Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief

Changes from November 10, 2020 to March 25, 2021

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy:
~~November 10, 2020~~March 25, 2021
In Brief
Clayton Thomas
Afghanistan Afghanistan ~~was elevated~~emerged as a significant U.S. foreign policy concern in 2001, when the as a significant U.S. foreign policy concern in 2001, when the
Analyst in Middle Eastern Analyst in Middle Eastern
United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military
Affairs Affairs
campaign against Al Qaeda and the campaign against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban government that harbored and Taliban government that harbored and supported it. supported it.

In the intervening In the intervening 1819 years, the United States has suffered years, the United States has suffered ~~around 2,400 military~~
~~fatalities in Afghanistan (including four in combat in 2020 to date)~~over 22,000 military casualties (including around 2,400 fatalities) in Afghanistan and Congress has and Congress has

appropriated approximately $ appropriated approximately $~~141~~143 billion for reconstruction and security forces there. In that time, an elected billion for reconstruction and security forces there. In that time, an elected
Afghan government has replaced the TalibanAfghan government has replaced the Taliban~~, and~~; improvement in most measures of human development most measures of human development ~~have improved, although~~
is limited; and future prospects of future prospects of ~~those measures remain mixed. According to a June 2020 U.S. Department of Defense report,~~
~~“The vital U.S. interest in Afghanistan is to prevent it from serving as a safe haven for terrorists to launch attacks~~
~~against the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests, or U.S. allies.”~~
~~As of November 2020, U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan appears closer to an end, with U.S. troop levels~~
~~decreasing in line with the February 29, 2020, U.S.-Taliban agreement on the issues of counterterrorism and the~~
~~withdrawal of U.S. and international troops. Still, questions remain. As part of the agreement, the United States~~
~~committed to withdraw all of its then-12,000 forces within 14 months; troops have since been reduced by as much~~
~~as two thirds. In return~~gains remain mixed. In January 2021, the Trump Administration reported that it had reduced U.S. forces in Afghanistan to 2,500, the lowest level since 2001, in advance of the potential full military withdrawal by May 2021 to which the United States committed in the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement. As part of that agreement, in return for the full withdrawal of international forces, the Taliban committed to preventing other groups, including Al Qaeda, from using Afghan , the Taliban committed to preventing other groups, including Al Qaeda, from using Afghan
soil to recruit, train, or fundraise toward activities that threaten the United States or its allies. The agreement is soil to recruit, train, or fundraise toward activities that threaten the United States or its allies. The agreement is
~~accompanied by secret annexes, raising concerns among some Members of Congress. U.S. officials~~accompanied by text which, according to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, contains additional Taliban commitments, including to not attack U.S. or international forces. U.S. officials contend that the Taliban have not fulfilled their commitments, and describe the describe the
prospective U.S. withdrawal as “conditions-based,” but have not specified exactly what conditions might halt, prospective U.S. withdrawal as “conditions-based,” but have not specified exactly what conditions might halt,
reverse, or otherwise alter the withdrawal timeline laid out in the agreement.reverse, or otherwise alter the withdrawal timeline laid out in the agreement. Afghan government representatives Afghan government representatives
were not participants in U.S.-Taliban talks, leading some observers to conclude that the United States would were not participants in U.S.-Taliban talks, leading some observers to conclude that the United States would
prioritize a military withdrawal over a complex political settlement that preserves some of the social, political, prioritize a military withdrawal over a complex political settlement that preserves some of the social, political,
and humanitarian gains made since 2001. and humanitarian gains made since 2001.
After months of delays, on September 12, 2020, Afghan government and Taliban representatives officially met in After months of delays, on September 12, 2020, Afghan government and Taliban representatives officially met in
Doha, QatarDoha, Qatar, to begin their first direct peace negotiations to begin their first direct peace negotiations toward such a settlement, a significant moment with potentially dramatic , a significant moment with potentially dramatic
implications for the course of the ongoing Afghan conflict. implications for the course of the ongoing Afghan conflict. ~~Even as negotiations proceed, they are~~ Talks do not appear to have made progress and remain complicated by complicated by
a number of factors, a number of factors, ~~most notably~~including high levels of violence. In light of the approaching withdrawal deadline and the stalling of intra-Afghan talks, the United States appears to have intensified its efforts to broker an intra-Afghan agreement. Secretary of State Antony Blinken reportedly wrote to Afghan government officials in March 2021 to express “urgency” that they form a united front and participate in planned multilateral diplomatic efforts, including talks in Turkey in April 2021. The United States also reportedly produced a draft peace agreement to “jumpstart” negotiations that includes a variety of options, including the establishment of an interim “transitional” government, which Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has rejected. Observers speculate about what kind of political arrangement, if any, could satisfy both the elected Afghan government and the Taliban to the extent that the latter fully abandons armed struggle. Future political arrangements and/or changes in the security environment may in turn influence U.S. policymakers’ consideration of future levels and conditions of development assistance. Given the outsized role that U.S. support plays in bolstering the Afghan government, many ~~high levels of violence. While the Taliban entering into talks with Kabul is a~~
~~momentous step, negotiations are not necessarily guaranteed to lead to a settlement to end the war. Observers~~
~~speculate about what kind of political arrangement, if any, could satisfy both the elected Afghan government and~~
~~the Taliban to the extent that the latter fully abandons armed struggle. In any event, it remains unclear to what~~
~~extent the U.S. withdrawal is contingent upon the outcome of talks or other contingencies, as U.S. officials give~~
~~contradictory visions of the future U.S. troop presence. Alterations to the U.S. military posture in Afghanistan and~~
~~related changes in the security environment may in turn influence U.S. policymakers’ consideration of future~~
~~levels and conditions of development assistance. Former Vice President Joseph Biden, the presumptive winner of~~
~~the 2020 U.S. presidential election, has previously expressed an intention to bring home U.S. combat troops, as~~
~~well as skepticism of nation building efforts.~~
~~Given the outsized role that U.S. assistance plays in supporting the Afghan government, some experts warn that a~~
~~prompt,~~ experts warn that a full-scale U.S. withdrawal and/or aid cutoff could lead to its collapse and perhaps even to the full-scale U.S. withdrawal and/or aid cutoff could lead to its collapse and perhaps even to the
reestablishment of formal Taliban rule over some or all of the country.reestablishment of formal Taliban rule over some or all of the country. By many measures, the Taliban are in a By many measures, the Taliban are in a
stronger military position now than at any point since 2001, though many once-public metrics related to the stronger military position now than at any point since 2001, though many once-public metrics related to the
conduct of the war have been classified or are no longer produced. conduct of the war have been classified or are no longer produced. ~~For additional information on Afghanistan and~~
~~U.S. policy there, see CRS Report R45818, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy, by Clayton Thomas. For~~
~~background information and analysis on the history of congressional engagement with Afghanistan and U.S.~~
~~policy there, as well as a summary of recent Afghanistan-related legislative proposals, see CRS Report R45329,~~
Afghanistan: Issues for Congress and Legislation 2017-2020, by Clayton Thomas.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

link to page 12 link to page 12 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief

Introduction
This report provides background information and analysis on U.S. policy in Afghanistan, with a This report provides background information and analysis on U.S. policy in Afghanistan, with a
focus on two interrelated developments: focus on two interrelated developments:
 The February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement  The February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement ~~on U.S. troop withdrawals and~~
, in which the United States committed to the full withdrawal of international forces by May 2021 in exchange for Taliban counterterrorism assurances. Taliban counterterrorism assurances.
  ~~Ongoing intra~~Intra-Afghan negotiations, which began in Doha, Qatar, in September -Afghan negotiations, which began in Doha, Qatar, in September
~~2020,~~2020, but appear to have since stalled, prompting a renewed U.S. diplomatic effort, including a planned senior-level meeting in Turkey in April 2021 aimed at reaching a political settlement to end the war aimed at reaching a political settlement to end the war and a U.S.-drafted peace proposal. .
The report also provides information on security dynamics related to the ongoing conflict The report also provides information on security dynamics related to the ongoing conflict in
~~Afghanistan~~ and related questions about the future of the United States’ military presence and and related questions about the future of the United States’ military presence and
U.S. investment in development and security development and security ~~assistance~~aid to Afghanistan (which has totaled (which has totaled ~~approximately $141 billion over the past~~
~~18 years~~more than $143 billion since 2001). ).
Background: U.S.-Taliban Agreement
On February 29, 2020, after more than a year of official negotiations between U.S. and Taliban On February 29, 2020, after more than a year of official negotiations between U.S. and Taliban
representatives, the two sides concluded an agreement laying the groundwork for the withdrawal representatives, the two sides concluded an agreement laying the groundwork for the withdrawal
of U.S. armed forces from Afghanistan, and for talks between Kabul and the Taliban. of U.S. armed forces from Afghanistan, and for talks between Kabul and the Taliban.
In July 2018, the Trump Administration entered into direct negotiations with the Taliban In July 2018, the Trump Administration entered into direct negotiations with the Taliban, without without
the participation of Afghan government representatives, reversing the long-standing U.S. position the participation of Afghan government representatives, reversing the long-standing U.S. position
prioritizing an “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned reconciliation process.”1 The September 2018 prioritizing an “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned reconciliation process.”1 The September 2018
appointment of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, appointment of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, ~~the~~an Afghan-born former U.S. Ambassador to Afghan-born former U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan, as Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation added momentum to this Afghanistan, as Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation added momentum to this
effort. For over a year, Khalilzad held a near-continuous series of meetings with Taliban officials effort. For over a year, Khalilzad held a near-continuous series of meetings with Taliban officials
in Doha, along with consultations with the Afghan, Pakistani, and other regional governments.in Doha, along with consultations with the Afghan, Pakistani, and other regional governments. On On
February February ~~14, 2020, a senior U.S. official revealed that U.S. and Taliban negotiators had reached a~~
~~“very specific” agreement to reduce violence across the country, including attacks against Afghan~~
~~forces, after which, if U.S. military commanders assessed that the truce held, the United States~~
~~and Taliban would sign a formal agreement.2~~
~~After the weeklong reduction in violence, Special Representative Khalilzad signed a formal~~
~~agreement in Doha with Taliban deputy political leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar on February~~
~~29, 2020, in front of a number of international observers, including Secretary of State Michael~~
~~Pompeo. On the same day in Kabul, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper met with Afghan President~~
~~Ashraf Ghani to issue a joint U.S.-Afghan declaration reaffirming U.S. support for the Afghan~~
~~government and reiterating the Afghan government’s longstanding willingness to negotiate with~~
~~the Taliban without preconditions.~~
~~As part of the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the United States agreed to draw down its forces from~~
~~13,000 to 8,600 within 135 days (with proportionate decreases in allied force levels) and to~~
~~withdraw all of its forces within 14 months (April 2021). Other U.S. commitments included~~
~~working to facilitate a prisoner exchange between the Taliban and the Afghan government and~~
~~removing U.S. sanctions on Taliban members. In exchange, the Taliban committed to not allow its~~

~~1 See, for example, Department of Defense, “Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” June 2017.~~
~~2 Conor Finnegan and Aleem Agha, “US, Taliban reach agreement to reduce violence, opening door to troop~~
~~withdrawal deal,” ABC News, February 14, 2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

4

~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

~~members or other groups, including Al Qaeda and the local Islamic State affiliate, to use Afghan~~
~~soil to threaten the U.S. or its allies, including by preventing recruiting, training, and fundraising.~~
~~U.S. officials said that “there are parts of this agreement that aren’t going to be public, but those~~
~~parts don’t contain any additional commitments by the United States whatsoever,” describing the~~
~~annexes as “confidential procedures for implementation and verification.”3 Secretary Pompeo~~
~~said “every member of Congress will get a chance to see them,” though some Members raised~~
~~questions about the necessity of classifying these annexes.4~~
~~Intra-Afghan Talks~~
~~The~~ 29, 2020, Special Representative Khalilzad signed a formal agreement in Doha with Taliban deputy political leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in front of a number of international observers.2 In the accord, the two sides agreed to two “interconnected” guarantees: the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021, and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the United States and its allies. Other U.S. commitments included facilitating a prisoner exchange between the Taliban and the Afghan government, and removing U.S. sanctions on Taliban members. Since the agreement, U.S. officials have asserted that the Taliban are not fulfilling their commitments under the accord, especially with regard to Al Qaeda (see “U.S. Adversaries: The Taliban, the Islamic State, and Al Qaeda” below).3 U.S. officials also describe increased Taliban violence as “not consistent” with the agreement. Although no provisions in the agreement address 1 See, for example, Department of Defense, “Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” June 2017. 2 The text of the agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf. Non-public annexes accompanied the agreement. 3 “Taliban not living up to its commitments, U.S. Defense Secretary says,” Reuters, May 5, 2020; Robert Burns, “US General: Taliban Not Yet Met Conditions for US Withdrawal,” Associated Press, June 10, 2020. Congressional Research Service 5 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief the Taliban reducing or refraining from attacks on U.S. or Afghan forces, the Taliban reportedly committed not to attack U.S. forces in non-public annexes accompanying the accord.4 In March 2020 testimony, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley told a Senate Armed Services Committee panel that committee members “have all the documents associated with this agreement” and that, in them, the Taliban pledged not to attack U.S. or international forces, as well as Afghan provincial capitals and other high profile targets.5 Some Members of Congress have raised questions about the executive branch’s decision to classify these annexes.6 U.S. Military Withdrawal7 The United States began withdrawing forces before the February 2020 agreement was reached and continued to do so after, despite U.S. assertions that Taliban violence and other actions are inconsistent with the agreement.8 On January 15, 2021, then-Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller announced that the number of U.S. forces had reached 2,500, the lowest level since 2001, completing a drawdown ordered by President Trump in November 2020.9 In March 2021, the New York Times reported that there are about 3,500 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, due to the undisclosed presence of U.S. Special Operations forces; a Pentagon spokesman maintained, “We are still at 2,500.”10 Trump Administration officials broadly insisted that the troop reduction would not result in any major changes to the two complementary U.S. missions in Afghanistan: counterterrorism and training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces. However, some U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) officials implied at the time that the troop level order by President Trump was not ideal from their perspective and might result in some adjustments to U.S. operations and limits to U.S. options.11 Some outside observers, including the congressionally-mandated Afghanistan Study Group, question the extent to which the United States can perform both the training and counterterrorism missions with acceptable risk levels with a force level below 4,500.12 The U.S. drawdown also may affect partner country forces (which now outnumber U.S. forces) and their ability to continue their training mission, in light of key logistical support that the United States provides. Some foreign officials have voiced caution regarding further withdrawal, including NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg who said that while there are risks to staying, “if 4 “Violence ‘Not Consistent’ with US-Taliban Deal: US Envoy,” TOLOnews, October 13, 2020. 5 Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on the Defense Budget Posture, CQ Congressional Transcripts, March 4, 2020. 6 Josh Rogin, “Pompeo under pressure to release Taliban deal ‘secret annexes’” (opinion), Washington Post, March 4, 2020. 7 See CRS Report R46670, U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions, coordinated by Clayton Thomas. 8 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Mujib Mashal, “U.S. Is Quietly Reducing Its Troop Force in Afghanistan,” New York Times, October 21, 2019; Kylie Atwood and Ryan Browne, “US troop drawdown in Afghanistan running ahead of schedule,” CNN, April 30, 2020. 9 “Statement by Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller on Troop Levels in Afghanistan,” Department of Defense, January 15, 2021. 10 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Has 1,000 More Troops in Afghanistan Than It Disclosed,” New York Times, March 14, 2021. 11 “General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. Defense One Interview with Katie Bo Williams,” U.S. Central Command, December 10, 2020; “Gen McKenzie and Luis Martinez On The Record Interview,” U.S. Central Command, December 22, 2020. 12 Afghanistan Study Group Final Report, United States Institute of Peace, February 2021. Congressional Research Service 6 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief we leave, we risk Afghanistan once again becoming a safe haven for international terrorists, and the loss of the gains made with such sacrifice.”13 In mid-February 2021, Stoltenberg announced at the close of a NATO Defense Ministerial that there had been no decision made regarding “the future of our presence,” stating, “We will not leave before the time is right.”14 Intra-Afghan Talks The February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement envisions the end of the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan, but it U.S.-Taliban agreement envisions the end of the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan, but it
does not represent a comprehensive peace does not represent a comprehensive peace ~~agreement~~settlement among Afghans ~~among Afghans, which most observers~~
~~assess is only possible through a negotiated political settlement between the Taliban and the~~
~~Afghan government~~. Intra-Afghan talks aimed at achieving such a settlement began in September . Intra-Afghan talks aimed at achieving such a settlement began in September
~~2020; the commencement of the long-sought talks represents~~2020, representing a major step toward resolving the a major step toward resolving the
conflict. Still, the two sides appear far apart on major issues such as future governance and conflict. Still, the two sides appear far apart on major issues such as future governance and
women’s rights, and some question the Taliban’s motives and intentions.women’s rights, and some question the Taliban’s motives and intentions.
~~The February 2020~~ The U.S.-Taliban agreement committed the Taliban to entering talks with the U.S.-Taliban agreement committed the Taliban to entering talks with the
Afghan government by MarchAfghan government by March 10, but negotiations remained unscheduled for months amid , but negotiations remained unscheduled for months amid
complications complications ~~that included~~ including gridlock in Kabul due to the disputed September 2019 presidential gridlock in Kabul due to the disputed September 2019 presidential
election, delays to a prisoner exchange between Taliban and the Afghan government, and ongoing election, delays to a prisoner exchange between Taliban and the Afghan government, and ongoing
violence. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, Ghani’s electoral opponent and violence. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, Ghani’s electoral opponent and
former partner in a unity government, agreed in May 2020 to end their political impasse and former partner in a unity government, agreed in May 2020 to end their political impasse and
appoint Abdullah as chairman of the newly-created High Council for National Reconciliation appoint Abdullah as chairman of the newly-created High Council for National Reconciliation
(HCNR) to oversee talks with the Taliban.(HCNR) to oversee talks with the Taliban.~~5 The parties to the conflict completed the prisoner~~
~~exchange~~15 The prisoner exchange was completed in early September 2020, removing the main obstacle to intra-Afghan talks, which in early September 2020, removing the main obstacle to intra-Afghan talks, which
~~began in Doha on September 12, 2020.~~
~~Participants~~
~~The Afghan government’s 21-member negotiating team, led by former Afghan intelligence~~
~~agency head and Ghani-ally Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, includes four women and represents~~
~~Afghanistan’s major ethnic groups.6 The Abdullah-chaired HCNR is to oversee the negotiating~~

~~3 Kim Dozier, “Secret Annexes, Backroom Deals: Can Zalmay Khalilzad Deliver Afghan Peace for Trump?” Time,~~
~~February 15, 2020; Briefing with Senior Administration Officials on Next Steps Toward an Agreement on Bringing~~
~~Peace to Afghanistan, February 29, 2020.~~
~~4 Juliegrace Brufke, “House Republicans sound the alarm on Taliban deal,” The Hill, March 3, 2020.~~
~~5 President Ghani had been declared the victor of the September 2019 presidential election on February 18, 2020,~~
~~winning just over 50% of the vote and thus avoiding a runoff with Abdullah, who won about 40%. Abdullah and his~~
~~supporters rejected Ghani’s narrow majority count as fraudulent and sought to establish themselves as a separate~~
~~government, with Ghani and Abdullah holding separate inauguration ceremonies on March 9, 2020. Overall, the~~
~~agreement ended the immediate political impasse, but one analyst argues that its ambiguities may plant the seeds of~~
~~future conflict and, more importantly, that “it did not remove the underlying causes of the crisis, notably the~~
~~polarization caused by the current political system.”~~began in Doha that month. The two sides have met intermittently in recent months, with some describing the talks as stalled.16 Special Representative Khalilzad said on September 11, 2020, that the United States will “be engaging each side,” but that it would not be a direct participant in talks, with its role limited to aiding the negotiations if asked.17 Khalilzad has since made numerous visits to Doha, where he has met separately with members of each negotiating team, and other regional capitals. Major Negotiating Issues Experts and officials expect that at least two key substantive issues will be dominant in intra-Afghan talks—reducing violence and determining the future structure and orientation of the Afghan state. 13 Online press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, NATO, December 1, 2020. See also Nina Werkhauser and Sandra Petersmann, “German government opposes Donald Trump’s Afghan troop withdrawal,” Deutsche Welle, November 19, 2020. 14 Robin Emmott, “NATO’s Afghanistan Withdrawal Depends on Violence Levels, Stoltenberg Says,” Reuters, February 15, 2021; Robin Emmott and Sabine Siebold, “No Decision on Any NATO Withdrawal From Afghanistan, Stoltenberg Says,” Reuters, February 18, 2021. 15 Ali Yawar Adili, “End of the Post-Election Impasse? Ghani and Ali Yawar Adili, “End of the Post-Election Impasse? Ghani and
Abdullah’s new power-sharing formula,” Abdullah’s new power-sharing formula,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, May 20, 2020. For more on Afghanistan’s , May 20, 2020. For more on Afghanistan’s
political system, and accusations that it is overcentralized and fuels conflict, see CRS Report R45818, political system, and accusations that it is overcentralized and fuels conflict, see CRS Report R45818, Afghanistan:
Background and U.S. Policy, by Clayton , by Clayton Thomas. 16 Kathy Gannon, “Afghan peace talks resume, but path is anything but certain,” The Washington Post, February 23, 2021; Alexander Cornwell, “Afghan peace talks should rotate among countries, envoy says amid stall,” Reuters, March 15, 2021. 17 U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad on the Afghanistan Peace Negotiations, September 11, 2020. ~~Thomas.~~
~~6 Christine Roehrs, Ali Yawar Adili, and Sayed Asadullah Sadat, “Two Parties Too Wary for Peace? Central Questions~~
~~for talks with the Taleban in Doha,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, September 11, 2020.~~
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

57 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief Reducing Violence The U.S.-Taliban agreement does not address Taliban operations against Afghan government forces, which continue and increased in some areas in 2020. Major Taliban operations in southern Afghanistan in late 2020 displaced tens of thousands of civilians, led Afghan forces to abandon nearly 200 checkpoints in Kandahar province in December 2020 alone, and prompted the United States to launch airstrikes in support of Afghan government forces.18 The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reports that, while the number of civilian casualties in 2020 fell below 10,000 for the first time since 2013, violence against civilians spiked following the start of intra-Afghan negotiations in September 2020.19 Targeted attacks have also increased in recent months.20 The Taliban denied involvement in the January 2021 assassination of female Supreme Court judges in Kabul and other attacks, but the United States and other countries released a joint statement on January 31, 2020, charging that “the Taliban bears responsibility for the majority of this targeted violence.”21 UNAMA attributes 45% of civilian casualties in 2020 to the Taliban, and notes that more women were killed in the conflict in 2020 than in any year since UNAMA started systematically documenting civilian casualties in 2009.22 The Afghan government has prioritized a permanent ceasefire, which the Taliban have rejected despite two limited truces in recent years. Many observers doubt the Taliban would agree to abandon violence, arguably their main source of leverage, before any intra-Afghan political settlement, though targeted reductions in violence could pave the way for a more comprehensive ceasefire.23 A Taliban spokesman said in March 2021 that the group had submitted a draft proposal for a reduction in violence by all sides in December 2020, but that agreement had not been reached.24 In his letter to President Ghani (see below), Secretary Blinken said the United States had prepared a “revised proposal for a 90-day Reduction-in-Violence,” and U.S. and Taliban negotiators are reportedly discussing a pause in U.S. air operations (on which Afghan forces are still highly reliant) in return for a reduction in Taliban attacks.25 Afghan Governance Major differences remain in the two sides’ respective visions for the future of Afghanistan, including the structure of the Afghan state and what rights the state recognizes for Afghan citizens, especially women.26 18 “Afghan troops, police abandon nearly 200 checkpoints to Taliban,” AFP, December 30, 2020; USFOR-A Spokesman Col Sonny Leggett, Twitter, October 12, 2020. 19 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2020, February 2021. 20 Saphora Smith and Ahmed Mengli, “Wave of killings target Afghan women judges, journalists, intellectuals,” NBC, January 24, 2021. 21 “Statement on Continuation of Assassinations, Kidnapping, and Destruction of Vital Infrastructure,” U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan, January 31, 2021. 22 UNAMA, Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2020, February 2021. 23 Abdul Qadir Sediqi, “Fight and talk: Facing negotiations, Taliban almost took key Afghan city,” Reuters, September 14, 2020. 24 Sharif Amiry, “Taliban 3-Month RIV Plan Shared With US: Naeem,” TOLOnews, March 22, 2021. 25 Text of the letter available at https://tolonews.com/pdf/02.pdf; David Cloud, “In Afghanistan, the U.S. weighs a pause in airstrikes to spur Taliban peace talks,” Los Angeles Times, March 23, 2021. 26 See CRS In Focus IF11646, Afghan Women and Girls: Status and Congressional Action, by Clayton Thomas and Congressional Research Service 8 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief The Taliban, who have focused on securing the withdrawal of foreign forces, have not detailed their proposals on governance issues. In remarks at the opening of intra-Afghan talks, Taliban deputy political leader Mullah Abdul Ghani

~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

~~team’s work. Abdullah initially rejected Ghani’s August 2020 appointment of HCNR members~~
~~and discussions reportedly continue on finalizing the group’s membership.7 These difficulties are~~
~~emblematic of enduring disputes among Afghan political elites, who remain divided on ethnic and~~
~~other lines.8~~
~~The Taliban negotiating team also comprises 21 members (all men), though the Taliban have not~~
~~made the list public. On September 5, the Taliban announced as lead negotiator Mawlawi Abdul~~
~~Hakim Haqqani, a senior hard-line cleric who is head of the Taliban’s judiciary body and~~
~~reportedly close to Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada. Some analysts have speculated that~~
~~the move represents an attempt by Taliban senior leadership (likely based in Pakistan) to exert~~
~~more control over negotiations, which are ostensibly overseen by Doha-based Taliban deputy~~
~~political head Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar (who met with Secretary of State Michael Pompeo in~~
~~Doha), whom analysts view as more moderate.9~~
~~U.S. Special Representative Khalilzad said on September 11, 2020, that the United States will “be~~
~~engaging each side,” but that it would not be a direct participant in talks, with its role limited to~~
~~aiding the negotiations if asked.10 Khalilzad has since made several visits to Doha, where he has~~
~~met separately with members of each negotiating team.~~
~~Major Negotiating Issues~~
~~Experts and officials expect the talks to last months and that at least two key substantive issues~~
~~will be dominant—reducing violence and determining the future structure and orientation of the~~
~~Afghan state.~~
~~Reducing Violence~~
~~The U.S.-Taliban agreement commits the Taliban to refrain from attacking U.S. and international~~
~~forces–a commitment the Taliban reportedly is observing. It does not, however, address Taliban~~
~~operations against Afghan government forces, which continue and have increased in some areas~~
~~in 2020.11 The Afghan Ministry of Defense reported Taliban attacks in 18 of the country’s 34~~
~~provinces on September 12 as talks began in Doha, and violence has continued apace since, with~~
~~hundreds of Afghan forces killed.12 In October 2020, the United States called the ongoing Taliban~~
~~offensive against the capital of Helmand province “inconsistent” with the U.S.-Taliban agreement~~
~~and launched airstrikes in support of Afghan government forces. The United Nations reports that~~
~~while the number of civilian casualties over the first nine months of 2020 was the lowest since~~

~~7 Ali Yawar Adili, “Peace Leadership: Power Struggles, Division, and an Incomplete Council,” Afghanistan Analysts~~
~~Network, September 6, 2020; “President Ghani meets with Chairman of High Council for National Reconciliation,”~~
~~Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Presidency, November 5, 2020.~~
~~8 For more on ethnicity and politics in Afghanistan, see CRS Report R45818,~~ ~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S.~~
~~Policy, by Clayton Thomas.~~
~~9 Frud Bezhan, “Why Did the Taliban Appoint a Hard-Line Chief Negotiator for Intra-Afghan Talks?” RFE/FL, Sept.~~
~~10, 2020.~~
~~10 U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Ambassador Zalmay~~
~~Khalilzad on the Afghanistan Peace Negotiations, September 11, 2020.~~
~~11 Susannah George and Aziz Tassel, “As Afghanistan struggles to start peace talks, violence fills the void,”~~
Washington Post, August 10, 2020.
~~12 Anisa Shaheed, “Taliban Attack in 18 Provinces as Talks Start: MoD,” Tolo News, September 12, 2020; Ehsanullah~~
~~Amiri and Sune Engel Rasmussen, “Violence Plagues Afghanistan as Peace Talks with Taliban Struggle to Take Off,”~~
Wall Street Journal, September 23, 2020.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

~~2012, the “harm done to civilians remains inordinate and shocking,” with nearly 6,000 Afghans~~
~~killed or injured in fighting this year.13~~
~~The Afghan government has prioritized a permanent ceasefire, which the Taliban have rejected~~
~~despite two limited truces in recent years. Many observers doubt the Taliban would agree to~~
~~abandon violence, arguably their main source of leverage, before a settlement, though targeted~~
~~reductions in violence could pave the way for a more comprehensive ceasefire.14~~
~~Afghan Governance~~
~~Major differences remain in the sides’ visions for the future of Afghanistan, including both the~~
~~structure of the Afghan state and what rights the state recognizes for Afghan citizens, especially~~
~~women.15~~
~~The Taliban, whose main priority has been the withdrawal of foreign forces, have not described~~
~~their specific proposals on these issues in detail. In his opening remarks at the talks, Mullah~~
Baradar said, “We seek an Afghanistan that is independent, sovereign, united, developed and freeBaradar said, “We seek an Afghanistan that is independent, sovereign, united, developed and free
— —an Afghanistan with an Islamic system in which all people of the nation can participate an Afghanistan with an Islamic system in which all people of the nation can participate
without discrimination.”without discrimination.”1627 In a February 2021 open letter to the American people, Baradar wrote that the group committed to protecting certain rights with conditions, such as “all rights of women afforded to them by Islamic law” and “freedom of speech within the framework of Islamic principles and national interests.”28 Some analysts posit the Taliban are likely to push for clerical oversight Some analysts posit the Taliban are likely to push for clerical oversight
of executive and legislative decision-makingof executive and legislative decision-making~~.17~~ as a “hybrid” of their 1996-2001 emirate and a more Western-style state.29
Afghan leaders express a determination to preserve Afghanistan’s democratic institutions and its Afghan leaders express a determination to preserve Afghanistan’s democratic institutions and its
constitution, which establishes Islam as the state religionconstitution, which establishes Islam as the state religion~~. In an interview in Doha, HCNR~~
~~Chairman~~ but does not tie legislation and national policymaking to religious jurisprudence. In a September 2020 interview, HCNR Chairman Abdullah Abdullah said, “For me, one person, one vote Abdullah said, “For me, one person, one vote — —I don’t call anything a red lineI don’t call anything a red line — —but but
that’s critical .that’s critical . . .. and compromises on these things will not get us to peace.”. and compromises on these things will not get us to peace.”~~18 Afghan~~30 President President
Ghani has Ghani has ~~promised~~stated that his government will not conclude any agreement that limits Afghans’ that his government will not conclude any agreement that limits Afghans’
rights and previously warned that any agreement to withdraw U.S. forces that did not include rights and previously warned that any agreement to withdraw U.S. forces that did not include
Kabul’s participation could lead to “catastrophe,” pointing to the 1990s-era civil strife following Kabul’s participation could lead to “catastrophe,” pointing to the 1990s-era civil strife following
the fall the fall of the Soviet-backed government that led to the rise of the Taliban.31 Some Afghans and other international observers have proposed the formation of an interim government, arguing that the Taliban’s continued refusal to recognize the Afghan government might make such a step necessary. A member of the Afghan government’s negotiating team said in January 2021, “An interim government is an undeniable topic of discussion, because we want a cease-fire and the Taliban aren’t ready to agree to one with the current government.”32 President Ghani and other Afghan officials have rejected such proposals, including from the United States (see below).33 It remains unclear what kind of security and political arrangements could satisfy both Kabul and the Taliban to the extent that the latter abandons its armed struggle. Many Afghans, especially women, who remember Taliban rule and oppose the group’s policies and beliefs, remain wary.34 Those Afghans doubt the Taliban’s trustworthiness and express concern that, in the absence of U.S. military pressure, the group will have little incentive to comply with the terms of any Sarah R. Collins. 27~~of the Soviet-backed government that led to the rise of the Taliban.19 The Afghan~~
~~government has rejected speculation about a possible power-sharing arrangement.~~
~~Speaking at the opening of talks, Secretary of State Pompeo encouraged Afghans to preserve~~
~~democratic gains while highlighting the limits of U.S. influence, saying, “the choice of your~~
~~political system is of course yours to make. … the United States doesn’t seek to impose its system~~
~~on others.”20 He added that the U.S. government believes “firmly that protecting the rights of all~~
~~Afghans is indeed the best way for you to break the cycle of violence.”~~

~~13 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Third Quarter Report on the Protection of Civilians in~~
~~Armed Conflict: 2020.~~
~~14 Abdul Qadir Sediqi, “Fight and talk: Facing negotiations, Taliban almost took key Afghan city,” Reuters, September~~
~~14, 2020.~~
~~15 See CRS In Focus IF11646, Afghan Women and Girls: Status and Congressional Action, by Clayton Thomas and~~
~~Sarah R. Collins.~~
16 Ayaz Gul, “Afghan Rivals Begin Historic Peace Talks; US Cautiously Optimistic,” Ayaz Gul, “Afghan Rivals Begin Historic Peace Talks; US Cautiously Optimistic,” Voice of America, September 12, , September 12,
2020. 2020.
1728 “Open letter to the people of the United States of America,” February 16, 2021. Available at http://alemarahenglish.net/?p=42767. 29 Frud Bezhan, “Are the Taliban Seeking A ‘Sunni Afghan Version’ of Iran?” Frud Bezhan, “Are the Taliban Seeking A ‘Sunni Afghan Version’ of Iran?” RFE/RL, October 2, 2020. , October 2, 2020.
1830 Susannah George, “The Taliban and the Afghan government are finally talking peace: What they’re negotiating and Susannah George, “The Taliban and the Afghan government are finally talking peace: What they’re negotiating and
what to expect,” what to expect,” Washington Post, September 12, 2020. , September 12, 2020.
1931 Phillip Walter Wellman, “Ghani tells Afghans peace deal with Taliban will not compromise basic rights,” Stars and Stripes, January 27, 2019; “Afghans Worry as US Makes Progress in Taliban Talks,” “Afghans Worry as US Makes Progress in Taliban Talks,” Voice of America, January 29, , January 29, 2019. 32 Frud Bezhan, “Would an Afghan Interim Government Help or Hinder Peace Efforts?” Gandhara, January 14, 2021. 33 Pamela Constable, “Peace talks are faltering, violence has surged, and U.S. troops are pulling out. Can the Afghan government withstand the pressure?” Washington Post, January 13, 2021. 34 Pamela Constable, “The Return of a Taliban Government? Afghanistan Talks Raise Once-Unthinkable Question,” Washington Post, January 29, 2019. Congressional Research Service 9 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief agreement reached with Kabul.35~~2019.~~
~~20 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at Intra-Afghan Negotiations Opening Ceremony, Sept. 12,~~
~~2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

7

~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

~~Prospects~~
~~It remains unclear what kind of security and political arrangements could satisfy both Kabul and~~
~~the Taliban to the extent that the latter abandons its armed struggle. Many Afghans, especially~~
~~women, who remember Taliban rule and oppose the group’s policies and beliefs, remain wary.21~~
~~Those Afghans doubt the Taliban’s trustworthiness and express concern that, in the absence of~~
~~U.S. military pressure, the group will have little incentive to comply with the terms of any~~
~~agreement reached with Kabul.22~~ Some Afghan officials reportedly suspect the Taliban of trying Some Afghan officials reportedly suspect the Taliban of trying
to “run out the clock on the withdrawal of American troops,” remaining in negotiations long to “run out the clock on the withdrawal of American troops,” remaining in negotiations long
enough to secure a full U.S. withdrawal, after which they will capitalize on their advantage on the enough to secure a full U.S. withdrawal, after which they will capitalize on their advantage on the
battlefield to seize control of the country by force.battlefield to seize control of the country by force.~~”23~~
~~U.S. officials have given differing accounts of the extent to which the U.S. military withdrawal is~~
~~contingent upon, or otherwise related to, the Taliban remaining in talks with Kabul or the~~
~~outcome of such talks.24 Deputy U.S. negotiator Molly Phee said on February 18, “We will not~~
~~prejudge the outcome of intra-Afghan negotiations, but we are prepared to support whatever~~
~~consensus the Afghans are able to reach about their future political and governing~~
~~arrangements.”25~~36
Still, a December 2019 survey reported that a “significant majority” of Afghans were both aware Still, a December 2019 survey reported that a “significant majority” of Afghans were both aware
of (77%) and strongly or somewhat supported (89%) efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with of (77%) and strongly or somewhat supported (89%) efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with
the Taliban, while opposing the group itself.the Taliban, while opposing the group itself.2637 At least some Afghans At least some Afghans reportedly support “peace at any cost” support “peace at any cost”
given the decades of conflict through which the country has suffered.given the decades of conflict through which the country has suffered.27
~~Conflict Status and U.S. Military Posture~~
~~As of November 2020, the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, known as Resolute Support~~
~~Mission (RSM), numbers under 12,000 troops, of which perhaps 4,000 are U.S. forces.28 RSM~~
~~has trained, advised, and assisted the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces~~
~~(ANDSF) since RSM’s inception in early 2015, when Afghan forces assumed responsibility for~~
~~security nationwide. Combat operations by thousands of other U.S. forces also continue. These~~
~~two “complementary missions” comprise the U.S. military’s Operation Freedom’s Sentinel.29~~
~~President Trump has frequently expressed a determination to withdraw U.S. forces, reportedly~~
~~stemming at least in part from his frustration with the state of the conflict, which U.S. military~~

~~21 Pamela Constable, “The Return of a Taliban Government? Afghanistan Talks Raise Once-Unthinkable Question,”~~
Washington Post, January 29, 2019.
~~22 “Afghans voice fears that the U.S. is undercutting them in deal with the Taliban,” Washington Post, August 17, 2019.~~
~~23 Mujib Mashal, “Violent attacks plague Afghanistan as peace talks in Doha slow,” New York Times, Sept. 19, 2020.~~
~~24 In a February 27 briefing ahead of the agreement signing, one unnamed senior U.S. official said, “If the political~~
~~settlement fails, if the talks fail, there is nothing that obliges the United States to withdraw troops,” while another said,~~
~~“The withdrawal timeline is related to counterterrorism, not political outcomes.” Briefing with Senior Administration~~
~~Officials.~~
~~25 Molly Phee, remarks at “Ending Our Endless War in Afghanistan,” United States Institute of Peace, Feb. 18, 2020.~~
~~26 The Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2019: A Survey of the Afghan People,” released December 3, 2019.~~
~~27 Susannah George and Sharif Hassan, “Faced with the prospect of formal peace talks, Afghans consider what they’re~~
~~willing to concede,” Washington Post, June 7, 2020.~~
~~28 Jim Garamone, “Alliance United in Afghanistan Strategy,” DOD News, October 23, 2020.~~
~~29 Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations,~~ ~~Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, Quarterly Report to~~
~~Congress, July 1 to September 30, 2018, November 19, 2018.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

8

~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

~~officials have assessed as a “strategic stalemate” since at least early 2017.30 Arguably~~
~~complicating that assessment, the U.S. government has withheld many once-public metrics of~~
~~military progress. Notably, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction~~
~~(SIGAR) reported in April 2019 that the U.S. military is “no longer producing its district-level~~
~~stability assessments of Afghan government and insurgent control and influence” because it “was~~
~~of limited decision-making value to the [U.S.] Commander.”31 The last reported metrics from~~
~~SIGAR in its January 30, 2019, report, showed that the share of districts under government~~
~~control or influence fell to 53.8%, as of October 2018. This figure was the lowest recorded by~~
~~SIGAR since tracking began in November 2015; 12% of districts were under insurgent control or~~
~~influence, with the remaining 34% contested. Conflict dynamics in the past two years do not~~
~~appear to have shifted in the Afghan government’s favor.~~
~~ANDSF Development and Deployment~~
~~The effectiveness of the ANDSF is key to the security of Afghanistan, and U.S. and international support is critical~~
~~to supporting the ANDSF. President Ghani has said, “[W]e wil not be able to support our army for six months~~
~~without U.S. [financial] support.”32 Since 2014, the United States generally has provided around 75% of the~~
~~estimated $5 bil ion to $6 bil ion a year required to fund the ANDSF, with the balance coming from U.S. partners~~
~~($1 bil ion annually) and the Afghan government ($500 mil ion). The Pentagon reported in June 2020 that “ful~~
~~[financial] self-sufficiency by 2024 does not appear realistic, even if levels of violence and, with it, the ANDSF force~~
~~structure, reduce significantly.”33~~
~~In the same report, DOD assessed that although Afghan forces (particularly the Afghan air force and special~~
~~forces) exhibit considerable capabilities, they wil “continue to rely over the long term on contracted logistic~~
~~support and on the United States for the vast majority of the funding needed to sustain combat operations.”34~~
~~Total ANDSF strength was reported at nearly 289,000 as of July 2020. Other metrics related to ANDSF strength~~
~~and performance, including casualty and attrition rates, have been classified by U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A)~~
~~starting with the October 2017 SIGAR quarterly report, citing a request from the Afghan government, although~~
~~SIGAR had previously published those metrics as part of its quarterly reports.35~~38 Accelerated U.S. Diplomatic Efforts In March 2021, with talks in Doha having made no evident progress, several reports indicate an intensified U.S. diplomatic push is under way to broker an intra-Afghan agreement. On March 7, the Afghan media outlet TOLOnews published an undated letter from Secretary Blinken to President Ghani (a similar letter reportedly also was sent to Abdullah). In the letter, Secretary Blinken asked President Ghani to exercise “urgent leadership” in forming a “united front” with other Afghan political leaders. Secretary Blinken said that all U.S. policy options, including a full military withdrawal by May 1, remain under consideration and asked President Ghani to “understand the urgency of my tone regarding the collective work outlined in this letter.”39 Ghani ally and First Vice President Amrullah Saleh said in response that his government would “never accept a coerced or imposed peace.”40 Additionally, in meetings with Afghan political leaders in early March 2021, Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad reportedly provided a draft proposal for a “participatory government” that would include the Taliban and be formed after an international meeting similar to the 2001 Bonn Conference that created the first post-Taliban Afghan government.41 The text of that proposal (eight pages, dated February 28, 2021) was also published by TOLOnews on March 7.42 The document, which is described as “intended to jumpstart” negotiations by providing concrete power-sharing alternatives, proposes the formation of a “transitional peace government.” The culmination of these U.S. diplomatic efforts appears to be a planned “senior-level meeting” to be held in Turkey in April 2021 “to finalize an agreement,” per Secretary Blinken’s letter. It is not clear how the meeting would differ from, complement, or otherwise relate to intra-Afghan talks in Doha. According to the chief Afghan government negotiator, President Ghani will only attend if Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada (who has been in hiding for years) does so.43 President Ghani reportedly also intends to propose a presidential election within six months as a 35 “Afghans voice fears that the U.S. is undercutting them in deal with the Taliban,” Washington Post, August 17, 2019. 36 Mujib Mashal, “Violent attacks plague Afghanistan as peace talks in Doha slow,” New York Times, Sept. 19, 2020. 37 The Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2019: A Survey of the Afghan People,” released December 3, 2019. 38 Susannah George and Sharif Hassan, “Faced with the prospect of formal peace talks, Afghans consider what they’re willing to concede,” Washington Post, June 7, 2020. 39 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, David Zucchino, and Lara Jakes, “U.S. Pushes U.N.-led Conference in Letter to Afghan Leader,” New York Times, March 7, 2021. Text of the letter available at https://tolonews.com/pdf/02.pdf. 40 “Blinken’s Letter Will Not Change Govt Stance on Peace: Saleh,” TOLOnews, March 8, 2021. 41 Sharif Amiry, “Khalilzad Pitched ‘Participatory Government’ to Afghan Leaders: Sources,” TOLOnews, March 3, 2021. 42 Text of the draft: https://tolonews.com/pdf/pdf.pdf. 43 Haseeba Atakpal, “Ghani to Attend Turkey Summit ‘If Taliban Leader Does,’” TOLOnews, March 20, 2021. Congressional Research Service 10 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief counter-offer to the U.S. proposal; in response to those reports, the Taliban rejected such a plan, pointing to previous elections that had “pushed the country to the verge of crisis.”44 Conflict Status As of March 2021, the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, known as Resolute Support Mission (RSM), numbers around 10,000 troops, of which 2,500-3,500 are U.S. forces.45 RSM has trained, advised, and assisted the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) since RSM’s inception in early 2015, when Afghan forces assumed responsibility for security nationwide. Combat operations by thousands of other U.S. forces also continue. These two “complementary missions” comprise the U.S. military’s Operation Freedom’s Sentinel.46 Since 2001, the United States has suffered over 22,000 military casualties (including around 2,400 fatalities) in Afghanistan.47
U.S. air operations escalated considerably under the Trump Administration: the U.S. dropped U.S. air operations escalated considerably under the Trump Administration: the U.S. dropped
more munitions in Afghanistan in 2019 than any other year since at least 2010 and in the first two more munitions in Afghanistan in 2019 than any other year since at least 2010 and in the first two
months of 2020 alone, U.S. forces conducted 1,010 strikes in 27 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.months of 2020 alone, U.S. forces conducted 1,010 strikes in 27 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.36
~~In May 2020, U.S. Air Forces Central Command stated it would no longer release monthly~~
~~reports on the number of airstrikes and munitions released, citing “how the report could adversely~~
~~impact ongoing discussions with the Taliban regarding Afghanistan peace talks.”37 U.S. air~~
48 Such operations appear to have decreased significantly since the U.S.-Taliban agreement, though U.S. operations appear to have decreased significantly since the U.S.-Taliban agreement, though U.S.
military spokesmen have highlighted periodic U.S. strikes against Taliban actions which the military spokesmen have highlighted periodic U.S. strikes against Taliban actions which the
United States characterizes as violating the agreementUnited States characterizes as violating the agreement ~~(such as the October 2020 Taliban~~
~~offensive in Helmand Province).~~

~~30 Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Esper and General Milley in the Pentagon Briefing Room,~~
~~December 20, 2019.~~
~~31 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2019. This information, which was in every~~
~~previous Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) quarterly report going back to January~~
~~2016, estimated the extent of Taliban control and influence in terms of both territory and population.~~
~~32 Anwar Iqbal, “Afghan Army to Collapse in Six Months Without US Help: Ghani,” Dawn, January 18, 2018.~~
~~33 Department of Defense, “Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” June 2020.~~
~~34 Ibid.~~
~~35 “Report: US Officials Classify Crucial Metrics on Afghan Casualties, Readiness,” Military Times, October 30, 2017.~~
~~36 U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, monthly strike summaries.~~
~~37 “AFCENT stops releasing airstrike information as Taliban talks continue,” Air Force Magazine, May 4, 2020.~~
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9

~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

~~U.S. Military Drawdown: Questions about Timing and~~
~~Conditionality~~
~~While arguing that the withdrawal would be conditions-based, Administration officials have~~
~~given conflicting signals about the extent to which the ongoing U.S. military withdrawal would~~
~~be contingent upon various developments.38 They also have rejected claims that withdrawal~~
~~decisions are motivated by U.S. domestic political concerns and that the U.S. military withdrawal~~
~~reduces the Taliban’s incentives to remain in, and conclude, intra-Afghan negotiations. It is~~
~~unclear whether the United States would halt or reverse its withdrawal if intra-Afghan talks~~
~~collapse. Some Members of Congress have proposed limiting funding for U.S. military~~
~~withdrawals unless the Administration certifies that withdrawals will not compromise U.S.~~
~~national security or Afghan social and political gains made since 2001 (see H.R. 7343).~~
~~Confusion about the United States’ future military posture appears to have grown in October 2020~~
~~due to contradictory visions expressed by senior Administration officials. On October 7, National~~
~~Security Advisor Robert O’Brien said that the number of U.S. troops would reach 2,500 by “early~~
~~next year.”39 Later that day, President Trump tweeted, “We should have the small remaining~~
~~number of our BRAVE Men and Women serving in Afghanistan home by Christmas!”40 It is~~
~~unclear what prompted the President’s tweet, and whether he was conveying an official change in~~
~~U.S. policy. The Taliban released a statement welcoming the President’s statement as a “positive~~
~~step.”41 Afghan officials reportedly characterized the tweet as “a big blow” that “dampened the~~
~~national mood.”42~~
~~Asked about the President’s tweet, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley~~
~~said,~~
~~... I default back to ‘we have a plan.’ It’s a conditions-based plan, and right now, the only~~
~~number that’s publicly out there that I am aware of in terms of any sort of official number~~
~~is 4,500 in the not-too-distant future by November. And that’s the plan. And we’re~~
~~continuing to monitor those conditions. And as further decisions that the President makes~~
~~based on those conditions, then we’ll execute those decisions.43~~
~~In the same interview, General Milley identified entering intra-Afghan talks, reducing violence,~~
~~and severing ties with Al Qaeda (see below) as some of the Taliban actions on which the U.S.~~
~~withdrawal is conditioned. While the Taliban have commenced talks with the Afghan~~
~~government, violence has remained steady, as mentioned above. U.S. military officials have given~~
~~differing interpretations of Taliban attacks. Then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper said in a~~
~~March 2 media availability that “our expectation is that the reduction in violence will continue, it~~

~~38 In a February 27 briefing ahead of the agreement signing, one unnamed senior U.S. official said, “if the political~~
~~settlement fails, if the talks fail, there is nothing that obliges the United States to withdraw troops;” another said, “the~~
~~withdrawal timeline is related to counterterrorism, not political outcomes. Office of the Spokesperson, “Briefing with~~
~~Senior Administration Officials on Next Steps Toward an Agreement on Bringing Peace to Afghanistan,” U.S.~~
~~Department of State, February 29, 2020.~~
~~39 Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Seeks to Draw Down Its Troops in Afghanistan to 2,500 by Early 2021,”~~
New York Times, October 7, 2020.
~~40 President Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, October 7, 2020, 7:28 PM.~~
~~41 Mohammad Naeem (@IeaOfficial), Twitter, October 8, 2020, 6:40 AM.~~
~~42 Pamela Constable and Sharif Hassan, “Afghans stunned, worried by Trump tweet to bring U.S. troops home early,”~~
Washington Post, October 11, 2020.
~~43 “Transcript: NPR’s Full Interview with Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mark Milley,” NPR, October 11, 2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

10

~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

~~[will] taper off until we get intra-Afghan negotiations.”44 It is not clear what the basis for that~~
~~expectation was; there is no provision in the U.S.-Taliban agreement committing the Taliban to~~
~~refrain from attacking Afghan forces, a fact that Khalilzad acknowledged in a May 15, 2020~~
~~media briefing.45 U.S. officials have stated consistently since the agreement that Taliban violence~~
~~is “unacceptably high.”46 In October 2020, Special Representative Khalilzad announced after a~~
~~meeting with Taliban officials in Doha that the sides had agreed to a “reset” and that “we expect~~
~~that number [of Afghans dying] to drop significantly.”47~~
~~Former Vice President Joseph Biden, the presumptive winner of the 2020 U.S. presidential~~
~~election, reportedly opposed the Obama Administration’s decision to increase U.S. force levels in~~
~~2009 and expressed skepticism about both U.S. development assistance and troop levels during~~
~~the 2020 primary campaign.48 On a number of occasions in 2019 and 2020, he declared his~~
~~intention to bring home U.S. combat troops if elected, leaving a small force focused solely on~~
~~counterterrorism operations.49~~
~~U.S. Adversaries: The Taliban, the Islamic State, and Al Qaeda50~~
~~The leader of the Taliban is Haibatullah Akhundzada, who is known as e~~~~mir~~. In May 2020, U.S. Air Forces Central Command stated it would no longer release monthly reports on the number of airstrikes and munitions released, citing “how the report could adversely impact ongoing discussions with the Taliban regarding Afghanistan peace talks.”49 The U.S. government has withheld many once-public metrics of military progress, arguably complicating assessments of the conflict’s status and trajectory. Notably, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported in April 2019 that the U.S. military is “no longer producing its district-level stability assessments of Afghan government and insurgent control and influence” because it “was of limited decision-making value to the [U.S.] Commander.”50 The last reported metrics (in the January 30, 2019, SIGAR report) showed that the share of districts under government control or influence fell to 548% as of October 2018. This figure was the lowest recorded by SIGAR since tracking began in November 2015; 12% of districts were under insurgent control or influence, with the remaining 34% contested. Conflict dynamics in the past two years do not appear to have shifted in the Afghan government’s favor. 44 Hamid Shalizi, “Exclusive: Afghan president, rejecting US peace plan, to offer election in six months, officials say,” Reuters, March 23, 2021. 45 Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs, March 23, 2020. 46 Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, Quarterly Report to Congress, July 1 to September 30, 2018, November 19, 2018. 47 “Casualty Status,” U.S. Department of Defense, March 22, 2021. 48 U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, monthly strike summaries. 49 “AFCENT stops releasing airstrike information as Taliban talks continue,” Air Force Magazine, May 4, 2020. 50 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2019. This information, which was in every previous Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) quarterly report going back to January 2016, estimated the extent of Taliban control and influence in terms of both territory and population. Congressional Research Service 11 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief ANDSF Development and Deployment The effectiveness of the ANDSF is key to the security of Afghanistan, and U.S. and international support is critical to supporting the ANDSF. President Ghani has said, “[W]e will not be able to support our army for six months without U.S. [financial] support.”51 Since 2014, the United States generally has provided around 75% of the estimated $5 billion to $6 billion a year required to fund the ANDSF, with the balance coming from U.S. partners ($1 billion annually) and the Afghan government ($500 million). The Pentagon reported in June 2020 that “full [financial] self-sufficiency by 2024 does not appear realistic, even if levels of violence and, with it, the ANDSF force structure, reduce significantly.”52 In the same report, DOD assessed that although Afghan forces (particularly the Afghan air force and special forces) exhibit considerable capabilities, they will “continue to rely over the long term on contracted logistic support and on the United States for the vast majority of the funding needed to sustain combat operations.”53 Total ANDSF strength was reported at over 305,000 as of October 2020. Other metrics related to ANDSF strength and performance, including casualty and attrition rates, have been classified by U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) starting with the October 2017 SIGAR quarterly report, citing a request from the Afghan government, although SIGAR had previously published those metrics as part of its quarterly reports.54 U.S. Adversaries: The Taliban, the Islamic State, and Al Qaeda55 The leader of the Taliban is Haibatullah Akhundzada, who is known as emir al-mu’minin, or , or
commander of the faithful; the Taliban style themselves as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. commander of the faithful; the Taliban style themselves as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
Haibatullah succeeded Mullah Mansoor, who was killed in a 2016 U.S. airstrike in Pakistan; Haibatullah succeeded Mullah Mansoor, who was killed in a 2016 U.S. airstrike in Pakistan;
Mansoor had succeeded Taliban founder Mullah Omar, who died of natural causes in Mansoor had succeeded Taliban founder Mullah Omar, who died of natural causes in ~~April~~ 2013. 2013.
Formerly a figure in Taliban religious courts, Haibatullah has been regarded as “more of an Formerly a figure in Taliban religious courts, Haibatullah has been regarded as “more of an
Islamic scholar than a military tactician.”Islamic scholar than a military tactician.”5156 Still, under his consensus-oriented leadership the Still, under his consensus-oriented leadership the
Taliban have achieved some notable military successes and the group is seen as more cohesive Taliban have achieved some notable military successes and the group is seen as more cohesive
and less susceptible to fragmentation than in the past.and less susceptible to fragmentation than in the past.5257
The Taliban, whose strength has been estimated at 60,000 full-time fighters, have consistently The Taliban, whose strength has been estimated at 60,000 full-time fighters, have consistently
demonstrated considerable tactical capabilities. U.S. officials demonstrated considerable tactical capabilities. U.S. officials ~~generally say that the Taliban do not~~
~~pose an existential threat to the Afghan government, given the current military balance. That~~
~~dynamic could change if the United States alters the level or nature of its troop deployments in~~
~~Afghanistan (per the U.S.-Taliban agreement) or reduces funding for the ANDSF. SIGAR~~
~~reported in April 2020 that U.S. forces are now withholding from public release data on enemy-~~

~~44 Defense Secretary Esper and Joint Chiefs of Staff Milley Hold Media Availability, March 2, 2020.~~
~~45 U.S Department of State, Briefing with Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad,~~
~~May 15, 2020.~~
~~46 See, for example, Morgan Phillips, “US Commander disappointed with Taliban peace efforts: Violence ‘higher’ than~~
~~agreement allows,” Fox News, March 10, 2020; “Ambassador Kay Bailey Hutchison on NATO’s Statement on~~
~~Afghanistan,” U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 24, 2020; “As Afghan peace talks stutter,~~
~~U.S. says violence levels too high,” Reuters, September 22, 2020.~~
~~47 U.S. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad (@US4AfghanPeace), Twitter, October 15, 2020, 9:21 AM.~~
~~48 Steve Coll, “Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan” (Penguin Press, 2018),~~
~~pp. 353-354, 367.~~
~~49 See “Candidates Answer CFR’s Questions: Joe Biden,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 1, 2019; “Joe Biden –~~
~~Foreign Policy,” New York Times, February 2020.~~
~~50 For more, see CRS In Focus IF10604, Al Qaeda and Islamic State Affiliates in Afghanistan, by Clayton Thomas.~~
~~51 “Red on Red: Analyzing Afghanistan’s Intra-Insurgency Violence,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 11, iss. 1, January 2018.~~
~~52 Andrew Watkins, “Taliban Fragmentation: Fact, Fiction, and Future,” U.S. Institute of Peace, March 2020.~~
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~~initiated attacks, which SIGAR called “one of the last remaining metrics SIGAR was able to use~~
~~to report publicly on the security situation in Afghanistan.”53~~
describe the current dynamic between the Afghan government and the Taliban as a “strategic stalemate” that is likely to persist, but only with U.S. support. In December 2020, General Milley described the stalemate as a situation “where the government of Afghanistan was never going to militarily defeat the Taliban and the Taliban, as long as we were supporting the government of Afghanistan, was never going to militarily defeat the regime.”58 That dynamic could change if the United States alters the level or nature of its troop deployments in Afghanistan (per the U.S.-Taliban agreement) or reduces funding for the ANDSF. In his March 2021 letter to President Ghani, Secretary Blinken stated, “Even with the continuation of financial assistance from the United States to your forces after an American military withdrawal, I am concerned that the security situation will worsen and the Taliban could make rapid territorial gains.” 51 Anwar Iqbal, “Afghan Army to Collapse in Six Months Without US Help: Ghani,” Dawn, January 18, 2018. 52 Department of Defense, “Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” June 2020. 53 Ibid. 54 “Report: US Officials Classify Crucial Metrics on Afghan Casualties, Readiness,” Military Times, October 30, 2017. 55 For more, see CRS In Focus IF10604, Al Qaeda and Islamic State Affiliates in Afghanistan, by Clayton Thomas. 56 “Red on Red: Analyzing Afghanistan’s Intra-Insurgency Violence,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 11, iss. 1, January 2018. 57 Andrew Watkins, “Taliban Fragmentation: Fact, Fiction, and Future,” U.S. Institute of Peace, March 2020. 58 “A Conversation with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley,” Brookings Institution, December 2, 2020. Congressional Research Service 12 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief Beyond the Taliban, a significant share of U.S. operations have been aimed at the local Islamic Beyond the Taliban, a significant share of U.S. operations have been aimed at the local Islamic
State affiliate, known as Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP, also known as ISIS-K). State affiliate, known as Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP, also known as ISIS-K).
Estimates of ISKP strength generally ranged from 2,000 to 4,000 fighters until ISKP “collapsed” Estimates of ISKP strength generally ranged from 2,000 to 4,000 fighters until ISKP “collapsed”
in late 2019 due to offensives by U.S. and Afghan forces and, separately, the Taliban.in late 2019 due to offensives by U.S. and Afghan forces and, separately, the Taliban.5459 ISKP and ISKP and
Taliban forces have sometimes fought over control of territory or because of political or other Taliban forces have sometimes fought over control of territory or because of political or other
differences.differences.5560 A number of ISKP leaders have been killed in U.S. strikes since 2016, and Afghan A number of ISKP leaders have been killed in U.S. strikes since 2016, and Afghan
forces arrested and captured two successive ISKP leaders in the spring of 2020. U.S. officials forces arrested and captured two successive ISKP leaders in the spring of 2020. U.S. officials
caution that ISKP remains a threat, pointing to several high profile attacks attributed to the group caution that ISKP remains a threat, pointing to several high profile attacks attributed to the group
in 2020in 2020 ~~(including a May 2020 assault on a maternity ward in Kabul and a November 2020 attack~~
~~on a university in Kabul), but the United Nations reports that casualties from ISKP attacks have~~
~~dropped considerably in 2020 compared to 2019.~~
~~Senior Al Qaeda (AQ) leaders, along with fighters of the regional AQ affiliate Al Qaeda in the~~
~~Indian Subcontinent, are also assessed to operate in Afghanistan. In May 2020, the United~~
~~Nations~~ , but the United Nations reports that casualties from ISKP attacks in 2020 decreased 45% from 2019.61 Some suggest that the Taliban’s participation in peace talks or a putative political settlement could prompt disaffected (or newly unemployed) fighters to join ISKP.62 Al Qaeda (AQ) is still assessed to have a presence in Afghanistan and its decades-long ties with the Taliban appear to have remained strong in recent years: in May 2020, U.N. sanctions monitors reported that senior Taliban leaders “regularly consulted” with their AQ counterparts reported that senior Taliban leaders “regularly consulted” with their AQ counterparts
during negotiations with the United States.during negotiations with the United States. ~~56 Al Qaeda has welcomed the U.S.-Taliban~~
~~agreement, “celebrating it as a victory for the Taliban’s cause and thus for global militancy.”57~~
~~U.S. officials have differed~~63 In October 2020, Afghan forces killed a senior AQ operative in Afghanistan’s Ghazni province, where he reportedly was living and working with Taliban forces, further underscoring questions about AQ-Taliban links and Taliban intentions with regard to Al Qaeda.64 U.S. officials’ statements have varied on the extent to which the Taliban are fulfilling on the extent to which the Taliban are fulfilling ~~its~~ their counterterrorism counterterrorism
~~commitments with regard to Al Qaeda, with which the Taliban have had close ties. Secretary~~
~~Pompeo said on July 1~~commitments concerning Al Qaeda. In July 2020, then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo said in a press interview that he had seen indications that the Taliban that he had seen indications that the Taliban ~~are~~ were actively combatting Al actively combatting Al
Qaeda, while Qaeda, while ~~General McKenzie said on July 15 that~~later that month the Commander of United States Central Command, General McKenzie, said, “right now, it is simply unclear to me that “right now, it is simply unclear to me that
the Taliban has the Taliban has taken any positive steps.”65 More recent U.S. public assessments align with General McKenzie’s analysis: the U.S. Treasury reported in a January 4, 2021, letter that “as of 2020, al-Qaeda is gaining strength in Afghanistan while continuing to operate with the Taliban under the Taliban’s protection.”66 On February 25, 2021, Edmund Fitton-Brown, coordinator of the U.N. monitoring team for Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban remarked that “we have not seen any evidence” that the Taliban have taken serious steps to suppress a potential future threat from AQ to the international community.67 The U.S.-Taliban accord is silent on what verification mechanisms 59~~taken any positive steps” with regard to Al Qaeda.58~~
~~It is uncertain what verification mechanisms might be in place to ensure Taliban compliance with~~
~~the commitment to prevent Al Qaeda from operating in Afghanistan, and to what extent the U.S.~~
~~withdrawal might be paused or reversed based on Taliban action with regard to Al Qaeda. Afghan~~
~~forces’ killing of a high-ranking AQ operative in Afghanistan’s Ghazni province, where he~~
~~reportedly was living and working with Taliban forces, further underscores questions about~~
~~Taliban intentions with regard to Al Qaeda.59~~

~~53 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2020. SIGAR reports that the U.S. military~~
~~“explained its decision by saying ‘EIA are now a critical part of deliberative interagency discussions regarding ongoing~~
~~political negotiations between the U.S. and the Taliban.’”~~
54 “ISIS Is Losing Afghan Territory. That Means Little for Its Victims,” “ISIS Is Losing Afghan Territory. That Means Little for Its Victims,” New York Times, December 2, 2019. , December 2, 2019.
5560 See, for example, “Heavy fighting flares between Taliban, Islamic State in Afghanistan,” See, for example, “Heavy fighting flares between Taliban, Islamic State in Afghanistan,” Reuters, April 24, 2019; , April 24, 2019;
Shawn Snow, “ISIS loses more than half its fighters from US airstrikes and Taliban ground operations,” Shawn Snow, “ISIS loses more than half its fighters from US airstrikes and Taliban ground operations,” Military
Times, February 27, 2020. , February 27, 2020.
5661 UNAMA, Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, op. cit. 62 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Zabihullah Ghazi, “Foes in Afghan War See Common Threat of Islamic State’s Return,” New York Times, March 22, 2021. 63 Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501 Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability (2019) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability
and security of Afghanistan, and security of Afghanistan, U.N. Document S/2020/415, released May 27, 2020. S/2020/415, released May 27, 2020.
~~57 Ibid.~~
5864 Jeff Seldin, “US Calls Death of al-Qaida Official a Major Setback for Terror Group,” Voice of America, October 26, 2020. 65 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, “Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo with Bret Baier of Fox News Special Report,Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo with Bret Baier of Fox News Special Report,” July 1, July 1,
2020; Carla Babb, “VOA Exclusive: CENTCOM chief says US can do job in Iraq with fewer forces,” Voice of 2020; Carla Babb, “VOA Exclusive: CENTCOM chief says US can do job in Iraq with fewer forces,” Voice of
AmericaAmerica, July 15, 2020. 66 “Memorandum for Department of Defense Lead Inspector General, Department of the Treasury,” January 4, 2021. Available at https://oig.treasury.gov/sites/oig/files/2021-01/OIG-CA-21-012.pdf. 67 Edmund Fitton-Brown, “Panel II: Countering Terrorism since 9/11: International Perspectives,” Middle East~~, July 15, 2020.~~
~~59 Jeff Seldin, “US Calls Death of al-Qaida Official a Major Setback for Terror Group,” Voice of America, October 26,~~
~~2020.~~
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might be in place to ensure Taliban compliance, and to what extent the U.S. withdrawal might be paused or reversed based on Taliban action (or inaction) with regard to Al Qaeda. Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors
Regional dynamics, and the involvement of outside powers, directly affect the conflict in Regional dynamics, and the involvement of outside powers, directly affect the conflict in
Afghanistan. The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan, Afghanistan. The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan,
which has played an active, and by many accounts negative, role in Afghan affairs for decades. which has played an active, and by many accounts negative, role in Afghan affairs for decades.
Pakistan’s security services maintain ties to Afghan insurgent groups, most notably the Haqqani Pakistan’s security services maintain ties to Afghan insurgent groups, most notably the Haqqani
Network.Network.6068 Afghan leaders, along with U.S. military commanders, Afghan leaders, along with U.S. military commanders, ~~attribute~~have attributed much of the much of the
insurgency’s power and longevity either directly or indirectly to Pakistani supportinsurgency’s power and longevity either directly or indirectly to Pakistani support~~; President~~
~~Trump has accused Pakistan of “housing the very terrorists that we are fighting.”61 Since late~~
~~2018, the Trump Administration has~~.69 The Trump Administration sought Islamabad’s assistance in U.S. talks with the Taliban sought Islamabad’s assistance in U.S. talks with the Taliban after 2018, and U.S. assessments of Taliban’s role have generally been more positive since. For example, ,
~~and~~ Khalilzad thanked Pakistan for releasing Baradar from custody in October 2018 and for Khalilzad thanked Pakistan for releasing Baradar from custody in October 2018 and for
facilitating the travel of Taliban figures to talks in Dohafacilitating the travel of Taliban figures to talks in Doha~~.62 A biannual Department of Defense~~
~~report on Afghanistan released in July 2020 asserted that Pakistan has demonstrated “strong~~
~~support to facilitating peace in Afghanistan.”63~~
~~Pakistan~~, and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin “expressed gratitude” to his Pakistani counterpart in March 2021 for Pakistan’s “continued support for the Afghan peace process.”70 Despite official Pakistani leadership’s statements to the contrary, Islamabad may view a weak and destabilized Afghanistan as preferable to a strong, unified Afghan may view a weak and destabilized Afghanistan as preferable to a strong, unified Afghan
state (particularly one led by an ethnic Pashtun-dominated government in Kabul; Pakistan has a state (particularly one led by an ethnic Pashtun-dominated government in Kabul; Pakistan has a
large and restive Pashtun minority).large and restive Pashtun minority).6471 Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by
the presence of over one million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-running and the presence of over one million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-running and
ethnically tinged dispute over their shared 1,600-mile border.ethnically tinged dispute over their shared 1,600-mile border.6572 Pakistan’s security establishment, Pakistan’s security establishment,
fearful of strategic encirclement by India, apparently continues to view the Afghan Taliban as a fearful of strategic encirclement by India, apparently continues to view the Afghan Taliban as a
relatively friendly and reliably anti-India element in Afghanistan. India’s diplomatic and relatively friendly and reliably anti-India element in Afghanistan. India’s diplomatic and
commercial presence in Afghanistan—and U.S. rhetorical support for it—exacerbates Pakistani commercial presence in Afghanistan—and U.S. rhetorical support for it—exacerbates Pakistani
fears of encirclement. India has been the largest regional contributor to Afghan reconstruction, fears of encirclement. India has been the largest regional contributor to Afghan reconstruction,
but New Delhi has not shown an inclination to pursue a deeper defense relationship with Kabul. but New Delhi has not shown an inclination to pursue a deeper defense relationship with Kabul.
Afghanistan Afghanistan ~~largely maintains~~maintains mostly cordial ties with its other neighbors, notably the post-Soviet states cordial ties with its other neighbors, notably the post-Soviet states
of Central Asia, whose role in Afghanistan has been relatively limited but could increase.of Central Asia, whose role in Afghanistan has been relatively limited but could increase.6673 In the In the
past two years, multiple U.S. commanders have warned of increased levels of support for the past two years, multiple U.S. commanders have warned of increased levels of support for the
Taliban from Russia and Iran, both of which have cited the Islamic State affiliate presence in Taliban from Russia and Iran, both of which have cited the Islamic State affiliate presence in
~~Afghanistan to justify their activities. Both were reported in 2020 to have been more directly~~
~~involved, including possibly supporting Taliban attacks against U.S. forces.67 Both nations were~~

60 Institute, Annual Counterterrorism Conference, February 25, 2021. 68 For more, see CRS In Focus IF10604, For more, see CRS In Focus IF10604, Al Qaeda and Islamic State Affiliates in Afghanistan, by Clayton Thomas. , by Clayton Thomas.
6169 White House, White House, Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, August 21, 2017. Some , August 21, 2017. Some
Pakistani officials disputed that charge and noted the Taliban’s increased territorial control within Afghanistan itself. Pakistani officials disputed that charge and noted the Taliban’s increased territorial control within Afghanistan itself.
Author interviews with Pakistani military officials, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, February 21, 2018. Author interviews with Pakistani military officials, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, February 21, 2018.
6270 “Mullah Baradar released by Pakistan at the behest of US: Khalilzad,” “Mullah Baradar released by Pakistan at the behest of US: Khalilzad,” The Hindu, February 9, 2019. Baradar had , February 9, 2019. Baradar had
been imprisoned in Pakistan since his capture in Karachi in a joint U.S.-Pakistani operation in 2010. been imprisoned in Pakistan since his capture in Karachi in a joint U.S.-Pakistani operation in 2010.
~~63 DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2020 (released July 1, 2020).~~
64Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pentagon chief praises Pakistan’s role in Afghan peace process,” Dawn, March 23, 2021. 71 Pashtuns are an ethnic group that makes up about 40% of Afghanistan’s 35 million people and 15% of Pakistan’s 215 Pashtuns are an ethnic group that makes up about 40% of Afghanistan’s 35 million people and 15% of Pakistan’s 215
million; they thus represent a plurality in Afghanistan but are a relatively small minority in Pakistan, though Pakistan’s million; they thus represent a plurality in Afghanistan but are a relatively small minority in Pakistan, though Pakistan’s
Pashtun population is considerably larger than Afghanistan’s. Pashtun population is considerably larger than Afghanistan’s.
6572 Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary, but Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary, but
Afghanistan does not. See Vinay Kaura, “The Durand Line: A British Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations,” Afghanistan does not. See Vinay Kaura, “The Durand Line: A British Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations,”
Middle East Institute, June 27, 2017. Middle East Institute, June 27, 2017.
6673 Humayun Hamidzada and Richard Ponzio, Humayun Hamidzada and Richard Ponzio, Central Asia’s Growing Role in Building Peace and Regional
Connectivity with Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, August 2019. , United States Institute of Peace, August 2019.
~~67 In October 2018, the Trump Administration sanctioned several Iranian military officials for providing support to the~~
~~Taliban. U.S. Department of the Treasury,~~ ~~Treasury and the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center Partners Sanction~~
~~Taliban Facilitators and their Iranian Supporters, October 23, 2018.~~
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Congressional Research Service 14 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief Afghanistan to justify their activities. Both were reported in 2020 to have been more directly involved, including possibly supporting Taliban attacks against U.S. forces.74 Both nations were opposed to the Taliban government of the late 1990s, but reportedly see the Taliban as a useful opposed to the Taliban government of the late 1990s, but reportedly see the Taliban as a useful
point of leverage vis-point of leverage vis-aà-vis the United States. Afghanistan may also represent a growing priority -vis the United States. Afghanistan may also represent a growing priority
for China in the context of broader Chinese aspirations in Asia and globally.for China in the context of broader Chinese aspirations in Asia and globally.68
~~Reports of Foreign Payments for Taliban Attacks~~
~~Since at least 2016, U.S. officials have indicated that Russia has been providing some measure of political and~~
~~potentially material support to the Taliban. Media reports in June-July 2020, however, alleged the existence of a~~
~~more specific connection than was previously reported publicly. Specifically, media reports indicate that U.S.~~
~~intelligence officials concluded that Russia’s military intelligence agency (commonly known as the GRU) has offered~~
~~payments to Taliban-linked militants in exchange for attacks on U.S. and international troops in Afghanistan.69~~
~~Administration officials rejected the accuracy of the reporting and decried intelligence leaks, without denying the~~
~~existence of related intelligence reporting or assessments. U.S. intelligence agencies have not verified the claims. A~~
~~Taliban spokesman denied “any such relations with any intelligence agency” and stated that “target kil ings and~~
~~assassinations were ongoing in years before, and we did it on our own resources.”70 Russia also denied the~~
~~allegations as “lies.”71 The reports prompted statements and proposed legislation (see H.R. 7553) from some~~
~~Members of Congress.~~
~~Separately, in August 2020, CNN reported that U.S. intelligence had concluded that Iran had similarly paid Taliban~~
~~fighters associated with the Haqqani network for attacks against U.S. personnel, which Iranian officials denied.72~~
~~Economy and U.S. Aid~~
~~In addition to its longstanding military presence, the United States has provided a considerable~~
~~amount of development assistance to Afghanistan. Since FY2002, Congress has appropriated over~~
~~$141 billion in overall aid for Afghanistan, with about 61% for security and 26% for development~~
~~(with the remaining 13% for civilian operations and humanitarian aid).73 The Administration’s~~
~~FY2021 budget requests $4 billion for Afghan forces, $250 million in Economic Support Funds,~~
~~and smaller amounts to help the Afghan government with efforts like counternarcotics.74 DOD’s~~
~~Cost of War report estimated the cost of U.S. combat operations (including related regional~~
~~support activities and support for Afghan forces) as of September 2019 at $805.8 billion since~~
~~FY2002.~~
~~A U.S. military withdrawal could affect the level and types of assistance the United States may~~
~~provide to Afghanistan. Some Members have raised concerns that a withdrawal might impair the~~
~~United States’ ability to monitor the distribution and effectiveness of U.S. aid, a longstanding~~
~~U.S. concern.75 Relatedly, the number of personnel present in Afghanistan under Chief of Mission~~

~~68 See, for example, Barbara Kelemen, “China’s Economic Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan: A New Party to the~~
~~Table?” Middle East Institute, January 21, 2020.~~
~~69 Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt and Michael Schwirtz, “Russia Secretly Offered Afghan Militants Bounties to Kill U.S.~~
~~Troops, Intelligence Says,” New York Times, June 26, 2020.~~
~~70 Ibid.~~
~~71 Interfax (Russia), “Reports Russia Offered Bounties to Taliban Militants to Attack U.S. Troops in Afghanistan Lies –~~
~~Peskov,” June 29, 2020; Brendan Cole, “How Russia Reacted to the U.S. Troop Bounty Claims,” Newsweek, July 1,~~
~~2020.~~
~~72 Zachary Cohen, “US intelligence indicates Iran paid bounties to Taliban for targeting American troops in~~
~~Afghanistan,” CNN, August 17, 2020.~~
~~73 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2020.~~
~~74 For more, see CRS Report R45329, Afghanistan: Issues for Congress and Legislation 2017-2020.~~
~~75 See Senator Reed’s remarks at Senate Armed Service Committee Hearing on U.S. Central Command, February 5,~~
~~2019.~~
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~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

~~authority (the vast majority of which are State Department or USAID personnel) has declined~~
~~steadily under the Trump Administration and significantly since the onset of the pandemic.~~
~~Furthermore, U.S. assistance may affect, and in turn be affected by, intra-Afghan talks and a~~
~~potential settlement. Special Representative Khalilzad said in September 2020 congressional~~
~~testimony that “we are committed for the long term in terms of providing assistance to~~
~~Afghanistan,” but that U.S. decisions would depend on the outcome of Afghan negotiations, as~~
~~other U.S. officials have emphasized.76 The appropriation of assistance funding remains a~~
~~congressional prerogative. It is unclear to what extent (if at all) the prospect of changes to U.S.~~
~~and international financial assistance might put pressure on or create U.S. leverage over the~~
~~behavior and policies of the Taliban or the Afghan government.77~~
~~U.S. and international development assistance could become more critical if a U.S. and allied~~
~~military withdrawal further weakens Afghanistan’s already shaky economy.~~ 75 Economy and U.S. Aid In addition to its long-standing military presence, the United States has provided considerable development assistance to Afghanistan. Since FY2002, Congress has appropriated over $143 billion in overall aid for Afghanistan, with about 62% for security and 25% for governance and development (with the remaining 13% for civilian operations and humanitarian aid).76 DOD’s quarterly Cost of War report estimated the cost of U.S. combat operations (including related regional support activities and support for Afghan forces) as of December 2020 at $824.9 billion since FY2002. A U.S. military withdrawal could affect the level and types of assistance the United States may provide to Afghanistan. Some Members have raised concerns that a withdrawal might impair the United States’ ability to monitor the distribution and effectiveness of U.S. aid, a long-standing U.S. concern.77 For FY2021, Congress appropriated just over $3 billion for the ANDSF, the lowest annual appropriation since FY2008.78 Additionally, the number of personnel present in Afghanistan under Chief of Mission authority (mostly State Department or USAID personnel) declined steadily during the Trump Administration and significantly after the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic began. Furthermore, U.S. assistance may affect, and in turn be affected by, intra-Afghan talks and a potential settlement. Special Representative Khalilzad said in September 2020 congressional testimony that “we are committed for the long term in terms of providing assistance to Afghanistan,” but that U.S. decisions would depend on the outcome of Afghan negotiations, as other U.S. officials have emphasized.79 The appropriation of assistance funding remains a congressional prerogative. It is unclear to what extent (if at all) the prospect of changes to U.S. and international financial assistance might put pressure on or create U.S. leverage over the behavior and policies of the Taliban or the Afghan government.80 74 Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt and Michael Schwirtz, “Russia Secretly Offered Afghan Militants Bounties to Kill U.S. Troops, Intelligence Says,” New York Times, June 26, 2020. Additionally, in October 2018, the Trump Administration sanctioned several Iranian military officials for providing support to the Taliban. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury and the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center Partners Sanction Taliban Facilitators and their Iranian Supporters, October 23, 2018. 75 See, for example, Barbara Kelemen, “China’s Economic Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan: A New Party to the Table?” Middle East Institute, January 21, 2020. 76 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2020. 77 See Senator Reed’s remarks at Senate Armed Service Committee Hearing on U.S. Central Command, February 5, 2019. 78 Congress also rescinded $1.1 billion in FY2020 ASFF funding. For more, see CRS Report R45329, Afghanistan: Issues for Congress and Legislation 2017-2020. 79 House Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security Holds Hearing on Afghanistan Strategy, September 22, 2020. For example, Secretary Pompeo told intra-Afghan negotiators in Doha that their “choices and conduct will affect both the size and scope of United States future assistance.” 80 For more, see Live Event: What Does the Taliban Want?, Wilson Center, October 6, 2020. Congressional Research Service 15 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief U.S. and international development assistance could become more critical if a U.S. and allied military withdrawal further weakens Afghanistan’s economy, already among the world’s smallest. Afghanistan’s gross Afghanistan’s gross
domestic product (GDP) has grown an average of 7% per year since 2003, but growth rates domestic product (GDP) has grown an average of 7% per year since 2003, but growth rates
averaged between 2% and 3% in recent years and decades of war have stunted the development averaged between 2% and 3% in recent years and decades of war have stunted the development
of most domestic industries. of most domestic industries. President Ghani said in July 2020 that 90% of Afghans live below the government-determined poverty level of two dollars a day.81 The ~~The~~ withdrawal of a U.S. force much smaller than that of a decade withdrawal of a U.S. force much smaller than that of a decade
ago would seem to have less dramatic second-order economic effects for Afghanistan than ago would seem to have less dramatic second-order economic effects for Afghanistan than did the the
post-2012 drawdown, which helped spur a “drastic economic decline.”post-2012 drawdown, which helped spur a “drastic economic decline.”7882 Still, the proposed Still, the proposed
withdrawal could pose risks for an Afghan economy suffering the effects of the withdrawal could pose risks for an Afghan economy suffering the effects of the ~~Coronavirus~~
~~Disease 2019 (COVID-19)~~COVID-19 pandemic, which has infected tens of thousands of Afghans (a figure pandemic, which has infected tens of thousands of Afghans (a figure
likely understates the scale of the virus in Afghanistan due to extremely limited testing).likely understates the scale of the virus in Afghanistan due to extremely limited testing).7983
Social conditions in Afghanistan remain challenging Social conditions in Afghanistan remain challenging, as well. On issues ranging from human as well. On issues ranging from human
trafficking to religious freedom to women’s rights, development assistance has helped trafficking to religious freedom to women’s rights, development assistance has helped
Afghanistan make limited progress since 2001, but prospects in these areas are uncertain, Afghanistan make limited progress since 2001, but prospects in these areas are uncertain,
especially under more unstable future scenarios. Afghanistan’s largely underdeveloped natural especially under more unstable future scenarios. Afghanistan’s largely underdeveloped natural
resources and/or geographic position at the crossroads of future global trade routes could improve resources and/or geographic position at the crossroads of future global trade routes could improve
the economic life of the country, and, by extension, its social and political dynamics. the economic life of the country, and, by extension, its social and political dynamics.
Nevertheless, Afghanistan’s economic and political outlook remains uncertain, if not negative, in Nevertheless, Afghanistan’s economic and political outlook remains uncertain, if not negative, in
light of the prospective decrease in U.S. and international investment and engagement. light of the prospective decrease in U.S. and international investment and engagement.
Outlook and Issues for Congress
~~The September 12, 2020, commencement of talks between the Afghan government and the~~
~~Taliban represented a significant moment for Afghanistan and for U.S. policy there. As~~
~~negotiators continue their work, U.S. officials, including Members of Congress, are expected to~~
~~closely follow the negotiations, given the impact that a settlement could have on U.S. interests~~
~~such as human rights and counterterrorism.~~
~~Still, U.S. officials caution that challenges remain and that “there is no guarantee that the Afghans~~
~~will capitalize on their opportunity.”80 Shifts in political and/or security dynamics may change~~

~~76 House Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security Holds Hearing on Afghanistan Strategy,~~
~~September 22, 2020. For example, Secretary Pompeo told intra-Afghan negotiators in Doha that their “choices and~~
~~conduct will affect both the size and scope of United States future assistance.”~~
~~77 For more, see Live Event: What Does the Taliban Want?, Wilson Center, October 6, 2020.~~
~~78 “The Economic Disaster Behind Afghanistan’s Mounting Human Crisis,” International Crisis Group, October 3,~~
~~2016.~~
~~79 World Health Organization, “WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard,” November 9, 2020.~~
~~80 Zalmay Khalilzad, remarks at “The Beginning of an End to Afghanistan’s Conflict?” United States Institute of Peace,~~
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~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

~~how various parties view both the U.S.-Taliban agreement and the pursuit of intra-Afghan talks~~
~~and what their respective commitments and interests are. Furthermore, the unfolding COVID-19~~
~~crisis could also affect those dynamics, as well as the capacity and/or willingness of the United~~
~~States and other international partners to maintain their engagement, both military and financial,~~
~~with Afghanistan. Former Vice President Joe Biden, the presumptive winner of the 2020 U.S.~~
~~presidential election, has repeatedly committed to withdraw U.S. combat troops and said that the~~
~~use of U.S. military force to pursue goals in Afghanistan other than counterterrorism is not in the~~
~~United States’ vital interests.81~~
~~Core issues for Congress in Afghanistan include Congress’s role in authorizing, appropriating~~
~~funds for, and overseeing U.S. military activities, aid, and regional policy implementation.~~
~~Additionally, Members of Congress~~ As the May 2021 deadline for the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan approaches, the Biden Administration appears to be intensifying its efforts to broker an intra-Afghan agreement that would reduce violence and provide a pathway to a political settlement. In any event, it appears increasingly unlikely that the United States will be able to meet that deadline, raising questions about how the Taliban might react and for how long, and under what conditions, U.S. troops will remain. President Biden, as Vice President, reportedly opposed the Obama Administration’s decision to increase U.S. force levels in 2009, and expressed skepticism about troop levels in Afghanistan as a candidate during the 2020 primary campaign.84 As President, he has not made extensive comments about Afghanistan, but said in a March 16, 2021, interview that the U.S.-Taliban agreement was “not a very solidly negotiated deal” and that meeting its May 1 withdrawal deadline “could happen” but would be “tough.”85 He also said an ongoing Administration review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan was “in process” and that reaching a decision would not take “a lot longer.” At a March 25, 2021, press conference, he said “I can’t picture” U.S. troops in Afghanistan next year.86 81 Anisa Shaheed, “Ghani’s Afghan Poverty Estimate ‘Catastrophic’: Analysts,” TOLOnews, July 20, 2020. 82 “The Economic Disaster Behind Afghanistan’s Mounting Human Crisis,” International Crisis Group, October 3, 2016. 83 World Health Organization, “WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard,” March 23, 2021. 84 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Penguin Press, 2018), pp. 353-354, 367; “Transcript: Joe Biden on Face the Nation,” CBS News, February 23, 2020. 85 “TRANSCRIPT: ABC News’ George Stephanopoulos interviews President Joe Biden,” ABC News, March 17, 2021. 86 “President Biden Holds News Conference,” C-SPAN, March 25, 2021. Congressional Research Service 16 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief Experts have laid out a number of approaches that the Biden Administration might take in light of the U.S. troop drawdown, of which the most common is to pursue a conditions-based approach to further alterations to U.S. troop levels.87 That might entail the presence of international troops past May 2021. This, in turn, could spur the Taliban to retarget foreign forces and possibly prompt the Taliban to abandon talks with the Afghan government and the United States. One longtime Afghanistan observer, in surveying the policy landscape that the new Administration confronts in Afghanistan, has said “there are no good or easy options—only less bad ones.”88 In the 117th Congress, some Members have expressed a range of views about the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. A number of lawmakers, including the chairmen of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, have called on the Administration to “reconsider” the pullout, describing it as potentially “destabilizing.”89 Others have called on the Administration to meet the May 1 deadline for a full U.S. military withdrawal (citing the recently published Interim National Security Guidance, which states “the United States should not, and will not, engage in ‘forever wars’”),90 or negotiate an extension.91 Core issues for Congress in Afghanistan include Congress’s role in authorizing, appropriating funds for, and overseeing U.S. military activities, aid, and regional policy implementation. Additionally, Members may examine how the United States can leverage its assets, may examine how the United States can leverage its assets,
influence, and experience in Afghanistan, as well as those of Afghanistan’s neighbors and influence, and experience in Afghanistan, as well as those of Afghanistan’s neighbors and
international organizations, to encourage more inclusive and effective governance. Congress also international organizations, to encourage more inclusive and effective governance. Congress also
could seek to shape the U.S. approach to the Taliban and/or intra-Afghan talks through oversight, could seek to shape the U.S. approach to the Taliban and/or intra-Afghan talks through oversight,
legislation, and public statements. legislation, and public statements.
In light of the U.S.-Taliban agreement In light of the U.S.-Taliban agreement and subsequent developments, Members of Congress and other U.S. policymakers may , Members of Congress and other U.S. policymakers may
reassess notions of what success in Afghanistan looks like, examining how potential outcomes reassess notions of what success in Afghanistan looks like, examining how potential outcomes
might harm or benefit U.S. interests, and the relative levels of U.S. engagement and investment might harm or benefit U.S. interests, and the relative levels of U.S. engagement and investment
required to attain them.required to attain them.8292 How Afghanistan fits into broader U.S. strategy is another issue on How Afghanistan fits into broader U.S. strategy is another issue on
which Members might engage, especially given competing fiscal priorities in light of the COVID-which Members might engage, especially given competing fiscal priorities in light of the COVID-
~~19 pandemic as well as the Administration’s focus on strategic competition with other great~~
~~powers.83~~

~~Author Information~~

~~Clayton Thomas~~

~~Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs~~

~~September 24, 2020.~~
~~81 “Transcript: Joe Biden on Face the Nation,” CBS News, February 23, 2020.~~
8219 pandemic as well as competing U.S. policy priorities.93 87 Madiha Afzal, “May 2021 should not be seen as a unilateral deadline for the United States to leave Afghanistan,” Brookings Institution, February 10, 2021; Afghanistan Study Group Final Report, op. cit. 88 Steve Coll, “Joe Biden Will Have to Address the War in Afghanistan—Again,” New Yorker, January 20, 2021. 89 Eric Schmitt, “A Top Democrat Warns Against a Hasty Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Afghanistan,” New York Times, February 24, 2021; “Key U.S. lawmaker questions May deadline for troop pullout from Afghanistan,” Reuters, March 9, 2021. 90 “Reps. Lee and Buck Urge President Biden to Uphold Deadline for Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Afghanistan,” Office of Congresswoman Barbara Lee, March 19, 2021. 91 Jared Golden, “I Fought in Afghanistan. It’s Time to Bring the Troops Home,” Newsweek, March 23, 2021. 92 The The Washington Post’s December 2019 publication of the “Afghanistan Papers” (largely records of SIGAR ’s December 2019 publication of the “Afghanistan Papers” (largely records of SIGAR
interviews conducted as part of a lessons learned project) ignited debate, including reactions from some Members of interviews conducted as part of a lessons learned project) ignited debate, including reactions from some Members of
Congress, on these very issues. Congress, on these very issues.
8393 See, for example, CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. Congressional Research Service 17 ~~See, for example, CRS In Focus IF11139,~~ ~~Evaluating DOD Strategy: Key Findings of the National Defense Strategy~~
~~Commission, by Kathleen J. McInnis;~~ ~~The US Role In The Middle East In An Era Of Renewed Great Power~~
~~Competition, Hoover Institution, April 2, 2019; and Benjamin Denison, “Confusion in the Pivot: The Muddled Shift~~
~~from Peripheral War to Great Power Competition,” War on the Rocks, February 12, 2019.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

16

~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief Author Information Clayton Thomas Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
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