, 2020~~February 18, 2022
This report provides an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to Israel. It includes a review of past This report provides an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to Israel. It includes a review of past
aid programs, data on annual assistance, and analysis of current issues. For general information aid programs, data on annual assistance, and analysis of current issues. For general information
Jeremy M. Sharp
on Israel, see on Israel, see Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II. Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II.

Successive Administrations, working with Congress, have provided Israel with significant Successive Administrations, working with Congress, have provided Israel with significant
assistance in light of robust domestic U.S. support for Israel and its security; shared strategic assistance in light of robust domestic U.S. support for Israel and its security; shared strategic

goals in the Middle East; a mutual commitment to democratic values; and historical ties dating goals in the Middle East; a mutual commitment to democratic values; and historical ties dating
from U.S. support for the creation of Israel in 1948. To date, the United States has provided Israel $from U.S. support for the creation of Israel in 1948. To date, the United States has provided Israel $~~146~~150 billion (current, or billion (current, or
noninflation-adjusted, dollars) in bilateral assistance and missile defense funding. At present, almost all U.S. bilateral aid to noninflation-adjusted, dollars) in bilateral assistance and missile defense funding. At present, almost all U.S. bilateral aid to
Israel is in the form of military assistanceIsrael is in the form of military assistance~~, although~~; from 1971 to 2007, Israel also received significant economic assistance. from 1971 to 2007, Israel also received significant economic assistance.
In 2016, the U.S. and Israeli governments signed their third 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on military aid, In 2016, the U.S. and Israeli governments signed their third 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on military aid,
covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under the terms of the MOU, the United States pledged to provide—subject to congressional covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under the terms of the MOU, the United States pledged to provide—subject to congressional
appropriation—$38 billion in military aid ($33 billion in Foreign Military Financing grants plus $5 billion in missile defense appropriation—$38 billion in military aid ($33 billion in Foreign Military Financing grants plus $5 billion in missile defense
appropriations) to Israel.appropriations) to Israel. ~~This MOU followed a previous $30 billion 10-year agreement, which ran through FY2018.~~
Israel is the first international operator of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Department of Defense’s fifth-generation stealth Israel is the first international operator of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Department of Defense’s fifth-generation stealth
aircraft, considered to be the most technologically advanced fighter jet ever made. To date, Israel has purchased 50 F-35s in aircraft, considered to be the most technologically advanced fighter jet ever made. To date, Israel has purchased 50 F-35s in
three separate contracts, funded with U.S. assistancethree separate contracts, funded with U.S. assistance, and has taken delivery on 30. For FY2022, the Biden.
~~For FY2021, the Trump~~ Administration requested $3.3 billion in FMF for Israel and $500 million in missile defense aid to Administration requested $3.3 billion in FMF for Israel and $500 million in missile defense aid to
mark the mark the ~~second~~fourth year of the MOU. The Administration also requested $5 million in Migration and Refugee Assistance year of the MOU. The Administration also requested $5 million in Migration and Refugee Assistance
humanitarian funding for migrants to Israel. humanitarian funding for migrants to Israel.
H.R. H.R. ~~7608 – State, Foreign Operations, Agriculture, Rural Development, Interior, Environment, Military Construction, and~~
~~Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2021 (which passed the House in July 2020)~~4373, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 would, among other things, provide $3.3 would, among other things, provide $3.3
billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Israel. billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Israel.
~~H.R. 7617 – The Defense, Commerce, Justice, Science, Energy and Water Development, Financial Services and General~~
~~Government, Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, Transportation, Housing, and Urban Development~~
~~Appropriations Act, 2021 (which passed the House in July 2020) would~~The Senate version, S. 3075, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022, also would provide $3.3 billion in FMF for Israel. H.R. 4432 and S. 3023, the respective House and Senate defense appropriations bills for FY2022, would each provide $500 million in provide $500 million in ~~joint U.S.-Israeli~~ missile missile
~~defense cooperation (of which $73 million for Iron Dome, $177~~defense funding for Israel, including $108 million for the Iron Dome program, $157 million for David’s Sling, $ million for David’s Sling, $7762 million for Arrow III, and million for Arrow III, and
$173 million for Arrow II$173 million for Arrow II).

. Several bills under consideration by Congress would provide $1 billion in supplemental aid for Iron Dome over three years. The foreign aid data in this report are compiled by the Congressional Research Service from a number of resources, including USAID's U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (also known as the "Greenbook"), CRS communications with the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and annual State Department and USAID Congressional Budget Justifications. For terminology and abbreviations used in this report, see Appendix A.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

~~link to page 7~~ U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

Background and Recent Trends
The United States and Israel have maintained strong bilateral relations based on a number of The United States and Israel have maintained strong bilateral relations based on a number of
factors, including robust domestic U.S. support for Israel and its security; shared strategic goals in factors, including robust domestic U.S. support for Israel and its security; shared strategic goals in
the Middle East; a mutual commitment to democratic values; and historical ties dating from U.S. the Middle East; a mutual commitment to democratic values; and historical ties dating from U.S.
support for the creation of Israel in 1948. U.S. foreign aid has been a major component in support for the creation of Israel in 1948. U.S. foreign aid has been a major component in
cementing and reinforcing these ties. U.S. officials and many lawmakers have long considered cementing and reinforcing these ties. U.S. officials and many lawmakers have long considered
Israel to be a vital partner in the region, and U.S. aid packages for Israel have reflected this Israel to be a vital partner in the region, and U.S. aid packages for Israel have reflected this
calculation. While some U.S. citizens have worked to cultivate U.S. support for Israel since its calculation. While some U.S. citizens have worked to cultivate U.S. support for Israel since its
creation in 1948, in the years following the 1973 Yom Kippur Warcreation in 1948, in the years following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, advocates for Israel have advocates for Israel have
engaged in organized, broad-based domestic efforts to foster bipartisan support in Congress for engaged in organized, broad-based domestic efforts to foster bipartisan support in Congress for
the bilateral relationship, including for U.S. aid to Israel. the bilateral relationship, including for U.S. aid to Israel.
~~In recent years, however, that strong domestic support for Israel has become more of a subject of~~
~~debate.1 While both the Republican and Democratic parties have expressed “unequivocal”~~
~~(Republican party platform 2016) or “ironclad” (Democratic party platform 2020) support for~~
~~Israel, including aid,2 some Democrats from within the progressive wing of the party have~~
~~become more vocal about conditioning, repurposing, or even cutting foreign aid to Israel.3 For~~
~~part of 2020, when Israel considered annexing part of the West Bank, a number of Democratic~~
~~lawmakers took varying approaches to signaling their opposition to annexation (see below). Some~~
~~Members warned in general terms that annexation would harm U.S.-Israeli relations, while others~~
~~were more explicit in cautioning that should Israel go ahead, they might advance legislation that~~
~~would have either cut aid or prohibited its use or application in annexed territories.~~
~~The 2020 Abraham Accords between Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain, which~~
~~normalized diplomatic relations between Israel and two Gulf Arab monarchies, may portend~~
~~requests to Congress for a major increase in U.S. foreign aid and military sales to Israel in the~~
~~years ahead see (“Qualitative Military Edge (QME)”). Although not officially part of Israel’s~~
~~agreement with the UAE, the United States has proposed selling the UAE, among other things,~~
~~the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the most advanced fighter aircraft ever built. To maintain Israel’s~~
~~technological superiority in arms over its neighbors, Israel and the United States are working on a~~
~~package of offsetting sales and foreign aid to Israel. As of October 2020, the Trump~~
~~Administration was considering an acceleration of the timetable for delivering some of the~~
~~remaining $26.4 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants to Israel (out of a total of $33~~
~~billion) pledged in the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to Israel, subject to the~~
~~approval of Congress. The United States also may approve additional sales of the F-35 to Israel~~
~~and accelerate the delivery of KC-46A refueling and transport aircraft to Israel.~~

1Although bipartisan support for U.S. assistance to Israel in Congress remains robust, congressional debate over some aspects of this aid has become more frequent.1 While bipartisan consensus on U.S. support for Israel appears to remain intact,2 formerly near congressional unanimity in support of providing aid to Israel without conditions or use limitations faces challenges (see, “Iron Dome” below).3 In particular, the debate over U.S. aid to Israel has become more linked to controversial issues regarding Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians.4 Both changing developments in the Middle East itself and changing U.S. domestic public opinion may be influencing emerging debates.5 These developments have had little or no apparent effect on the “ironclad” U.S. commitment to Israel’s security,6 as evidenced by successive administrations’ opposition to conditioning aid to Israel,7 but they have opened political space for more of a debate on aid conditionality. 1 Dennis Ross, “How Israel Should Navigate the New American Landscape,” Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, November 2021. 2 On September 23, 2021, the House passed H.R. 5323, the Iron Dome Supplemental Appropriations Act, on a 420 to 9 vote (with two voting “present”). 3 In 2021, as House appropriators began considering annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPs) appropriations legislation, over 300 lawmakers signed onto a letter calling for U.S. military assistance to Israel not to be reduced or conditioned. See, https://teddeutch.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2021.04.21_mou_letter_delauro_granger_signed.pdf. While congressional letters of support for continued U.S. aid to Israel are historically commonplace, it is rare for such letters to specify aid conditionality as a possible outcome. 4 Michael J. Koplow, “The Aftermath of the Iron Dome Debate,” Israel Policy Forum, September 27, 2021. 5 See, Lisa Lerer and Jennifer Medina, “Tensions Among Democrats Grow Over Israel as the Left Defends Palestinians,” New York Times, May 15, 2021. See also, “U.S. Public Has Favorable View of Israel’s People, but Is Less Positive Toward Its Government,” Pew Research Center, April 24, 2019. The issue of what constitutes legitimate criticism of U.S. policy toward Israel and what qualifies as the de- The issue of what constitutes legitimate criticism of U.S. policy toward Israel and what qualifies as the de-
legitimization of Israel or even anti-Semitism legitimization of Israel or even anti-Semitism ~~has received extensive media coverage in recent years. For example, see~~
~~“How the Battle over Israel and Anti-Semitism is Fracturing American Politics,” New York Times, March 28, 2019.~~
~~2 The Republican National Committee’s 2020 platform, unchanged from 2016, is available online here: https://prod-~~
~~cdn-static.gop.com/docs/Resolution_Platform_2020.pdf. The 2020 Democratic Party Platform is available online at:~~
~~https://www.demconvention.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2020-07-31-Democratic-Party-Platform-For-~~
~~Distribution.pdf.~~
~~3 For example, during his campaign to be the 2020 Democratic presidential nominee, Senator Bernie Sanders said in~~
~~October 2019: “My solution is to say to Israel: ‘You get $3.8 billion every year. If you want military aid, you’re going~~
~~to have to fundamentally change your relationship to the people of Gaza.’ In fact, I think it is fair to say that some of~~
~~that should go right now into humanitarian aid. See, “Biden calls Sanders’ Pitch to Leverage Israel Aid ‘Bizarre,’~~
~~Associated Press, December 7, 2019.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

1

~~link to page 7~~ ~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Table 1. Total U.S. Foreign Aid Obligations to Israel: 1946-2020~~
~~current, or non-inflation-adjusted, dollars in millions~~
~~Fiscal Year~~
~~Military~~
~~Economic~~
~~Missile Defense~~
~~Total~~
~~1946-2018~~
~~97,907.700~~
~~34,326.000~~
~~6,411.409~~
~~138,645.109~~
~~2019~~
~~3,300.000~~
-
~~500.000~~
~~3,800.000~~
~~2020~~
~~3,300.000~~
-
~~500.000~~
~~3,800.000~~
~~Total~~
~~104,507.700~~
~~34,326.000~~
~~7,411.409~~
~~146,245.109~~(from both the left and the right) has received extensive media coverage in recent years. See, “Ari Hoffman and Joel Swanson, “Should Supporting Israel Be a Litmus Test for Participation in a Rally Against Antisemitism?” Forward, July 13, 2021. 6 U.S. Department of Defense, April 11 Joint Press Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Israeli Minister of Defense Benny Gantz, April 11, 2021. 7 During his Senate confirmation hearing, then U.S. Ambassador-designate to Israel, Thomas Nides, responded to a question on conditioning security assistance to Israel by saying, “The reality is the administration does not support conditionality on the assistance. And as you know, we're at a $38 billion 10-year MOU, and the position of the administration is we do not support conditionality.” See, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on Pending Nominations, CQ Congressional Transcripts, Congressional Hearings, Sept. 22, 2021. Congressional Research Service 1 link to page 8 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Some of the major advocacy organizations engaged on this issue, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and Christians United for Israel (CUFI), express unequivocal support for U.S. security assistance to Israel.8 J Street supports continued security assistance provided that U.S. funds do not infringe on Palestinian rights or sustain actions such as the unilateral annexation of West Bank territory.9 Some political groups that are not focused exclusively on Israel matters have advocated for increased scrutiny of U.S. military aid to Israel, particularly during the May 2021 conflict in Israel and Gaza.10 These groups have stimulated debates about possibly conditioning or cutting foreign aid to Israel,11 or supporting boycotts and sanctions.12 Table 1. Total U.S. Foreign Aid Obligations to Israel: 1946-2021 current, or non-inflation-adjusted, U.S. dollars in millions Fiscal Year Military Economic Missile Defense Total 1946-2019 101,206.200 34,336.000 6,911.409 142,453.609 2020 3,300.000 - 500.000 3,800.000 2021 3,300.000 - 500.000 3,800.000 Total 107,806.200 34,336.000 7,911.409 150,053.609
Sources: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), the U.S. State Department, and the Missile Defense U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), the U.S. State Department, and the Missile Defense
Agency. Agency.
Notes: The Greenbook figures do not include missile defense funding provided by the Department of Defense. The Greenbook figures do not include missile defense funding provided by the Department of Defense.
According to USAID Data Services as of According to USAID Data Services as of ~~March 2020~~December 2021, in constant , in constant ~~2018~~2021 U.S. dol ars (inflation-adjusted), total U.S. U.S. dol ars (inflation-adjusted), total U.S.
aid to Israel obligated from 1946-aid to Israel obligated from 1946-~~2018~~2021 is $ is $~~236~~247 bil ion. bil ion.
U.S. Aid and Israel’s Advanced Military Technology
Almost all current U.S. aid to Israel is in the form of military assistance.Almost all current U.S. aid to Israel is in the form of military assistance.413 U.S. military aid has U.S. military aid has
helped transform Israel’s armed forces into one of the most technologically sophisticated helped transform Israel’s armed forces into one of the most technologically sophisticated
militaries in the world militaries in the world ((see, “Qualitative Military Edge (QME)”). U.S. military aid also has helped ). U.S. military aid also has helped
Israel build its domestic defense industry, which now ranks as one of the top global Israel build its domestic defense industry, which now ranks as one of the top global ~~exporters of~~
~~arms.5~~arms exporters.14 Israeli defense companies, such as Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael, and Elbit Israeli defense companies, such as Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael, and Elbit
~~Systems export nearly 70% of their products abroad. 6 Israel exports missile defense systems,~~
~~unmanned aerial vehicles, cybersecurity products, radar, and electronic communications systems~~
~~to, among others: India,7 Azerbaijan, Vietnam, Thailand, South Korea, Singapore, Philippines,~~
~~Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, Russia, Brazil, and the United States.8 In addition to~~
~~the U.S. purchase of Iron Dome (see below), the United States has purchased, among other items,~~
~~the following Israeli defense articles: Trophy active protection systems for M1 Abrams tanks,~~
~~helmets for F-35 fighter pilots, and an electronic fence along the U.S.-Mexico border.~~

4 8 For example, see AIPAC’s and CUFI’s policy agendas respectively at https://www.aipac.org/s/policy-agenda and https://cufi.org/about/policy/policy-agenda/ 9 See, J Street’s position on aid at https://jstreet.org/policy/us-security-assistance-to-israel/#.YdR4gGjMKUk. 10 Laura Kelly, “Progressive Groups Call for Biden to Denounce Evictions of Palestinians as 'War Crimes,'” The Hill, May 13, 2021. 11 “America’s Democrats are Increasingly Divided over Israel,” The Economist, May 14, 2021. 12 Sean Sullivan, “Supporters of a Tougher Line on Israel Split over Tactics and Message,” Washington Post, May 30, 2021. See also, CRS Report R44281, Israel and the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) Movement, coordinated by Jim Zanotti. 13 For many years, U.S. economic aid helped subsidize a lackluster Israeli economy, but since the rapid expansion of For many years, U.S. economic aid helped subsidize a lackluster Israeli economy, but since the rapid expansion of
Israel’s high-tech sector and overall economy in the 1990s (sparked partially by U.S.-Israeli scientific cooperation), Israel’s high-tech sector and overall economy in the 1990s (sparked partially by U.S.-Israeli scientific cooperation),
Israel has been considered a fully industrialized nationIsrael has been considered a fully industrialized nation (as of 2021, Israel’s Gross Domestic Product per capita ranks 46th worldwide). Consequently, Israel and the United States agreed to gradually . Consequently, Israel and the United States agreed to gradually
phase out economic grant aid to Israel. In FY2008, Israel stopped receiving bilateral Economic Support Fund (ESF) phase out economic grant aid to Israel. In FY2008, Israel stopped receiving bilateral Economic Support Fund (ESF)
grants. It had been a large-scale recipient grants. It had been a large-scale recipient of grant ESF assistance since 1971. 14 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 2016 to 2020, Israel was the 8th largest arms exporter worldwide, accounting for 3% of world deliveries. See, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, Congressional Research Service 2 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Systems, export nearly 70% of their products.15 Israel exports missile defense systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, cybersecurity products, radar, and electronic communications systems to, among others: India,16Azerbaijan, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Russia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Brazil, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States.17 Israeli Exports of Spyware Revelations regarding the export of Israeli software have drawn attention to Israel’s defense export oversight which, since 2006, has been overseen by Israel’s Defense Export Controls Agency (DECA). In 2021, after investigative reports revealed the Israeli-owned cyber security firm NSO Group had sold mobile phone software to foreign governments, which then used it to spy on other heads of state, dissidents, and human rights activists, the Israeli media looked more closely at DECA’s export licensing process. According to one report, “The limitations on such sales are exceedingly few. Israel’s current law on defense exports requires the Defense Ministry to make ‘considerations regarding the end user or the end use,’ but does not expressly forbid arms sales to human rights violators.. . the Defense Ministry’s Defense Export Controls Agency, which has a small staff and responsibility for overseeing thousands of export licenses, lacks the necessary knowledge about the countries purchasing Israeli firms’ technology to assess how the products wil be used.”18 The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security added NSO to its “Entity List” for engaging in activities that are contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.19 In December 2021, Israel altered its export licensing policy for cybersecurity software, requiring purchasers to pledge they wil not use Israeli equipment to commit “terrorist acts” or “serious crime,” as defined by DECA.20 As Israel has become a global leader in certain niche defense technologies, Israeli defense exports to the U.S. market have grown substantially. According to one report, the U.S. military purchased $1.5 billion worth of Israeli equipment in 2019, representing a five-fold increase from two decades before.21 In addition to the U.S. purchase of Iron Dome (see below), the United States has purchased, among other items, the following Israeli defense articles: Trophy active protection systems for M1 Abrams tanks, enhanced night vision goggles, laser range finders for the U.S. Marines, helmets for F-35 fighter pilots, wings for the F-35, and a system of towers, electronic sensors, radars, and cameras for use along the U.S.-Mexican border. The United States and Israel are in the process of gradually phasing out Israel’s ability to use a portion of its U.S. military assistance for domestic purchases (also known as Off-Shore Procurement – see Figure 1), and thus some Israeli companies have opened subsidiaries that are 2020,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2021. 15~~of grant ESF assistance since 1971.~~
~~5 See, CRS Report R44716, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008-2015, by Catherine A.~~
~~Theohary. Also, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 2015 to 2019, Israel~~
~~was the 8th largest arms exporter worldwide, accounting for 3% of world deliveries. See, “Trends in International Arms~~
~~Transfers, 2019,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2020.~~
6 Sasson Hadad, Tomer Fadlon, and Shmuel Even (editors), “Israel’s Defense Industry and US Security Aid,” Sasson Hadad, Tomer Fadlon, and Shmuel Even (editors), “Israel’s Defense Industry and US Security Aid,” INSS, ,
Memorandum No. 202, July 2020. Memorandum No. 202, July 2020.
716 India is the largest buyer of Israeli defense equipment. See, Rina Bassist, “Israel, India Advance on Phalcon AWACS India is the largest buyer of Israeli defense equipment. See, Rina Bassist, “Israel, India Advance on Phalcon AWACS
Megadeal,” Megadeal,” Al Monitor, September 3, 2020. , September 3, 2020.
817 Israel Ministry of Defense, Defense Export and Defense Co‐Operation Agency (SIBAT), and Israel Ministry of Defense, Defense Export and Defense Co‐Operation Agency (SIBAT), and Jane’s, , ~~Navigating the~~
~~Emerging Markets~~Emerging Markets Reports, Israel, January , Israel, January ~~10, 2019~~19, 2022. Per a 1987 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and . Per a 1987 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and
Israel as amended, (Reciprocal Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Memorandum of Understanding), Israeli Israel as amended, (Reciprocal Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Memorandum of Understanding), Israeli
and U.S. defense contractors are able to compete in both countries for contracts on an equal basis. For the text of the and U.S. defense contractors are able to compete in both countries for contracts on an equal basis. For the text of the
MOU, seeMOU, see~~: https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/mou-israel.pdf.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

2

~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Qualitative Military Edge (QME)~~
~~U.S. military aid for Israel has been designed to maintain Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over~~
~~neighboring militaries.9 The rationale for QME is that Israel must rely on better equipment and~~
~~training to compensate for being much smaller in land area and population than most of its~~
~~potential adversaries.10 For decades, successive Administrations, in conjunction with Congress,~~
~~have taken measures to maintain Israel’s QME in a number of ways. For example:~~
 In practice, U.S. arms sales policy has traditionally allowed Israel first regional
access to U.S. defense technology.11
~~ In cases in which both Israel and an Arab state operate the same U.S. platform,~~
~~Israel has first received either a more advanced version of the platform or the~~
ability to customize ~~the U.S. system.12~~ https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/mou-israel.pdf. 18 See, Judah Ari Gross, “NSO Group Affair is Latest in Israel’s Long History of Arming Shady Regimes,” Times of Israel, July 28, 2021. 19 Available online at https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2021/11/commerce-adds-nso-group-and-other-foreign-companies-entity-list. 20 See, “Israel Issues Stricter Guidelines for use of its Cyber Tech Exports,” Reuters, December 6, 2021. 21 Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollock, “Asset Test 2021: How the U.S. Can Keep Benefiting from Its Alliance with Israel,” Transition 2021: Policy Notes for the Biden Administration, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 2021. Congressional Research Service 3 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel licensed to do business in the United States. Incorporating within the United States enables Israeli companies both to increase business with the U.S. military and, in some cases, conduct U.S. aid-financed military deals with the Israeli government. As more Israeli companies have obtained a U.S. presence, it has led to increased defense partnerships between U.S. and Israeli firms, whereby weapons development is done in Israel and production is completed in the United States.22 Elbit Systems of America (Fort Worth, Texas), a wholly owned subsidiary of Israel’s Elbit Systems, is one of the largest Israeli-owned firms operating in the United States. It acts as a purchasing agent for the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs.23 As long as these subsidiaries follow U.S. guidelines (each must be a U.S.-based supplier, manufacturer, reseller, or distributor incorporated or licensed to do business in the United States and registered with the Israeli Ministry of Defense Mission in New York),24 they are eligible (pending U.S. government approval) to enter into Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) contracts25 financed by FMF with the Israeli government.26 Reoccurring language in annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations bills,27 as implemented by Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, permit Israel (along with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and Pakistan) to use FMF to finance DCS contracts, in which the purchaser (Israel) enters into a contract directly with a vendor.28 Qualitative Military Edge (QME) U.S. military aid for Israel has been designed to maintain Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over neighboring militaries.29 The rationale for QME is that Israel must rely on better equipment and training to compensate for being much smaller in land area and population than most of its 22 Ora Coren, “Israel's Arms Makers to Become more American under New Military-Aid Pact,” Ha’aretz, updated April 10, 2018. 23 Available online at https://elbitsystems.com/majior-subsidiaries/. 24 CRS conversation with U.S. State Department, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), January 6, 2022. 25 Direct Commercial Contracts Division (DCC)/DCS allow a foreign entity to contract directly with a U.S.-based company in order to obtain needed supplies or services (subject to U.S. Government review and approval). This process takes the U.S. Government out of the “middleman” role that it plays in facilitating FMS transactions. See, CRS InFocus CRS In Focus IF11441, Transfer of Defense Articles: Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), by Nathan J. Lucas and Michael J. Vassalotti. 26 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Guidelines for Foreign Military Financing of Direct Commercial Contracts, March 2017. 27 See, for example, section headed “Foreign Military Financing Program” under Division K of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260). 28 P.L. 101-167, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, states that “Only those countries for which assistance was justified for the Foreign Military Sales Financing Program in the fiscal year 1989 congressional presentation for security assistance programs may utilize funds made available under this heading for procurement of defense articles, defense services or design and construction services that are not sold by the United States Government under the Arms Export Control Act.” The Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s Security Assistance Manual further states that “DSCA (Directorate for Security Assistance (DSA) Direct Commercial Contracts Division (DCC)) approves DCCs to be financed with FMF on a case-by-case basis.” See Chapter 9.7.3, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) as Defense Security Cooperation Agency Manual 5105.38-M, DSCA Policy 12-20. 29 For more coverage of this issue, see CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti. Congressional Research Service 4 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel potential adversaries.30 For decades, successive Administrations, in conjunction with Congress, have taken measures to maintain Israel’s QME in a number of ways. For example,  In practice, U.S. arms sales policy has traditionally allowed Israel first regional access to U.S. defense technology.31  In cases in which both Israel and an Arab state operate the same U.S. platform, Israel has first received either a more advanced version of the platform or the ability to customize the U.S. system.32
 In cases in which Israel objected to a major defense article sale to an Arab  In cases in which Israel objected to a major defense article sale to an Arab
military (e.g., the 1981 sale of Airborne Early Warning and Control System military (e.g., the 1981 sale of Airborne Early Warning and Control System
aircraft or “AWACS” to Saudi Arabia), Congress has, at times, advocated for and aircraft or “AWACS” to Saudi Arabia), Congress has, at times, advocated for and
legislated legislated conditions on the usage and transfer of such weapons prior to or of such weapons prior to or
after a sale.after a sale.1333
 The United States has compensated Israel with “  The United States has compensated Israel with “offsetting” weapons packages or ” weapons packages or
military aid when selling other U.S. major defense articles to a Middle Eastern military aid when selling other U.S. major defense articles to a Middle Eastern
military rival (see textbox below). military rival (see textbox below).
Over time, Congress codified informal QME-related practices in Over time, Congress codified informal QME-related practices in ~~a way~~ways that encouraged a more that encouraged a more
deliberate interagency process for each major U.S. arms sale to Middle Eastern governments deliberate interagency process for each major U.S. arms sale to Middle Eastern governments
other than Israel.other than Israel.1434 In the 110th Congress, Representative Howard Berman sponsored legislation In the 110th Congress, Representative Howard Berman sponsored legislation

~~9 For more coverage of this issue, see CRS Report R46580,~~ ~~Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms~~
~~Sales to the United Arab Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.~~
10(H.R. 5916, Section 201) to “carry out an empirical and qualitative assessment on an ongoing basis of the extent to which Israel possesses a qualitative military edge over military threats.” After becoming Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), then-Chairman Berman was able to incorporate this language into the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-429). The relevant QME provisions of this law had three primary elements: (1) they defined 30 The concept of QME (independent of its application to Israel) dates back to the Cold War. In assessing the balance of The concept of QME (independent of its application to Israel) dates back to the Cold War. In assessing the balance of
power in Europe, U.S. war planners would often stress to lawmakers that, because countries of the Warsaw Pact had a power in Europe, U.S. war planners would often stress to lawmakers that, because countries of the Warsaw Pact had a
numerical advantage over U.S. and allied forces stationed in Europe, the United States must maintain a “qualitative numerical advantage over U.S. and allied forces stationed in Europe, the United States must maintain a “qualitative
edge” in defense systems. For example, see, Written Statement of General William O. Gribble, Jr., Hearings on edge” in defense systems. For example, see, Written Statement of General William O. Gribble, Jr., Hearings on
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Program for Fiscal Year 1973, Before Subcommittee No. 1 of Committee Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Program for Fiscal Year 1973, Before Subcommittee No. 1 of Committee
on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Second Congress, Second Session, February 2, 3, 7, 9, 22, 23, on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Second Congress, Second Session, February 2, 3, 7, 9, 22, 23,
24, March 6, 7, and 8, 1972. The concept was subsequently applied to Israel in relation to its Arab adversaries. In 1981, 24, March 6, 7, and 8, 1972. The concept was subsequently applied to Israel in relation to its Arab adversaries. In 1981,
then-U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig testified before Congress, saying, “A central aspect of US policy since the then-U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig testified before Congress, saying, “A central aspect of US policy since the
October 1973 war has been to ensure that Israel maintains a qualitative military edge.” Secretary of State Alexander October 1973 war has been to ensure that Israel maintains a qualitative military edge.” Secretary of State Alexander
Haig, Statement for the Record submitted in response to Question from Hon. Clarence Long, House Appropriations Haig, Statement for the Record submitted in response to Question from Hon. Clarence Long, House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, April 28, 1981. Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, April 28, 1981.
1131 For example, Israel acquired the F-15 in 1976, six years before Saudi Arabia. It received the delivery of the F-16 For example, Israel acquired the F-15 in 1976, six years before Saudi Arabia. It received the delivery of the F-16
fighter in 1980, three years before Egypt. In 1977, P.L. 95–92 provided thatfighter in 1980, three years before Egypt. In 1977, P.L. 95–92 provided that: “In accordance with the historic special “In accordance with the historic special
relationship between the United States and Israel and previous agreements and continuing understandings, the Congress relationship between the United States and Israel and previous agreements and continuing understandings, the Congress
joins with the President in reaffirming that a policy of restraint in United States arms transfers, including arms sales joins with the President in reaffirming that a policy of restraint in United States arms transfers, including arms sales
ceilings, shall not impair Israelceilings, shall not impair Israel'’s deterrent strength or undermine the military balance in the Middle East.” s deterrent strength or undermine the military balance in the Middle East.”
1232 “The Double Edged Sword of the Qualitative Military Edge,” “The Double Edged Sword of the Qualitative Military Edge,” Israel Policy Forum, April 11, 2016. , April 11, 2016.
1333 See Section 131, Certification Concerning AWACS sold to Saudi Arabia, P.L. 99-83, the International Security and See Section 131, Certification Concerning AWACS sold to Saudi Arabia, P.L. 99-83, the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985. Development Cooperation Act of 1985.
~~14 According to one Senate staffer, prior~~34 Prior to 2008, during congressional review of possible U.S. arms sales to the Middle to 2008, during congressional review of possible U.S. arms sales to the Middle
East, QME concerns only were addressed on an ad hoc basis, usually through consultations between the military and East, QME concerns only were addressed on an ad hoc basis, usually through consultations between the military and
committee staff. Some congressional staff felt that assessments for specific arms sales tended to be overly subjective. committee staff. Some congressional staff felt that assessments for specific arms sales tended to be overly subjective.
~~Since~~Because staff frequently raised QME concerns, the attempt to staff frequently raised QME concerns, the attempt to ~~enshrine~~codify QME as a statutory requirement stemmed from a QME as a statutory requirement stemmed from a
desire to rationalize the process, make it more objective, and incorporate it as a regular component of the U.S. arms desire to rationalize the process, make it more objective, and incorporate it as a regular component of the U.S. arms
sales review process to Middle Eastern governments. CRS conversation with Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member, September 24, 2020. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

35 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel QME;35 (2)

~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~(H.R. 5916, Section 201) to “carry out an empirical and qualitative assessment on an ongoing~~
~~basis of the extent to which Israel possesses a qualitative military edge over military threats.”~~
~~After becoming Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, then-Chairman Berman was~~
~~able to incorporate this language into the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-429). The~~
~~relevant QME provisions of this law had three primary elements: (1) they defined QME;15 (2)~~
they required an assessment of Israel’s QME every four years; and (3) they amended the Arms they required an assessment of Israel’s QME every four years; and (3) they amended the Arms
Export Control Act (Export Control Act (AECA, 22 U.S.C. §2776) to require a determination, for any export of a U.S. defense 22 U.S.C. §2776) to require a determination, for any export of a U.S. defense
article to any country in the Middle East other than Israel, that such a sale would not adversely article to any country in the Middle East other than Israel, that such a sale would not adversely
affect Israel’s QME. affect Israel’s QME.
Preserving QME: Offsetting Weapons Packages for Israel
The fol owing specific instances The fol owing specific instances ~~supplement~~supplemented general U.S. efforts to strengthen Israel’s QME general U.S. efforts to strengthen Israel’s QME~~, which are~~
~~documented in a number of sources:16~~
:36  
In 1992, after the United States announced a sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 fighters, the George H.W. In 1992, after the United States announced a sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 fighters, the George H.W.
Bush Administration provided Israel with Apache and Blackhawk helicoptersBush Administration provided Israel with Apache and Blackhawk helicopters, and pre-positioned U.S. and pre-positioned U.S.
defense equipment in Israel for Israeli use with U.S. approvaldefense equipment in Israel for Israeli use with U.S. approval~~, as various means of preserving Israel’s~~
~~QME.17~~.37
 
In 2007, after the George W. Bush Administration agreed to sell Saudi Arabia Joint Direct Attack In 2007, after the George W. Bush Administration agreed to sell Saudi Arabia Joint Direct Attack
Munitions (JDAMs), the Administration reportedly agreed to sell more advanced JDAMs to IsraelMunitions (JDAMs), the Administration reportedly agreed to sell more advanced JDAMs to Israel ~~as a~~
~~means of preserving its QME.18~~.38
 
In 2010, the Obama Administration agreed to sell an additional 20 F-35 aircraft to Israel In 2010, the Obama Administration agreed to sell an additional 20 F-35 aircraft to Israel ~~as a means of~~
~~preserving its QME~~ in response to a sale to Saudi Arabia that included F-15s.in response to a sale to Saudi Arabia that included F-15s.1939
 
In 2013, after the Obama Administration agreed to sell the UAE advanced F-16 fighters, then Secretary In 2013, after the Obama Administration agreed to sell the UAE advanced F-16 fighters, then Secretary
of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that the United States would provide Israel with KC-135 refueling of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that the United States would provide Israel with KC-135 refueling
aircraft, anti-radiation missiles, advanced radar, and the sale of six V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft.aircraft, anti-radiation missiles, advanced radar, and the sale of six V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft.2040 At At
the time, the U.S. proposal marked the first time that the United States had offered to sell tilt-rotor the time, the U.S. proposal marked the first time that the United States had offered to sell tilt-rotor
Ospreys to another country. Israel would eventually cancel its planned purchase of the V-22 due to Ospreys to another country. Israel would eventually cancel its planned purchase of the V-22 due to
budgetary constraints. budgetary constraints.
Since the passage of the QME law and its amending of the Since the passage of the QME law and its amending of the ~~Arms Export Control Act~~AECA, the , the
interagency process to assess Israel’s QME has taken place behind closed doors with little interagency process to assess Israel’s QME has taken place behind closed doors with little
fanfare. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) Security Assistance fanfare. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) Security Assistance
Manual, QME determinations can be classified.Manual, QME determinations can be classified.2141 After a QME determination has been made After a QME determination has been made

~~sales review process to Middle Eastern governments. CRS conversation with Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff~~
~~member, September 24, 2020.~~
15regarding a specific proposed sale, DSCA includes a line in the applicable congressional notification reading, “The proposed sale will not alter the basic military balance in the region.” At various times, the U.S. government reportedly has held regular consultations with Israeli officials regarding the potential impact of regional arms sales on QME.42 More recently, some former Obama Administration officials responded to news in 2020 of the possible sale of the F-35 (see below) to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with criticism of what they perceived as a lack of time for U.S. officials and Congress to properly assess the transaction, noting that “the process of 35 Section 201(d)(2) defines QME as “the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from Section 201(d)(2) defines QME as “the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from
any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damage and any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damage and
casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons, command, casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons, command,
control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics
are superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or non-state actors.” are superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or non-state actors.”
1636 See, e.g., See, e.g., U.S. State Department, Remarks by Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, State Department, Remarks by Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
November 4, 2011; “U.S.-Israel Strategic Cooperation: U.S. Provides Israel a Qualitative Military Advantage,” November 4, 2011; “U.S.-Israel Strategic Cooperation: U.S. Provides Israel a Qualitative Military Advantage,” Jewish
Virtual Library. .
1737 See, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 White House Statement on US Military Assistance to Israel, September See, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 White House Statement on US Military Assistance to Israel, September
26, 1992, VOLUME 13-14: 1992-1994. 26, 1992, VOLUME 13-14: 1992-1994.
1838 Dan Williams, “Israel to get ‘ Dan Williams, “Israel to get ‘~~smarter~~Smarter’ U.S.-made ’ U.S.-made ~~bombs~~Bombs than Saudis,” than Saudis,” Reuters, January 13, 2020. , January 13, 2020.
1939 Eli Lake, “In Gates Book, Details of Israel’s Hard Bargaining Eli Lake, “In Gates Book, Details of Israel’s Hard Bargaining ~~Over~~over Saudi Arms,” Saudi Arms,” Daily Beast, January 10, 2014. , January 10, 2014.
2040 “U.S. Near $10 Billion Arms Deal with Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE,” “U.S. Near $10 Billion Arms Deal with Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE,” ~~Reuters~~Reuters, April 19, 2013. , April 19, 2013.
2141 See https://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-5. 42 For an example, see Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israeli Brass Decry U.S. Arms Sales to Arab States,” Defense News, January 23, 2012. At the time this article was published, the U.S. side of the working group was led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, while the Israeli side was led by the Defense Ministry’s policy chief and the Israel Defense Forces director of planning. ~~See https://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-5.~~
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

46

U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

~~regarding a specific proposed sale, DSCA includes a line in the applicable congressional~~
~~notification reading, “The proposed sale will not alter the basic military balance in the region.”~~
~~At times, lawmakers~~military consultations with Israel on a given weapons system typically took several years of extensive defense shuttle diplomacy, completed before formally notifying Congress of the arms sale package.”43 One Member of Congress wrote that previous QME determinations encompassed “classified negotiations that got to the heart of Israel’s defense capabilities.”44 Lawmakers have amended or attempted to amend aspects of the 2008 law. The U.S.- have amended or attempted to amend aspects of the 2008 law. The U.S.-
Israel Strategic Partnership Act (P.L. 113-296) amended Section 36 of the AECA to require that Israel Strategic Partnership Act (P.L. 113-296) amended Section 36 of the AECA to require that
the Administration explain, in cases of sales or exports of major U.S. defense equipment to other the Administration explain, in cases of sales or exports of major U.S. defense equipment to other
Middle Eastern states, what is “Israel’s capacity to address the improved capabilities provided by Middle Eastern states, what is “Israel’s capacity to address the improved capabilities provided by
such sale or export.”such sale or export.”~~22 In~~45 Most recently, in the 116th Congress, Representative Bradley Schneider sponsored (H.R. the 116th Congress, Representative Bradley Schneider sponsored (H.R.
8494), the Guaranteeing Israel8494), the Guaranteeing Israel'’s QME Act of 2020, which s QME Act of 2020, which ~~requires~~ would have required the President to consult with the President to consult with
~~Israeli officials before making a QME determination.23 Another QME-related bill introduced in~~
~~the 116th Congress is S. 4814, the Secure F-35 Exports Act of 2020. This legislation would,~~
~~among other things, require a certification by the President before the provision of F-35 aircraft to~~
~~a Middle Eastern country other than Israel that such sale will not undermine Israel’s QME.~~
~~At various times in the past, the U.S. government reportedly has held regular consultations with~~
~~Israeli officials regarding the potential impact of regional arms sales on QME.24 Some former~~
~~Obama Administration officials have responded to news of the possible sale of the F-35 to the~~
~~UAE with criticism of what they perceive as a lack of time for U.S. officials and Congress to~~
~~properly assess the transaction. Some have written that previous QME determinations~~
~~encompassed “classified negotiations that got to the heart of Israel’s defense capabilities,”25 and~~
~~that “the process of military consultations with Israel on a given weapons system typically took~~
~~several years of extensive defense shuttle diplomacy, completed before formally notifying~~
~~Congress of the arms sale package.”26~~
~~U.S. Bilateral Military Aid to Israel~~
~~Since 1999, overall U.S. assistance to Israel has been outlined in 10-year government-to-~~
~~government Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). MOUs are not legally binding agreements~~
~~like treaties, and thus do not require Senate ratification. Also, Congress may accept or change~~
~~year-to-year assistance levels for Israel, or provide supplemental appropriations. Nevertheless,~~
~~past MOUs have significantly influenced the terms of U.S. aid to Israel; Congress has~~
~~appropriated foreign aid to Israel largely according to the terms of the MOU in place at the time.~~

~~22 The Act also requires the Administration to:~~Israeli officials before making a QME determination.46 The Proposed F-35 Sale to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel’s QME Prior to 2020, the UAE had no formal diplomatic relations with Israel, but the two small, technologically advanced countries had been gradually and secretly increasing their bilateral cooperation for decades.47 By 2020, the regional diplomatic environment presented a favorable opportunity to formalize the relationship. At the time, the UAE had faced significant U.S. and other foreign criticism for its military interventions in Yemen and Libya, its use of spyware against domestic and foreign opponents,48 and its isolation of fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member Qatar. At the same time, then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had secured a pledge from his new partners in a coalition government to support Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank, a move likely to be seen as inflammatory across the Arab world.49 Within this context, the Trump Administration, Israel, and the UAE jointly negotiated an Israel-UAE diplomatic normalization agreement during the summer of 2020 in exchange for Israel agreeing to suspend its annexation plans. In support of the set of bilateral agreements that came to be known as the “Abraham Accords,” the Trump Administration also pledged to sell to the UAE 43 Barbara A. Leaf and Dana Stroul, “The F-35 Triangle: America, Israel, the United Arab Emirates,” War on the Rocks, September 15, 2020. See also, Andrew Shapiro and Derek Chollet, “Selling F-35s to the Middle East Was Never Going to Be Easy,” Defense One, September 14, 2020. 44 Representative Elissa Slotkin, “The Importance of Preserving Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge,” Medium.com, September 14, 2020. 45 The Act also requires the Administration to evaluate “how such sale or export alters the strategic and tactical evaluate “how such sale or export alters the strategic and tactical
balance in the region, including relative capabilities; and Israel’s capacity to respond to the improved regional balance in the region, including relative capabilities; and Israel’s capacity to respond to the improved regional
capabilities provided by such sale or export,” and include “an identification of any specific new capacity, capabilities, capabilities provided by such sale or export,” and include “an identification of any specific new capacity, capabilities,
or training that Israel may require to address the regional or country-specific capabilities provided by such sale or or training that Israel may require to address the regional or country-specific capabilities provided by such sale or
export; and a description of any additional United States security assurances to Israel made, or requested to be made, in export; and a description of any additional United States security assurances to Israel made, or requested to be made, in
connection with, or as a result of, such sale or export.” connection with, or as a result of, such sale or export.”
2346 In the 115th Congress, Representative Schneider sponsored H.R. 2833, Defending Israel’s QME Act of 2017. In the 115th Congress, Representative Schneider sponsored H.R. 2833, Defending Israel’s QME Act of 2017.
~~24 Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israeli Brass Decry U.S. Arms Sales to Arab States,” Defense News, January 23, 2012. At the~~
~~time this article was published, the U.S. side of the working group was led by the Under Secretary of Defense for~~
~~Policy and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, while the Israeli side was led by the Defense~~
~~Ministry’s policy chief and the Israel Defense Forces director of planning.~~
~~25 Representative Elissa Slotkin, “The Importance of Preserving~~47 Dion Nissenbaum, “Secret Ties Paved Way for U.A.E., Israel Deal,” Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2020. 48 Mark Mazzetti, Nicole Perlroth and Ronen Bergman, “It Seemed like a Popular Chat App. It’s Secretly a Spy Tool,” New York Times, December 22, 2019. 49 Israel Democracy Institute, Coalition Agreement for the Establishment of an Emergency and National Unity Government in Israel, April 20, 2020. Congressional Research Service 7 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel the advanced F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft50 and armed drones (see below).51 Previously, the United States had repeatedly denied UAE requests to purchase the F-35, while allowing Israel to become the first Middle East operator of the fifth generation platform in 2017 (see, “F-35” below). UAE officials say the country has sought since 2014 to buy the F-35. Israel has long held aerial superiority in the Middle East due to both the skill of its pilots and the American-built planes in its fleet. Israel is the sole Middle Eastern country that operates the F-35, and this possession of a fifth generation aircraft, along with its older, but still formidable, squadrons of F-15Is and F-16Cs, provides it with a significant advantage over neighboring Arab states. No other Middle Eastern air force currently possesses a stealth fighter akin to the F-35. While other regional air forces possess advanced fourth generation fighters—such as Saudi Arabia (Boeing F-15SA), Qatar (Boeing F-15QA), the UAE (Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 60 E/F Desert Falcon),52 and Egypt (Dassault Rafale)— the F-35’s advanced sensors and its ability to share information with legacy aircraft give Israel’s older fighters a situational awareness of the battlefield that no other regional state possesses. During the last few months of the 116th Congress, many lawmakers largely welcomed the signing of the Israel-UAE normalization agreement while asserting congressional prerogatives to thoroughly review any potential related arms sales to the UAE, particularly as they relate to the QME.53 Some lawmakers raised questions as to whether the sale of the F-35 to Middle Eastern countries other than Israel would automatically erode Israel’s QME. In a September 2020 SFRC hearing, then Ranking Member Robert Menendez asked then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale how the State Department was going to adhere to the 2008 law on QME if the sale of the F-35 to the UAE went forward. In his response, Hale remarked that: We have a large group of people at the Pentagon and at the State Department who evaluate based on technical criteria and assessments of security and what it is that the Israelis have and what it is that our partners need. And they will make recommendations to the Secretary of State and then we have a consultative process with Israel. It occurs every year. There’s an executive session in which it’s a closed session in which we talked about these things.54 On October 9, Senators Menendez and Reed sent a letter to then Secretary of State Michael Pompeo posing a series of questions about the possible sale that they asserted “must be fully 50 See CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti. 51 Amy Spiro, “Pompeo Says F-35 Sale to UAE was ‘Critical’ to the Abraham Accords,” Times of Israel, June 10, 2021. 52 The UAE’s Block 60 E/F Desert Falcon is considered a 4.5 generation fighter and the most advanced F-16 variant in the world. See, Tyler Rogoway, “Here’s What the Ball on the Nose of UAE’s Block 60 F-16E/F Desert Falcon Does,” The War Zone (online), September 19, 2019. 53 Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell expressed his view that “We in Congress have an obligation to review any U.S. arms sales package linked to the [Israel-UAE] deal. As we help our Arab partners defend against growing threats, we must continue ensuring that Israel’s qualitative military edge remains unchallenged.” See, Congressional Record, Senate Speeches and Inserts, Page S5563, September 14, 2020. Then Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Chairman Jim Risch stressed his view of the need for congressional consultations on preserving Israel’s QME and upholding requirements in the AECA. See, Eric Shawn, “Trump Administration's Proposed F-35 Sale to UAE Hits Snag,” Fox News, October 7, 2020. On September 15, 2020, then HFAC Chairman Eliot Engel sponsored a resolution (H.Res. 1110) that, among other things, would have reaffirmed Congress’ commitment to maintaining Israel’s QME. Prior to the resolution, several House lawmakers wrote a letter to President Trump warning that they would oppose any arms sale that would threaten Israel’s QME. See, Rep. Schneider Leads Dem Call Defending Israel’s Qualitative Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge, Press Release, September 11, 2020. 54 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing entitled, “U.S. Policy in a Changing Middle East,” September 24, 2020. Congressional Research Service 8 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel answered before this sale is sent to Congress for review, as required by statute.”55 On October 20, Senators Menendez and Feinstein introduced S. 4814, the Secure F-35 Exports Act of 2020. This legislation would have, among other things, required a certification by the President before the provision of F-35 aircraft to a Middle Eastern country other than Israel that such sale would not undermine Israel’s QME. A few Members expressed outright opposition to a proposed sale of the F-35 to the UAE.56 Representative Gregory Meeks stated that he was “absolutely opposed to that sale because we don’t know what’s happening in the future. I’ve seen it happen before…. I think that it violates Israel’s strategic interest and safety.”57 On November 10, 2020, the Trump Administration notified Congress of a $23 billion arms sale to the UAE, to include F-35s, drones, and various munitions. As mentioned above, the sale was proposed to support UAE-Israel diplomatic normalization. An effort to block the proposed sale in the Senate failed to garner the required votes (S.J.Res. 77 and S.J.Res. 78).58 President Trump issued a Statement of Administration Policy expressing his opposition to the resolutions of disapproval, noting: These sales are consistent with the longstanding commitment and statutory obligation of the United States to maintain Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME). The Department of State, in consultation with the Department of Defense, has included in its certification to Congress a determination that these sales will not adversely affect Israel’s QME. In a joint statement on October 23, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Benny Gantz endorsed the delivery of advanced defense capabilities to the UAE, noting the commitments by the United States to maintain Israel’s QME. Transfer of enhanced capabilities to a partner after normalization of relations with Israel is consistent with decades-long United States precedent. The United States provided enhanced security capability to Egypt following its 1979 normalization of relations with Israel, and provided enhanced security capability to Jordan following its 1994 normalization of relations with Israel.59 In the last hours of the Trump presidency, the UAE signed a Letter of Offer and Acceptance or LOA (not a contract) to purchase up to 50 F-35s and 18 MQ-9 Reaper drones from the United States.60 The Biden Administration temporarily paused the sale for review upon taking office, but 55 Available at: https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-09-20%20RM%20Reed%20letter%20to%20Pompeo%20Esper%20re%20F-35%20UAE.pdf. 56 See, for example, Representative Debbie Wasserman Schultz, “Trump Puts Israel’s Security in Danger with Deal to Sell Fighter Jets to United Arab Emirates, Miami Herald, September 5, 2020. 57 Jacob Kornbluh, “Rep. Meeks Expresses ‘Absolute’ Opposition to Sale of F-35 Jets to UAE,” Jewish Insider, September 24, 2020. 58 During floor consideration of the resolutions, then Senate Majority Leader McConnell stated that “Israel’s Ambassador, Defense Minister, and Prime Minister have all made sure they are comfortable with this deal.” See, Congressional Record, Senate Speeches And Inserts, Page S7247, Dec. 8, 2020. Senator Cornyn argued that the sales would “allow greater military cooperation between the United States, the UAE, and Israel and strengthen a growing coalition of aligned forces in the region.” See, Congressional Record, Senate Speeches And Inserts, Page S7268, Dec. 8, 2020. Other lawmakers, such as Senator Menendez, argued against the sales and raised the possibility that they would exacerbate arms proliferation in the region and impact Israel's QME. See, Press Release, “Menendez Delivers Floor Remarks on Joint Resolutions of Disapproval of Trump Administration's Proposed Arms Sale to UAE,” December 9, 2020. 59 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy, S.J.Res. 77, S.J.Res. 78, S.J.Res. 79, and S.J.Res. 80, Providing for Congressional Disapproval of the Proposed Export to the United Arab Emirates of Certain Defense Articles and Services, December 9, 2020 60 Mike Stone, “UAE Signs Deal with U.S. to Buy 50 F-35 Jets and up to 18 Drones: Sources,” Reuters, January 20, Congressional Research Service 9 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel a State Department spokesperson told journalists in April 2021 that the Administration planned to proceed with the sale.61 In April 2021, SFRC Chairman Menendez re-introduced the SECURE F–35 Exports Act of 2021 (S. 1182). As of January 2022, a contract between the UAE and Lockheed Martin for the F-35 had yet to be reached or approved by the Biden Administration. In November 2021, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Regional Security Mira Resnick said, “We’ve had quite a robust and sustained dialogue with Emirati officials.... and I anticipate a continued, robust and sustained dialogue with the UAE to ensure that any defense transfers meet our mutual national security strategic objectives…. while protecting US technology.... It’s a real game-changing opportunity for the UAE and for our partnership, and we look forward to implementing that sale.” 62 The UAE’s ongoing relationship with China is one potential obstacle to concluding the F-35 sale. In November 2021, the Biden Administration demanded an immediate halt to Chinese construction of a reported military facility at Khalifa port, about 50 miles north of Abu Dhabi, where Chinese company Cosco operates a commercial container terminal.63 Both the Trump and Biden Administrations have pressed the UAE to remove Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei Technologies Company from its network before the United States sells the Emiratis the F-35. The UAE, which seeks to build a 5G system, has countered that it requires more time and an alternative supplier before considering Huawei’s removal.64 U.S. Bilateral Military Aid to Israel Since 1999, overall U.S. assistance to Israel has been outlined in 10-year government-to-government Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). MOUs are not legally binding agreements like treaties, and thus do not require Senate ratification. Also, Congress may accept or change year-to-year assistance levels for Israel or provide supplemental appropriations. Nevertheless, past MOUs have significantly influenced the terms of U.S. aid to Israel; Congress has appropriated foreign aid to Israel largely according to the terms of the MOU in place at the time. P.L. 116-283, the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2021 NDAA”), contains Section 1273 of the United States Israel Security Assistance Authorization Act of 2020, which authorizes “not less than” $3.3 billion in annual FMF to Israel through 2028 per the terms of the current MOU (see below). 2021. 61 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Remarks to the Press, January 27, 2021; “Joe Biden Is Proceeding with Donald Trump’s Biggest Arms Deal,” Huffington Post, April 13, 2021. 62 Jared Szuba, “Intel: US, UAE Talk F-35 as Russia Pitches Stealth Aircraft,” Al Monitor, November 17, 2021. 63 Gordon Lubold and Warren P. Strobel, “China Move in U.A.E. Thwarted --- U.S. Rang Alarm about Building of Suspected Military Facility at Port on Mideast Ally's Turf,” Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2021. 64 Nick Wadhams and Sylvia Westall, “Biden Prods UAE to Dump Huawei, Sowing Doubts on Key F-35 Sale,” Bloomberg, June 11, 2021. Congressional Research Service 10~~Military Edge,” Medium.com,~~
~~September 14, 2020.~~
~~26 Barbara A. Leaf and Dana Stroul, “The F-35 Triangle: America, Israel, the United Arab Emirates,”~~ ~~War on the~~
~~Rocks, September 15, 2020. See also, Andrew Shapiro and Derek Chollet, “Selling F-35s to the Middle East Was~~
~~Never Going to Be Easy,” Defense One, September 14, 2020.~~
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U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

Brief History of MOUs on U.S. Aid to Israel
The first 10-year MOU (FY1999-FY2008), agreed to under the Clinton Administration, was known as the “Glide The first 10-year MOU (FY1999-FY2008), agreed to under the Clinton Administration, was known as the “Glide
Path Agreement” and represented a political commitment to provide Israel with at least $26.7 bil ion in total Path Agreement” and represented a political commitment to provide Israel with at least $26.7 bil ion in total
economic and military aid over its duration (of which $21.3 bil ion was in military aid).economic and military aid over its duration (of which $21.3 bil ion was in military aid).2765 This MOU provided the This MOU provided the
template for the gradual phase-out of all economic assistance to Israel. template for the gradual phase-out of all economic assistance to Israel.
In 2007, the Bush Administration and the Israeli government agreed to a second MOU consisting of a $30 bil ion In 2007, the Bush Administration and the Israeli government agreed to a second MOU consisting of a $30 bil ion
military aid package for the 10-year period from FY2009 to FY2018. Under the terms of that agreement, Israel military aid package for the 10-year period from FY2009 to FY2018. Under the terms of that agreement, Israel
was explicitly permitted to continue spending up to 26.3% of U.S. assistance on Israeli-manufactured equipment was explicitly permitted to continue spending up to 26.3% of U.S. assistance on Israeli-manufactured equipment
(known as Off-Shore Procurement or OSP - discussed below). The agreement stated that “Both sides (known as Off-Shore Procurement or OSP - discussed below). The agreement stated that “Both sides
acknowledge that these funding levels assume continuation of adequate levels for U.S. foreign assistance overall, acknowledge that these funding levels assume continuation of adequate levels for U.S. foreign assistance overall,
and are subject to the appropriation and availability of funds for these purposes.”and are subject to the appropriation and availability of funds for these purposes.”2866
The Current 10-Year Security Assistance Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU)
At a signing ceremony at the State Department on September 14, 2016, representatives of the At a signing ceremony at the State Department on September 14, 2016, representatives of the
U.S. and Israeli governments signed another 10-year U.S. and Israeli governments signed another 10-year ~~Memorandum of Understanding~~MOU on military on military
aid covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under the terms of this third MOU, the United States pledges, aid covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under the terms of this third MOU, the United States pledges,
subject to congressional appropriation, to provide $38 billion in military aid ($33 billion in subject to congressional appropriation, to provide $38 billion in military aid ($33 billion in
~~Foreign Military Financing~~FMF grants, plus $5 billion in defense appropriations for missile defense grants, plus $5 billion in defense appropriations for missile defense
programs) to Israel. According to the terms of the MOU, “Both the United States and Israel programs) to Israel. According to the terms of the MOU, “Both the United States and Israel
jointly commit to respect the FMF levels specified in this MOU, and not to seek changes to the jointly commit to respect the FMF levels specified in this MOU, and not to seek changes to the
FMF levels for the duration of this understanding.”FMF levels for the duration of this understanding.”2967

2765 See, Joint Statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak, July 19, 1999. According to the statement, See, Joint Statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak, July 19, 1999. According to the statement,
“The United States and Israel will sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which will express their joint “The United States and Israel will sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which will express their joint
intention to restructure U.S. bilateral assistance to Israel. The MOU will state the United States’ intention to sustain its intention to restructure U.S. bilateral assistance to Israel. The MOU will state the United States’ intention to sustain its
annual military assistance to Israel, and incrementally increase its level by one-third over the next decade to a level of annual military assistance to Israel, and incrementally increase its level by one-third over the next decade to a level of
$2.4 billion subject to Congressional consultations and approval. At the same time, the MOU will provide for a gradual $2.4 billion subject to Congressional consultations and approval. At the same time, the MOU will provide for a gradual
phase-out of U.S. economic aid to Israel, over a comparable period, as the Israeli economy grows more robust, less phase-out of U.S. economic aid to Israel, over a comparable period, as the Israeli economy grows more robust, less
dependent on foreign aid, and more integrated in world markets.” dependent on foreign aid, and more integrated in world markets.”
2866 United States-Israel Memorandum of Understanding, Signed by then U.S. Under Secretary of State R. Nicholas United States-Israel Memorandum of Understanding, Signed by then U.S. Under Secretary of State R. Nicholas
Burns and Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General Aaron Abramovich, August 16, 2007. Burns and Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General Aaron Abramovich, August 16, 2007.
2967 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Israel, September 14, 2016. Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Israel, September 14, 2016.
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U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

Figure 1. Phasing Out Off-Shore Procurement (OSP) Under the MOU

Source: CRS. CRS.
The terms of the The terms of the ~~2019-2028~~FY2019-FY2028 MOU differ from previous agreements on issues such as MOU differ from previous agreements on issues such as,
  Phasing out Off-Shore Procurement (OSP).68 Under the terms of the third Under the terms of the third MOU, MOU,
OSP will decrease slowly until FY2024, but will then be phased out more OSP will decrease slowly until FY2024, but will then be phased out more
dramatically over the MOU’s last five years, ending entirely in FY2028 (dramatically over the MOU’s last five years, ending entirely in FY2028 (~~see~~see
Figure 1). The MOU calls on Israel to provide the United States with “detailed . The MOU calls on Israel to provide the United States with “detailed
programmatic information related to the use of all U.S. funding, including funds programmatic information related to the use of all U.S. funding, including funds
used for OSP.” In response to the planned phase-out of OSP, some Israeli defense used for OSP.” In response to the planned phase-out of OSP, some Israeli defense
contractors may be seeking to merge with U.S. companies or open U.S. contractors may be seeking to merge with U.S. companies or open U.S.
subsidiariessubsidiaries ~~in order~~ to continue their eligibility for defense contracts financed to continue their eligibility for defense contracts financed
through through ~~FMF.30~~FMF (see, “U.S. Aid and Israel’s Advanced Military Technology”).69
  Missile Defense. Under the terms of the third MOU, the Administration pledges Under the terms of the third MOU, the Administration pledges
to request $500 million in annual combined funding for missile defense programs to request $500 million in annual combined funding for missile defense programs
with joint U.S.-Israeli elements—such as Iron Dome, Arrow II and Arrow III, and with joint U.S.-Israeli elements—such as Iron Dome, Arrow II and Arrow III, and
David’s Sling. Previous MOUs did not include missile defense funding, which David’s Sling. Previous MOUs did not include missile defense funding, which
has traditionally been appropriated via separate interactions between successive has traditionally been appropriated via separate interactions between successive
Administrations and Congresses. While the MOU commits both the United Administrations and Congresses. While the MOU commits both the United
~~States and Israel to a $500 million annual U.S. missile defense contribution, it~~
~~also stipulates that under exceptional circumstances (major armed conflict~~
~~involving Israel), both sides may agree on U.S. support above the $500 million~~
~~annual cap.~~

30 68 Section 42(c) (22 U.S.C. §2791(c)) of the AECA prohibits using funds made available under this Act for procurement outside the United States unless the President determines that such procurement does not have an adverse effect on the economy of the United States or the industrial mobilization base. Executive Order 13637 designated this authority to the Secretary of Defense and the issuance of an OSP waiver requires concurrence by the Departments of State and Commerce. See, U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance Manual, Chapter 9. 69 “Israeli UAV Firm agrees deal for Unnamed US Company,” “Israeli UAV Firm agrees deal for Unnamed US Company,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 18, 2017. , July 18, 2017.
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712 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel States and Israel to a $500 million annual U.S. missile defense contribution, it also stipulates that under exceptional circumstances (e.g., major armed conflict involving Israel), both sides may agree on U.S. support above the $500 million annual cap (see, “The May 2021 War in Gaza and Proposed Supplemental Iron Dome Funding”).

~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

  No FMF for Fuel. According to the third MOU, Israel will no longer be According to the third MOU, Israel will no longer be
permitted to use a portion of its FMF to purchase fuel (or “other consumables”) permitted to use a portion of its FMF to purchase fuel (or “other consumables”)
from the United States. Under the second MOU, Israel had budgeted an estimated from the United States. Under the second MOU, Israel had budgeted an estimated
$400 million a year in FMF to purchase jet fuel from the United States. $400 million a year in FMF to purchase jet fuel from the United States.
Congressional appropriators have indicated in annual foreign assistance Congressional appropriators have indicated in annual foreign assistance
legislation that they support FMF used to subsidize Israeli purchases of U.S. jet legislation that they support FMF used to subsidize Israeli purchases of U.S. jet
fuel.fuel.3170 In July 2020, DSCA notified Congress of a major defense sale to Israel of In July 2020, DSCA notified Congress of a major defense sale to Israel of
990 million gallons of 990 million gallons of ~~Petroleum~~petroleum-based products, including jet fuel, for an -based products, including jet fuel, for an
estimated cost of $3 billion.estimated cost of $3 billion.3271
Figure 2. U.S. Military Aid to Israel over Decades

Source: CRS Graphics. CRS Graphics.
Notes: Figures included Foreign Military Financing only. Missile defense funds are not included. Figures are not Figures included Foreign Military Financing only. Missile defense funds are not included. Figures are not
adjusted for inflation. adjusted for inflation.
~~Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Arms Sales~~
~~Israel is the largest recipient of U.S. Foreign Military Financing. For FY2021, the President’s~~
~~request for Israel would encompass approximately 59% of total requested FMF funding~~
~~worldwide. Annual FMF grants to Israel represent approximately 20% of the overall Israeli~~

3170 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Memorandum of Understanding Reached with Israel, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Memorandum of Understanding Reached with Israel,
September 14, 2016. In the Committee report accompanying H.R. 2839, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, September 14, 2016. In the Committee report accompanying H.R. 2839, the Department of State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020, appropriators wrote: “The Committee notes that Israel maintains the and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020, appropriators wrote: “The Committee notes that Israel maintains the
flexibility under the MOU to purchase jet fuel from the United States.” See, H.Rept. 116-78 - State, Foreign flexibility under the MOU to purchase jet fuel from the United States.” See, H.Rept. 116-78 - State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2020. That same provision was reinserted into H.Rept. 116-444, Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2020. That same provision was reinserted into H.Rept. 116-444,
- State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2021. - State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2021.
32The explanatory statement accompanying the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act directs federal agencies to comply with “the directives, reporting requirements, and instructions” contained in H.Rept. 116-444 accompanying H.R. 7608. 71 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel – —Jp-8 Aviation Fuel, Diesel Fuel, and Unleaded Gasoline,” Jp-8 Aviation Fuel, Diesel Fuel, and Unleaded Gasoline,”
Transmittal 20-44, July 6, 2020. Transmittal 20-44, July 6, 2020.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

813 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Arms Sales Israel is the largest recipient of FMF. For FY2022, the President’s request for Israel would encompass approximately 53% of total requested FMF funding worldwide. Annual FMF grants to Israel represent approximately 16.5% of the overall Israeli

~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

defense budget.defense budget.3372 Israel’s defense expenditure as a percentage of its Gross Domestic Product Israel’s defense expenditure as a percentage of its Gross Domestic Product
(5.(5.36% in % in ~~2019~~2020) is one of the highest in the world.) is one of the highest in the world.3473
Cash Flow Financing
Section 23 of the Section 23 of the ~~Arms Export Control Act~~AECA (22 U.S.C. §2763) authorizes the President to finance (22 U.S.C. §2763) authorizes the President to finance
the “procurement of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services by the “procurement of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services by
friendly foreign countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may friendly foreign countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may
determine consistent with the requirements of this section.” Successive Administrations have used determine consistent with the requirements of this section.” Successive Administrations have used
this authority to permit Israel to this authority to permit Israel to ~~finance multiyear purchases through installment payments~~utilize FMF funds to finance multiyear purchases in advance of their appropriations from Congress, rather , rather
than having to pay the full amount of such purchases up front.than having to pay the full amount of such purchases up front.3574 Known as “cash flow financing,” Known as “cash flow financing,”
this benefit enables Israel to negotiate major arms purchases with U.S. defense suppliers with this benefit enables Israel to negotiate major arms purchases with U.S. defense suppliers with
payments scheduled over a longer time horizon.payments scheduled over a longer time horizon.3675 Cash flow financing and its derivatives also have allowed Israel to use U.S. government-approved sources of external financing to support the procurement of major U.S. defense systems, such as combat aircraft. Beginning with its purchase of F-16D aircraft from Lockheed Martin over 20 years ago and continuing presently with ongoing procurement of the F-35, the United States has utilized what is known as the “Deferred Payments Program.” 76 This program allows Israel to 72
~~Early Transfer and Interest Bearing Account~~
~~Since FY1991 (P.L. 101-513), Congress has mandated that Israel receive its FMF aid in a lump~~
~~sum during the first month of the fiscal year.37 The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act,~~
~~FY2020 (P.L. 116-94) states, “That of the funds appropriated under this heading, not less than~~
~~$3,300,000,000 shall be available for grants only for Israel which shall be disbursed within 30~~
~~days of enactment of this Act.” Once disbursed, Israel’s military aid is transferred to an interest~~
~~bearing account with the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank.38 Israel has used interest collected on its~~

33 The Israeli Ministry of Defense provides funding figures for its domestic defense budget but excludes some The Israeli Ministry of Defense provides funding figures for its domestic defense budget but excludes some
procurement spending and spending on civil defense. The estimate referenced above is based on figures published by procurement spending and spending on civil defense. The estimate referenced above is based on figures published by
Jane’s ~~Defence Budgets~~~~, “Israel,”~~ ~~IHS Global Insight, May 15, 2020.~~ Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, “Israel - Defence Budget Overview,” October 4, 2021. Jane’s removes FMF from its Israeli defense Jane’s removes FMF from its Israeli defense
budget calculations to reflect how much Israel independently spends on defense.budget calculations to reflect how much Israel independently spends on defense.
34 73 Four other nations spend more on defense as a percentage of GDP: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Algeria, and Kuwait. See Four other nations spend more on defense as a percentage of GDP: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Algeria, and Kuwait. See
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military expenditure by country as percentage of gross Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military expenditure by country as percentage of gross
domestic product, 1988-domestic product, 1988-~~2019~~2020, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 1949-, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 1949-~~2019.~~
352020. 74 The United States initially began authorizing installment-style sales to Israel to help it rebuild its military capabilities The United States initially began authorizing installment-style sales to Israel to help it rebuild its military capabilities
after the 1973 war with Egypt and Syria. Congress appropriated $2.2 billion for Israel in P.L. 93-199, the Emergency after the 1973 war with Egypt and Syria. Congress appropriated $2.2 billion for Israel in P.L. 93-199, the Emergency
Security Assistance Act of 1973. Section 3 of that act stated that “Foreign military sales credits [loans or grants] Security Assistance Act of 1973. Section 3 of that act stated that “Foreign military sales credits [loans or grants]
extended to Israel out of such funds shall be provided on such terms and conditions as the President may determine and extended to Israel out of such funds shall be provided on such terms and conditions as the President may determine and
without regard to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act as amended.” At the time, the Foreign Military Sales without regard to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act as amended.” At the time, the Foreign Military Sales
Act of 1968 (amended in 1971 and the precursor to the Arms Export Control Act of 1976), capped the annual amount Act of 1968 (amended in 1971 and the precursor to the Arms Export Control Act of 1976), capped the annual amount
of foreign military sales credit that could be extended to a recipient at no more than $250 million per year. Under the of foreign military sales credit that could be extended to a recipient at no more than $250 million per year. Under the
authorities contained in P.L. 93-199, President Nixon, in two separate determinations (April authorities contained in P.L. 93-199, President Nixon, in two separate determinations (April &and July 1974), allocated the July 1974), allocated the
$2.2 billion to Israel as $1.5 billion in grant military aid, the largest U.S. grant aid package ever for Israel at the time. $2.2 billion to Israel as $1.5 billion in grant military aid, the largest U.S. grant aid package ever for Israel at the time.
The remaining $700 million was designated as a military loan. The remaining $700 million was designated as a military loan.
A year and a half later, the Ford Administration reached a new arms sales agreement with Israel providing that, A year and a half later, the Ford Administration reached a new arms sales agreement with Israel providing that,
according to the according to the New York Times, “the cost of the new military equipment would be met through the large amount of , “the cost of the new military equipment would be met through the large amount of
aid approved by the just-completed session of Congress as well as the aid that will be approved by future Congresses.” aid approved by the just-completed session of Congress as well as the aid that will be approved by future Congresses.”
See, “U.S. Decides to Sell Some Arms to Israel See, “U.S. Decides to Sell Some Arms to Israel ~~that it had~~ That It Blocked in the Past,” Blocked in the Past,” New York Times, October 12, 1976. , October 12, 1976.
3675 Cash flow financing is defined in Section 25(d) of the Cash flow financing is defined in Section 25(d) of the ~~Arms Export Control Act~~AECA and Section 503(a)(3) of the Foreign and Section 503(a)(3) of the Foreign
~~Assistance Act.~~
~~37 When government operations are funded by a continuing appropriations resolution, Congress may at times include~~
~~provisions in such resolutions that would prevent the early transfer of FMF to Israel (presumably until a final year~~
~~appropriations bill is passed). For example, see Section 109 of P.L. 113-46, the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014.~~
~~38 According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)~~Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. 76 Under this arrangement, Lockheed Martin sells Citibank a legal claim on its defense contract with Israel. The U.S. Defense Department then repays Citibank using the available FMF allocation for Israel. The Israeli government uses its own national funds to pay interest on the Citibank loans. One organization in support of continued U.S. support for Israel has advocated for Congress to authorize the use of FMF to cover Israeli interest payments on weapons deals to creditors. See, Jonathan Ruhe, Charles B. Perkins, and Ari Cicurel, “Israel’s Acceleration of U.S. Weapons Congressional Research Service 14 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel defer payments owed under its LOA for F-35 aircraft and use future year FMF appropriations to make payments pursuant to a pre-determined payment schedule. Upon deferral of a given payment by Israel, a private bank (in the case of the F-35, a small consortium led by Citibank) pays Lockheed Martin in full and Lockheed Martin assigns its right to be paid by the U.S. Government to the bank.77 In 2021, Israel’s “security cabinet” (formally known as the Ministerial Committee on Defense) approved plans to allocate over $9 billion in future FMF appropriations to finance the purchases of various U.S. weapons systems, such as the Sikorsky CH-53K heavy lift helicopter and additional F-35 aircraft (see below). Various news reports indicate that the Israeli government is pursuing a delay of the payments coming due under the Deferred Payment Program in order to assist in financing these near-term foreign military sales acquisitions.78 In Foreign Military Sales cases in which Israel and the United States seek to execute LOAs beyond the scope of the current MOU (either beyond FY2028 or above the $33 billion pledged), the U.S. government has established a “Special Billing Arrangement” or SBA with Israel. The purpose of SBAs, according to DSCA, is to “improve cash management for eligible FMS partners.”79 Under an SBA, Israel may use national cash reserves for funding requirements associated with an FMS case (e.g., funds to cover termination liability) that exceeds the amount of funds listed in or duration of the current MOU.80 Early Transfer and Interest Bearing Account Since FY1991 (P.L. 101-513), Congress has mandated that Israel receive its FMF aid in a lump sum during the first month of the fiscal year.81 P.L. 116-260, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2021 (herein after referred to as “the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act”) states, “That of the funds appropriated under this heading, not less than $3,300,000,000 shall be available for grants only for Israel which shall be disbursed within 30 days of enactment of this Act.” Once disbursed, Israel’s military aid is transferred to an interest bearing account with the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank.82 Israel has used interest collected on its military aid to pay down, among other things, its bilateral debt (nonguaranteed) to U.S. government agencies, which, Procurement: Analysis and Recommendations, The Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), February 2021. However, according to DSCA, it is unclear whether FMF is legally available for that purpose. 77 CRS Correspondence with DSCA, January 2022. 78 Avi Bar-Eli, “Analysis | 'Okay, but Never Again': How Israel Air Force Sealed $9 Billion U.S. Arms Deal,” Ha’aretz, February 9, 2021 and “Israel’s Military Skirts Budget Restrictions for $9 Billion Air Force Upgrade,” Al Monitor, February 10, 2021. 79 See Chapter 9.10.2, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) as Defense Security Cooperation Agency Manual 5105.38-M, DSCA Policy 12-20. 80 According to DSCA, “Since requirements and procedures are unique to each country, they are normally established in an agreement between the customer country, DSCA, and the appropriate banking institutions in the U.S. and the purchaser’s country.” See, Defense Security Cooperation University, Security Cooperation Management, Chapter 12, Edition 41, May 2021. 81 On at least one occasion when government operations were funded by a continuing appropriations resolution, Congress has included provisions in the resolution preventing the early transfer of FMF to Israel until the final appropriations bill for that fiscal year was passed. See Section 109 of P.L. 113-46, the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014. 82 According to DSCA, “Some countries may establish an account with the , “Some countries may establish an account with the
federal reserve bank (FRB), New York, for their FMS [Foreign Military Sales] deposits. An agreement between the federal reserve bank (FRB), New York, for their FMS [Foreign Military Sales] deposits. An agreement between the
FMS purchaser’s defense organization, the purchaser’s central bank, FRB New York and DSCA identifies the terms, FMS purchaser’s defense organization, the purchaser’s central bank, FRB New York and DSCA identifies the terms,
conditions, and mechanics of the account’s operation. Countries receiving FMFP funds must maintain their interest conditions, and mechanics of the account’s operation. Countries receiving FMFP funds must maintain their interest
bearing account in the FRB.” See, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), “The Management bearing account in the FRB.” See, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), “The Management
of Security Cooperation (Green Book),” 34th Edition, April 2015. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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15 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

~~military aid to pay down its bilateral debt (nonguaranteed) to U.S. government agencies, which,~~
according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, stood at $according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, stood at $~~148~~11.8 million as of .8 million as of ~~December 2015.39~~March 2021.83
Israel cannot use accrued interest for defense procurement inside Israel. Israel cannot use accrued interest for defense procurement inside Israel.
Shorter Congressional Review Period Per provisions in the AECA, Israel, along with NATO member states, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand (commonly referred to as NATO+5) have shorter congressional review periods (15 days instead of 30) and higher dollar notification thresholds than other countries for both government-to-government and commercially licensed arms sales.84 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Israel was~~F-35 Joint Strike Fighter~~
~~Israel is~~ the first declared international operator of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. the first declared international operator of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.4085 It has purchased It has purchased
50 F-35s (called 50 F-35s (called Adirs4186)) in three separate contracts in three separate contracts ~~(see Table 2) using Foreign Military~~
~~Financing~~using FMF grants. As of September grants. As of September ~~2020~~2021, Israel had received , Israel had received 2730 of 50 jets, which of 50 jets, which ~~they have~~
it has divided into two squadrons divided into two squadrons (the 116th ‘Lions of the South’ and 105th ‘Golden Eagle’ squadrons) based at Nevatim Air Base in southern Israel.based at Nevatim Air Base in southern Israel.4287 From there and From there and
without any aerial refueling, Israel’s F-35s could strike targets in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, without any aerial refueling, Israel’s F-35s could strike targets in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan,
and most of Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.and most of Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.4388 To date, Israel reportedly has used its F-35 To date, Israel reportedly has used its F-35
aircraft to conduct aerial strikes inside Syria.aircraft to conduct aerial strikes inside Syria.4489
The Department of Defense’s F-35 program The Department of Defense’s F-35 program
~~is an international cooperative program in~~
Figure 3. U.S. and Israeli F-35s Fly in
~~which Israel (and Singapore) are considered~~
~~Formation~~
~~“security cooperation participants” outside of~~is an international cooperative program in Formation which Israel (and Singapore) are considered
Joint Exercise Enduring Lightning III (October 2020) Joint Exercise Enduring Lightning III (October 2020)
“security cooperation participants” outside of the F-35 cooperative development the F-35 cooperative development
partnership.partnership.4590 As a result, Israel is not eligible As a result, Israel is not eligible
to assign staff to the F-35 Joint Program to assign staff to the F-35 Joint Program
Office in Washington and does not receive Office in Washington and does not receive
~~full F-35 technical briefings.46 The United~~
~~States government and Lockheed Martin~~
~~retain exclusive access to the F-35’s software~~
~~code, which Israel cannot alter itself.~~

~~Source:~~ ~~U.S. Air Force~~ Source: U.S. Air Force.

~~of Security Cooperation (Green Book),” 34th Edition, April 2015.~~
3983 Foreign Credit Reporting System (FCRS), Amounts Due the U.S. Government Foreign Credit Reporting System (FCRS), Amounts Due the U.S. Government ~~from Sovereign and Other Foreign~~
~~Official Obligors as of 12/31/2015~~, United States Department of the , United States Department of the Treasury, Office of Global Economics and Debt. 84 See CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 85 In September 2008, DSCA~~Treasury, Office of International Debt Policy.~~
~~40 In September 2008, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)~~ notified Congress of a possible Foreign notified Congress of a possible Foreign
Military Sale of up to 75 F-35s to Israel in a deal with a possible total value of $15.2 billion. See, Defense Security Military Sale of up to 75 F-35s to Israel in a deal with a possible total value of $15.2 billion. See, Defense Security
Cooperation Agency, Transmittal No. 08-83, Israel - F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft, September 29, 2008. Cooperation Agency, Transmittal No. 08-83, Israel - F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft, September 29, 2008.
4186 “After F-35 makes Aliyah, it will get new Israeli identity,” “After F-35 makes Aliyah, it will get new Israeli identity,” Israel Hayom, May 2, 2016. In Hebrew, “, May 2, 2016. In Hebrew, “~~aliyah~~Aliyah” refers to ” refers to
geographical relocation to Israel. “Adir” is a Hebrew word for “mighty” or “powerful.” geographical relocation to Israel. “Adir” is a Hebrew word for “mighty” or “powerful.”
4287 Yaakov Lappin, “Israeli Air Force Favouring Additional F-35s,” Yaakov Lappin, “Israeli Air Force Favouring Additional F-35s,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 10, 2020. , September 10, 2020.
4388 Gareth Jennings, “Israel Declares F-35 to Be Operational,” Gareth Jennings, “Israel Declares F-35 to Be Operational,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 6, 2017. , December 6, 2017.
4489 “F-35 Stealth Fighter Sees First Combat, in Israeli Operation,” “F-35 Stealth Fighter Sees First Combat, in Israeli Operation,” BBC News, May 22, 2018 and “Israel - Air Force,” , May 22, 2018 and “Israel - Air Force,”
Jane'’s World Air Forces, July 5, 2019. , July 5, 2019.
4590 See CRS Report RL30563, See CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler. , by Jeremiah Gertler.
~~46 “Israel,” Jane's World Air Forces, September 1, 2020.~~
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full F-35 technical briefings.91 The United States government and Lockheed Martin retain exclusive access to the F-35’s software code, which Israel is not permitted to alter. However, Israel’s involvement in the F-35 However, Israel’s involvement in the F-35
program is program is ~~still~~ extensive, with Israeli extensive, with Israeli
companies Figure 4. F-35 Helmet Mounted Display
~~companies~~ making F-35 wing sets (IAI) and making F-35 wing sets (IAI) and
helmets Made by Israeli Manufacturer Elbit Systems Made by Israeli Manufacturer Elbit Systems
~~helmets~~ (Elbit Systems). Israel also received (Elbit Systems). Israel also received
significant development access to the F-35 significant development access to the F-35
and the ability to customize its planes with and the ability to customize its planes with
Israeli-made C4 (command, control, Israeli-made C4 (command, control,
communications, computers) systems, under communications, computers) systems, under
the condition that the software coding be done the condition that the software coding be done
by the United States. In 2018, the Navy by the United States. In 2018, the Navy
awarded Lockheed Martin a $148 million awarded Lockheed Martin a $148 million
contract for “the procurement of Israel-unique contract for “the procurement of Israel-unique
weapons certification, modification kits, and weapons certification, modification kits, and

electronic warfare analysis.” electronic warfare analysis.”4792 Software Software
Source: Elbit Systems Ltd. Elbit Systems Ltd.
upgrades (called Block 3F+) added to the upgrades (called Block 3F+) added to the
Note: The F-35 Helmet Mounted Display is a joint The F-35 Helmet Mounted Display is a joint
main computer of Israel’s F-35s main computer of Israel’s F-35s ~~does~~reportedly
venture between Elbit Systems and Rockwell Col ins. venture between Elbit Systems and Rockwell Col ins.
~~reportedly~~ facilitate the “use of Israeli-facilitate the “use of Israeli-
designed electronic equipment and weaponrydesigned electronic equipment and weaponry,” thereby permitting Israel to “employ its own ” thereby permitting Israel to “employ its own
external jamming pod and also allow internal carriage of indigenous air-to-air missiles and guided external jamming pod and also allow internal carriage of indigenous air-to-air missiles and guided
munitions.”munitions.”4893 In December 2021, the Defense Department awarded a $49 million contract to Lockheed Martin to support work on “an F-35 variant ‘tailored’ for an undisclosed FMS customer,” probably Israel.94
In October 2020, the United States and Israel conducted their third Enduring Lightning joint In October 2020, the United States and Israel conducted their third Enduring Lightning joint
aviation exercise using the F-35. American and Israeli pilots trained together to counter both aviation exercise using the F-35. American and Israeli pilots trained together to counter both
surface and air adversaries, while supporting units assisted with refueling, radar, and opponent surface and air adversaries, while supporting units assisted with refueling, radar, and opponent
simulations. simulations.
KC-46A Pegasus
In March 2020, DSCA notified Congress of a planned sale to Israel of eight KC-46A Boeing In March 2020, DSCA notified Congress of a planned sale to Israel of eight KC-46A Boeing
“Pegasus” aircraft for an estimated $2.4 billion.“Pegasus” aircraft for an estimated $2.4 billion.4995 According to Boeing, the KC-46A Pegasus is a According to Boeing, the KC-46A Pegasus is a
multirole tanker (can carry passengers, fuel, and equipment) that can refuel all U.S. and allied multirole tanker (can carry passengers, fuel, and equipment) that can refuel all U.S. and allied
military aircraft. After Japan, Israel is the second country approved by the United States to military aircraft. After Japan, Israel is the second country approved by the United States to
receive the KC-46A. The Israel Air Force’s current fleet of tankers was originally procured in the receive the KC-46A. The Israel Air Force’s current fleet of tankers was originally procured in the
1970s1970s~~, and it is anticipated that Israel will be able~~; Israel is anticipated to use the KC-46A to refuel its F-35 fighters to use the KC-46A to refuel its F-35 fighters.

47, a key capability in projecting force toward Iran and elsewhere.96 91 “Israel,” Jane’s World Air Forces, September 1, 2020. 92 U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, Contracts For February 2, 2018. U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, Contracts For February 2, 2018.
4893 Gareth Jennings, “Israel Stands-Up Second F-35 Unit,” Gareth Jennings, “Israel Stands-Up Second F-35 Unit,” Jane'’s Defence Weekly, January 17, 2020. , January 17, 2020.
4994 Gareth Jennings, “Lockheed Martin to Design and Develop F-35 Variant ‘Tailored' for Foreign Customer,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 29, 2021. 95 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Israel Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Israel – —KC-46A Aerial Refueling Aircraft, Transmittal No 20-12, March 3, KC-46A Aerial Refueling Aircraft, Transmittal No 20-12, March 3,
2020. 2020.
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~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Table 2. Selected Notified U.S. Foreign Military Sales to Israel50~~
~~Amount/Description~~
~~Cong. Notice~~
~~Primary Contractor(s)~~
~~Estimated Cost~~
~~75 F-35A Joint Strike Fighter (Lightning~~
~~2008~~
~~Lockheed Martin~~
~~$15.2 billion~~96 Seth J. Frantzman, “Israel Inks $3 Billion Deal for KC-46 Tankers, CH-53 Helos,” Defense News, January 4, 2022. Congressional Research Service 17 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel In February 2021, Israel signed an LOA to buy two KC-46As and, in January 2022, it Figure 5. The KC46A Pegasus reached a second LOA for two additional tankers. Delivery of the Pegasus tankers is anticipated at some point in 2024, though Israel’s government has sought to expedite this timetable.97 In January 2022, five House lawmakers wrote a letter to President Biden seeking justification for why the KC-46A delivery timetable cannot be accelerated.98 CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters In late 2021, Israel signed an LOA with the United States to purchase 12 Sikorsky “King Source: U.S. Air Force Stallion” CH-53K Heavy Lift helicopters for $2 billion. The deal will enable Israel to replace its older model Sikorsky Yasur helicopters, which have been in use for nearly half a century.99 Delivery is anticipated sometime between 2025 and 2026. Excess Defense Articles The Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program provides a means by which the United States can advance foreign policy objectives—assisting friendly and allied nations—while also reducing its inventory of outdated or excess equipment. This program, managed by DSCA, enables the United States to provide friendly countries with supplies in excess of the requirements of U.S, at either reduced rates or no charge.100 97 Joseph Trevithick, “Israel's Request To Speed Delivery Of KC-46 Tankers Critical For Striking Iran Denied - The War Zone,” The Drive, December 14, 2021. 98 Andrew Clevenger, “Biden should Expedite Delivery of KC-46s to Israel, GOP Lawmakers Say,” CQ News, January 7, 2022. 99 U.S. Naval Air Systems Command, “Israel to purchase CH-53K King Stallion,” NAVAIR News, January 4, 2022. 100 To access DSCA’s Excess Defense Articles database, see http://www.dsca.mil/programs/eda. Congressional Research Service 18 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel As a designated “major non-NATO ally,”101 Israel is eligible to receive EDA under Section 516(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and Section 23(a) of the AECA. According to DSCA, from 2010 to 2019, Israel received at least $385 million in EDA deliveries (current value).102 Table 2. Selected Notified U.S. Foreign Military Sales to Israel103 Amount/Description Cong. Notice Primary Contractor(s) Estimated Cost 75 F-35A Joint Strike Fighter (Lightning 2008 Lockheed Martin $15.2 bil ion
II) Aircraft II) Aircraft
JP-8 aviation fuel, diesel fuel, and JP-8 aviation fuel, diesel fuel, and
2013 2013
N/A N/A
$2 bil ion $2 bil ion
unleaded gasoline unleaded gasoline
600 AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder Block II Air- 600 AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder Block II Air-
2014 2014
Raytheon Raytheon
$544 mil ion $544 mil ion
air missiles and associated equipment air missiles and associated equipment
14,500 Joint Direct Attack Munitions 14,500 Joint Direct Attack Munitions
2015 2015
Various Various
$1.879 bil ion $1.879 bil ion
(JDAM) and associated equipment (JDAM) and associated equipment
Equipment to support Excess Defense Equipment to support Excess Defense
2016 2016
Science and Engineering Science and Engineering
$300 mil ion $300 mil ion
Articles sale of 8 SH-60F Sea Hawk Articles sale of 8 SH-60F Sea Hawk
Services and General Services and General
Helicopters Helicopters
Electric Electric
13 76mm naval guns and technical 13 76mm naval guns and technical
2017 2017
DRS North America DRS North America
$440 mil ion $440 mil ion
support support
240 Namer armored personal carrier 240 Namer armored personal carrier
2019 2019
MTU America MTU America
$238 mil ion $238 mil ion
power packs and associated equipment power packs and associated equipment
KC-46A aerial refueling aircraft KC-46A aerial refueling aircraft
2020 2020
Boeing Corporation Boeing Corporation
$2.4 bil ion $2.4 bil ion
JP-8 aviation fuel, diesel fuel, and JP-8 aviation fuel, diesel fuel, and
2020 2020
N/A N/A
$3 bil ion $3 bil ion
unleaded gasoline unleaded gasoline
Sources: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms
~~Transfer Database, IHS Jane’s.~~
Notes: All figures and dates are approximate.
~~Excess Defense Articles~~
~~The Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program provides a means by which the United States can~~
~~advance foreign policy objectives—assisting friendly and allied nations through provision of~~
~~equipment in excess of the requirements of its own defense forces. This program, managed by~~
~~DSCA, enables the United States to reduce its inventory of outdated equipment by providing~~
~~friendly countries with necessary supplies at either reduced rates or no charge.51~~
~~As a designated “major non-NATO ally,”52 Israel is eligible to receive EDA under Section 516(a)~~
~~of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 23(a) of the Arms Export Control Act. According to~~

~~50 For open source information on the status of Israeli procurement plans regarding key aircraft platforms such as F-~~
~~15IA, V-22 Osprey, and KC-46A, see “Israel - Air Force,” Jane’s World Air Forces, July 5, 2019.~~
~~51 To access DSCA’s Excess Defense Articles database, see http://www.dsca.mil/programs/eda.~~
5218 CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters (with 2021 Lockheed Martin (parent $3.4 bil ion support equipment) company of Sikorsky) and General Electric Company Sources: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfer Database, IHS Jane’s. Note: All figures are approximate. 101 On November 4, 1986, President Reagan signed into law P.L. 99-661, the National Defense Authorization Act for On November 4, 1986, President Reagan signed into law P.L. 99-661, the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY1987. In Section 1105 of that act, Congress called for greater defense cooperation between the United States and FY1987. In Section 1105 of that act, Congress called for greater defense cooperation between the United States and
countries that the Secretary of Defense could designate as a “major non-NATO ally” (MNNA). Such cooperation could countries that the Secretary of Defense could designate as a “major non-NATO ally” (MNNA). Such cooperation could
entail U.S. funding for joint research and development and production of U.S. defense equipment. In February 1987, entail U.S. funding for joint research and development and production of U.S. defense equipment. In February 1987,
the United States granted Israel MNNA status along with several other countries (Egypt, Japan, South Korea, and the United States granted Israel MNNA status along with several other countries (Egypt, Japan, South Korea, and
Australia). According to press reports at the time, in the absence of a U.S.-Israeli mutual defense agreement, supporters Australia). According to press reports at the time, in the absence of a U.S.-Israeli mutual defense agreement, supporters
of Israel had been advocating for Israel to receive “equal treatment” with regard to certain special military benefits of Israel had been advocating for Israel to receive “equal treatment” with regard to certain special military benefits
(such as the ability to bid on U.S. defense contracts) that NATO allies received from the United States. See, “Israel (such as the ability to bid on U.S. defense contracts) that NATO allies received from the United States. See, “Israel
seeks to obtain the kind of Financial Aid that NATO Members get from U.S. Government,” seeks to obtain the kind of Financial Aid that NATO Members get from U.S. Government,” Wall Street Journal, ,
February 3, 1987. Nearly a decade later, Congress passed additional legislation that further solidified Israel’s MNNA February 3, 1987. Nearly a decade later, Congress passed additional legislation that further solidified Israel’s MNNA
status. In 1996, Section 147 of P.L. 104-164 amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by requiring the President to status. In 1996, Section 147 of P.L. 104-164 amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by requiring the President to
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~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~DSCA, from 2010 to 2019, Israel received at least $385 million in EDA deliveries (current value~~
~~only).53~~
~~Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli~~
~~Missile Defense Programs~~
~~Congress and successive Administrations have demonstrated strong support for joint U.S.-Israeli~~
~~missile defense projects designed to thwart a diverse range of threats. Threats include short-range~~
~~missiles and rockets fired by nonstate actors, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, to mid- and longer-~~
~~range ballistic missiles in Syria’s and Iran’s arsenals.54~~ notify Congress 30 days before designating a country as a MNNA. According to the act, Israel, along with several other countries, “shall be deemed to have been so designated by the President as of the effective date of this section, and the President is not required to notify the Congress of such designation of those countries.” See, 22 U.S.C. §2321j. 102 Excess Defense Articles Database Tool, Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 103 For information on the status of Israeli procurement plans regarding key aircraft platforms such as F-15IA, V-22 Osprey, and KC-46A, see “Israel - Air Force,” Jane’s World Air Forces, July 5, 2019. Congressional Research Service 19 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense Programs Congress and successive Administrations have demonstrated strong support for joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense projects designed to thwart a diverse range of threats. Due to Iranian weapons proliferation and the rapid spread of drone technology throughout the Middle East, Israel faces a bevy of state and non-state actors in possession of sophisticated precision-guided missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and guided and unguided rockets. While the near-term threats of short-range missiles and rockets launched by non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah remain, the development of Iranian proxies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, as well as Iran’s own advancement in precision guided munitions, have opened new fronts for Iran-backed groups to potentially threaten Israel’s security. Congress provides regular U.S. funding Congress provides regular U.S. funding
for Israeli and U.S.-Israeli missile defense programs in defense authorization and appropriations for Israeli and U.S.-Israeli missile defense programs in defense authorization and appropriations
bills. Israel and the United States each contribute financially to several weapons systems and bills. Israel and the United States each contribute financially to several weapons systems and
engage in co-development, co-production, and/or technology sharing in connection with them. engage in co-development, co-production, and/or technology sharing in connection with them.
Since 2001, Israel and the United States have conducted a joint biennial ballistic missile defense Since 2001, Israel and the United States have conducted a joint biennial ballistic missile defense
exercise, called Juniper Cobra,exercise, called Juniper Cobra,104 to work on integrating their weapons, radars, and other systems. to work on integrating their weapons, radars, and other systems.55105
The following section provides background on Israel’s four-layered active defense network: Iron The following section provides background on Israel’s four-layered active defense network: Iron
Dome (short range), David’s Sling (low to mid-range), Arrow II (upper-atmospheric), and Arrow Dome (short range), David’s Sling (low to mid-range), Arrow II (upper-atmospheric), and Arrow
III (exo-atmospheric).III (exo-atmospheric).
~~Iron Dome~~
~~Iron Dome is a short-range antirocket~~ In addition to these existing systems, Israel, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, and various private defense contractors are working on next generation defense systems, such as Arrow IV106 and various ground and air-based laser systems.107 On February 1, 2022, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett said, “In about a year, the IDF will launch a laser interception system, at first experimentally and later it will become operational, first in the south and then elsewhere....This will allow us in the medium to long term to surround Israel with a laser wall that protects us from missiles, rockets, UAVs, and other threats.”108 Iron Dome Iron Dome is a short-range anti-rocket, anti-mortar, and anti-artillery system (intercept range of 2.5 to 43 miles) developed by system (intercept range of 2.5 to 43 miles) developed by
Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and originally produced in Israel. Iron Dome’s Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and originally produced in Israel. Iron Dome’s
targeting system and radar are designed to fire its Tamir interceptors only at incoming projectiles targeting system and radar are designed to fire its Tamir interceptors only at incoming projectiles
that pose threats to the area being protected (generally, strategically important sites, including that pose threats to the area being protected (generally, strategically important sites, including
population centers); it is not configured to fire on rockets population centers); it is not configured to fire on rockets ~~headed toward unpopulated areas~~outside of that area. Israel . Israel
~~can move Iron Dome batteries as threats change~~can move Iron Dome batteries as threats change (there is a sea-variant of Iron Dome 104 The IDF postponed the 2022 Juniper Cobra exercise. See, Anna Ahronheim, “IDF Delays Juniper Cobra Drill amid Russian, Iranian Tensions,” Jerusalem Post, February 8, 2022. 105 The United States and Israel also jointly conduct a military exercise known as Juniper Falcon, which is designed to enhance interoperability between both nations’ militaries. 106 Udi Shaham, “Israel, US developing Arrow-4,” Jerusalem Post, February 19, 2021. 107 Anna Ahronheim, “Lockheed Martin, Rafael Join Forces to Build 'Ground-Based' Laser Weapon,” Jerusalem Post, July 28, 2021. 108 “Bennett Reveals: IDF to use Laser Interception System in a Year,” 7Israel National News (Arutz Sheva), February 1, 2022. Congressional Research Service 20 link to page 32 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel as well). Currently, Israel has ten Iron Dome batteries . Currently, Israel has ten Iron Dome batteries
deployed throughout the country, and each battery is designed to defend a 60-square-mile deployed throughout the country, and each battery is designed to defend a 60-square-mile
~~populated area.56 As of January 2020, Iron Dome has carried out more than 2,400 operational~~
~~interceptions.57~~

~~notify Congress 30 days before designating a country as a MNNA. According to the Act, Israel, along with several~~
~~other countries, “shall be deemed to have been so designated by the President as of the effective date of this section,~~
~~and the President is not required to notify the Congress of such designation of those countries.” See, 22 U.S.C. §2321j.~~
~~53 Excess Defense Articles Database Tool, Defense Security Cooperation Agency.~~
~~54 For background on mortar, rocket, and missile threats to Israel, see CRS Report R44017,~~ ~~Iran’s Foreign and Defense~~
~~Policies, by Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report R41514, Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jim Zanotti, and~~
~~“Missiles and Rockets of Hezbollah,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 26, 2018.~~
~~55 The United States and Israel also jointly conduct a military exercise known as Juniper Falcon, which is designed to~~
~~enhance interoperability between both nations’ militaries. In March 2019, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM)~~
~~deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to Israel to practice “operational procedures for~~
~~augmenting Israel's existing air and missile defense architecture.” See, USEUCOM deploys Terminal High Altitude~~
~~Area Defense (THAAD) system to Israel,” United States European Command, March 4, 2019.~~
~~56 Each battery has three launchers loaded with up to 20 Tamir interceptors per launcher for a total of 60 interceptors~~
~~per battery. See, https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/irondome.~~
~~57Anna Ahronheim, “100% Success Rate in Trial for Advanced Iron Dome System,” Jerusalem Post, January 13, 2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

13

populated area.109 Co-production and U.S. Funding Figure 6. Iron Dome Launcher To date, the United States has provided $1.7 billion to Israel for Iron Dome batteries, interceptors, co-production costs, and general maintenance (see Table 5). Because Iron Dome was developed by Israel alone, Israel initially retained proprietary technology rights to it. The United States and Israel have had a decades-long partnership in the development and co-production of other missile defense systems (such as the Arrow). As the United Source: Raytheon. States began financially supporting Israel’s development of Iron Dome in FY2011, U.S. interest in ultimately becoming a partner in its co-production grew. Congress then called for Iron Dome technology sharing and co-production with the United States.110 U.S. Army Procurement of Iron Dome U.S. efforts to acquire Iron Dome have come in the context of lawmakers’ expressed concern over a lack of capability to protect American soldiers deployed overseas from possible sophisticated cruise missile attacks.111 Congress directed the Army to take interim steps to procure additional systems.112 Section 112 of P.L. 115-232, The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, required the Secretary of Defense to certify whether there is a need for the U.S. Army to deploy an interim missile defense capability (fixed-site, cruise missile defense capability) and, if so, to deploy additional batteries. In response to this mandate, the U.S. Army procured two Iron Dome batteries from Rafael at a cost of $373 mil ion. The Army justified the purchase by referencing Iron Dome’s high interception rate as well as the Tamir interceptor’s low cost relative to existing U.S. missile defense systems.113 After testing various systems, in September 2021, the U.S, Army selected Dynetics’ Enduring Shield system, rather than Iron Dome, to fulfil its “Indirect Fire Protection Capability”.114 Since then, the Army temporarily deployed one Iron Dome battery to Guam for further testing. Section 111 of P.L. 117-81, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, amends the 2019 NDAA to eliminate a mandate for two additional U.S. Army purchases of Iron Dome. Currently, the U.S. Marine Corps is evaluating Iron Dome to fulfil its “Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC).” 109 Each battery has three to four launchers loaded with up to 20 Tamir interceptors per launcher for a total of 60-80 interceptors per battery. Every Iron Dome Battery also comes equipped with vehicles to reload launchers. 110 In conference report language accompanying P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013, conferees agreed: “The Department of Defense needs to obtain appropriate data rights to Iron Dome technology to ensure us the ability to use that data for U.S. defense purposes and to explore potential co-production opportunities. The conferees support this policy and expect the Department to keep the congressional defense committees informed of developments and progress on this issue.” 111 Jen Judson, “Congress Wants new Plans from Army on its Indirect Fire Protection Suite Development,” Defense News, September 18, 2018. 112 In 2018, some Members of Congress advocated for the selection of Iron Dome to protect U.S. troops deployed abroad against threats emanating from Russia and North Korea. See, “Bipartisan House Letter requests Iron Dome Use for US Army,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, April 24, 2018. 113 “US Army Buys Israel’s Iron Dome for Tactical Missile Defense,” Jewish Policy Center, January 22, 2019. 114 Andrew Eversden, “Dynetics Beats Out Iron Dome for $237M Army Missile Defense Contract,” Breaking Defense, September 27, 2021. Congressional Research Service 21 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel In March 2014, the United States and Israeli governments signed a co-production agreement to enable the manufacture of components of the Iron Dome system in the United States, while also providing the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) with full access to what had been proprietary Iron Dome technology.115 U.S.-based Raytheon is Rafael’s U.S. partner in the co-production of Iron Dome.116 In 2020, the two companies formed a joint venture incorporated in the United States known as “Raytheon Rafael Area Protection Systems (R2S).” Tamir interceptors (the U.S. version is called SkyHunter) are manufactured at Raytheon’s missiles and defense facility in Tucson, Arizona and elsewhere and then assembled in Israel. Israel also maintains the ability to manufacture Tamir interceptors within Israel. The May 2021 War in Gaza and Proposed Supplemental Iron Dome Funding Overview As previously mentioned, Congress and successive Administrations have demonstrated strong support for joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense. However, nearly nine months after Israel’s May 2021 conflict with Hamas in Gaza, an Israeli government request for supplemental U.S. military aid to replenish its stocks of interceptor missiles for the Iron Dome short-range anti-rocket system remains pending with Congress. See Table 3 below for some examples and timetables for the congressional appropriation of emergency aid to Israel following the outbreak of regional conflict. Table 3. Select Examples of Emergency Aid to Israel Conflict/Crisis Congressional Action Enactment Israel’s Operation Protective Edge $225 mil ion in supplemental aid for August 4, 2014 in Gaza (July 8-August 26, 2014) Iron Dome (P.L. 113-145) U.S. Invasion of Iraq (March 20-May $1 bil ion in military aid and $9 April 16, 2003 1, 2003) bil ion in U.S.-backed loan guarantees (P.L. 108-11) Operation Desert Storm against $650 mil ion in economic aid to pay March 28, 1991 Iraq and Iraqi missile attacks against for damages incurred during Persian Israel (January 17 – February 28, Gulf War (P.L. 102-21) 1991) Source: Congress.gov. Background For eleven days in May 2021, Israel and Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), fought their fourth major conflict since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. In Israel, 12 people were killed, while in Gaza, more than 250 people (including more than 60 children) were killed. During the conflict, armed Palestinian groups (mostly Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad) fired barrages of mortars and rockets (and sent explosive-laden drones) into Israel in an attempt to 115 The co-production agreement is formally titled, “Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the State of Israel Concerning Iron Dome Defense System Procurement.” 116 The FY2014 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Resolution, P.L. 113-145, exempted $225 million in Iron Dome funding—requested by Israel on an expedited basis during the summer 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict—from the co-production requirements agreed upon in March 2014. Congressional Research Service 22 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel overwhelm Iron Dome’s radar.117 These militants fired 4,369 rockets/mortars into Israel, of which 3,400 reached Israel. Of the 3,400, 1,428 were headed toward populated areas, and Iron Dome intercepted and destroyed 1,357, a 95% success rate.118 While Hamas rockets are relatively cheap to produce, the Iron Dome is costly to maintain. The unit cost of Iron Dome's Tamir interceptors, according to one source, may be approximately $53,000.119 In the aftermath of the conflict, President Joseph Biden assured Israel of his “full support to replenish Israel’s Iron Dome short-range anti-rocket system to ensure its defenses and security in the future.”120 In early June 2021 during a visit to Israel, Senator Lindsey Graham suggested that Israel was planning to request up to $1 billion in supplemental aid for Iron Dome.121 Soon thereafter, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz traveled to Washington DC, where he formally requested additional U.S. financing. In August, the Administration informed Congress that supplemental aid for Iron Dome had its “unequivocal support,” should Congress choose to proceed in “funding the request.”122 Selected Chronology of Congressional Action on Israel and Iron Dome: 2021-2022 Date Legislative Event May 2021 Senator Bil Hagerty introduced S. 1751, the Emergency Resupply for Iron Dome Act of 2021, which would direct the President to transfer all unexpended balances of appropriations made available for assistance to Gaza to the Department of Defense for grants to Israel for Iron Dome. May/June 2021 During House consideration of H.R. 3237, the Emergency Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021, Representative Tony Gonzales proposed a Motion to Recommit (MTR), stating that “if we adopt the motion to recommit, we wil instruct the Committee on Appropriations to consider my amendment to H.R. 3237. It would provide emergency funding for the Iron Dome defense system.. ”123 Representative Gonzales’s amendment would have included $73 mil ion for Iron Dome, as part of a $500 mil ion total appropriation for all 4 jointly funded Israeli missile defense systems. The MTR was not adopted. Several weeks later, some lawmakers reportedly considered adding Iron Dome supplemental funding to H.R.3237.124 Congress passed H.R.3237 in July (P.L.117-31) without Iron Dome aid. June 2021 During House floor consideration of H.R. 256, “To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,” HFAC Ranking Member Representative Michael McCaul filed an MTR in order to offer an amendment that would have established “contingency plans to provide Israel with defense articles such as munitions, ISR technology, aircraft, and related services. It would also 117 Mona El-Naggar, “Gaza’s Rockets: A Replenished Arsenal that Vexes Israel,” New York Times, May 13, 2021. 118 Shlomo Maital, “Iron Dome: The Inside Story,” The Jerusalem Report, July 26, 2021. 119 Yaniv Kubovich, “Israeli Army Wants Laser Interceptors Operational by 2022,” Ha’aretz, October 19, 2021. 120 The White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East, May 20, 2021. 121 “U.S. Senator Expects U.S. to Send More Funds for Israel's 'Iron Dome,'” Reuters, June 1, 2021. 122 Senate Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, Hearing entitled, “U.S. Security Assistance in the Middle East,” August 10, 2021. 123 See, Congressional Record, Emergency Security Supplemental to Respond to January 6th Appropriations Act, 2021, page H2629, May 20, 2021. 124 Jennifer Shutt, “Iron Dome Funds May Hitch a Ride on Capitol Security Supplemental,” CQ News, June 3, 2021. Congressional Research Service 23 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel create a waiver to expedite arms transfers if Israel is under threat of military attack.”125 The MTR failed to pass. July 2021 On July 1, Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy sought unanimous consent to consider H.J.Res 54, which would provide $1 bil ion for Iron Dome over three years. The motion was not considered and, instead, referred to the Committees on Appropriations and Budget. September 2021 On September 21, the House Rules Committee published a draft of H.R. 5305, the Extending Government Funding & Delivering Emergency Assistance Act, which would include $1 bil ion in supplemental assistance for Iron Dome. Within hours of the announcement, some lawmakers reportedly objected to the inclusion of Iron Dome.126 Subsequently, appropriators pul ed the Iron Dome funding from the legislation. September 2021 On September 22, Senator Richard Shelby introduced S.2789, the Extending Government Funding and Delivering Emergency Assistance Act. This continuing resolution would have funded the government until December 3 included $1 bil ion in Iron Dome supplemental aid over three years. September 2021 On September 23, the House voted (by a 420-9 margin, with two voting “present”) to pass the Iron Dome Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 5323), which would provide $1 bil ion in supplemental funding for Iron Dome over the next three years (FY2022-FY2024). September 2021 On September 23, Senator Marco Rubio introduced S.2830, the Iron Dome Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022, which would provide $1 bil ion for Iron Dome over a three-year period. Senator Ted Cruz also introduced S.2839, which also would provide $1 bil ion for Iron Dome over three years. October 2021 In early October, the Senate tried to pass H.R.5323 by unanimous consent. However, Senator Rand Paul argued that while he supports supplemental aid for Iron Dome, the funding should come from funds previously obligated for Afghanistan.127 October 2021 On October 6, Senator Paul introduced S.2944, the Funding Iron Dome by Defunding the Taliban Act. This bil would provide $1 bil ion for Iron Dome over three years and would rescind all “of the unobligated balances from the amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the covered funds for reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.” October 2021 On October 20, 2021, Senator Jon Tester introduced S.3032, the FY2022 Defense Appropriations bil . This annual appropriations bil includes the ful $500 mil ion U.S. commitment for Israel’s missile defense per the 2016 MOU (of which $108 mil ion is for Iron Dome), and also would provide an additional $1 bil ion over three years for Iron Dome. December 2021 On December 15, 2021, Senator Paul objected to a motion seeking unanimous consent for a floor vote on Iron Dome supplemental aid, the fourth time he had done so since September 2021.128 125 House Foreign Affairs Committee, Republicans, “McCaul Speaks on House Floor on Amendment to Reaffirm the U.S. will Provide Defense Assistance to Israel,” June 17, 2021. 126 Erik Wasson, Jarrell Dillard, and Billy House, “Democrats Strip Funds for Israel from Bill to Raise Debt Ceiling,” Bloomberg, September 21, 2021. 127 Congressional Record, Senate Procedural Matters, Motion to Discharge, Page S6954, Oct. 7, 2021. 128 Melissa Weiss, “Paul again Blocks Unanimous Consent Vote on Iron Dome Supplemental Funding,” Jewish Insider, December 16, 2021. Congressional Research Service 24 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel David’s Sling Overview In August 2008, Israel and the United States officially signed a “project agreement” to co-develop the David’s Sling system.129

~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Figure 5. Iron Dome Launcher~~

Source: Raytheon.
~~Iron Dome’s Past Performance~~
~~Iron Dome was declared operational in 2011. Its first major test came in November 2012 during a~~
~~weeklong conflict (termed “Operation Pillar of Cloud/Defense” by Israel) between Israel and~~
~~various Palestinian militant groups, including Hamas. Israeli officials claim that Iron Dome~~
~~intercepted 85% of the more than 400 rockets fired by Gaza-based militants.58~~
~~Between 2012 and 2014, Israel upgraded Iron Dome’s various tracking and firing mechanisms.~~
~~During Israel’s 2014 conflict with Hamas and other Palestinian militants, media reports~~
~~(generally based on Israeli claims) seemed to indicate that Iron Dome had a successful~~
~~interception rate close to 90%.59 Five Israeli civilians were killed by rocket fire between July and~~
~~August 2014.~~
~~According to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Jane’s Defence Weekly, during a two-day~~
~~conflict in May 2019 with Palestinian militant groups in the Gaza Strip, Israel’s Iron Dome~~
~~achieved an 86% successful interception rate against rockets fired at urban areas.60 In that time~~
~~period, three Israelis were killed by rocket fire. A commander of the Qassam Brigades, the~~
~~military wing of Hamas, claimed during the May 2019 conflict that Hamas had “overcome the so-~~

~~58 One assessment concludes that Iron Dome’s initial performance in 2012 was less effective than Israel claims, but~~
~~subsequent improvements made Iron Dome perform far better. See, “As Missiles Fly, a Look at Israel’s Iron Dome~~
~~Interceptor,” The Conversation, April 15, 2018.~~
~~59 “Israel says Iron Dome scores 90 Percent Rocket Interception Rate,” Reuters, July 10, 2014.~~
~~60 “IDF Reports Good Iron Dome Performance,” Jane's Defence Weekly, May 9, 2019.~~
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~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~called Iron Dome by adopting the tactic of firing dozens of rockets in a single burst…. The high~~
~~intensity of fire and the great destructive ability of the missiles… caused great losses and~~
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~~link to page 24~~ ~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~destruction to the enemy.”61 According to an assessment by Uzi Rubin, a former head of the Israel~~
~~Missile Defense Organization, Iron Dome “faced challenges it never did before, and it faced them~~
~~quite well… There is no 100% defense, never – it’s against the laws of physics…. Even if you~~
~~manage to hit every incoming missile, there’s Newton’s Law - even the debris must come~~
~~down.”62 In addition to Iron Dome, Israel also has extensive homeland security policies and alerts~~
~~designed to protect civilians, such as mobile phone applications that warn of incoming missiles,~~
~~bomb shelters in neighborhoods, and regulations requiring the construction of safe rooms in~~
~~homes near the Gaza border.63~~
~~Co-production and U.S. Funding~~
~~To date, the United States has provided $1.6 billion to Israel for Iron Dome batteries, interceptors,~~
~~co-production costs, and general maintenance (see Table 4). Because Iron Dome was developed~~
~~by Israel alone, Israel initially retained proprietary technology rights to it. The United States and~~
~~Israel have had a decades-long partnership in the development and co-production of other missile~~
~~defense systems (such as the Arrow). As the United States began financially supporting Israel’s~~
~~development of Iron Dome in FY2011, U.S. interest in ultimately becoming a partner in its co-~~
~~production grew. Congress then called for Iron Dome technology sharing and co-production with~~
~~the United States.64~~
~~In March 2014, the United States and Israeli governments signed a co-production agreement to~~
~~enable the manufacture of components of the Iron Dome system in the United States, while also~~
~~providing the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) with full access to what had been proprietary~~
~~Iron Dome technology.65 U.S.-based Raytheon is Rafael’s U.S. partner in the co-production of~~
~~Iron Dome.66~~
~~U.S. Army Procurement of Iron Dome~~
~~Ongoing U.S. efforts to acquire Iron Dome have come in the context of lawmakers’ concern over a lack of~~
~~capability to protect American soldiers deployed overseas from possible sophisticated cruise missile attacks.~~
~~Consequently, Congress directed the Army to take interim steps to procure additional systems.67 Section 112 of~~
~~P.L. 115-232, The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, required the Secretary~~
~~of Defense to certify whether there is a need for the U.S. Army to deploy an interim missile defense capability~~
~~(fixed-site, cruise missile defense capability) and, if so, to deploy additional batteries. In response to this mandate,~~
~~the U.S. Army evaluated several systems for its Expanded Mission Area Missile program (Iron Dome, Norwegian~~
~~Advanced Surface to Air Missile System, and IFPC Increment 2) and, in January 2019, chose to procure two Iron~~
~~Dome batteries from Rafael for a cost of $373 mil ion. The Army justified the purchase by referencing Iron~~
~~Dome’s high interception rate as well as the Tamir interceptor’s low cost relative to existing U.S. missile defense~~
~~systems.68 However, the Army so far has declined to purchase additional Iron Dome batteries. Reportedly, Israel~~
~~has refused to share Iron Dome’s source code with U.S. counterparts, who would like to customize and integrate~~
~~Iron Dome with other U.S. missile defense systems.69 The U.S. Marine Corps also is evaluating Iron Dome and has~~
~~not expressed the same desires as the Army about the system being interoperable with the Corps’ missile defense~~
~~systems.70~~

~~61 “Hamas Military Wing says it 'outsmarted' Israel's Iron Dome during Deadly Gaza Flare-Up,” The New Arab, May 7,~~
~~2019.~~
~~62 “Assessing the Damage,” Jerusalem Post, May 10, 2019.~~
~~67 In 2018, some Members of Congress advocated for the selection of Iron Dome to protect U.S. troops deployed~~
~~abroad against threats emanating from Russia and North Korea. See, “Bipartisan House Letter requests Iron Dome Use~~
~~for US Army,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, April 24, 2018.~~
~~68 “US Army Buys Israel’s Iron Dome for Tactical Missile Defense,” Jewish Policy Center, January 22, 2019.~~
~~69 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Doubts Iron Dome Can Kill Cruise Missiles,” Breaking Defense, March 4, 2020.~~
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~~After Israel’s summer 2014 conflict with Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups, there was~~
~~high Israeli demand for additional Tamir interceptors, Iron Dome batteries, and the external~~
~~financing to procure these items.71 On September 30, 2014, Raytheon received a $149 million~~
~~contract from Rafael to provide parts for the Tamir interceptor. With U.S. co-production, around~~
~~60%-70% of the components of the Tamir interceptor are now manufactured in the United States~~
~~before final assembly in Israel.72 Israel also maintains the ability to manufacture Tamir~~
~~interceptors within Israel.~~
~~In December 2019, Israel agreed to export eight ELM-2084 Multi-Mission Radars (the radar~~
~~system used by Iron Dome) to the Czech Republic for $125 million. Israel has already exported~~
~~variants of the radar system to Canada, Singapore, Finland, and India.~~
~~David’s Sling~~
~~Overview~~
~~In August 2008, Israel and the United States officially signed a “project agreement” to co-develop~~
~~the David’s Sling system.73~~ David’s Sling (aka Magic Wand) is a short/medium-range system David’s Sling (aka Magic Wand) is a short/medium-range system
designed to counter long-range rockets and slower-flying cruise missiles fired at ranges from 25 designed to counter long-range rockets and slower-flying cruise missiles fired at ranges from 25
miles to 186 miles, such as those possessed by Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. David’s miles to 186 miles, such as those possessed by Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. David’s
Sling is designed to intercept missiles with ranges and trajectories for which Iron Dome and/or Sling is designed to intercept missiles with ranges and trajectories for which Iron Dome and/or
Arrow interceptors are not optimally configured. It has been developed jointly by Rafael Arrow interceptors are not optimally configured. It has been developed jointly by Rafael
Advanced Defense Systems and Raytheon.Advanced Defense Systems and Raytheon.130 David’s Sling uses Raytheon’s Stunner missile for David’s Sling uses Raytheon’s Stunner missile for
interception, and each launcher can hold up to 16 missiles. In April 2017, Israel declared David’s interception, and each launcher can hold up to 16 missiles. In April 2017, Israel declared David’s
Sling operational and, according to one analysis, “two David’s Sling batteries are sufficient to Sling operational and, according to one analysis, “two David’s Sling batteries are sufficient to
cover the whole of Israel.”cover the whole of Israel.”74

~~66 The FY2014 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Resolution, P.L. 113-145, exempted $225 million in Iron~~
~~Dome funding—requested by Israel on an expedited basis during the summer 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict—from the co-~~
~~production requirements agreed upon in March 2014.~~
~~67 In 2018, some Members of Congress advocated for the selection of Iron Dome to protect U.S. troops deployed~~
~~abroad against threats emanating from Russia and North Korea. See, “Bipartisan House Letter requests Iron Dome Use~~
~~for US Army,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, April 24, 2018.~~
~~68 “US Army Buys Israel’s Iron Dome for Tactical Missile Defense,” Jewish Policy Center, January 22, 2019.~~
~~69 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Doubts Iron Dome Can Kill Cruise Missiles,” Breaking Defense, March 4, 2020.~~
~~70 Ashley Roque, “Congress Considering Mandating Additional US Army Iron Dome Buy,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,~~
~~May 7, 2020.~~
~~71 See, “Inside The Iron Dome,” Moment Magazine, July 17, 2018.~~
~~72 “Inside Iron Dome's Secret Manufacturing Plant,” Globes (Israel Business News), October 7, 2018.~~
73131 Israel first used David’s Sling in July 2018. At the time, Syrian regime forces were Figure 7. David’s Sling Launches Stunner attempting to retake parts of southern Syria as Interceptor part of the ongoing conflict there. During the fighting, Asad loyalists fired two SS-21 Tochka or ‘Scarab’ tactical ballistic missiles at rebel forces, but the missiles veered into Israeli territory. David’s Sling fired two Stunner interceptors, but the final impact point of the Syrian missiles changed mid-flight, and Israel ordered one of the interceptors to self-destruct; the other most likely landed in Syrian territory.132 Chinese media claimed that Asad regime forces recovered the Stunner interceptor intact and handed it over to Russia; the Israeli government did not comment on this allegation.133 Source: Israel Ministry of Defense. 129 This joint agreement is a Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Framework agreement between the This joint agreement is a Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Framework agreement between the
United States and Israel. The joint program to implement the agreement is known as the Short Range Ballistic Missile United States and Israel. The joint program to implement the agreement is known as the Short Range Ballistic Missile
Defense (SRBMD) David’s Sling Weapon System (DSWS) Project. The Department of Defense/U.S.-Israeli Defense (SRBMD) David’s Sling Weapon System (DSWS) Project. The Department of Defense/U.S.-Israeli
Cooperative Program Office manages the SRBMD/DSWS program, which is equitably funded between the United Cooperative Program Office manages the SRBMD/DSWS program, which is equitably funded between the United
States and Israel. States and Israel.
~~74 “IDF officially declares David’s Sling Operational,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 3, 2017.~~
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~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Israel first used David’s Sling in July 2018.~~
~~At the time, Syrian regime forces were~~
~~Figure 6. David’s Sling Launches Stunner~~
~~attempting to retake parts of southern Syria as~~
~~Interceptor~~
~~part of the ongoing conflict there. During the~~
~~fighting, Asad loyalists fired two SS-21~~
~~Tochka or ‘Scarab’ tactical ballistic missiles~~
~~at rebel forces, but the missiles veered into~~
~~Israeli territory. David’s Sling fired two~~
~~Stunner interceptors, but the final impact~~
~~point of the Syrian missiles changed mid-~~
~~flight, and Israel ordered one of the~~
~~interceptors to self-destruct; the other most~~
~~likely landed in Syrian territory.75 Chinese~~
~~media alleged that Asad regime forces~~
~~recovered the Stunner interceptor intact and~~
~~handed it over to Russia; the Israeli~~
~~government has not commented on this~~
~~report.76~~130 See Raytheon Missile and Defense, David's Sling System and SkyCeptor Missile at https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/capabilities/products/davidssling 131 “IDF officially declares David’s Sling Operational,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 3, 2017. 132 See, “Israel, US Complete Successful Advanced David’s Sling Missile Tests,” Jerusalem Post, March 20, 2019, and “David’s Sling has Dubious Debut against Syrian Missiles, Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 25, 2018. 133 Tyler Rogoway, “If an Israeli Stunner Missile Really Did Fall Into Russian Hands It Is a Huge Deal,” The Drive, November 13, 2019. Congressional Research Service 25 link to page 32 link to page 31 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel
Co-production and U.S. Funding
Since FY2006, the United States has Since FY2006, the United States has
contributed over $contributed over $~~1.9~~2.1 billion to the billion to the
development of David’s Sling (development of David’s Sling (seesee Table 45). .
In June 2018, the United States and Israel In June 2018, the United States and Israel
signed a co-production agreement for the signed a co-production agreement for the

joint manufacture of the Stunner interceptor. joint manufacture of the Stunner interceptor.
Source: Israel Ministry of Defense.
Some interceptor components are built in Tucson, Arizona, by Raytheon. Some interceptor components are built in Tucson, Arizona, by Raytheon.
The Arrow and Arrow II
Under a 1986 agreement allowing Israel to participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), Under a 1986 agreement allowing Israel to participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),
the United States and Israel have co-developed different versions of the Arrow anti-ballistic the United States and Israel have co-developed different versions of the Arrow anti-ballistic
missile, andmissile, and, since 1988, Israel and the United States have engaged in joint development. since 1988, Israel and the United States have engaged in joint development.77134 The The
Arrow is designed to counter short-range ballistic missiles. The United States has funded just Arrow is designed to counter short-range ballistic missiles. The United States has funded just
under half of the annual costs of the development of the Arrow Weapon System, with Israel under half of the annual costs of the development of the Arrow Weapon System, with Israel
supplying the remainder. The total U.S. financial contribution (for all Arrow systems) supplying the remainder. The total U.S. financial contribution (for all Arrow systems) ~~exceeds~~

~~75 See, “Israel, US Complete Successful Advanced David's Sling Missile Tests,” Jerusalem Post, March 20, 2019, and~~
~~“David’s Sling has Dubious Debut against Syrian Missiles, Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 25, 2018.~~
~~76 Tyler Rogoway, “If an Israeli Stunner Missile Really Did Fall Into Russian Hands It Is a Huge Deal,” The Drive,~~
~~November 13, 2019.~~
~~77 Shortly after the start of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1985, the Reagan Administration sought allied~~
~~political support through various cooperative technology agreements on ballistic missile defense (BMD). A~~
~~memorandum of understanding was signed with Israel on May 6, 1986, to jointly develop an indigenous Israeli~~
~~capability to defend against ballistic missiles. Subsequently, a number of additional agreements were signed, including,~~
~~for example, an April 1989 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to develop an Israeli computer facility as part of the~~
~~Arrow BMD program, a June 1991 agreement to develop a second generation Arrow BMD capability, and a September~~
~~2008 agreement to develop a short-range BMD system to defend against very short-range missiles and rockets. Israeli~~
~~interest in BMD was strengthened by the missile war between Iran and Iraq in the later 1980s, and the experience of~~
~~being attacked by Scud missiles from Iraq during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.~~
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~~$3.7 billion (see Table 3). The system became operational in 2000 in Israel and has been tested~~
~~successfully.~~
~~The Arrow II program (officially referred to as the Arrow System Improvement Program or~~
~~ASIP), a joint effort of Boeing and IAI, is designed to defeat longer-range ballistic missiles. One~~
~~Arrow II battery is designed to protect large swaths of Israeli territory. In March 2017, media~~
~~sources reported the first known use of the Arrow II, when they said that it successfully~~
~~intercepted a Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM) that had been fired on an Israeli jet returning to~~
~~Israel from an operation inside Syria.~~
~~In August 2020, nearly 20 years after the first Arrow system became operational, Israel~~
~~successfully tested the Arrow II system. According to one account of the test, Arrow II~~
~~“successfully intercepted a Sparrow simulated long-range, surface-to-surface missile, which~~
~~could one day be fired at Israel by Iran...”78~~
~~Table 3. U.S. Contributions to the Arrow Program (Arrow, Arrow II, and Arrow III)~~
has exceeded $4 billion (see Table 4). The system became operational in 2000 in Israel and has been tested successfully. The Arrow II program (officially referred to as the Arrow System Improvement Program or ASIP), a joint effort of Boeing and IAI, is designed to defeat longer-range ballistic missiles. One Arrow II battery is designed to protect large swaths of Israeli territory. In March 2017, media sources reported the first known use of the Arrow II, when they said that it successfully intercepted a Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM) that had been fired on an Israeli jet returning to Israel from an operation inside Syria.135 In August 2020, nearly 20 years after the first Arrow system became operational, Israel successfully tested the Arrow II system. According to one account of the test, Arrow II “successfully intercepted a Sparrow simulated long-range, surface-to-surface missile, which could one day be fired at Israel by Iran...”136 134 Shortly after the start of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1985, the Reagan Administration sought allied political support through various cooperative technology agreements on ballistic missile defense (BMD). A memorandum of understanding was signed with Israel on May 6, 1986, to jointly develop an indigenous Israeli capability to defend against ballistic missiles. Subsequently, a number of additional agreements were signed, including, for example, an April 1989 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to develop an Israeli computer facility as part of the Arrow BMD program, a June 1991 agreement to develop a second generation Arrow BMD capability, and a September 2008 agreement to develop a short-range BMD system to defend against very short-range missiles and rockets. Israeli interest in BMD was strengthened by the missile war between Iran and Iraq in the later 1980s, and the experience of being attacked by Scud missiles from Iraq during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. 135 For more information, See U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, Arrow at https://www.mda.mil/news/gallery_internationalcoop_arrow.html 136 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel Successfully Carries out Arrow 2 Interception. Test Simulated Shooting Down of Long-Range Missile, Including Possibly from Iran,” Jerusalem Post, August 14, 2020. Congressional Research Service 26 link to page 32 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Table 4. U.S. Contributions to the Arrow Program (Arrow, Arrow II, and Arrow III) current U.S. dollars in millions Fiscal Year Total Fiscal Year Total Fiscal Year Total ~~dollars in millions~~
~~Fiscal Year~~
~~Total~~
~~Fiscal Year~~
~~Total~~
1990 1990
52.000 52.000
2004 2004
144.803 144.803
2018 392.300 1991 1991
42.000 42.000
2005 2005
155.290 155.290
2019 243.000 1992 1992
54.400 54.400
2006 2006
122.866 122.866
2020 214.000 1993 1993
57.776 57.776
2007 2007
117.494 117.494
2021 250.000 1994 1994
56.424 56.424
2008 2008
118.572 118.572
1995 1995
47.400 47.400
2009 2009
104.342 104.342
1996 1996
59.352 59.352
2010 2010
122.342 122.342
1997 1997
35.000 35.000
2011 2011
125.393 125.393
1998 1998
98.874 98.874
2012 2012
125.175 125.175
1999 1999
46.924 46.924
2013 2013
115.500 115.500
2000 2000
81.650 81.650
2014 2014
119.070 119.070
2001 2001
95.214 95.214
2015 2015
130.908 130.908
2002 2002
131.700 131.700
2016 2016
146.069 146.069
2003 2003
135.749 135.749
2017 2017
272.224 272.224

~~2018~~
~~392.300~~

~~2019~~
~~243.000~~

~~2020~~
~~214.000~~

Total
~~3,763~~4,013.811
Source: U.S. Missile Defense Agency. U.S. Missile Defense Agency.

High Altitude Missile Defense System (Arrow III)
Citing a potential nuclear threat from Iran, Israel has sought a missile interceptor that operates at Citing a potential nuclear threat from Iran, Israel has sought a missile interceptor that operates at
a higher altitude and greater range than the original Arrow systems. In October 2007, the United a higher altitude and greater range than the original Arrow systems. In October 2007, the United
States and Israel agreed to establish a committee to evaluate Israel’s proposed “Arrow III,” an States and Israel agreed to establish a committee to evaluate Israel’s proposed “Arrow III,” an
upper-tier system designed to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere. upper-tier system designed to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere.
The Arrow III is a more advanced version—in terms of speed, range and altitude—of the current The Arrow III is a more advanced version—in terms of speed, range and altitude—of the current
Arrow II interceptor. In 2008, Israel decided to begin development of the Arrow III and the Arrow II interceptor. In 2008, Israel decided to begin development of the Arrow III and the

~~78 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel Successfully Carries out Arrow 2 Interception. Test Simulated Shooting Down of Long-~~
~~Range Missile, Including Possibly from Iran,” Jerusalem Post, August 14, 2020.~~
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United States agreed to co-fund its development despite an initial proposal by Lockheed Martin United States agreed to co-fund its development despite an initial proposal by Lockheed Martin
and the and the ~~Department of Defense (DOD)~~DOD urging Israel to purchase the Terminal High-Altitude Area urging Israel to purchase the Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) missile defense system instead. In March 2019, the United States deployed a Defense (THAAD) missile defense system instead. In March 2019, the United States deployed a
THAAD missile battery to Israel. THAAD missile battery to Israel.
The Arrow III, made (like the Arrow II) by IAI and Boeing, has been operational since January The Arrow III, made (like the Arrow II) by IAI and Boeing, has been operational since January
2017. 2017. ~~In July 2010, the~~The United States and Israel signed an Arrow III co-production agreement in June 2019; their ~~United States and Israel signed a bilateral agreement (The Upper-Tier~~
~~Interceptor Project Agreement) to extend their cooperation in developing and producing the~~
~~Arrow III, including an equitable U.S.-Israeli cost share. U.S.-Israeli~~ co-production of Arrow III co-production of Arrow III
components is ongoing.components is ongoing.79137 A U.S.-based subsidiary of IAI, Stark Aerospace Inc. based in A U.S.-based subsidiary of IAI, Stark Aerospace Inc. based in
Columbus, Mississippi, is producing canisters for the Arrow III system. Since co-development Columbus, Mississippi, is producing canisters for the Arrow III system. Since co-development
began in 2008, Congress has appropriated $1.1 billion for Arrow III (began in 2008, Congress has appropriated $1.1 billion for Arrow III (seesee Table 45). In January . In January
~~2019, the United States and Israel conducted a successful test of Arrow III over the~~
~~Mediterranean, and in July 2019, Arrow III successfully intercepted targets in a series of tests at~~
~~the Pacific Spaceport Complex-Alaska (PSCA) in Kodiak, Alaska.~~
~~Table 4. Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense:~~
~~FY2006-FY2020~~
~~current~~ 2022, Israel successfully tested Arrow III with reported breakthroughs in the system’s algorithmic detection of incoming projectiles and calculation of interception launch trajectories.138 137 In July 2010, the United States and Israel signed a bilateral agreement (The Upper-Tier Interceptor Project Agreement) to extend their cooperation in developing and producing the Arrow III, including an equitable U.S.-Israeli cost share. 138 Judah Ari Gross, “Israel Successfully Tests Arrow 3 Anti-Ballistic Missile System,” Times of Israel, January 18, 2022. Congressional Research Service 27 link to page 32 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Table 5. Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense: FY2006-FY2021 current U.S. dollars in millions dollars in millions
Arrow III
(High
David’s Sling
Iron
Fiscal Year
Arrow II
Altitude)
(Short-Range)
Dome
Total
FY2006 FY2006
122.866 122.866
— —
10.0 10.0
— —
132.866 132.866
FY2007 FY2007
117.494 117.494
— —
20.4 20.4
— —
137.894 137.894
FY2008 FY2008
98.572 98.572
20.0 20.0
37.0 37.0
— —
155.572 155.572
FY2009 FY2009
74.342 74.342
30.0 30.0
72.895 72.895
— —
177.237 177.237
FY2010 FY2010
72.306 72.306
50.036 50.036
80.092 80.092
— —
202.434 202.434
FY2011 FY2011
66.427 66.427
58.966 58.966
84.722 84.722
205.000 205.000
415.115 415.115
FY2012 FY2012
58.955 58.955
66.220 66.220
110.525 110.525
70.0 70.000a
305.700 305.700
FY2013 After FY2013 After
40.800 40.800
74.700 74.700
137.500 137.500
194.000 194.000
447.000 447.000
Sequestration Sequestration
FY2014 FY2014
44.363 44.363
74.707 74.707
149.712 149.712
460.309 460.309
729.091 729.091
(includes (includes
supp) supp)
FY2015 FY2015
56.201 56.201
74.707 74.707
137.934 137.934
350.972 350.972
619.814 619.814
FY2016 FY2016
56.519 56.519
89.550 89.550
286.526 286.526
55.000 55.000
487.595 487.595
FY2017 FY2017
67.331 67.331
204.893 204.893
266.511 266.511
62.000 62.000
600.735 600.735
FY2018 FY2018
82.300 82.300
310.000 310.000
221.500 221.500
92.000 92.000
705.800 705.800
FY2019 FY2019
163.000 163.000
80.000 80.000
187.000 187.000
70.000 70.000
500.000 500.000
FY2020 FY2020
159.000 159.000
55.000 55.000
191.000 191.000
95.000 95.000
500.000 500.000
FY2021 173.000 77.000 177.000 73.000 500.000 Total 1,453~~Total~~
~~1,280~~.476
1,~~188~~265.779
~~1,993~~2,170.317
1,~~654~~727.281
6,~~116~~616.853
a. These funds were not appropriated by Congress but reprogrammed by the Obama Administration from a. These funds were not appropriated by Congress but reprogrammed by the Obama Administration from
other Department of Defense accounts. other Department of Defense accounts.

~~79 The United States and Israel signed the Arrow III co-production agreement in June 2019.~~
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~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

Emergency U.S. Stockpile in Israel
In the early 1980s, Israeli leaders sought to expand what they called their “strategic In the early 1980s, Israeli leaders sought to expand what they called their “strategic
collaboration” with the U.S. military by inviting the United States to stockpile arms and collaboration” with the U.S. military by inviting the United States to stockpile arms and
equipment at Israeli bases for American use in wartime.equipment at Israeli bases for American use in wartime.80139 Beginning in 1984, the United States Beginning in 1984, the United States
began to stockpile military equipment in Israel, but only “single-use” armaments that could not be began to stockpile military equipment in Israel, but only “single-use” armaments that could not be
used by the Israel Defense Forces.used by the Israel Defense Forces.81140 In 1989, the George H.W. Bush Administration decided to In 1989, the George H.W. Bush Administration decided to
alter the terms of the stockpile and provide Israel access to it in emergency situations.alter the terms of the stockpile and provide Israel access to it in emergency situations.82141 At the At the
time, the United States was attempting to sell Saudi Arabia M1A1 tanks, and U.S. officials sought time, the United States was attempting to sell Saudi Arabia M1A1 tanks, and U.S. officials sought
Israel’s acquiescence to the deal. Israel’s acquiescence to the deal.
139 “U.S. - Israel Strategic Link: Both Sides Take Stock,” New York Times, October 2, 1981. 140 “U.S. Tells Israel it Plans to Sell Saudis 300 Tanks,” New York Times, September 29, 1989. 141 In October 1989, the United States and Israel agreed to pre-position $100 million worth of dual-use defense equipment in Israel. Congressional Research Service 28 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Section 514 of the FAA ~~Section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act~~ of 1961 (22 U.S.C. §2321h) allows U.S. defense of 1961 (22 U.S.C. §2321h) allows U.S. defense
articles stored in war reserve stocks to be transferred to a foreign government through articles stored in war reserve stocks to be transferred to a foreign government through ~~Foreign~~
~~Military Sales~~FMS or through grant military assistance, such as FMF. Congress limits the value of or through grant military assistance, such as FMF. Congress limits the value of
assets transferred into War Reserves Stock Allies (WRSA) stockpiles located in foreign countries assets transferred into War Reserves Stock Allies (WRSA) stockpiles located in foreign countries
in any fiscal year through authorizing legislation (see below). The U.S. retains title to the WRSA in any fiscal year through authorizing legislation (see below). The U.S. retains title to the WRSA
stocks, and title must be stocks, and title must be ~~subsequently~~ transferred before the foreign country may use them. transferred before the foreign country may use them.
~~The~~Until January 2021, the United States European Command United States European Command
~~(EUCOM) manages the War Reserves Stock~~(EUCOM) had managed
Figure 78. Army Officers Inspect WRSA-I
the War Reserves Stock Allies-Israel (WRSA-I) program.Allies-Israel (WRSA-I) program. ~~The~~142 Since then, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has managed the program, through which the United United
States stores missiles, armored vehicles, and States stores missiles, armored vehicles, and
artillery ammunition in Israel.artillery ammunition in Israel.83143 According to According to
one Israeli officerone Israeli officer in 2010, “Officially, all of this , “Officially, all of this
equipment belongs to the US military…. If equipment belongs to the US military…. If
however, there is a conflict, the IDF [Israel however, there is a conflict, the IDF [Israel
Defense Forces] can ask for permission to use Defense Forces] can ask for permission to use
some of the equipment.”some of the equipment.”84144 According to one According to one
expert, “WRSA-I is a strategic boon to Israel. expert, “WRSA-I is a strategic boon to Israel.
The process is streamlined: No 60-day The process is streamlined: No 60-day
~~congressional notification is required, and~~

~~there’s no waiting on delivery.”85~~ Source: 405th AFSB exercises War Reserve Stocks for Allies transfer, DVIDS, Defense Visual Information congressional notification is required, and Distribution Service, February 28, 2019. there’s no waiting on delivery.”145 In February In February
2019, as part of the bilateral military exercise 2019, as part of the bilateral military exercise
Source: 405th AFSB exercises War Reserve Stocks
~~for Allies transfer, DVIDS, Defense Visual Information~~
~~Juniper Falcon 2019, officers from the 405th~~
~~Distribution Service, February 28, 2019.~~
~~Army~~ Juniper Falcon 2019, officers from the 405th Army Field Support Brigade simulated a Field Support Brigade simulated a
transfer of munitions from the WRSA-I to Israeli Defense Forces control. transfer of munitions from the WRSA-I to Israeli Defense Forces control.
Since 1989, Israel has requested access to the stockpile on at least two occasions, including Since 1989, Israel has requested access to the stockpile on at least two occasions, including:

~~80 “U.S. - Israel Strategic Link: Both Sides Take Stock,” New York Times, October 2, 1981.~~
~~81 “U.S. Tells Israel it Plans to Sell Saudis 300 Tanks,” New York Times, September 29, 1989.~~
~~82 In October 1989, the United States and Israel agreed to pre-position $100 million worth of dual-use defense~~
~~equipment in Israel.~~
83 the following:  During the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel requested that the United States expedite the delivery of precision-guided munitions to Israel. The George W. Bush Administration did not use the emergency authority codified in the AECA, but rather allowed Israel to access the WRSA-I stockpile.  In July 2014, during Israeli military operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the Defense Department permitted Israel to draw from the stockpile, paid with FMF, to replenish 120-mm tank rounds and 40-mm illumination rounds fired from grenade launchers.146 142 In January 2021, right before leaving office, President Trump moved Israel from the area of responsibility (AOR) of EUCOM to that of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). 143 At present, the United States and Israel have a bilateral agreement that governs the storage, maintenance, in-country At present, the United States and Israel have a bilateral agreement that governs the storage, maintenance, in-country
transit, and other WRSA-related costs. The government of Israel, using both its national funds and FMF, pays for the transit, and other WRSA-related costs. The government of Israel, using both its national funds and FMF, pays for the
construction, maintenance and refurbishment costs of WRSA ammunition storage facilities. It also pays for the construction, maintenance and refurbishment costs of WRSA ammunition storage facilities. It also pays for the
packaging, crating, handling and transportation of armaments to and from the stockpile. In any future expedited packaging, crating, handling and transportation of armaments to and from the stockpile. In any future expedited
procedure, reserve stocks managed by EUCOM could be transferred to Israel; then, U.S. officials would create an-after-procedure, reserve stocks managed by EUCOM could be transferred to Israel; then, U.S. officials would create an-after-
the-fact Foreign Military Sale to account for the transferred equipment. the-fact Foreign Military Sale to account for the transferred equipment.
84144 “US may give Israel Iraq Ammo,” “US may give Israel Iraq Ammo,” Jerusalem Post, February 11, 2010. , February 11, 2010.
85145 “Best Friends Don’t Have to Ask,” Politico Magazine, August 14, 2014. 146 “U.S. Defends Supplying Israel Ammunition during Gaza Conflict,” Reuters, July 31, 2014. Congressional Research Service 29 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel The FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act ~~“Best Friends Don’t Have to Ask,” Politico Magazine, August 14, 2014.~~
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~~link to page 16~~ ~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~ During the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel requested that~~
~~the United States expedite the delivery of precision-guided munitions to Israel. In~~
~~order to accomplish this, the George W. Bush Administration did not use the~~
~~emergency authority codified in the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), but rather~~
~~allowed Israel to access the WRSA-I stockpile.~~
~~ In July 2014, during Israeli military operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip,~~
~~the Defense Department permitted Israel to draw from the stockpile, paid with~~
~~FMF, to replenish 120-mm tank rounds and 40-mm illumination rounds fired~~
~~from grenade launchers.86~~
~~Section 7049(b)(4) of P.L. 116-6, the FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act,~~ extended the extended the
authorization of WRSA-I through authorization of WRSA-I through ~~FY2020.87 Section 1273 of P.L. 115-232, the John S. McCain~~
~~National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, extended the authority for WRSA-I~~
~~through~~ FY2023.FY2023.147
At times, Congress has passed legislation that has authorized At times, Congress has passed legislation that has authorized ~~EUCOM~~the U.S. military to increase the value of to increase the value of
materiel stored in Israel. According to DSCA, “It should be understood that no new procurements materiel stored in Israel. According to DSCA, “It should be understood that no new procurements
are involved in establishing and maintaining these stockpiles. Rather, the defense articles used to are involved in establishing and maintaining these stockpiles. Rather, the defense articles used to
establish a stockpile and the annual authorized additions represent defense articles that are establish a stockpile and the annual authorized additions represent defense articles that are
already within the stocks of the U.S. armed forces. The stockpile authorizing legislation simply already within the stocks of the U.S. armed forces. The stockpile authorizing legislation simply
identifies a level of value for which a stockpile may be established or increased.”identifies a level of value for which a stockpile may be established or increased.”88148
Stockpiling Precision-Guided Munitions for Israel
Since 2014, Israel has requested that the Since 2014, Israel has requested that the ~~United States~~U.S. military increase its military increase its ~~own~~ stockpile of precision-guided stockpile of precision-guided
munitions (PGMs) stored in Israel for possible Israeli emergency use against Hezbol ah, Hamas, and other terrorist munitions (PGMs) stored in Israel for possible Israeli emergency use against Hezbol ah, Hamas, and other terrorist
groups. Section 1273 of P.L. 115-232, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year groups. Section 1273 of P.L. 115-232, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2019, 2019, ~~authorizes~~authorized the President to conduct a joint assessment of the quantity and type of PGMs necessary for Israel the President to conduct a joint assessment of the quantity and type of PGMs necessary for Israel
in the event of a in the event of a prolonged war. Section 1275 of P.L.116-283, the 2021 NDAA, amended Section 514 of the FAA (for a three-year period only) to enable the President to transfer PGMs to Israel without regard to annual limits on their value once they were stored in Israel provided that such a transfer, among other things, does not harm the U.S. supply of PGMs and the combat readiness of the United States. This provision requires the President to certify to Congress that any transfer meets these statutory conditions. It also requires another assessment of the quantity and type of PGMs necessary for Israel in the event of a prolonged war. If the U.S. military~~prolonged war. If such an assessment is completed, Section 1273 requires that the Administration~~
~~share its assessment with Congress. In 2015, DSCA notified Congress of possible foreign military sales to Israel~~
~~for Joint Direct Attack Munition Tail Kits, munitions, and associated equipment, parts and logistical support for an~~
~~estimated cost of $1.879 bil ion (see Table 2 above).~~
~~If EUCOM~~ has contributed the maximum amount legally permitted in each applicable fiscal year, has contributed the maximum amount legally permitted in each applicable fiscal year,
then the non-inflationthen the non-inflation -adjusted value of materiel stored in Israel would currently stand at adjusted value of materiel stored in Israel would currently stand at $~~3.4~~
4 billion. The following legislation authorized increases in value to the stockpile: . The following legislation authorized increases in value to the stockpile:
 FY1990: P.L. 101-167, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related  FY1990: P.L. 101-167, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, provided $165 million for all stockpile Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, provided $165 million for all stockpile
programs and expanded their locations to include Korea, Thailand, NATO programs and expanded their locations to include Korea, Thailand, NATO
members, and countries which were then major non-NATO allies (Australia, members, and countries which were then major non-NATO allies (Australia,
Japan, Korea, IsraelJapan, Korea, Israel, and Egypt). Although the and Egypt). Although the ~~Act~~act did not specify funds for did not specify funds for
Israel, of the $165 million appropriated, $10 million was for Thailand, $55 Israel, of the $165 million appropriated, $10 million was for Thailand, $55
million was for South Korea, and $100 million was intended as an initial million was for South Korea, and $100 million was intended as an initial
authorization for Israel.authorization for Israel.89

~~86 “U.S. Defends Supplying Israel Ammunition during Gaza Conflict,” Reuters, July 31, 2014.~~
~~87 The authorization extension states that “Section 12001(d) of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005~~
~~(P.L. 109-108–287; 118 Stat. 1011) is amended by striking ‘2018’ and inserting ‘2019.’”~~
88149  FY1991: P.L. 101-513, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for FY1991, authorized additions to defense articles in Israel “not less than” $300 million in value for FY1991.  FY1993: P.L. 102-391, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for FY1993, authorized additions to defense articles in Israel “not less than” $200 million in value for FY1993. 147 The 2021 NDAA, P.L. 116-283, reauthorized WRSA-I through FY2025. However, the House Office of Legislative Counsel ruled that because the FY2021 NDAA had tried to reauthorize WRSA-I for years that were already addressed in law by the FY2021 Omnibus (the Omnibus passed 5 days before the NDAA), the FY2021 NDAA’s reauthorizing amendment on WRSA-I “could not be executed.” See, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-11978/pdf/COMPS-11978.pdf. 148 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), DISAM’s Online Greenbook, Chapter 2, Security , Chapter 2, Security
Legislation and Policy. Legislation and Policy.
89149 Dr. Louis J. Samelson, “Military Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1990,” Dr. Louis J. Samelson, “Military Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1990,” The DISAM Journal, Winter, , Winter,
1989/1990. 1989/1990.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2230 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel 

~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~ FY1991: P.L. 101-513, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related~~
~~Programs Appropriations Act for FY1991, authorized additions to defense~~
~~articles in Israel “not less than” $300 million in value for FY1991.~~
~~ FY1993: P.L. 102-391, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related~~
~~Programs Appropriations Act for FY1993, authorized additions to defense~~
~~articles in Israel “not less than” $200 million in value for FY1993.~~
 FY1994: P.L. 103-87, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related FY1994: P.L. 103-87, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act for FY1994, authorized additions to defense Programs Appropriations Act for FY1994, authorized additions to defense
articles in Israel up to $200 million in value for FY1994. articles in Israel up to $200 million in value for FY1994.
 FY1995: P.L. 103-306, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related  FY1995: P.L. 103-306, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act for FY1995, authorized a total addition to defense Programs Appropriations Act for FY1995, authorized a total addition to defense
articles in Israel of $200 million for FYs 1994 and 1995. articles in Israel of $200 million for FYs 1994 and 1995.
 FY2007-FY2008: Section 13(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Department of State Authorities  FY2007-FY2008: Section 13(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Department of State Authorities
Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-472) amended Section 514 of the Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-472) amended Section 514 of the ~~Foreign Assistance Act~~
~~of 1961~~FAA, as amended (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. §2321h) to authorize additions to , as amended (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. §2321h) to authorize additions to
defense articles in Israel of up to $200 million in value for each of FY2007 and defense articles in Israel of up to $200 million in value for each of FY2007 and
FY2008.FY2008.90150
 FY2011-FY2012: P.L. 111-266, the Security Cooperation Act of 2010, authorized  FY2011-FY2012: P.L. 111-266, the Security Cooperation Act of 2010, authorized
additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200 million in value for each of additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200 million in value for each of
FY2011 and FY2012. FY2011 and FY2012.
 FY2014-FY2015: P.L. 113-296, the United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act  FY2014-FY2015: P.L. 113-296, the United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act
of 2014, authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200 million in of 2014, authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200 million in
value for each of FY2014 and FY2015. value for each of FY2014 and FY2015.
 FY2016-FY2017: Section 7034(k)(11)(B) of P.L. 114-113, the FY2016  FY2016-FY2017: Section 7034(k)(11)(B) of P.L. 114-113, the FY2016
Consolidated Appropriations Act, authorized additions to defense articles in Consolidated Appropriations Act, authorized additions to defense articles in
Israel up to $200 million in value for each of FY2016 and FY2017. Israel up to $200 million in value for each of FY2016 and FY2017.
 FY2018-FY2019: Section 7034(l)(7) of P.L. 115-141, the FY2018 Consolidated  FY2018-FY2019: Section 7034(l)(7) of P.L. 115-141, the FY2018 Consolidated
Appropriations Act, authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200 Appropriations Act, authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200
million in value for each of FY2018 and FY2019. million in value for each of FY2018 and FY2019.
 FY2019-FY2020: Section 7048(b)(4)(B) of P.L. 116-6, the FY2019 Consolidated  FY2019-FY2020: Section 7048(b)(4)(B) of P.L. 116-6, the FY2019 Consolidated
Appropriations Act, authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200 Appropriations Act, authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200
million in value for each of FY2019 and FY2020.million in value for each of FY2019 and FY2020.151  FY2021-FY2023: Section 7035(b)(3) of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200 million in value for each of FY2021, FY2022, and FY2023.
Defense Budget Appropriations/Authorization for
Anti-Tunnel Defense
In 2016, the Israeli and U.S. governments began collaborating on a new system to detect In 2016, the Israeli and U.S. governments began collaborating on a new system to detect
underground smuggling tunnels and to counter cross-border tunnels used (most prominently by underground smuggling tunnels and to counter cross-border tunnels used (most prominently by
Hamas in the summer 2014 conflict) to infiltrate Israel. Reportedly, this technology uses acoustic Hamas in the summer 2014 conflict) to infiltrate Israel. Reportedly, this technology uses acoustic
or seismic sensors and software to detect or seismic sensors and software to detect ~~the sounds of digging by monitoring vibrations~~digging.152 This technology may be based on discovery techniques used in the oil and natural gas sector.153

90150 This increase for each fiscal year is based on legislative language contained in Section 12002 of P.L. 108-287, the This increase for each fiscal year is based on legislative language contained in Section 12002 of P.L. 108-287, the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005.
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~~link to page 17 link to page 17~~ ~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~underground.91 This technology may be based on discovery techniques used in the oil and natural~~
~~gas sector.92~~151 P.L. 116-94, the FY2020 Consolidated Appropriations Act also authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200 million in value for each of FY2020 and FY2021. 152 “Israel’s Underground War—Technology and Specialist Troops deployed in face of Subterranean Threat,” Wall Street Journal, March 2, 2016. 153 “Israeli official bets Advances in anti-tunnel technology will secure Gaza Border,” Washington Post, March 6, 2018. Congressional Research Service 31 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel
Section 1279 of P.L. 114-92, the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act, authorized the Section 1279 of P.L. 114-92, the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act, authorized the
establishment of a U.S.-Israeli anti-tunnel cooperation program.establishment of a U.S.-Israeli anti-tunnel cooperation program.93154 This authorization allowed This authorization allowed
funds from the research, development, test, and evaluation defense-wide account to be used (in funds from the research, development, test, and evaluation defense-wide account to be used (in
combination with Israeli funds) to establish anti-tunnel capabilities that detect, map, and combination with Israeli funds) to establish anti-tunnel capabilities that detect, map, and
neutralize underground tunnels that threaten the United States or Israel. The authorization neutralize underground tunnels that threaten the United States or Israel. The authorization
requires the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on, among other things, the sharing of requires the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on, among other things, the sharing of
research and development costs between the United States and Israel. research and development costs between the United States and Israel.
Table 56. U.S.-Israeli Anti-Tunnel Cooperation
current U.S. dollars in millions current U.S. dollars in millions
Fiscal Year
Appropriation
FY2016 FY2016
40.0 40.0
FY2017 FY2017
42.5 42.5
FY2018 FY2018
47.5 47.5
FY2019 FY2019
47.5 47.5
FY2020 FY2020
- - FY2021 47.5
Total
~~177.500~~225.0
Source: Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying Consolidated Appropriations Acts for FY2016-Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying Consolidated Appropriations Acts for FY2016-~~2018. For~~
~~FY2021, Congress is considering providing $47.5 mil ion.~~2021. See, – “Combatting Terrorism Technology Support” in Defense Explanatory Statement. Over the years, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have become more adept at detecting tunnels. Reportedly, the Gaza division of the IDF maintains a technology lab for analyzing soil and developing new mapping techniques; units within its engineering corps also possess drilling systems and robotic devices for inspecting tunnels.155
Defense Budget Appropriations/Authorization for
Countering Unmanned Aerial Systems
As unmanned aerial vehicle technology has proliferated across the Middle East, Israel has sought As unmanned aerial vehicle technology has proliferated across the Middle East, Israel has sought
U.S. assistance in countering various systems used by state and non-state actorsU.S. assistance in countering various systems used by state and non-state actors ~~alike. In order~~. In an effort to to
counter unmanned drones, counter unmanned drones, ~~States~~states are researching various methods to detect incoming unmanned are researching various methods to detect incoming unmanned
aircraft (using radio or optical sensors) and then either disabling, destroying, or aircraft (using radio or optical sensors) and then either disabling, destroying, or ~~even~~ seizing them seizing them
~~by either~~ by jamming their communications, intercepting their flight paths, or hacking their jamming their communications, intercepting their flight paths, or hacking their
electronic electronic systems.156 Several Israeli companies have counter-drone solutions in development, including: Drone Dome (Rafael), ReDrone (Elbit Systems), and Drone Guard (Israel Aerospace Industries or IAI). According to one unnamed executive at IAI, “Drone defence is an expensive business as 154 Section 1279 of P.L. 116-92, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act, extended the authority of the anti-tunnel cooperation program through December 31, 2024. 155 Arie Egozi, “Israelis Test Classified Tunnel Tech to Stymie Terrorists; US Watches,” Breaking Defense, August 13, 2019. 156 Ilan Ben Zion, “As Attack Drones Multiply, Israeli Firms Develop Defenses,” Associated Press, September 26, 2019. Congressional Research Service 32 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel countries have a large number of facilities to protect....It’s a crazy arms race because the technological possibilities for drone use continue to increase.”157 Congress first authorized a cooperative U.S.-Israeli Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) program by expanding the scope~~systems.94~~
~~Congress first authorized a cooperative U.S.-Israeli Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS)~~
~~program by expanding the scope of the anti-tunnel cooperation program (see~~ ~~“Defense Budget~~
~~Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense Programs”). Then, in the FY2020 NDAA (P.L.~~
~~116-92), Congress created a separate authority (Section 1278), which authorized the Secretary of~~
~~Defense to “carry out research, development, test, and evaluation activities, on a joint basis with~~
~~Israel, to establish capabilities for countering unmanned aerial systems that threaten the United~~

~~91 “Israel’s Underground War—Technology and Specialist Troops deployed in face of Subterranean Threat,”~~ ~~Wall~~
~~Street Journal, March 2, 2016.~~
~~92 “Israeli Official bets Advances in Anti-Tunnel Technology will secure Gaza Border,” Washington Post, March 6,~~
~~2018.~~
~~93 Section 1279 of P.L. 116-92, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act, extended the authority~~ of the anti- of the anti-
~~tunnel cooperation program through December 31, 2024.~~
~~94 Ilan Ben Zion, “As Attack Drones Multiply, Israeli Firms Develop Defenses,” Associated Press, September 26, 2019.~~
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24

~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

tunnel cooperation program for FY2019.158 In the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92), Congress created a separate authority (Section 1278), which authorized the Secretary of Defense to “carry out research, development, test, and evaluation activities, on a joint basis with Israel, to establish capabilities for countering unmanned aerial systems that threaten the United States or Israel.” Section 1278 requires a matching contribution from the government of Israel States or Israel.” Section 1278 requires a matching contribution from the government of Israel
and caps the annual U.S. contribution at $25 million. Congress authorized the program through and caps the annual U.S. contribution at $25 million. Congress authorized the program through
~~2024.~~
~~For FY2020, the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying P.L. 116-93, the Consolidated~~
~~Appropriations Act, 2020, included $13 million under “Combatting Terrorism Technology~~
~~Support” for the C-UAS program. For FY2021, H.Rept. 116-453 accompanying H.R. 7617, the~~
~~FY2021 Defense Appropriations bill, would provide $25 million for C-UAS under~~ FY2024. Table 7. U.S.-Israeli Anti-Drone Cooperation current U.S. dollars in millions Fiscal Year Appropriation FY2020 13.0 FY2021 25.0 Total 38.0 Source: Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying Consolidated Appropriations Acts 2020-2021. See “Combatting Combatting
Terrorism Technology SupportTerrorism Technology Support.”
” in Defense Explanatory Statement. Aid Restrictions and Possible Violations
U.S. aid and arms sales to Israel, like those to other foreign recipients, are subject to U.S. law. U.S. aid and arms sales to Israel, like those to other foreign recipients, are subject to U.S. law.
Some U.S. citizens and interest groups periodically call upon Congress to ensure that U.S. Some U.S. citizens and interest groups periodically call upon Congress to ensure that U.S.
military assistance to Israel is military assistance to Israel is ~~conditioned on the Israeli government’s compliance~~compliant with applicable with applicable
U.S. laws and policies and with international humanitarian law. U.S. laws and policies and with international humanitarian law.
Arms Sales and Use of U.S.-Supplied ~~Equipment95~~Equipment159
The 1952 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and subsequent arms agreements between Israel The 1952 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and subsequent arms agreements between Israel
and the United States limit Israel’s use of U.S. military equipment to defensive purposes.and the United States limit Israel’s use of U.S. military equipment to defensive purposes.~~96 The~~
~~Arms Export Control Act (AECA,~~ 160 The AECA (22 U.S.C. §2754) authorizes the sale of U.S. defense articles 22 U.S.C. §2754) authorizes the sale of U.S. defense articles
and services for specific purposes, including “legitimate self-defense.”and services for specific purposes, including “legitimate self-defense.”97161 The AECA (22 U.S.C. The AECA (22 U.S.C.
~~§2753) states that recipients may not use such articles “for purposes other than those for which~~
~~[they have been] furnished” without prior presidential consent.98 The Act stipulates that sale~~
~~agreements entered into after November 29, 1999, must grant the U.S. government the right to~~
~~verify “credible reports” that articles have been used for unauthorized purposes. The Foreign~~

95§2753) states that 157 “Why Drones are Becoming Iran’s Weapons of Choice,” The Economist, November 10, 2021. 158 See Section 1272 of P.L. 115-232, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019. 159 See, CRS In Focus IF11197, See, CRS In Focus IF11197, U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked Questions, ,
by Paul K. Kerr and Liana W. Rosen. by Paul K. Kerr and Liana W. Rosen.
96160 U.S. State Department, U.S. State Department, Treaties in Force, Agreement relating to mutual defense assistance, Entered into force July , Agreement relating to mutual defense assistance, Entered into force July
23, 1952; TIAS 2675. 23, 1952; TIAS 2675.
97161 Pursuant to the AECA, when Israel, like other foreign nations, purchases U.S. defense articles and services, it must Pursuant to the AECA, when Israel, like other foreign nations, purchases U.S. defense articles and services, it must
sign a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) with the United States government. The LOA lists the items and/or sign a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) with the United States government. The LOA lists the items and/or
services, estimated costs, and the terms and conditions of sale. Unless otherwise specified, the standard terms and services, estimated costs, and the terms and conditions of sale. Unless otherwise specified, the standard terms and
conditions for Israel are consistent with the general terms for all U.S. arms sales abroad. These terms and conditions conditions for Israel are consistent with the general terms for all U.S. arms sales abroad. These terms and conditions
permit the use of items acquired: for internal security; for legitimate self-defense; for preventing or hindering the permit the use of items acquired: for internal security; for legitimate self-defense; for preventing or hindering the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of the means of delivering such weapons; to permit the Purchaser to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of the means of delivering such weapons; to permit the Purchaser to
participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or
otherwise to permit the Purchaser to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose otherwise to permit the Purchaser to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose
Congressional Research Service 33 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel recipients may not use such articles “for purposes other than those for which [they have been] furnished” without prior presidential consent.162 The act stipulates that sale agreements entered into after November 29, 1999 must grant the U.S. government the right to verify “credible reports” that articles have been used for unauthorized purposes. The FAA of 1961, as amended, also contains general provisions on the use of U.S.-supplied military equipment.163 Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act Section 502B(a)(2) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. §2304(a)(2)) stipulates that, absent the exercise of a presidential waiver due to extraordinary circumstances, “no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” 164 For the purposes of Section 502B, “security assistance” is defined broadly to include sales of defense articles or services, extensions of credits, and guaranties of loans under the AECA, licenses for exports to foreign government military or security forces, and certain categories of assistance authorized under the FAA. The term “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” is defined to include 1) “torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment”; 2) “prolonged detention without charges and trial”; 3) forced disappearance; and 4) “other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person.” Pursuant to this provision, the executive branch may make a determination that a foreign government has engaged in “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” and is therefore ineligible for security assistance. Pursuant to Section 502B(c), Congress also may, through a resolution of the House or Senate or by request of SFRC or HFAC, require a report within 30 days from the Secretary of State concerning human rights in a specific country, including an assessment of whether extraordinary circumstances exist that necessitate a continuation of security assistance. After receiving such report, Congress, by joint resolution, may act to terminate, restrict, or continue security assistance to such country. As a general matter, the executive branch appears to have rarely restricted assistance pursuant to this provision. There is no statutory requirement for the executive branch to notify Congress when it chooses to unilaterally invoke 502B. In the 116th Congress, several lawmakers introduced resolutions that, among other things, would have required the Secretary of State to submit a report to Congress pursuant to section 502B(c), including:  S.Res.409 - A resolution requesting information on Turkey’s human rights practices in Syria pursuant to section 502B(c) of the FAA of 1961; of maintaining or restoring international peace and~~of maintaining or restoring international peace~~ security; for the purpose of enabling foreign military forces in less security; for the purpose of enabling foreign military forces in less
developed countries to construct public works and to engage in other activities helpful to social and economic developed countries to construct public works and to engage in other activities helpful to social and economic
development; for purposes specified in any Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the USG and the development; for purposes specified in any Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the USG and the
Purchaser; or, for purposes specified in any other bilateral or regional defense agreement to which the USG and the Purchaser; or, for purposes specified in any other bilateral or regional defense agreement to which the USG and the
Purchaser are both parties. For a sample LOA, see Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance Purchaser are both parties. For a sample LOA, see Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance
Management Manual, available Management Manual, available ~~online at: [~~at https://www.samm.dsca.mil/figure/figure-c5f4https://www.samm.dsca.mil/figure/figure-c5f4]
98 162 Nevertheless, in 22 U.S.C. Nevertheless, in 22 U.S.C. §2753, the AECA also states that the consent of the President shall not be required for the 2753, the AECA also states that the consent of the President shall not be required for the
transfer by a foreign country or international organization of defense articles sold by the United States if the recipient is transfer by a foreign country or international organization of defense articles sold by the United States if the recipient is
the government of a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Government of Australia, the the government of a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Government of Australia, the
Government of Japan, the Government of the Republic of Korea, the Government of Israel, or the Government of New Government of Japan, the Government of the Republic of Korea, the Government of Israel, or the Government of New
~~Zealand.~~
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~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, also contains general provisions on the use of U.S.-~~
~~supplied military equipment.99~~
Zealand. 163 For example, see (among other sections), Section 502B, Human Rights (22 U.S.C. §2304), Section 505, Conditions of Eligibility (22 U.S.C. §2314), and Section 511, Considerations in Furnishing Military Assistance (22 U.S.C. §2321d). 164 op.cit., CRS In Focus (IF11197). Congressional Research Service 34 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel  S.Res.243 - A resolution requesting information on Saudi Arabia’s human rights practices in Yemen pursuant to section 502B(c) of the FAA of 1961;  S.Res.754 - A resolution requesting information on the Government of Azerbaijan’s human rights practices pursuant to section 502B(c) of the FAA of 1961; and  S.Res.169 - A resolution requesting a statement under section 502B(c) of the FAA of 1961 with respect to violations of human rights by the Government of Saudi Arabia. It is the statutory responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense, pursuant to the AECA, It is the statutory responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense, pursuant to the AECA,
to conduct end-use monitoring (EUM) to ensure that recipients of U.S. defense articles use such to conduct end-use monitoring (EUM) to ensure that recipients of U.S. defense articles use such
items solely for their intended purposes. The AECA also provides authority to the President items solely for their intended purposes. The AECA also provides authority to the President
(through a presidential determination) and Congress (joint resolution) to prohibit the sale or (through a presidential determination) and Congress (joint resolution) to prohibit the sale or
delivery of U.S.-origin defense articles to a recipient country if it has used such articles “for a delivery of U.S.-origin defense articles to a recipient country if it has used such articles “for a
purpose not authorized” by the AECA or the FAA.purpose not authorized” by the AECA or the FAA.~~100~~165
Questions over the misuse of U.S.-supplied equipment to Israel have arisen in several instances in Questions over the misuse of U.S.-supplied equipment to Israel have arisen in several instances in
past decades, including over the sale of tear gas to Israel during the late 1980s,past decades, including over the sale of tear gas to Israel during the late 1980s,~~101~~166 the sale of the sale of
Caterpillar D-9 bulldozers to Israel allegedly used in the destruction of Palestinian homes,Caterpillar D-9 bulldozers to Israel allegedly used in the destruction of Palestinian homes,~~102~~167 and and
IsraelIsrael's’s 2006 use of U.S.-supplied cluster munitions in Lebanon. use of U.S.-supplied cluster munitions in Lebanon.~~103~~
~~In March 2020, 64 Representatives wrote a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo posing a~~
~~series of questions,104~~168 In 2020 and 2021, some lawmakers wrote a series of letters to the State Department out of concern that Israel may have been using U.S.-origin construction out of concern that Israel may have been using U.S.-origin construction
equipment to demolish the homes of Palestinians that Israel has accused of committing equipment to demolish the homes of Palestinians that Israel has accused of committing
~~terrorism.105 The Members specifically requested “an examination of Israeli compliance with the~~
~~requirements applied to recipients of U.S.-origin defense articles pursuant to the Arms Export~~
~~Control Act of 1976 (AECA) as amended [22 U.S.C. 2751, et. seq.]” and “a determination as to~~
~~whether a report to Congress on this issue is required by section 3(c)(2) of AECA [22 U.S.C.~~
~~2753].”~~
~~Human Rights Vetting (Leahy Law)106~~
~~Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, prohibits the furnishing~~
~~of assistance authorized by the FAA and the AECA to any foreign security force unit where there~~
~~is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. The State~~
~~Department and U.S. embassies overseas implement Leahy vetting to determine which foreign~~
~~security individuals and units are eligible to receive U.S. assistance or training.~~
~~In February 2016, Senator Leahy and 10 other Members of Congress sent a letter to then-~~
~~Secretary of State John Kerry asking the State Department to determine whether alleged~~

~~99 For example, see (among other sections), Section 502B, Human Rights (22 U.S.C. 2304), Section 505, Conditions of~~
~~Eligibility (22 U.S.C. §2314), and Section 511, Considerations in Furnishing Military Assistance (22 U.S.C. §2321d).~~
~~100~~terrorism.169 In House Report language accompanying H.R.4373, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022, appropriators urged “the Secretary of State to address in bilateral consultations with Israel the importance of ensuring that MOU-supported equipment is not used in any way that undermines the prospects of a negotiated two-state solution.”170 165 See CRS In Focus IF11533, See CRS In Focus IF11533, Modifying or Ending Sales of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles, by Paul K. Kerr and Liana , by Paul K. Kerr and Liana
W. Rosen, and CRS In Focus IF10392, W. Rosen, and CRS In Focus IF10392, Foreign Military Sales Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
~~101~~166 See Government Accountability Office, See Government Accountability Office, Israel: Use of U.S.-Manufactured Tear Gas in the Occupied Territories,
NSIAD-89-128, April 13, 1989. NSIAD-89-128, April 13, 1989.
~~102~~167 CORRIE v. CATERPILLAR INC, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, filed March 15, 2005. CORRIE v. CATERPILLAR INC, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, filed March 15, 2005.
~~103~~168 See, U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Cluster Munitions Policy,” Stephen D. Mull, Acting Assistant Secretary for See, U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Cluster Munitions Policy,” Stephen D. Mull, Acting Assistant Secretary for
Political-Military Affairs, On-the-Record Briefing, May 21, 2008. Political-Military Affairs, On-the-Record Briefing, May 21, 2008.
~~104 Press Release, “Release: Khanna, Cohen, Eshoo Lead Letter Urging Administration to Oppose the Displacement of~~
~~Palestinian Families and Ensure U.S. Equipment is not used in West Bank Home Demolitions,” March 16, 2020. For~~
~~background on Israel’s policy of home demolition, see “Rare Israeli Ruling against Practice of Demolishing Homes of~~
~~Palestinians Accused of Violence,” Washington Post, August 19, 2020.~~
~~105 For background on Israel’s policy of home demolition, see “Rare Israeli Ruling against Practice of Demolishing~~
~~Homes of Palestinians Accused of Violence,” Washington Post, August 19, 2020.~~
~~106 For background on the Leahy Law, see CRS Report R43361,~~ ~~“Leahy Law” Human Rights Provisions and Security~~
~~Assistance: Issue Overview, coordinated by Nina M. Serafino.~~
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~~link to page 36 link to page 35 link to page 39~~ ~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~extrajudicial killings or torture by Israeli military and police (and Egypt separately) should trigger~~
~~Leahy law restrictions.107 In its response to Congress, the State Department stated that no Israeli~~
~~individual or unit potentially involved in the letter’s alleged incidents had been submitted to~~
~~receive U.S. assistance.108~~
~~H.R. 2407 - Promoting Human Rights for Palestinian Children Living Under Israeli~~
~~Military Occupation Act~~
~~In the 115th Congress, Representative Betty McCol um introduced a bil , H.R. 4391, Promoting Human Rights by~~
~~Ending Israeli Military Detention of Palestinian Children Act, that would have, among other things, prohibited U.S.~~
~~assistance to Israel (notwithstanding any other provision of law) from being used to support the military detention,~~
~~interrogation, or il -treatment of Palestinian children in violation of international humanitarian law. This bil was~~
~~referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and it did not see further committee or floor action.~~
~~In the 116th Congress, Representative McCol um introduced an amended version of the legislation (H.R. 2407),~~
~~that, rather than specifically addressing U.S. military assistance to Israel, would alter Section 620M of the Foreign~~
~~Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d; commonly known as the “Leahy Law”) by prohibiting foreign assistance~~
~~to a foreign country that may be used to support~~169 Posted on Twitter by Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib, March 12, 2021, 2:14pm. 170 H.Rept. 117-84, State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2022. Congressional Research Service 35 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Some Congressional Opposition to Sale of PGMs to Israel During the May 2021 conflict in Gaza, some Members critical of Israel’s conduct during the hostilities sought to block a proposed sale of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to Israel. On May 5, 2021, five days before the start of hostilities, the State Department formally notified SFRC and HFAC of a proposed $735 mil ion Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) of Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits and Small Diameter Bombs (SDBs) manufactured by Boeing to Israel. On May 20, Senator Bernie Sanders and Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Mark Pocan, and Rashida Tlaib introduced respective resolutions (S.J.Res.19 and H.J.Res.49) of disapproval against the proposed sale of munitions.171 The resolutions did not receive a vote in either chamber and, on May 21, the Biden Administration approved an export license for the sale. Senator Sanders reportedly then placed a hold on all State Department nominees, but lifted it soon after the State Department pledged additional humanitarian aid for the Palestinians.172 After the State Department issued the license, Secretary Blinken stated in a televised interview that: “When it comes to arms sales, two things. First, the President’s been equally clear: We are committed to giving Israel the means to defend itself, especial y when it comes to these indiscriminate rocket attacks against civilians. Any country would respond to that, and we – we’re committed to Israel’s defense. At the same time, any arms sale is going to be done in ful consultation with Congress. We’re committed to that. And we want to make sure that that process works effectively.”173 Human Rights Vetting (Leahy Law)174 Section 620M of the FAA of 1961, as amended, prohibits the furnishing of assistance authorized by the FAA and the AECA to any foreign security force unit where there is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. The State Department and U.S. embassies overseas implement Leahy vetting to determine which foreign security individuals and units are eligible to receive U.S. assistance or training. In February 2016, Senator Leahy and 10 other Members of Congress sent a letter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry asking the State Department to determine whether alleged extrajudicial killings or torture by Israeli military and police (and Egypt separately) should trigger Leahy law restrictions.175 In its response to Congress, the State Department stated that no Israeli individual or unit potentially involved in the letter’s alleged incidents had been submitted to receive U.S. assistance.176 171 During House consideration of H.R. 4350, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, several lawmakers proposed an amendment to suspend the “transfer of Boeing Joint Direct Attack Munition weaponry under the $735 million direct commercial sale to the Israeli government.” The House did not include this amendment in its final bill. See House Committee on Rules, H.R. 4350 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022. 172 Jeff Abramson, “U.S. Arms Sales to Israel Challenged,” Arms Control Today, June 2021. 173 U.S. State Department, Secretary Antony J. Blinken on ABC’s This Week with George Stephanopoulos, May 23, 2021. 174 For background on the Leahy Law, see CRS Report R43361, “Leahy Law” Human Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue Overview, coordinated by Nina M. Serafino. 175 The letter’s text is available at http://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000153-c56c-d662-a75b-cfecc6be0000. 176 See the text of then Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield’s April 18, 2016, response letter to Representative Henry C. Johnson at http://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000154-7c2f-d905-a357-7c7f04750000. Congressional Research Service 36 link to page 46 link to page 45 link to page 49 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel H.R. 2590, the Defending the Human Rights of Palestinian Children and Families Living Under Israeli Military Occupation Act For the third consecutive Congress, Representative Betty McCol um has introduced legislation focused on Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians.177 In addition to its findings, sense of Congress, and statement of administration policy sections, as well as other directives, H.R. 2590 contains a section (Section 5) entitled, “Limitation on Assistance.” It contains the fol owing provisions: Section 5(a) – “Notwithstanding any other provision of law,” this section would prohibit foreign assistance funds to the Government of Israel for, among other things, (1) “Supporting the military detention, interrogation, abuse, the military detention, interrogation, abuse, or il -treatment of Palestinian children,” (2) “Supporting the seizure, appropriation, or destruction of Palestinian property and forcible transfer of civilians in the Israeli-control ed and occupied West Bank,” and (3) “Deploying, or supporting the deployment of personnel, training, services, lethal materials, equipment, facilities, logistics, transportation, or any other activity to territory in the occupied West Bank to facilitate or support further unilateral annexation by Israel.” Section 5(b) – This section would require the Secretary of State to make an initial certification to Congress, fol owed by a regular annual one, that no U.S. assistance from the previous fiscal year has been used by Israel to support “personnel, training, lethal materials, equipment, facilities, logistics, transportation, or any other activity that supports or is associated with any of the activities” prohibited in Section 5(a). Or, the Secretary could certify that U.S. assistance funds from the previous fiscal year were used for a prohibited activity (as specified in Section 5(a)), in which case the Secretary must accompany the certification with a report to Congress describing “in detail the amount of such funds used by the Government of Israel in violation of such subsection and each activity supported by such funds.” Use of U.S. Funds within~~or il -treatment of~~
~~children in violation of international humanitarian law. H.R. 2407 also would authorize $19 mil ion each year for~~
~~non-governmental organizations monitoring possible human rights abuses associated with reported Israeli military~~
~~detention of Palestinian children. Gross violations of internationally recognized human rights are currently defined~~
~~in Section 502B(d)(1) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2304(d)(1)) to include: “torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading~~
~~treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges and trial, causing the disappearance of persons by~~
~~the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or~~
~~the security of person.” The U.S. State Department currently issues annual Country Reports on Human Rights~~
~~Practices that regularly reference non-government sources.109~~
~~Use of U.S. Funds Within~~ Israel’s Pre-June 1967 Borders
In some instances, U.S. assistance to Israel may be used only in areas subject to the In some instances, U.S. assistance to Israel may be used only in areas subject to the
administration of Israel prior to June 1967 (see administration of Israel prior to June 1967 (see “Loan Guarantees”). For example, U.S. State ). For example, U.S. State
Department-provided MRA assistance (see Department-provided MRA assistance (see “Migration & Refugee Assistance”), per agreement ), per agreement
between the State Department and United Israel Appeal, may only be used for absorption centers, between the State Department and United Israel Appeal, may only be used for absorption centers,
ulpanim (intensive Hebrew-language schools with particular focus on immigrants to Israel), or (intensive Hebrew-language schools with particular focus on immigrants to Israel), or
youth youth aliyah (relocation to Israel) institutions located within Israel’s pre-June 1967 area of (relocation to Israel) institutions located within Israel’s pre-June 1967 area of
control.control.~~110~~178
Until recently, no program funded by the endowments of U.S.-Israeli binational foundations (see Until recently, no program funded by the endowments of U.S.-Israeli binational foundations (see
“U.S.-Israeli Scientific & Business Cooperation”) could be “conducted in geographic areas which ) could be “conducted in geographic areas which
came under the administration of the Government of Israel after June 5, 1967, and may not came under the administration of the Government of Israel after June 5, 1967, and may not ~~relate~~
~~to subjects primarily pertinent to such areas.”111 In October 2020, the Trump Administration~~

~~107 The letter’s text is available at http://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000153-c56c-d662-a75b-cfecc6be0000.~~
~~108 See the text of then Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield’s April 18, 2016, response letter~~
~~to Representative Henry C. Johnson at http://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000154-7c2f-d905-a357-7c7f04750000.~~
~~109 For the latest report on Israel, Golan Heights, West Bank, and Gaza, including information on Israeli military law~~
~~and detention of Palestinian prisoners (adults and minors), see: https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-~~
~~human-rights-practices/israel-golan-heights-west-bank-and-gaza/.~~
~~110~~ 177 In the 115th Congress, Representative McCollum introduced H.R. 4391, Promoting Human Rights by Ending Israeli Military Detention of Palestinian Children Act, that would have, among other things, prohibited U.S. assistance to Israel (notwithstanding any other provision of law) from being used to support the military detention, interrogation, or ill-treatment of Palestinian children in violation of international humanitarian law. This bill was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and it did not see further committee or floor action. In the 116th Congress, Representative McCollum introduced a similar version of the legislation (H.R. 2407), that, rather than specifically addressing U.S. military assistance to Israel, would have altered Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. §2378d; commonly known as the "Leahy Law") by prohibiting foreign assistance to a foreign country that may be used to support the military detention, interrogation, abuse, or ill-treatment of children in violation of international humanitarian law. H.R. 2407 also would have authorized $19 million each year for nongovernmental organizations monitoring possible human rights abuses associated with reported Israeli military detention of Palestinian children. This bill also was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and it did not see further committee or floor action. 178 This stipulation is found in grant agreements between the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, This stipulation is found in grant agreements between the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees,
and Migration (PRM) and United Israel Appeal (clause 8. F. 2and Migration (PRM) and United Israel Appeal (clause 8. F. 2 – —Use in Territories Subject to the Administration of the Use in Territories Subject to the Administration of the
State of Israel Prior to June 1967). The FY2013 agreement (S-PRMCO-13-GR-1041State of Israel Prior to June 1967). The FY2013 agreement (S-PRMCO-13-GR-1041 – —March 13, 2013) is for $15 March 13, 2013) is for $15
million. CRS Correspondence with U.S. State Department, March 2014. million. CRS Correspondence with U.S. State Department, March 2014.
~~111 See “Regulations” document at: http://www.bsf.org.il/BSFPublic/DefaultPage1.aspx?PageId=221&innerTextID=~~
~~221.~~
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relate to subjects primarily pertinent to such areas.”179 In October 2020, the Trump Administration announced that it had removed geographic restrictions from the founding agreements establishing announced that it had removed geographic restrictions from the founding agreements establishing
the three main U.S.-Israeli binational foundations (BIRD, BARD, BSF), thereby permitting the three main U.S.-Israeli binational foundations (BIRD, BARD, BSF), thereby permitting
universities in the West Bank to apply for grant funding.universities in the West Bank to apply for grant funding.~~112~~
~~Annexation and U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~
~~During part of 2020, after Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu formed a coalition~~
~~government to end more than a year of political uncertainty in Israel, he considered unilaterally~~
~~annexing parts of the West Bank in order to fulfill earlier campaign pledges to his supporters.113~~
~~The May 2020 power sharing agreement with Defense Minister Benny Gantz authorized~~
~~Netanyahu to present the issue of annexation before either the cabinet or Knesset for a vote, but~~
~~only after July 1, 2020. In August 2020, the United Arab Emirates and Israel publicly announced~~
~~that they had, in principle, reached an agreement, whereby the UAE would normalize diplomatic~~
~~relations with Israel in exchange for Israel suspending its annexation plans.114 Both sides reached~~
~~a formal diplomatic agreement, known as the Abraham Accords, in September 2020 and, since~~
~~then, the issue of annexation has remained tabled.~~
~~During spring and summer 2020, before the issue of annexation was put aside, some Democrats~~
~~in Congress took various steps to signal their opposition to Israel’s planned annexation of parts of~~
~~the West Bank. In the House, 191 Democrats (81% of the Democratic Caucus) wrote a letter to~~
~~Israeli leaders that expressed their “deep concern” with annexation plans and urged the Israeli~~
~~government to reconsider.115 Another letter, addressed to Secretary Pompeo, warned U.S. officials~~
~~that if Israel proceeded with annexation, the 12 House signatories and one Senator were prepared~~
~~to:~~
~~ensure non-recognition of annexed territories as well as pursue legislation that conditions~~
~~the $3.8 billion in U.S. military funding to Israel to ensure that U.S. taxpayers are not~~
~~supporting annexation in any way. We will include human rights conditions and the~~
~~withholding of funds for the offshore procurement of Israeli weapons equal to or exceeding~~
~~the amount the Israeli government spends annually to fund settlements, as well as the~~
~~policies and practices that sustain and enable them.116~~
~~In August 2020, Representative Betty McCollum introduced H.R. 8050, the Israeli Annexation~~
~~Non-Recognition Act, which would, among other things, prohibit FMF and other defense funds~~
~~from being used to support certain activities in West Bank territory that had been unilaterally~~
~~annexed by Israel.~~
~~In the Senate, 19 Senate Democrats sent a May 2020 letter to Israeli leaders warning them that if~~
~~they moved annexation forward, “we would not support that action. This is consistent with long-~~
~~standing American policy opposing unilateral actions by either party to the conflict.”117 Then~~

~~112 Noa Landau, Hagar Shezaf, and Shira Kadari-Ovadia, “Netanyahu, Ambassador Friedman Ink Deal Expanding~~
~~Scientific Cooperation to Settlements,” Ha’aretz, October 28, 2020.~~
~~113 For additional background, see CRS Report R46433,~~ ~~Israel’s Possible Annexation of West Bank Areas: Frequently~~
~~Asked Questions, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~114 For additional background, see CRS Insight IN11485,~~ ~~Israel-UAE Normalization and Suspension of West Bank~~
~~Annexation, by Jim Zanotti and Kenneth Katzman.~~
~~115 Congressman Ted Deutch, Press Releases, 191 House Members Express Concern over Push for Unilateral~~
~~Annexation in Israel, June 25, 2020.~~
~~116 Available online at: https://ocasio-cortez.house.gov/sites/ocasio-~~
~~cortez.house.gov/files/documents/LettertoPompeoFinal.pdf.~~
~~117 Senator Chris Van Hollen, Press Releases, “Van Hollen, Murphy, Kaine, Senate Democrats Caution Israel Against~~
~~Unilateral Annexation of West Bank Territory,” May 21, 2020. Reportedly, an earlier draft of the letter, had been more~~
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~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Senator Van Hollen filed an amendment to S. 4049, the Senate’s version of the National Defense~~
~~Authorization Act for FY2021, which would have prohibited funds authorized in the bill, or any~~
~~other Act, from being used to “support the deployment of United States defense articles, services,~~
~~or training to territories in the West Bank unilaterally annexed by Israel after July 1, 2020, or to~~
~~facilitate the unilateral annexation of such territories.”118 The amendment was not made in order~~
~~during Senate consideration of the FY2021 NDAA.119~~
~~Israeli Arms Transfers to Third Parties~~
~~Per Section §3(a) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA - 22 U.S. Code~~180 According to an October 2020 press statement released by the U.S. Embassy in Israel: Upon entry of force of the Protocol signed here in Judea and Samaria, more Israeli partners will be eligible to receive funding for scientific collaboration in a wide variety of fields....Established in the 1970s, the BIRD, BARD, and BSF Agreements for each of the three Foundations have not permitted support for projects conducted in areas that came under the administration of the Government of Israel after June 5, 1967. These geographic restrictions are no longer consistent with U.S. policy following (i) the Administration’s opposition to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334, (ii) the Administration’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and moving the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, (iii) the Administration’s recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and (iv) the Administration’s announcement that the U.S. will no longer consider that the establishment of civilian settlements in the West Bank is per se inconsistent with international law.... Updating the Agreements further strengthens the special bilateral relationship between the United States and Israel and continues efforts to generate significant mutual scientific and economic benefits.181 In the 117th Congress, Section 5 of H.R.5344, the Two-State Solution Act, would, among other things, restrict the United States government from providing “support for projects conducted in geographic areas which came under the administration of the Government of Israel after June 5, 1967...” Israeli Arms Transfers to Third Parties Per Section 3(a) of the AECA (22 U.S.C. §2753) and Section §2753) and Section
505(e) of the 505(e) of the ~~Foreign Assistance Act~~FAA (22 U.S. (22 U.S. ~~Code~~ C. §2314), the U.S. government must review §2314), the U.S. government must review
and approve any transfer of U.S.-origin equipment from a recipient to a third party that was not and approve any transfer of U.S.-origin equipment from a recipient to a third party that was not
previously authorized in the original acquisition.previously authorized in the original acquisition.~~120~~ 182 Third Party Transfer (or TPT) is the retransfer Third Party Transfer (or TPT) is the retransfer
of title, physical possession or control of defense articles from the authorized recipient to any of title, physical possession or control of defense articles from the authorized recipient to any
person or organization not an employee, officer or agent of that recipient country.person or organization not an employee, officer or agent of that recipient country.~~121~~183
As previously mentioned, Israel is a major global manufacturer of armaments. Yet, it also As previously mentioned, Israel is a major global manufacturer of armaments. Yet, it also
possesses significant quantities of major U.S.-origin defense equipment stemming from its possesses significant quantities of major U.S.-origin defense equipment stemming from its
decades-old security partnership with the United States. At times, third parties have sought to decades-old security partnership with the United States. At times, third parties have sought to
procure U.S. equipment procure U.S. equipment ~~used~~held by Israel, and U.S.-Israel differences over approval of retransfer has by Israel, and U.S.-Israel differences over approval of retransfer has
at times caused friction in the bilateral relationship. For example, in 2017, Croatia solicited bids at times caused friction in the bilateral relationship. For example, in 2017, Croatia solicited bids
for the procurement of fighter aircraft and, a year later, chose to purchase 12 used F-16 Barak for the procurement of fighter aircraft and, a year later, chose to purchase 12 used F-16 Barak
~~fighters from Israel in a deal worth an estimated $500 million, conditioned on U.S. TPT approval.~~
~~In December 2018, the Trump Administration notified Congress that it had approved the sale, but~~
~~only if all Israeli modifications were removed beforehand. Reportedly, Croatia did not want the F-~~
~~16s returned to their original condition, and the deal was cancelled despite high level negotiations~~
~~between Israeli and U.S. officials.122~~
~~Israel and China~~
~~Amidst ongoing global U.S.-Chinese competition in various fields, Israel’s defense and~~
~~technology trade with China has at times come under U.S. scrutiny.123 Since the middle of the last~~

~~critical in tone. See, Melissa Weiss, “Scoop: Senators Back Away from Threatening Israel with End of Bipartisan~~
~~Support,” Jewish Insider, May 10, 2020.~~
~~118 Senator Chis Van Hollen, Press Releases, “Van Hollen, Senate Democrats File NDAA Amendment Prohibiting U.S.~~
~~Funds from Supporting Israeli Annexation of the West Bank,” July 2, 2020.~~
~~119 In a floor speech, Senator Van Hollen defended the purpose of the amendment against those who claimed that the~~
~~Senator would have suspended U.S. missile defense funding to Israel (Iron Dome is not a U.S. defense article). He~~
~~remarked: “As I explained in my floor statement at the time of its introduction, the amendment would not have reduced~~
~~U.S. security assistance to Israel by a single penny. It would simply have ensured that no U.S. security assistance could~~
~~be used for the purpose of unilaterally annexing territory in the West Bank. Furthermore, nothing in this amendment~~
~~would have prohibited Israel from using U.S.-financed missile defense systems such as Iron Dome to defend against~~
~~attacks in any territories that could be unilaterally annexed by the Israeli Government.” See, Senate Speeches and~~
~~Inserts, Page S.4663, Congressional Record, August 3, 2020.~~
~~120 See, U.S. State Department, “Third Party Transfer Process and Documentation,” Bureau of Political-Military~~
~~Affairs, December 17, 2018.~~
~~121 See, Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies, “The Management of Security Cooperation (Green Book),”~~
~~Edition 39, January 2019.~~
~~122 “Croatia cancels F-16 Deal with Israel due to U.S. Objections,” Axios, January 10, 2019.~~
~~123 See, “The Evolving Israel-China Relationship,” RAND Corporation, 2019.~~
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179 See “Regulations” document at http://www.bsf.org.il/BSFPublic/DefaultPage1.aspx?PageId=221&innerTextID=221. 180 Noa Landau, Hagar Shezaf, and Shira Kadari-Ovadia, “Netanyahu, Ambassador Friedman Ink Deal Expanding Scientific Cooperation to Settlements,” Ha’aretz, October 28, 2020. 181 U.S. State Department, U.S., Israel Expand Reach of Binational Foundations and Establish New Scientific and Technological Cooperation Agreement, U.S. Embassy Jerusalem, Press Release, October 28, 2020. 182 See, U.S. State Department, “Third Party Transfer Process and Documentation,” Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, December 17, 2018. 183 See, Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies, “The Management of Security Cooperation (Green Book),” Edition 39, January 2019. Congressional Research Service 38 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel fighters from Israel in a deal worth an estimated $500 million, conditioned on U.S. TPT approval. In December 2018, the Trump Administration notified Congress that it had approved the sale, but only if all Israeli modifications were removed beforehand. Reportedly, Croatia did not want the F-16s returned to their original condition, and the deal was cancelled despite high-level negotiations between Israeli and U.S. officials.184 Israel and China Amidst ongoing global U.S.-Chinese competition in various fields, Israel’s defense and technology trade with China has at times come under U.S. scrutiny.185 Since the middle of the last decade, Israeli defense exports to China have nearly ceased. Two planned Israeli sales to China decade, Israeli defense exports to China have nearly ceased. Two planned Israeli sales to China
drew significant opposition both from successive Administrations and from Congress drew significant opposition both from successive Administrations and from Congress
(PHALCON airborne radar systems in 2000 and upgrade of Chinese Harpy Killer drone aircraft (PHALCON airborne radar systems in 2000 and upgrade of Chinese Harpy Killer drone aircraft
in 2004/2005).in 2004/2005).~~124 As~~186 Apparently as a result of U.S. pressure on Israel to cease its long-standing and sometimes a result of U.S. pressure on Israel to cease its long-standing and sometimes
clandestine defense relationship with China, Israel created its own arms export control agency, clandestine defense relationship with China, Israel created its own arms export control agency,
known as the Defense Export Control Agency (DECAknown as the Defense Export Control Agency (DECA – see textbox above). In addition, the United States and Israel ). In addition, the United States and Israel
signed a 2005 bilateral agreement, known as the “Declaration of Understanding on Technology signed a 2005 bilateral agreement, known as the “Declaration of Understanding on Technology
Exports,” whereby both countries pledged to ensure defense export transparency, with the United Exports,” whereby both countries pledged to ensure defense export transparency, with the United
States pledging not to ban Israel’s defense deals on commercial grounds to ensure Israeli States pledging not to ban Israel’s defense deals on commercial grounds to ensure Israeli
competitiveness globally.competitiveness globally.~~125~~
187 Though Though official Israeli-Chinese defense ties have essentially ended, Israeli-Chinese defense ties have essentially ended,188 China is now Israel’s second largest China is now Israel’s second largest
single-state trading partner (after the United States), and there is still some concern that Israeli single-state trading partner (after the United States), and there is still some concern that Israeli
technology transfer in the commercial sphere will be used by China to compete with the United technology transfer in the commercial sphere will be used by China to compete with the United
States and potentially threaten its national security in various fields, such as cybersecurity, States and potentially threaten its national security in various fields, such as cybersecurity,
artificial intelligence, and robotics.artificial intelligence, and robotics.~~126~~189 According to one analyst According to one analyst in 2018, “Since they cannot buy defense , “Since they cannot buy defense
equipment from Israel, Chinese companies with links to the country’s military have looked to equipment from Israel, Chinese companies with links to the country’s military have looked to
civilian technologies instead, particularly those adaptable to military use.”civilian technologies instead, particularly those adaptable to military use.”~~127~~190 Partly due to U.S. Partly due to U.S.
concerns regarding China’s involvement in Israel’s economy, Israel created an advisory panel on concerns regarding China’s involvement in Israel’s economy, Israel created an advisory panel on
foreign investment in Israel in late 2019.foreign investment in Israel in late 2019.~~128~~191 However, this panel 184 “Croatia cancels F-16 Deal with Israel due to U.S. Objections,” Axios, January 10, 2019. 185 See, “The Evolving Israel-China Relationship,” RAND Corporation, 2019. 186 ~~However, this panel reportedly does not have the~~
~~authority to review investments in sectors such as high-tech that accounted for most of China’s~~
~~investments in Israel in the previous decade.129 Apparently, debate continues within Israel’s~~
~~government about how to balance economic interests with national security concerns.130~~
~~Chinese investment in Israel also has raised some concern within the Administration and~~
~~Congress. Section 1289 of P.L. 116-92, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2020,~~
~~expressed a sense of the Senate that the United States government should “urge the Government~~
~~of Israel to consider the security implications of foreign investment in Israel.” According to one~~
~~Israeli analysis, President Trump reportedly warned Prime Minister Netanyahu in March 2019~~
~~that U.S. security assistance for and cooperation with Israel could be limited if Chinese~~
~~companies establish a 5G communications network in Israel, in line with similar warnings that~~
~~the Administration has communicated to other U.S. allies and partners.131 Additionally, a state-~~
~~owned Chinese company (the Shanghai International Port Group) has secured the contract to~~

~~124 In 2000,~~ Representative Sonny Callahan of Alabama, then Chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Representative Sonny Callahan of Alabama, then Chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the
House Appropriations Committee, told a hearing on April 6, 2000, that he would block $250 million in FY2001 House Appropriations Committee, told a hearing on April 6, 2000, that he would block $250 million in FY2001
military assistance to Israel unless Israel cancelled the PHALCON sale to China. Representative Callahan offered an military assistance to Israel unless Israel cancelled the PHALCON sale to China. Representative Callahan offered an
amendment during a June 20 subcommittee markup to withhold $250 million from the $2.88 billion in total economic amendment during a June 20 subcommittee markup to withhold $250 million from the $2.88 billion in total economic
and military assistance proposed for Israel for FY2001, but the amendment failed by a vote of nine to six. See, “Israel-and military assistance proposed for Israel for FY2001, but the amendment failed by a vote of nine to six. See, “Israel-
China Radar Deal Opposed,” China Radar Deal Opposed,” Washington Post, April 7, 2000 and “U.S. Congressman: We’ll Block Israeli Aid Unless , April 7, 2000 and “U.S. Congressman: We’ll Block Israeli Aid Unless
China Deal Cancelled,” China Deal Cancelled,” Jerusalem Post, April 7, 2000. , April 7, 2000.
~~125~~187 “Israel, U.S. Draft Agreement for Openness, Equality in Arms Deals,” “Israel, U.S. Draft Agreement for Openness, Equality in Arms Deals,” Ha’aretz, June 27, 2005. , June 27, 2005.
~~126 “China Tech Push in Israel Stirs Security Fears,” Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2019.~~
~~127 “Israel and China Take a Leap Forward—but to Where?” Mosaic, November 5, 2018.~~
~~128 Arie Egozi, “Israelis Create Foreign Investment Overseer; China Targeted,” Breaking Defense, November 13, 2019.~~
~~129 Shira Efron, et al.,~~ ~~Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure: Security Implications for Israel and~~
~~the United States, RAND Corporation, 2020, pp. 24-25.~~
~~130 James M. Dorsey, “Israel-China Relations: Staring Into the Abyss of US-Chinese Decoupling,” The Globalist, June~~
~~9, 2020; Mercy A. Kuo, “US-China-Israel Relations: Pompeo’s Visit,” The Diplomat, May 27, 2020.~~
~~131 Hiddai Segev, Doron Ella, and Assaf Orion, “My Way or the Huawei? The United States-China Race for 5G~~
~~Dominance,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1193, July 15, 2019.~~
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~~operate a new terminal at Haifa’s seaport for 25 years (beginning in 2021), and another state-~~
~~owned Chinese company (a subsidiary of China Harbour Engineering Company) is developing~~
~~Ashdod’s new port. Both Haifa and Ashdod host Israeli naval bases. Due to the Chinese contract~~
~~for Haifa, the U.S. Navy is reportedly reconsidering its practice of periodically docking there.132~~
188 In late 2021, three Israeli companies and 10 suspects were indicted on charges of exporting cruise missiles to China without a permit. According to one report, “Israel is home to some 1,600 licensed arms exporters, which employ 150,000 to 200,000 people. In addition, there is a large supply chain of subcontractors who supply software, hardware, raw materials, and other goods necessary for arms production. DECA is supposed to watch over this massive system, guided by strict rules governing Israel’s arms export industry. The body, which operates with nearly no transparency, is supposed to vet deals to ensure that arms do not go to enemy countries, endanger Israel in any way, include classified technology, or stand to harm Israel’s international standing.” See, “10 Israelis set to be Indicted for Illegally Exporting Missiles to China,” Times of Israel, December 20, 2021. 189 “China Tech Push in Israel Stirs Security Fears,” Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2019. 190 “Israel and China Take a Leap Forward—but to Where?” Mosaic, November 5, 2018. 191 Arie Egozi, “Israelis Create Foreign Investment Overseer; China Targeted,” Breaking Defense, November 13, 2019. Congressional Research Service 39 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel reportedly does not have the authority to review investments in sectors such as high-tech that accounted for most of China’s investments in Israel in the previous decade.192 Both successive Administrations and Congress have urged Israel to do more to limit Chinese investment. Section 1289 of P.L. 116-92, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2020, expressed a sense of the Senate that the United States government should “urge the Government of Israel to consider the security implications of foreign investment in Israel.” According to one Israeli analysis, President Trump reportedly warned Prime Minister Netanyahu in March 2019 that U.S. security assistance for and cooperation with Israel could be limited if Chinese companies establish a 5G communications network in Israel, in line with similar warnings that the Administration had communicated to other U.S. allies and partners.193 In spring 2020, after the United States again raised concern over Chinese investment in major In spring 2020, after the United States again raised concern over Chinese investment in major
Israeli projects, the subsidiary of a Hong Kong-based company lost a bid to build Israel’s largest Israeli projects, the subsidiary of a Hong Kong-based company lost a bid to build Israel’s largest
desalination plant. Shortly before Israel announced the bid decision, desalination plant. Shortly before Israel announced the bid decision, then Secretary of State Michael Secretary of State Michael
Pompeo visited Israel and publicly stated, “We do not want the Chinese Communist Party to have Pompeo visited Israel and publicly stated, “We do not want the Chinese Communist Party to have
access to Israeli infrastructure, Israeli communication systems, all of the things that put Israeli access to Israeli infrastructure, Israeli communication systems, all of the things that put Israeli
citizens at risk and in turn put the capacity for America to work alongside Israel on important citizens at risk and in turn put the capacity for America to work alongside Israel on important
projects at risk as projects at risk as well.”194 The Biden Administration also has continued to warn regional partners about Chinese investment in critical infrastructure. According to Mira Resnick, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Security at the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, “We know our partners and allies in the Middle East have trade relations with China and that’s OK, but we made it clear that there is a certain kind of cooperation with China we cannot live with.”195 State-owned and private Chinese companies continue to do business in Israel. A state-owned Chinese company (the Shanghai International Port Group) began operating the new terminal at Haifa’s seaport for 25 years. Another state-owned Chinese company (a subsidiary of China Harbour Engineering Company) is developing Ashdod’s new port. Both Haifa and Ashdod host Israeli naval bases. Due to the Chinese contract for Haifa, the Biden Administration has reportedly pressed Israeli counterparts to regularly check heavy machinery at the port for technology that could be employed to spy on the nearby naval base.196 The China Civil Engineering Construction Company has helped build several road tunnels and is working on the construction of Tel Aviv’s Light Rail project. In 2022, after repeated high level U.S. engagement with Israel on China, Israel has reportedly agreed to “update Washington about any major deals with Beijing, especially in infrastructure and technology” and “would reconsider any such deals at America’s request.”197 In early 2022, Israel 192 Shira Efron, et al., Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure: Security Implications for Israel and the United States, RAND Corporation, 2020, pp. 24-25. 193 Hiddai Segev, Doron Ella, and Assaf Orion, “My Way or the Huawei? The United States-China Race for 5G Dominance,” Institute for National Security Studies, Insight No. 1193, July 15, 2019. 194 Shirley Zhao and Ivan Levingston, “Li Ka-Shing Hong Kong Group Loses Israel Deal amid U.S. Push,” Bloomberg, May 26, 2020. 195 Barak Ravid, “CIA Director Raised China Concerns with Israeli Prime Minister,” Axios.com, August 18, 2021. 196 Arie Egozi, “US Presses Israel on Haifa Port amid China Espionage Concerns: Sources,” Breaking Defense, October 5, 2021. 197 Lahav Harkov, “Israel Agrees to Update US about China Trade to Avoid Tension,” Jerusalem Post, January 3, 2022. Congressional Research Service 40 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel chose other foreign companies over Chinse bidders for the next phase of Tel Aviv’s light rail construction.~~well.”133 The United States and Israel also are reportedly nearing a deal~~
~~whereby Israel would pledge not to choose a Chinese technology company to build its 5G next~~
~~generation mobile network.134~~
Other Ongoing Assistance and
Cooperative Programs
Migration & Refugee Assistance
Since 1973, Israel has received Since 1973, Israel has received a total of approximately $1.68 billion in grants from the State Department’s Migration and Refugee grants from the State Department’s Migration and Refugee
Assistance account (MRA)Assistance account (MRA)~~135~~ to assist in the resettlement of migrants to Israel. to assist in the resettlement of migrants to Israel.198 Funds are paid to Funds are paid to
the United Israel Appeal, a private philanthropic organization in the United States, which in turn the United Israel Appeal, a private philanthropic organization in the United States, which in turn
transfers the funds to the Jewish Agency for Israel.transfers the funds to the Jewish Agency for Israel.~~136~~199 Between 1973 and 1991, the United States Between 1973 and 1991, the United States
gave about $460 million for resettling Jewish refugees in Israel. gave about $460 million for resettling Jewish refugees in Israel. ~~Annual amounts have varied~~
~~from a low of $5 million to a high of $80 million, based at least partly on the~~ During the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants in Israel, MRA grants to Israel increased to almost $80 million per year from 1992 to 1999 ($630 million). Since then, annual grants have decreased based at least partly on the declining number of Jews number of Jews
leaving the former Soviet Union and other areas for Israelleaving the former Soviet Union and other areas for Israel.
(see Table 8). Table 68. Migration and Refugee Assistance Funding Levels for Israel
Fiscal Year
Total
FY2000-FY2012 FY2000-FY2012
$519.3 mil ion $519.3 mil ion
FY2013 FY2013
$15 mil ion $15 mil ion
FY2014 FY2014
$15 mil ion $15 mil ion
FY2015 FY2015
$10 mil ion $10 mil ion
FY2016 FY2016
$10 mil ion $10 mil ion
FY2017 FY2017
$7.5 mil ion $7.5 mil ion
FY2018 FY2018
$7.5 mil ion $7.5 mil ion

~~132 “U.S. Navy may Stop Docking in Haifa after Chinese Take Over Port,” Jerusalem Post, December 15, 2018.~~
~~133 Shirley Zhao and Ivan Levingston, “Li Ka-Shing Hong Kong Group Loses Israel Deal Amid U.S. Push,”~~
Bloomberg, May 26, 2020.
~~134 “Israel, U.S. Near Deal to Exclude China from Israeli 5G Networks: U.S. Official,” Reuters, August 14, 2020.~~
~~135 The MRA account is authorized as part of the State Department’s institutional budget, with funds for the account~~
~~appropriated through the foreign operations appropriations bill.~~
~~136 The Jewish Agency for Israel’s website is available at http://www.jafi.org.il/.~~
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~~Fiscal Year~~
~~Total~~
~~FY2019~~
FY2019 $5.0 mil ion FY2020 $5.0 mil ion $5.0 mil ion
~~FY2020~~
FY2021 $5.0 mil ion $5.0 mil ion
~~FY2021 Request~~
~~$5.0 mil ion~~Total $599.3 million
Source: U.S. State Department. U.S. State Department.
Congress has changed the earmark language since the first refugee resettlement funds were Congress has changed the earmark language since the first refugee resettlement funds were
appropriated in 1973. At first, the congressional language said the funds were for “resettlement in appropriated in 1973. At first, the congressional language said the funds were for “resettlement in
Israel of refugees from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and from Communist countries in Israel of refugees from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and from Communist countries in
Eastern Europe.” But starting in 1985, the language was simplified to “refugees resettling in Eastern Europe.” But starting in 1985, the language was simplified to “refugees resettling in
Israel” to ensure that Ethiopian Jews would be covered by the funding. Technically, the legislative Israel” to ensure that Ethiopian Jews would be covered by the funding. Technically, the legislative
language designates funds for refugee resettlement, but in Israel little differentiation is made language designates funds for refugee resettlement, but in Israel little differentiation is made
198 The MRA account is authorized by 22 U.S.C. § 2601. Funding for the account comes from appropriations in the foreign operations appropriations bill. 199 The Jewish Agency for Israel’s website is available at http://www.jafi.org.il/. Congressional Research Service 41 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel between Jewish “refugees” and other Jewish immigrants, and the funds are used to support the between Jewish “refugees” and other Jewish immigrants, and the funds are used to support the
absorption of all absorption of all Jewish immigrants. immigrants.
Loan Guarantees
Overview
Since 1972, the United States has extended loan guarantees to Israel to assist with housing Since 1972, the United States has extended loan guarantees to Israel to assist with housing
shortages, Israel’s absorption of new immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia, and shortages, Israel’s absorption of new immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia, and
its economic recovery following the 2000-2003 recession, which was probably caused in part by its economic recovery following the 2000-2003 recession, which was probably caused in part by
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict known as the second intifada. Loan guarantees are a form of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict known as the second intifada. Loan guarantees are a form of
indirect U.S. assistance to Israelindirect U.S. assistance to Israel~~, since~~; they enable Israel to borrow from commercial sources at they enable Israel to borrow from commercial sources at
lower rates. Congress directs that subsidies be set aside in a U.S. Treasury account in case of a lower rates. Congress directs that subsidies be set aside in a U.S. Treasury account in case of a
possible Israeli default. These subsidies, which are a percentage of the total loan (based in part on possible Israeli default. These subsidies, which are a percentage of the total loan (based in part on
the credit rating of the borrowing country), have come from the U.S. or the Israeli government. the credit rating of the borrowing country), have come from the U.S. or the Israeli government.
Israel has never defaulted on a U.S.-backed loan guarantee. Israel has never defaulted on a U.S.-backed loan guarantee.
Loan Guarantees for Economic Recovery
In 2003, then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon requested an additional $8 billion in loan guarantees to In 2003, then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon requested an additional $8 billion in loan guarantees to
help the Israeli government stimulate Israel’s then-ailing economy. The loan guarantee request help the Israeli government stimulate Israel’s then-ailing economy. The loan guarantee request
accompanied a request for an additional $4 billion in military grants to help Israel prepare for accompanied a request for an additional $4 billion in military grants to help Israel prepare for
possible attacks during an anticipated U.S. war with Iraq. P.L. 108-11, the FY2003 Emergency possible attacks during an anticipated U.S. war with Iraq. P.L. 108-11, the FY2003 Emergency
Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, authorized $9 billion in loan guarantees over three Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, authorized $9 billion in loan guarantees over three
years for Israel’s economic recovery and $1 billion in military grants. P.L. 108-11 stated that the years for Israel’s economic recovery and $1 billion in military grants. P.L. 108-11 stated that the
proceeds from the loan guarantees could be used only within Israel’s pre-June 5, 1967, area of proceeds from the loan guarantees could be used only within Israel’s pre-June 5, 1967, area of
control; that the annual loan guarantees could be reduced by an amount equal to the amount Israel control; that the annual loan guarantees could be reduced by an amount equal to the amount Israel
spends on settlements outside of Israel’s pre-June 1967 area of control; that Israel would pay all spends on settlements outside of Israel’s pre-June 1967 area of control; that Israel would pay all
fees and subsidies; and that the President would consider Israel’s economic reforms when fees and subsidies; and that the President would consider Israel’s economic reforms when
determining terms and conditions for the loan guarantees.determining terms and conditions for the loan guarantees.~~137~~

~~137~~200 On November 26, 2003, the Department of State announced that the $3 billion in loan guarantees for FY2003 were reduced by $289.5 million because Israel continued to build settlements in the occupied territories and continued construction of a security barrier separating key Israeli and Palestinian population centers.201 In FY2005, the U.S. government reduced the amount available for Israel to borrow by an additional $795.8 million. Since then, Israel has not borrowed any funds. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Israel is legally obligated to use the proceeds of guaranteed loans for refinancing its government debt and also has agreed that proceeds shall 200 According to P.L. 108-11, “[Loan] guarantees may be issued under this section only to support activities in the According to P.L. 108-11, “[Loan] guarantees may be issued under this section only to support activities in the
geographic areas which were subject to the administration of the Government of Israel before June 5, 1967: Provided geographic areas which were subject to the administration of the Government of Israel before June 5, 1967: Provided
further, That the amount of guarantees that may be issued shall be reduced by an amount equal to the amount extended further, That the amount of guarantees that may be issued shall be reduced by an amount equal to the amount extended
or estimated to have been extended by the Government of Israel during the period from March 1, 2003, to the date of or estimated to have been extended by the Government of Israel during the period from March 1, 2003, to the date of
issue of the guarantee, for activities which the President determines are inconsistent with the objectives and issue of the guarantee, for activities which the President determines are inconsistent with the objectives and
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~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~On November 26, 2003, the Department of State announced that the $3 billion in loan guarantees~~
~~for FY2003 were reduced by $289.5 million because Israel continued to build settlements in the~~
~~occupied territories and continued construction of a security barrier separating key Israeli and~~
~~Palestinian population centers.138 In FY2005, the U.S. government reduced the amount available~~
~~for Israel to borrow by an additional $795.8 million. Since then, Israel has not borrowed any~~
~~funds.~~
~~According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Israel is legally obligated to use the proceeds~~
~~of guaranteed loans for refinancing its government debt and also has agreed that proceeds shall~~
understandings reached between the United States and the Government of Israel regarding the implementation of the loan guarantee program: Provided further, That the President shall submit a report to Congress no later than September 30 of each fiscal year during the pendency of the program specifying the amount calculated under the preceding proviso and that will be deducted from the amount of guarantees authorized to be issued in the next fiscal year.” 201 U.S. State Department, “Boucher cites Concerns over Settlement Building and Security Fence Route,” State Department Press Releases And Documents, November 26, 2003. Congressional Research Service 42 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel not be used for military purposes or to support activities in areas outside its pre-June 5, 1967, not be used for military purposes or to support activities in areas outside its pre-June 5, 1967,
areas of control (the West Bank—including East Jerusalemareas of control (the West Bank—including East Jerusalem—), the Gaza Strip, and the Golan , the Gaza Strip, and the Golan
Heights). However, U.S. officials Heights). However, U.S. officials ~~have~~in 2009 noted that noted that ~~since~~because Israel’s national budget is fungible, Israel’s national budget is fungible,
proceeds from the issuance of U.S.-guaranteed debt that are used to refinance Israeli government proceeds from the issuance of U.S.-guaranteed debt that are used to refinance Israeli government
debt free up domestic Israeli funds for other uses.debt free up domestic Israeli funds for other uses.~~139~~202
As of As of ~~2020~~2021, Israel , Israel ~~has~~had issued $4.1 billion in U.S.-backed bonds. issued $4.1 billion in U.S.-backed bonds.~~140~~203 After deducting the amounts After deducting the amounts
mentioned above, Israel might still be authorized to issue up to $3.814 billion in U.S.-backed mentioned above, Israel might still be authorized to issue up to $3.814 billion in U.S.-backed
bonds. However, if the Israeli government sought to issue new U.S.-backed bonds, it is unclear bonds. However, if the Israeli government sought to issue new U.S.-backed bonds, it is unclear
whether the loan guarantees available to Israel might be subject to reduction based on Israel’s whether the loan guarantees available to Israel might be subject to reduction based on Israel’s
estimated cumulative subsequent expenditures for settlements in the West Bank. estimated cumulative subsequent expenditures for settlements in the West Bank. ~~Since the~~
The original loan guarantee program authorization for Israel original loan guarantee program authorization for Israel ~~in 2003~~was through FY2005. Since then, Congress has extended the , Congress has extended the
program program ~~four~~five times. times.~~141~~204 The program is currently authorized through the end of FY2023. The program is currently authorized through the end of FY2023.
In general, Israel may view U.S. loan guarantees as a “last resort” option, which its treasury could In general, Israel may view U.S. loan guarantees as a “last resort” option, which its treasury could
use if unguaranteed local and international bond issuances become too expensive. According to use if unguaranteed local and international bond issuances become too expensive. According to
one Israeli official in 2012, “We consider the loan guarantees as preparation for a rainy day.... one Israeli official in 2012, “We consider the loan guarantees as preparation for a rainy day....
This is a safety net for war, natural disaster and economic crisis, which allows Israel to maintain This is a safety net for war, natural disaster and economic crisis, which allows Israel to maintain
economic stability in unstable surroundings.”economic stability in unstable surroundings.”~~142~~205 Israeli officials may believe that although they Israeli officials may believe that although they
have not used the loan guarantees in the last have not used the loan guarantees in the last 1417 years, maintaining the program boosts the years, maintaining the program boosts the
country’s fiscal standing among international creditors in capital markets. country’s fiscal standing among international creditors in capital markets.

~~understandings reached between the United States and the Government of Israel regarding the implementation of the~~
~~loan guarantee program: Provided further, That the President shall submit a report to Congress no later than September~~
~~30 of each fiscal year during the pendency of the program specifying the amount calculated under the preceding~~
~~proviso and that will be deducted from the amount of guarantees authorized to be issued in the next fiscal year.”~~
~~138 U.S. State Department, “Boucher cites Concerns over Settlement Building and Security Fence Route,” State~~
~~Department Press Releases And Documents, November 26, 2003.~~
~~139~~ 202 CRS correspondence with the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of International Affairs, October 2009. CRS correspondence with the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of International Affairs, October 2009.
~~140~~203 This includes $1.6 billion in FY2003; $1.75 billion in FY2004; and $750 million in FY2005. This includes $1.6 billion in FY2003; $1.75 billion in FY2004; and $750 million in FY2005.
~~141~~204 P.L. 108-447, the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, first extended the authority of the loan guarantees from P.L. 108-447, the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, first extended the authority of the loan guarantees from
FY2005 to FY2007. P.L. 109-472, the 2006 Department of State Authorities Act, extended the authority to provide FY2005 to FY2007. P.L. 109-472, the 2006 Department of State Authorities Act, extended the authority to provide
loan guarantees through FY2011. Under that legislation, the loan guarantee program had a stated end of September 30, loan guarantees through FY2011. Under that legislation, the loan guarantee program had a stated end of September 30,
2011; however, there was also a “carryover” provision in the statute under which Israel could draw on unused U.S. 2011; however, there was also a “carryover” provision in the statute under which Israel could draw on unused U.S.
guarantees until September 30, 2012. In the summer of 2012, Congress passed and the President signed into law P.L. guarantees until September 30, 2012. In the summer of 2012, Congress passed and the President signed into law P.L.
112-150, the United States-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012. Section 5(b) of the law extended the 112-150, the United States-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012. Section 5(b) of the law extended the
loan guarantee authority until September 30, 2015. Section 7034(k)(10) of P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Consolidated loan guarantee authority until September 30, 2015. Section 7034(k)(10) of P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Consolidated
Appropriations Act, further extended the program until September 30, 2019, allowing unused amounts to be carried Appropriations Act, further extended the program until September 30, 2019, allowing unused amounts to be carried
over into FY2020over into FY2020. P.L. 116-6, the FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act, further extended the program until September 30, 2023, allowing unused amounts to be carried over into FY2024. 205.
~~142~~ “U.S. to Grant Three-year Extension of Loan Guarantees to Israel,” “U.S. to Grant Three-year Extension of Loan Guarantees to Israel,” Ha’aretz, January 24, 2012. , January 24, 2012.
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Table 79. U.S. Loan Guarantees to Israel: FY2003-~~FY2020~~FY2021
current current U.S. dollars in millions dollars in millions
Deductions
Amount
for
Amount
Available for
Settlement
Borrowed by
Israel to
Fiscal Year
Activity
Israel
Borrow
FY2003 FY2003
289.5 289.5
1,600.0 1,600.0
1,110.5 1,110.5
FY2004 FY2004
— —
1,750.0 1,750.0
1,250.0 1,250.0
FY2005 FY2005
795.8 795.8
750.0 750.0
1,454.2 1,454.2
FY2006 FY2006
— —
— —
3,814.7 3,814.7
FY2007 FY2007
— —
— —
3,814.7 3,814.7
FY2008 FY2008
— —
— —
3,814.7 3,814.7
FY2009 FY2009
— —
— —
3,814.7 3,814.7
FY2010 FY2010
— —
— —
3,814.7 3,814.7
FY2011 FY2011
— —
— —
3,814.7 3,814.7
FY2012 FY2012
— —
— —
3,814.7 3,814.7
FY2013 FY2013
— —
— —
3,814.7 3,814.7
FY2014 FY2014
— —
— —
3,814.7 3,814.7
FY2015 FY2015
— —
— —
3,814.7 3,814.7
FY2016 FY2016
— —
— —
3,814.7 3,814.7
FY2017 FY2017
— —
— —
3,814.7 3,814.7
FY2018 FY2018
— —
— —
3,814.7 3,814.7
FY2019 FY2019
— —
— —
3,814.7 3,814.7
FY2020 FY2020
— —
— —
3,814.7 3,814.7
FY2021 — — 3,814.7 Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury and U.S. State Department. U.S. Department of the Treasury and U.S. State Department.
Note: For FY2003-FY2005, the U.S. Department of the Treasury authorized Israel to borrow up to $3 bil ion : For FY2003-FY2005, the U.S. Department of the Treasury authorized Israel to borrow up to $3 bil ion
per year of the total $9 bil ion authorized for the Loan Guarantee program. per year of the total $9 bil ion authorized for the Loan Guarantee program.
American Schools and Hospitals Abroad Program (ASHA)~~143~~206
Through Through ~~foreign operations~~Foreign Operations appropriations appropriations ~~legislation~~bills, Congress has funded the ASHA program , Congress has funded the ASHA program
as part of the overall Development Assistance (DA) appropriation to the United States Agency for as part of the overall Development Assistance (DA) appropriation to the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID). According to USAID, ASHA is designed to strengthen self-International Development (USAID). According to USAID, ASHA is designed to strengthen self-
sustaining schools, libraries, and medical centers that best demonstrate American ideals and sustaining schools, libraries, and medical centers that best demonstrate American ideals and
practices abroad. ASHA has been providing support to institutions in the Middle East since 1957, practices abroad. ASHA has been providing support to institutions in the Middle East since 1957,
and a number of universities and hospitals in Israel have been recipients of ASHA grants. and a number of universities and hospitals in Israel have been recipients of ASHA grants. Institutions based in Israel combined receive $2 to $4 million annually in ASHA grants. In FY2020,In
~~FY2019~~ (the most recent year for which data are available), ASHA grant recipients in Israel/West (the most recent year for which data are available), ASHA grant recipients in Israel/West
Bank included Bank included American Committee for Shaare Zedek Hospital in Jerusalem, Shaare Zedek Hospital in Jerusalem, ~~the Feinberg Graduate School of the~~
~~Weizmann Institute of Science, and the Nazareth Project, Inc~~American Friends of the Episcopal Diocese of Jerusalem, Hadassah - The Women’s Zionist Organization of America, and Trustees of the Feinberg Graduate School. According to USAID, institutions . According to USAID, institutions
based in Israel have received the most program funding in the Middle East region. based in Israel have received the most program funding in the Middle East region.

~~143~~206 According to USAID, recipients of ASHA grants on behalf of overseas institutions must be private U.S. According to USAID, recipients of ASHA grants on behalf of overseas institutions must be private U.S.
organizations, headquartered in the United States, and tax-exempt. The U.S. organization must also serve as the organizations, headquartered in the United States, and tax-exempt. The U.S. organization must also serve as the
founder and/or sponsor of the overseas institution. Schools must be for secondary or higher education and hospital founder and/or sponsor of the overseas institution. Schools must be for secondary or higher education and hospital
centers must conduct medical education and research outside the United States. Grants are made to U.S. sponsors for centers must conduct medical education and research outside the United States. Grants are made to U.S. sponsors for
the exclusive benefit of institutions abroad. See http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/asha/. the exclusive benefit of institutions abroad. See http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/asha/.
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link to page link to page 4150 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel ~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Table 8. ASHA Program Grants from Israel Account: FY2000-FY2016~~
~~Fiscal Year~~
~~Amount~~
~~FY2000~~
~~$2.75 mil ion~~
~~FY2001~~
~~$2.25 mil ion~~
~~FY2002~~
~~$2.65 mil ion~~
~~FY2003~~
~~$3.05 mil ion~~
~~FY2004~~
~~$3.15 mil ion~~
~~FY2005~~
~~$2.95 mil ion~~
~~FY2006~~
~~$3.35 mil ion~~
~~FY2007~~
~~$2.95 mil ion~~
~~FY2008~~
~~$3.90 mil ion~~
~~FY2009~~
~~$3.90 mil ion~~
~~FY2010~~
~~$3.80 mil ion~~
~~FY2011~~
~~$4.225 mil ion~~
~~FY2012~~
~~$3.00 mil ion~~
~~FY2013~~
~~$3.800 mil ion~~
~~FY2014~~
~~$3.052 mil ion~~
~~FY2015~~
~~$3.075 mil ion~~
~~FY2016~~
~~$3.600 mil ion~~
~~FY2017~~
~~N/A~~
~~FY2018~~
~~N/A~~
~~FY2019~~
~~N/A~~
~~Total~~
~~$55.452 million~~
Source: USAID.
U.S.-Israeli Scientific & Business Cooperation
In the early 1970s, Israeli academics and businessmen began looking for ways to expand In the early 1970s, Israeli academics and businessmen began looking for ways to expand
investment in Israel’s nascent technology sector. The sector, which would later become the investment in Israel’s nascent technology sector. The sector, which would later become the
driving force in the country’s economy, was in need of private capital for research and driving force in the country’s economy, was in need of private capital for research and
development at the time. The United States and Israel launched several programs to stimulate development at the time. The United States and Israel launched several programs to stimulate
Israeli industrial and scientific research, and Congress has on several occasions authorized and Israeli industrial and scientific research, and Congress has on several occasions authorized and
~~appropriated144~~appropriated funds for this purpose to the following organizations: funds for this purpose to the following organizations:
207   The BIRD Foundation (Israel-U.S. Binational Research & Development (Israel-U.S. Binational Research & Development
Foundation). Foundation).~~145~~208 BIRD, which was established in 1977, provides matchmaking ~~BIRD, which was established in 1977, provides matchmaking~~

~~144 With the exception of recent funding for U.S.-Israeli energy cooperation (see~~ ~~“U.S.-Israeli Energy Cooperation”~~
~~section below), Congress has not appropriated funding for binational foundations since the mid-1980s. At this point,~~
~~the foundations are able to sustain grant making with interest earned from their respective endowments and fees~~
~~collected from companies who successfully profited after receiving research support from the foundations.~~
~~145 See http://www.birdf.com/default.asp. Congress helped establish BIRD’s endowment with appropriations of $30~~
~~million and $15 million in 1977 (P.L. 95-26) and 1985 (P.L. 98-473), respectively. These grants were matched by the~~
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services between Israeli and American companies in research and development services between Israeli and American companies in research and development
with the goal of expanding cooperation between U.S. and Israeli private high-with the goal of expanding cooperation between U.S. and Israeli private high-
tech industries. The mission of the Foundation is “to stimulate, promote and tech industries. The mission of the Foundation is “to stimulate, promote and
support joint (nondefense) industrial R&D of mutual benefit to…” the two support joint (nondefense) industrial R&D of mutual benefit to…” the two
countries.countries.~~146~~209 Projects are supported in the areas of homeland security, Projects are supported in the areas of homeland security,
communications, electronics, electro-optics, software, life sciences, and communications, electronics, electro-optics, software, life sciences, and
renewable and alternative energy, among others.renewable and alternative energy, among others.~~147~~210 According to the Foundation, According to the Foundation,
$$~~363~~372 million in grants have been awarded to million in grants have been awarded to ~~a thousand~~1,018 projects. Awards projects. Awards
typically range from $700,000 to $900,000. The award size varies based on total typically range from $700,000 to $900,000. The award size varies based on total
project budget and other considerations. The recipients must provide at least 50% project budget and other considerations. The recipients must provide at least 50%
of the of the total project budget.  The BSF Foundation (U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation).211~~total project budget. While support for military projects is not a part of the~~
~~program, several of the completed ventures have yielded products that might be~~
~~useful in a military setting, including the Aircraft Enhanced Vision System (EVS)~~
~~camera, “which is designed to provide day/night improved orientation during~~
~~taxiing or flying. It allows visual landing in reduced visibility conditions, such as~~
~~fog, haze, dust, smog etc.” The Foundation also funded the creation of a~~
~~Through-Wall Location and Sensing System that is portable and “detects whether~~
~~people are present behind walls, how many, and where they are situated.”148~~
 The BSF Foundation ~~(U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation).149~~ BSF, BSF,
which was started in 1972, promotes cooperation in scientific and technological which was started in 1972, promotes cooperation in scientific and technological
research. Since 2012, BSF has partnered with the National Science Foundation research. Since 2012, BSF has partnered with the National Science Foundation
(NSF) to jointly fund collaborative U.S.-Israeli scientific research. In August (NSF) to jointly fund collaborative U.S.-Israeli scientific research. In August
2019, Israel’s Council of Research announced that it would provide $56 million 2019, Israel’s Council of Research announced that it would provide $56 million
over a five-year period to expand the BSF-NSF program. over a five-year period to expand the BSF-NSF program.
  The BARD Foundation (Binational Agriculture and Research and Development (Binational Agriculture and Research and Development
Fund). BARD was created in Fund). BARD was created in ~~1978~~1978212 and supports U.S.-Israeli cooperation in agricultural research.213 Since then, it has disbursed $315 million in grants 207 With the exception of recent funding for U.S.-Israeli energy cooperation (see “U.S.-Israeli Energy Cooperation” section below), Congress has not appropriated funding for binational foundations since the mid-1980s. At this point, the foundations are able to sustain grant making with interest earned from their respective endowments and fees (repayments) collected from companies who successfully profited after receiving research support from the foundations. Since its founding, BIRD has received $113 million in fees from 470 companies. 208 See http://www.birdf.com/default.asp. Congress helped establish BIRD’s endowment with appropriations of $30 million and $15 million in 1977 (P.L. 95-26) and 1985 (P.L. 98-473), respectively. These grants were matched by the Israeli government for a total endowment of $90 million. 209 ~~and supports U.S.-Israeli cooperation in~~
~~agricultural research.150 In the 115th Congress, P.L. 115-334 amended the original~~
~~1977 authorization of binational agricultural cooperation by adding that BARD~~
~~should promote research in “drip irrigation, pesticides, aquaculture, livestock,~~
~~poultry, disease control, and farm equipment”~~
 In 1995, the United States and Israel established The U.S.-Israel Science and
Technology Foundation (USISTF) to fund and administer projects mandated by
~~the U.S.-Israel Science and Technology Commission (USISTC),151 a bilateral~~

~~Israeli government for a total endowment of $90 million.~~
~~146~~ Eitan Ydilevich, “Building U.S.-Israel Economic Partnerships, The BIRD Model,” Washington, DC. Eitan Ydilevich, “Building U.S.-Israel Economic Partnerships, The BIRD Model,” Washington, DC., June 10, 2010, June 10, 2010,
p. 2. p. 2.
~~147~~210 BIRD Foundation, What is BIRD?, available at http://www.birdf.com/Index.asp?CategoryID=22&ArticleID=79. BIRD Foundation, What is BIRD?, available at http://www.birdf.com/Index.asp?CategoryID=22&ArticleID=79.
~~148 Information from the BIRD Foundation website, http://www.birdf.com.~~
~~149~~211 See, http://www.bsf.org.il/Gateway4/. In 1972 and 1984, the United States and Israel contributed a total of $100 See, http://www.bsf.org.il/Gateway4/. In 1972 and 1984, the United States and Israel contributed a total of $100
million ($50 million each) for BSF’s endowment. The U.S. share ($50 million) first came in 1972 in the form of a $30 million ($50 million each) for BSF’s endowment. The U.S. share ($50 million) first came in 1972 in the form of a $30
million accelerated Israeli repayment of earlier food aid debt to the United States. A second tranche followed in 1984 million accelerated Israeli repayment of earlier food aid debt to the United States. A second tranche followed in 1984
with $20 million congressional appropriation with $20 million congressional appropriation (P.L. 98-473). According to the treaty establishing the Foundation, the P.L. 98-473). According to the treaty establishing the Foundation, the
Foundation shall use the interest, as well as any funds derived from its activities, for the operations of the Foundation. Foundation shall use the interest, as well as any funds derived from its activities, for the operations of the Foundation.
~~150 See http://www.bard-isus.com/. Congress helped establish BARD’s endowment with appropriations of $40 million~~
~~and $15 million in 1979 (P.L. 95-481) and 1985 (P.L. 98-473), respectively. These grants were matched by the State of~~
~~Israel for a total endowment of $110 million. In recent years, Congress has provided funds for BARD in annual~~
~~Agriculture Appropriations legislation at approximately $500,000 a year.~~
~~151~~ 212 Congress originally authorized BARD in Section 1458(e) of the National Agricultural Research, Extension, and Teaching Policy Act of 1977 (7 U.S.C. §3291(e)). 213 See http://www.bard-isus.com/. Congress helped establish BARD’s endowment with appropriations of $40 million Congressional Research Service 45 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel (typically three-year, $310,000 grants) for over 1,330 projects.214 In the 115th Congress, P.L. 115-334 amended the original 1977 authorization of binational agricultural cooperation by adding that BARD should promote research in “drip irrigation, pesticides, aquaculture, livestock, poultry, disease control, and farm equipment.” In 2018, BARD signed a cooperative agreement with The National Institute of Food and Agriculture. Congress has encouraged cooperation between those two entities.215  In 1995, the United States and Israel established The U.S.-Israel Science and Technology Foundation (USISTF) to fund and administer projects mandated by the U.S.-Israel Science and Technology Commission (USISTC),216 a bilateral ~~The U.S.-Israel Science and Technology Commission (USISTC) was established in 1993 to facilitate cooperative~~
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entity jointly established by the United States Department of Commerce and the entity jointly established by the United States Department of Commerce and the
Israel Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor in 1994 to foster scientific, Israel Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor in 1994 to foster scientific,
technological, and economic cooperation between the two countries. technological, and economic cooperation between the two countries.
Since 2007, Congress has repeatedly authorized and appropriated funds for the creation of new Since 2007, Congress has repeatedly authorized and appropriated funds for the creation of new
U.S.-Israeli cooperative programs in various fields. Most of these new programs fall under the U.S.-Israeli cooperative programs in various fields. Most of these new programs fall under the
administrative purview of the BIRD Foundation. They include the following: administrative purview of the BIRD Foundation. They include the following:
U.S.-Israeli Energy Cooperation (BIRD Energy)
BIRD Energy is a cooperative program between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Israeli BIRD Energy is a cooperative program between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Israeli
Ministry of Energy designed to further research in renewable energy and energy efficiency. It is Ministry of Energy designed to further research in renewable energy and energy efficiency. It is
nominally part of the BIRD Foundation. Congress authorized the creation of the program in nominally part of the BIRD Foundation. Congress authorized the creation of the program in
Section 917 of P.L. 110-140, the Renewable Fuels, Consumer Protection, and Energy Efficiency Section 917 of P.L. 110-140, the Renewable Fuels, Consumer Protection, and Energy Efficiency
Act of 2007.Act of 2007.~~152~~217 Although the law did not appropriate any funds for joint research and Although the law did not appropriate any funds for joint research and
development, it did establish a grant program to support research, development, and development, it did establish a grant program to support research, development, and
commercialization of renewable energy or energy efficiency. The law also authorized the commercialization of renewable energy or energy efficiency. The law also authorized the
Secretary of Energy to provide funds for the grant program as needed. Congress authorized the Secretary of Energy to provide funds for the grant program as needed. Congress authorized the
program for seven years from the time of enactment, which was on December 19, 2007. Then, in program for seven years from the time of enactment, which was on December 19, 2007. Then, in
December 2014, the President signed into law P.L. 113-296, the United States-Israel Strategic December 2014, the President signed into law P.L. 113-296, the United States-Israel Strategic
Partnership Act of 2014, which reauthorized the U.S.-Israeli Energy Cooperation program for an Partnership Act of 2014, which reauthorized the U.S.-Israeli Energy Cooperation program for an
additional 10 years until September 30, 2024. additional 10 years until September 30, 2024.
~~Congress and the Administration have provided a total of $21.7 million for BIRD Energy to~~
~~date.153 As of 2019, total combined U.S. and Israeli investment in BIRD Energy for 41 approved~~
~~projects stood at $37.69 million.~~
~~U.S.-Israel Center of Excellence in Energy, Engineering and Water Technology~~
~~(Energy Center)~~
~~In 2018, the U.S. Department of Energy and the Israeli Energy Ministry agreed to establish a new~~
~~program known as the U.S.-Israel Center of Excellence in Energy, Engineering and Water~~
~~Technology (“the Energy Center”). To date, Congress has appropriated154 $12 million for the~~
~~center, and the Israeli government and private sector partners have matched those funds for initial~~

and $15 million in 1979 (P.L. 95-481) and 1985 (P.L. 98-473), respectively. These grants were matched by the State of Israel for a total endowment of $110 million. In recent years, Congress has provided funds for BARD in annual Agriculture Appropriations legislation at approximately $500,000 a year. 214 Shoshanna Solomon, “20 Agriculture Projects of US-Israel Fund Added $3 Billion to Economies,” Times of Israel, November 16, 2020. 215 See, the Explanatory Statement for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2021, accompanying the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act. 216 The U.S.-Israel Science and Technology Commission (USISTC) was established in 1993 to facilitate cooperative ventures between high tech industries in the two countries. The goal of the program is to “to maximize the contribution ventures between high tech industries in the two countries. The goal of the program is to “to maximize the contribution
of technology to economic growth.” While the collaborative work may be somewhat similar to that supported by the of technology to economic growth.” While the collaborative work may be somewhat similar to that supported by the
BIRD Foundation, “the Science and Technology Commission assists in the commercialization of new technologies BIRD Foundation, “the Science and Technology Commission assists in the commercialization of new technologies
with longer lead times to market. These projects involve higher risk and require substantial capital commitments.” The with longer lead times to market. These projects involve higher risk and require substantial capital commitments.” The
ventures are funded and administered by the U.S.-Israel Science and Technology Foundation. The U.S. and Israeli ventures are funded and administered by the U.S.-Israel Science and Technology Foundation. The U.S. and Israeli
governments each committed $15 million to the effort over three years for a total of $30 million. governments each committed $15 million to the effort over three years for a total of $30 million.
~~152~~217 Congress first considered authorizing a program to expand U.S.-Israeli scientific cooperation in the field of Congress first considered authorizing a program to expand U.S.-Israeli scientific cooperation in the field of
renewable energy in legislation entitled, The United States-Israel Energy Cooperation Act (H.R. 1838renewable energy in legislation entitled, The United States-Israel Energy Cooperation Act (H.R. 1838 ~~– 110th~~
~~Congress).~~
~~153 Congress specifies funds for BIRD Energy in conference report language accompanying energy and water~~
~~appropriations legislation. For FY2020, see Division C of 2020 Omnibus Conference Report accompanying P.L. 116-~~
~~94, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020.~~
~~154 P.L. 115-141, the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act, provided $4 million for the establishment of a U.S.-~~
~~Israel Center of Excellence in energy and water technologies. P.L. 115-244, the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch,~~
~~and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019, provided an additional $4 million in funding.~~
~~In FY2020, Congress appropriated another $4 million. See, Division C of 2020 Omnibus Conference Report~~
~~accompanying P.L. 116-94, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020.~~
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~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~seed money of $24 million.155 Potential research areas identified by the Energy Center include:~~
—110th Congress). Congressional Research Service 46 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Through FY2021, Congress and the Administration have provided a total of $23.7 million for BIRD Energy.218 As of 2021, total combined U.S. and Israeli investment in BIRD Energy for 60 signed projects stood at $47.5 million. In late 2021, the United States and Israel announced the awards of $5.48 million in BIRD Energy grants to six clean energy projects to advance “vehicle technologies, batteries, energy efficiency measures, energy storage and the water-energy nexus.”219 U.S.-Israel Center of Excellence in Energy, Engineering and Water Technology (Energy Center) In 2018, the U.S. Department of Energy and the Israeli Energy Ministry agreed to establish a new program known as the U.S.-Israel Center of Excellence in Energy, Engineering and Water Technology (“the Energy Center”). To date, Congress has appropriated220 $16 million for the center, and the Israeli government and private sector partners have matched those funds.221 Potential research areas identified by the Energy Center include energy cybersecurity in critical infrastructure, energy storage, and production and utilization of energy cybersecurity in critical infrastructure, energy storage, and production and utilization of
natural gas. According to the natural gas. According to the Center, the total expected government funding for the Energy Center is $40~~Center, the maximum award for a single consortium is $10~~ million million
~~for a period of five~~for 5 years. years.~~156~~222
BIRD Homeland Security (BIRD HLS)
The BIRD Foundation also manages the BIRD Homeland Security Program, a cooperative The BIRD Foundation also manages the BIRD Homeland Security Program, a cooperative
undertaking between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Israel Ministry of undertaking between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Israel Ministry of
Public Security (MOPS) to further joint research of advanced technologies for Homeland Public Security (MOPS) to further joint research of advanced technologies for Homeland
Security.Security.~~157~~223 Currently, DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is working together Currently, DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is working together
with Israeli counterparts to develop technologies for first responders.with Israeli counterparts to develop technologies for first responders.~~158~~224 To date, Congress has To date, Congress has
provided a total of provided a total of $911 million in funding for BIRD HLS in funding for BIRD HLS~~, of which $4 million was specified in~~
.225 218 Congress specifies funds for BIRD Energy in conference report language accompanying conference report language accompanying ~~FY2018 and FY2019 Homeland Security~~
~~Appropriation legislation for a “binational cooperative pilot program.” Congress appropriated $2~~
~~million for BIRD HLS in FY2020.159 The remaining $3 million came in the form of three one-~~
~~million-dollar Homeland Security Department grants (FY2016-FY2018) for a first responders~~
~~program.160~~
~~FY2021 Israel Assistance Legislation~~
~~H.R. 7608– State, Foreign Operations, Agriculture, Rural Development, Interior, Environment,~~
~~Military Construction, and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2021 (which passed the House in~~
~~July 2020) would provide (including in directives in the accompanying H.Rept. 116-444):~~
~~ $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing for Israel;~~
~~ $5 million in MRA to resettle Jewish refugees in Israel;~~

~~155~~energy and water appropriations legislation. For FY2021, see Division D of the Explanatory Statement accompanying the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act. 219 U.S. Embassy Israel, U.S. Department of Energy and Israeli Partners Invest $5.48 Million In Cooperative Clean Energy Projects, December 9, 2021. 220 For FY2021, see Division D of the Explanatory Statement accompanying the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act. 221 The U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act (P.L. 113-296) authorized the President to promote cooperative programs The U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act (P.L. 113-296) authorized the President to promote cooperative programs
with Israel in the fields of energy, water, agriculture, and alternative fuel technologies. P.L. 114-322, the WIIN Act with Israel in the fields of energy, water, agriculture, and alternative fuel technologies. P.L. 114-322, the WIIN Act
(Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act), called on the White House Office of Science and Technology (Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act), called on the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy to develop a coordinated strategic plan that, among other things, strengthened “research and development Policy to develop a coordinated strategic plan that, among other things, strengthened “research and development
cooperation with international partners, such as the State of Israel, in the area of desalination technology.” cooperation with international partners, such as the State of Israel, in the area of desalination technology.”
~~156 U.S. Department of Energy, “DOE, Israel’s Ministry of Energy, and Israel Innovation Authority Announce Call for~~
~~Proposals for the U.S.-Israel Energy Center,” April 30, 2019.~~
~~157~~222 BIRD Foundation, Annual Report, 2020. 223 The U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act (P.L. 113-296) authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting The U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act (P.L. 113-296) authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting
through the Director of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency and with the concurrence of the through the Director of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency and with the concurrence of the
Secretary of State, to enter into cooperative research pilot programs with Israel to enhance IsraelSecretary of State, to enter into cooperative research pilot programs with Israel to enhance Israel'’s capabilities in s capabilities in
border, maritime, and aviation security, explosives detection, and emergency services. In 2016, Congress passed P.L. border, maritime, and aviation security, explosives detection, and emergency services. In 2016, Congress passed P.L.
114-304, the United States-Israel Advanced Research Partnership Act of 2016, a law that permanently authorized the 114-304, the United States-Israel Advanced Research Partnership Act of 2016, a law that permanently authorized the
expansion of BIRD HLS to include cybersecurity technologies. expansion of BIRD HLS to include cybersecurity technologies.
~~158~~224 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Snapshot: Israel & U.S.: A Unique Partnership in Science, Technology U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Snapshot: Israel & U.S.: A Unique Partnership in Science, Technology
and Business,” January 23, 2018. and Business,” January 23, 2018.
~~159~~225 See Division See Division DF of the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Congressional Research Service 47 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Other Congressionally Authorized Cooperative Endeavors The following is a list of other congressionally authorized cooperative endeavors between the United States and Israel, which could lead to the establishment of grant programs managed by both governments.  Directed Energy (Lasers) – Section 1280 of P.L.116-283, the 2021 NDAA, stated that the Defense Department may establish a program to carry out “research, development, test, and evaluation activities, on a joint basis with Israel, to promote directed energy capabilities of mutual benefit to both the United States and Israel...”  Health/COVID-19 Cooperation – Section 1280A of P.L.116-283, the 2021 NDAA, authorized $4 million a year (FY2021-FY2023) for bilateral cooperation between the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Government of Israel to focus on health technologies to address the challenge of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. U.S.-Israeli health cooperation is longstanding. Since 1978, medical and health researchers from the U.S. Army and Israel Defense Forces have held the biennial Shoresh conference to share information on military operational medicine, infectious disease, and combat care.226 In the Joint Explanatory Statement for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies accompanying the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress appropriated $2 million in FY2021 funding for “for the development of health technologies, including but not limited to the following: artificial intelligence, biofeedback, sensors, monitoring devices, and kidney care.”227  Cybersecurity – Section 1551 of P.L.117-81, the National ~~of the Joint Explanatory Statement (not in the bill text) accompanying P.L. 116-93, Consolidated~~
~~Appropriations Act, 2020. Since that explanatory statement refers to relevancy of House and Senate reports, S.Rept.~~
~~116-125 (which carries same weight as the joint explanatory statement) of the FY2020 Department of Homeland~~
~~Security Appropriations Bill, 2020, includes $2 million for a “Binational Cooperative Pilot.” Appropriators also~~
~~specified that “the pilot should continue its focus on border security, maritime security, biometrics, cybersecurity, and~~
~~video analytics among other topics. Within 180 days of the enactment of this act, S&T shall provide a report to the~~
~~Committee on the results of each grant awarded through the pilot and on any commercialization or transition to practice~~
~~that has resulted from the pilot's projects.”~~
~~160 CRS correspondence with BIRD Foundation, July 2019.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

38

~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~ An extension of the authorization for Israel to access the War Reserves Stockpile~~
~~through FY2023;~~
~~ An addition to the value of war materiel in the War Reserves Stockpile by $600~~
~~million total over a three-year period from 2021-2023;~~
~~ $10 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to help support the Ethiopian-~~
~~Israeli community;~~
~~ Lawmaker support for funds directed toward the Special Defense Acquisition~~
~~Fund to be used to transfer precision guided munitions to reserve stocks for~~
~~Israel;~~
~~ $2 million in ESF for an Eastern Mediterranean Partnership joint dialogue, an~~
~~annual event in the United States with Israel, Greece, and Cyprus designed to~~
~~promote energy independence and regional cooperation;~~
~~ Authorization to establish a ‘People-to-People Partnership for Peace Fund’ to~~
~~provide funding for projects to help build the foundation for peaceful co-~~
~~existence between Israelis and Palestinians and for a sustainable two-state~~
~~solution;~~
~~ Lawmaker support for future Israeli purchases of jet fuel from the United States~~
~~using U.S. military aid; and~~
~~ Lawmaker support for USAID to allocate $2 million toward a cooperative~~
~~development program between USAID and Israel’s Mashav (Israel’s foreign aid~~
~~agency) to address international water, agriculture, and energy sustainability. 161~~
~~H.R. 6395 and S. 4049 (with S.AMDT 2301) –~~ ~~The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National~~
~~Defense Authorization~~ Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, required the Department of Homeland Security to establish a grant program to support U.S.-Israeli cooperation in cybersecurity research and commercialization of cybersecurity technology. The act authorized not less than $6~~Act for Fiscal Year 2021~~ ~~(which passed the House and Senate in July~~
~~2020) would authorize:~~
~~ $500 million in joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense cooperation (the House version~~
~~specified $77 million for Arrow III, $50 million for David’s Sling, $73 million~~
~~for Iron Dome, and $300 million for Arrow II);~~
~~ (in the House) a U.S.-Israeli grant program to facilitate research to aid the~~
~~diagnoses and treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD);~~
~~ (in the Senate) the creation of a U.S.-Israel Operations Technology Working~~
~~Group to provide a standing forum for the United States and Israel to~~
~~systematically share intelligence-informed military capability requirements and~~
~~deepen their defense partnership; and~~
~~ the inclusion of S. 3176, the “United States-Israel Security Assistance~~
~~Authorization Act of 2020” into the bill.162~~

~~161 In 2019, USAID signed a MOU with Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz to strengthen the global partnership~~
~~between USAID and Israel’s foreign aid agency, MASHAV. A joint U.S.-Israel program for international development~~
~~was already established in 1984, the U.S.-Israel Cooperative Development Program. While it has been dormant in~~
~~recent years, its statutory language still exists as Section 106 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Subsection (f)~~
~~specifically authorizes “cooperative projects among the United States, Israel, and developing countries.”~~
~~162 S. 3176 would, among other things, authorize $3.3 billion in FMF to Israel through FY2028, extend the~~
~~authorization of WRSA-I and increase its value, and extend the authorization of loan guarantees to Israel through~~
~~FY2025.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

39

~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~H.R. 7617 –~~ ~~The Defense, Commerce, Justice, Science, Energy and Water Development,~~
~~Financial Services and General Government, Labor, Health and Human Services, Education,~~
~~Transportation, Housing, and Urban Development Appropriations Act, 2021~~ ~~(which passed the~~
~~House in July 2020) would provide:~~
~~ $500 million in joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense cooperation (of which $73~~
~~million for Iron Dome, $177 million for David’s Sling, $77 million for Arrow III,~~
~~and $173 million for Arrow II);~~
~~ $47.5 million for U.S.-Israeli Anti-Tunneling cooperation;~~
~~ $25 million for U.S.-Israeli Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems cooperation;~~
~~ $4 million for National Institutes of Health Office of the Director to establish a~~
~~pilot program to support research and development jointly with Israel for~~
~~effective responses to COVID-19; and~~
~~ $2 million for BIRD Energy and $4 million for the U.S.-Israel Center of~~
~~Excellence in Energy, Engineering and Water Technology.163~~

~~163 See H.Rept. 116-449 accompanying H.R. 7613, the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies~~
~~Appropriations bill, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

40

~~link to page 45~~ ~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Appendix. Bilateral Aid to Israel~~
~~Table A-1~~ ~~shows cumulative U.S. aid to Israel for FY1951 through FY2018 in current dollars.~~
~~Table A-1. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Israel~~
~~millions of dollars (current non-inflation adjusted)~~
~~Fiscal Year Economic~~
~~Military~~
~~Total~~
~~1951-2000~~
~~29,266.4~~
~~46,418.1 75,684.5~~
~~2000~~
~~1,022.1~~
~~2,841.3~~
~~3,863.4~~
~~2001~~
~~850.4~~
~~1,989.0~~
~~2,839.4~~
~~2002~~
~~726.7~~
~~2,061.2~~
~~2,787.8~~
~~2003~~
~~657.0~~
~~3,088.6~~
~~3,745.6~~
~~2004~~
~~556.8~~
~~2,165.5~~
~~2,722.3~~
~~2005~~
~~482.1~~
~~2,231.4~~
~~2,713.5~~
~~2006~~
~~285.8~~
~~2,257.8~~
~~2,543.6~~
~~2007~~
~~168.0~~
~~2,341.7~~
~~2,509.8~~
~~2008~~
~~44.3~~
~~2,381.2~~
~~2,425.5~~
~~2009~~
~~40.3~~
~~2,383.0~~
~~2,423.3~~
~~2010~~
~~36.3~~
~~2,801.3~~
~~2,837.6~~
~~2011~~
~~37.1~~
~~3,009.5~~
~~3,046.5~~
~~2012~~
~~25.1~~
~~3,175.6~~
~~3,200.7~~
~~2013~~
~~17.5~~
~~2,985.8~~
~~3,003.3~~
~~2014~~
~~23.4~~
~~3,103.2~~
~~3,126.6~~
~~2015~~
~~12.3~~
~~3,281.0~~
~~3,293.3~~
~~2016~~
~~13.3~~
~~3,100.0~~
~~3,113.3~~
~~2017~~
~~50.2~~
~~3,175.0~~
~~3,225.2~~
~~2018~~
~~10.8~~
~~3,117.6~~
~~3,128.4~~
~~Total~~
~~34,326.0 97,907.7 132,233.7~~
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), ~~U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and~~
~~Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 2018.~~

~~Author Information~~

~~Jeremy M. Sharp~~

~~Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs~~

~~Congressional Research Service~~

41 million a year for such activities from FY2022 through FY2026.  Regional Cooperation - Section 1279 of P.L.116-283, the 2021 NDAA, authorized the State Department and USAID to establish a “program between the United States and appropriate regional partners to provide for cooperation in the Middle East region by supporting projects related to innovation and advanced technologies.” U.S.-Israel Cooperation in International Development In 1985, Congress first authorized (by amending Section 106 of the FAA) and appropriated foreign assistance funds to “finance cooperative projects among the United States, Israel, and developing countries.”228 Based on this congressional mandate, USAID launched two programs in 226 U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC), USAMRMC Hosts Israeli Defense Force at 18th Shoresh Conference, July 8, 2019. 227 See Division H, Joint Explanatory Statement for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies, accompanying the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act. 228 See Section 307 of P.L. 99-83, the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 and P.L. 98-473, the FY1985 Continuing Appropriations Act. This original legislative concept for U.S.-Israeli cooperation in international development came from the 98th Congress and was based on H.R.5424, “A bill to provide for joint United Congressional Research Service 48 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel partnership with Israel: the Cooperative Development Program (CDP - training and technical assistance projects run by Israel in the developing world) and the Cooperative Development Research Program (CDR - scientific research on problems of developing countries). 229 For nearly two decades, Israel used cash aid grants (either from the ESF or DA accounts) to train their development personnel in Israel and in foreign nations. USAID phased out the CDP program after FY2003.230 Section 1278 of P.L.116-283, the 2021 NDAA, further amended Section 106 of the FAA of 1961 (22 U.S.C. §2151d) to authorize $2 million a year (FY2021-FY2023) in order to finance cooperative projects among “the United States, Israel, and developing countries that identify and support local solutions to address sustainability challenges relating to water resources, agriculture, and energy storage.” In FY2021, the explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act included $2 million in ESF for “USAID-Israel International Development Cooperation.” States-Israeli development assistance projects.” 229 USAID partnered with Mashav, Israel's Agency for International Development Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 230 See Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, Related Programs, House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Program, FY2004. Congressional Research Service 49 link to page 54 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Appendix. Bilateral Aid to Israel Table A-1 shows cumulative U.S. aid to Israel for FY1946 through FY2019 in current dollars. Table A-1. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Israel millions of U.S. dollars (current non-inflation-adjusted) Fiscal Year Economic Military Total 1946-2015 34,251.9 88,526.7 122,778.6 2016 15.3 3,101.5 3,116.8 2017 50.1 3,178.0 3,228.1 2018 10.8 3,100.1 3,110.8 2019 8.5 3,300.0 3,308.5 Total 34,336.6 101,206.3 135,542.8 Source: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 2019. Congressional Research Service 50 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Appendix A. Common Acronyms and Abbreviations used in this Report AECA Arms Export Control Act DOD Department of Defense DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency ESF Economic Support Fund FAA Foreign Assistance Act FMF Foreign Military Financing FMS Foreign Military Sale HFAC House Foreign Affairs Committee IDF Israel Defense Forces LOA Letter of Offer and Acceptance MOU Memorandum of Understanding MRA Migration and Refugee Assistance NDAA National Defense Authorization Act OSP Off-Shore Procurement QME Qualitative Military Edge SFOPS Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs SFRC Senate Foreign Relations Committee UAE United Arab Emirates USAID U.S. Agency for International Development WRSA War Reserves Stock Allies Author Information Jeremy M. Sharp Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Congressional Research Service 51

U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

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