Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress

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Emerging Military Technologies: Background
~~November 10, 2020~~October 21, 2021
and Issues for Congress
Kelley M. Sayler
Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing
Analyst in Advanced Analyst in Advanced
emerging military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with emerging military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with
Technology and Global Technology and Global
U.S. competitors. The U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to U.S. competitors. The U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to
Security Security
ensure its dominance in conflict and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, ensure its dominance in conflict and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years,

however, technology has both rapidly evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a however, technology has both rapidly evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a

result of advances in the commercial sector. As former Secretary of Defense Chuck result of advances in the commercial sector. As former Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel observed, this development has threatened to erode the United States’ traditional sources of military Hagel observed, this development has threatened to erode the United States’ traditional sources of military
advantage. The Department of Defense (DOD) has undertaken a number of initiatives to arrest this trend. For advantage. The Department of Defense (DOD) has undertaken a number of initiatives to arrest this trend. For
example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging technologies for example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging technologies for
military and security purposes as military and security purposes as ~~well~~ wel as associated strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation. In support of as associated strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation. In support of
this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations focused on defense innovation, including the Defense this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations focused on defense innovation, including the Defense
Innovation Unit and the Defense Wargaming Alignment Group. Innovation Unit and the Defense Wargaming Alignment Group.
More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy echoed the underpinnings of the Third Offset Strategy, noting More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy echoed the underpinnings of the Third Offset Strategy, noting
that U.S. national security that U.S. national security ~~will likely be~~
~~affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character~~ wil likely be affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New technologies of war…. New technologies
include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy, include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy,
hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars
of the future.of the future.
The United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies. However, China and Russia—key The United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies. However, China and Russia—key
strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military technologies. As these strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military technologies. As these
technologies are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, they could hold significant technologies are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, they could hold significant
implications for the future of international security writ large, and implications for the future of international security writ large, and ~~will~~ wil have to be a significant focus for Congress, have to be a significant focus for Congress,
both in terms of funding and program oversight. both in terms of funding and program oversight.
This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, China, and This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, China, and
Russia: Russia:
 artificial  artificial ~~intelligence~~intel igence, ,
 lethal autonomous weapons,  lethal autonomous weapons,
 hypersonic weapons,  hypersonic weapons,
 directed energy weapons,  directed energy weapons,
 biotechnology, and  biotechnology, and
 quantum technology.  quantum technology.
It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these technologies, It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these technologies,
considers the potential implications of emerging military technologies for warfighting, and outlines associated considers the potential implications of emerging military technologies for warfighting, and outlines associated
issues for Congress. These issues include the level and stability of funding for emerging technologies, the issues for Congress. These issues include the level and stability of funding for emerging technologies, the
management structure for emerging technologies, the management structure for emerging technologies, the ~~challenges~~chal enges associated with recruiting and retaining associated with recruiting and retaining
technology workers, the acquisitions process for rapidly evolving and dual-use technologies, the protection of technology workers, the acquisitions process for rapidly evolving and dual-use technologies, the protection of
emerging technologies from theft and expropriation, and the governance and regulation of emerging technologies. emerging technologies from theft and expropriation, and the governance and regulation of emerging technologies.
Such issues could hold implications for congressional authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making. Such issues could hold implications for congressional authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making.

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Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging
military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The
U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict
and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly
evolved and rapidlyevolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As
former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has observed, this development has threatened to erode former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has observed, this development has threatened to erode
the United States’ traditional sources of military advantage.1 The Department of Defense (DOD) the United States’ traditional sources of military advantage.1 The Department of Defense (DOD)
has undertaken a number of initiatives in recent years in an effort to arrest this trend. For has undertaken a number of initiatives in recent years in an effort to arrest this trend. For
example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging
technologies for military and security purposes as technologies for military and security purposes as ~~well~~ wel as associated strategies, tactics, and as associated strategies, tactics, and
concepts of operation.2 In support of this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations concepts of operation.2 In support of this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations
focused on defense innovation, including the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense focused on defense innovation, including the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense
Wargaming Alignment Group.Wargaming Alignment Group.
More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy has echoed the underpinnings of the Third More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy has echoed the underpinnings of the Third
Offset Strategy, noting that U.S. national security Offset Strategy, noting that U.S. national security ~~will likely~~ wil likely be be
affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New
technologiestechnologies ~~include advanced~~ include advanced computing,computing, “big“big data”data” analytics,analytics, artificial intelligence, artificial intelligence,
autonomy, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very autonomy, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very
technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.3technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.3
Although the United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies, China and Although the United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies, China and
Russia—key strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military Russia—key strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military
technologies. As they are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, these technologies. As they are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, these
technologies could hold significant implications for congressional considerations and the future technologies could hold significant implications for congressional considerations and the future
of international security writ large. of international security writ large.
This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States,
China, and Russia: China, and Russia:
 artificial  artificial ~~intelligence~~intel igence, ,
 lethal autonomous weapons,  lethal autonomous weapons,
 hypersonic weapons,  hypersonic weapons,
 directed energy weapons,  directed energy weapons,
 biotechnology,  biotechnology,
 and quantum technology.  and quantum technology.
It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these
technologies, considers the potential implications of emerging militarytechnologies, considers the potential implications of emerging military technologies, and outlines technologies, and outlines

1 Remarks as delivered by1 Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, “Defense Innovation Days Secretary of Defense Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, “Defense Innovation Days
Opening Keynote,” September 3, 2014, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605602/. Opening Keynote,” September 3, 2014, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605602/.
~~2 The Third~~2 T he T hird Offset Strategy is a strategy for maintaining U.S. military superiority. It succeeds the First and Second Offset Strategy is a strategy for maintaining U.S. military superiority. It succeeds the First and Second
Offsets—nuclear weapons and the precision-guidedOffsets—nuclear weapons and the precision-guided munitions regime, respectively. Remarks as prepared for delivery munitions regime, respectively. Remarks as prepared for delivery
by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bobby Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, “National Defense University Convocation,” August 5, 2014, at Work, “National Defense University Convocation,” August 5, 2014, at
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605598/.https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605598/.
3 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of 3 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of ~~The~~T he United States of America,” 2018, p. United States of America,” 2018, p.
3, at https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 3, at https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
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associated issues for Congress. Such issues could hold implications for congressional associated issues for Congress. Such issues could hold implications for congressional
authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making. authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making.
Artificial Intelligence (AI)4
Although the U.S. government has no official definition of artificial Although the U.S. government has no official definition of artificial ~~intelligence, policymakers~~
~~generally~~ intel igence, policymakers general y use the term AI to refer to a computer system capable of human-level cognition. AI is use the term AI to refer to a computer system capable of human-level cognition. AI is
further divided into two categories: narrow AI and general AI. Narrow AI systems can perform further divided into two categories: narrow AI and general AI. Narrow AI systems can perform
only the specific task that they were trained to perform, while general AI systems would be only the specific task that they were trained to perform, while general AI systems would be
capable of performing a broad range of tasks, including those for which they were not capable of performing a broad range of tasks, including those for which they were not ~~specifically~~
specifical y trained. General AI systems do not yet—and may never—exist.5trained. General AI systems do not yet—and may never—exist.5
Narrow AI is currently being incorporated into a number of military applications by both the Narrow AI is currently being incorporated into a number of military applications by both the
United States and its competitors. Such applications include but are not limited to United States and its competitors. Such applications include but are not limited to ~~intelligence,~~
~~surveillance~~intel igence, surveil ance, and reconnaissance;6 logistics; cyber operations; command and control; and semi-, and reconnaissance;6 logistics; cyber operations; command and control; and semi-
autonomous and autonomous vehicles. These technologies are intended in part to augment or autonomous and autonomous vehicles. These technologies are intended in part to augment or
replace human operators, freeing them to perform more complex and cognitively demanding replace human operators, freeing them to perform more complex and cognitively demanding
work. In addition, AI-enabled systems could (1) react significantly faster than systems that rely on work. In addition, AI-enabled systems could (1) react significantly faster than systems that rely on
operator input; (2) cope with an exponential increase in the amount of data availableoperator input; (2) cope with an exponential increase in the amount of data available for analysis; for analysis;
and (3) enable new concepts of operations, such as swarming (i.e., cooperative behavior in which and (3) enable new concepts of operations, such as swarming (i.e., cooperative behavior in which
unmanned vehicles autonomously coordinate to achieve a task) that could confer a warfighting unmanned vehicles autonomously coordinate to achieve a task) that could confer a warfighting
advantage by overwhelming adversary defensive systems. advantage by overwhelming adversary defensive systems.
Narrow AI, however, could introduce a number of Narrow AI, however, could introduce a number of ~~challenges~~chal enges. For example, such systems may be . For example, such systems may be
subject to algorithmic bias as a result of their training datasubject to algorithmic bias as a result of their training data or models. Researchers have repeatedly . Researchers have repeatedly
discovered instances of racial bias in AI facial recognition programs due to the lack of discovered instances of racial bias in AI facial recognition programs due to the lack of diversity in diversity in
the images on which the systems were trained, while some natural language processing programs the images on which the systems were trained, while some natural language processing programs
have developed gender bias.7 Such biases could hold significant implications for AI applications have developed gender bias.7 Such biases could hold significant implications for AI applications
in a military context. For example, incorporating undetected biases into systems with lethal in a military context. For example, incorporating undetected biases into systems with lethal
effects could lead to cases of mistaken identity and the unintended effects could lead to cases of mistaken identity and the unintended ~~killing~~ kil ing of civilians or of civilians or
noncombatants.noncombatants.
Similarly, Similarly, narrow AI algorithms can produce unpredictable and unconventional results that could narrow AI algorithms can produce unpredictable and unconventional results that could
lead to unexpected failures if incorporated into military systems. In a commonly cited lead to unexpected failures if incorporated into military systems. In a commonly cited
demonstration of this phenomenon (demonstration of this phenomenon (~~illustrated~~il ustrated i in Figure 1), researchers combined a picture that , researchers combined a picture that
an AI system correctly identified as a panda with random distortion that the computer labeled an AI system correctly identified as a panda with random distortion that the computer labeled
“nematode.” The difference in the combined image is imperceptible to the human eye, but it “nematode.” The difference in the combined image is imperceptible to the human eye, but it
resulted in the AI system labeling the image as a gibbon with 99.3% confidence. Such resulted in the AI system labeling the image as a gibbon with 99.3% confidence. Such
vulnerabilitiesvulnerabilities could be exploited could be exploited ~~intentionally~~ intentional y by adversaries to disrupt AI-reliant or -assisted by adversaries to disrupt AI-reliant or -assisted
target identification, selection, and engagement. This could, in turn, raise ethical concerns—or, target identification, selection, and engagement. This could, in turn, raise ethical concerns—or,

4 For more information about artificial intelligence, see CRS4 For more information about artificial intelligence, see CRS Report R45178, Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National
Security, by, by Kelley M. Sayler. Kelley M. Sayler.
5 For a discussion5 For a discussion of narrow versus general artificial intelligence, as wellof narrow versus general artificial intelligence, as well as as a range of expert opinions about the future a range of expert opinions about the future
of general artificial intelligence, see Nick Bostrom, of general artificial intelligence, see Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford, United (Oxford, United
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014). Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014).
6 For a discussion 6 For a discussion of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, see CRSof intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, see CRS Report R46389, Report R46389, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance Design for Great Power ~~Competition~~Com petition , by Nishawn, by Nishawn S. S. Smagh.Smagh.
7 Brian Barrett, “Lawmakers Can’t Ignore Facial Recognition’s Bias7 Brian Barrett, “Lawmakers Can’t Ignore Facial Recognition’s Bias Anymore,” Wired, July 26,Anymore,” Wired, July 26, 2018, at 2018, at
https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-facial-recognition-congress-bias-law-enforcement/; and Will Knight, “https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-facial-recognition-congress-bias-law-enforcement/; and Will Knight, “ How to How to
Fix SiliconFix Silicon Valley’s SexistValley’s Sexist Algorithms,” MITAlgorithms,” MIT ~~Technology~~ T echnology Review, November 23, 2016, at Review, November 23, 2016, at
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602950/how-to-fix-silicon-valleys-sexist-algorithms/. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602950/how-to-fix-silicon-valleys-sexist-algorithms/.
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~~potentially,~~ potential y, lead to violations of the law of armed conflict—if it results in the system selecting lead to violations of the law of armed conflict—if it results in the system selecting
and engaging a target or class of targets that was not approved by a human operator.and engaging a target or class of targets that was not approved by a human operator.
Figure 1. AI Failure in Image Recognition

Source: AndrewAndrew Ilachinski,Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms, Issues Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval , Center for Naval
Analyses,Analyses, January 2017, p. 61. January 2017, p. 61.
~~Finally~~Final y, recent news reports and analyses have highlighted the role of AI in enabling increasingly , recent news reports and analyses have highlighted the role of AI in enabling increasingly
realistic photo, audio, and video digital forgeries, popularly known as “deep fakes.” Adversaries realistic photo, audio, and video digital forgeries, popularly known as “deep fakes.” Adversaries
could deploy this AI capability as part of their information operations in a “gray zone” conflict.8 could deploy this AI capability as part of their information operations in a “gray zone” conflict.8
Deep fake technology could be used against the United States and its Deep fake technology could be used against the United States and its ~~allies~~al ies to generate false news to generate false news
reports, influence public discourse, erode public trust, and attempt blackmail of government reports, influence public discourse, erode public trust, and attempt blackmail of government
officials. For this reason, some analysts argue that social media platforms—in addition to officials. For this reason, some analysts argue that social media platforms—in addition to
deploying deep fake detection tools—may need to expand the means of labeling and deploying deep fake detection tools—may need to expand the means of labeling and
authenticating content.9 Doing so might require that users identify the time and location at which authenticating content.9 Doing so might require that users identify the time and location at which
the content originated or properly label content that has been edited. Other analysts have the content originated or properly label content that has been edited. Other analysts have
expressed concern that regulating deep fake technology could impose an undue burden on social expressed concern that regulating deep fake technology could impose an undue burden on social
media platforms or lead to unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and artistic expression.10 media platforms or lead to unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and artistic expression.10
These analysts have suggested that existing law is sufficient for managing the malicious use of These analysts have suggested that existing law is sufficient for managing the malicious use of
deep fakes and that the focus should be instead on the need to educate the public about deep fakes deep fakes and that the focus should be instead on the need to educate the public about deep fakes
and minimizeand minimize incentives for creators of malicious deep fakes. incentives for creators of malicious deep fakes.
United States
DOD’s unclassified investments in AI have grown from just over $600 DOD’s unclassified investments in AI have grown from just over $600 ~~million~~mil ion in FY2016 to in FY2016 to
~~$927 million in FY2020~~approximately $874 mil ion in FY2022, with the department , with the department ~~reportedly~~ maintaining over 600 active AI maintaining over 600 active AI
projects.11 Pursuant to the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 115-232), projects.11 Pursuant to the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 115-232),

DOD established the Joint Artificial Intel igence Center (JAIC, pronounced “jake”) to coordinate DOD projects of over $15 mil ion; the JAIC was granted acquisition authority by Section 808 of 8 “Gray zone” conflicts are those that occur below8 “Gray zone” conflicts are those that occur below the threshold of formallythe threshold of formally declared war.declared war. For more information about For more information about
information operations, see CRSinformation operations, see CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10771, IF10771, Defense ~~Primer: Information~~Prim er: Inform ation Operations, by Catherine A. , by Catherine A.
~~Theohary~~T heohary. .
9 Some social media 9 Some social media platforms such as platforms such as ~~Twitter~~T witter have established rules have established rules for labelingfor labeling and removing certain types of and removing certain types of
synthetic or manipulated media. Seesynthetic or manipulated media. See Yoel Roth and Ashita Achuthan, “Yoel Roth and Ashita Achuthan, “ Building rulesBuilding rules in public:in public: Our approach to Our approach to
synthetic & manipulated media,” synthetic & manipulated media,” Twitter,, February 4, 2020, at https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/February 4, 2020, at https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/
new-approach-to-synthetic-and-manipulated-media.html. new-approach-to-synthetic-and-manipulated-media.html.
10 Jessica 10 Jessica Ice, “Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment,” Ice, “Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment,” Case Western Reserve Law Review, 2019, , 2019,
at https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol70/iss2/12. at https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol70/iss2/12.
11 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: 11 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United United
States States ~~Department~~Departm ent of Defense Fiscal Year of Defense Fiscal Year ~~2020~~2022 Budget Request Budget Request, May 2021, p. 3-2, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. ~~, March 2019, p. 9; and Brendan McCord, “Eye on AI,”~~
~~August 28, 2019, transcript available at https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b75ac0285ede1b470f58ae2/t/~~
~~5d6aa8edb91b0c0001c7a05f/1567. DOD requested $800 million in FY2021 to “continue the AI pathfinders, Joint~~
~~Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) and Project Maven” and an additional $1.7 billion for autonomy. Office of the~~
~~Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, “Defense Budget Overview: United States~~
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~~DOD established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC, pronounced “jake”) to coordinate~~
~~DOD projects of over $15 million~~ the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283).12 The JAIC has .12 The JAIC has ~~identified its priority~~undertaken a number of National Mission National Mission
Initiatives for AIInitiatives for AI as, including predictive maintenance,13 humanitarian aid and disaster relief, predictive maintenance,13 humanitarian aid and disaster relief, ~~cyberspace,~~
~~and automation. DOD requested $800 million for JAIC and Project Maven, an image processing~~
~~program, in FY2021.14~~
~~The FY2019 NDAA additionally~~warfighter health, and business process transformation. In addition, the JAIC maintains the Joint Common Foundation, a “secure cloud-based AI development and experimentation environment” intended to support the testing and fielding of department-wide AI capabilities.14 The FY2019 NDAA also directed DOD to publish a strategic roadmap for AI directed DOD to publish a strategic roadmap for AI
development and fielding, as development and fielding, as ~~well~~ wel as to develop guidance on “appropriate ethical, legal, and other as to develop guidance on “appropriate ethical, legal, and other
policies for the Department governing the development and use of artificial policies for the Department governing the development and use of artificial ~~intelligence~~ intel igence enabled enabled
systems and systems and technologies in operational situations.”15 In support of this mandate, the Defense technologies in operational situations.”15 In support of this mandate, the Defense
Innovation Board (DIB), an independent federal advisory committee to the Secretary of Defense, Innovation Board (DIB), an independent federal advisory committee to the Secretary of Defense,
drafted recommendations for the ethical use of artificial drafted recommendations for the ethical use of artificial ~~intelligence~~intel igence.16 Based on these .16 Based on these
recommendations, DOD then adopted five ethical principles for AI based on the DIB’s recommendations, DOD then adopted five ethical principles for AI based on the DIB’s
recommendations: responsibility, equitability, traceability, reliability,recommendations: responsibility, equitability, traceability, reliability, and governability.17 and governability.17 ~~The~~
~~JAIC has been charged with implementing the ethical principles.18~~
~~The FY2019 NDAA also established a National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence to~~
On May 26, 2021, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks issued a memorandum providing guidance on the implementation of Responsible Artificial Intel igence (RAI), in keeping with the ethical principles.18 The JAIC has been charged with developing and implementing RAI strategy, guidance, and policy.19 Final y, Section 1051 of the FY2019 NDAA established a National Security Commission on Artificial Intel igence to conduct a comprehensive assessment of militarily relevant AI technologies and to provide conduct a comprehensive assessment of militarily relevant AI technologies and to provide
recommendations for strengthening U.S. competitiveness.recommendations for strengthening U.S. competitiveness.19 The commission’s The commission’s ~~interim~~final report to report to
~~Congress identifies five key lines of effort for driving U.S. AI competitiveness~~Congress was delivered in March 2021 and general y offers recommendations along five key lines of effort: (1) investing in : (1) investing in
research and development, (2) research and development, (2) applying AI to national security missions, (3) training and applying AI to national security missions, (3) training and
recruiting AI talent, (4) protecting and recruiting AI talent, (4) protecting and building upon U.S. technology advantages, and (5) building upon U.S. technology advantages, and (5)

~~Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request,” February 2020, pp. 1-9.~~
~~12 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §1051~~marshal ing global AI cooperation.20 12 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, T itle II, §1051; and P.L. 116-283, Section 2, Division A, T itle VIII, §808. .
13 Predictive maintenance uses AI “to predict the failure of critical parts, automate diagnostics, and plan maintenance 13 Predictive maintenance uses AI “to predict the failure of critical parts, automate diagnostics, and plan maintenance
~~based~~ based on data and equipment condition.” Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense on data and equipment condition.” Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense
Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” February 12, 2019, p. 11, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” February 12, 2019, p. 11, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/
1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-~~STRATEGY.PDF.~~
~~14 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, “Defense Budget Overview: United~~
~~States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request,” February 2020, p. 1-9, at~~
~~https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/fy2021_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf~~
ST RAT EGY.PDF. 14 Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, “Joint Common Foundation,” at https://www.ai.mil/jcf.html. 15 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, 15 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, ~~Title~~T itle II, §238. II, §238.
16 For a discussion16 For a discussion of DOD’s rationale for developing principles for ethical AI, as wellof DOD’s rationale for developing principles for ethical AI, as well as DOD’s existing ethical as DOD’s existing ethical
commitments related to AI, see Defense Innovation Board, “AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of commitments related to AI, see Defense Innovation Board, “AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of
Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense,” October 31, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense,” October 31, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/
2002204458/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_PRIMARY_DOCUMENT2002204458/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_PRIMARY_DOCUMENT .PDF. .PDF.
17 For definitions of these principles, see Department of Defense, “ 17 For definitions of these principles, see Department of Defense, “ DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial
Intelligence,” February 24, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-Intelligence,” February 24, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-
adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/. adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/.
~~18 For information about the JAIC’s implementation plan, see “The DoD AI Ethical Principles—~~
~~Shifting From Principles to Practice,” April 1, 2020, at https://www.ai.mil/blog_04_01_20-~~
~~shifting_from_principles_to_practice.html. Pursuant to Section 238 of the FY2019 NDAA, RAND Corporation, a~~
~~federally funded research and development center, additionally conducted a review of DOD posture for AI. See~~
~~Danielle C. Tarraf et al.,~~ ~~The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence: Assessment and~~
~~Recommendations, RAND Corporation, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4229.html.~~
~~19 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title X, §1051. The Commission’s Interim Report, which assesses the~~
~~challenges and opportunities of militarily relevant AI technologies, is available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/~~
~~153OrxnuGEjsUvlxWsFYauslwNeCEkvUb/view. Its first quarter recommendations, released in March 2020, are~~
~~available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wkPh8Gb5drBrKBg6OhGu5oNaTEERbKss/view. Second quarter~~
~~recommendations, released in July 2020, are available at~~
~~https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LDrd6T7H50ry9uXNA6cwhsrtnpQ63EWH/view. Third quarter recommendations,~~
~~released in October 2020, are available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jg9YlNagGI_0rid-HXY-fvJOAejlFIiy/view.~~
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~~marshalling global AI cooperation. The commission is releasing quarterly memos, which are to~~
~~provide recommendations for implementing these lines of effort, with a final report due in March~~
~~2021.~~
~~Per Section 256 of the FY2020 NDAA, DOD is also to “develop a strategy for educating~~
~~servicemembers in relevant occupational fields on matters relating to artificial intelligence”;~~
~~Section 260 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit through 2023 biannual reports on the~~
~~JAIC to the congressional defense committees.20 These reports are to include a description of the~~
~~JAIC’s mission, objectives, activities, workforce, and organizational structure, as well as a~~
~~description of any new AI-related policies or ethical guidelines and “any steps taken by the~~
~~Center to protect systems that use artificial intelligence from any attempts to misrepresent or alter~~
~~information used or provided by artificial intelligence.”21 Finally, Section 5711 tasks the Director~~
~~of National Intelligence with periodically briefing the congressional intelligence committees on~~
~~major intelligence community AI initiatives and coordination efforts.22~~
~~China~~
~~China is widely viewed as the United States’ closest competitor in the international AI market.23~~
18 RAI is to focus on RAI governance, warfighter trust, AI pro duct and acquisition lifecycle, requirements validation, responsible AI ecosystem, and AI workforce. For additional information about RAI, see Kathleen H. Hicks, “Implementing Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Department of Defense,” May 26, 2021, at https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/27/2002730593/-1/-1/0/IMPLEMENTING-RESPONSIBLE-ART IFICIAL-INT ELLIGENCE-IN-T HE-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE.PDF. 19 Kathleen H. Hicks, “Implementing Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Department of Defense,” May 26, 2021, at https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/27/2002730593/-1/-1/0/IMPLEMENTING-RESPONSIBLE-ART IFICIAL-INT ELLIGENCE-IN-T HE-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE.PDF. 20 National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, Final Report, March 2021, at https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report -Digital-1.pdf. Pursuant to Section 238 of the FY2019 NDAA, RAND Corporation, a federally funded research and development center, additionally conducted a review of DOD’s posture Congressional Research Service 4 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress China China is widely viewed as the United States’ closest competitor in the international AI market.21 China’s 2017 “Next Generation AI Development Plan” describes AI as a “strategic technology” China’s 2017 “Next Generation AI Development Plan” describes AI as a “strategic technology”
that has become a “focus of international competition.”that has become a “focus of international competition.”2422 Recent Chinese achievements in the Recent Chinese achievements in the
field demonstrate China’s potential to realize its goals for AI development. In particular, China field demonstrate China’s potential to realize its goals for AI development. In particular, China
has pursued language and facial recognition technologies, many of which it plans to integrate into has pursued language and facial recognition technologies, many of which it plans to integrate into
the country’s domestic the country’s domestic ~~surveillance~~surveil ance network. Such technologies could be used to counter network. Such technologies could be used to counter
espionage and aid military targeting. In addition to developing various types of air, land, sea, and espionage and aid military targeting. In addition to developing various types of air, land, sea, and
undersea autonomous military vehicles, China is actively pursuing swarm technologies, which undersea autonomous military vehicles, China is actively pursuing swarm technologies, which
could be used to overwhelm adversary missile defense interceptors. Moreover, open-source could be used to overwhelm adversary missile defense interceptors. Moreover, open-source
publications indicate that China is developing a suite of AI tools for cyber operations.publications indicate that China is developing a suite of AI tools for cyber operations.25
23 China’s management of its AI ecosystem stands in stark contrast to that of the United States. China’s management of its AI ecosystem stands in stark contrast to that of the United States.2624 In In
general, few boundaries exist between Chinese commercial companies, university research general, few boundaries exist between Chinese commercial companies, university research
laboratories, the military, and the central government. China’s National laboratories, the military, and the central government. China’s National ~~Intelligence~~Intel igence Law, for Law, for
example, requires companies and individuals to “support, assist, and cooperate with national example, requires companies and individuals to “support, assist, and cooperate with national
~~intelligence work.”27~~ intel igence work.”25 As a result, the Chinese government has a direct means of guiding military As a result, the Chinese government has a direct means of guiding military
AI development priorities and accessing technology developed for civilian purposes. AI development priorities and accessing technology developed for civilian purposes.

~~20 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §256 and §260.~~
~~21 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §260.~~
~~22 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division E, Title LVII, §5711.~~
~~23 See, for example, Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order (Boston, MA:~~
~~Houghton Mifflin Co., 2018).~~
~~24 China State Council, “A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” p. 2.~~
~~25 Elsa Kania, Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power,~~
~~Center for a New American Security, November 28, 2017, p. 27.~~
~~26 Ibid., p. 6.~~
~~27 Arjun Kharpal, “Huawei says it would never hand data to China’s government. Experts say it wouldn’t have a~~
~~choice,” CNBC, March 5, 2019.~~
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~~Russia~~
~~Russian president Vladimir Putin has stated that “whoever becomes the leader in [AI] will~~
~~become the ruler of the world.”28 At present, however, Russian AI development lags significantly~~
~~behind that of the United States and China. As part of Russia’s effort to close this gap, Russia has~~
~~released a national strategy that outlines 5- and 10-year benchmarks for improving the country’s~~
~~AI expertise, educational programs, datasets, infrastructure, and legal regulatory system.29 Russia~~
~~has indicated it will continue to pursue its 2008 defense modernization agenda, which called for~~
~~robotizing 30% of the country’s military equipment by 2025.30~~
~~The Russian military has been researching a number of AI applications, with a heavy emphasis on~~
~~semiautonomous and autonomous military vehicles. Russia has also reportedly built a combat~~
~~module for unmanned ground vehicles that may be capable of autonomous target identification—~~
~~and, potentially, target engagement—and it plans to develop a suite of AI-enabled autonomous~~
~~systems.31 In addition, the Russian military plans to incorporate AI into unmanned aerial, naval,~~
~~and undersea vehicles and is reportedly developing swarming capabilities.32 These technologies~~
~~could reduce both cost and manpower requirements, potentially~~ Russia Russian president Vladimir Putin has stated that “whoever becomes the leader in [AI] wil become the ruler of the world.”26 At present, however, Russian AI development lags significantly behind that of the United States and China. As part of Russia’s effort to close this gap, Russia has released a national strategy that outlines 5- and 10-year benchmarks for improving the country’s AI expertise, educational programs, datasets, infrastructure, and legal regulatory system.27 Russia has indicated it wil continue to pursue its 2008 defense modernization agenda, which cal ed for robotizing 30% of the country’s military equipment by 2025.28 The Russian military has been researching a number of AI applications, with a heavy emphasis on semiautonomous and autonomous military vehicles. Russia has also reportedly built a combat module for unmanned ground vehicles that may be capable of autonomous target identification— for AI. See Danielle C. T arraf et al., The Departm ent of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence: Assessm ent and Recom m endations, RAND Corporation, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4229.html. 21 See, for example, Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2018). 22 China State Council, “A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” p. 2. 23 Elsa Kania, Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power, Center for a New American Security, November 28, 2017, p. 27. 24 Ibid., p. 6. 25 Arjun Kharpal, “ Huawei says it would never hand data to China’s government. Experts say it wouldn’t have a choice,” CNBC, March 5, 2019. 26 “‘Whoever leads in AI will rule the world’: Putin to Russian children on Knowledge Day ,” RT.com, September 1, 2017, at https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-putin/. 27 Office of the President of the Russian Federation, “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the Development of Artificial Intelligence in the Russian Federation” (Center for Security and Emerging T echnology, T rans.), October 10, 2019, at https://cset.georgetown.edu/research/decree-of-the-president -of-the-russian-federation-on-the-development -of-artificial-intelligence-in-the-russian-federation/. 28 T om Simonite, “For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race,” Wired, August 8, 2017. Congressional Research Service 5 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress and, potential y, target engagement—and it plans to develop a suite of AI-enabled autonomous systems.29 In addition, the Russian military plans to incorporate AI into unmanned aerial, naval, and undersea vehicles and is reportedly developing swarming capabilities.30 These technologies could reduce both cost and manpower requirements, potential y enabling Russia to field more enabling Russia to field more
systems with fewer personnel. Russia is also exploring innovative uses of AI for remote sensing systems with fewer personnel. Russia is also exploring innovative uses of AI for remote sensing
and electronic warfare, which could in turn reduce an adversary’s ability to effectively and electronic warfare, which could in turn reduce an adversary’s ability to effectively
communicate and navigate on the battlefield.communicate and navigate on the battlefield.~~33 Finally~~31 Final y, Russia has made extensive use of AI , Russia has made extensive use of AI
technologies for domestic propaganda and technologies for domestic propaganda and ~~surveillance, as well~~ surveil ance, as wel as for information operations as for information operations
directed against the United States and U.S. directed against the United States and U.S. ~~allies.34~~al ies.32
Despite Russia’s aspirations, analysts argue that it may be difficult for Russia to make significant Despite Russia’s aspirations, analysts argue that it may be difficult for Russia to make significant
progress in AI development. progress in AI development. ~~In 2017, Russian military spending dropped by 20% in constant~~
~~dollars, with subsequent cuts in 2018.35 In addition, many analysts note that Russian academics~~

~~28 “‘Whoever leads in AI will rule the world’: Putin to Russian children on Knowledge Day,” RT.com, September 1,~~
~~2017, at https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-putin/.~~
~~29 Office of the President of the Russian Federation, “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the~~
~~Development of Artificial Intelligence in the Russian Federation” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology,~~
~~Trans.), October 10, 2019, at https://cset.georgetown.edu/research/decree-of-the-president-of-the-russian-federation-on-~~
~~the-development-of-artificial-intelligence-in-the-russian-federation/.~~
~~30 Tom Simonite, “For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race,” Wired, August 8, 2017.~~
31 Tristan Greene, “Russia is Developing AI Missiles to Dominate the New Arms Race,” The Next Web~~, July~~ For example, some analysts note that Russian academics have produced few research papers on AI—ranking 22nd in AI-related publications global y33—and that the Russian technology industry has yet to produce AI applications on par with those produced by the United States and China.34 Other analysts counter that such factors may be irrelevant, arguing that while Russia has never been a leader in internet technology, it has managed to become a notably disruptive force in cyberspace.35 Russia may also be able to draw upon its growing technological cooperation with China.36 International Institutions A number of international institutions have examined issues surrounding AI, including the Group of Seven (G7), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which developed the first intergovernmental 29 T ristan Greene, “Russia is Developing AI Missiles to Dominate th e New Arms Race,” The Next Web, July 27, 2017, 27, 2017,
at https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2017/07/27/russia-is-developing-ai-missiles-to-dominate-the-new-at https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2017/07/27/russia-is-developing-ai-missiles-to-dominate-the-new-
arms-race/; and Kyle Mizokami, “arms-race/; and Kyle Mizokami, “ Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer RobotKalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot ,” Popular Mechanics, July,” Popular Mechanics, July 19, 19,
2017, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27393/kalashnikov-to-make-ai-directed-2017, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27393/kalashnikov-to-make-ai-directed-
machine-guns/. machine-guns/.
3230 Samuel Samuel Bendett, “Red Robots Rising:Bendett, “Red Robots Rising: Behind the Rapid Development of RussianBehind the Rapid Development of Russian ~~Unmanned Military~~ Unmanned Milit ary Systems,” Systems,” The
Strategy Bridge, December 12, 2017. , December 12, 2017.
3331 Jill Dougherty and Molly Jay, “Russia Jill Dougherty and Molly Jay, “Russia ~~Tries~~ T ries to Get Smart about Artificial Intelligence”; to Get Smart about Artificial Intelligence”; The Wilson Quarterly, ,
SpringSpring 2018; and Margarita Konaev and Samuel2018; and Margarita Konaev and Samuel Bendett, “Russian AI-Enabled Combat: Coming to a City Near You?,” Bendett, “Russian AI-Enabled Combat: Coming to a City Near You?,”
War on the Rocks, July, July 31, 2019, at https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/russian-ai-enabled-combat31, 2019, at https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/russian-ai-enabled-combat -coming-to-a-city--coming-to-a-city-
near-you/. near-you/.
3432 Alina Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution, Alina Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution,
November 15, 2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-November 15, 2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-
warfare/; and Chriswarfare/; and Chris Meserole and Alina Polyakova, “Meserole and Alina Polyakova, “ Disinformation Wars,” Disinformation Wars,” Foreign Policy, May 25, 2018, at , May 25, 2018, at
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/25/disinformation-wars/. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/25/disinformation-wars/.
~~35 “Military expenditure by country, in constant (2017) US$ m., 1988-2018,” Stockholm International Peace Research~~
~~Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/~~
~~Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932018%20in%20constant%20%282017%29%20USD~~
~~%20%28pdf%29.pdf.~~
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~~have produced few research papers on AI and that the Russian technology industry has yet to~~
~~produce AI applications on par with those produced by the United States and China.36 Other~~
~~analysts counter that such factors may be irrelevant, arguing that while Russia has never been a~~
~~leader in internet technology, it has managed to become a notably disruptive force in~~
~~cyberspace.37 Russia may also be able to draw upon its growing technological cooperation with~~
~~China.38~~
~~International Institutions~~
~~A number of international institutions have examined issues surrounding AI, including the Group~~
~~of Seven (G7), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Organisation for~~
~~Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which developed the first intergovernmental~~
~~set of principles for AI.39~~33 Margarita Konaev et al., Headline or Trend Line? Evaluating Chinese-Russian Collaboration in AI, Center for Security and Emerging T echnology, August 2021, p. 9. 34 Leon Bershidsky, “T ake Elon Musk Seriously on the Russian AI T hreat,” Bloomberg, September 5, 2017, at https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-09-05/take-elon-musk-seriously-on-the-russian-ai-threat; and Alina Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution, November 15, 2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/. 35 Gregory C. Allen, “Putin and Musk Are Right: Whoever Masters AI Will Run the World,” CNN, September 5, 2017. 36 Samuel Bendett and Elsa Kania, A New Sino-Russian High-tech Partnership, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 29, 2019, at https://www.aspi.org.au/report/new-sino-russian-high-tech-partnership. Some analysts have cautioned, however, that “the extent and scope of Chinese-Russian collaboration in AI may be overstated by both Chinese and Russian sources as well as U.S. observers.” Margarita Konaev et al., Headline or Trend Line? Evaluating Chinese-Russian Collaboration in AI, Center for Security and Emerging T echnology, August 2021, p. 9. Congressional Research Service 6 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress set of principles for AI.37 These principles are intended to “promote AI that is innovative and These principles are intended to “promote AI that is innovative and
trustworthy and that respects human rights and democratic values.”trustworthy and that respects human rights and democratic values.”4038 The United States is one of The United States is one of
42 countries—including the OECD’s 36 member countries, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa 42 countries—including the OECD’s 36 member countries, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Peru, and Romania—to have adopted the OECD AI Principles. These principles serve as the Rica, Peru, and Romania—to have adopted the OECD AI Principles. These principles serve as the
foundation for the Group of Twenty’s (G20’s) June 2019 Ministerial Statement on human-foundation for the Group of Twenty’s (G20’s) June 2019 Ministerial Statement on human-
centered AI.centered AI.4139 In addition, the OECD established the AI Policy Observatory in 2019 to develop In addition, the OECD established the AI Policy Observatory in 2019 to develop
policy options that policy options that ~~will~~ wil “help countries encourage, nurture, and monitor the responsible “help countries encourage, nurture, and monitor the responsible
development of trustworthy AI systems for the benefit of society.” development of trustworthy AI systems for the benefit of society.”
Potential Questions for Congress
 What measures is DOD taking to implement its ethical principles for artificial  What measures is DOD taking to implement its ethical principles for artificial
~~intelligence~~intel igence? Are such measures sufficient to ensure DOD’s adherence to the ? Are such measures sufficient to ensure DOD’s adherence to the
principles? principles?
 Do DOD and the  Do DOD and the ~~intelligence~~ intel igence community have adequate information about the community have adequate information about the
state of foreign military AI applications and the ways in which such applications state of foreign military AI applications and the ways in which such applications
may be used to harm U.S. national security? may be used to harm U.S. national security?
 How should national security considerations with regard to deep fakes be  How should national security considerations with regard to deep fakes be
balanced with free speech protections, artistic expression, and beneficial uses of balanced with free speech protections, artistic expression, and beneficial uses of
the underlying technologies? What efforts, if any, should the U.S. government the underlying technologies? What efforts, if any, should the U.S. government
undertake to ensure that the public is educated about deep fakes? undertake to ensure that the public is educated about deep fakes?

~~36 Leon Bershidsky, “Take Elon Musk Seriously on the Russian AI Threat,” Bloomberg, September 5, 2017, at~~
~~https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-09-05/take-elon-musk-seriously-on-the-russian-ai-threat; and Alina~~
~~Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution, November 15,~~
~~2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/.~~
~~37 Gregory C. Allen, “Putin and Musk Are Right: Whoever Masters AI Will Run the World,” CNN, September 5, 2017.~~
~~38 See Samuel Bendett and Elsa Kania, A New Sino-Russian High-tech Partnership, Australian Strategic Policy~~
~~Institute, October 29, 2019, at https://www.aspi.org.au/report/new-sino-russian-high-tech-partnership.~~
~~39 In May 2020, the United States joined the G7’s Global Partnership on AI, which is “to guide the responsible adoption~~
~~of AI based on shared principles of ‘human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation and economic growth.’” Matt~~
~~O’Brien, “US joins G7 artificial intelligence group to counter China,” Associated Press, May 28, 2020.~~
40 Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)40 Although there is no international y agreed definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09 defines LAWS as a class of weapon systems capable of both independently identifying a target and employing an onboard weapon to engage and destroy the target without manual human control. This concept of autonomy is also known as “human out of the loop” or “full autonomy.” The directive contrasts LAWS with human-supervised, or “human on the loop,” autonomous weapon systems, in which operators have the ability to monitor and halt a weapon’s target engagement. Another category is semi-autonomous, or “human in the loop,” weapon systems that “only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected by a human operator.”41 LAWS would require computer algorithms and sensor suites to classify an object as hostile, make an engagement decision, and guide a weapon to the target. Although these systems are not yet in widespread development,42 it is believed they would enable military operations in 37 In May 2020, the United States joined the G7’s Global Partnership on AI, which is “ to guide the responsible adoption of AI based on shared principles of ‘human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation and economic growth. ’” Matt O’Brien, “ US joins G7 artificial intelligence group to counter China,” Associated Press, May 28, 2020. 38 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Principles on AI,” June 2019, at Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Principles on AI,” June 2019, at
https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles/.https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles/.
41 39 “G20 Ministerial Statement on “G20 Ministerial Statement on ~~Trade~~T rade and Digital Economy,” June 9, 2019, at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000486596.pdf. 40 For additional information about LAWS, see CRS Report R44466, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Issues for Congress, by Nathan J. Lucas. 41 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at https://www.esd.whs. 42 Some analysts have argued that certain loitering munitions such as the Israeli Harpy meet the United States’ Congressional Research Service 7 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress ~~and Digital Economy,” June 9, 2019, at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/~~
~~000486596.pdf.~~
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~~Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)42~~
~~Although there is no internationally agreed definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems,~~
~~Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09 defines LAWS as a class of weapon systems~~
~~capable of both independently identifying a target and employing an onboard weapon to engage~~
~~and destroy the target without manual human control. This concept of autonomy is also known as~~
~~“human out of the loop” or “full autonomy.” The directive contrasts LAWS with human-~~
~~supervised, or “human on the loop,” autonomous weapon systems, in which operators have the~~
~~ability to monitor and halt a weapon’s target engagement. Another category is semi-autonomous,~~
~~or “human in the loop,” weapon systems that “only engage individual targets or specific target~~
~~groups that have been selected by a human operator.”43~~
~~LAWS would require computer algorithms and sensor suites to classify an object as hostile, make~~
~~an engagement decision, and guide a weapon to the target. This capability would enable the~~
~~system to operate in~~ communications-degraded or -denied environments where traditional communications-degraded or -denied environments where traditional
systems may not be able to operate. Some analysts have noted that LAWS could systems may not be able to operate. Some analysts have noted that LAWS could ~~additionally~~
~~“allow~~additional y “al ow weapons to strike military objectives more accurately and with less risk of collateral weapons to strike military objectives more accurately and with less risk of collateral
damage” or civilian damage” or civilian ~~casualties.44~~
casualties.43 Others, including approximately 30 countries and 165 nongovernmental organizations, have Others, including approximately 30 countries and 165 nongovernmental organizations, have
~~called~~cal ed for a preemptive ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns such as a perceived lack of for a preemptive ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns such as a perceived lack of
accountability for use and a perceived inabilityaccountability for use and a perceived inability to comply with the proportionality and distinction to comply with the proportionality and distinction
requirements of the requirements of the ~~laws~~law of armed conflict. Some analysts have also raised concerns about the of armed conflict. Some analysts have also raised concerns about the
potential operational risks posed by lethal autonomous weapons.potential operational risks posed by lethal autonomous weapons.4544 These risks could arise from These risks could arise from
“hacking, enemy behavioral manipulation, unexpected interactions with the environment, or “hacking, enemy behavioral manipulation, unexpected interactions with the environment, or
simple malfunctions or software errors.”simple malfunctions or software errors.”4645 Although such risks could be present in automated Although such risks could be present in automated
systems, they could be heightened in autonomous systems, in which the human operator would be systems, they could be heightened in autonomous systems, in which the human operator would be
unable to unable to ~~physically~~physical y intervene to terminate engagements— intervene to terminate engagements—~~potentially~~potential y resulting in wider-scale or resulting in wider-scale or
more numerous instances of fratricide, civilian casualties, or other unintended consequences.more numerous instances of fratricide, civilian casualties, or other unintended consequences.4746
United States
The United States is not known to be developing LAWSThe United States is not known to be developing LAWS ~~currently~~, nor does it currently have , nor does it currently have
LAWS in its inventory; however, there is no prohibition on the development, fielding, or LAWS in its inventory; however, there is no prohibition on the development, fielding, or
employment of LAWS. DODD 3000.09 establishes employment of LAWS. DODD 3000.09 establishes ~~department~~DOD guidelines for the future guidelines for the future
development and fielding of LAWS to ensure that they comply with “the law of war, applicable development and fielding of LAWS to ensure that they comply with “the law of war, applicable
treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement.”treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement.”4847 This directive includes a requirement that LAWS be designed to “al ow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”48 “Human judgment over the use of force” does not require manual human “control” of the weapon system, as is often reported, but instead requires broader human involvement in decisions about how, when, where, and why the weapon wil be employed. definition of LAWS. See, for example, Defense Innovation Board, AI Principles: Recom m endations on the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence by the Departm ent of Defense - Supporting Docum ent, October 2019, p. 12, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204459/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_SUPPORT ING_DOCUMENT .PDF. In addition, while a United Nations report concluded that T urkey’s deployment of the ST M Kargu-2 constitutes the first use of a lethal autonomous weapon system in combat, the UN described the Kargu-2 as being “ program m ed to attack targets” [emphasis added]. For this reason, it is unlikely that the Kargu-2 meets the U.S. definition of LAWS. United Nations Security Council, “ Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” March 8, 2021, p. 17, at https://undocs.org/S/2021/229. 43 U.S. Government, “Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging T echnologies ~~This directive~~

~~42 For additional information about LAWS, see CRS Report R44466,~~ ~~Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Issues for~~
~~Congress, by Nathan J. Lucas.~~
~~43 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at~~
~~https://www.esd.whs.~~
~~44 U.S. Government, “Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging Technologies~~ in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons,” in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons,”
March 28, 2018, at https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/March 28, 2018, at https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/
(httpAssets)/7C177AE5BC10B588C125825F004B06BE/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.4.pdf(httpAssets)/7C177AE5BC10B588C125825F004B06BE/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.4.pdf . .
4544 See, See, for example, Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a Newfor example, Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security, American Security,
February 2016, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-February 2016, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-
risk.pdf. risk.pdf.
4645 Ibid. Ibid.
4746 Ibid. Ibid.
4847 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at
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~~includes a requirement that LAWS be designed to “allow commanders and operators to exercise~~
~~appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”49 “Human judgment over the use of~~
~~force” does not require manual human “control” of the weapon system, as is often reported, but~~
~~instead requires broader human involvement in decisions about how, when, where, and why the~~
~~weapon will be employed.~~https://www.esd.whs. For an explanation of this directive, see CRS In Focus IF11150, Defense Prim er: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonom ous Weapon System s, by Kelley M. Sayler. 48 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at https://www.esd.whs. Congressional Research Service 8 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress
In addition, DODD 3000.09 requires that the software and hardware of In addition, DODD 3000.09 requires that the software and hardware of ~~all~~ al systems, including systems, including
lethal autonomous weapons, be tested and evaluated to ensure they lethal autonomous weapons, be tested and evaluated to ensure they
[f]unction as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries; [f]unction as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries;
complete engagements in a timeframe consistent with commander and operator intentions complete engagements in a timeframe consistent with commander and operator intentions
and, ifand, if unable to do so, terminate engagements or seek additional human operator input unable to do so, terminate engagements or seek additional human operator input
beforebefore ~~continuing the engagement; and are sufficiently robust to~~ continuing the engagement; and are sufficiently robust to minimize failuresminimize failures that that
could lead to unintended engagements or to loss of control of the system to unauthorized could lead to unintended engagements or to loss of control of the system to unauthorized
parties. parties.
Any changes to a system’s operating state—for example, due to machine learning—would Any changes to a system’s operating state—for example, due to machine learning—would
require the system to be retested and reevaluated to ensure that it has retained its safety features require the system to be retested and reevaluated to ensure that it has retained its safety features
and abilityand ability to operate as intended. In addition to the standard weapons review process, LAWS to operate as intended. In addition to the standard weapons review process, LAWS
must undergo a secondary senior-level review by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the must undergo a secondary senior-level review by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and either the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and either the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Sustainment or the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering prior to both and Sustainment or the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering prior to both
development and fielding. DOD is reportedly in the process of developing a handbook to guide development and fielding. DOD is reportedly in the process of developing a handbook to guide
senior leaders through this review. senior leaders through this review.
China
According to According to former U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, some Chinese weapons manufacturers, such U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, some Chinese weapons manufacturers, such
as Ziyan, have advertised their weapons as having the ability to select and engage targets as Ziyan, have advertised their weapons as having the ability to select and engage targets
autonomously.autonomously.5049 It is unclear whether these claims are accurate; however, China It is unclear whether these claims are accurate; however, China has no has no
prohibition on the development of LAWS, which it has characterized as weapons that prohibition on the development of LAWS, which it has characterized as weapons that exhibit—at exhibit—at
a minimum—five attributes: a minimum—five attributes:
The first is lethality, which means sufficient pay load (charge) and for means [ The first is lethality, which means sufficient pay load (charge) and for means [sic] to be ] to be
lethal. The second is autonomy, which means absence of human intervention and control lethal. The second is autonomy, which means absence of human intervention and control
duringduring ~~the~~ the entire processentire process of executingof executing a task.a task. Thirdly, impossibilityThirdly, impossibility for termination, for termination,
meaning that once started there is no way to terminate the device. Fourthly, indiscriminate meaning that once started there is no way to terminate the device. Fourthly, indiscriminate
effect, meaning that the device will execute the task of killing and maiming regardless of effect, meaning that the device will execute the task of killing and maiming regardless of
conditions, scenarios and targets. Fifthly evolution, meaning that through interaction with conditions, scenarios and targets. Fifthly evolution, meaning that through interaction with
the environment the device can learn autonomously, expand its functions and capabilities the environment the device can learn autonomously, expand its functions and capabilities
in a way exceeding human expectations.in a way exceeding human expectations.51

~~https://www.esd.whs. For an explanation of this directive, see CRS In Focus IF11150,~~ ~~Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on~~
~~Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelley M. Sayler.~~
~~49 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at~~
~~https://www.esd.whs.~~
~~50 Patrick Tucker~~50 Russia Russia has proposed the following definition of LAWS: “unmanned technical means other than ordnance that are intended for carrying out combat and support missions without any involvement of the operator” beyond the decision of whether and how to deploy the system.51 Russia has noted that LAWS could “ensure the increased accuracy of weapon guidance on military targets, while contributing to lower rate of unintentional strikes against civilians and civilian targets.”52 Although Russia has not publicly stated that it is developing LAWS, Russian weapons 49 Patrick T ucker, “SecDef: China is Exporting Killer Robots to the Mideast,” , “SecDef: China is Exporting Killer Robots to the Mideast,” Defense One, November 5, 2019. , November 5, 2019.
5150 UN CCW, “China: Position Paper,” April 11, 2018, p. 1, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/ UN CCW, “China: Position Paper,” April 11, 2018, p. 1, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/
(httpAssets)/E42AE83BDB3525D0C125826C0040B262/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.7.pdf(httpAssets)/E42AE83BDB3525D0C125826C0040B262/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.7.pdf . 51 UN CCW, “Russian Federation: Potential opportunities and limitations of military uses of lethal autonomous weapons systems,” 2019, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/B7C992A51A9FC8BFC12583 BB00637BB9/$file/CCW.GGE.1.2019.WP.1_R+E.pdf . 52 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 9 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress .
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~~Russia~~
~~Russia has proposed the following definition of LAWS: “unmanned technical means other than~~
~~ordnance that are intended for carrying out combat and support missions without any involvement~~
~~of the operator” beyond the decision of whether and how to deploy the system.52 Russia has noted~~
~~that LAWS could “ensure the increased accuracy of weapon guidance on military targets, while~~
~~contributing to lower rate of unintentional strikes against civilians and civilian targets.”53~~
~~Although Russia has not publicly stated that it is developing LAWS, Russian weapons~~
manufacturer Kalashnikov has reportedly built a combat module for unmanned ground vehicles manufacturer Kalashnikov has reportedly built a combat module for unmanned ground vehicles
capable of autonomous target identification and, capable of autonomous target identification and, ~~potentially~~potential y, target engagement., target engagement.54
53 International Institutions
Since 2014, the United States has participated in international discussions of LAWS under the Since 2014, the United States has participated in international discussions of LAWS under the
auspices of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW). The auspices of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW). The
UN CCW has considered proposals by states parties to issue political declarations about LAWS, UN CCW has considered proposals by states parties to issue political declarations about LAWS,
as as ~~well~~ wel as proposals to regulate or ban them. At the UN CCW, the United States and Russia have as proposals to regulate or ban them. At the UN CCW, the United States and Russia have
opposed a preemptive ban on LAWS, while China has supported a ban on the use—but not opposed a preemptive ban on LAWS, while China has supported a ban on the use—but not
development—of LAWS, which it defines as weapon systems that are inherently indiscriminate development—of LAWS, which it defines as weapon systems that are inherently indiscriminate
and thus in violation of the law of war.and thus in violation of the law of war.54
Potential Questions for Congress
 To what extent are potential U.S. adversaries developing LAWS? How, if at  To what extent are potential U.S. adversaries developing LAWS? How, if at ~~all~~al , ,
should this affect U.S. LAWS research and development? should this affect U.S. LAWS research and development?
 What role should the United States play in UN CCW discussions of LAWS?  What role should the United States play in UN CCW discussions of LAWS?
Should the United States support the status quo, propose a political declaration, Should the United States support the status quo, propose a political declaration,
or advocate regulation of or a ban on LAWS?or advocate regulation of or a ban on LAWS?
 If the United States chooses to develop LAWS, are current weapons review  If the United States chooses to develop LAWS, are current weapons review
processes and legal standards for their employment in conflict sufficient? processes and legal standards for their employment in conflict sufficient?
~~ Should the United States continue to oppose a ban on LAWS? If so, should it~~
~~consider some form of their regulation short of a complete ban?~~
~~Hypersonic Weapons55~~
Hypersonic Weapons55 A number of countries, including the United States, Russia, and China, are developing hypersonic A number of countries, including the United States, Russia, and China, are developing hypersonic
weapons—those that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound. There are weapons—those that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound. There are
two categories of hypersonic weapons: ~~two categories of hypersonic weapons:~~

~~52 UN CCW, “Russian Federation: Potential opportunities and limitations of military uses of lethal autonomous~~
~~weapons systems,” 2019, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/~~
~~(httpAssets)/B7C992A51A9FC8BFC12583BB00637BB9/$file/CCW.GGE.1.2019.WP.1_R+E.pdf.~~
~~53 Ibid.~~
~~54 Kyle Mizokami, “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Popular Mechanics, July 19, 2017.~~
~~55 For additional information about hypersonic weapons, see CRS Report R45811,~~ ~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background~~
~~and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.~~
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  Hypersonic glide vehicles are launched from a rocket before gliding to a are launched from a rocket before gliding to a
target.56 target.56
  Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered by high-speed engines throughout the are powered by high-speed engines throughout the
duration of their flight. duration of their flight.
In contrast to In contrast to ~~ballistic~~bal istic missiles, which also travel at hypersonic speeds, hypersonic weapons do missiles, which also travel at hypersonic speeds, hypersonic weapons do
not follow a parabolic not follow a parabolic ~~ballistic~~bal istic trajectory and can maneuver en route to their destination, making trajectory and can maneuver en route to their destination, making
defense against them difficult. defense against them difficult.
Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified
two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: (1) the weapon’s short two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: (1) the weapon’s short
time-of-flight, which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response, and (2) its unpredictable time-of-flight, which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response, and (2) its unpredictable
53 Kyle Mizokami, “ Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Popular Mechanics, July 19, 2017. 54 For additional information about UN CCW discussions on LAWS, see CRS In Focus IF11294, International Discussions Concerning Lethal Autonom ous Weapon System s, by Kelley M. Sayler. 55 For additional information about hypersonic weapons, see CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler; and CRS In Focus IF11459, Defense Prim er: Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons, by Kelley M. Sayler and Amy F. Woolf. 56 When hypersonic glide vehicles are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to as a hypersonic boost -glide weapon. Congressional Research Service 10 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress flight path, which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore flight path, which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore
heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict.57heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict.57
Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal
because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia already possess the ability to strike the United because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia already possess the ability to strike the United
States with intercontinental States with intercontinental ~~ballistic~~bal istic missiles, which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm missiles, which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm
U.S. missile defenses.58 Furthermore, these analysts U.S. missile defenses.58 Furthermore, these analysts ~~note~~argue that in the case of hypersonic weapons, that in the case of hypersonic weapons,
traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it is traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it is ~~really~~real y a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the
world that would be so suicidal that it would even think threating to use—not to mention to world that would be so suicidal that it would even think threating to use—not to mention to
~~actually~~ actual y use—hypersonic weapons against the United States ... would end use—hypersonic weapons against the United States ... would end ~~well~~wel .”59 .”59
United States
The Pentagon has requested $3.The Pentagon has requested $3.~~2 billion in its FY2021 budget request for all hypersonic-related~~
~~research. This amount includes $206.8 million~~8 bil ion in FY2022 for hypersonic weapons and $248 mil ion for hypersonic defense programs. for hypersonic defense programs.60 DOD is DOD is
currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program, currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program,
which is intended to provide the U.S. military with the abilitywhich is intended to provide the U.S. military with the ability to strike hardened or time-sensitive to strike hardened or time-sensitive
targets with conventional warheads, as targets with conventional warheads, as ~~well~~ wel as through several Air Force, Army, and DARPA as through several Air Force, Army, and DARPA
programs.programs.6061 Analysts who support these Analysts who support these development efforts argue that hypersonic weapons could development efforts argue that hypersonic weapons could
enhance deterrence, as enhance deterrence, as ~~well~~ wel as provide the U.S. military with an abilityas provide the U.S. military with an ability to defeat capabilities such to defeat capabilities such
as as mobile missile launchers and advanced air and missile defense systems that form the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-advanced air and missile defense systems that form the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-
access/area denial strategies.access/area denial strategies.6162 Others have argued that hypersonic weapons confer little to no Others have argued that hypersonic weapons confer little to no

~~56 When hypersonic glide vehicles are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to~~
~~as a hypersonic boost-glide weapon.~~
~~57 See, for example, Richard H. Speier et al.,~~ ~~Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of~~
~~Weapons, RAND~~ additional warfighting advantage and note that the U.S military has yet to identify any mission requirements or concepts of operation for hypersonic weapons.63 The United States is unlikely to field an operational hypersonic weapon before 2023; however, in contrast to Russia and China, the United States is not developing hypersonic weapons for potential use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, the United States is seeking to develop 57 See, for example, Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons, RAND Corporation, 2017, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html. Corporation, 2017, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html.
58 David Axe, “How the U.S.58 David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” ~~The~~T he Daily Beast, January 16, 2019, Daily Beast, January 16, 2019,
at https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B. at https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B.
Schneider,Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14. “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14.
59 Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” 59 Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” ~~The~~T he National Interest, January 5, 2019, at National Interest, January 5, 2019, at
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632.
~~60 In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a common glide vehicle~~
~~for use across the services. The services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide Body Board of Directors~~
~~with rotating chairmanship. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army Ramps Up Funding for Laser Shield,~~ 60 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United States Departm ent of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, May 2021, p. 3-2, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. For additional information about hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623, Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler and Stephen M. McCall. 61 In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a common glide vehicle for use across the services. T he services coordinate efforts on a Common Hyperson ic Glide Body Board of Directors with rotating chairmanship. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army Ramps Up Funding for Laser Shield, Hypersonic Sword,” Hypersonic Sword,”
Breaking Defense, February 28, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-Breaking Defense, February 28, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-
shield-hypersonic-sword/. For a fullshield-hypersonic-sword/. For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, seehistory of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see ~~CRS~~ CRS Report R41464, Report R41464,
Conventional ~~Prompt~~Prom pt Global Strike and Long -Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf. , by Amy F. Woolf.
6162 Roger Zakheim and Roger Zakheim and ~~Tom~~T om Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” remarks at Defense Responses,” remarks at
the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army
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~~additional warfighting advantage and note that the U.S military has yet to identify any mission~~
~~requirements for hypersonic weapons.~~
~~The United States is unlikely to field an operational hypersonic weapon before 2023; however, in~~
~~contrast to Russia and China, the United States is not developing hypersonic weapons for~~
~~potential use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, the United States is seeking to develop~~
Justification Book of Research, Development, T est and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580. 63 See, for example, Valerie Insinna, “ Air Force’s top civilian hints at changes to hypersonic weapons programs,” Defense News, September 22, 2021, at https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/09/22/air-forces-top-civilian-hints-at-changes-to-hypersonic-weapons-programs/. Congressional Research Service 11 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress hypersonic weapons that can attack targets with greater accuracy, which could be more hypersonic weapons that can attack targets with greater accuracy, which could be more
~~technically challenging~~technical y chal enging to develop than nuclear-armed—and less accurate—Russian and Chinese to develop than nuclear-armed—and less accurate—Russian and Chinese
systems. systems.
China
According to Tong Zhao, a According to Tong Zhao, a ~~fellow~~fel ow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most
experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in
China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S. China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S.
military technology” such as U.S. regional missile defenses.military technology” such as U.S. regional missile defenses.6264 China’s pursuit of hypersonic China’s pursuit of hypersonic
weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the United weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the United
States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting
infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s abilityinfrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s ability to conduct a to conduct a
retaliatory strike against the United States.retaliatory strike against the United States.63
65 China has developed the DF-41 intercontinental China has developed the DF-41 intercontinental ~~ballistic~~bal istic missile (ICBM), which, according to a missile (ICBM), which, according to a
2014 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, could carry a nuclear 2014 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, could carry a nuclear
hypersonic glide vehicle.hypersonic glide vehicle.6466 General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, ~~the current~~ then-commander of U.S. commander of U.S.
Northern Northern Command, seemed to confirm this assessment in February 2020, when he testified that Command, seemed to confirm this assessment in February 2020, when he testified that
“China is testing a [nuclear-“China is testing a [nuclear-~~armed~~capable] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle … which is ] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle … which is
designed designed to fly at high speeds and low altitudes, complicating our abilityto fly at high speeds and low altitudes, complicating our ability to provide precise to provide precise
warning.”warning.”65
~~In addition, China has~~ 67 Reports indicate that China may have tested a nuclear-capable HGV68—launched by a Long March rocket—in August 2021.69 In contrast to the bal istic missiles that China has previously used to launch HGVs, the Long March, a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), launches the HGV into orbit before the HGV de-orbits to its target. This could provide China with a space-based global strike capability and further reduce the amount of target warning time prior to a strike.70 China has additional y tested the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle at least nine times since 2014. tested the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle at least nine times since 2014.
U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately 1,200 U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately 1,200
miles and have stated that the missile may be capable of performing evasive maneuvers during miles and have stated that the missile may be capable of performing evasive maneuvers during
~~flight.66 Although unconfirmed by intelligence agencies, some analysts project the DF-ZF will be~~
~~operational as early as 2020.67 In addition, in August 2018 China successfully tested Starry Sky-2,~~

~~Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580.~~
~~62 Tong Zhao, “~~ 64 T ong Zhao, “ Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic ~~Technology~~T echnology and the and the
Security Dilemma,” Carnegie-Security Dilemma,” Carnegie-~~Tsinghua~~T singhua Center for Global Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/
07/23/conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-07/23/conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-
dilemma-pub-76894. dilemma-pub-76894.
6365 Ibid.; Ibid.; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculusand Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide,”on Hypersonic Glide,” ~~August~~ August 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide. Research Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide.
6466 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2014 Annual Report, p. 292, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/ p. 292, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/Complete%20Report.PDF. default/files/annual_reports/Complete%20Report.PDF.
6567 General General ~~Terrence~~T errence J. O’Shaughnessy, J. O’Shaughnessy, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services“Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” February, 13, 2020, Committee,” February, 13, 2020,
at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/OShaughnessy_02-13-20.pdf. at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/OShaughnessy_02-13-20.pdf.
~~66 “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The Economist, April 6, 2019, at~~
~~https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-~~
~~coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems,”~~ ~~The~~
~~Diplomat, April 28, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-~~
~~missile-defense-systems/.~~
~~67 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2015 Annual Report, p. 20, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/~~
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~~a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype.68~~68 It is not clear if this nuclear-capable HGV is the same model as that referenced by General O’Shaughnessy. 69 Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile,” October 16, 2021, at https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian has stated that “ this was a routine test of [a] space vehicle,” rather than a test of a nuclear-capable HGV. Zhao Lijian, “ Remarks at Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, October 18, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1915130.shtml. 70 Greg Hadley, “ Kendall: China Has Potential to Strike Earth From Space,” Air Force Magazine, September 20, 2021, at https://www.airforcemag.com/global-strikes-space-china-frank-kendall/. Congressional Research Service 12 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress flight.71 Although unconfirmed by intel igence agencies, some analysts believe the DF-ZF could have become operational as early as 2020.72 In addition, in August 2018 China successfully tested Starry Sky-2, a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype.73 Some reports indicate that the Starry Sky-2 Some reports indicate that the Starry Sky-2
could be operational by 2025.could be operational by 2025.6974 U.S. officials have declined to comment on the U.S. officials have declined to comment on the program.program.7075
Russia
Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it
accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States
and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-~~Ballistic~~Bal istic Missile Treaty in Missile Treaty in
2002.2002.7176 Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated in 2018 that “the US is permitting Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated in 2018 that “the US is permitting
constant, uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-constant, uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-~~ballistic~~bal istic missiles, improving their quality, missiles, improving their quality,
and creating new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, and creating new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, ~~eventually this will~~ eventual y this wil result in result in
the complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that the complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that ~~all~~ al of our missiles could of our missiles could
simply be intercepted.”simply be intercepted.”7277 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they
approach their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its approach their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its
sense of strategic stability.sense of strategic stability.73
78 Russia is pursuing two nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons: the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon Russia is pursuing two nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons: the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon
(or Zircon). Avangard is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an ICBM, giving it “effectively (or Zircon). Avangard is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an ICBM, giving it “effectively
‘unlimited’ range.”‘unlimited’ range.”7479 Russian news sources claim that Avangard entered into service in December Russian news sources claim that Avangard entered into service in December
~~2019.75 Tsirkon, a ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile, may become operational as early as~~
~~2023.76~~
~~International Institutions~~
~~No international treaty or agreement is dedicated to overseeing the development of hypersonic~~
~~weapons. Although the New START Treaty—a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United~~
~~States and Russia—does not specifically limit hypersonic weapons, it does limit ICBMs, which~~

71 “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The Economist, April 6, 2019, at https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that -fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “ China T ests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems,” The Diplom at, April 28, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-missile-defense-systems/. 72 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2015 Annual Report, p. 20, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF. default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF.
6873 Jessie Jessie Yeung, “Yeung, “ China claims to have successfullyChina claims to have successfully tested its first hypersonic aircrafttested its first hypersonic aircraft ,” ,” CNN, August, August 7, 2018, at 7, 2018, at
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircrafthttps://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft -intl/index.html. See also -intl/index.html. See also U.S.-China ~~Economic~~Econom ic and
Security Review ~~Commission~~Com m ission 2018 Annual Report, p. 220, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/, p. 220, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/
2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf . .
6974 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20. p. 20.
7075 Bill Bill Gertz, “Gertz, “ China Reveals China Reveals ~~Test~~T est of New of New Hypersonic Missile,” Hypersonic Missile,” The Washington Free Beacon, August, August 10, 2018, at 10, 2018, at
https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/. https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/.
7176 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic
~~Arms~~Arm s Control, February, February 2019, at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-2019, at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-
and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/. and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/.
7277 Vladimir Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,”Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/March 1, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/56957. president/news/56957.
7378 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See ~~Tong~~ T ong
Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic ~~Technology~~T echnology and the Security and the Security
Dilemma,” Carnegie-Dilemma,” Carnegie-~~Tsinghua~~ T singhua Center for GlobalCenter for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/
conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-
pub-76894. pub-76894.
7479 Steve Steve ~~Trimble~~T rimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” , “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Aviation Week,, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20. Congressional Research Service 13 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress 2019.80 Tsirkon, a ship- and submarine-launched hypersonic cruise missile, wil reportedly “[complete] trials in 2021 and begin serial deliveries in 2022.”81 International Institutions No international treaty or agreement is dedicated to overseeing the development of hypersonic weapons. Although the New START Treaty—a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United States and Russia—does not specifical y limit hypersonic weapons, it does limit ICBMs, which could be used to launch hypersonic glide vehicles.82 Because Russia has deployed its Avangard ~~January 14-27, 2019, p. 20.~~
~~75 “First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,” TASS, December 27, 2019,~~
~~at https://tass.com/defense/1104297.~~
~~76 “Russian Navy to accept latest Tsirkon hypersonic missile for service in 2023—source,” TASS, March 20, 2019.~~
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~~could be used to launch hypersonic glide vehicles.77 Because Russia has deployed its Avangard~~
hypersonic glide vehicle on an SS-19 ICBM, it has agreed that missiles equipped with Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle on an SS-19 ICBM, it has agreed that missiles equipped with Avangard
count under New START. Furthermore, Article V of the treaty states that “when a Party believes count under New START. Furthermore, Article V of the treaty states that “when a Party believes
that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party ~~shall~~ shal have the right to raise the have the right to raise the
question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateralquestion of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Consultative
Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that it would be possible to negotiate Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that it would be possible to negotiate
provisions that would count additional types of hypersonic weapons under the New START provisions that would count additional types of hypersonic weapons under the New START
limits.limits.7883 However, because New START is due to expire in However, because New START is due to expire in ~~2021, unless extended through~~ 2026, 2026,
~~this solution may be temporary.79~~this may be a short-term solution.84 In addition, the treaty would not cover hypersonic weapons In addition, the treaty would not cover hypersonic weapons
developed in countries developed in countries other than the United States and Russia. Final y, some analysts have noted that, if any parties to the Outer Space Treaty were to launch a nuclear-armed HGV on a fractional orbital bombardment system, they would likely be in violation of Article IV of the treaty, which prohibits the placement of “any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” into orbit.85 ~~other than the United States and Russia.~~
Potential Questions for Congress
 What mission(s)  What mission(s) ~~will~~ wil hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons
the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions? the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions?
 Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how  Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how
should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or
the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling
technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? technologies, and supporting test infrastructure?
 How, if at  How, if at ~~all, will~~ al , wil the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability? Is the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability? Is
there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START,
~~negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking~~
~~transparency and confidence-building activities?~~
~~Directed-Energy (DE) Weapons~~
~~DOD defines directed-energy (DE) weapons as those using concentrated electromagnetic energy,~~
~~rather than kinetic energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment,~~
~~facilities, and/or personnel.”80 DE weapons could be used by ground forces in short-range air~~
~~defense (SHORAD), counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), or counter-rocket, artillery,~~
~~and mortar (C-RAM) missions.81 DE weapons could offer low costs per shot and—assuming~~
~~access to a sufficient power supply82—nearly limitless magazines that, in contrast to existing~~

~~77 For example, Russia’s Avangard hypersonic glide~~ 80 “First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,” TASS, December 27, 2019, at https://tass.com/defense/1104297. 81 Dmitry Fediushko and Nikolai Novichkov, “ T sirkon hypersonic missile state trials to be completed in 2021,” Jane’s Defense Weekly (subscription required), February 3, 2021, at https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/FG_3887346-JDW. 82 For example, Russia’s Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle is reportedly launched by an intercontinental ballistic vehicle is reportedly launched by an intercontinental ballistic
missile.missile. ~~See~~ See Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or ~~Tactical Tool~~T actical T ool?,” ?,” Air Force Magazine, May 7, , May 7,
2019, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-weapons-strategic-asset-or-tactical-tool/. 2019, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-weapons-strategic-asset-or-tactical-tool/.
7883 James Acton notes: “during [New James Acton notes: “during [New ST ART ~~START~~] negotiations, Russia] negotiations, Russia ~~argued~~ argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a
~~new~~ new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they wouldkind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussionstrigger bilateral discussions about whether and how about whether and how
they wouldthey would be be regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?:
Asking the Right Questions about Conventional ~~Prompt~~Prom pt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, , Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2013, p. 139, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf. 2013, p. 139, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf.
7984 CRS CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf. 85 Jeffrey Lewis, “ China’s Orbital Bombardment System Is Big, Bad News—but Not a Breakthrough,” Foreign Policy, October 18, 2021, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/18/hypersonic-china-missile-nuclear-fobs/. Congressional Research Service 14 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building activities? Directed Energy (DE) Weapons86 DOD defines directed energy (DE) weapons as those using concentrated electromagnetic energy, rather than kinetic energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, and/or personnel.”87 DE weapons could be used by ground forces in short-range air defense (SHORAD), counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), or counter-rocket, artil ery, and mortar (C-RAM) missions.88 DE weapons could offer low costs per shot and—assuming access to a sufficient power supply89—nearly limitless magazines that, in contrast to existing ~~Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf.~~
~~80 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Joint Publication 3-85, May 22, 2020, GL-6.~~
~~81 For more information about the role of DE weapons in C-UAS missions, see CRS In Focus IF11426,~~ ~~Department of~~
~~Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.~~
~~82 Although research has been conducted on chemically fueled lasers, most countries are now pursuing solid state~~
~~lasers, which are fueled by electrical power. As a result, the cost per shot is equivalent to the cost of the electrical~~
~~power required to fire the shot. Some analysts have noted that the cost per shot could thus be between $1 and $20. See~~
~~Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at~~
~~https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-~~
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~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

conventional systems, could enable an efficient and effective means of defending against missile conventional systems, could enable an efficient and effective means of defending against missile
salvos or swarms of unmanned systems. salvos or swarms of unmanned systems. ~~Theoretically~~Theoretical y, DE weapons could also provide options , DE weapons could also provide options
for boost-phase missile intercept, given their speed-of-light travel time; however, as in the case of for boost-phase missile intercept, given their speed-of-light travel time; however, as in the case of
hypersonic missile defense, experts disagree on the affordability, technological feasibility, and hypersonic missile defense, experts disagree on the affordability, technological feasibility, and
utility of this application.utility of this application.8390
High-powered microwave weapons, a subset of DE weapons, could be used as a nonkinetic High-powered microwave weapons, a subset of DE weapons, could be used as a nonkinetic
means of disabling electronics, communications systems, and improvised explosive devices, or as means of disabling electronics, communications systems, and improvised explosive devices, or as
a nonlethal “heat ray” system for crowd control. a nonlethal “heat ray” system for crowd control.
United ~~States84~~States
Although the United States has been researching directed energy since the 1960s, some experts Although the United States has been researching directed energy since the 1960s, some experts
have observed that “actual directedhave observed that “actual directed- energy programs … have frequently energy programs … have frequently ~~fallen~~fal en short of short of
expectations,” with DOD investing expectations,” with DOD investing ~~billions~~bil ions of dollars in programs that were ultimately of dollars in programs that were ultimately
~~cancelled.85~~ cancel ed.91 Others contend that developments in commercial lasers could be leveraged for Others contend that developments in commercial lasers could be leveraged for
military applications.military applications.8692 Directed Directed- energy weapons programs continue, however, to face questions energy weapons programs continue, however, to face questions
about their technological maturity, including questions about the ability to improve beam quality about their technological maturity, including questions about the ability to improve beam quality
~~and control to militarily useful levels and the ability to meet power, cooling, and size~~
~~requirements for integration into current platforms.87~~
~~The U.S. Navy fielded the first operational U.S. DE weapon, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS),~~
~~in 2014 aboard the USS Ponce. LaWS was a 30-kilowatt (-kW) laser prototype that “was capable~~
~~of blinding enemy forces as a warning, shooting down drones, disabling boats, or damaging~~
~~helicopters.”88 The Navy plans to deploy its 60-kW laser, HELIOS, aboard the USS Preble in~~
~~2021, while the Army plans to field its first “combat relevant” laser—the 50-kW Directed Energy~~
~~Mobile Short-Range Air Defense System—on Stryker fighting vehicles in FY2022.89 Similarly,~~

~~ready.~~
~~83 See, for example, James N. Miller and Frank A. Rose, “Bad Idea: Space-Based Interceptors and Space-Based~~
~~Directed Energy Systems,” Center for Strategic and~~ 86 For additional information about directed energy weapons, see CRS Report R46925, Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kelley M. Sayler. 87 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Joint Publication 3 -85, May 22, 2020, GL-6. 88 For more information about the role of DE weapons in C-UAS missions, see CRS In Focus IF11426, Department of Defense Counter-Unm anned Aircraft System s, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler. 89 Although research has been conducted on chemically fueled lasers, most countries are now pursuing solid state lasers, which are fueled by electrical power. As a result, the cost per shot is equivalent to the cost of the electrical power required to fire the shot. See Ariel Robinson, “ Directed Energy Weapons: Will T hey Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-ready. 90 See, for example, James N. Miller and Frank A. Rose, “ Bad Idea: Space-Based Interceptors and Space-Based Directed Energy Systems,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2018, at International Studies, December 13, 2018, at
https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-space-based-interceptors-and-space-based-directed-energy-systems/; and Justin https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-space-based-interceptors-and-space-based-directed-energy-systems/; and Justin
Doubleday,Doubleday, “ “Pentagon punts MDA‘s laser ambitions, shifts fundingPentagon punts MDA‘s laser ambitions, shifts funding toward OSD-ledtoward OSD-led ‘laser scaling,’” ‘laser scaling,’” Inside Defense, ,
February 19, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/pentagon-punts-mdas-laser-ambitions-shifts-funding-February 19, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/pentagon-punts-mdas-laser-ambitions-shifts-funding-
toward-osd-led-laser-scaling.toward-osd-led-laser-scaling.
~~84 For additional information about U.S. directed-energy programs, see CRS Report R44175,~~ ~~Navy Lasers, Railgun,~~
~~and Gun-Launched Guided Projectile: Background~~ 91 Paul Scharre, Preface to “Directed-Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects,” Center for a New American Security, April 2015, p. 4. 92 See Ariel Robinson, “ Directed Energy Weapons: Will T hey Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-ready. Congressional Research Service 15 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress and control to militarily useful levels and the ability to meet power, cooling, and size requirements for integration into current platforms.93 The U.S. Navy fielded the first operational U.S. DE weapon, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS), in 2014 aboard the USS Ponce. LaWS was a 30-kilowatt (-kW) laser prototype that “was capable of blinding enemy forces as a warning, shooting down drones, disabling boats, or damaging helicopters.”94 The Navy is testing and plans to instal its 60-kW laser, HELIOS, on the USS Preble “in line with its deployment schedule,” while the Army plans to field its first “combat relevant” laser—the 50-kW Directed Energy Mobile Short-Range Air Defense System—on Stryker fighting vehicles in FY2022.95 Similarly, the Air Force is currently conducting field assessments of several counter-UAS DE systems, including both laser and high-powered microwave systems.96 Overal , DOD requested at least $578 mil ion in FY2022 for unclassified DE research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), and at least $331 mil ion for unclassified DE weapons procurement.97 Many of these programs are intended to support DOD’s Directed Energy Roadmap, which seeks to scale up DE weapon power levels from around 150 kW, as is currently feasible, to around 300 kW in FY2022 and to around 500 kW by FY2024.98 China According to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China has been developing DE weapons since at least the 1980s and has made steady progress in developing HPM and increasingly powerful HELs.99 China has reportedly developed a 30-kilowatt road-mobile DE system, LW-30, designed to engage unmanned aerial vehicles and precision-guided weapons.100 Reports indicate that China is also developing an airborne DE weapon pod and has 93 Ibid. 94 Kyle Mizokami, “ T he U.S. Army Plans T o Field the Most Powerful Laser Weapon Yet ,” Popular Mechanics, August 7, 2019. 95 “Lockheed Martin’s HELIOS Shipboard Laser Being T ested at Wallops Island,” Seapower Magazine, August 1, 2021, at https://seapowermagazine.org/lockheed-martins-helios-shipboard-laser-being-tested-at-wallops-island/; and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, ~~and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report~~
~~R45098,~~ ~~U.S. Army Weapons-Related Directed Energy (DE) Programs: Background and Potential Issues for~~
~~Congress, by Andrew Feickert.~~
~~85 Paul Scharre, Preface to “Directed-Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects,” Center for a New American Security,~~
~~April 2015, p. 4.~~
~~86 See Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at~~
~~https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-~~
~~ready.~~
~~87 Ibid.~~
~~88 Kyle Mizokami, “The U.S. Army Plans To Field the Most Powerful Laser Weapon Yet,” Popular Mechanics,~~
~~August 7, 2019.~~
~~89 Lockheed Martin, “Lockheed Martin’s HELIOS Laser Weapon System Takes Step Toward Ship Integration,” March~~
~~11, 2020, at https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2020-03-11-Lockheed-Martins-HELIOS-Laser-Weapon-System-Takes-~~
~~Step-Toward-Ship-Integration; and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer,~~
“Defense Budget Overview: United States Defense Budget Overview: United States ~~Department~~Departm ent of Defense Fiscal Year of Defense Fiscal Year ~~2021~~2022 Budget Request Budget Request~~,” February 2020,~~
, May 2021, p. 10-8, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/~~fy2021/~~
~~fy2021_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.~~
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~~the Air Force is currently conducting field assessments of several counter-UAS DE systems,~~
~~including both laser and high-powered microwave systems.90~~
~~The Army, Navy, Air Force, and DARPA each have DE development programs underway, with~~
~~the Pentagon requesting $235 million for directed-energy weapons and directed-energy defensive~~
~~capabilities in FY2020; the FY2021 budget overview does not provide the topline funding request~~
~~for DE weapons.91 These programs are intended to scale up power levels from around 150 kW, as~~
~~is currently feasible, to around 300 kW, a level at which cruise missiles could potentially be~~
~~intercepted, by FY2022 and to around 500 kW by FY2024.92~~
~~China~~
~~China has reportedly developed a 30-kilowatt road-mobile DE system, LW-30, designed to~~
~~engage unmanned aerial vehicles and precision-guided weapons.93 Reports indicate that China is~~
~~also developing an airborne DE weapon pod and has~~ FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. 96 Kyle Mizokami, “ T he Air Force Mobilizes Its Laser and Microwave Weapons Abroad,” Popular Mechanics, April 9, 2020, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a32083799/laser-microwave-weapons/. 97 T hese figures include funding for DOD-wide programs as well as programs managed by the Air Force, Army, and Navy. CRS analysis of FY2022 budget documents; for additional information, see Appendix B in CRS Report R46925, Departm ent of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kelley M. Sayler. 98 Although there is no consensus regarding the precise power level that would be needed to neutralize different target sets, it is generally believed that a laser of around 100 kW could engage UAVs, small boats, rockets, artillery, and mortar, whereas a laser of around 300 kW could additionally engage cruise missiles flying in certain profiles (i.e., flying across—rather than at —the laser). Dr. Jim T rebes, “ Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” Presentation at IDGA, October 21, 2020; and CRS conversation with Principal Director for Directed Energy Modernization Dr. Jim T rebes, November 17, 2020. Required power levels could be affected by additional factors such as adversary countermeasures and atmospheric conditions and effects. 99 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), USCC 2017 Annual Report, November 2017, p. 563, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-09/2017_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf. 100 Nikolai Novichkov, “Airshow China 2018: CASIC’s LW-30 laser weapon system breaks cover,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 9, 2018. Congressional Research Service 16 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress used or proposed using DE weapons to used or proposed using DE weapons to
interfere with U.S. and interfere with U.S. and ~~allied~~al ied military aircraft and to military aircraft and to disrupt U.S. freedom of navigation disrupt U.S. freedom of navigation
operations in the Indo-Pacific.operations in the Indo-Pacific.94101
According to the Defense According to the Defense ~~Intelligence~~Intel igence Agency, China is Agency, China is ~~additionally~~ additional y pursuing DE weapons pursuing DE weapons
to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites and their sensors and possibly already has a limited to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites and their sensors and possibly already has a limited
capabilitycapability ~~to employ laser systems against satellite sensors. China~~ to employ laser systems against satellite sensors. China likely will field a likely will field a
ground-based laser weapon that can counter low-orbit space-based sensors by 2020, and ground-based laser weapon that can counter low-orbit space-based sensors by 2020, and
by the mid-to-late 2020s, it may field higher power systems that extend the threat to the by the mid-to-late 2020s, it may field higher power systems that extend the threat to the
structures of non-optical satellites.structures of non-optical satellites.95
~~Russia~~
~~Russia claims to have fielded the Peresvet ground-based DE weapon system in December 2018.~~
~~Although little is publicly known about Peresvet, including its power level, the weapon can~~

~~90 Kyle Mizokami, “The Air Force Mobilizes Its Laser and Microwave Weapons Abroad,” Popular Mechanics, April 9,~~
~~2020, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a32083799/laser-microwave-weapons/.~~
~~91 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United~~
~~States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request, March 2019, p. 9.~~
~~92 Although there is no consensus regarding the precise power level that would be needed to neutralize different target~~
~~sets, it is generally believed that a laser of around 100 kW could engage UAVs, small boats, rockets, artillery, and~~
~~mortar, whereas a laser of around 300 kW could additionally engage cruise missiles flying in certain profiles (i.e.,~~
~~flying across—rather than at—the laser). See, for example, CRS Report R41526,~~ ~~Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface,~~
~~Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; and Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.,~~
~~“Lasers to Kill Cruise Missiles Sought by Navy, Air Force, Army,” Breaking Defense, October 29, 2019. For~~
~~information about DOD’s Laser Scaling Plan, see Jason Sherman, “New Laser Scaling Plan sets directed-energy~~
~~efforts, FY-19 contracts,” Inside Defense, April 17, 2019, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/new-laser-scaling-~~
~~plan-sets-directed-energy-efforts-fy-19-contracts.~~
~~93 Nikolai Novichkov, “Airshow China 2018: CASIC’s LW-30 laser weapon system breaks cover,”~~ ~~Jane’s Defence~~
~~Weekly, November 9, 2018.~~
~~94 Andrew Tate, “China aiming to procure airborne laser-based weapon pod,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 8, 2020;~~
~~and Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at~~
~~https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/.~~
95102 Russia Russia has been conducting DE weapons research since the 1960s, with a particular emphasis on HELs. Russia has reportedly deployed the Peresvet, a mobile, ground-based HEL, with several mobile intercontinental bal istic missile units. Although little is publicly known about Peresvet, including its power level, some analysts assert it is to dazzle satel ites and provide point defense against unmanned aircraft systems.103 Russia’s deputy defense minister Alexei Krivoruchko has stated that efforts are underway to increase Peresvet’s power level and to deploy it on military aircraft.104 Reports suggest that Russia may also be developing HPMs as wel as additional HELs capable of performing antisatel ite missions. International Institutions DE weapons “are not authoritatively defined under international law, nor are they currently on the agenda of any existing multilateral mechanism.”105 However, certain applications of DE weapons are prohibited. For example, Protocol I of the CCW “Protocol on Blinding Lasers” prohibits the employment of “laser weapons specifical y designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.”106 Some analysts have suggested that multilateral agreements should be considered. For example, Congress may consider prohibitions on nonlethal anti-personnel uses of DE weapons—such as “heat rays” or lasers intended to cause temporary visual impairment—or on certain military applications of DE 101 Andrew T ate, “ China aiming to procure airborne laser-based weapon pod,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 8, 2020; and Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “ Countering China’s Laser Offensive ,” T he Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/. 102 Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, February 2019, p. 20, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/, February 2019, p. 20, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/
27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/~~Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf.~~
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~~reportedly disrupt Global Positioning System (GPS) and communications signals and may be able~~
~~to perform C-UAS and antisatellite missions.96~~
~~International Institutions~~
~~DE weapons “are not authoritatively defined under international law, nor are they currently on the~~
~~agenda of any existing multilateral mechanism.”97 However, certain applications of DE weapons~~
~~are prohibited. For example, Protocol IV of the CCW “Protocol on Blinding Lasers” prohibits~~
~~“excessively injurious” applications of DE weapons, including the use of DE weapons to~~
~~permanently blind enemy combatants. Similarly, some analysts have suggested that multilateral~~
~~agreements should be established to restrict certain military applications of lasers—such as~~
~~aircraft interference—in peacetime.98~~
~~Potential Questions for Congress~~
~~ Does the technological maturity of DE weapons warrant current funding levels?~~
~~To what extent, if at all~~Space_T hreat_V14_020119_sm.pdf. 103 Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, February 2019, p. 23, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_T hreat_V14_020119_sm.pdf; and “ Putin hails new Russian laser weapons,” Associated Press, May 17, 2019, at https://apnews.com/ff03960c48a6440bacc1c2512a7c197a. 104 Bart Hendrickx, “ Peresvet: a Russian mobile laser system to dazzle enemy satellites,” The Space Review, June 5, 2020, at https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3967/1. 105 “Directed Energy Weapons: Discussion paper for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),” Article 36, November 2017. 106 T he protocol does not cover the development, procurement, or possession of such weapons, nor does it prohibit the employment of laser weapons that may cause blindness “as an incidental or collateral effect.” Additional Protocol to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions o n the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deem ed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscrim inate Effects, Vienna, October 13, 1995, United Nations, T reaty Series, vol. 1380, p. 370, at https://treaties.un.org/doc/T reaties/1995/10/19951013%2001-30%20AM/Ch_XXVI_02_ap.pdf. For additional information about the protocol and its relationship to DE weapons programs, see Appendix I of CRS Report R41526, Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. Congressional Research Service 17 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress weapons—such as aircraft interference—in peacetime.107 Other analysts have argued that DE weapons could be considered more humane than conventional weapons because their accuracy could potential y reduce collateral damage and because they could provide a nonlethal anti- personnel capability in circumstances in which lethal force might otherwise be used.108 Potential Questions for Congress  Does the technological maturity of DE weapons warrant current funding levels? To what extent, if at al , can advances in commercial lasers be leveraged for , can advances in commercial lasers be leveraged for
military applications? military applications?
 How successful have U.S. field tests of DE weapons been? Are any changes to  How successful have U.S. field tests of DE weapons been? Are any changes to
operational concepts, rules of engagement, or tactics required to optimize the use operational concepts, rules of engagement, or tactics required to optimize the use
of DE weapons or deconflict the use of DE weapons with other U.S. military of DE weapons or deconflict the use of DE weapons with other U.S. military
operations? operations?
  ~~Are any additional restrictions on the~~In what circumstances and for what purposes should the U.S. military’s use of ~~use of~~ DE weapons DE weapons ~~necessary and, if so,~~
~~what kind?~~
~~Biotechnology~~
be permissible? What, if any, regulations, treaties, or other measures should the United States consider with regard to the use of DE weapons in both war and peacetime? Biotechnology Biotechnology leverages life sciences for technological applications. A number of developments Biotechnology leverages life sciences for technological applications. A number of developments
in biotechnology hold potential implications for the U.S. military and for international security in biotechnology hold potential implications for the U.S. military and for international security
writ large. As a 2018 Government Accountability Office report notes, the Departments of writ large. As a 2018 Government Accountability Office report notes, the Departments of
Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National ~~Intelligence~~Intel igence
assess that biotechnologies, such as the low-cost gene-editing tool CRISPR,assess that biotechnologies, such as the low-cost gene-editing tool CRISPR,99109 have the potential have the potential
to to
alter genes or create DNA to modify plants, animals, and humans. Such biotechnologies alter genes or create DNA to modify plants, animals, and humans. Such biotechnologies
couldcould be usedbe used to enhance [orto enhance [or ~~degrade] the performance~~ degrade] the performance of military personnel. The of military personnel. The
proliferationproliferation ~~of synthetic biology—used to create genetic code that does not exist in~~
~~nature—may increase the number of actors that can create chemical and biological~~
~~weapons.100~~

~~96 Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, p. 23, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/~~
~~News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf; and “Putin hails new Russian laser~~
~~weapons,” Associated Press, May 17, 2019, at https://apnews.com/ff03960c48a6440bacc1c2512a7c197a.~~
~~97 “Directed Energy Weapons: Discussion paper for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),”~~
~~Article 36, November 2017.~~
98 of synthetic biology—used to create genetic code that does not exist in nature—may increase the number of actors that can create chemical and biological weapons.110 Similarly, the U.S. intel igence community’s 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment cited genome editing as a potential weapon of mass destruction.111 107 Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” ~~The~~T he Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at
https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/. https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/.
~~99 For a general overview of CRISPR, see CRS~~ 108 See, for example, Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise of Directed-Energy Weapons, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 19, 2021, at https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA_ChangingT heGame_ereader.pdf. 109 For a general overview of CRISPR, see CRS Report R44824, Report R44824, Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9, by Marcy E. , by Marcy E.
GalloGallo et al. et al.
~~100~~110 Government Accountability Office, Government Accountability Office, National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States as
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~~Similarly, the U.S. intelligence community’s 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment cited genome~~
~~editing as a potential weapon of mass destruction.101~~Identified by Federal Agencies, December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. 111 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide T hreat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016. Congressional Research Service 18 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress
In addition, biotechnology could be used to create adaptive camouflage, cloaking devices, or In addition, biotechnology could be used to create adaptive camouflage, cloaking devices, or
lighter, stronger, and—lighter, stronger, and—~~potentially~~potential y—self-healing body and vehicle armor.—self-healing body and vehicle armor.~~102~~112 Concerns have been Concerns have been
raised that U.S. competitors may not hold the same ethical standards in the research and raised that U.S. competitors may not hold the same ethical standards in the research and
application of biotechnologies, particularly regarding biologicalapplication of biotechnologies, particularly regarding biological weapons, genome editing, or weapons, genome editing, or
more invasive forms of human performance modification.more invasive forms of human performance modification.~~103~~113
United States
Pursuant to Section 1086 of the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328),Pursuant to Section 1086 of the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328),~~104~~114 the Trump Administration the Trump Administration
released the released the National Biodefense Strategy, which outlines “how the United States Government , which outlines “how the United States Government
~~will~~ wil manage its activities more effectively to assess, prevent, detect, prepare for, respond to, and manage its activities more effectively to assess, prevent, detect, prepare for, respond to, and
recover from biological threats, coordinating its biodefense efforts with those of international recover from biological threats, coordinating its biodefense efforts with those of international
partners, industry, academia, non-governmental entities, and the private sector.”partners, industry, academia, non-governmental entities, and the private sector.”~~105~~115 As some As some
analysts have noted, however, this strategy was not accompanied by a resourced action plan and, analysts have noted, however, this strategy was not accompanied by a resourced action plan and,
thus, was “largely unimplemented.”thus, was “largely unimplemented.”~~106~~116 Furthermore, there is no DOD-specific biotechnology Furthermore, there is no DOD-specific biotechnology
research strategy.research strategy.~~107~~117
Unclassified U.S. biotechnology programs with military applications center primarily on Unclassified U.S. biotechnology programs with military applications center primarily on
improving “readiness, resilience, and recovery.” DARPA, for example, has a number of improving “readiness, resilience, and recovery.” DARPA, for example, has a number of
biotechnology programs devoted to battlefield medicine, diagnostics, and prognostics. It is also biotechnology programs devoted to battlefield medicine, diagnostics, and prognostics. It is also
exploring options for mitigating the effects of traumatic brain injury, treating neuropsychiatric exploring options for mitigating the effects of traumatic brain injury, treating neuropsychiatric
~~illnesses~~il nesses such as depression and post-traumatic stress, and protecting against infectious diseases such as depression and post-traumatic stress, and protecting against infectious diseases
and bio-engineered threats to the U.S. food supply. In addition, DARPA’s Safe Genes program and bio-engineered threats to the U.S. food supply. In addition, DARPA’s Safe Genes program
seeks “to [protect] service members from accidental or intentional misuse of genome editing seeks “to [protect] service members from accidental or intentional misuse of genome editing

Identified by Federal Agencies, December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf.
~~101 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”~~
~~delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016.~~
102 Patrick Tucker, “The US Army Is Making Synthetic Biology a Priority,” Defense One~~, July 1, 2019; and “~~ technologies.”118 Biotechnology research is also being conducted at the service laboratories, which completed a $45 mil ion, three-year joint research initiative in synthetic biology “intended to develop new bio-based materials and sensors.”119 112 Patrick T ucker, “ The US Army Is Making Synthetic Biology a P riority,” Defense One, July 1, 2019; and “ Army Army
scientists explore synthetic biology potential,” U.S. Army, June 24, 2019, at https://www.army.mil/article/223495/scientists explore synthetic biology potential,” U.S. Army, June 24, 2019, at https://www.army.mil/article/223495/
army_scientists_explore_synthetic_biology_potential. army_scientists_explore_synthetic_biology_potential.
~~103~~113 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide ~~Threat~~ T hreat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
delivereddelivered before the U.S.before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services,Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016; and Daniel R. Coats, “February 9, 2016; and Daniel R. Coats, “ Statement for Statement for
the Record: Worldwidethe Record: Worldwide ~~Threat~~ T hreat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services,Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018. Although the U.S. military has long usedMarch 6, 2018. Although the U.S. military has long used certain drugscertain drugs such as caffeine, such as caffeine,
modafinil, dextroamphetamine, and various sleep aidsmodafinil, dextroamphetamine, and various sleep aids to enhance soldier performance, it bans other performanceto enhance soldier performance, it bans other performance --
enhancing drugsenhancing drugs and techniques such as anabolic steroids and bloodand techniques such as anabolic steroids and blood doping. Seedoping. See Paul ScharrePaul Scharre and Lauren Fish,and Lauren Fish, ~~Human~~
~~Performance Enhancement~~ Hum an Perform ance Enhancem ent, Center for a New American Security, November 7, 2018, at https://www.cnas.org/, Center for a New American Security, November 7, 2018, at https://www.cnas.org/
publications/reports/human-performance-enhancement-1. publications/reports/human-performance-enhancement-1.
~~104~~114 P.L. 114-328, Section 2, Division A, P.L. 114-328, Section 2, Division A, ~~Title~~T itle X, §1086. X, §1086.
~~105 The~~115 T he White House, White House, National Biodefense Strategy, 2018, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/, 2018, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf. National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf.
~~106~~116 See, See, for example, for example, ~~Tara O’Toole~~T ara O’T oole, “Remarks at ‘Synthetic Biology and National Security: Risks, “Remarks at ‘Synthetic Biology and National Security: Risks and Opportunities,’” and Opportunities,’”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 14, 2020. Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 14, 2020.
~~107~~117 Diane Dieuliis, Diane Dieuliis, “Biotechnology for the Battlefield: In Need of a Strategy,” “Biotechnology for the Battlefield: In Need of a Strategy,” War on the Rocks, November 27, 2018. , November 27, 2018.
~~There~~T here is, however, a coordinated framework for biotechnology regulation. See is, however, a coordinated framework for biotechnology regulation. See ~~“Modernizing~~ “Mo dernizing the Regulatory System the Regulatory System
for Biotechnology Products: Final Versionfor Biotechnology Products: Final Version of the 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of of the 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of
Biotechnology,” January 2017, at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-01/documents/Biotechnology,” January 2017, at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-01/documents/
2017_coordinated_framework_update.pdf. 2017_coordinated_framework_update.pdf.
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~~technologies.”108 Biotechnology research is also being conducted at the service laboratories,~~
~~which recently completed a $45 million, three-year joint research initiative in synthetic biology~~
~~“intended to develop new bio-based materials and sensors.”109~~
118 See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Our Research: Biological T echnologies Office,” at https://www.darpa.mil/our-research?tFilter=&oFilter=1. 119 Marisa Alia-Novobilski, “ T ri-Service effort leverages synthetic biology expertise to address future warfighter Congressional Research Service 19 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress In addition, some reports suggest that the United States is researching or has previously In addition, some reports suggest that the United States is researching or has previously
researched biotechnology and neuroscience applications to increase soldier lethality, including researched biotechnology and neuroscience applications to increase soldier lethality, including
applications to make soldiers “stronger, smarter, [and] more capable, and … give them more applications to make soldiers “stronger, smarter, [and] more capable, and … give them more
endurance than other humans.”endurance than other humans.”~~110~~120 Some groups have expressed ethical concerns about this Some groups have expressed ethical concerns about this
research; although the United States had a series of presidential bioethics commissions between research; although the United States had a series of presidential bioethics commissions between
1974 and 2017, there is no current national framework for examining ethical concerns.1974 and 2017, there is no current national framework for examining ethical concerns.~~111~~
~~Finally~~121 Final y, per Section 263 of the FY2020 NDAA, per Section 263 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92), DOD is to conduct “a review of the military , DOD is to conduct “a review of the military
understanding and relevancy of applications of emerging biotechnologies to national understanding and relevancy of applications of emerging biotechnologies to national security security
requirements of the Department of Defenserequirements of the Department of Defense~~,” as well as “an assessment of the technical basis~~
~~within the Department used to inform the intelligence community of the Department’s collection~~
~~and analysis needs relating to emerging biotechnologies.”112 DOD is additionally to develop a~~
~~recommendation on the appropriate definition of “emerging biotechnologies” and provide~~
~~recommendations for future legislative and administrative activities.113~~” and provide recommendations for future legislative and administrative activities.”122 Section 278 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) additional y directs DOD to “conduct an assessment and direct comparison of capabilities in emerging biotechnologies for national security purposes .. between the capabilities of the United States and the capabilities of adversaries of the United States.”123
China
Motivated by an aging population and growing health care needs, China has been particularly Motivated by an aging population and growing health care needs, China has been particularly
interested in conducting biotechnology research. Biotechnology is cited as a key strategic priority interested in conducting biotechnology research. Biotechnology is cited as a key strategic priority
within China’s within China’s Made in China 2025 initiative initiative ~~and is additionally~~ and is additional y highlighted within China’s highlighted within China’s
current five-year development plan.current five-year development plan.~~114~~124 In particular, China is aggressively pursuing In particular, China is aggressively pursuing
biotechnologies for genetic testing and precision medicine. In 2016, Chinese scientists became biotechnologies for genetic testing and precision medicine. In 2016, Chinese scientists became
the first to use the CRISPR gene-editing tool on humans, and in 2018, a Chinese scientist the first to use the CRISPR gene-editing tool on humans, and in 2018, a Chinese scientist
produced—perhaps with the approval of the Chinese government—the first “gene-edited produced—perhaps with the approval of the Chinese government—the first “gene-edited
babies.”babies.”~~115~~125 In addition, China maintains one of the world’s largest repositories of genetic In addition, China maintains one of the world’s largest repositories of genetic
information, the National Genebank, which includes U.S. genetic data. Such information could be information, the National Genebank, which includes U.S. genetic data. Such information could be
used to develop personalized disease treatment plans or, used to develop personalized disease treatment plans or, ~~potentially~~potential y, precision bioweapons.126 Open-source information about China’s research into specific military applications of biotechnology is limited; however, China’s policy of military-civil fusion would enable the needs,” Wright -Patterson AFB, September 27, 2017. 120~~, precision bioweapons.116~~

~~108 See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Our Research: Biological Technologies Office,” at~~
~~https://www.darpa.mil/our-research?tFilter=&oFilter=1.~~
~~109 Marisa Alia-Novobilski, “Tri-Service effort leverages synthetic biology expertise to address future warfighter~~
~~needs,” Wright-Patterson AFB, September 27, 2017.~~
~~110~~ Annie Jacobsen, Annie Jacobsen, The Pentagon’s Brain: An Uncensored History of DARPA, America ’s Top-Secret Military
Research Agency (New York: (New York: ~~Little~~Litt le, Brown and Company, 2015). See also Michael Joseph Gross,, Brown and Company, 2015). See also Michael Joseph Gross, ~~“The~~ “ T he Pentagon’s Pentagon’s
Push to Program Soldiers’ Brains,” Push to Program Soldiers’ Brains,” The Atlantic, November 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/, November 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
2018/11/the-pentagon-wants-to-weaponize-the-brain-what2018/11/the-pentagon-wants-to-weaponize-the-brain-what -could-go-wrong/570841/. -could-go-wrong/570841/.
~~111~~121 For a history of these commissions, see Presidential Commission for the Study For a history of these commissions, see Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues,of Bioethical Issues, “ “History of History of
Bioethics Commissions,” archived January 15, 2017, at https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/history.html. Bioethics Commissions,” archived January 15, 2017, at https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/history.html.
~~112~~122 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, ~~Title~~T itle II, §263. 123 P.L. 116-283, Section 2, Division A, T itle II, §278. 124 “Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035,” Xinhua News Agency, March 12, 2021, T ranslated by Etcetera Language Group, Inc., at https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0284_14th_Five_Year_Plan_EN.pdf. 125 ~~II, §263.~~
~~113 Ibid.~~
~~114 Shannon Ellis, “Biotech Booms in China,” Nature, January 17, 2018.~~
~~115~~ Amidst international outcry, China later sentenced the scientist to three years in jail and termed his work “extremely Amidst international outcry, China later sentenced the scientist to three years in jail and termed his work “extremely
abominable in nature.” Michael Standaert, “'Extremely abominable’: Chinese gene-editing scientist faces law,”abominable in nature.” Michael Standaert, “'Extremely abominable’: Chinese gene-editing scientist faces law,” Al
Jazeera, November 26, 2018. See also, Elsa Kania, “, November 26, 2018. See also, Elsa Kania, “ Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a
‘New‘New Domain of Warfare,’” Domain of Warfare,’” Defense One, August, August 14, 2019. 14, 2019.
~~116~~126 David J. Lynch, “ David J. Lynch, “ Biotechnology: the US-China dispute over genetic data,” Biotechnology: the US-China dispute over genetic data,” Financial Times, July 31, 2017. See also , July 31, 2017. See also
Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “ China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New
Revolution in Military Affairs,” The Jam estown Foundation, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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~~Open-source information about China’s research into specific military applications of~~
~~biotechnology is limited; however, China’s policy of military-civil fusion would enable the~~
Chinese military to readily leverage developments in civilianChinese military to readily leverage developments in civilian biotechnology.biotechnology.~~117~~127 Furthermore, Furthermore,
reports indicate that China’s Central Military Commission “has funded projects on military brain reports indicate that China’s Central Military Commission “has funded projects on military brain
science, advanced biomimetic systems, biological and biomimetic materials, human performance science, advanced biomimetic systems, biological and biomimetic materials, human performance
enhancement, and ‘new concept’ biotechnology,” while the Chinese military’s medical enhancement, and ‘new concept’ biotechnology,” while the Chinese military’s medical
institutions have conducted extensive research on CRISPR gene editing.institutions have conducted extensive research on CRISPR gene editing.~~118~~128
Russia
Although Russia released BIO2020—a whole-of-government strategy for improving the standing Although Russia released BIO2020—a whole-of-government strategy for improving the standing
of Russia’s biotechnology sector—in 2012, biotechnology research in Russia continues to lag of Russia’s biotechnology sector—in 2012, biotechnology research in Russia continues to lag
behind that of the United States and China.behind that of the United States and China.~~119~~129 BIO2020 identifies Russia’s priority areas for BIO2020 identifies Russia’s priority areas for
biotechnology research as biopharmaceutics and biomedicine, industrial biotechnology and biotechnology research as biopharmaceutics and biomedicine, industrial biotechnology and
bioenergetics, agricultural and food biotechnology, forest biotechnology, environmental bioenergetics, agricultural and food biotechnology, forest biotechnology, environmental
protection biotechnology, and marine biotechnology.protection biotechnology, and marine biotechnology.~~120~~
130 Little information is publicly available Little information is publicly available on how Russia might employ such dual-use technologies on how Russia might employ such dual-use technologies
within a military or national security context. However, the accusation that the country within a military or national security context. However, the accusation that the country ~~recently~~
~~attempted~~ attempted to assassinate a former double agent for the United Kingdom using a Novichok nerve to assassinate a former double agent for the United Kingdom using a Novichok nerve
agent—in agent—in violation of the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention—suggests that it may be violation of the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention—suggests that it may be
similarly unrestrained in weaponizing biologicalsimilarly unrestrained in weaponizing biological agents, including those derived from synthetic agents, including those derived from synthetic
biology.biology.~~121~~ 131 Indeed, the Soviet Union is known to have maintained an extensive, long-standing Indeed, the Soviet Union is known to have maintained an extensive, long-standing
biological weapons program, Biopreparat, in violation of the 1972 Biologicalbiological weapons program, Biopreparat, in violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Weapons
~~Convention.122~~
~~International Institutions~~
~~Only the weaponization of biotechnology is prohibited under international law.123 Some~~
~~international institutions have demonstrated interest in considering broader implications of~~
~~biotechnologies. For example, since 1983, ASEAN has maintained a subcommittee on~~
~~biotechnology that facilitates coordination of regional biotechnology projects. Similarly, since~~
~~1993, the OECD has maintained an Internal Co-ordination Group for Biotechnology that~~

~~Revolution in Military Affairs,” The Jamestown Foundation, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/~~
~~chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/.~~
~~117 Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a ‘New Domain of~~
Warfare,’” Defense One~~, August~~ Convention.132 Furthermore, in August 2020, the End-User Review Committee (ERC)—composed of representatives of the U.S. Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, Energy, and, where appropriate, Treasury—stated that it has “reasonable cause” to believe that three Russian research institutes are associated with the Russian biological weapons program.133 International Institutions Only the weaponization of biotechnology is prohibited under international law.134 Some international institutions have demonstrated interest in considering broader implications of 127 Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “ Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a ‘New Domain of Warfare,’” Defense One, August 14, 2019, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/08/chinas-military-pursuing-14, 2019, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/08/chinas-military-pursuing-
biotech/159167/. biotech/159167/.
~~118~~128 Ibid. Ibid.
~~119~~129 Russian Russian Federation, “BIO2020: Summary of the State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology Federation, “BIO2020: Summary of the State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology
in the Russianin the Russian Federation,” 2012. Federation,” 2012.
~~120~~130 Ibid. Ibid.
~~121~~131 Mark Urban, “ Mark Urban, “~~Salisbury~~ Salisbury attack ‘evidence’ of Russianattack ‘evidence’ of Russian weapon stockpile,”weapon stockpile,” BBC, March 4, 2019. For a full, March 4, 2019. For a full assessment assessment
of the potential national security threats posed by synthetic biology, see the Committee on Strategies for Identifying of the potential national security threats posed by synthetic biology, see the Committee on Strategies for Identifying
and Addressingand Addressing Potential Biodefense VulnerabilitiesPotential Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic BiologyPosed by Synthetic Biology ~~Consensus~~ Consensus Report: Report: Biodefense in the
Age of Synthetic Biology, National Academy of Sciences,, National Academy of Sciences, 2018, at http://nap.edu/24890. 2018, at http://nap.edu/24890.
~~122 Lukas Trakimavičius~~132 Lukas T rakimavičius “Is Russia “Is Russia Violating the Biological Weapons Convention?,” Atlantic Council, May 23, 2018, Violating the Biological Weapons Convention?,” Atlantic Council, May 23, 2018,
at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-russia-violating-the-biological-weapons-convention/. at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-russia-violating-the-biological-weapons-convention/.
~~123 The United States, China, and Russia~~ 133 T he ERC added these research institutes to the Entity List, which identifies entities acting “contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.” Department of Commerce, “ Addition of Entities to the Entity List, and Revision of Entries on the Entity List,” August 27, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/27/2020-18909/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-revision-of-entries-on-the-entity-list. 134 T he United States, China, and Russia have ratified the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which is a legally have ratified the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which is a legally
bindingbinding treaty that bans the development and production of biological weapons.treaty that bans the development and production of biological weapons.
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biotechnologies. For example, since 1983, ASEAN has maintained a subcommittee on biotechnology that facilitates coordination of regional biotechnology projects. Similarly, since 1993, the OECD has maintained an Internal Co-ordination Group for Biotechnology that monitors developments in biotechnology and facilitates coordination among various sectors monitors developments in biotechnology and facilitates coordination among various sectors
involved in biotechnology research (e.g., agriculture, science and technology, environment, involved in biotechnology research (e.g., agriculture, science and technology, environment,
industry). In addition, the United Nations Convention on Biologicalindustry). In addition, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity is charged with Diversity is charged with
governing the development and use of governing the development and use of ~~genetically~~genetical y modified organisms. modified organisms.~~124~~135 These entities are not, These entities are not,
however, focused however, focused ~~specifically~~specifical y on military applications of biotechnology. on military applications of biotechnology.
In terms of potential militarization, In terms of potential militarization, the 1972 Biologicalthe 1972 Biological Weapons Convention requires review Weapons Convention requires review
conferences, which every five years assess both the implementation of the treaty and ongoing conferences, which every five years assess both the implementation of the treaty and ongoing
developments in biotechnology. Annual meetings are held between review conferences to developments in biotechnology. Annual meetings are held between review conferences to
~~informally~~informal y consider relevant topics, as consider relevant topics, as ~~well~~ wel as to address national bilateralas to address national bilateral and multilateraland multilateral efforts efforts
to enhance biosecurity. Some analysts have argued that an international framework should be to enhance biosecurity. Some analysts have argued that an international framework should be
established to consider the militarization of biotechnologies and discuss potential regulation of or established to consider the militarization of biotechnologies and discuss potential regulation of or
limits on certain applications.limits on certain applications.~~125~~136
Potential Questions for Congress
 Is a DOD biotechnology strategy or organization needed to identify research  Is a DOD biotechnology strategy or organization needed to identify research
priorities and coordinate department-wide research? What, if any, resources or priorities and coordinate department-wide research? What, if any, resources or
organizational changes would be required to organizational changes would be required to ~~fully~~ful y implement a national implement a national
biodefense strategy? biodefense strategy?
 What military applications of biotechnologies are U.S. competitors developing?  What military applications of biotechnologies are U.S. competitors developing?
Is the U.S. military appropriately balancing the potential warfighting utility of Is the U.S. military appropriately balancing the potential warfighting utility of
biotechnologies with ethical considerations? biotechnologies with ethical considerations?
 What, if any, national and international frameworks are needed to consider the  What, if any, national and international frameworks are needed to consider the
ethical, moral, and legal implications of military applications of biotechnologies ethical, moral, and legal implications of military applications of biotechnologies
such as synthetic biology, genome editing, and human performance such as synthetic biology, genome editing, and human performance
modification? modification?
Quantum ~~Technology~~Technology137
Quantum technology translates the principles of quantum physics into technological Quantum technology translates the principles of quantum physics into technological
applications.applications.~~126~~138 In general, quantum technology has not yet reached maturity; however, it could In general, quantum technology has not yet reached maturity; however, it could
hold significant implications for the future of military hold significant implications for the future of military ~~communications~~sensing, encryption, and , encryption, and ~~stealth~~
~~technologies.~~ communications. GAO reports that DOD, State, DHS, and GAO reports that DOD, State, DHS, and ~~the~~ ODNI have assessed that “quantum ODNI have assessed that “quantum
communications could enable adversaries to develop secure communications that U.S. personnel communications could enable adversaries to develop secure communications that U.S. personnel
~~would not be able to intercept or decrypt. Quantum computing may allow adversaries to decrypt~~
~~[unclassified, classified, or sensitive] information, which could enable them to target U.S.~~
~~personnel and military operations.”127~~

~~124 The United States is~~ would not be able 135 T he United States is not a party to this convention or its associated protocols. not a party to this convention or its associated protocols.
~~125~~136 See, See, for example, Brett Edwards,for example, Brett Edwards, “ “We’ve got to talk: We’ve got to talk: ~~The~~T he militarization of biotechnology,” militarization of biotechnology,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, August, August 4, 2017, at https://thebulletin.org/2017/08/weve-got4, 2017, at https://thebulletin.org/2017/08/weve-got -to-talk-the-militarization-of-biotechnology/. -to-talk-the-militarization-of-biotechnology/.
~~126 These principles include~~ 137 See also CRS In Focus IF11836, Defense Primer: Quantum Technology, by Kelley M. Sayler. 138 T hese principles include superposition—in which “a quantum system can exist in two or more states at once”—and superposition—in which “a quantum system can exist in two or more states at once”—and
entanglemententanglement —in which “—in which “ two or more quantum objects in a system can betwo or more quantum objects in a system can be intrinsically linked suchintrinsically linked such that measurement that measurement
of one dictates the possibleof one dictates the possible measurement outcomes for another, regardless of how far apart the two objects are.” Emily measurement outcomes for another, regardless of how far apart the two objects are.” Emily
GrumblingGrumbling and Mark Horowitz, eds., and Mark Horowitz, eds., Quantum ~~Computing~~ Com puting: Progress and Prospects, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Sciences,
2019, at https://www.nap.edu/read/25196/chapter/1. For additional information about quantum technology, see CRS 2019, at https://www.nap.edu/read/25196/chapter/1. For additional information about quantum technology, see CRS
Report R45409, Report R45409, Quantum ~~Information~~ Inform ation Science: Applications, Global Research and ~~Development, and~~Developm ent, an d Policy
Considerations, by Patricia Moloney Figliola. , by Patricia Moloney Figliola.
127 Government Accountability Office, National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States as
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~~Quantum technology could have other military applications, such as quantum radar systems~~
~~hypothesized to be capable of identifying the performance characteristics (e.g., radar cross-~~
~~section, speed) of objects with a greater level of accuracy than conventional radar systems. If~~
~~realized, these systems could significantly ease the tracking and targeting of U.S. low-observable,~~
~~or stealth, aircraft such as the F-22, F-35, and B-2 by adversaries.128 Similarly, advances in~~
~~quantum sensing could theoretically~~ to intercept or decrypt. Quantum computing may al ow adversaries to decrypt [unclassified, classified, or sensitive] information, which could enable them to target U.S. personnel and military operations.”139 Quantum technology could have other military applications, such as quantum sensing, which could theoretical y enable significant improvements in submarine detection, enable significant improvements in submarine detection,
rendering the oceans “transparent.”rendering the oceans “transparent.”~~129~~140 This could, in turn, compromise the survivability of the This could, in turn, compromise the survivability of the
U.S. sea-based nuclear U.S. sea-based nuclear deterrent. Quantum sensing could also provide alternative positioning, navigation, and timing options that could in theory al ow militaries to continue to operate at full performance in GPS- degraded or GPS-denied environments~~deterrent~~. .
Military Military application of such technologies could be constrained, however, by the fragility of application of such technologies could be constrained, however, by the fragility of
quantum states, which can be disrupted by minute movements, changes in temperature, or other quantum states, which can be disrupted by minute movements, changes in temperature, or other
environmental factors. As physicist Mikkel Hueck has explained, “if future devices that use environmental factors. As physicist Mikkel Hueck has explained, “if future devices that use
quantum technologies [continue to] require cooling to very cold temperatures, then this quantum technologies [continue to] require cooling to very cold temperatures, then this ~~will~~ wil make make
them expensive, bulky, and power hungry.” As a result, widespread adoption them expensive, bulky, and power hungry.” As a result, widespread adoption ~~will~~ wil likely require likely require
significant advances in materials science and fabrication techniques. significant advances in materials science and fabrication techniques.
United States
According to a Defense Science BoardAccording to a Defense Science Board’s Task Force on Applications of Quantum Technologies Task Force on Applications of Quantum Technologies
assessment, three applications of quantum technologies demonstrate the most promise for the assessment, three applications of quantum technologies demonstrate the most promise for the
U.S. military:U.S. military: quantum sensing, quantum computing, and quantum communications.quantum sensing, quantum computing, and quantum communications.~~130~~141 The task The task
force notes that quantum sensing could “force notes that quantum sensing could “~~dramatically~~dramatical y improve” DOD’s ability to conduct certain improve” DOD’s ability to conduct certain
missions, providing precision navigation and timing options in environments in which GPS is missions, providing precision navigation and timing options in environments in which GPS is
degraded or denied; that quantum computers could “degraded or denied; that quantum computers could “~~potentially~~potential y give DOD substantial give DOD substantial
computation power” for decryption, signals processing, and AI; and that quantum computation power” for decryption, signals processing, and AI; and that quantum
communications could improve networking technologies.communications could improve networking technologies.~~131~~142 The task force concludes that The task force concludes that
“quantum sensing applications are currently poised for mission use whereas quantum computing “quantum sensing applications are currently poised for mission use whereas quantum computing
and communications are in earlier stages of development…. Quantum radar and communications are in earlier stages of development…. Quantum radar ~~will~~ wil not provide not provide
upgraded capability to DOD.”upgraded capability to DOD.”~~132~~143 Both DARPA and the services fund an array of quantum Both DARPA and the services fund an array of quantum
technology programs across these and other research areas. technology programs across these and other research areas.
Per Section 234 of the FY2019 NDAA, the Secretary of Defense—acting through the Under Per Section 234 of the FY2019 NDAA, the Secretary of Defense—acting through the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering—is tasked with coordinating these programs Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering—is tasked with coordinating these programs
and providing “for interagency cooperation and collaboration on quantum information science and providing “for interagency cooperation and collaboration on quantum information science

139 Government Accountability Office, National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States as Identified by Federal Agencies, December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. Significant advances , December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. Significant advances
in quantum computing willin quantum computing will likely belikely be ~~required~~ required to break current encryption methods. Indeed, some analysts believe that a to break current encryption methods. Indeed, some analysts believe that a
quantum computer with around 20 million qubits—shorthand for “quantum computer with around 20 million qubits—shorthand for “ quantum bits,” or computing units that leverage the quantum bits,” or computing units that leverage the
principle of superposition—wouldprinciple of superposition—would be requiredbe required to break these methods; the most advanced quantumto break these methods; the most advanced quantum computers today computers today
have around 53 qubits.have around 53 qubits. ~~See “~~ See “ How a quantum computer could break 2048How a quantum computer could break 2048 -bit RSA-bit RSA encryption in 8 hours,” encryption in 8 hours,” MIT
Technology Review, May 30, 2019, at https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/05/30/65724/how-a-quantum-, May 30, 2019, at https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/05/30/65724/how-a-quantum-
computer-could-break-2048-bit-rsa-encryption-in-8-hours/. computer-could-break-2048-bit-rsa-encryption-in-8-hours/.
~~128 Martin Giles, “The US and China are in a quantum arms race that will transform warfare,” MIT Technology Review,~~
~~January 3, 2019, at https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/01/03/137969/us-china-quantum-arms-race/.~~
~~129~~140 Michael J. Biercuk Michael J. Biercuk and Richard Fontaine, “and Richard Fontaine, “~~The~~T he Leap into Quantum Leap into Quantum ~~Technology~~T echnology: A Primer for National Security : A Primer for National Security
Professionals,” Professionals,” War on the Rocks, November 17, 2017, at https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/leap-quantum-, November 17, 2017, at https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/leap-quantum-
technology-primer-national-security-professionals/. technology-primer-national-security-professionals/.
~~130~~141 Defense Science Defense Science Board, Board, Applications of Quantum Technologies: Executive Summary, October 2019, at , October 2019, at
https://dsb.cto.mil/reports.htm. https://dsb.cto.mil/reports.htm.
~~131~~142 Ibid. Ibid.
~~132~~143 Ibid. Ibid.
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and technology research and development between the Department of Defense and other and technology research and development between the Department of Defense and other
departments and agencies of the United States and appropriate private sector entities.”departments and agencies of the United States and appropriate private sector entities.”~~133 DOD is~~
~~additionally to develop a research and investment plan for quantum technologies and to submit to~~
~~the congressional defense committees, by December 31, 2020, an assessment of U.S. and foreign~~
~~efforts to use quantum technologies for military applications.134 Furthermore, Section 220 of the~~
~~FY2020 NDAA requires DOD to develop ethical guidelines for the use of quantum technologies,~~
~~as well as plans for supporting the quantum workforce and reducing the cybersecurity risks~~
~~associated with quantum technologies.135 It additionally requires DOD to~~
~~establish or designate [at least one] defense laboratory or establish activities to engage with~~
~~appropriate public and private sector organizations, including academic organizations, to~~
~~enhance and accelerate the research, development, and deployment of quantum~~
~~information sciences and quantum information science-enabled technologies and~~
~~systems.136~~
~~China~~
~~China has increasingly prioritized quantum technology research within its development plans.137~~
~~Indeed, President Xi has cited quantum communications and quantum computing as key research~~
~~initiatives~~ 144 In addition, Section 220 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) authorizes the Secretary of each military department to establish Quantum Information Science (QIS) Research Centers that may “engage with appropriate public and private sector organizations” to advance quantum research.145 To date, the Navy has designated the Naval Research Laboratory as its QIS Research Center, while the Air Force has designated the Air Force Research Laboratory as a QIS Research Center for both the Air Force and Space Force. The Army says it does not plan to establish a QIS Research Center at this time. Final y, Section 214 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the services to compile and annual y update a list of technical chal enges that quantum computers could potential y address within the next one to three years. It also directs the services to establish programs with smal and medium businesses to provide quantum computing capabilities to government, industry, and academic researchers working on these chal enges. Section 1722 directs DOD to conduct an assessment of the risks posed by quantum computers, as wel as current standards for post- quantum cryptography. China China has increasingly prioritized quantum technology research within its development plans.146 Indeed, President Xi has cited quantum communications and quantum computing as key research initiatives “prioritized for major breakthroughs by 2030,” an objective that is also cited in the “prioritized for major breakthroughs by 2030,” an objective that is also cited in the
country’s National Science and Technology Innovation Program.country’s National Science and Technology Innovation Program.~~138~~147 China is already a world China is already a world
leader in quantum technology. In 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum leader in quantum technology. In 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum ~~satellite~~satel ite to to
provide a “global quantum encrypted communications capability.” In 2017, China hosted the first provide a “global quantum encrypted communications capability.” In 2017, China hosted the first
quantum-secured intercontinental videoconference.quantum-secured intercontinental videoconference.~~139~~148 Furthermore, China is investing heavily in Furthermore, China is investing heavily in
terrestrial quantum communications networks. It completed construction of a 2,000 kilometer terrestrial quantum communications networks. It completed construction of a 2,000 kilometer
(approximately 1250 miles) Beijing-Shanghai(approximately 1250 miles) Beijing-Shanghai quantum network in 2016 and plans to expand that quantum network in 2016 and plans to expand that
network nationwide in the years to come.network nationwide in the years to come.~~140~~149 While such advances in quantum technology have While such advances in quantum technology have
been driven primarily by academia, China has expressed its intent to leverage them for military been driven primarily by academia, China has expressed its intent to leverage them for military
applications in the country’s Thirteenth Five-Year S&T Military-Civil Fusion Special Projects applications in the country’s Thirteenth Five-Year S&T Military-Civil Fusion Special Projects
Plan. 144~~Plan.~~

~~133~~ P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §234. P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §234.
~~134 Ibid. A DOD representative also sits on the National Quantum Coordination Office’s Subcommittee on Quantum~~
~~Information Sciences, as required by the National Quantum Initiative Act (P.L. 115-368).~~
~~135~~145 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, ~~Title~~T itle II, §220. II, §220.
~~136 Ibid.~~
~~137~~146 For a history of China’s quantum technology research and development initiatives, see Elsa B. Kania and John For a history of China’s quantum technology research and development initiatives, see Elsa B. Kania and John
Costello, Costello, Quantum ~~Hegemony~~ Hegem ony?: China’s ~~Ambitions~~Am bitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation Leadership , Center for a New , Center for a New
American Security, September 2018, p. 8, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReportAmerican Security, September 2018, p. 8, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport --
Quantum-Quantum-~~Tech_FINAL~~T ech_FINAL.pdf?mtime=20180912133406. .pdf?mtime=20180912133406.
~~138~~147 Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 6.
~~139~~148 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 101, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/, May 2, 2019, p. 101, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/
~~2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf.~~
~~140~~2019_CHINA_MILIT ARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf . 149 Elsa B. Kania and John Costello, Elsa B. Kania and John Costello, Quantum Hegemony?: China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation
Leadership, p. 14., p. 14.
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Russia
Russian development of quantum technology, as with artificial Russian development of quantum technology, as with artificial ~~intelligence,~~ intel igence, lags significantly lags significantly
behind that of the United States and China, with some analysts noting that Russia is likelybehind that of the United States and China, with some analysts noting that Russia is likely “5 to “5 to
10 years behind” in quantum computing.10 years behind” in quantum computing.~~141~~150 In an effort to spur development, Russia announced In an effort to spur development, Russia announced
plans in December 2019 to invest $790 plans in December 2019 to invest $790 ~~million~~mil ion in quantum research over the next five years and in quantum research over the next five years and
adopted a five-year Russian Quantum Technologies Roadmap.adopted a five-year Russian Quantum Technologies Roadmap.~~142~~151 These initiatives are not These initiatives are not
military-specific, however, and limited information is availablemilitary-specific, however, and limited information is available in open sources about how Russia in open sources about how Russia
might apply them to its military.might apply them to its military.
International Institutions
No major international institutions have formal initiatives devoted to monitoring or regulating No major international institutions have formal initiatives devoted to monitoring or regulating
military or other applications of quantum technology. military or other applications of quantum technology.
Potential Questions for Congress
 Does the maturity of military applications of quantum technology warrant current  Does the maturity of military applications of quantum technology warrant current
funding levels? To what extent, if at funding levels? To what extent, if at ~~all~~al , can advances in commercial quantum , can advances in commercial quantum
technology be leveraged for military applications? technology be leveraged for military applications?
 Are adequate measures being taken to develop quantum-resistant encryption and  Are adequate measures being taken to develop quantum-resistant encryption and
to protect data that has been encrypted using current methods? to protect data that has been encrypted using current methods?
 How mature are U.S. competitor efforts to develop military applications of  How mature are U.S. competitor efforts to develop military applications of
quantum technologies? To what extent, if at quantum technologies? To what extent, if at ~~all~~al , could such efforts threaten , could such efforts threaten
advanced U.S. military capabilities such as submarines and fifth-generation advanced U.S. military capabilities such as submarines and fifth-generation
stealth aircraft? stealth aircraft?
Potential Implications of Emerging Technologies
for Warfighting
The implications of emerging technologies for warfighting and strategic stability are difficult—if The implications of emerging technologies for warfighting and strategic stability are difficult—if
not impossible—to predict, as they not impossible—to predict, as they ~~will~~ wil be a function of many factors, including the rate of be a function of many factors, including the rate of
technological advancement in both the United States and competitor nations, the manner in which technological advancement in both the United States and competitor nations, the manner in which
emerging technologies are integrated into existing military forces and concepts of operation, the emerging technologies are integrated into existing military forces and concepts of operation, the
interactions between emerging technologies, and the extent to which national policies and interactions between emerging technologies, and the extent to which national policies and
international law enable or inhibit their development, integration, and use. international law enable or inhibit their development, integration, and use.
Nonetheless, many emerging technologies exhibit characteristics that could Nonetheless, many emerging technologies exhibit characteristics that could ~~potentially~~potential y affect the affect the
future character of war. For example, developments in technologies such as AI, big data analytics, future character of war. For example, developments in technologies such as AI, big data analytics,
and lethal autonomous weapons could diminish or remove the need for a human operator. This and lethal autonomous weapons could diminish or remove the need for a human operator. This
could, in turn, increase combat efficiency and accelerate the pace of combat—could, in turn, increase combat efficiency and accelerate the pace of combat—~~potentially with~~
~~destabilizing~~ potential y with destabilizing consequences.consequences.
Emerging technologies such as low-cost drones could shift the balance between quality—upon Emerging technologies such as low-cost drones could shift the balance between quality—upon
which U.S. military forces have which U.S. military forces have ~~traditionally~~traditional y relied—and quantity, as relied—and quantity, as ~~well~~ wel as between offense and as between offense and

~~141~~ 150 Quirin Schiermeier, “Russia Quirin Schiermeier, “Russia joins race to make quantum dreams a reality,” joins race to make quantum dreams a reality,” Nature, December 17, 2019, at , December 17, 2019, at
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03855-z. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03855-z.
~~142~~151 For comparison, the U.S. National Quantum Initiative Act (P.L. 115-368), signed into law in December 2018, For comparison, the U.S. National Quantum Initiative Act (P.L. 115-368), signed into law in December 2018,
commits the United States to investing $1.25 billion in quantum research over five years. commits the United States to investing $1.25 billion in quantum research over five years.
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defense. For example, swarms of coordinated, unmanned vehicles could overwhelm defensive defense. For example, swarms of coordinated, unmanned vehicles could overwhelm defensive
systems, providing a greater advantage to the attacker, while directedsystems, providing a greater advantage to the attacker, while directed- energy weapons that energy weapons that
provide a low-cost means of neutralizing such attacks, could favor the defender. Thus, emerging provide a low-cost means of neutralizing such attacks, could favor the defender. Thus, emerging
technologies could shift the offense-defense balance multiple times over the coming decades. technologies could shift the offense-defense balance multiple times over the coming decades.
Interactions among emerging technologies could also improve existing military capabilities or Interactions among emerging technologies could also improve existing military capabilities or
enable new capabilities—with unforeseen consequences for warfighting and strategic stability. enable new capabilities—with unforeseen consequences for warfighting and strategic stability.
For example, an enabling technology like AI could be paired with quantum computing to produce For example, an enabling technology like AI could be paired with quantum computing to produce
more powerful methods of machine learning, more powerful methods of machine learning, ~~potentially~~potential y leading to improvements in image leading to improvements in image
recognition and target identification and enabling more sophisticated autonomous weapons. recognition and target identification and enabling more sophisticated autonomous weapons.
Similarly, AI could be paired with 5G communications technologies to enable virtual training Similarly, AI could be paired with 5G communications technologies to enable virtual training
environments or with biotechnology in a “brain-computer interface” to enhance human cognition environments or with biotechnology in a “brain-computer interface” to enhance human cognition
or control prosthetics or robotic systems.or control prosthetics or robotic systems.~~143~~152 Such developments could, in turn, require new Such developments could, in turn, require new
strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation.strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation.~~144~~153
Emerging military technologies—particularly complex systems such as AI and LAWS—could Emerging military technologies—particularly complex systems such as AI and LAWS—could
~~additionally~~ additional y produce unintended consequences if they fail to perform as anticipated. These produce unintended consequences if they fail to perform as anticipated. These
consequences could range from system failure to violations of the law of armed conflict. As consequences could range from system failure to violations of the law of armed conflict. As
analyst Paul Scharre has noted, “in the most extreme case, an autonomous weapon could continue analyst Paul Scharre has noted, “in the most extreme case, an autonomous weapon could continue
engaging inappropriate targets until it exhausts its magazine, engaging inappropriate targets until it exhausts its magazine, ~~potentially~~potential y over a wide area.” over a wide area.”~~145~~154 This This
could, in turn, result in mass fratricide or civilian casualties—a possibility that has led some could, in turn, result in mass fratricide or civilian casualties—a possibility that has led some
analysts to analysts to ~~call~~ cal for a pre-emptive ban on LAWS.for a pre-emptive ban on LAWS.
~~Finally~~ Final y, emerging military, emerging military technologies could raise an array of ethical considerations. For technologies could raise an array of ethical considerations. For
example, some analysts have argued that the use of LAWS would be inherently immoral—example, some analysts have argued that the use of LAWS would be inherently immoral—
regardless of whether the weapon could be used regardless of whether the weapon could be used ~~legally~~legal y—because a human operator would not —because a human operator would not
make specific target selection and engagement decisions.make specific target selection and engagement decisions.~~146~~155 Others have countered that human Others have countered that human
operators would continue to exercise “appropriate levels of human judgement over the use of operators would continue to exercise “appropriate levels of human judgement over the use of
force” and would remain accountable for ensuring that the deployment of LAWS conforms to the force” and would remain accountable for ensuring that the deployment of LAWS conforms to the
requirements of the laws of armed conflict.requirements of the laws of armed conflict.~~147~~156 Those supporting a pre-emptive ban on LAWS have Those supporting a pre-emptive ban on LAWS have
~~additionally~~ additional y appealed to the Martens Clause, which appears in the1899 Hague Convention appealed to the Martens Clause, which appears in the1899 Hague Convention
preamble and states that weapons usage should conform to the “principles of humanity and the preamble and states that weapons usage should conform to the “principles of humanity and the
dictates of the public conscience.”dictates of the public conscience.”~~148~~157 These analysts believe that LAWS contravene that These analysts believe that LAWS contravene that
requirement; however, others have noted that the Martens Clause has not been used previously to requirement; however, others have noted that the Martens Clause has not been used previously to
ban a weapons system and, furthermore, that the legal status of the Martens Clause is ban a weapons system and, furthermore, that the legal status of the Martens Clause is

~~143~~ 152 For additional information about military applications of 5G, see CRS For additional information about military applications of 5G, see CRS In FocusIn Focus IF11251, IF11251, National Security
~~Implications~~Im plications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler., by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.
~~144~~ 153 For a discussion For a discussion of these and other military and security implications—including implications for deterrence, crisis of these and other military and security implications—including implications for deterrence, crisis
stability, force posture, and military roles and missions—seestability, force posture, and military roles and missions—see Robert O. Work and ShawnRobert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, Brimley, 20YY: Preparing for
War in the Robotic Age, Center for a New, Center for a New American Century, January 22, 2014, pp. 31American Century, January 22, 2014, pp. 31 -35, at https://www.cnas.org/-35, at https://www.cnas.org/
publications/reports/20yy-preparing-for-war-in-the-robotic-age. publications/reports/20yy-preparing-for-war-in-the-robotic-age.
~~145~~154 Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security, FebruaryAmerican Security, February 2016, 2016,
at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf. at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf.
~~146~~155 See, See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, for example, Bonnie Docherty, Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots, Human , Human
Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-
killer-robots. killer-robots.
~~147~~156 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at
https://www.esd.whs. https://www.esd.whs.
~~148~~157 See, See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, for example, Bonnie Docherty, Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots, Human , Human
Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-
killer-robots. killer-robots.
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questionable and instead constitutes “merely a recognition of ‘customary international law’.” questionable and instead constitutes “merely a recognition of ‘customary international law’.”~~149~~158
Similarly, some analysts have raised ethical concerns about applications of biotechnology that Similarly, some analysts have raised ethical concerns about applications of biotechnology that
involve human testing or modification as involve human testing or modification as ~~well~~ wel as the weaponization of biotechnology, which as the weaponization of biotechnology, which
could potential y~~could potentially~~ be used for targeted genetic attacks. be used for targeted genetic attacks.~~150~~
159 Issues for Congress
Congress has previously demonstrated interest in conducting oversight of emerging military Congress has previously demonstrated interest in conducting oversight of emerging military
technologies beyond technology-specific activities. In Section 247 of the FY2019 NDAAtechnologies beyond technology-specific activities. In Section 247 of the FY2019 NDAA (P.L. 115-232), ,
Congress specified “a set of classified reports that set forth a direct comparison between the Congress specified “a set of classified reports that set forth a direct comparison between the
capabilities of the United States in emerging technology areas and the capabilities of adversaries capabilities of the United States in emerging technology areas and the capabilities of adversaries
of the United States.”of the United States.”~~151~~160 These areas include hypersonic weapons, AI, quantum technology, These areas include hypersonic weapons, AI, quantum technology,
directed energy weapons, and other relevant technologies as determined by the directed energy weapons, and other relevant technologies as determined by the Secretary of Secretary of
Defense. Section 225 of the FY2019 NDAA Defense. Section 225 of the FY2019 NDAA ~~additionally~~ additional y tasked the Under Secretary of Defense tasked the Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering with generating procedures for developing “technologies that are for Research and Engineering with generating procedures for developing “technologies that are
urgently needed to react to a technological development of an adversary of the United States or to urgently needed to react to a technological development of an adversary of the United States or to
respond to a significant and urgent emerging technology [that are] not respond to a significant and urgent emerging technology [that are] not receiving appropriate receiving appropriate
research funding or attention from the Department of Defense.” research funding or attention from the Department of Defense.”
Furthermore, Section 232 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) tasked the Secretary of Defense Furthermore, Section 232 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) tasked the Secretary of Defense
with developing “a process to ensure that the policies of the Department of Defense relating to with developing “a process to ensure that the policies of the Department of Defense relating to
emerging technology are formulated and updated continuously as such technology is developed emerging technology are formulated and updated continuously as such technology is developed
by the Departmentby the Department~~.”152~~
,”161 while Section 236 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) granted the Secretary the authority to establish a Steering Committee tasked with developing assessments of and a strategy for emerging technology and national security threats. As Congress continues to review the Pentagon’s plans for emerging military technologies during As Congress continues to review the Pentagon’s plans for emerging military technologies during
the annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider issues surrounding funding the annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider issues surrounding funding
considerations, management, personnel, acquisition, technology protection, considerations, management, personnel, acquisition, technology protection, ~~and~~ governance and governance and
~~regulation~~ regulation, and oversight. .
Funding Considerations
A number of emerging military technologies, including hypersonic weapons and directed energy A number of emerging military technologies, including hypersonic weapons and directed energy
weapons, have experienced fluctuations in funding over the years. According to a U.S. weapons, have experienced fluctuations in funding over the years. According to a U.S.
~~government interagency task force on the defense industrial base, such “fluctuations challenge the~~
~~viability of suppliers within the industrial base by diminishing their ability to hire and retain a~~

~~149~~ 158 Paul Scharre, Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future ofo f War (New(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, York: W.W. Norton & Company,
2018), pp. 263-266. 2018), pp. 263-266.
~~150~~159 For a more in-depth discussion For a more in-depth discussion of ethical considerations related to biotechnology, see CRSof ethical considerations related to biotechnology, see CRS Report R44824, Report R44824,
Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9, by Marcy E. Gallo, by Marcy E. Gallo et al. Seeet al. See also Elsa Kania andalso Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “Wilson VornDick, “ China’s China’s
Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the NewMilitary Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” Revolution in Military Affairs,” The
~~Jamestown~~Jam estown Foundation, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-
military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/. military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/.
~~151~~160 Each report is to include Each report is to include the following elements: “(1) an evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries the following elements: “(1) an evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries
on such technology, (2) an evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on suchon such technology, (2) an evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology, (technology, ( 3) an evaluation of 3) an evaluation of
the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology, (4) an assessment of the technological progress of the the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology, (4) an assessment of the technological progress of the
United States and adversariesUnited States and adversaries on such technology, (5) descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such on such technology, (5) descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such
technology, [and] (6) an assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to usetechnology, [and] (6) an assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.”such technology.”
~~152~~ 161 Section 232 defines emerging Section 232 defines emerging technology as “technology determined to be in an emerging phase of development by technology as “technology determined to be in an emerging phase of development by
the Secretary of Defense, includingthe Secretary of Defense, including quantum computing, technology for the analysis of large and diverse sets of data quantum computing, technology for the analysis of large and diverse sets of data
(commonly known as ‘big(commonly known as ‘big data analytics’), artificial intelligence, autonomous technology, robotics, directed energy, data analytics’), artificial intelligence, autonomous technology, robotics, directed energy,
hypersonics, biotechnology, and such other technology as mayhypersonics, biotechnology, and such other technology as may be identified by the Secretary.” be identified by the Secretary.”
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~~skilled~~government interagency task force on the defense industrial base, such “fluctuations chal enge the viability of suppliers within the industrial base by diminishing their ability to hire and retain a skil ed workforce, [achieve] production efficiencies, and in some cases, [stay] in business.” workforce, [achieve] production efficiencies, and in some cases, [stay] in business.”~~153~~162
Other analysts have noted that such fluctuations are often due to unavoidable tradeoffs between Other analysts have noted that such fluctuations are often due to unavoidable tradeoffs between
technology investment priorities or to questions about a given technology’s feasibility or technology investment priorities or to questions about a given technology’s feasibility or
maturity.maturity.~~154~~
163 Some analysts have suggested that, given the potential for technological surprise, funding for Some analysts have suggested that, given the potential for technological surprise, funding for
~~overall~~ overal research and development is inadequateresearch and development is inadequate~~—particularly in light of the 9% reduction in the~~
~~FY2021 President’s budget request for federal research and development~~. Summarizing such . Summarizing such
views, technology expert views, technology expert ~~Martjin~~ Martijn Rasser notes that reducing Rasser notes that reducing ~~overall~~ overal research and development in research and development in
order to enable “big bets” or heavy investments in a particular technology or technologies, can be order to enable “big bets” or heavy investments in a particular technology or technologies, can be
a risky approach because a risky approach because “we just don’t know where the next breakthroughs “we just don’t know where the next breakthroughs ~~will~~ wil come from.”come from.”~~155~~
164 Management
In general, DOD manages each of the aforementioned emerging military technologies separately In general, DOD manages each of the aforementioned emerging military technologies separately
due to the distinct expertise required. For example, within the Office of the Under Secretary of due to the distinct expertise required. For example, within the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]), there are separate technical directors or Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]), there are separate technical directors or
assistant directors for artificial assistant directors for artificial ~~intelligence~~intel igence, autonomy, hypersonic weapons, directed energy, , autonomy, hypersonic weapons, directed energy,
biotechnology, and quantum science—among other technology areas—which report through the biotechnology, and quantum science—among other technology areas—which report through the
Director for Modernization to USD(R&E).Director for Modernization to USD(R&E).~~156~~165 Development of each of these technologies is Development of each of these technologies is
guided by a standalone technology roadmap and, in the case of AI, a classified strategy. Although guided by a standalone technology roadmap and, in the case of AI, a classified strategy. Although
the Director for Modernization has oversight over emerging military technologies, some analysts the Director for Modernization has oversight over emerging military technologies, some analysts
have suggested that there is a need for a more holistic approach to portfolio management that have suggested that there is a need for a more holistic approach to portfolio management that
better considers how such technologies might be combined and integrated.better considers how such technologies might be combined and integrated.~~157~~
166 Furthermore, senior leaders do not always agree on the priorities among emerging military Furthermore, senior leaders do not always agree on the priorities among emerging military
technologies—both in terms of effort and funding—and such priorities can shift frequently. This technologies—both in terms of effort and funding—and such priorities can shift frequently. This
fluctuation has led some analysts to suggest that DOD should adopt a technology strategy “to set fluctuation has led some analysts to suggest that DOD should adopt a technology strategy “to set
spending priorities that can be sustained over time, outlasting individualspending priorities that can be sustained over time, outlasting individual leaders.”167 162 Interagency T ask~~leaders.”158~~

~~153 Interagency Task~~ Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806, Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806, Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing
and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States, September 2018, p. 21, at , September 2018, p. 21, at
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-~~STRENGTHENING-THE-~~
~~MANUFACTURING~~ST RENGT HENING-T HE-MANUFACT URING-AND%20DEFENSE--AND%20DEFENSE-~~INDUSTRIAL~~INDUST RIAL-BASE-AND--BASE-AND- SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF. SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF.
~~154~~163 See, See, for example, Ariel Robinson, “for example, Ariel Robinson, “ Directed Energy Weapons: Will Directed Energy Weapons: Will ~~They~~T hey Ever Be Ready?,” Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July , July
1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-
ever-be-ready. ever-be-ready.
~~155~~164 See, See, for example, Will Knight, “for example, Will Knight, “~~Trump~~ T rump Proposes a Cut in Research Spending, Proposes a Cut in Research Spending, ~~but~~ but a Boost for AI,” a Boost for AI,” Wired,, February February
11, 2020, at https://www.wired.com/story/trump-proposes-cut-research-spending-boost11, 2020, at https://www.wired.com/story/trump-proposes-cut-research-spending-boost -ai/. For more information about -ai/. For more information about
federal R&D funding,federal R&D funding, ~~including~~ including a discussiona discussion of DOD R&D funding,of DOD R&D funding, see CRSsee CRS Report R46341, Report R46341, Federal Research and
~~Development~~Developm ent (R&D) Funding: FY2021 , coordinated by John F. Sargent Jr. , coordinated by John F. Sargent Jr.
~~156~~165 CRS CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10834, IF10834, Defense Primer: Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering , by Marcy E. , by Marcy E.
Gallo.Gallo.
~~157~~ 166 See, See, for example, Government Accountability Office, for example, Government Accountability Office, Weapon System Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve
the Department of Defense’s Portfolio Management, August 2015, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672205.pdf; and , August 2015, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672205.pdf; and
Pete Modigliani, Pete Modigliani, After the divorce: How the Pentagon can position itself for speed, agility, and innovation in the new
era of acquisitions, , ~~MITRE~~MIT RE, March 2019, at https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-18-03404-3-after-, March 2019, at https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-18-03404-3-after-
the-divorce-white-paper.pdf. the-divorce-white-paper.pdf.
~~158~~167 Paul Scharre and Ainikki Riikonen, “ Paul Scharre and Ainikki Riikonen, “~~The~~ T he Defense Department Needs a Real Defense Department Needs a Real ~~Technology~~T echnology Strategy Strategy ,” ,” Defense One, ,
April 21, 2020, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/04/pentagon-needs-technology-strategy/164764/. April 21, 2020, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/04/pentagon-needs-technology-strategy/164764/.
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Personnel
Some reports indicate that DOD and the defense industry have difficulty recruiting and retaining Some reports indicate that DOD and the defense industry have difficulty recruiting and retaining
personnel with expertise in emerging technologies because research funding and salaries personnel with expertise in emerging technologies because research funding and salaries
significantly lag behind those of commercial companies.significantly lag behind those of commercial companies.~~159~~168 Other reports suggest that such Other reports suggest that such
~~challenges~~chal enges stem from quality-of-life factors, as stem from quality-of-life factors, as ~~well~~ wel as from a belief among many technology as from a belief among many technology
workers that “they can achieve large-scale change faster and better outside the government than workers that “they can achieve large-scale change faster and better outside the government than
within it.”within it.”~~160~~169 DOD faces additional DOD faces additional ~~challenges~~chal enges in training and educating its standing workforce. in training and educating its standing workforce.
Examples of recommendations for addressing this set of Examples of recommendations for addressing this set of ~~challenges~~chal enges include increasing technology include increasing technology
education opportunities at military academies, enhancing partnerships between DOD and research education opportunities at military academies, enhancing partnerships between DOD and research
universities, creating government universities, creating government ~~fellowships~~fel owships and accelerated promotion tracks for technology and accelerated promotion tracks for technology
workers, and improving the technology literacy of human resource teams.workers, and improving the technology literacy of human resource teams.~~161~~
170 Acquisition
DOD may need to continue adjusting its acquisition process to account for rapidly evolving dual-DOD may need to continue adjusting its acquisition process to account for rapidly evolving dual-
use technologies such as AI.use technologies such as AI.~~162~~171 For example, a 2017 internal study of the process found that it For example, a 2017 internal study of the process found that it
takes an average of 81 months for information technology programs to move from the initial takes an average of 81 months for information technology programs to move from the initial
Analysis of Alternatives, defining the requirements for a system, to an Initial Operational Analysis of Alternatives, defining the requirements for a system, to an Initial Operational
Capability.Capability.~~163~~172 In contrast, commercial companies In contrast, commercial companies ~~typically~~typical y execute an iterative development execute an iterative development
process for software systems (such as those involved in AI capabilities), deliveringprocess for software systems (such as those involved in AI capabilities), delivering an initial an initial
product in six to nine months.product in six to nine months.~~164~~173 These findings prompted DOD to issue an interim software These findings prompted DOD to issue an interim software
acquisition policy intended to “[simplify] the acquisition model to enable continuous integration acquisition policy intended to “[simplify] the acquisition model to enable continuous integration
and delivery of software capability on timelines relevant to the Warfighter/end user.”and delivery of software capability on timelines relevant to the Warfighter/end user.”~~165~~174 Similar Similar
efforts may be needed for other emerging military technologies. efforts may be needed for other emerging military technologies.

~~159~~ 168 M.L. Cummings, M.L. Cummings, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare,” “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare,” Chatham House, January 2017, p. 11, at , January 2017, p. 11, at
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-01-26-artificial-intelligence-future-https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-01-26-artificial-intelligence-future-
warfare-cummings-final.pdf. warfare-cummings-final.pdf.
~~160~~169 Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, ~~“The~~ “T he Divide between Silicon Valley Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington Is a National-Security and Washington Is a National-Security ~~Threat~~T hreat,” ,”
The Atlantic, December 13, 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/growing-gulf-between-silicon-, December 13, 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/growing-gulf-between-silicon-
valley-and-washington/577963/. valley-and-washington/577963/.
~~161~~170 See See Defense Science Board, Defense Science Board, Applications of Quantum Technologies: Executive Summary; National Security ; National Security
Commission on Artificial Intelligence, Commission on Artificial Intelligence, First Quarter ~~Recommendations~~Recom m endations, March 2020, pp. 21-43, at , March 2020, pp. 21-43, at
https://drive.google.com/file/d/https://drive.google.com/file/d/~~1wkPh8Gb5drBrKBg6OhGu5oNaTEERbKss/view;~~ 1wkPh8Gb5drBrKBg6OhGu5oNaT EERbKss/view; and Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, and Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs,
““~~The~~T he Divide between Silicon Divide between Silicon ~~Valley~~ Valley and Washington.” For example, DOD is establishingand Washington.” For example, DOD is establishing a university consortium for a university consortium for
hypersonic research and workforce developmenthypersonic research and workforce development , while the Defense Digital Service, while the Defense Digital Service now offers one- to two-year now offers one- to two-year
assignments for commercial technology workers. Similarly, the National Security Innovation Network seeks to create assignments for commercial technology workers. Similarly, the National Security Innovation Network seeks to create
models and pathways for recruiting technologists to the U.S. government. models and pathways for recruiting technologists to the U.S. government.
~~162~~171 Andrew Andrew Ilachinski, Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval , Center for Naval
Analysis, January 2017, pp. 190-191. For an overview of recent acquisition reform efforts, see CRSAnalysis, January 2017, pp. 190-191. For an overview of recent acquisition reform efforts, see CRS Report R45068, Report R45068,
Acquisition Reform in the FY2016-FY2018 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) , by Heidi, by Heidi M. Peters. M. Peters.
~~163~~172 Andrew Andrew Ilachinski, Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, p. 189. , p. 189.
~~164~~173 Defense Science Defense Science Board, “Design and Acquisition of Software for Defense Systems,” February 2018, at Board, “Design and Acquisition of Software for Defense Systems,” February 2018, at
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1048883.pdf. See also Defense Innovation Board, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1048883.pdf. See also Defense Innovation Board, Software is Never Done:
Refactoring the Acquisition Code for ~~Competitive~~Com petitive Advantage, May 3, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/30/, May 3, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/30/
2002124828/-1/-1/0/2002124828/-1/-1/0/
~~SOFTWAREISNEVERDONE_REFACTORINGTHEACQUISITIONCODEFORCOMPETITIVEADVANTAGE_FIN~~
~~AL.SWAP.REPORT.PDF.~~
~~165~~SOFT WAREISNEVERDONE_REFACT ORINGT HEACQUI SIT IONCODEFORCOMPET IT IVEADVANT AGE_FINAL.SWAP.REPORT .PDF. 174 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment , “Software Acquisition Pathway Interim , “Software Acquisition Pathway Interim
Policy and Procedures,” January 3, 2020, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/ae/assets/docs/USA002825-Policy and Procedures,” January 3, 2020, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/ae/assets/docs/USA002825-
19%20Signed%20Memo%20(Software).pdf. 19%20Signed%20Memo%20(Software).pdf.
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Furthermore, the commercial companies that are often at the forefront of innovation in emerging Furthermore, the commercial companies that are often at the forefront of innovation in emerging
technologies may be reluctant to partner with DOD due to the complexity of the defense technologies may be reluctant to partner with DOD due to the complexity of the defense
acquisition process. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of this issue found that, of acquisition process. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of this issue found that, of
12 U.S. commercial companies who choose not to do business with DOD, 12 U.S. commercial companies who choose not to do business with DOD, ~~all~~ al 12 cited the 12 cited the
complexity of the defense acquisition process as a rationale for their decision.complexity of the defense acquisition process as a rationale for their decision.~~166~~175 DOD has created DOD has created
a number of avenues for rapid acquisitions—including the Strategic Capabilities Office, the a number of avenues for rapid acquisitions—including the Strategic Capabilities Office, the
Defense Innovation Unit, and Project Maven—that are intended to streamline cumbersome Defense Innovation Unit, and Project Maven—that are intended to streamline cumbersome
processes and accelerate the acquisitions timeline.processes and accelerate the acquisitions timeline.~~167~~176 Project Maven, for example, was established Project Maven, for example, was established
in Aprilin April 2017; by December, the team was fielding a 2017; by December, the team was fielding a ~~commercially~~commercial y acquired prototype AI system acquired prototype AI system
in combat.in combat.~~168~~177 Although some analysts argue that these are promising developments, critics point Although some analysts argue that these are promising developments, critics point
out that the department must replicate such results at scale and implement more comprehensive out that the department must replicate such results at scale and implement more comprehensive
acquisitions reform.acquisitions reform.~~169~~178
Intellectual Property
Commercial technology companies are often reluctant to partner with DOD due to concerns about Commercial technology companies are often reluctant to partner with DOD due to concerns about
~~intellectual~~ intel ectual property and data rights.property and data rights.~~170~~179 As an official interviewed for a 2017 GAO report on As an official interviewed for a 2017 GAO report on
broader broader ~~challenges~~chal enges in military acquisitions noted, in military acquisitions noted, ~~intellectual~~intel ectual property is the “life blood” of property is the “life blood” of
commercial technology companies, yet “DOD is putting increased pressure on companies to grant commercial technology companies, yet “DOD is putting increased pressure on companies to grant
unlimited technical data and software rights or government purpose rights rather than limited or unlimited technical data and software rights or government purpose rights rather than limited or
restricted rights.”restricted rights.”~~171~~180 In an effort to manage these concerns, DOD released an instruction that In an effort to manage these concerns, DOD released an instruction that
“establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the acquisition, “establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the acquisition,
licensing, and management of IP.”licensing, and management of IP.”~~172~~181 The instruction The instruction ~~additionally~~additional y establishes a DOD IP Cadre to establishes a DOD IP Cadre to
advise and assist the acquisition workforce on matters related to IP and advise and assist the acquisition workforce on matters related to IP and ~~calls~~cal s for the development for the development
of an IP strategy to “identify and manage the full spectrum of IP and related matters” for each of an IP strategy to “identify and manage the full spectrum of IP and related matters” for each
acquisition program.acquisition program.~~173~~182
Supply Chain Security
A number of recent reports have raised concerns about the security of the U.S. supply chain for A number of recent reports have raised concerns about the security of the U.S. supply chain for
emerging military technologies. For example, one assessment found that China “may have emerging military technologies. For example, one assessment found that China “may have

~~166 U.S.~~ 175 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Government Accountability Office, Military Acquisitions, DOD is Taking Step to Address Challenges Faced
by Certain ~~Companies~~ Com panies, GAO-17-644, July 20, 2017, p. 9. Other rationales cited include unstable budget, GAO-17-644, July 20, 2017, p. 9. Other rationales cited include unstable budget environment, environment,
lengthy contracting timeline, government-specific contract terms and conditions, and inexperienced DOD contracting lengthy contracting timeline, government-specific contract terms and conditions, and inexperienced DOD contracting
workforce. workforce.
~~167~~176 In certain circumstances, DOD may also use In certain circumstances, DOD may also use other transaction authorities (other transaction authorities (~~OTAs~~OT As) to accelerate research, ) to accelerate research,
prototyping, and production. For additional prototyping, and production. For additional ~~information about OTAs, see CRS~~ info rmation about OT As, see CRS Report R45521, Report R45521, ~~Department~~Departm ent of Defense
Use of Other Transaction Authority: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress,, by Heidi M. Peters. by Heidi M. Peters.
~~168~~177 Marcus Weisgerber, Marcus Weisgerber, ~~“The~~ “T he Pentagon’s New Artificial Intelligence is Already Hunting Pentagon’s New Artificial Intelligence is Already Hunting ~~Terrorists~~T errorists,” ,” Defense One, ,
December 21, 2017, at http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/12/pentagons-new-artificial-intelligence-already-December 21, 2017, at http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/12/pentagons-new-artificial-intelligence-already-
hunting-terrorists/144742/. hunting-terrorists/144742/.
~~169~~178 Andrew Andrew Ilachinski, Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval , Center for Naval
Analysis, January 2017, p. 190. Analysis, January 2017, p. 190.
~~170~~179 U.S. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Government Accountability Office, Military Acquisitions, DOD is Taking Steps to Address Challenges Faced
by Certain ~~Companies.~~
~~171~~ Com panies. 180 Ibid., p. 20. Ibid., p. 20.
~~172~~181 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment , “DOD Instruction 5010.44 Intellectual , “DOD Instruction 5010.44 Intellectual
Property (IP) Acquisition and Licensing,” October 16, 2019, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/Property (IP) Acquisition and Licensing,” October 16, 2019, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/
issuances/dodi/501044p.PDF?ver=2019-10-16-144448-070. issuances/dodi/501044p.PDF?ver=2019-10-16-144448-070.
~~173~~182 Ibid., pp. 8-11. Ibid., pp. 8-11.
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opportunities to jeopardize the development of hypersonics through industrial espionage, opportunities to jeopardize the development of hypersonics through industrial espionage,
transfers of technology, or providing unreliable components” due to its potential exposure to low-transfers of technology, or providing unreliable components” due to its potential exposure to low-
level U.S. suppliers.level U.S. suppliers.~~174~~183 Similarly the National Security Commission on Artificial Similarly the National Security Commission on Artificial ~~Intelligence~~ Intel igence
found that “the United States lacks domestic facilities capable of producing, integrating, found that “the United States lacks domestic facilities capable of producing, integrating,
assembling, and testing” the microelectronics needed to enable AI, forcing the U.S. “to rely on assembling, and testing” the microelectronics needed to enable AI, forcing the U.S. “to rely on
foreign fabrication and complex global supply chains for production.”foreign fabrication and complex global supply chains for production.”~~175~~
184 Technology Protection
Estimates indicate “that American industry loses more than $600 Estimates indicate “that American industry loses more than $600 ~~billion~~bil ion dollars [each year] to dollars [each year] to
theft and expropriation,” including the theft and expropriation of emerging military technologies theft and expropriation,” including the theft and expropriation of emerging military technologies
and related and related ~~intellectual~~ intel ectual property.property.~~176~~185 The United States has a number of programs devoted to The United States has a number of programs devoted to
addressing this issue. For example, pursuant to the Foreign Investment Risk Review addressing this issue. For example, pursuant to the Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS) now reviews certain foreign investments, including those involving “emerging States (CFIUS) now reviews certain foreign investments, including those involving “emerging
and foundational technologies.” In addition, FIRRMA authorized CFIUS to consider “whether a and foundational technologies.” In addition, FIRRMA authorized CFIUS to consider “whether a
covered transaction involves a country of special concern that has a demonstrated or declared covered transaction involves a country of special concern that has a demonstrated or declared
strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure that would affect strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure that would affect
United States leadership in areas related to national security.”United States leadership in areas related to national security.”~~177~~186 Similarly, DOD’s Protecting Similarly, DOD’s Protecting
Critical Technology Task Force helps protect universities, labs, and the U.S. defense industrial Critical Technology Task Force helps protect universities, labs, and the U.S. defense industrial
base against the theft of “classified information, controlled unclassified information, and key base against the theft of “classified information, controlled unclassified information, and key
data.”data.”~~178~~187 As part of this effort, the task force intends to institute cybersecurity training programs As part of this effort, the task force intends to institute cybersecurity training programs
for for ~~small~~ smal businesses, enhance DOD’s understanding of supply chain vulnerabilities, and develop businesses, enhance DOD’s understanding of supply chain vulnerabilities, and develop
a prioritized list of technologies that are critical to national security—as mandated by Section a prioritized list of technologies that are critical to national security—as mandated by Section
1049 of the FY2019 NDAA—among other activities.1049 of the FY2019 NDAA—among other activities.~~179~~188 Some analysts have recommended Some analysts have recommended
expanding technology protection efforts to include U.S. expanding technology protection efforts to include U.S. ~~allies~~al ies and partners. and partners.~~180~~

~~174~~189 183 Govini, Govini, The 2020 Federal Scorecard: High-Intensity Warfare Edition, p. 67, at https://www.govini.com/wp-content/, p. 67, at https://www.govini.com/wp-content/
uploads/2020/06/Govini-2020-Federal-Scorecard.pdf. uploads/2020/06/Govini-2020-Federal-Scorecard.pdf.
~~175~~184 National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, First Quarter Recommendations, p. 46. , p. 46.
~~176~~185 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical ~~Technology Task~~T echnology T ask
Force,” October 24, 2018, at https://insidecybersecurity.com/sites/insidecybersecurity.com/files/documents/2018/nov/Force,” October 24, 2018, at https://insidecybersecurity.com/sites/insidecybersecurity.com/files/documents/2018/nov/
cs2018_0459.pdf. cs2018_0459.pdf.
~~177 The~~186 T he specific technologies that qualify as “emerging and foundational technologies” are to be specific technologies that qualify as “emerging and foundational technologies” are to be ~~identified~~iden tified by an by an
interagency process led by the Department of Commerce. See P.L. 115-232, interagency process led by the Department of Commerce. See P.L. 115-232, ~~Title~~T itle XVII, §1702(c). For more XVII, §1702(c). For more
information on FIRRMA, see CRSinformation on FIRRMA, see CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10952, IF10952, CFIUS Reform Under FIRRMA, by James K. Jackson and , by James K. Jackson and
Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs. SomeCathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs. Some entities, including the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, have entities, including the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, have
arguedargued that the U.S. government should consider additional measures of technology protection, such as “that the U.S. government should consider additional measures of technology protection, such as “ heavier heavier
scrutiny of the potential end use and end userscrutiny of the potential end use and end user of specific items.” Seeof specific items.” See National Security Commission on Artificial National Security Commission on Artificial
Intelligence, Intelligence, Interim Report, November 2019, p. 42, at https://drive.google.com/file/d/, November 2019, p. 42, at https://drive.google.com/file/d/
153OrxnuGEjsUvlxWsFYauslwNeCEkvUb/view. 153OrxnuGEjsUvlxWsFYauslwNeCEkvUb/view.
~~178~~187 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical ~~Technology Task~~T echnology T ask
Force.” Force.”
~~179 C. Todd~~188 C. T odd Lopez, “ Lopez, “~~Task~~ T ask Force Curbs Force Curbs ~~Technology Theft~~T echnology T heft to Keep Joint Force Strong,” DOD News, to Keep Joint Force Strong,” DOD News, November 26, November 26,
2019, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2027555/task-force-curbs-technology-theft-to-keep-2019, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2027555/task-force-curbs-technology-theft-to-keep-
jointjoint -force-strong/. -force-strong/.
~~180~~189 See, See, for example, Daniel Kliman, Ben FitzGerald,for example, Daniel Kliman, Ben FitzGerald, Kristine Lee, and Joshua FittKristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt , , Forging an Alliance Innovation
Base, Center for a New, Center for a New American Security, March 2020, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/American Security, March 2020, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/~~documents~~document s//
CNAS-ReportCNAS-Report -Alliance-Innovation-Base-Final.pdf?mtime=20200329174909. -Alliance-Innovation-Base-Final.pdf?mtime=20200329174909.
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Governance and Regulation
According to then-Director of National According to then-Director of National ~~Intelligence~~Intel igence Daniel Coats, “technology developments … Daniel Coats, “technology developments …
are likelyare likely to outpace regulation, which could create international norms that are contrary to US to outpace regulation, which could create international norms that are contrary to US
interests and increase the likelihood of technology surprise.”interests and increase the likelihood of technology surprise.”~~181~~190 To address this concern, some To address this concern, some
analysts have argued that “the United States should undertake broad, sustained diplomatic analysts have argued that “the United States should undertake broad, sustained diplomatic
engagement to advance collaboration on emerging technologies, norms, and standards setting.”engagement to advance collaboration on emerging technologies, norms, and standards setting.”~~182~~
~~Oversight183~~191 Similarly, Section 9414 of the FY2021 NDAA directs the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology to oversee a study that assesses China’s role in international standards setting organizations and provides recommendations for mitigating China’s influence and strengthening U.S. participation in these organizations. Oversight192
As Congress conducts oversight of emerging military technologies, it may be As Congress conducts oversight of emerging military technologies, it may be ~~challenged~~chal enged in its in its
abilityability to independently evaluate and assess complex, disparate technical disciplines. In 1972, to independently evaluate and assess complex, disparate technical disciplines. In 1972,
Congress established the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to provide expert Congress established the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to provide expert
“assessments, background papers, technical memoranda, case studies, and workshop “assessments, background papers, technical memoranda, case studies, and workshop
proceedings” that were to inform congressional decisionmaking and legislativeproceedings” that were to inform congressional decisionmaking and legislative activities.activities.~~184~~193
Congress eliminated funding for OTA in 1995 “amid broader efforts to reduce the size of Congress eliminated funding for OTA in 1995 “amid broader efforts to reduce the size of
government.government.~~185~~194 Since then, Congress has continued to debate the need for OTA or a similar Since then, Congress has continued to debate the need for OTA or a similar
technology assessment organization.technology assessment organization.~~186~~

195
Author Information

Kelley M. Sayler Kelley M. Sayler

Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global
Security Security

~~181~~ 190 Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide ~~Threat~~ T hreat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
delivereddelivered before the U.S.before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services,Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 6, March 6, ~~2018.~~
~~182~~20 18. 191 Samuel Samuel J. Brannen, Christian S.J. Brannen, Christian S. Haig,Haig, Katherine Schmidt, and Kathleen H. Hicks,Katherine Schmidt, and Kathleen H. Hicks, Twin Pillars: Upholding National
Security and National Innovation in ~~Emerging~~Em erging Technologies Governance , Center for Strategic and International , Center for Strategic and International
Studies,Studies, January 2020, at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/January 2020, at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/
200123_Brannen_TwinPillars_WEB_FINAL.pdf?eljUpAKOjVauOujYfnvuSGDK0xvsQGZF.200123_Brannen_TwinPillars_WEB_FINAL.pdf?eljUpAKOjVauOujYfnvuSGDK0xvsQGZF.
~~183~~ 192 For a full discussion For a full discussion of issuesof issues ~~surrounding~~ surrounding congressional oversight of technology, see CRScongressional oversight of technology, see CRS Report R46327, Report R46327, The
Office of Technology ~~Assessment~~Assessm ent: History, Authorities, Issues, and Options, by John F. Sargent Jr.. , by John F. Sargent Jr..
~~184~~193 Ibid. Ibid.
~~185~~ 194 Ibid. Ibid.
~~186~~195 For an overview of For an overview of ~~OTA~~OT A/technology assessment/technology assessment -related legislation in the 107th-116th Congresses, see Appendix C in -related legislation in the 107th-116th Congresses, see Appendix C in
CRSCRS Report R46327, Report R46327, The Office of Technology ~~Assessment~~Assessm ent: History, Authorities, Issues, and Options, by John F. , by John F.
Sargent Jr.. Sargent Jr..
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