Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Changes from August 24, 2020 to May 18, 2021

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and
~~August 24, 2020~~May 18, 2021
Issues for Congress
Rachel F. Fefer,
~~President Trump has used Section 232 authority to apply new tariffs to steel and~~
~~Coordinator~~
~~aluminum imports and potentially to imports of automobiles and automobile parts and~~
~~Analyst in International~~
~~certain other goods.~~ Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862) Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862)
~~Trade and Finance~~
~~provides the~~ provides the Coordinator President with the ability to impose restrictions on certain imports based on President with the ability to impose restrictions on certain imports based on

an an Analyst in International affirmative determination by the Department of Commerce (Commerce) that the affirmative determination by the Department of Commerce (Commerce) that the
~~Keigh E. Hammond~~Trade and Finance
product(s) under investigation “is being imported into the United States in such product(s) under investigation “is being imported into the United States in such
~~Senior Research Librarian~~
quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.” Keigh E. Hammond President Trump used Section 232 authority to apply new tariffs to steel and aluminum Senior Research Librarian imports and to create negotiating leverage by suggesting tariffs on certain other goods such as automobiles and automobile parts. The Biden Administration may consider how Vivian C. Jones to address the existing Section 232 tariffs. Prior to the Trump Administration, the last Specialist in International Section 232 investigation was in 2001 and a president arguably last acted under Section Trade and Finance 232 in 1986. Congress has interest in Section 232 actions because they are a delegation of its constitutional authority over tariffs and commerce with foreign nations, and raise a Brandon J. Murrill number of economic and policy issues. Some Members have introduced legislation to Legislative Attorney revise Section 232 authorities. Effective March 23, 2018, President Trump applied 25% and 10% tariffs, respectively, Michaela D. Platzer Specialist in Industrial on certain steel and aluminum imports and, in February 2020, expanded the scope of Organization and Business products subject to the additional tariffs. Permanent tariff exemptions in exchange for quantitative limitations ~~quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.”~~

~~Congress has interest in Section 232 actions because they are a delegation of its~~
~~Vivian C. Jones~~
~~constitutional authority over tariffs and commerce with foreign nations, and raise a~~
~~Specialist in International~~
~~number of economic and policy issues. Some Members have introduced legislation to~~
~~Trade and Finance~~
~~revise Section 232 authorities.~~

~~Global overcapacity in steel and aluminum production, mainly driven by China, has~~
~~Brandon J. Murrill~~
~~Legislative Attorney~~
~~been an ongoing concern of Congress. While the United States has extensive~~

~~antidumping and countervailing duties on Chinese steel imports to counter China’s~~
~~unfair trade practices, steel industry and other experts argue that the magnitude of~~
~~Michaela D. Platzer~~
~~Specialist in Industrial~~
~~Chinese production acts to depress prices globally. The George W. Bush, Obama, and~~
~~Organization and Business~~
~~Trump Administrations have each engaged in multilateral discussions to address global~~

~~steel capacity reduction through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and~~
~~Development (OECD) and other international forums.~~
~~Brock R. Williams~~

~~Specialist in International~~
~~Effective March 23, 2018, President Trump applied 25% and 10% tariffs, respectively,~~
~~Trade and Finance~~
~~on certain steel and aluminum imports and, in February 2020, expanded the scope of~~

~~products subject to the additional tariffs. Permanent tariff exemptions in exchange for~~

~~quantitative limitations~~ on U.S. imports were negotiated covering steel for Brazil and on U.S. imports were negotiated covering steel for Brazil and
South Korea, and both steel and aluminum for Argentina. Australia was permanently South Korea, and both steel and aluminum for Argentina. Australia was permanently Brock R. Williams Specialist in International exempted from both tariffs, exempted from both tariffs,
with no quantitative restrictions. The with no quantitative restrictions. The ~~United States~~ Trump Administration Trade and Finance removed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Mexico removed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Mexico
and Canada, in part to and Canada, in part to secure congressional support for the new United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement secure congressional support for the new United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA)(USMCA), and after the three countries agreed to establish an import monitoring and after the three countries agreed to establish an import monitoring ~~mechanism. USMCA includes~~
~~side letters limiting potential Section 232~~ mechanism. U.S. tariffs on tariffs on ~~autos and parts above a certain threshold of imports. In August~~
~~2020, citing a surge in imports, the United States reinstated tariffs on certain aluminum imports from Canada.~~
~~Canada plans to retaliate with tariffs on U.S. imports equal to a reciprocal amount.~~
~~Commerce is managing a process for exclusions of steel and aluminum products subject to Section 232 tariffs in~~
~~order to limit potential negative domestic effects of the tariffs on U.S. businesses and consumers. As of March 23,~~
~~2020, Commerce received 179,128 exclusion requests, 157,983 for steel and 21,145~~steel and aluminum under Section 232 currently affect $13.1 bil ion of U.S. annual imports, excluding countries currently exempted. The tariffs wil remain in place unless the Biden Administration removes or amends them. Commerce is managing a process for Section 232 tariff exclusions of steel and aluminum products in order to limit the tariffs’ potential negative domestic effects on U.S. businesses and consumers. As of February 7, 2021, Commerce received 288,021 exclusion requests, 260,450 for steel and 27,571 for aluminum. Of those for aluminum. Of those
requests, the agency granted requests, the agency granted ~~78,569~~170,084 exclusions and denied exclusions and denied ~~25,440.~~ 59,134, with 44,325 exclusion requests rejected or withdrawn. The remaining requests The remaining requests ~~are~~were pending. Several pending. Several
Members of Congress and the Commerce Inspector General have raised issues and concerns about the exclusion Members of Congress and the Commerce Inspector General have raised issues and concerns about the exclusion
~~process.~~
~~Several U.S. trading partners are challenging the~~process. Commerce has made multiple updates intended to clarify and simplify the exclusion process and decrease the overal volume of requests. Global overcapacity in steel and aluminum production, mainly driven by China, has been an ongoing concern of Congress. While the United States has extensive antidumping and countervailing duties on Chinese steel imports to counter China’s unfair trade practices, steel industry and other experts argue that the magnitude of Chinese production acts to depress prices global y. The George W. Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden Administrations each engaged in multilateral discussions to address global steel capacity reduction, including through the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and other international forums. Several U.S. trading partners are chal enging the steel and aluminum tariffs under World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute tariffs under World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute
settlement rules and have threatened or enacted retaliatory measures. Some analysts view the U.S. unilateral settlement rules and have threatened or enacted retaliatory measures. Some analysts view the U.S. unilateral
actions as actions as ~~potentially~~potential y undermining WTO rules, which undermining WTO rules, which ~~generally~~general y prohibit parties from acting prohibit parties from acting ~~unilaterally,~~ unilateral y, but but
provide exceptions, including when parties act to protect “essential security interests.” In turn, the United provide exceptions, including when parties act to protect “essential security interests.” In turn, the United States States
has initiated cases against other countries’ retaliatory measures under WTO rules. Some U.S. firms are also has initiated cases against other countries’ retaliatory measures under WTO rules. Some U.S. firms are also
~~challenging the~~ chal enging the Trump Administration’s actions Administration’s actions ~~domestically.~~
domestical y. Congressional Research Service Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress Congress enacted Section 232 during the Cold War when national security issues were at the forefront of national Congress enacted Section 232 during the Cold War when national security issues were at the forefront of national
debate. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 sets clear steps and timelines for Section 232 investigations and actions, debate. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 sets clear steps and timelines for Section 232 investigations and actions,
and and ~~allows~~al ows the President to make a final determination over the appropriate action to take following an affirmative the President to make a final determination over the appropriate action to take following an affirmative
~~Congressional Research Service~~

~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~finding by Commerce that the relevant imports threaten to impair national security. Prior to the Trump~~
~~Administration, there were 26 Section 232 investigations, resulting in nine affirmative findings by Commerce. In~~
~~six of those cases the President imposed a trade action.~~
finding by Commerce that the relevant imports threaten to impair national security. After imposing the steel and aluminum tariffs, the After imposing the steel and aluminum tariffs, the Trump Administration opened six additional Section 232 Administration opened six additional Section 232
investigations, intensifying debate over potential legislationinvestigations, intensifying debate over potential legislation to revise the authority. The investigations covered to revise the authority. The investigations covered
imports of: imports of:
 automobile and automobile parts, initiated May 23, 2018;  automobile and automobile parts, initiated May 23, 2018;
 uranium ore and related products, initiated July 18, 2018;  uranium ore and related products, initiated July 18, 2018;
 titanium sponge, initiated March 4, 2019;  titanium sponge, initiated March 4, 2019;
 transformers and certain grain-oriented electrical steel parts, initiated May 4, 2020;  transformers and certain grain-oriented electrical steel parts, initiated May 4, 2020;
 mobile cranes, initiated May 6, 2020; and  mobile cranes, initiated May 6, 2020; and
 vanadium, initiated vanadium, initiated June 3, 2020. The Department of Commerce determined imports of autos, uranium, and titanium sponge~~June 3, 2020~~
~~Commerce determined imports of each of the first three products~~ threaten to impair threaten to impair national security, but President Trump did not impose tariffs or quotas on these imports and did not release the Commerce reports. Commerce also completed and submitted its reports on transformers and vanadium; the findings have not been disclosed and no further trade enforcement action has been taken. The mobile crane investigation was withdrawn by the petitioner. The Biden Administration may consider whether to sustain, withdraw, or amend the existing steel and aluminum tariffs; if and how to change the product exclusion process; and whether to make public the other completed investigations. President Trump~~national security. The final~~
~~reports were submitted to the President, but have not been made public. The President chose not to impose~~
~~restrictions on uranium and titanium, but potential import restrictions on autos remain pending. The latter three~~
~~investigations are ongoing.~~
~~The President~~’s Section 232 tariff actions and investigations ’s Section 232 tariff actions and investigations continue to raise a number of potential issues for Congress. The raise a number of potential issues for Congress. The
focus on imports from traditional U.S. focus on imports from traditional U.S. ~~allies~~al ies has prompted some policymakers to raise questions about the proper has prompted some policymakers to raise questions about the proper
interpretation of threats to national security on which Section 232 investigations are based. The tariffs’ economic interpretation of threats to national security on which Section 232 investigations are based. The tariffs’ economic
effects—relatively higher domestic steel and aluminum priceseffects—relatively higher domestic steel and aluminum prices ~~and~~, expansion in expansion in domestic production in those sectors, and production in those sectors, and
higher costs for consumers and many end users (e.g., auto manufacturing and construction)—have also prompted higher costs for consumers and many end users (e.g., auto manufacturing and construction)—have also prompted
reactions from several Members, some in support of the measures and others voicing concerns. reactions from several Members, some in support of the measures and others voicing concerns. ~~To date~~Previously, Congress , Congress
~~has~~ held hearings on the potential economic and broader policy effects of the held hearings on the potential economic and broader policy effects of the ~~tariffs, and legislation~~tariffs. Legislation has been has been
~~introduced~~ introduced during the 116th and 117th Congress to override the tariffs that have already to override the tariffs that have already been imposed, or to revise or been imposed, or to revise or ~~potentially limit the authority~~
~~previously-delegated to the President in future investigations~~potential y limit the President’s trade enforcement authority. .

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Introduction
~~Introduction~~
~~The Trump Administration has conducted eight investigations, two of which have led to~~
~~presidential proclamations imposing tariffs on U.S. imports of certain steel and aluminum~~
~~products, using presidential powers granted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of~~
~~1962.1 Section 232~~Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 authorizes the President to impose restrictions on certain imports based on an authorizes the President to impose restrictions on certain imports based on an
affirmative determination by the Department of Commerce (Commerce) that the targeted affirmative determination by the Department of Commerce (Commerce) that the targeted
products are being imported into the United States “in such quantities or under such products are being imported into the United States “in such quantities or under such
circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.” The circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.” The Trump Administration conducted eight investigations, two of which led to presidential proclamations imposing tariffs on U.S. imports of certain steel and aluminum products using Section 232 powers.1 The Constitution gives Congress Constitution gives Congress
primary authority over international trade matters.2 In the case of Section 232, Congress has primary authority over international trade matters.2 In the case of Section 232, Congress has
delegated to the President broad authority to impose limits on imports in the interest of U.S. delegated to the President broad authority to impose limits on imports in the interest of U.S.
national security. The statute does not require congressional national security. The statute does not require congressional approval of any presidential actions approval of any presidential actions
that that ~~fall~~ fal within its scope.3 within its scope.3
Section 232 is one of several tools the United States has at its disposal to address trade barriers Section 232 is one of several tools the United States has at its disposal to address trade barriers
and other foreign trade practices. Additional tools include (1) investigations and actions to and other foreign trade practices. Additional tools include (1) investigations and actions to
address import surges that are or threaten to be a “substantial cause of serious injury” to a U.S. address import surges that are or threaten to be a “substantial cause of serious injury” to a U.S.
industry (Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974); (2) those that address violations or denial of U.S. industry (Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974); (2) those that address violations or denial of U.S.
benefits under trade agreements (Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974); and (3) antidumping and benefits under trade agreements (Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974); and (3) antidumping and
countervailing duty laws (Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930) to counter injurious unfair trade countervailing duty laws (Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930) to counter injurious unfair trade
practices. The Biden Administration has stated it wil review President Trump’s Section 232 actions and make determinations on how to handle the existing tariffs, exclusion process, and outstanding investigations for which the reports have not been made public. Investigations initiated and import restrictions imposed by the Executive Branch under Section 232 potential y raise a number of economic and policy issues for Congress. Such issues may include, among others: the effects of Section 232 tariffs on industries, workers, farmers, and consumers in congressional districts and states; the Executive Branch’s adherence to congressional requirements in its implementation of Section 232 actions, including transparency and time limitations; the tariff exclusion processes; and the potential impact of unilateral tariff actions on the multilateral trading system, U.S. trading relationships, and U.S. al iances~~practices.~~
~~International trade is an important component of the U.S. economy, and Members often hear from~~
~~constituents when factories and other businesses are hurt by competing imports, or if exporters~~
~~face trade restrictions and other market access barriers overseas. Section 232 actions may affect~~
~~industries, workers, farmers, and consumers in congressional districts and states (both positively~~
~~and negatively). Following the steel and aluminum Section 232 actions, Commerce initiated~~
~~Section 232 investigations into imports of automobiles and automobile parts in May 2018,~~
~~uranium ore and product imports in July 2018, and titanium sponges in March 2019. Commerce~~
~~submitted the auto investigation report to the President in February 2019, the uranium report in~~
~~April, and the titanium sponges report in November, but none of the three reports has been made~~
~~public or reportedly shared with Congress. Commerce initiated three more investigations in~~
~~spring 2020 into imports of electrical transformers and certain grain-oriented electrical steel~~
~~components, mobile cranes, and vanadium; all three inquiries are ongoing. All of the Section 232~~
~~investigations potentially raise a number of economic and policy issues for Congress.~~
This report provides an overview of Section 232, analyzes the Trump Administration’s Section This report provides an overview of Section 232, analyzes the Trump Administration’s Section
232 investigations and actions, 232 investigations and actions, steps the Biden Administration may take, and considers select and considers select policy and economic implications and issues policy and economic implications and issues
for Congress. To provide context for the current debate, the report also includes a discussion of for Congress. To provide context for the current debate, the report also includes a discussion of
previous Section 232 investigations and a brief previous Section 232 investigations and a brief ~~legislative~~ legislative history of the statute. history of the statute.

Overview of Section 232 Following an investigation by the Department of Commerce, Section 232 of the Trade Act of 1962 authorizes the President to impose imports restrictions on products, imported into the United States “in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.” The Trade Act of 1962, including Section 232, was enacted during the Cold War when 1 P.L. 87-794; 19 U.S.C. §1862. 1 P.L. 87-794; 19 U.S.C. §1862.
2 Article I, Section 8, of the 2 Article I, Section 8, of the ~~Constitution~~Constit ution gives Congress the power “ gives Congress the power “To T o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations ....” regulate Commerce with foreign Nations ....”
and “and “ToT o lay and collect lay and collect ~~Taxes~~T axes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises ....” , Duties, Imposts, and Excises ....”
3 In the Crude3 In the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Oil Windfall Profit ~~Tax~~T ax Act of 1980, however, Congress amended Section 232 by creating a joint Act of 1980, however, Congress amended Section 232 by creating a joint
disapproval resolution provision under which Congressdisapproval resolution provision under which Congress can override presidential actions in the case of adjustments to can override presidential actions in the case of adjustments to
petroleum or petroleum product imports. P.L. 96-223, Section 402. For more information, sepetroleum or petroleum product imports. P.L. 96-223, Section 402. For more information, see ~~Appendix~~Appe ndix A.
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~~Overview of Section 232~~
~~Following an investigation by the Department of Commerce, Section 232 of the Trade Act of~~
~~1962 authorizes the President to impose imports restrictions on products, imported into the United~~
~~States “in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national~~
~~security.” The Trade Act of 1962, including Section 232, was enacted during the Cold War when~~
national security issues were at the forefront. Section 232 has been used national security issues were at the forefront. Section 232 has been used ~~periodically~~periodical y in response in response
to industry petitions, as to industry petitions, as ~~well~~ wel as through self-initiation by the executive branch. The Trade as through self-initiation by the executive branch. The Trade
Expansion Act establishes a clear process and timelines for a Section 232 investigation, but the Expansion Act establishes a clear process and timelines for a Section 232 investigation, but the
executive branch’s interpretation of “national security” and the potential scope of any executive branch’s interpretation of “national security” and the potential scope of any
investigation can be expansive. investigation can be expansive.
Key Provisions and Process
Upon request by the head of any U.S. department or agency, by petition by an interested party, or Upon request by the head of any U.S. department or agency, by petition by an interested party, or
by self-initiation, the Secretary of Commerce must commence a Section 232 investigation. The by self-initiation, the Secretary of Commerce must commence a Section 232 investigation. The
Secretary of Commerce conducts the investigation in consultation with the Secretary of Defense Secretary of Commerce conducts the investigation in consultation with the Secretary of Defense
and other U.S. officials, as appropriate, to determine the effects of the specified imports on and other U.S. officials, as appropriate, to determine the effects of the specified imports on
national security. Public hearings and consultations may also be held in the course of the national security. Public hearings and consultations may also be held in the course of the
investigation. Commerce has 270 days from the initiation date to prepare a report advising the investigation. Commerce has 270 days from the initiation date to prepare a report advising the
President as to whether or not the targeted product(s) is being imported “in such quantities or President as to whether or not the targeted product(s) is being imported “in such quantities or
under such circumstances as to threaten to impair” U.S. national security, and to provide under such circumstances as to threaten to impair” U.S. national security, and to provide
recommendations for action or inaction based on the findings. According to the statute, any recommendations for action or inaction based on the findings. According to the statute, any
portion of the report that does not contain classified or proprietary information must be published portion of the report that does not contain classified or proprietary information must be published
in the in the Federal Register. Se. See Figure 1 for the Section 232 process and timeline. for the Section 232 process and timeline.
While there is no specific definition of national security in the statute, it states that the While there is no specific definition of national security in the statute, it states that the
investigation must consider certain factors, such as domestic production needed for projected investigation must consider certain factors, such as domestic production needed for projected
national defense requirements; domestic capacity; the availability of human resources and national defense requirements; domestic capacity; the availability of human resources and
supplies essential to the national defense; and potential unemployment, loss of supplies essential to the national defense; and potential unemployment, loss of ~~skills~~skil s or or
investment, or decline in government revenues resulting from displacement of any domestic investment, or decline in government revenues resulting from displacement of any domestic
products by excessive imports.4products by excessive imports.4
Once the President receives the report, he has 90 days to decide whether or not he concurs with Once the President receives the report, he has 90 days to decide whether or not he concurs with
the Commerce Department’s findings and recommendations, and to determine the nature and the Commerce Department’s findings and recommendations, and to determine the nature and
duration of the action he views as necessary to adjust the imports so they no longer threaten to duration of the action he views as necessary to adjust the imports so they no longer threaten to
impair the national security (impair the national security (~~generally~~general y, imposition of some trade-restrictive measure). The , imposition of some trade-restrictive measure). The
President may implement the recommendations suggested in the Commerce report, take other President may implement the recommendations suggested in the Commerce report, take other
actions, or decide to take no action. After making a decision, the President has 15 days to actions, or decide to take no action. After making a decision, the President has 15 days to
implement the action and 30 days to submit a written statement to Congress explaining the action implement the action and 30 days to submit a written statement to Congress explaining the action
or inaction; he must also publish his findings in the or inaction; he must also publish his findings in the Federal Register. Presidential actions may . Presidential actions may
stay in place “for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its stay in place “for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its
derivatives so that such imports derivatives so that such imports ~~will~~ wil not so threaten to impair the national security.”5 Congress not so threaten to impair the national security.”5 Congress
does not have to approve of a Section 232 determination or action.6 does not have to approve of a Section 232 determination or action.6

~~4 19 U.S.C. §1862(d). The~~ 4 19 U.S.C. §1862(d). T he Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at Commerce conducts the investigation in at Commerce conducts the investigation in
accordance with federal regulations codifiedaccordance with federal regulations codified in 15 C.F.R.in 15 C.F.R. part 705 (Effect of Imported Articles on the National part 705 (Effect of Imported Articles on the National
Security). Security).
5 Section 232(b). 5 Section 232(b).
6 For more information on 6 For more information on ~~TPA~~T PA, see CRS, see CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10038, IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson., by Ian F. Fergusson.
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Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Figure 1. Section 232 Investigation Process

Source: CRS graphic based on 19 U.S.C.CRS graphic based on 19 U.S.C. §1862. §1862.
Section 232 Investigations to Date
The Commerce Department (or the Department of the Treasury before it) initiated a total of 31 The Commerce Department (or the Department of the Treasury before it) initiated a total of 31
Section 232 investigations between 1962 and Section 232 investigations between 1962 and ~~2019 (see~~2020 (see Table B-1). In 16 of these cases, . In 16 of these cases,
Commerce determined that the targeted imports did not threaten to impair national security. In 14 Commerce determined that the targeted imports did not threaten to impair national security. In 14
cases, Commerce determined that the targeted imports threatened to impair national security and cases, Commerce determined that the targeted imports threatened to impair national security and
made recommendations to the President (made recommendations to the President (~~see~~see Figure 2). The President took action nine times. . The President took action nine times.
One case was terminated at the petitioner’s request before Commerce completed its investigation. One case was terminated at the petitioner’s request before Commerce completed its investigation.
Prior to the Trump Administration, 10 Section 232 investigations were self-initiated by the Prior to the Trump Administration, 10 Section 232 investigations were self-initiated by the
Administration. (For a full list of cases to date, Administration. (For a full list of cases to date, seesee Appendix B.) )
In eight investigations dealing with crude oil and petroleum products, Commerce decided that the In eight investigations dealing with crude oil and petroleum products, Commerce decided that the
imports threatened to impair national security. The President took action in five of these cases. In imports threatened to impair national security. The President took action in five of these cases. In
the first three cases on petroleum imports (1973-1978), the President imposed licensing fees and the first three cases on petroleum imports (1973-1978), the President imposed licensing fees and
additional supplemental fees on imports, which are no longer in effect, rather than adjusting additional supplemental fees on imports, which are no longer in effect, rather than adjusting
tariffs or instituting quotas. In two cases, the President imposed oil embargoes, once in 1979 tariffs or instituting quotas. In two cases, the President imposed oil embargoes, once in 1979
(Iran) and once in 1982 (Libya). Both were superseded by broader economic sanctions in the (Iran) and once in 1982 (Libya). Both were superseded by broader economic sanctions in the
following years.7following years.7

~~7 The~~ 7 T he Section 232 petroleum embargo against Iran was Section 232 petroleum embargo against Iran was revoked by Executive Order 12282 of January 19, 1981, revoked by Executive Order 12282 of January 19, 1981,
“Prohibitions Against “Prohibitions Against ~~Transactions~~T ransactions Involving Japan, Revocation,” 46 Involving Japan, Revocation,” 46 Federal Register 7925, which established7925, which established broader broader
sanctions against Iran. sanctions against Iran.
~~The~~ T he petroleum embargo against Libya was petroleum embargo against Libya was ~~superseded~~ superseded by (1) Proclamation 5141 of December 22, 1983, “by (1) Proclamation 5141 of December 22, 1983, “ Imports of Imports of
Petroleum and Petroleum Products,” 48Petroleum and Petroleum Products,” 48 Federal Register 56929, and (2) Executive Order 12538, “Imports of Refined 56929, and (2) Executive Order 12538, “Imports of Refined
Petroleum Products from Libya,” 50Petroleum Products from Libya,” 50 Federal Register 47527, November 15, 1985; and then was effectively revoked by 47527, November 15, 1985; and then was effectively revoked by
Executive Order 13357, “Termination of Emergency Declared in Executive Order 12543 With Respect to the Policies Executive Order 13357, “Termination of Emergency Declared in Executive Order 12543 With Respect to the Policies
and Actions of the Government of Libya and Revocation of Related and Actions of the Government of Libya and Revocation of Related ~~Executive~~Execut ive Order,” 69 Order,” 69 Federal Register 56665, 56665,
September 20, 2004, and the corresponding September 20, 2004, and the corresponding ~~Treasury~~T reasury regulation, Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets regulation, Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets
Control, “Libyan Sanctions Regulations, Angola (Control, “Libyan Sanctions Regulations, Angola (~~UNITA~~UNIT A) Sanctions Regulations, Rough) Sanctions Regulations, Rough Diamonds (LiberiaDiamonds (Liberia ) )
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Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

In the three most recent crude oil and petroleum investigations (from 1987 to 1999), Commerce In the three most recent crude oil and petroleum investigations (from 1987 to 1999), Commerce
determined that the imports threatened to impair national security, but did not recommend determined that the imports threatened to impair national security, but did not recommend
presidential action to adjust imports. In the first of these reports (1987), Commerce recommended presidential action to adjust imports. In the first of these reports (1987), Commerce recommended
a series of steps to increase domestic energy production and ensure adequate oil supplies rather a series of steps to increase domestic energy production and ensure adequate oil supplies rather
than imposing quotas, fees, or tariffs because any such actions would not be “cost beneficial and, than imposing quotas, fees, or tariffs because any such actions would not be “cost beneficial and,
in the long run, impair rather than enhance national security.”8 In the latter two investigations in the long run, impair rather than enhance national security.”8 In the latter two investigations
(1994 and 1999), Commerce found that existing government programs and activities related to (1994 and 1999), Commerce found that existing government programs and activities related to
energy security would be more appropriate and cost effective than import adjustments. By not energy security would be more appropriate and cost effective than import adjustments. By not
acting, the President in effect followed Commerce’s recommendation. acting, the President in effect followed Commerce’s recommendation.
Prior to the Trump Administration, a president arguably last acted under Section 232 in 1986. In Prior to the Trump Administration, a president arguably last acted under Section 232 in 1986. In
that case, Commerce determined that imports of metal-cutting and metal-forming machine tools that case, Commerce determined that imports of metal-cutting and metal-forming machine tools
threatened to impair national security. In this case, the President sought voluntary export restraint threatened to impair national security. In this case, the President sought voluntary export restraint
agreements with leading foreign exporters, and developed domestic programs to revitalize the agreements with leading foreign exporters, and developed domestic programs to revitalize the
U.S. industry.9 These agreements predate the founding of the World Trade Organization (WTO), U.S. industry.9 These agreements predate the founding of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
which established multilateral rules prohibiting voluntary export restraints.10which established multilateral rules prohibiting voluntary export restraints.10
The Trump Administration The Trump Administration ~~has initiated eight Section 232 investigations to date. In addition to the~~
~~two cases on steel and aluminum, on May 23, 2018, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross announced~~
~~the initiation of a Section 232 investigation to determine whether imports of automobiles,~~
~~including SUVs, vans and light trucks, and automotive parts threaten to impair national security.11~~
~~In January 2018, two U.S. uranium producers petitioned for an investigation into uranium~~
~~imports.12 On July 18, 2018, Commerce announced the initiation of a Section 232 investigation~~
~~on these imports and informed the Secretary of Defense.13 In September 2018, a U.S. titanium~~
~~company petitioned for an investigation into titanium sponge imports. In March 2019, Commerce~~
~~announced the initiation of a Section 232 investigation on these imports and informed the~~
~~Secretary of Defense.14 In May 2020, Commerce initiated two separate investigations into~~
~~imports of electrical transformers and certain grain-oriented electrical steel components15 and~~

~~Sanctions Regulations,” 61 Federal Register~~ initiated eight Section 232 investigations into the imports of: steel; aluminum; automobiles, including sport utility vehicles, vans and light trucks, and automotive parts; uranium; titanium sponge; electrical transformers and certain grain-oriented electrical steel components; mobile cranes; and vanadium imports.11 The latter two investigations were in response to industry petitions. Sanctions Regulations,” 61 Federal Register 16042, March 30, 2006. 16042, March 30, 2006.
8 Department of Commerce, 8 Department of Commerce, The Effect of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Product Imports on the National Security,
January 1989. January 1989.
9 U.S.9 U.S. President (R. Reagan), “Statement on the Revitalization of the Machine Tool Industry” President (R. Reagan), “Statement on the Revitalization of the Machine Tool Industry” Weekly Compilation of
Presidential ~~Documents~~Docum ents, vol. 22 (December 16, 1986), p. 1654. , vol. 22 (December 16, 1986), p. 1654.
10 Article 11 of the 10 Article 11 of the ~~WTO~~WT O Agreement on Safeguards Agreement on Safeguards stipulates that “a Member shall not seek, take or maintain any stipulates that “a Member shall not seek, take or maintain any
voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar ~~measures~~measure s on the export or the import on the export or the import
side.side. ~~These~~ T hese include actions taken by a single include actions taken by a single Member as wellMember as well as actions under agreements, arrangements and as actions under agreements, arrangements and
understandingsunderstandings entered into by two or more Members.” entered into by two or more Members.” ~~There~~T here are exceptions to this prohibition, including for “[a]n are exceptions to this prohibition, including for “[a]n
import quota applied as a safeguardimport quota applied as a safeguard measure in conformity with the relevant provisions of measure in conformity with the relevant provisions of ~~GATT~~ GAT T 1994 and this 1994 and this
Agreement.” For more information, see https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm#fnt-3. Agreement.” For more information, see https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm#fnt-3.
11 U.S.11 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Department of Commerce, “ U.S. Department of Commerce Initiates Section 232 Investigation into Auto U.S. Department of Commerce Initiates Section 232 Investigation into Auto
Imports,” Imports,” press release, May 23, 2018. U.S. Department of Commerce, “ U.S. Department of Commerce Initiates Section 232 Investigation into Uranium Imports,” press release, July 18, 2018. U.S. Department of Commerce, March 2019, “ U.S. Department of Commerce Initiates Section 232 Investigation into T itanium Sponge Imports,” press release, March 2019. U.S. Department of Commerce, “ U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross to Initiate Section 232 Investigation into Imports of Laminations and Wound Cores for Incorporation into Transformers, Electrical T ransformers, and T ransformer Regulators,” press release, May 4, 2020. U.S. Department of Commerce, “ U.S. Department of Commerce to Initiate~~May 23, 2018, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2018/05/us-department-commerce-initiates-~~
~~section-232-investigation-auto-imports.~~
~~12 Energy Fuels Resources (USA) Inc. and Ur-Energy USA Inc., “Petition for Relief under Section 232 of the Trade~~
~~Expansion Act of 1962 from Imports of Uranium Products that Threaten National Security,” January 16, 2018.~~
~~13 U.S. Department of Commerce, “U.S. Department of Commerce Initiates Section 232 Investigation into Uranium~~
~~Imports,” July 18, 2018, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2018/07/us-department-commerce-initiates-~~
~~section-232-investigation-uranium.~~
~~14 U.S. Department of Commerce, March 2019, “U.S. Department of Commerce Initiates Section 232 Investigation into~~
~~Titanium Sponge Imports,” https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/03/us-department-commerce-~~
~~initiates-section-232-investigation-titanium.~~
~~15 U.S.~~ Section 232 Investigation into Mobile Crane Imports,” press release, May 6, 2020. U.S. Department of Commerce, “Department of Commerce, “ U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur RossU.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross ~~to Initiate~~ Initiates Section 232 Investigation into Section 232 Investigation into Imports of Vanadium,” press release, June 2, 2020.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

~~mobile cranes;16 in June, the Administration initiated one into vanadium imports.17 The latter two~~
~~investigations were in response to industry petitions.~~
Figure 2. Section 232 Investigations

Source: CRS Graphic based on BIS data (https://www.bis.doc.gov/). CRS Graphic based on BIS data (https://www.bis.doc.gov/).
Notes: * indicates investigation complete but results have not been made public. For a detailed list of cases, seeFor a detailed list of cases, see ~~Appendix B~~.Appendix B
Relationship to WTO
While unilateral trade restrictions may appear to be counter to U.S. trade liberalization While unilateral trade restrictions may appear to be counter to U.S. trade liberalization
commitments under the WTO agreements, Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and commitments under the WTO agreements, Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), which was one of the foundational agreements of the WTO, Trade (GATT), which was one of the foundational agreements of the WTO, ~~allows~~al ows WTO WTO
members to take measures to protect “essential security interests.” Broad national security members to take measures to protect “essential security interests.” Broad national security
exceptions are also included in international trade obligations at the bilateral and regional levels, exceptions are also included in international trade obligations at the bilateral and regional levels,
and could and could ~~potentially~~ potential y limit the abilitylimit the ability of countries to of countries to ~~challenge~~chal enge such actions by trade partners. such actions by trade partners.
~~Historically~~Historical y, exceptions for national security have been rarely invoked and multiple trading , exceptions for national security have been rarely invoked and multiple trading
partners have partners have ~~challenged~~chal enged recent U.S. actions under the WTO agreements (see recent U.S. actions under the WTO agreements (see “WTO Cases ””). ).
Section 232 Actions on Steel and Aluminum
In AprilIn April 2017, 2017, in two presidential memorandatwo presidential memoranda, President Trump instructed Commerce to give priority to two self- instructed Commerce to give priority to two self-
initiated investigations into the national security threats posed by imports of steel and initiated investigations into the national security threats posed by imports of steel and
aluminum.aluminum.1812 In conducting its investigation, Commerce held public hearings and In conducting its investigation, Commerce held public hearings and solicited public comments via the Federal Register and consulted with the Secretary of Defense and other agencies, as required by the statute.13 In addition to the hearings, stakeholders submit ed approximately 300 comments regarding the Section 232 investigation and potential actions. Some 12 U.S. President (T rump), “Memorandum on Steel Imports and T hreats to National Security,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docum ents, April 20, 2017, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201700259/pdf/DCPD-201700259.pdf, and U.S. President (T rump), “ Memorandum on Aluminum Imports and T hreats to National Security,” Weekly Com pilation of Presidential Docum ents, April 27, 2017, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201700284/pdf/DCPD-201700284.pdf. 13 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Notice of Request for Public Co mments and Public Hearing on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Steel,” 82 Federal Register 19205, April 26, 2017, and Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Notice of Request for Public Comments and Public Hearing on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Aluminum,” 82 Federal Register 21509, May 9, 2017. Congressional Research Service 5 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress ~~solicited public~~

~~Imports of Laminations and Wound Cores for Incorporation into Transformers, Electrical Transformers, and~~
~~Transformer Regulators,” May 4, 2020, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/05/us-secretary-~~
~~commerce-wilbur-ross-initiate-section-232-investigation.~~
~~16 U.S. Department of Commerce, “U.S. Department of Commerce to Initiate Section 232 Investigation into Mobile~~
~~Crane Imports,” May 6, 2020, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/05/us-department-commerce-~~
~~initiate-section-232-investigation-mobile-crane.~~
~~17 U.S. Department of Commerce, “U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross Initiates Section 232 Investigation into~~
~~Imports of Vanadium,” June 2, 2020, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/06/us-secretary-commerce-~~
~~wilbur-ross-initiates-section-232-investigation.~~
~~18 U.S. President (Trump), “Memorandum on Steel Imports and Threats to National Security,”~~ ~~Weekly Compilation of~~
~~Presidential Documents, April 20, 2017, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201700259/pdf/DCPD-~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~comments via the Federal Register and consulted with the Secretary of Defense and other~~
~~agencies, as required by the statute.19 In addition to the hearings, stakeholders submitted~~
~~approximately 300 comments regarding the Section 232 investigation and potential actions. Some~~
parties (mostly steel producers) supported broad actions to limit steel imports, while others parties (mostly steel producers) supported broad actions to limit steel imports, while others
(mostly users and consuming industries such as automakers) opposed any additional tariffs or (mostly users and consuming industries such as automakers) opposed any additional tariffs or
quotas on imports. The U.S. aluminum industry held differing views of the global aluminum quotas on imports. The U.S. aluminum industry held differing views of the global aluminum
tariff, with most parties opposing it.tariff, with most parties opposing it.2014 Some stakeholders in the steel and aluminum industries Some stakeholders in the steel and aluminum industries
sought a middle ground, endorsing limited actions to target the underlying issues of overcapacity sought a middle ground, endorsing limited actions to target the underlying issues of overcapacity
and unfair trade practices. and unfair trade practices. ~~Still~~ Stil others focused on the process, voicing caution in the use of others focused on the process, voicing caution in the use of
Section 232 authority and warning against an overly broad definition of “national security” for Section 232 authority and warning against an overly broad definition of “national security” for
protectionist purposes.protectionist purposes.2115
The Commerce investigations analyzed the importance of certain steel and aluminum products to The Commerce investigations analyzed the importance of certain steel and aluminum products to
national security, using a relatively broad definition of “national security,” defining it to include national security, using a relatively broad definition of “national security,” defining it to include
“the general security and welfare of certain industries, beyond those necessary to satisfy national “the general security and welfare of certain industries, beyond those necessary to satisfy national
defense requirements, which are critical for minimum operations of the economy and defense requirements, which are critical for minimum operations of the economy and
government.”government.”2216 The scope of the investigations extended to current and future requirements for The scope of the investigations extended to current and future requirements for
national defense and to 16 specific critical infrastructure sectors, such as electric transmission, national defense and to 16 specific critical infrastructure sectors, such as electric transmission,
transportation systems, food and agriculture, and critical manufacturing, including domestic transportation systems, food and agriculture, and critical manufacturing, including domestic
production of primary metals (e.g., production of iron and steel and aluminum) machinery, production of primary metals (e.g., production of iron and steel and aluminum) machinery,
transportation equipment, and electrical equipment.transportation equipment, and electrical equipment.2317 The reports also examined domestic The reports also examined domestic
production capacity and utilization, industry requirements, current quantities and circumstances production capacity and utilization, industry requirements, current quantities and circumstances
of imports, international markets, and global overcapacity. Commerce based its definition of of imports, international markets, and global overcapacity. Commerce based its definition of
national security on a 2001 investigation on iron ore and semi-finished steel.national security on a 2001 investigation on iron ore and semi-finished steel.2418 Section 232 Section 232
investigations prior to 2001 investigations prior to 2001 ~~generally~~ general y used a narrower definition considering U.S. national used a narrower definition considering U.S. national
defense needs or overreliance on foreign suppliers. Commerce defense needs or overreliance on foreign suppliers. Commerce ~~has continued to use the broader~~

~~201700259.pdf, and U.S. President (Trump), “Memorandum on Aluminum Imports and Threats to National Security,”~~
~~Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents~~~~, April 27, 2017, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201700284/~~
~~pdf/DCPD-201700284.pdf.~~
~~19 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Notice of Request for Public Comments and Public~~
~~Hearing on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Steel,” 82 Federal Register 19205, April 26,~~
~~2017, and Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Notice of Request for Public Comments and~~
~~Public Hearing on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Aluminum,” 82 Federal Register 21509,~~
~~May 9, 2017.~~
~~20 CRS In Focus IF10998, Effects of U.S. Tariff Action on U.S. Aluminum Manufacturing, by Michaela D. Platzer.~~
~~21 “The case for and against 232 action on steel: Three principal positions,” Inside U.S. Trade, June 12, 2017, and~~
~~“Awaiting an aluminum decision: some key comment takeaways,” Inside U.S. Trade, July 3, 2017.~~
~~22 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “The~~continued to use the broader definition for national security for the other Section 232 investigations under the Trump Administration. If the Biden Administration were to initiate a new Section 232 investigation, Commerce could adjust the definition of national security and scope of such as investigation. Commerce Findings and Recommendations The final reports, submitted to President Trump on January 11 and January 22, 2018, respectively, concluded that imports of certain steel mil products19 and certain types of primary aluminum and unwrought aluminum20 “threaten to impair the national security” of the United States. The 14 CRS In Focus IF10998, Effects of U.S. Tariff Action on U.S. Aluminum Manufacturing , by Michaela D. Platzer. 15 “T he case for and against 232 action on steel: T hree principal positions,” Inside U.S. Trade, June 12, 2017, and “Awaiting an aluminum decision: some key comment takeaways,” Inside U.S. Trade, July 3, 2017. 16 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “T he Effect of Imports of Steel on the National Effect of Imports of Steel on the National
Security,” p. 1, January 11, 2018, https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/Security,” p. 1, January 11, 2018, https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/
the_effect_of_imports_of_steel_on_the_national_security_-_with_redactions_-_20180111.pdf. (hereinafter, Steel the_effect_of_imports_of_steel_on_the_national_security_-_with_redactions_-_20180111.pdf. (hereinafter, Steel
Report). Report).
2317 In addition to being labeled In addition to being labeled as as one of the “critical infrastructure sectors,” both steel and aluminum industry one of the “critical infrastructure sectors,” both steel and aluminum industry
organizations seek designation as an “essential industry” to allow continuation of operations in the event of federal organizations seek designation as an “essential industry” to allow continuation of operations in the event of federal
emergencies such asemergencies such as ~~during~~ during the Covid-19 pandemic. Seethe Covid-19 pandemic. See American Iron and Steel Institute, “American Iron and Steel Institute, “ AISI Urges AISI Urges
Administration to Designate Steel as Essential IndustryAdministration to Designate Steel as Essential Industry ,” March 20, 2020, and Aluminum Association, “,” March 20, 2020, and Aluminum Association, “ American American
AluminumAluminum an Essential Industry in a Moment of National Emergency,” March 19, 2020.an Essential Industry in a Moment of National Emergency,” March 19, 2020.
24 18 U.S. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, “The Effect of Imports of Iron Ore and SemiDepartment of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, “The Effect of Imports of Iron Ore and Semi --
FinishedFinished Steel on the National Security,” October 2001Steel on the National Security,” October 2001~~, https://bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents?task=~~
~~doc_download&gid=81.~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~definition for national security for the other Section 232 investigations under the Trump~~
~~Administration.~~
~~Commerce Findings and Recommendations~~
~~The final reports, submitted to the President on January 11 and January 22, 2018, respectively,~~
~~concluded that imports of certain steel mill products25 and certain types of primary aluminum and~~
~~unwrought aluminum26 “threaten to impair the national security” of the United States. The~~
. 19 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “T he Effect of Imports of Ste el on the National Security,” January 11, 2018, https://www.commerce.gov/section-232-investigation-effect-imports-steel-us-national-security. 20 U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security, “T he Effect of Imports of Aluminum on the Congressional Research Service 6 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress Secretary of Commerce asserted that “the only effective means of removing the threat of Secretary of Commerce asserted that “the only effective means of removing the threat of
impairment is to reduce imports to a level that should ... enable U.S. steel impairment is to reduce imports to a level that should ... enable U.S. steel ~~mills~~mil s to operate at 80 to operate at 80
percent or more of their rated production capacity” (the minimum rate the report found necessary percent or more of their rated production capacity” (the minimum rate the report found necessary
for the long-term viabilityfor the long-term viability of the U.S. steel industry and, separately, for the aluminum industry). of the U.S. steel industry and, separately, for the aluminum industry).
The Secretary further recommended the President “take immediate action to adjust the level of The Secretary further recommended the President “take immediate action to adjust the level of
these imports through quotas or tariffs” and identified three potential courses of action for both these imports through quotas or tariffs” and identified three potential courses of action for both
steel and aluminum imports, including tariffs or quotas on steel and aluminum imports, including tariffs or quotas on ~~all~~ al or some steel imports from specific or some steel imports from specific
countries. countries.
The The then-Secretary of Defense, while concurring with Commerce’s “conclusion that imports of foreign Secretary of Defense, while concurring with Commerce’s “conclusion that imports of foreign
steel and aluminum based on unfair trading practices impair the national security,” recommended steel and aluminum based on unfair trading practices impair the national security,” recommended
targeted tariffs and that “an inter-agency group further refine the targeted tariffs, so as to create targeted tariffs and that “an inter-agency group further refine the targeted tariffs, so as to create
incentives for trade partners to work with the U.S. on addressing the underlying issue of Chinese incentives for trade partners to work with the U.S. on addressing the underlying issue of Chinese
transshipment” in which Chinese producers ship goods to another country to transshipment” in which Chinese producers ship goods to another country to ~~reexport.27~~re-export.21 He also He also
noted, however, that “the U.S. military requirements for steel and aluminum noted, however, that “the U.S. military requirements for steel and aluminum each only represent each only represent
about three percent of U.S. production.”about three percent of U.S. production.”28
~~Presidential~~22 President Trump’s Actions
On March 8, 2018, President Trump issued two proclamations imposing duties on U.S. imports of On March 8, 2018, President Trump issued two proclamations imposing duties on U.S. imports of
certain steel and aluminum products, based on the Secretary of Commerce’s findings.certain steel and aluminum products, based on the Secretary of Commerce’s findings.2923 The The
proclamations outlined the President’s decisions to impose tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on proclamations outlined the President’s decisions to impose tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on
aluminum imports effective March 23, 2018, but provided for flexibility in regard to country and aluminum imports effective March 23, 2018, but provided for flexibility in regard to country and
product applicability of the tariffs (see below). The new tariffs were to be imposed product applicability of the tariffs (see below). The new tariffs were to be imposed in addition to to
any duties already in place, including antidumping and countervailing duties (AD/CVD). any duties already in place, including antidumping and countervailing duties (AD/CVD).
In the proclamations, the President established a bifurcated approach, instructing Commerce to In the proclamations, the President established a bifurcated approach, instructing Commerce to
establish a process for domestic parties to request individual product exclusions and a U.S. Trade establish a process for domestic parties to request individual product exclusions and a U.S. Trade

~~25 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National~~
~~Security,” January 11, 2018, https://www.commerce.gov/section-232-investigation-effect-imports-steel-us-national-~~
~~security.~~
~~26 U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security, “The Effect of Imports of Aluminum on the~~
Representative (USTR)-led process to discuss “alternative ways” through diplomatic negotiations to address the threat with countries having a “security relationship” with the United States. President Trump official y notified Congress of his actions in a letter dated April 6, 2018. Several Members voiced their views since the investigations were launched, including through hearings and letters to President Trump.24 On January 24, 2020, after the steel and aluminum tariffs had been in effect for over 22 months, President Trump expanded the scope of products covered to include “derivative” products, effective February 8, 2020.25 The President’s proclamation stated that the additional tariffs were National Security,” January 17, 2018, https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/National Security,” January 17, 2018, https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/
the_effect_of_imports_of_aluminum_on_the_national_security_-_with_redactions_-_20180117.pdf (hereinafter, the_effect_of_imports_of_aluminum_on_the_national_security_-_with_redactions_-_20180117.pdf (hereinafter,
AluminumAluminum Report). Report).
2721 Letter from James N. Mattis, Letter from James N. Mattis, ~~Secretary~~Secret ary of Defense, to Wilbur L. Ross of Defense, to Wilbur L. Ross Jr., Secretary of Commerce, 2018, Jr., Secretary of Commerce, 2018,
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/
department_of_defense_memo_response_to_steel_and_aluminum_policy_recommendations.pdfdepartment_of_defense_memo_response_to_steel_and_aluminum_policy_recommendations.pdf . .
2822 Ibid. Ibid.
2923 Presidential Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States,” 83 Presidential Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States,” 83
Federal Register 11619, March 15, 2018, and Proclamation 9705 of March 8, 2018, “11619, March 15, 2018, and Proclamation 9705 of March 8, 2018, “ Adjusting Imports of Steel Into Adjusting Imports of Steel Into
the United States,” 83the United States,” 83 Federal Register 11625, March 15, 2018. 11625, March 15, 2018.
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~~link to page 44 link to page 44 link to page 21~~ ~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~Representative (USTR)-led process to discuss “alternative ways” through diplomatic negotiations~~
~~to address the threat with countries having a “security relationship” with the United States.~~
~~The President officially notified Congress of his actions in a letter dated April 6, 2018. Several~~
~~Members have voiced their views since the investigations were launched, including through~~
~~hearings and letters to the President.30~~
~~On January 24, 2020, after the steel and aluminum tariffs had been in effect for over 22 months,~~
~~the President expanded the scope of products covered to include “derivative” products, effective~~
~~February 8, 2020.31 The President’s proclamation stated that the additional tariffs were needed~~
24 U.S. President (T rump), “Letter to Congressional Leaders on Requests for Exclusions from United States T ariffs on Aluminum and Steel Imports,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, April 6, 2018. 25 T he White House, “ Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Derivative Steel Congressional Research Service 7 link to page 46 link to page 46 link to page 21 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress needed because the domestic steel and aluminum industries continued to be below the target capacity because the domestic steel and aluminum industries continued to be below the target capacity
utilization identifiedutilization identified in the initialin the initial Commerce investigations, and imports of certain Commerce investigations, and imports of certain finished, or finished, or
derivative, products were undermining the purpose of the original proclamations. derivative, products were undermining the purpose of the original proclamations.
With the increased costs of steel and aluminum inputs because of the Section 232 tariffs, some With the increased costs of steel and aluminum inputs because of the Section 232 tariffs, some
U.S. manufacturers had trouble competing with importers of finished, or derivative, products U.S. manufacturers had trouble competing with importers of finished, or derivative, products
(e.g., steel wheels or metal filing cabinets). (e.g., steel wheels or metal filing cabinets). ~~Thus,~~ U.S. industries manufacturing similar products U.S. industries manufacturing similar products
have sought AD/CVD protection from import competition. Thus, there has been a noticeable have sought AD/CVD protection from import competition. Thus, there has been a noticeable
increase in AD/CVDincrease in AD/CVD investigations on finished products containing steel or aluminum. The investigations on finished products containing steel or aluminum. The
additional additional AD/CVD cases as a result of the Section 232 tariffs are in addition to any AD/CVDAD/CVD cases as a result of the Section 232 tariffs are in addition to any AD/CVD
duties already duties already in place. Some economists have in place. Some economists have ~~called~~cal ed this phenomenon “cascading protection.” this phenomenon “cascading protection.”3226
According to the January 2020 proclamation, the countries that successfully negotiated According to the January 2020 proclamation, the countries that successfully negotiated
exemptions from each of the steel and aluminum tariffs (see below) are also exempt from the exemptions from each of the steel and aluminum tariffs (see below) are also exempt from the
additional tariffs on derivative products. The Commerce process for requesting product additional tariffs on derivative products. The Commerce process for requesting product
exclusions applies to derivative products (see below). exclusions applies to derivative products (see below).
Some analysts have raised questions about the President’s authority to impose the additional Some analysts have raised questions about the President’s authority to impose the additional
tariffs and some U.S. manufacturers have tariffs and some U.S. manufacturers have ~~challenged~~chal enged the action (see the action (see “Proclamation Imposing
Tariffs on Steel-Derivative Products”~~). The President~~”). President Trump’s actions under the 2020 proclamation relies ’s actions under the 2020 proclamation relies
on the 2018 Section 232 investigations, although those investigations did not cover steel and on the 2018 Section 232 investigations, although those investigations did not cover steel and
aluminum derivative products. House Ways and Means Committee Member Representative aluminum derivative products. House Ways and Means Committee Member Representative
Jackie Walorski sent a letter to Commerce questioning why a new investigation was not needed Jackie Walorski sent a letter to Commerce questioning why a new investigation was not needed
for the change in product scope, and how the change would help increase domestic industry for the change in product scope, and how the change would help increase domestic industry
capacity utilization, among other issues.capacity utilization, among other issues.3327 The Section 232 statute does not The Section 232 statute does not ~~specifically allow~~specifical y al ow for for
additional actions after the initialadditional actions after the initial ~~timeline~~ timeline or provide an expiration date of an investigation. or provide an expiration date of an investigation.
Similar questions as to whether the President’s authority to act is time-limited have been raised in Similar questions as to whether the President’s authority to act is time-limited have been raised in
relation to the Section 232 auto investigation (see relation to the Section 232 auto investigation (see “Automobiles and Parts”).
~~Country Exemptions~~
~~Although tariffs were initially~~ ”). In April 2021, the Court of International Trade (CIT) ruled that President Trump’s proclamation imposing tariffs on steel-derivative products was untimely and thus “invalid as contrary to law.”28 Country Exemptions Although tariffs were initial y imposed on most trading partners, including many imposed on most trading partners, including many ~~allies~~al ies and FTA and FTA
partners, partners, ~~the President~~President Trump expressed a expressed a ~~willingness~~wil ingness to consider exceptions to individual countries, specifical y stating that countries with which the United States has a “security relationship” may discuss “alternative ways” to address the national security threat and gain an exemption from the tariffs. Initial y, President Trump temporarily excluded imports of steel and aluminum products from Mexico and Canada from the new tariffs, and the Trump Administration implicitly and explicitly linked a successful outcome of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) ~~to consider exceptions to individual countries,~~

~~30 U.S. President (Trump), “Letter to Congressional Leaders on Requests for Exclusions from United States Tariffs on~~
~~Aluminum and Steel Imports,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, April 6, 2018.~~
~~31 The White House, “Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Derivative Steel~~
Articles into the United States,” 85 Articles into the United States,” 85 Federal Register 5281, January 24, 2020. For a full 5281, January 24, 2020. For a full list of derivative products list of derivative products
coveredcovered, see https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/01/29/2020 -01806/adjusting-imports-of-derivative-aluminum-articles-and-derivative-steel-articles-into-the-united ~~see https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/other-areas/office-of-technology-evaluation-ote/section-232-~~
~~investigations~~. Steel and aluminum derivative products are defined according to certain criteria and the specific covered . Steel and aluminum derivative products are defined according to certain criteria and the specific covered
products are specified in annexes of the presidential proclamationproducts are specified in annexes of the presidential proclamation . 26.
32 Chad P. Bown, Chad P. Bown, ~~“Trump~~ “T rump’s steel and aluminum tariffs are cascading’s steel and aluminum tariffs are cascading out of control,” out of control,” Peterson Institute for
International ~~Economics~~Econom ics, February 4, 2020. , February 4, 2020.
3327 Letter from Rep. Jackie Walorski to Wilbur L. Ross Jr., Secretary of Commerce, March 3, 2020. Letter from Rep. Jackie Walorski to Wilbur L. Ross Jr., Secretary of Commerce, March 3, 2020.
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~specifically stating that countries with which the United States has a “security relationship” may~~
~~discuss “alternative ways” to address the national security threat and gain an exemption from the~~
~~tariffs. Initially, the President temporarily excluded imports of steel and aluminum products from~~
~~Mexico and Canada from the new tariffs, and the Administration implicitly and explicitly linked a~~
~~successful outcome of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)~~ 28 PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United States, 2021 Ct. Intl. T rade LEXIS 36, *12-13 (Ct. Int’l T rade Apr. 5, 2021). Congressional Research Service 8 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress renegotiation to renegotiation to
maintaining the exemptions. With regard to other countries, maintaining the exemptions. With regard to other countries, ~~the~~ President President Trump charged the USTR with charged the USTR with
negotiating negotiating ~~bilaterally~~ bilateral y with trading partners on potential exemptions. with trading partners on potential exemptions.
On March 22, 2018, after discussions with multiple countries, On March 22, 2018, after discussions with multiple countries, ~~the President~~President Trump issued issued proclamations proclamations
temporarily excluding Australia, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, the European Union (EU), temporarily excluding Australia, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, the European Union (EU),
Canada and Mexico, from the Section 232 tariffs.Canada and Mexico, from the Section 232 tariffs.~~34 The President~~29 President Trump gave a deadline of May 1, gave a deadline of May 1,
2018, by which time each trading partner had to negotiate “a satisfactory alternative means to 2018, by which time each trading partner had to negotiate “a satisfactory alternative means to
remove the threatened impairment to the national security by imports” for steel and aluminum in remove the threatened impairment to the national security by imports” for steel and aluminum in
order to maintain the exemption. On Aprilorder to maintain the exemption. On April 30, 2018, the White House extended 30, 2018, the White House extended negotiations and negotiations and
tariff exemptions with Canada, Mexico, and the EU for an additional 30 days, until June 1, 2018, tariff exemptions with Canada, Mexico, and the EU for an additional 30 days, until June 1, 2018,
and exempted Argentina, Australia, and Braziland exempted Argentina, Australia, and Brazil from the tariffs indefinitely pending final from the tariffs indefinitely pending final
agreements.agreements.3530 South Korea, which pursued a resolution over the tariffs in the context of South Korea, which pursued a resolution over the tariffs in the context of
discussions to modify the U.S.-South Korea (KORUS) Free Trade Agreement, agreed to an discussions to modify the U.S.-South Korea (KORUS) Free Trade Agreement, agreed to an
absolute annual quota for 54 separate subcategories of steel and was exempted from the steel absolute annual quota for 54 separate subcategories of steel and was exempted from the steel
tariffs.tariffs.3631 South Korea did not negotiate an agreement on aluminum and its exports to the South Korea did not negotiate an agreement on aluminum and its exports to the United United
States have been subject to the aluminum tariffs since May 1, 2018. States have been subject to the aluminum tariffs since May 1, 2018.
On May 31, 2018, On May 31, 2018, ~~the~~ President President Trump proclaimed Argentina and Brazil, in addition to South Korea, proclaimed Argentina and Brazil, in addition to South Korea,
permanently exempt from the steel tariffs, having reached final quota agreements with the United permanently exempt from the steel tariffs, having reached final quota agreements with the United
States on steel imports.States on steel imports.3732 Brazil, like Brazil, like South Korea, did not negotiate an agreement on aluminum South Korea, did not negotiate an agreement on aluminum
and is subject to the aluminum tariffs. The and is subject to the aluminum tariffs. The Trump Administration also proclaimed aluminum imports Administration also proclaimed aluminum imports
from Argentina permanently exempt from the aluminum tariffs subject to an absolute quota.from Argentina permanently exempt from the aluminum tariffs subject to an absolute quota.3833 The The
Trump Administration proclaimed imports of steel and aluminum from Australia permanently exempt Administration proclaimed imports of steel and aluminum from Australia permanently exempt
from the tariffs as from the tariffs as ~~well~~wel , but did not set any quantitative restrictions on , but did not set any quantitative restrictions on Australian imports.Australian imports.
As of June 1, 2018, imports of steel and aluminum from As of June 1, 2018, imports of steel and aluminum from ~~all~~ al other countries were subject to the other countries were subject to the
Section 232 tariffs. The imposition of tariffs on major trading partners such as Canada, Mexico, Section 232 tariffs. The imposition of tariffs on major trading partners such as Canada, Mexico,
and the EU increased the economic significance of the tariffs and prompted criticism from several and the EU increased the economic significance of the tariffs and prompted criticism from several
Members of Congress, including the chairs of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Members of Congress, including the chairs of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance
Committees.Committees.39

3434 The Trump Administration completed negotiations on the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) on September 30, 2018, to replace the NAFTA. The USMCA did not resolve or address the Section 232 tariffs on imported steel and aluminum from Canada and 29 Proclamation 9710 of March 22, 2018 “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States,” 83 Proclamation 9710 of March 22, 2018 “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States,” 83 Federal Register
13355, March 28, 2018; and Proclamation 9711 of March 22, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United 13355, March 28, 2018; and Proclamation 9711 of March 22, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United
States,” 83States,” 83 Federal Register 13361, March 28, 2018. 13361, March 28, 2018.
3530 Executive Office of the President, “President Donald J. Executive Office of the President, “President Donald J. ~~Trump~~T rump Approves Section 232 Approves Section 232 ~~Tariff~~T ariff Modifications,” press Modifications,” press
release, April 30, 2018, https://release, April 30, 2018, https://~~www.whitehouse~~trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-approves-section-.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-approves-section-
232-tariff-modifications/. 232-tariff-modifications/.
3631 U.S. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Customs and Border Protection, QB 18-118 Steel Mill Articles (AMENDED), May 1, 2018, , May 1, 2018,
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/quota/bulletins/qb-18-118-steel-mill-articles. https://www.cbp.gov/trade/quota/bulletins/qb-18-118-steel-mill-articles.
3732 Proclamation 9759 of May 31, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States,” 83 Proclamation 9759 of May 31, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States,” 83 Federal Register 25857, 25857,
June 5, 2018. June 5, 2018.
3833 Proclamation 9758 of May 31, 2018 “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States,” 83 Proclamation 9758 of May 31, 2018 “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States,” 83 Federal Register
25849, June 5, 2018. 25849, June 5, 2018.
3934 Chairman Kevin Brady, “Brady Statement on Administration’s Action on Steel and Aluminum Chairman Kevin Brady, “Brady Statement on Administration’s Action on Steel and Aluminum ~~Tariffs~~ T ariffs,” press ,” press
release, May 31, 2018; Chairman Orrin Hatch, “release, May 31, 2018; Chairman Orrin Hatch, “ Hatch Statement on Administration Aluminum, Steel Hatch Statement on Administration Aluminum, Steel ~~Tariff~~T ariff
Announcement,” press release, May 31, 2018, https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/hatch-statement-on-Announcement,” press release, May 31, 2018, https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/hatch-statement-on-
administration-aluminum-steel-tariff-announcement. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
9 9

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

~~The Trump Administration completed negotiations on the United States-Mexico-Canada~~
~~Agreement (USMCA) on September 30, 2018, to replace the NAFTA. The USMCA did not~~
~~resolve or address the Section 232 tariffs on imported steel and aluminum from Canada and~~
Mexico, but Mexico, but ~~includes~~included a requirement that motor vehicles contain 70% or more of North American a requirement that motor vehicles contain 70% or more of North American
steel and aluminum content to qualify for duty-free treatment.steel and aluminum content to qualify for duty-free treatment.4035 The parties also signed side The parties also signed side
letters in case of Section 232 action on autos and auto parts, to exclude certain amounts of letters in case of Section 232 action on autos and auto parts, to exclude certain amounts of
Canadian and Mexican exports of these products and provide a 60-day period to reach a Canadian and Mexican exports of these products and provide a 60-day period to reach a
negotiated outcome.negotiated outcome.4136 Separately, on May 17, 2019, the three parties announced a new monitoring Separately, on May 17, 2019, the three parties announced a new monitoring
mechanism to prevent surges in imports of steel and aluminum, and agreed to withdraw mechanism to prevent surges in imports of steel and aluminum, and agreed to withdraw ~~all~~
al Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs and related retaliatory tariffs.Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs and related retaliatory tariffs.42
37 A year later, in May 2020, the American Primary Aluminum Association, which represents U.S. A year later, in May 2020, the American Primary Aluminum Association, which represents U.S.
primary aluminum producers, primary aluminum producers, ~~alleged~~al eged a surge in aluminum imports from Canada and a surge in aluminum imports from Canada and ~~called~~cal ed for for
the re-imposition of tariffs.the re-imposition of tariffs.4338 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Foreign Trade The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Foreign Trade
Council, and Aluminum Association opposed the proposal.Council, and Aluminum Association opposed the proposal.4439 After consultations with Canada, the After consultations with Canada, the
Trump Administration re-imposed tariffs on imports of non-Trump Administration re-imposed tariffs on imports of non-~~alloyed~~al oyed unwrought aluminum from unwrought aluminum from
Canada, effective August 16, 2020.Canada, effective August 16, 2020.4540 Canada Canada ~~called~~cal ed the new tariffs “absurd” and issued a list of the new tariffs “absurd” and issued a list of
products targeted for retaliatory tariffs.products targeted for retaliatory tariffs.46
~~Regarding the EU, on October 16, 2018, the Trump Administration notified Congress under TPA~~
~~of new broad-based U.S. trade agreement negotiations with the EU to address ongoing trade~~
~~frictions including Section 232 tariffs. The Administration seeks a “fairer, more balanced” U.S.-~~
~~EU relationship. The TPA notification followed the July 2018 Joint Statement (agreed between~~
~~President Trump and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker) that aimed to de-~~
~~escalate trade tensions in which the two sides agreed to not impose further tariffs on each other’s~~
~~trade products while negotiations are active.47 The negotiations have not started formally, largely~~

~~administration-aluminum-steel-tariff-announcement.~~
~~40 USTR, United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Text~~41 The day before Canada’s retaliatory tariffs were to go into effect, the Trump Administration withdrew its tariffs but set monthly quotas for imports which Canada denied agreeing to.42 A day before leaving office, President Trump exempted aluminum imports from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from the tariffs, citing “an important security relationship” between the two countries.43 A quota was negotiated. Analysts raised concerns that the action was linked to the UAE’s signing of the “Abraham Accords” with Israel and not to the aluminum industry. President 35 UST R, United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement T ext, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreementagreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement . In a side letter on automobiles, the United States also agreed. In a side letter on automobiles, the United States also agreed that, that,
in the event of Section 232 measure imposed on passenger vehicles and auto parts, that the United States wouldin the event of Section 232 measure imposed on passenger vehicles and auto parts, that the United States would exclude exclude
2.6 million passenger vehicles, all light trucks imported from Mexico, and up to $108 billion worth (in declared 2.6 million passenger vehicles, all light trucks imported from Mexico, and up to $108 billion worth (in declared
customs value) of auto parts annually. For more customs value) of auto parts annually. For more ~~information on USMCA, see CRS~~ informat ion, see CRS In Focus IF11387, USMCA: Motor Vehicle Provisions and Issues, by M. Angeles Villarreal, Bill Canis, and Liana Wong. On USMCA, see CRS Report R44981, Report R44981, The United States-
Mexico-Canada ~~Agreement~~Agreem ent (USMCA), by M. Angeles, by M. Angeles Villarreal andVillarreal and Ian F. Fergusson. Ian F. Fergusson.
4136 Side Side letters are available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-letters are available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-
agreement/agreementagreement/agreement -between. -between.
~~42 USTR~~37 UST R, “Joint Statement by the United States and Mexico on Section 232 Duties on Steel, “Joint Statement by the United States and Mexico on Section 232 Duties on Steel and Aluminum,” May 17, and Aluminum,” May 17,
2019, 2019, ~~https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/may/united-states-announces-deal-~~
~~canada and and “~~and “ Modification of Regulations RegardingModification of Regulations Regarding the Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis System,” 85the Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis System,” 85
Federal Register 17515, March 30, 2020. 17515, March 30, 2020.
4338 American Primary Aluminum Association letter to American Primary Aluminum Association letter to ~~USTR~~UST R, May 26, 2020, available at , May 26, 2020, available at
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/apaa-calls-on-ambassador-lighthizer-to-restore-tariffs-on-surging-https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/apaa-calls-on-ambassador-lighthizer-to-restore-tariffs-on-surging-
canadian-aluminum-imports-301066198.html. canadian-aluminum-imports-301066198.html.
4439 U.S. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “U.S. Chamber Opposes AluminumChamber of Commerce, “U.S. Chamber Opposes Aluminum ~~Tariffs~~ T ariffs on Canada,” June 23, 2020; “Business on Canada,” June 23, 2020; “Business
groups oppose Section 232 tariffs on Canadian aluminum,”groups oppose Section 232 tariffs on Canadian aluminum,” Inside U.S. Trade, June 24, 2020. , June 24, 2020.
4540 White House, “Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States,” press release, August White House, “Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States,” press release, August 6, 6,
2020, and “2020, and “ Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States,” 85 Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States,” 85 Federal Register 49921, August 14, 2020. 49921, August 14, 2020.
4641 Andy Blatchford, “ Andy Blatchford, “~~Trump~~ T rump’s ‘absurd decision’’s ‘absurd decision’ to slap aluminum tariffs on Canadato slap aluminum tariffs on Canada ~~draws~~ draws threat of C$3.6B in threat of C$3.6B in
retaliatory duties,” retaliatory duties,” PolticoPro, August, August 7, 2020, and Government of Canada, “7, 2020, and Government of Canada, “ Notice of intent to impose Notice of intent to impose
countermeasures action against the United States in response to tariffs on Canadian aluminumcountermeasures action against the United States in response to tariffs on Canadian aluminum products,” Augustproducts,” August 7, 7,
2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/department2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/department -finance/programs/consultations/2020/notice-intent-impose--finance/programs/consultations/2020/notice-intent-impose-
countermeasures-action-againstcountermeasures-action-against -united-states-response-tariffs-canadian-aluminum-products.html. 42 Proclamation 10106 of October 27, 2020, “Adjusting Imports of Alum inum Into the United States,” 85 Federal Register 68709-68713, October 27, 2020; Lauren Gardner, “ Canada drops retaliation plans after U.S. ends aluminum levies,” Politico Pro, September 15, 2020. 43 Executive Office of the President, “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States,” 85 Federal Register 6825-6831, January 25, 2021. Congressional Research Service 10 link to page 43 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress Biden nullified Trump’s action before it took effect noting that “imports from the UAE may stil displace domestic production.”44 Regarding the EU, on October 16, 2018, the Trump Administration notified Congress under TPA of new broad-based U.S. trade agreement negotiations with the EU to address ongoing trade frictions including Section 232 tariffs. The Trump Administration was seeking a “fairer, more balanced” U.S.-EU relationship. The TPA notification followed the July 2018 Joint Statement (agreed between President Trump and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker) that aimed to de-escalate trade tensions in which the two sides agreed to not impose further tariffs on each other’s trade products while negotiations are active.45 The negotiations did not started formal y under the Trump Administration, largely due to lack of U.S.-EU consensus on their scope. President Biden has stated he does not want to start new trade agreement negotiations at this time but has not ruled out addressing specific bilateral trade issues. When asked about the steel and aluminum tariffs, Commerce Secretary Raimundo stated “the 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum have in fact helped save American jobs in the steel and aluminum industries.”46 Since then, the Biden Administration and EU announced they wil enter into “discussions on the mutual resolution of concerns in this area that addresses steel and aluminum excess… to find solutions before the end of the year that wil demonstrate how the U.S. and EU can address excess capacity, ensure the long-term viability of our steel and aluminum industries, and strengthen our democratic al iance.”47 The parties agreed not to further increase tariffs while the discussions continue. Additional Tariff Increases on Steel Imports from Turkey President Trump raised steel tariffs to 50% on Turkish imports in August 2018, and then lowered them to 25% in May 2019. The President cited trade reasons for the increased tariffs, however some analysts have suggested other foreign policy objectives may have also played a part. U.S. importers contested the August 2018 increase in steel tariffs on Turkey in the Court of International Trade (CIT), claiming that the action did not fol ow Section 232’s procedural mandates. In a July 2020 final opinion, CIT judges agreed. See “Domestic Court Chal enges”, and CRS In Focus IF10961, U.S.-Turkey Trade Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar. Product Exclusions In 2018, to limit potential negative domestic impacts of the tariffs on U.S. consumers and consuming industries, Commerce published an interim final rule establishing a methodology for parties located in the United States to request exclusions for items that are not “produced in the United States in a sufficient and reasonably available amount or of a satisfactory quality.”48 Requests for exclusions and objections to requests were initial y posted on the regulations.gov 44 White House, “ A Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States,” February 1, 2021. 45 White House Factsheet , “President Donald J. T rump Launches a New Reciprocal T rade Relat ionship with the European Union,” July 27, 2018. 46 Senator Pat T oomey, Twitter for iPhone, April 7, 2021, 4:21 PM. 47 U.S. T rade Representative, “ Joint United States-European Union Statement on Addressing Global Steel and Aluminum Excess Capacity,” May 17, 2021. 48 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Requirements for Submissions Requesting Exclusions From the Remedies Instituted in Presidential Proclamations Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United States and Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States,” 83 Federal Register 12106, March 19, 2018. Congressional Research Service 11 link to page 17 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress website, creating a cumbersome process as the number of requests grew.49~~-united-states-response-tariffs-canadian-aluminum-products.html.~~
~~47 White House Factsheet, “President Donald J. Trump Launches a New Reciprocal Trade Relationship with the~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
10

~~link to page 42 link to page 42~~ ~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~due to lack of U.S.-EU consensus on their scope. The EU asserts that it will stop negotiating if it~~
~~is subject to new Section 232 tariffs.48~~
~~Additional and Proposed Tariff Increases on Steel and Aluminum Imports~~
~~President Trump has proposed further tariff increases for steel and aluminum imports from Turkey, Argentina,~~
~~and Brazil. The President has cited trade-related concerns, plus other foreign and economic policy goals for these~~
~~proposals. The most recent proposals have not been implemented, and the tariff increases on Turkey have been~~
~~challenged in the Court of International Trade (CIT).~~

Turkey49
~~President Trump has adjusted tariffs on steel imports from Turkey twice (raising tariffs to 50% in August 2018, and~~
~~then reducing them to 25% in May 2019), and has proposed further increases. On October 14, 2019, after~~
~~Turkey’s military incursion into northeast Syria, President Trump announced plans to apply sanctions on Turkey,~~
~~as well as increase steel tariffs on imports from Turkey back to 50%.50 While sanctions were applied, and then~~
~~later lifted after an announced ceasefire, the tariff increase has not been imposed to date.51~~
~~U.S. importers contested the initial August 2018 increase in steel tariffs on Turkey in the Court of International~~
~~Trade (CIT), claiming that the action did not fol ow Section 232’s procedural mandates. In a July 2020 final opinion,~~
~~CIT judges agreed.52~~
~~The value of U.S. imports of steel from Turkey have decreased 83.3% between 2017 and 2019. In 2019, Turkey~~
~~was the 23rd largest supplier of steel to the United States, dropping from its position as the 9th largest supplier in~~
~~2017.~~
~~The President also proposed a tariff increase on aluminum imports from Turkey, but no increase has been~~
~~implemented. U.S. imports of aluminum from Turkey rose by more than 390% from 2017, making it the 14th~~
~~largest supplier of aluminum to the United States.~~

~~Argentina and Brazil~~
~~In June 2018, President Trump announced that some countries would be exempt from the tariffs, after agreeing to~~
~~adhere to quotas on imports into the United States. Among others, permanent exemptions were granted to Brazil~~
~~for steel tariffs and to Argentina for both steel and aluminum tariffs, in exchange for quotas.~~
~~In December 2019, citing concerns over the valuation of Argentina and Brazil’s currencies, President Trump~~
~~announced plans to reinstate steel and aluminum tariffs on imports from Argentina and Brazil.53 The tariffs have~~
~~not been reinstated to date.~~
~~In 2019, Brazil was the second largest supplier of steel to the United States by value, accounting for 11.3% of~~
~~relevant U.S. imports. Argentina was the 21st largest supplier of steel by value (1.0% of relevant U.S. imports) and~~
~~the 10th largest supplier of aluminum (2.6% of relevant U.S. imports) to the United States.~~

~~European Union,” July 27, 2018.~~
~~48 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10931, U.S.-EU Trade and Economic Issues, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.~~
~~49 Also see CRS In Focus IF10961, U.S.-Turkey Trade Relations, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.~~
~~50 The White House, “Statement from President Donald J. Trump Regarding Turkey’s Actions in Northeast Syria,”~~
~~October 14, 2019, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-donald-j-trump-regarding-~~
~~turkeys-actions-northeast-syria/.~~
~~51 The White House, “Remarks by President Trump on the Situation in Northern Syria,” October 23, 2019, at~~
~~https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-situation-northern-syria/.~~
~~52 “CIT quashes expansion of Section 232 tariffs on Turkish steel,” Inside U.S. Trade, July 14, 2020. See~~ ~~“Domestic~~
~~Court Challenges”.~~
~~53 @realDonaldTrump, December 2, 2019, at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1201455858636472320.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
11

~~link to page 18~~ ~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~Product Exclusions~~
~~To limit potential negative domestic impacts of the tariffs on U.S. consumers and consuming~~
~~industries, Commerce published an interim final rule for how parties located in the United States~~
~~may request exclusions for items that are not “produced in the United States in a sufficient and~~
~~reasonably available amount or of a satisfactory quality.”54 Requests for exclusions and objections~~
~~to requests were initially posted on regulations.gov.55 The rule went into~~ The rule went into effect the same day as effect the same day as
publication to publication to ~~allow~~al ow for immediate submissions. for immediate submissions.
Commerce reviews exclusion requests and makes determinations based upon national security Commerce reviews exclusion requests and makes determinations based upon national security
considerations. To minimize the impact of any singleconsiderations. To minimize the impact of any single exclusion on the Section 232 action, the rule exclusion on the Section 232 action, the rule
~~allows only~~only al owed “individuals or organizations using steel articles ... in business activities ... in the “individuals or organizations using steel articles ... in business activities ... in the
United States to submit exclusion requests,” eliminating the ability of larger United States to submit exclusion requests,” eliminating the ability of larger ~~umbrella~~umbrel a groups or groups or
trade associations to submit petitions on behalf of member companies.trade associations to submit petitions on behalf of member companies.5650 Any approved product Any approved product
exclusion exclusion ~~is limited~~ was initial y limited to the individualto the individual or organization that submitted the specific or organization that submitted the specific exclusion request. exclusion request.
Parties may also submit objections to any exclusion within 30 days after the exclusion request is Parties may also submit objections to any exclusion within 30 days after the exclusion request is
posted. The review of exclusion requests and objections posted. The review of exclusion requests and objections ~~will~~is not not to exceed 90 days, creating a exceed 90 days, creating a
period of uncertainty for petitioners. Exclusions period of uncertainty for petitioners. Exclusions ~~will generally~~wil general y last for one year last for one year from the date of from the date of
signature.signature.57
51 As of As of ~~July 27, 2020~~February 7, 2021, Commerce received , Commerce received ~~222,773~~288,021 exclusion requests exclusion requests~~, 198,869~~ (ERs), 260,450 for steel for steel and 27,571~~and~~
~~23,904~~ for aluminum. Of those requests, the agency granted for aluminum. Of those requests, the agency granted ~~107,886 steel exclusions and 13,289~~
~~aluminum exclusions; 30,189 steel and 3,189 aluminum requests were denied (see Figure 3).58~~
170,084 exclusions and denied 59,134; 44,325 ERs were rejected or withdrawn. The remaining requests were pending (see Figure 3).52 Some Members have advocated for or against specific exclusions in support of Some Members have advocated for or against specific exclusions in support of constituents that constituents that
represent different parts of the supply chain, in some cases putting Members on represent different parts of the supply chain, in some cases putting Members on opposing sides of opposing sides of
an exclusion request.an exclusion request.59

~~54 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Requirements for Submissions Requesting~~
~~Exclusions From the Remedies Instituted in Presidential Proclamations Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United~~
~~States and Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States,” 83 Federal Register 12106, March 19, 2018.~~
5553 Figure 3. Section 232 Exclusion Requests as of February 7, 2021 Source: CRS based on data from Department of Commerce. 49 Docket Number BIS-2018-0006 (Steel); Docket Number BIS-2018-0002, (Aluminum). Docket Number BIS-2018-0006 (Steel); Docket Number BIS-2018-0002, (Aluminum).
5650 A parallel requirement applies for aluminum requests. A parallel requirement applies for aluminum requests.
5751 Bureau Bureau of Industry and Security, of Industry and Security, Requirements for Submissions Requesting Exclusions from the Remedies Instituted
in Presidential ~~Proclamations Adjusting Imports~~Proclam ations Adjusting Im ports of Steel into the United States and Adjusting ~~Imports of Aluminum~~ Im ports of Alum inum into
the United States; and the Filing of Objections to ~~Submitted~~Subm itted Exclusion Requests for Steel and ~~Aluminum~~Alum inum , Docket BIS-, Docket BIS-
2018-0006, https://www.regulations.gov/. 2018-0006, https://www.regulations.gov/.
5852 Data obtained by CRS Data obtained by CRS from Bureaufrom Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, ~~August 18, 2020.~~
59February 9, 2021. 53 For example, see letters from Reps. H. Rogers, For example, see letters from Reps. H. Rogers, Kaptur, Guthrie, Comer, M. Rogers,Kaptur, Guthrie, Comer, M. Rogers, Barr, Aderholt, Johnson, Barr, Aderholt, Johnson,
Gonzalez and GibbsGonzalez and Gibbs to President to President ~~Trump~~T rump, February 7, 2020, and from Sen., February 7, 2020, and from Sen. ~~Toomey~~ T oomey to Secretary Ross, February 5, to Secretary Ross, February 5,
2020, related to exclusion requests2020, related to exclusion requests from Allegheny from Allegheny ~~Technologies~~T echnologies Incorporated ( Incorporated (~~ATI~~AT I). ).
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
12 12

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

~~Figure 3. Section 232 Exclusion Requests as of July 27, 2020~~

Source: CRS based on data from Department of Commerce.
~~Companies have~~ Multiple companies raised strong concerns about the intensive, time-consuming process to submit raised strong concerns about the intensive, time-consuming process to submit
exclusion requests; the lengthy waiting period to hear back from Commerce, which has exceeded exclusion requests; the lengthy waiting period to hear back from Commerce, which has exceeded
90 days in some cases; what some view as an arbitrary nature of acceptances and denials; and that 90 days in some cases; what some view as an arbitrary nature of acceptances and denials; and that
~~all~~ al exclusion requests to date have been rejected when a U.S. steel or aluminum producer has exclusion requests to date have been rejected when a U.S. steel or aluminum producer has
objected.objected.6054 Some steel companies who expected to benefit from the tariffs and whose exclusion Some steel companies who expected to benefit from the tariffs and whose exclusion
requests have been denied are experiencing financial difficulty.requests have been denied are experiencing financial difficulty.61
55 Several Members of Congress Several Members of Congress ~~have~~ raised concerns about the exclusion process. A bipartisan raised concerns about the exclusion process. A bipartisan
group of House Members, for example, group of House Members, for example, ~~raised concerns about the speed~~noted the slowness of the review process and of the review process and
the significant the significant burden it places on manufacturers, burden it places on manufacturers, ~~especially small~~ especial y smal businesses.businesses.6256 The Members The Members
included specific recommendations, such as included specific recommendations, such as ~~allowing~~al owing for broader product ranges to be included in for broader product ranges to be included in
a single request, a single request, ~~allowing~~al owing trade associations to petition, grandfathering in existing contracts to trade associations to petition, grandfathering in existing contracts to
avoid disruptions, and regularly reviewing the tariffs’ effects and sunsetting them if they have a avoid disruptions, and regularly reviewing the tariffs’ effects and sunsetting them if they have a
“significant negative “significant negative impact.”impact.”63
~~Commerce~~57 Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is the lead agency involved in making final decisions regarding whether the requests are granted or denied. Rulemaking for products exclusions has been an evolving process. Commerce asserts it has taken several steps to improve asserts it has taken several steps to improve the exclusion process, including the exclusion process, including
increasing and organizing its staff “to efficiently process exclusion requests,” and “expediting the increasing and organizing its staff “to efficiently process exclusion requests,” and “expediting the
grant of properly filed exclusion requests that receive no grant of properly filed exclusion requests that receive no objections.” The agency’s International Trade Administration (ITA) also became involved in the exclusion process by analyzing exclusion requests and objections to determine whether there is sufficient domestic production available to meet the requestor’s product needs.58 On September 6, 2018, Commerce announced a new rule to al ow companies to rebut objections to petitions.59 The rule, published on September 11, 2018, included new rebuttal and counter-rebuttal procedures, more information about the exclusion submission requirements and process, the criteria Commerce uses in deciding whether to grant an exclusion request, and revised estimates of the total number of exclusion requests and objections that Commerce expects to receive.60 In June 2019, Commerce launched an online 232 Exclusions Portal for submitting and processing of steel and exclusion requests, objections, rebuttals, and sur-rebuttals.61 The portal is for al submissions on or after June 13, 2019, while al prior submissions reside on 54 Ed Crooks and Fan Fei, “T rade war winners and losers grapple with T rump~~objections.” Commerce’s Bureau of~~
~~Industry and Security (BIS) is the lead agency involved in making final decisions regarding~~
~~whether the requests are granted or denied. The agency’s International Trade Administration~~
~~(ITA) also became involved in the exclusion process by analyzing exclusion requests and~~

~~60 Ed Crooks and Fan Fei, “Trade war winners and losers grapple with Trump~~ tariff chaos,” tariff chaos,” The Financial Times, July , July
23, 2018 and. Christine McDaniel and Joe Brunk, “23, 2018 and. Christine McDaniel and Joe Brunk, “ Section 232 Steel and AluminumSection 232 Steel and Aluminum ~~Tariff~~ T ariff Exclusion Requests Exclusion Requests
Continue Apace,” Continue Apace,” Mercatus The Bridge, January 21, 2020. , January 21, 2020.
6155 Bryan Gruley Bryan Gruley and Joe Deaux, “and Joe Deaux, “~~The~~T he Biggest Fan of Biggest Fan of ~~Trump~~T rump’s Steel ’s Steel ~~Tariffs~~T ariffs is Suing is Suing Over Over ~~Them~~T hem,” ,” Bloomberg, February , February
13, 2020. 13, 2020.
6256 MIL OSI MIL OSI - ForeignAffairs.co.nz, “MIL-OSI USA:- ForeignAffairs.co.nz, “MIL-OSI USA: Walorski CallsWalorski Calls for Changes to for Changes to ~~Tariff~~T ariff Product Exclusion Process Product Exclusion Process
for Manufacturers,” ForeignAffairs.co.nz, May 8, 2018. for Manufacturers,” ForeignAffairs.co.nz, May 8, 2018.
~~63 Ibid.~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~objections to determine whether there is sufficient domestic production available to meet the~~
~~requestor’s product needs.64~~
~~On September 6, 2018, Commerce announced a new rule to allow companies to rebut objections~~
~~to petitions.65 The rule, published September 11, 2018, included new rebuttal and counter-rebuttal~~
~~procedures, more information about the exclusion submission requirements and process, the~~
~~criteria Commerce uses in deciding whether to grant an exclusion request, and revised estimates~~
~~of the total number of exclusion requests and objections that Commerce expects to receive.66 In~~
~~June 2019, Commerce launched an online 232 Exclusions Portal for submitting and processing of~~
~~steel and exclusion requests, objections, rebuttals, and sur-rebuttals.67 The portal is for all~~
~~submissions as of June 13, 2019, while all prior submissions reside on~~ 57 Ibid. 58 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Interim Final Rule. Submissions of Exclusion Requests and Objections to Submitted Requests for Steel and Aluminum,” 83 Federal Register 46026, September 11, 2018. 59 T estimony by Department of Commerce Assistant Secretary For Export Administration Bureau of Industry and Security Richard Ashooh at Senate Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies hearing on Conduct Oversight of Bureau of Industry & Security, International Trade Adm inistration, & US International Trade Com m ission, September 6, 2018, https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/conduct -oversight -of-bureau-of-industry-and-security-international-trade-administration_us-international-trade-commission. 60 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, "Submissions of Exclusion Requests and Objections to Submitted Requests for Steel and Aluminum," 83 Federal Register 46026, September 11, 2018. 61 Portal is available at https://www.commerce.gov/page/section-232-investigations. Congressional Research Service 13 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress regulations.gov. The portal regulations.gov. The portal
may provide greater transparency of 232 submission documents, but may provide greater transparency of 232 submission documents, but does not necessarily impact does not necessarily impact
Commerce’s decision-making process. Commerce’s decision-making process.
Some Members have questioned the Some Members have questioned the ~~Administration~~executive branch’s processes and ability to pick winners and ’s processes and ability to pick winners and
losers through granting or denying exclusion requests. For example, Members have requested that losers through granting or denying exclusion requests. For example, Members have requested that
Commerce provide specific statistics and information on the exclusion requests and have sought Commerce provide specific statistics and information on the exclusion requests and have sought
greater transparency on the exclusion process. greater transparency on the exclusion process. ~~Senator Elizabeth Warren requested that the~~
~~Commerce Inspector General investigate the implementation of the exclusion process, including a~~
~~review of the procedures Commerce has established; how they are being followed; and if~~
~~exclusion decisions are made on a transparent, individual basis, free from political interference.~~
~~Pending legislation~~Legislation introduced in the 116th Congress to revise Section 232 in the 116th Congress to revise Section 232 ~~also addresses~~would have addressed the process for the process for
excluding products such as having the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) administer excluding products such as having the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) administer
the process or establishing specific the process or establishing specific ~~timelines (e.g.,~~ timelines (e.g., 116th- S. 287, H.R. 940, S. 2362).S. 287, H.R. 940, S. 2362).
On October 29, 2018, the Commerce Inspector General’s office (IG) initiated an audit of the On October 29, 2018, the Commerce Inspector General’s office (IG) initiated an audit of the
agency’s processes and procedures for reviewing and adjudicating product exclusion requests.agency’s processes and procedures for reviewing and adjudicating product exclusion requests.68
62 In July 2019, the Commerce IG determined that BIS had a large backlog of exclusion requests In July 2019, the Commerce IG determined that BIS had a large backlog of exclusion requests
and that requests with objections had lower completion rates.and that requests with objections had lower completion rates.6963 In October 2019, the IG issued a In October 2019, the IG issued a
Management Alert regarding “a lack of transparency that contributes to the appearance of Management Alert regarding “a lack of transparency that contributes to the appearance of
improper influence in decision-making for tariff exclusion requests.”improper influence in decision-making for tariff exclusion requests.”7064 The IG recommended that The IG recommended that
BIS take specific actions to ensure transparency. Commerce did not announce any new changes to BIS take specific actions to ensure transparency. Commerce did not announce any new changes to

~~64 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Interim Final Rule. Submissions of Exclusion~~
~~Requests and Objections to Submitted Requests for Steel and Aluminum,” 83 Federal Register 46026, September 11,~~
~~2018.~~
~~65 Testimony by Department of Commerce Assistant Secretary For Export Administration Bureau of Industry and~~
~~Security Richard Ashooh at Senate Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies hearing on~~
~~Conduct Oversight of Bureau of Industry & Security, International Trade Administration, & US International Trade~~
~~Commission, September 6, 2018, https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/conduct-oversight-of-bureau-of-~~
~~industry-and-security-international-trade-administration_us-international-trade-commission.~~
~~66 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, "Submissions of Exclusion Requests and Objections to~~
~~Submitted Requests for Steel and Aluminum," 83 Federal Register 46026, September 11, 2018.~~
~~67 Portal is available at https://www.commerce.gov/page/section-232-investigations.~~
~~68 Letter from Carol Rice, Assistant Inspector General for Audit and Evaluation, to Daniel O. Hill, Acting Under~~
~~Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, Bureau of Industry and Security, October 29, 2018.~~
~~69 Letter from Carol Rice, Assistant Inspector General for Audit and Evaluation, to Nazak Nikakhtar, Assistant~~
~~Secretary for Industry and Analysis, Performing the Non-Exclusive Duties of the Under Secretary of Commerce for~~
~~Industry and Security, Bureau of Industry and Security, July 1, 2019.~~
~~70 Letter from Carol Rice, Assistant Inspector General for Audit and Evaluation, to Secretary Ross, Management Alert:~~
~~Certain Communications by Department Officials Suggest Improper Influence in the Section 232 Exclusion Request~~
~~Review Process Final Memorandum No. OIG-20-003-M, October 28, 2019.~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~the exemption process or policy to further address the concerns noted in the IG report and by~~
~~some Members.71~~
~~In May 2020, Commerce issued a Federal Register notice requesting feedback on the exclusion~~
~~process and “the appropriateness of the factors considered, and the efficiency and transparency of~~
~~the process employed, in rendering decisions on requests for exclusions from the tariffs and~~
~~quotas imposed on imports of steel and aluminum articles.”72 The notice also solicited comments~~
~~on potential revisions to the process. Comments included recommendations to ensure more~~
~~consistent application of Commerce regulations, rigorous claim verification, and adding~~
~~derivative products to the exclusion process.73 Other recommendations included reversing the~~
~~burden of proof for objections and requiring domestic steel manufacturers to show they can meet~~
~~the needs of the downstream manufacturer who is requesting the exclusion.74~~
~~To ensure that Commerce follows through with improving the exclusion process, in the~~
~~Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), signed on February 15, 2019, Congress~~
~~provided funding for “contractor support to implement the product exclusion process for articles~~
~~covered by actions taken under section 232.”75 To~~ the exemption process or policy to further address the concerns noted in the IG report and by some Members.65 In May 2020, Commerce issued a Federal Register notice requesting feedback on the exclusion process and “the appropriateness of the factors considered, and the efficiency and transparency of the process employed, in rendering decisions on requests for exclusions from the tariffs and quotas imposed on imports of steel and aluminum articles.”66 The notice also solicited comments on potential revisions to the process. In December 2020, Commerce announced further changes through the rule-making process.67 Commerce al owed for General Approved Exclusions (GAEs) that may be used by any importing entity, eliminating the need for every entity to apply for an exclusion for the same product as wel as quantity limits. Al owing GAEs are intended in part to reduce the burden on SMEs and on Commerce, who should receive fewer exclusion requests as a result. In addition, Commerce clarified language so that the same time standard would be applied to U.S. objectors and foreign suppliers. To ensure that Commerce follows through with improving the exclusion process, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), signed on February 15, 2019, Congress provided funding for “contractor support to implement the product exclusion process for articles 62 Letter from Carol Rice, Assistant Inspector General for Audit and Evaluation, to Daniel O. Hill, Acting Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, Bureau of Industry and Security, Oc tober 29, 2018. 63 Letter from Carol Rice, Assistant Inspector General for Audit and Evaluation, to Nazak Nikakhtar, Assistant Secretary for Industry and Analysis, Performing the Non-Exclusive Duties of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, Bureau of Indust ry and Security, July 1, 2019. 64 Letter from Carol Rice, Assistant Inspector General for Audit and Evaluation, to Secretary Ross, Management Alert: Certain Communications by Department Officials Suggest Improper Influence in the Sectio n 232 Exclusion Request Review Process Final Memorandum No. OIG-20-003-M, October 28, 2019. 65 For example, see Rep. Walorski Statement on Commerce OIG Finding “Improper Influence” in Section 232 Exclusion Process, October 30, 2019. 66 Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce, "Notice of Inquiry Regarding the Exclusion Process for Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Import T ariffs and Quotas," 85 Federal Register 31441, May 26, 2020. 67 Bureau of Industry and Security, "Section 232 Steel and Aluminum T ariff Exclusions Process," 85 Federal Register 81060-81084, December 14, 2020. Congressional Research Service 14 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress covered by actions taken under section 232.”68 To help ensure improvements to the exclusion process, ensure improvements to the exclusion process,
Congress indicated that the additional money is to be “devoted to an effective Section 232 Congress indicated that the additional money is to be “devoted to an effective Section 232
exclusion process” and required that Commerce submit quarterly reports to Congress.exclusion process” and required that Commerce submit quarterly reports to Congress.76 69 Congress Congress
mandated that the reports identify: mandated that the reports identify:
 the number of exclusion requests received;  the number of exclusion requests received;
 the number of exclusion requests approved and denied;  the number of exclusion requests approved and denied;
 the status of efforts to assist  the status of efforts to assist ~~small~~smal - and medium-sized businesses in navigating - and medium-sized businesses in navigating
the exclusion process; the exclusion process;
 Commerce-wide staffing levels for the exclusion process, including information  Commerce-wide staffing levels for the exclusion process, including information
on any staff detailed to complete this task; and on any staff detailed to complete this task; and
 Commerce-wide funding by source appropriation and object class for costs  Commerce-wide funding by source appropriation and object class for costs
undertaken to process the exclusions. undertaken to process the exclusions.
~~The Commerce Federal Register notice requesting feedback on the process and potential revisions~~
~~may be part of the agency’s implementation of the appropriation requirements.~~
~~Tariffs Collected to Date~~
~~As of August 12, 2020, two full years since the Section 232 tariffs took effect~~In the Fiscal year 2022 Budget Request hearing, Secretary Raimundo stated that Commerce has reduced the time for companies to receive exclusions.70 Tariffs Collected to Date As of April 14, 2021, U.S. Customs and , U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) assessed $7.Border Protection (CBP) assessed $7.~~3 billion~~7 bil ion in steel tariffs and $2. in steel tariffs and $2.~~2 billion~~4 bil ion in aluminum tariffs in aluminum tariffs.
About 63% of steel tariffs ($4.5 About 63% of steel tariffs ($4.5 ~~billion~~bil ion) and 68% of aluminum tariffs ($1.5 ) and 68% of aluminum tariffs ($1.5 ~~billion~~bil ion) were collected ) were collected
the first year the tariffs were in effect, highlighting the first year the tariffs were in effect, highlighting the fact that revenue from these two Section the fact that revenue from these two Section
232 actions has been declining. This could reflect (1) 232 actions has been declining. This could reflect (1) the exemptions to Canada and Mexico in May 2019 (top suppliers of both metals), (2) the effect of exemptions granted to U.S. importers, and (3) declining imports in response to the relatively higher import prices, an objective of the Trump Administration’s actions.71 Re-imposed tariffs on Canadian aluminum could impact the trend in the future. In addition, CBP has assessed $18.8 mil ion and $1 mil ion from the tariffs on steel and aluminum derivative products, respectively. The increased tariffs on these products reflects a January 24, 2020 Presidential proclamation that also placed tariffs on imports of products such as steel nails, tacks, and drawing pins; as wel as aluminum stranded wire, cables, and plaited bands and other like products.72 The tariffs collected are put in the general fund of the U.S. Treasury and are not al ocated to a specific fund. 68 P.L. 116-6 Division C, T itle I. 69 H.J.Res. 31, p. 609. 70 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request for The Departm ent of Com m erce, 117th Cong., May 6, 2022. 71 See CBP website (https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/trade) for statistics. According to the President’s proclamations implementing the Section 232 tariffs, one of the objectives of the tariffs is to “reduce imports to a level that the Secretary assessed would enable domestic steel (and aluminum) producers to use approximately 80 percent of existing domestic production capacity and thereby achieve long-term economic viability through increased production.” Presidential Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States,” 83 Federal Register 11619, March 15, 2018, and Proclamation 9705 of March 8, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United States,” 83 Federal Register 11625, March 15, 2018. 72 Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020, "Adjusting imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Derivative Steel Articles into the United States," 85 Federal Register 5281, January 24, 2020. Congressional Research Service 15 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress Additional Trump Administration Investigations Automobiles and Parts73~~the exemptions to Canada and Mexico in~~

~~71 For example, see Rep. Walorski Statement on Commerce OIG Finding “Improper Influence” in Section 232~~
~~Exclusion Process, October 30, 2019.~~
~~72 Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce, "Notice of Inquiry Regarding the Exclusion Process for Section 232~~
~~Steel and Aluminum Import Tariffs and Quotas," 85 Federal Register 31441, May 26, 2020.~~
~~73 Letter from Representative Jackie Walorski to Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, July 10, 2020.~~
~~74 Christine McDaniel, “Commerce Should Improve the Objection Process for the Section 232 Tariff Exclusion~~
~~Requests,” Mercatus Center, George Mason University, July 13, 2020.~~
~~75 P.L. 116-6 Division C, Title I.~~
~~76 H.J.Res. 31, p. 609.~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~May 2019 (top suppliers of both metals), (2) the effect of exemptions granted to U.S. importers,~~
~~and (3) declining imports in response to the relatively higher import prices, an objective of the~~
~~Administration’s actions.77 Re-imposed tariffs on Canadian aluminum could impact the trend in~~
~~the future. In addition, CBP has assessed $18.8 million and $1 million from the tariffs on steel~~
~~and aluminum derivative products. The tariffs collected are put in the general fund of the U.S.~~
~~Treasury and are not allocated to a specific fund.~~
~~Additional Trump Administration Investigations~~
~~Automobiles and Parts78~~
Subsequent to the steel and aluminum investigations, the Trump Administration in May 2018 Subsequent to the steel and aluminum investigations, the Trump Administration in May 2018
initiated a third Section 232 investigation into the import of passenger cars, initiated a third Section 232 investigation into the import of passenger cars, ~~SUVs,~~ sport utility vehicles, vans, light vans, light
trucks, and automotive parts.trucks, and automotive parts.7974 Commerce held a public hearing to hear from Commerce held a public hearing to hear from stakeholders on the stakeholders on the
potential impact of these imports on national security, identifying a broad set of factors related to potential impact of these imports on national security, identifying a broad set of factors related to
national defense and the national economy for consideration.national defense and the national economy for consideration.8075 As many foreign auto As many foreign auto
manufacturers have established facilities in the United States—accounting for 45% of manufacturers have established facilities in the United States—accounting for 45% of
employment in U.S. auto assembly and parts employment in U.S. auto assembly and parts ~~plants81~~plants76—Commerce —Commerce ~~specifically~~specifical y requested requested
information on how the impact of auto imports on U.S. national security may differ when “U.S. information on how the impact of auto imports on U.S. national security may differ when “U.S.
production by majority U.S.-owned firms is considered separately from U.S. production by production by majority U.S.-owned firms is considered separately from U.S. production by
majority foreign-owned firms.”77 Some Members and auto industry representatives spoke out in opposition to any tariffs during the auto industry Section 232 investigation. Three groups voiced support for at least limited measures to specifical y address auto imports: the United Automobile Workers, the United Steelworkers, and the Forging Industry Association.78 Commerce submitted the final Section 232 report to President Trump on February 17, 2019; the report has not been publicly released.79 Some Members have asked for the report to be made public, and the Cause of Action Institute sued Commerce to release the report after an unsuccessful Freedom of Information Act request.80 On March 6, 2020, Senator Toomey and other Members of Congress filed an amicus brief with the district court arguing, among other things, that (1) Congress needed the report in order to exercise oversight over the authority it had granted to the executive branch in Section 232; and (2) the President could not invoke executive privilege to withhold disclosure of the document.81 The court has not issued a decision in the case. Some analysts viewed the use of the Section 232 73 CRS Specialist Bill Canis contributed to this section. 74 For a further discussion of the Section 232 auto industry investigation, see CRS In Focus IF10971, Section 232 Auto Investigation, coordinated by Rachel F. Fefer. 75 U.S. ~~majority foreign-owned firms.”82~~
~~The value of U.S. imports potentially covered under the new investigation is significantly greater~~
~~than that of steel and aluminum imports. In 2019, the United States imported more than eight~~
~~million vehicles, with a value of $197 billion, and more than $155 billion in auto parts.83 With~~
~~complex global supply chains, industry dynamics such as the large number of foreign-owned auto~~

~~77 According to the President’s proclamations implementing the Section 232 tariffs, one of the objectives of the tariffs~~
~~is to “reduce imports to a level that the Secretary assessed would enable domestic steel (and aluminum) producers to~~
~~use approximately 80 percent of existing domestic production capacity and thereby achieve long-term economic~~
~~viability through increased production.” Presidential Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of~~
~~Aluminum into the United States,” 83 Federal Register 11619, March 15, 2018, and Proclamation 9705 of March 8,~~
~~2018, “Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United States,” 83 Federal Register 11625, March 15, 2018.~~
~~78 CRS Specialist Bill Canis contributed to this section.~~
~~79 For a further discussion of the Section 232 auto industry investigation, see CRS In Focus IF10971,~~ ~~Section 232 Auto~~
~~Investigation, coordinated by Rachel F. Fefer.~~
~~80 U.S.~~ Department of Commerce, “Notice on Section 232 National Investigation of Imports of Automobiles and Department of Commerce, “Notice on Section 232 National Investigation of Imports of Automobiles and
Automotive Parts,” 83Automotive Parts,” 83 Federal Register 24735, May 30, 2018. 24735, May 30, 2018.
8176 In 2017, employment in manufacture of motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and vehicle parts was In 2017, employment in manufacture of motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and vehicle parts was 972,000; of those, 972,000; of those,
431,000 worked in foreign-owned431,000 worked in foreign-owned plants in the United States, according to the latest data from the U.S. Department of plants in the United States, according to the latest data from the U.S. Department of
Commerce, BureauCommerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), of Economic Analysis (BEA), Activities of U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Multinational Enterprises,
viewedviewed on Julyon July 31, 2020, https://www.bea.gov/data/intl-trade-investment/activities-us-affiliates-foreign-mnes, and 31, 2020, https://www.bea.gov/data/intl-trade-investment/activities-us-affiliates-foreign-mnes, and
BEA, BEA, National ~~Income~~Incom e and Product Accounts, , ~~Table~~T able 6.4D. Full-time and Part 6.4D. Full-time and Part~~-Time~~ -T ime Employees by Industry, viewed Employees by Industry, viewed
February 20, 2020, https://apps.bea.gov/February 20, 2020, https://apps.bea.gov/~~iTable~~iT able/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&nipa_table_list=193&/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&nipa_table_list=193&
categories=survey. categories=survey.
8277 U.S. U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice on Section 232 National Investigation of Imports of Automobiles and Department of Commerce, “Notice on Section 232 National Investigation of Imports of Automobiles and
Automotive Parts,” 83Automotive Parts,” 83 Federal Register 24735, May 30, 2018. 24735, May 30, 2018.
~~83 Mexico, Japan, Canada, Germany, and South Korea accounted for 85% of vehicles imported by the United States in~~
~~2018; nearly 40% of automotive parts were imported from Mexico, with China, Canada, Japan, Germany, and South~~
~~Korea accounting for an additional 43% of imports. U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade~~
~~Administration, Automotive Team: Industry Trade Data, https://legacy.trade.gov/td/otm/autostats.asp.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

78 Doug Palmer and Megan Cassella, “ U.S. allies warn of retaliation if T rump imposes auto tariffs,” PoliticoPro, July 19, 2018. 79 U.S. Department of Commerce, “ Statement from the Department of Commerce on Submission of Automobiles and Automobile Parts Section 232 Report to the President ,” Press Releases, February 17, 2019. 80 Eliana Johnson and Andrew Restuccia, “T rump Administration withholds report justifying ‘shock’ auto tariffs,” PoliticoPro, March 20, 2019; Doug Palmer, “ Watchdog group sues for release of Commerce auto tariff report ,” PoliticoPro, March 21, 2019. 81 Senator T oomey, “ Toomey Leading Bipartisan Amicus Brief Supporting Lawsuit Seeking Release of Commerce Department’s 232 Auto Report ,” March 7, 2020, https://www.toomey.senate.gov/?p=op_ed&id=2591. Congressional Research Service 16 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress investigation and potential tariffs as a tactical move by the Trump Administration to pressure trade negotiating partners. To compel the Trump Administration to release the report, Congress included an amendment in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93) mandating that Commerce publish the report in the Federal Register and that it submit to Congress any portion of the report that contains classified information.82 The Trump Administration did not comply, citing executive privilege and asserting that disclosure of the report “would risk impairing ongoing diplomatic efforts to address a national-security threat and would risk interfering with executive branch deliberations,” in apparent reference to negotiations with the EU and others ongoing at that time.83 Several Members, including then-Senate Finance Chair Senator Grassley, objected to the Trump Administration’s refusal to release the report.84 The Biden Administration has yet to release the report. Bil s introduced in the 116th Congress would have required a report by the USITC on the economic importance of domestic automotive manufacturing before the President could impose import restrictions on the sector (S. 121, H.R. 1710). Implications of a 232 Action for U.S Automakers The value of U.S. imports potential y covered under the Trump Administration investigation would have been significantly greater than that of steel and aluminum imports. In 2020, the United States imported more than 6.6 mil ion vehicles, with a value of $159 bil ion, and more than $131 bil ion in auto parts. With complex global supply chains, industry dynamics such as the large number of foreign-owned auto manufacturing facilities in the United States, and the potential for further retaliation by trading manufacturing facilities in the United States, and the potential for further retaliation by trading
partners if tariffs partners if tariffs ~~are~~were to be imposed as a result of the investigation, the economic consequences could imposed as a result of the investigation, the economic consequences could
behave been substantial. substantial.84 For example, the For example, the 1.5 mil ion ~~1.9 million~~ vehicles exported from the United States in vehicles exported from the United States in ~~2019—~~
2020—with a value of $with a value of $~~59 billion—and $85 billion~~ 47 bil ion—and $67 bil ion in parts exports could in parts exports could behave been targeted for retaliation by targeted for retaliation by
some trading some trading partners, as could partners, as could have the vehicle assembly plants of U.S.the vehicle assembly plants of U.S. -controlled companies in controlled companies in
overseas markets such as China and Europe.overseas markets such as China and Europe.85 The Center for Automotive Research (CAR), a The Center for Automotive Research (CAR), a
research and analysis group that studies issues affecting the automotive industry, estimated that a research and analysis group that studies issues affecting the automotive industry, estimated that a
25% tariff added to 25% tariff added to ~~all~~ al imported vehicles and parts (including from Canada and Mexico) could imported vehicles and parts (including from Canada and Mexico) could
raise the cost of U.S. vehicle assembly by 6%; if levied only against the post-Brexit EU, those raise the cost of U.S. vehicle assembly by 6%; if levied only against the post-Brexit EU, those
costs costs would increase by less than 1%.would increase by less than 1%.86
In its 2019 annual report, Ford Motor Company In its 2019 annual report, Ford Motor Company ~~asserts~~asserted that “steps taken by the U.S. government that “steps taken by the U.S. government
to apply or consider applying tariffs on automobiles, parts, and other products and to apply or consider applying tariffs on automobiles, parts, and other products and materials have materials have
the potential to disrupt existing supply chains, impose additional costs on our business, affect the the potential to disrupt existing supply chains, impose additional costs on our business, affect the
demand for our products, and make us less competitive. Further, other countries attempting to demand for our products, and make us less competitive. Further, other countries attempting to
retaliate by imposing tariffs would increase the cost for us to import retaliate by imposing tariffs would increase the cost for us to import our vehicles into such our vehicles into such
countries.”countries.”87
The automotive supply chain has The automotive supply chain has ~~already~~ been affected by steel and aluminum tariffs. According been affected by steel and aluminum tariffs. According
to to CAR, U.S. vehicles and parts manufacturers account for 26% of U.S. steel consumption and 82 P.L. 116-93, Sec. 112. 83 Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General Office Legal Counsel, “Publication of a Report to the President on the Effect of Automobile and Automobile-Part Imports on the National Security,” January 17, 2020. 84 “Grassley says he intends to ‘pursue’ release of Section 232 autos report ,” Inside U.S. Trade, February 11, 2020; Doug Palmer, “ T oomey blasts Commerce decision not to release auto report ,” PoliticoPro, January 21, 2020; letter from New Democrat Coalition to Pres. T rump dated February 13, 2020. Congressional Research Service 17 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress 31% of aluminum consumption. The American Automotive Policy Council, an industry trade group that represents the policy interests of Chrysler (a subsidiary of Stel antis N.V. since January 2021), Ford, and General Motors, has estimated that the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs added $400 to the price of a new vehicle. Notes: Mexico, Japan, Canada, South Korea, and Germany accounted for 90% of vehicles imported by the United States in 2020; nearly 40% of automotive parts were imported from Mexico, with China, Canada, Japan, Germany, and South Korea accounting for an additional 40% of imports. EU members alone (not including United Kingdom) in 2020 purchased 256,569 U.S-made vehicles, worth $10.8 bil ion. More than two-thirds of U.S. automotive parts exports were to Mexico and Canada. To il ustrate the complexity of auto negotiations, see CRS In Focus IF10835, NAFTA Motor Vehicle Talks Reopen Old Trade Debate, by Bil Canis. Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, ~~CAR, U.S. vehicles and parts manufacturers account for 26% of U.S. steel consumption and~~
~~31% of aluminum consumption.88 The American Automotive Policy Council, an industry trade~~
~~group that represents the policy interests of Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA US), Ford, and~~
~~General Motors, has estimated that the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs have added $400 to~~
~~the price of a new vehicle.89 Three groups voiced support for at least limited measures to~~
~~specifically address auto imports: the United Automobile Workers, the United Steelworkers, and~~
~~the Forging Industry Association.90~~
~~Some Members and auto industry representatives spoke out in opposition to any tariffs during the~~
~~auto industry Section 232 investigation. The Driving American Jobs Coalition, created to oppose~~
~~the potential tariffs, is comprised of industry groups representing auto manufacturers, parts~~
~~suppliers, auto dealers, parts distributors, retailers, and vehicle service providers.91 Others view~~
~~the use of this investigation and potential tariffs as a tactical move by the Administration to~~

~~84 To illustrate the complexity of auto negotiations, see CRS In Focus IF10835,~~ ~~NAFTA Motor Vehicle Talks Reopen~~
~~Old Trade Debate, by Bill Canis.~~
~~85 EU members alone in 2019 purchased 350,201 U.S-made vehicles, worth $13.7 billion. Nearly three-quarters of U.S.~~
~~automotive parts exports were to Mexico and Canada. U.S. Department of Commerce,~~ International Trade International Trade
~~Administration, Automotive Team: Industry Trade Data, https://legacy.trade.gov/td/otm/autostats.asp~~
86 Administration, Automotive Trade Data. Michael Schultz, et al., Michael Schultz, et al., U.S. Consumer & Economic Impacts of U.S. Automotive trade Policies, Center for , Center for
AutomotiveAutomotive Research, February 2019, p. 26, https://www.cargroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/US-Consumer-Research, February 2019, p. 26, https://www.cargroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/US-Consumer-
Economic-Impacts-of-US-Automotive-Trade-Policies-.pdfEconomic-Impacts-of-US-Automotive-Trade-Policies-.pdf
87 Ford Motor Company, 2019 Annual Report~~, Form 10-K, For the Year Ended December 31, 2019, p. 15,~~.
https://shareholder.ford.com/investors/financials/annual-reports/default.aspx.https://shareholder.ford.com/investors/financials/annual-reports/default.aspx.
88 Michael Schultz, et al.,Michael Schultz, et al., U.S. Consumer & Economic Impacts of U.S. Automotive trade Policies, , Center for Center for
~~Automotive~~ Automotive Research, February 2019, pp. 24-25.Research, February 2019, pp. 24-25.
89 Ryan Beene, “Auto industry unites to oppose Trump import tariffs,” Ryan Beene, “Auto industry unites to oppose Trump import tariffs,” Automotive News, March 29, 2019, , March 29, 2019,
https://www.autonews.com/automakers-suppliers/auto-industry-unites-oppose-trump-https://www.autonews.com/automakers-suppliers/auto-industry-unites-oppose-trump-import-tariffs. Ford Motor Company, 2019 Annual Report, Form 10-K, For the Year Ended December 31, 2019, p. 15. Uranium85 Unlike the self-initiated investigations into steel, aluminum, and auto imports, the Trump Administration opened two additional Section 232 investigations in response to industry petitions. In July 2018, Commerce launched a Section 232 investigation into uranium imports in response to a petition from two uranium producers (uranium mining and mil ing companies), and after consulting with industry, government officials, and a public comment period.86 The petitioners, the uranium producers Energy Fuels and Ur-Energy, requested limiting imports to guarantee 25% of the U.S. nuclear fuel market for U.S. uranium producers, and “Buy American” provisions for government purchases of uranium to bolster the industry.87 Compared to historical production, current uranium mining has become a relatively smal -scale industry in the United States. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports U.S. production of uranium shrank to 1.6 mil ion pounds in 2018, 33% less than 2017, and declined to 173,875 pounds in 2019.88 For the fourth quarter of 2020, EIA reported it “could not publicly release data for U.S. production of uranium concentrate (U3O8) in the fourth quarter of 2020. Domestic uranium production has declined considerably in recent years, and activity did not reach a threshold where a specific production figure could be published without violating the protections that EIA has committed to provide.”89 85 CRS Analyst Lance Larson contributed to this section. 86 Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of T echnology Evaluation, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Uranium, ” 83 Federal Register 35204, July 25, 2018. 87 Energy Fuels, “Energy Fuels and Ur-Energy Jointly File Section 232 Petition with U.S. Commerce Department to Investigate Effects of Uranium Imports on U.S. National Security,” press release, January 16, 2018. 88 Energy Information Administration (EIA), Domestic Uranium Production Report - Quarterly, February 13, 2020. 89 Energy Information Administration (EIA), Domestic Uranium Production Report - Quarterly, February 22, 2021. Congressional Research Service 18 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress Kazakhstan accounted for approximately 42~~import-tariffs.~~
~~90 Doug Palmer and Megan Cassella, “U.S. allies warn of retaliation if Trump imposes auto tariffs,” PoliticoPro, July~~
~~19, 2018.~~
~~91 GT Staff, “Coalition Launches Campaign to Oppose Section 232 Auto Tariffs,” GlobalTrade Magazine, September~~
~~4, 2018, http://www.globaltrademag.com/global-trade-daily/coalition-launches-campaign-to-oppose-section-232-auto-~~
~~tariffs.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~link to page 42~~ ~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~pressure trade negotiating partners as the President continues to threaten auto tariffs.92 For~~
~~example, since the initiation of trade negotiations with the EU, the President has repeatedly~~
~~threatened to impose tariffs on U.S. auto imports in the absence of progress on the negotiations.93~~
~~The EU has reportedly drafted a list of targets for retaliatory tariffs if the Administration moves~~
~~forward with auto tariffs under Section 232.94 However, the president’s continued ability to~~
~~impose tariffs under the 2018 investigation is unclear after recent court rulings stating that~~
~~“temporal restrictions on the President’s power to take action pursuant to a [Commerce] report~~
~~and recommendation by the Secretary is not a mere directory guideline, but a restriction that~~
~~requires strict adherence.”95~~
~~Commerce submitted the final Section 232 report to the President on February 17, 2019, but the~~
~~report has not been publicly released.96 Some trade policy experts and Members have suggested~~
~~that the deadline by which President Trump may act under the current Section 232 report expired~~
~~in November 2019;97 the Administration disagrees.98 Some Members have asked for the report to~~
~~be made public, and the Cause of Action Institute sued Commerce to release the report after an~~
~~unsuccessful Freedom of Information Act request.99 On March 6, 2020, Senator Toomey and~~
~~other Members of Congress filed an amicus brief with the district court arguing, among other~~
~~things, that (1) Congress needed the report in order to exercise oversight over the authority it had~~
~~granted to the executive branch in Section 232; and (2) the President could not invoke executive~~
~~privilege to withhold disclosure of the document.100 The court has not issued a decision in the~~
~~case.~~
~~To compel the Administration to release the report, Congress included an amendment in the~~
~~Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (H.R. 1158; P.L. 116-93) mandating that Commerce~~
~~publish the report in the Federal Register and that it submit to Congress any portion of the report~~
~~that contains classified information.101 The Administration has yet to release the report. A legal~~
~~opinion by the Department of Justice cited executive privilege, noting that disclosure of the report~~
~~“would risk impairing ongoing diplomatic efforts to address a national-security threat and would~~
~~risk interfering with executive branch deliberations,” in apparent reference to ongoing~~

~~92 Jakob Hanke, et al., “Juncker and Trump’s transatlantic trade truce falters,” Politico, October 17, 2018.~~
~~93 “Trump threatens big tariffs on car imports from EU,” Reuters, January 22, 2020.~~
~~94 Jonathan Stearns and Irina Vilcu, “EU Ready to Target Caterpillar, Xerox If Trump Hits Cars, Official Says,”~~
Bloomberg, February 22, 2019.
~~95 See “Domestic Court Challenges” discussion of Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States.~~
~~96 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Statement from the Department of Commerce on Submission of Automobiles and~~
~~Automobile Parts Section 232 Report to the President,” Press Releases, February 17, 2019.~~
~~97 David Lawder, “Trump can no longer impose ‘Section 232’ auto tariffs after missing deadline: experts,” Reuters,~~
~~November 19, 2020, and https://twitter.com/SenToomey.~~
~~98 “Wilbur Ross Says U.S. Has Had Constructive Talks With German Automotive,” Bloomberg Markets, January 23rd,~~
~~2020.~~
~~99 Eliana Johnson and Andrew Restuccia, “Trump administration withholds report justifying ‘shock’ auto tariffs,”~~
PoliticoPro, March 20, 2019; Doug Palmer, “Watchdog group sues for release of Commerce auto tariff report,”
PoliticoPro, March 21, 2019.
~~100 Senator Toomey, “Toomey Leading Bipartisan Amicus Brief Supporting Lawsuit Seeking Release of Commerce~~
~~Department’s 232 Auto Report,” March 7, 2020, https://www.toomey.senate.gov/?p=op_ed&id=2591.~~
~~101 P.L. 116-93, Sec. 112.~~
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18

~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~negotiations with the EU and others.102 Several Members, including Senate Finance Chair Senator~~
~~Grassley have pushed back against the Administration’s refusal to release the report.103~~
~~Bills introduced in the House and Senate would require a report by the USITC on the economic~~
~~importance of domestic automotive manufacturing before the President could impose import~~
~~restrictions on the sector (S. 121, H.R. 1710).~~
~~Uranium104~~
~~Unlike the self-initiated investigations into steel, aluminum, and auto imports, the Trump~~
~~Administration opened two additional Section 232 investigations in response to industry~~
~~petitions. In July 2018, Commerce launched a Section 232 investigation into uranium imports in~~
~~response to a petition from two uranium producers (uranium mining and milling companies), and~~
~~after consulting with industry, government officials, and a public comment period.105 The~~
~~petitioners, the uranium producers Energy Fuels and Ur-Energy, requested limiting imports to~~
~~guarantee 25% of the U.S. nuclear fuel market for U.S. uranium producers, and “Buy American”~~
~~provisions for government purchases of uranium to bolster the industry.106~~
~~Compared to historical production, current uranium mining has become a relatively small-scale~~
~~industry in the United States. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports U.S.~~
~~production of uranium shrank to 1.6 million pounds in 2018, 33% less than 2017, and declined to~~
~~173,875 pounds in 2019.107 Kazakhstan accounted for 41~~% of the world’s production of uranium; % of the world’s production of uranium;
Canada and Canada and ~~Australia~~Australia together supplied roughly a quarter of the world’s production in supplied roughly a quarter of the world’s production in ~~2017.108~~2019.90 China China
made up made up 3.5% of worldwide uranium production in 2018.3.5% of worldwide uranium production in 2018.~~109~~91
In April In April, 2019, Commerce submitted its report to 2019, Commerce submitted its report to ~~the President~~President Trump, determining affirmatively that , determining affirmatively that
uranium imports threaten to impair U.S. national security.uranium imports threaten to impair U.S. national security.~~110~~92 In July, the President expressed In July, the President expressed
concerns regarding national security, concerns regarding national security, ~~calling~~cal ing for a “fuller analysis of national security considerations with respect to the entire nuclear fuel supply chain.” The White House memorandum established a Nuclear Fuel Working Group, co-chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, with representatives from other executive branch agencies. The working group was directed to “examine the current state of domestic nuclear fuel production to reinvigorate the entire nuclear fuel supply chain.”93 In April 2020, the Department of Energy (DOE) released a report titled “Strategy to Restore American Nuclear Energy Leadership” containing policy recommendations to revive the domestic uranium industry and drive U.S. exports, among other recommendations.94 Titanium Sponge In March 2019, Commerce launched another Section 232 investigation in response to a petition from a U.S. titanium firm.95 In explaining the investigation, the Commerce Secretary stated, “Titanium sponge has uses in a wide range of defense applications, from helicopter blades and tank armor to fighter jet airframes and engines.”96 Titanium Metals Corporation (known as Timet) indefinitely idled production of titanium sponge at its Nevada facility in 2020, though it is unclear whether the company has permanently ceased sponge production in the United States.97 Timet cited declining sales due to the COVID-19 pandemic as a reason.98 The United Steelworkers urged Congress and the Trump Administration in 2020 to save the Timet facility from permanent closure, arguing that without capacity to produce titanium sponge domestical y the national defense and critical infrastructure of the 90 World Nuclear Association, World Uranium Mining Production, December 2020, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx. 91 Ad Hoc Utilities Group, “Domestic Uranium Quotas T hreaten America’s Economy, Energy, and Security”. 92 T he ~~for a “fuller analysis of national security~~

~~102 Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General Office Legal Counsel, “Publication of a Report to the President on the~~
~~Effect of Automobile and Automobile-Part Imports on the National Security,” January 17, 2020,~~
~~https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/file/1236426/download.~~
~~103 “Grassley says he intends to ‘pursue’ release of Section 232 autos report,” Inside U.S. Trade, February 11, 2020;~~
~~Doug Palmer, “Toomey blasts Commerce decision not to release auto report,” PoliticoPro, January 21, 2020; letter~~
~~from New Democrat Coalition to Pres. Trump dated February 13, 2020.~~
~~104 CRS Analyst Lance Larson contributed to this section.~~
~~105 Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Technology Evaluation, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice of~~
~~Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Uranium,” 83~~ ~~Federal~~
~~Register~~ ~~35204, July 25, 2018.~~
~~106 Energy Fuels, “Energy Fuels and Ur-Energy Jointly File Section 232 Petition with U.S. Commerce Department to~~
~~Investigate Effects of Uranium Imports on U.S. National Security,” press release, January 16, 2018,~~
~~http://www.energyfuels.com/news-pr/energy-fuels-ur-energy-jointly-file-section-232-petition-u-s-commerce-~~
~~department-investigate-effects-uranium-imports-u-s-national-security/.~~
~~107 Energy Information Administration (EIA), Domestic Uranium Production Report - Quarterly, February 13, 2020.~~
~~[not finding content on EIA site, suggest we omit URL. Or could it now be in annual report??]~~
~~108 World Nuclear Association, World Uranium Mining Production, August 2019, http://www.world-nuclear.org/~~
~~information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx.~~
~~109 Ad Hoc Utilities Group, “Domestic Uranium Quotas Threaten America’s Economy, Energy, and Security,”~~
~~https://www.ahuguranium.com/.~~
~~110 The~~ White House, Memorandum on the Effect of Uranium Imports on the National Security and Establishment of White House, Memorandum on the Effect of Uranium Imports on the National Security and Establishment of
the United States Nuclearthe United States Nuclear Fuel Working Group,Fuel Working Group, Presidential MemorandumPresidential Memorandum , July 12, 2019, , July 12, 2019,
https://https://~~www.whitehouse~~trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-effect.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-effect -uranium-imports-national-security--uranium-imports-national-security-
establishmentestablishment -united-states-nuclear-fuel-working-group/-united-states-nuclear-fuel-working-group/ . 93 Ibid. 94 U.S. Department of Energy, “ Strategy to Restore American Nuclear Energy Leadership,” April 23, 2020, https://www.energy.gov/strategy-restore-american-nuclear-energy-leadership. For more information on uranium enrichment, see CRS Report R45753, The Front End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Current Issues, by Lance N. Larson and CRS In Focus IF11505, Uranium Reserve Program Proposal: Policy Im plications, by Lance N. Larson . 95 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of T itanium Sponge,” 84 Federal Register 8503, March 8, 2019. 96 U.S. Department of Commerce press release, March 2019, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/03/us-department-commerce-initiates-section-232-investigation-titanium. 97 Orla O'Sullivan, “Last U.S. T itanium Sponge Maker Exits: T imet Cites Covid-19, not Section 232 Denial,” Metal Bulletin Daily, September 15, 2020. Note that producers idle facilities so that they can be started if supported by market conditions. 98 Gary Martin and Jonathan Ng, “Henderson T IMET Plan Workers Seeking Federal Help to Prevent Closure,” The Las Vegas Review Journal, August 3, 2020, https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/henderson/henderson -timet -plant-workers-seeking-federal-help-to-prevent-closure-2087819/. Congressional Research Service 19 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress United States would be compromised.99 Timet was the sole producer in the United States after Al egheny Technologies, Inc (ATI) idled its titanium sponge production plant in Utah in 2016.100 The United States.
~~Congressional Research Service~~
19

~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~considerations with respect to the entire nuclear fuel supply chain.” The White House~~
~~memorandum established a Nuclear Fuel Working Group, co-chaired by the Assistant to the~~
~~President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy,~~
~~with representatives from other executive branch agencies. The working group was directed to~~
~~“examine the current state of domestic nuclear fuel production to reinvigorate the entire nuclear~~
~~fuel supply chain.”111 In April 2020, the working group released its “Strategy to Restore~~
~~American Nuclear Energy Leadership” containing ideas to revive the uranium industry and drive~~
~~U.S. exports, among other recommendations.112~~
~~Titanium Sponge~~
~~In March 2019, Commerce launched another Section 232 investigation in response to a petition~~
~~from a U.S. titanium firm.113 In explaining the investigation, the Commerce Secretary stated,~~
~~“Titanium sponge has uses in a wide range of defense applications, from helicopter blades and~~
~~tank armor to fighter jet airframes and engines.”114~~
~~Titanium Metals Corporation (known as Timet) is currently the only producer of titanium sponge~~
~~in the United States; U.S.~~ Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that titanium sponge Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that titanium sponge
manufacturing manufacturing employed 150 workers in employed 150 workers in ~~2019.115 In 2016, there were three such producers.116 For~~
~~2019, and the United States was 86% import~~ 2020.101 For 2019 and 2020, the United States was more than 50% import-reliant for titanium sponge, reliant for titanium sponge, updown from 73% from 73% ~~the~~
~~previous year.117~~in 2018.102 In 2019, Japan was the biggest supplier of titanium sponge to the United States, In 2019, Japan was the biggest supplier of titanium sponge to the United States,
accounting for accounting for ~~more than 90~~89% of sponge imports; Kazakhstan was the second-leading supplier, % of sponge imports; Kazakhstan was the second-leading supplier,
making up making up 810% of imported titanium sponge.% of imported titanium sponge.~~118~~ 103 Although China was the world’s largest producer Although China was the world’s largest producer
of titanium sponge, producing of titanium sponge, producing 84110 thousand thousand tons in tons in ~~2019~~2020, it is , it is ~~not~~general y not considered an important source of sponge an important source of sponge
imports for the United States.imports for the United States.~~119~~104 In its In its Section 232 petition, Timet voiced concern that without protection, 232 petition, Timet voiced concern that without protection,
the U.S. defense and aerospace industries could become dependent on titanium sponge imports the U.S. defense and aerospace industries could become dependent on titanium sponge imports
from “risky” sources such as China or Russia. Furthermore, the company noted that China is not from “risky” sources such as China or Russia. Furthermore, the company noted that China is not
certified as a producer of premium grade titanium sponge used in rotating parts of jet engines.certified as a producer of premium grade titanium sponge used in rotating parts of jet engines.~~120~~

~~111 Ibid.~~
~~112 U.S. Department of Energy, “Strategy to Restore American Nuclear Energy Leadership,” April 23, 2020,~~
~~https://www.energy.gov/strategy-restore-american-nuclear-energy-leadership. For more information on uranium~~
~~enrichment, see CRS Report R45753, The Front End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Current Issues, by Lance N. Larson.~~
~~113 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security~~
~~Investigation of Imports of Titanium Sponge,” 84 Federal Register 8503, March 8, 2019.~~
~~114 U.S. Department of Commerce press release, March 2019, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/~~
~~03/us-department-commerce-initiates-section-232-investigation-titanium.~~
~~115 USGS, Titanium and Titanium Dioxide Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2020, https://minerals.usgs.gov/~~
~~minerals/pubs/commodity/titanium/.~~
~~116 USGS, Titanium Minerals Yearbook, January 2020, Table 2, p. 79.7., https://prd-wret.s3-us-west-~~
~~2.amazonaws.com/assets/palladium/production/atoms/files/myb1-2016-titan.pdf~~
~~117 USGS, Titanium and Titanium Dioxide Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2020,~~
~~https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2020/mcs2020-titanium.pdf.~~
~~118 Global Trade Atlas, based on U.S. import statistics for 8108.20.0010, Titanium Sponge.~~
~~119 USGS, Titanium and Titanium Dioxide Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2020, https://minerals.usgs.gov/~~
~~minerals/pubs/commodity/titanium/.~~
~~120 Petition of the Titanium metals Corporation Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 for relief from~~
~~Imports of Titanium Sponge that Threaten National Security, September 27, 2018, p.19, https://www.timet.com/assets/~~
~~local/documents/petition/Titanium-Sponge-232-Petition-Executive-Summary.pdf.~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~Commerce submitted its report to the President in November 2019, but has not released it to~~
~~Congress or to the public.121 On February 27, 2020, the President announced that he agreed with~~
~~the Commerce finding that titanium sponge imports threaten to impair national security and also~~
~~with the Commerce recommendation not to adjust imports.122 Similar to the uranium case, the~~
~~White House memorandum established a working group, in this case co-chaired by the Secretary~~
~~of Defense and the Secretary of Commerce with heads from other executive branch agencies. The~~
~~working group is~~ 105 Commerce submitted its report to President Trump in November 2019, but has not released it to Congress or to the public.106 On February 27, 2020, President Trump announced that he agreed with the Commerce finding that titanium sponge imports threaten to impair national security and also with the Commerce recommendation not to adjust imports.107 Similar to the uranium case, the White House memorandum established a working group, the Titanium Sponge Working Group (TSWG), in this case co-chaired by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Commerce with heads from other executive branch agencies.108 The TSWG is to develop recommendations to help ensure access to titanium sponge in the United States for use for national defense and in critical industries during an emergency. In December 2020, the TSWG issued a Federal Register notice seeking public comment to inform its deliberations.109 The 99 Letter from T homas Conway, International President, United Steelworkers, to Honorable Donald J. T rump, President of the United States, September 21, 2020, https://www.usw.org/blog/2021/march/20-09-21-USW-urges-administrative-action-to-protect-US-titanium-supply-chain.pdf. 100 Katie Benchina Olsen, “AT I Idles Utah T itanium Sponge Facility,” MetalMiner, September 7, 2017; also see, USGS, Titanium Minerals Yearbook, January 2020, T able 2, p. 79.7., https://prd-wret.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/assets/palladium/production/atoms/files/myb1-2016-titan.pdf. 101 USGS, Titanium and Titanium Dioxide Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2021, https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/titanium/. 102 USGS, Titanium and Titanium Dioxide Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2021, https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2021/mcs2021 -titanium.pdf. 103 USGS, Titanium Mineral Industry Surveys, Fourth Quarter 2019, https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/titanium-statistics-and-information. 104 USGS, Titanium and Titanium Dioxide Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2021, https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/titanium/. 105 Petition of the Titanium Metals Corporation Under Section 232 of the T rade Expansion Act o f 1962 for relief from Imports of T itanium Sponge that T hreaten National Security, September 27, 2018, p.19, https://www.timet.com/assets/local/documents/petition/Titanium-Sponge-232-Petition-Executive-Summary.pdf. 106 BIS, Section 232 Investigations: T he Effects on Imports on National Security, https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/other-areas/office-of-technology-evaluation-ote/section-232-investigations. 107 T he White House, Memorandum on the Effect of Titanium Sponge Imports on the National Security, February 27, 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-effect -titanium-sponge-imports-national-security/. 108 Bureau of Industry and Security, “Notice of Request for Public Comments by the T itanium Sponge Working Group,” 85 Federal Register 79464-79466, December 10, 2020. 109 Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security, "Notice of Request for P ublic Comments by the T itanium Sponge Working Group," 85 Federal Register 79464, December 10, 2020. Congressional Research Service 20 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress working group is also to meet with counterpart agencies in Japan to “agree upon measures to ensure to meet with counterpart agencies in Japan to “agree upon measures to ensure
access to titanium sponge in the United States for use for national defense and critical industries access to titanium sponge in the United States for use for national defense and critical industries
in an emergency.”in an emergency.”~~123~~110 Furthermore, Furthermore, ~~the President~~President Trump instructed the Secretary of Defense “to take instructed the Secretary of Defense “to take ~~all~~
al appropriate action… to increase access to titanium sponge for use for national defense and critical appropriate action… to increase access to titanium sponge for use for national defense and critical
industries and to support domestic production capacity for the production of titanium industries and to support domestic production capacity for the production of titanium sponge to sponge to
meet national defense requirements.”meet national defense requirements.”~~124 Timet is reportedly satisfied with the result of the~~
~~investigation.125~~111
Transformers and ~~Components126~~Components112
On May 4, 2020, Commerce self-initiated a Section 232 investigation into whether imports of On May 4, 2020, Commerce self-initiated a Section 232 investigation into whether imports of
certain electrical transformers or their parts, including laminations and cores made of grain-certain electrical transformers or their parts, including laminations and cores made of grain-
oriented electrical steel (GOES), threaten to impair national security. The existing Section 232 oriented electrical steel (GOES), threaten to impair national security. The existing Section 232
steel tariffs included the expanded derivative products and do not cover GOES derivative steel tariffs included the expanded derivative products and do not cover GOES derivative
products, which had raised concerns among some Members of Congress who products, which had raised concerns among some Members of Congress who ~~called~~cal ed the tariffs the tariffs
insufficient. They also argue that some firms had avoided tariffs by increasing imports of such insufficient. They also argue that some firms had avoided tariffs by increasing imports of such
derivative products from Mexico and Canada, which do not presently face tariff restrictions.derivative products from Mexico and Canada, which do not presently face tariff restrictions.~~127~~113
Canada contested the circumvention Canada contested the circumvention ~~allegation~~al egation in its submission to Commerce. Canadian officials in its submission to Commerce. Canadian officials
claimed that the North American supply chain was highly integrated, and that Canadian claimed that the North American supply chain was highly integrated, and that Canadian
component manufacturers source some GOES inputs from U.S. suppliers. Furthermore, they component manufacturers source some GOES inputs from U.S. suppliers. Furthermore, they
wrote, restriction of Canadian imports might “adversely affect” the integrated North American wrote, restriction of Canadian imports might “adversely affect” the integrated North American
electrical grid shared by the United States and Canada.electrical grid shared by the United States and Canada.~~128~~114 AK Steel, with manufacturing AK Steel, with manufacturing
operations in Pennsylvania and Ohio, is currently the sole domestic GOES producer.operations in Pennsylvania and Ohio, is currently the sole domestic GOES producer.~~129~~

~~121 BIS, Section 232 Investigations: The Effects on Imports on National Security, https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/~~
~~other-areas/office-of-technology-evaluation-ote/section-232-investigations.~~
~~122 The White House, Memorandum on the Effect of Titanium Sponge Imports on the National Security, February 27,~~
~~2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-effect-titanium-sponge-imports-national-~~
~~security/.~~
~~123 Ibid.~~
~~124 Ibid.~~
~~125 Doug Palmer, “Trump won't restrict titanium sponge imports in name of national security,” PoliticoPro, February~~
~~28, 2020.~~
~~126 CRS Analyst Brian E. Humphreys contributed to this section.~~
~~127 Senator Portman, “Portman, Brown, Casey Ask President Trump to Prioritize Electrical Steel in Trade Remedy,”~~
~~press release, March 8, 2018.~~
~~128 Government of Canada, Comments By the Government of Canada to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Request for~~
~~Comment: The Effect of Imports of Laminations for Staked Cores for Incorporation Into Transformers, Stacked Cores~~
~~for Incorporation Into Transformers, Wound Cores for Incorporation Into Transformers, and Transformer Regulators,~~
~~An Investigation Under Section 232(B) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended U.S. Federal Register,~~
~~Washington, DC, July 2, 2020, p. 15.~~
~~129 Representative Mike Kelly, “Reps. Kelly and Balderson Urge President Trump to Protect AK Steel, the Last~~
~~Remaining U.S. Electrical Steel Producer,” press release, March 6, 2020.~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~GOES products are incorporated into transformers used in critical energy infrastructure. Risk~~
~~assessments for the U.S. energy infrastructure have generally focused on threats and hazards that~~
~~may disable or permanently damage large numbers of high-voltage electric-power transformers~~
~~(LPTs) that are critical to the movement of electricity. Because LPTs require long lead times for~~
~~their manufacture, transport, and installation, the loss of these systems for any reason may have~~
~~severe long-term consequences for electric reliability. Experts have expressed increasing concern~~
~~about the threat of coordinated cyberattacks through the nation's networked control systems that~~
~~might significantly impair the nation's electric grid by damaging LPTs and other bulk-power~~
~~equipment.130 Widely recognized cyber supply chain vulnerabilities may increase cybersecurity~~
~~risks to the electricity subsector.131~~
~~In 2016, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) directed the North American~~
~~Energy Reliability Corporation (NERC) to develop a new reliability standard to address supply~~
~~chain risk management issues affecting cybersecurity of bulk-power systems.132 The rule would~~
~~require industry stakeholders to formalize cybersecurity risk management and implement more~~
~~rigorous vetting of vendors and software, among other measures.133 In April 2020, FERC delayed~~
~~implementation of the rule to October 1, 2020, due to COVID-19 contingencies.134~~
~~An affirmative Section 232 investigation might block procurement of bulk-power systems from~~
~~certain foreign-owned vendors and subcontractors on national security grounds, rather than~~
~~allowing industry stakeholders to purchase these systems and then assume corporate~~
~~responsibility for carrying out risk mitigation measures mandated by applicable FERC reliability~~
~~standards. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and National Foreign Trade Council oppose potential~~
~~action to limit imports under Section 232 and instead advocate for use of AD/CVD to limit~~
~~targeted imports. There are currently duties assessed on transformer components imported from~~
~~South Korea. The Commerce investigation is ongoing.~~
~~Mobile Cranes135~~
~~On May 19, 2020, Commerce initiated an investigation on imports of mobile cranes136 on the~~
~~basis of a petition filed by the Manitowoc Company, Inc.137 In its December 2019 petition, the~~

~~130 For more information, see CRS Report R45312, Electric Grid Cybersecurity, by Richard J. Campbell.~~
~~131 For more information see, NIST Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management, https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cyber-supply-~~
~~chain-risk-management.~~
~~132 North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), Implementation Plan, Project 2016-03 Cyber Security~~
~~Supply Chain Risk Management Reliability Standard, July 2017, p. 2. NERC “is a not-for-profit international~~
~~regulatory authority whose mission is to assure the effective and efficient reduction of risks to the reliability and~~
~~security of the grid.... NERC is the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) for North America, subject to oversight by~~
~~the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and governmental authorities in Canada.” See NERC, “About~~
~~NERC”, https://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/default.aspx.~~
~~133 North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “Reliability Standards for the Bulk Electric Systems of North~~
~~America,” June 23, 2020.~~
~~134 U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Order Granting Deferred Implementation of Certain NERC~~
~~Reliability Standards, April 17, 2020, 171 FERC ¶ 61,052.~~
~~135 CRS Specialist Bill Canis contributed to this section.~~
~~136 Cranes are large machines that move heavy objects using a projecting beam. They are used to unload freight and~~
~~place bridge sections over highways, and in construction and manufacturing applications. Cranes can be either~~
~~stationary or mobile, with the latter mounted on wheels, crawler tracks, or trucks.~~
~~137 Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Technology Evaluation, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice of~~
~~Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Mobile Cranes,” 83~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~Wisconsin-based company asserted that lower-priced imports—particularly from Germany,~~
~~Austria, and Japan—and intellectual property infringement138—by a Chinese competitor—have~~
~~resulted in a 72% increase in imported cranes since 2014 and the closure of one of its two U.S.~~
~~production facilities.139~~
~~According to its petition, Manitowoc is the “dominant supplier of mobile cranes to the U.S.~~
~~military and has a long history of Department of Defense contract awards, having supplied a wide~~
~~number of rough-terrain and self-propelled cranes through the Defense Logistics Agency and~~
~~through direct sales to all military branches of service.”140~~115 GOES products are incorporated into transformers used in critical energy infrastructure. Risk assessments for the U.S. energy infrastructure have general y focused on threats and hazards that may disable or permanently damage large numbers of high-voltage electric-power transformers (LPTs) that are critical to the movement of electricity. Because LPTs require long lead times for their manufacture, transport, and instal ation, the loss of these systems for any reason may have severe long-term consequences for electric reliability. Experts have expressed increasing concern about the threat of coordinated cyberattacks through the nation's networked control systems that might significantly impair the nation's electric grid by damaging LPTs and other bulk-power equipment.116 Widely recognized cyber supply chain vulnerabilities may increase cybersecurity risks to the electricity subsector.117 110 T he White House, Memorandum on the Effect of Titanium Sponge Imports on the National Security, February 27, 2020. 111 Ibid. 112 CRS Analyst Brian E. Humphreys contributed to this section. 113 Senator Portman, “Portman, Brown, Casey Ask President T rump to Prioritize Electrical Steel in T rade Remedy,” press release, March 8, 2018. 114 Government of Canada, Comments By the Government of Canada to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Request for Comment: T he Effect of Imports of Laminations for Staked Cores for Incorporation Into Transformers, Stacked Cores for Incorporation Into T ransformers, Wound Cores for Incorporation Into T ransformers, a nd T ransformer Regulators, An Investigation Under Section 232(B) of the T rade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended U.S. Federal Register, Washington, DC, July 2, 2020, p. 15. 115 Representative Mike Kelly, “Reps. Kelly and Balderson Urge President T rump to Prot ect AK Steel, the Last Remaining U.S. Electrical Steel Producer,” press release, March 6, 2020. 116 For more information, see CRS Report R45312, Electric Grid Cybersecurity, by Richard J. Campbell. 117 For more information see, NIST Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management , https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cyber-supply-chain-risk-management . Congressional Research Service 21 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress In 2016, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) directed the North American Energy Reliability Corporation (NERC) to develop a new reliability standard to address supply chain risk management issues affecting cybersecurity of bulk-power systems.118 The rule would require industry stakeholders to formalize cybersecurity risk management and implement more rigorous vetting of vendors and software, among other measures.119 In April 2020, FERC delayed implementation of the rule to October 1, 2020, due to COVID-19 contingencies.120 In April 2021, the DOE issued a request for information related to cybersecurity risks in the grid supply chain.121 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and National Foreign Trade Council advocated for use of AD/CVD to limit targeted imports rather than Section 232 action. There are currently duties assessed on transformer components imported from South Korea. Commerce concluded its investigation and delivered its report to President Trump on October 16, 2020, but it has not been made public.122 In November 2020, the Trump Administration concluded consultations to address the transshipment of GOES. According to the then USTR, Mexico agreed to establish a monitoring system for exports of electrical transformer laminations and cores made of non-North American GOES to the United States. As a result, the Trump Administration stated that Mexico would not be subject to further Section 232 action.123 No other action against other countries was taken. Mobile Cranes124 On May 19, 2020, Commerce initiated an investigation on imports of mobile cranes125 on the basis of a petition filed by the Manitowoc Company, Inc.126 In its December 2019 petition, the Wisconsin-based company asserted that lower-priced imports—particularly from Germany, Austria, and Japan—and intel ectual property infringement127—by a Chinese competitor—have 118 North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), Implementation Plan, Project 2016-03 Cyber Security Supply Chain Risk Management Reliability Standard, July 2017, p. 2. NERC “is a not -for-profit international regulatory authority whose mission is to assure the effective and efficient reduction of risks to the reliability and security of the grid.... NERC is the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) for North America, subject to oversight by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and governmental authorities in Canada.” See NERC, “A bout NERC”, https://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/default.aspx. 119 North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “Reliability Standards for the Bulk Electric Systems of North America,” June 23, 2020. 120 U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Order Granting Deferred Implementation of Certain NERC Reliability Standards, April 17, 2020, 171 FERC ¶ 61,052. 121 Department of Energy, "Revocation of Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities," 08483 Federal Register, April 22, 2021. 122 According to email from BIS Congressional Affairs to CRS on April 2, 2021. 123 UST R, “ UST R Statement on Successful Conclusion of Steel Negotiations with Mexico,” press release, November 5, 2020. 124 CRS Specialist Bill Canis contributed to this section. 125 Cranes are large machines that move heavy objects using a projecting beam. T hey are used to unload freight and place bridge sections over highways, and in construction and manufacturing applications. Cranes can be either stationary or mobile, with the latter mounted on wheels, crawler tracks, or trucks. 126 Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of T echnology Evaluation, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Mobile Cranes,” 83 Federal Register 31439, May 26, 2020. 127 T he International T rade Commission found in May 2015 that a Chinese crane manufacturer had violated Manitowoc patents and trade secrets with regard to certain crawler cranes and excluded them from entry into the United States. In the Matter of Certain Crawler Cranes and Com ponents Thereof, Investigation No. 337-TA-887 1-4 (U.S. International Congressional Research Service 22 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress resulted in a 72% increase in imported cranes since 2014 and the closure of one of its two U.S. production facilities.128 According to its petition, Manitowoc is the “dominant supplier of mobile cranes to the U.S. military and has a long history of Department of Defense contract awards, having supplied a wide number of rough-terrain and self-propel ed cranes through the Defense Logistics Agency and through direct sales to al military branches of service.” The company asserts that in 2019, it The company asserts that in 2019, it
was the U.S. military’s exclusive supplier of was the U.S. military’s exclusive supplier of ~~all~~al -terrain and boom truck cranes, and supplied half -terrain and boom truck cranes, and supplied half
of the rough terrain cranes used by the services.of the rough terrain cranes used by the services.~~141~~ Manitowoc also said that its cranes are Manitowoc also said that its cranes are
essential to essential to “strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure” “strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure”
within the United States.within the United States.~~142 Manitowoc is seeking~~129 At the time, Manitowoc sought the imposition of duties on some imported the imposition of duties on some imported
mobile cranes, though notably mobile cranes, though notably ~~requests exclusions for~~excluded imports of its own mobile cranes imports of its own mobile cranes
manufactured in manufactured in Germany. Germany.
The crane industry The crane industry iswas split in its views on the Manitowoc petition: other mobile crane split in its views on the Manitowoc petition: other mobile crane
manufacturers and some crane users support the petition, while others have argued against it.manufacturers and some crane users support the petition, while others have argued against it.~~143~~130
Opponents to the Section 232 investigation, mostly those involved in crane rental, sales, and Opponents to the Section 232 investigation, mostly those involved in crane rental, sales, and
service, say that Kobelco and Tadano, two Japanese crane manufacturers that have invested in service, say that Kobelco and Tadano, two Japanese crane manufacturers that have invested in
U.S. factories, make more reliable equipment with regards to safety, quality, service, and U.S. factories, make more reliable equipment with regards to safety, quality, service, and
reliability,reliability, and are more competitively priced than their Manitowoc counterparts.and are more competitively priced than their Manitowoc counterparts.~~144~~131 One Texas One Texas
crane importer asserted thatcrane importer asserted that, Manitowoc has not invested in its plants or in innovation through Manitowoc has not invested in its plants or in innovation through
research and development (R&D) since the early 1990s, so that demand for its product has research and development (R&D) since the early 1990s, so that demand for its product has
diminished.132 In August 2020, the company stated that it was no longer requesting tariffs as a remedy and that “the most effective remedy would be for the President to take concrete steps to stimulate demand.”133 The firm later withdrew its petition and the investigation was halted.134 Vanadium135 On May 28, 2020, Commerce, in response to a petition, initiated an investigation to determine the effects on U.S. national security from imports of vanadium.136 Vanadium is a metal used in the T rade Commission). 128~~diminished.145 The investigation is ongoing.~~

Federal Register 31439, May 26, 2020.
~~138 The International Trade Commission found in May 2015 that a Chinese crane manufacturer had violated Manitowoc~~
~~patents and trade secrets with regard to certain crawler cranes and excluded them from entry into the United States.~~ In
~~the Matter of Certain Crawler Cranes and Components Thereof, Investigation No. 337-TA-887 1-4 (U.S. International~~
~~Trade Commission).~~
~~139~~ While the company headquarters and engineering remain in Wisconsin, its sole crawler While the company headquarters and engineering remain in Wisconsin, its sole crawler crane manufacturing facility crane manufacturing facility
waswas moved in 2016 to Shady Grove, Penn. Manitowoc Company, Inc., moved in 2016 to Shady Grove, Penn. Manitowoc Company, Inc., Petition of the Manitowoc ~~Company~~Com pany, Inc. under
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 for the Relief from ~~Imports~~ Im ports of Mobile Cranes that Threaten National
Security, DecemberDecember 19, 2019. 19, 2019.
~~140 Ibid.~~
~~141 Ibid.~~
~~142~~129 Ibid. Ibid.
~~143~~130 D. Ann Shiffler, “Global crane community responds to Manitowoc petition for tariffs,” D. Ann Shiffler, “Global crane community responds to Manitowoc petition for tariffs,” International Cranes and
Specialized Transport, July 18, 2020, at https://www.khl.com/international-cranes-and-specialized-transport/global-, July 18, 2020, at https://www.khl.com/international-cranes-and-specialized-transport/global-
crane-community-responds-to-manitowocs-petition-for-tariffs/145129.article. crane-community-responds-to-manitowocs-petition-for-tariffs/145129.article.
~~144~~131 Public comments of Scott Cummins, CEO of Scott Equipment Company, LLC, July 17, 2020, Public comments of Scott Cummins, CEO of Scott Equipment Company, LLC, July 17, 2020,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2020-0009-0008. https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2020-0009-0008.
~~145~~132 Public comments of Don Udelson, President of G.P., Lift Source Public comments of Don Udelson, President of G.P., Lift Source Machinery, Machinery, ~~LTD.,~~
LT D., https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2020-0009-0025. https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2020-0009-0025.
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~Vanadium146~~
~~On May 28, 2020, Commerce, in response to a petition, initiated an investigation to determine the~~
~~effects on U.S. national security from imports of vanadium.147 Vanadium is a metal used in the~~
~~production of metal alloys~~133 D.Ann Shiffler, “New president said Manitowoc does not support tariffs on crane imports,” American Cranes & Transport, August 11, 2020. 134 Isabelle Icso, “Commerce terminates Section 232 probe into mobile crane imports,” Inside U.S. Trade, December 4, 2020. 135 CRS Analyst Brandon S. T racy contributed to this section. 136 Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of T echnology Evaluation, U.S. Department of Com merce, “Notice of Congressional Research Service 23 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress production of metal al oys, and is designated a critical mineral by the Department of the , and is designated a critical mineral by the Department of the
Interior.Interior.~~148~~137 Vanadium is most often used as a strengthening agent for steel and is Vanadium is most often used as a strengthening agent for steel and is ~~especially~~especial y valued valued
for its strength-to-weight ratio.for its strength-to-weight ratio.~~149 Uses potentially~~138 Uses potential y important for national security include the important for national security include the
manufacture of components of aircraft, jet engines, manufacture of components of aircraft, jet engines, ~~ballistic~~bal istic missiles, and batteries for energy missiles, and batteries for energy
storage.storage.~~150~~139 Vanadium is also used in the manufacture of steel Vanadium is also used in the manufacture of steel ~~alloys~~al oys, which are commonly sold as , which are commonly sold as
steel plate, sheet, beams, bars, pipes, and tubes, among others, and can be used as a catalyst for steel plate, sheet, beams, bars, pipes, and tubes, among others, and can be used as a catalyst for
the production of some acids. Other minerals can often serve as substitutes for vanadium. the production of some acids. Other minerals can often serve as substitutes for vanadium.
AMG Vanadium (Cambridge, OH) AMG Vanadium (Cambridge, OH)~~151~~140 and U.S. Vanadium, LLC (Hot Springs, AR) and U.S. Vanadium, LLC (Hot Springs, AR)~~152~~141 filed the 232 filed the 232
petition. The petitioners assert that the U.S. vanadium industry is “adversely impacted by unfairly petition. The petitioners assert that the U.S. vanadium industry is “adversely impacted by unfairly
priced imports, limited exported markets due to value-added-tax regimes, and the distortionary priced imports, limited exported markets due to value-added-tax regimes, and the distortionary
effects of Chinese and Russian industrial policies.”effects of Chinese and Russian industrial policies.”~~153~~142 AMG Vanadium AMG Vanadium and other U.S. producers and other U.S. producers
of ferrovanadium are protected by antidumping orders on imports of ferrovanadium from China of ferrovanadium are protected by antidumping orders on imports of ferrovanadium from China
and South Africa that have been in place since 2003.and South Africa that have been in place since 2003.~~154~~143
Opponents of the Section 232 investigation point out that there is no primary production of Opponents of the Section 232 investigation point out that there is no primary production of
vanadium in the United States, and that both of the U.S. petitioners rely on secondary sources of vanadium in the United States, and that both of the U.S. petitioners rely on secondary sources of
vanadium, including imports of spent catalysts from oil refiners, fly ash from industrial boilers vanadium, including imports of spent catalysts from oil refiners, fly ash from industrial boilers
and power plants, and vanadium-bearing steelmaking slag.and power plants, and vanadium-bearing steelmaking slag.~~155~~144 Another U.S. manufacturer that uses Another U.S. manufacturer that uses
vanadium pentoxide to produce ferrovanadium, objected to any Section 232 action because the vanadium pentoxide to produce ferrovanadium, objected to any Section 232 action because the
limited production of vanadium pentoxide in the United States makes it necessary to rely on limited production of vanadium pentoxide in the United States makes it necessary to rely on

~~146 CRS Analyst Brandon S. Tracy contributed to this section.~~
~~147 Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Technology Evaluation, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice of~~
~~Request for Public~~ vanadium imports for its feedstock. The company suggested that if the investigation resulted in tariffs on al vanadium imports, it could critical y reduce the amount of vanadium available for steelmaking.145 Other downstream producers, including manufacturers of vanadium flow batteries Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Vanadium,” 85Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Vanadium,” 85 Federal
Register 34179, June 3, 2020. 34179, June 3, 2020.
~~148~~137 Office of the Secretary, Interior, “Final List of Critical Minerals 2018,” 83 Office of the Secretary, Interior, “Final List of Critical Minerals 2018,” 83 Federal Register 23295, May 18, 2018. 23295, May 18, 2018.
~~149~~138 U.S. U.S. Vanadium,Vanadium, LLC, https://usvanadium.com. LLC, https://usvanadium.com.
~~150~~139 “U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur “U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur ~~Ross~~ Ross Initiates Section 232 Investigation into Imports of Vanadium,” Press Initiates Section 232 Investigation into Imports of Vanadium,” Press
Release,Release, June 2, 2020. June 2, 2020.
~~151 AMG Vanadium~~ 140 AMG Vanadium reclaims spent steel refinery and other vanadium-bearing residues,reclaims spent steel refinery and other vanadium-bearing residues, which it converts to which it converts to
ferrovanadium as wellferrovanadium as well as as a ferronickel-molybdenum alloy that are marketed and sold to the carbona ferronickel-molybdenum alloy that are marketed and sold to the carbon and stainless steel and stainless steel
industries;industries; ~~AMG~~ AMG Vanadium,Vanadium, https://amg-v.com/. https://amg-v.com/.
~~152 U.S. Vanadium LLC is~~ 141 U.S. Vanadium LLC is a processor of vanadium that makes higha processor of vanadium that makes high -purity vanadium oxides and downstream vanadium -purity vanadium oxides and downstream vanadium
chemicals that it markets to the catalyst, chemical, titanium, and energy storage industries.chemicals that it markets to the catalyst, chemical, titanium, and energy storage industries. U.S. VanadiumU.S. Vanadium LLC, LLC,
https://usvanadium.com/news/f/us-vanadium-llc-announces-agreementhttps://usvanadium.com/news/f/us-vanadium-llc-announces-agreement -to-acquire-evraz-stratcor. -to-acquire-evraz-stratcor.
~~153~~142 Department of Commerce, “U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross Department of Commerce, “U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross Initiates Section 232 Investigation on Imports Initiates Section 232 Investigation on Imports
of Vanadium,”of Vanadium,” Press Release,Press Release, June 2, 2020. June 2, 2020.
~~154~~143 International International ~~Trade~~T rade Administration, Department of Commerce, “Notice of Antidumping Order: Ferrovanadium from Administration, Department of Commerce, “Notice of Antidumping Order: Ferrovanadium from
the Republicthe Republic of South Africa,” 68 of South Africa,” 68 Federal Register 4169, January 28, 2003, and “Notice of Amended Final 4169, January 28, 2003, and “Notice of Amended Final
Antidumping Duty Determination of Sales at Less than Fair ValueAntidumping Duty Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order: Ferrovanadium from and Antidumping Duty Order: Ferrovanadium from
the People’s Republicthe People’s Republic of China,” 68 of China,” 68 Federal Register 4168, January 28, 2003. In these antidumping orders, the scope 4168, January 28, 2003. In these antidumping orders, the scope
includedincluded all ferrovanadium, but specifically excludedall ferrovanadium, but specifically excluded all vanadium additives, suchall vanadium additives, such as nitride vanadium, vanadiumas nitride vanadium, vanadium --
aluminum master alloys, vanadium chemicals, vanadium oxides, vanadium waste and scrap, and vanadiumaluminum master alloys, vanadium chemicals, vanadium oxides, vanadium waste and scrap, and vanadium -bearing raw -bearing raw
materials (slag,materials (slag, boiler residues,boiler residues, and fly ash). and fly ash).
~~155~~144 Julie Julie C. Mendoza et al., C. Mendoza et al., Comments of Bushveld Minerals, Limited, Morris, Manning & Martin LLP, Section 232 , Morris, Manning & Martin LLP, Section 232
National Security Investigation of Imports of Vanadium, JulyNational Security Investigation of Imports of Vanadium, July 20, 2020, 20, 2020,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2020-0002-0013https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2020-0002-0013. 145 Comments of David F. Carey, General Manager, Bear Metallurgical Company, July 20, 2020, https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2020-0002-0015. .
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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link to page link to page 3130 link to page 33 link to page 33 link to page 46 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

~~vanadium imports for its feedstock. The company suggested that if the investigation resulted in~~
~~tariffs on all vanadium imports, it could critically reduce the amount of vanadium available for~~
~~steelmaking.156 Other downstream producers, including manufacturers of vanadium flow batteries~~
~~and of titanium mill products for the aerospace industry, also opposed the Section 232 measure.157~~
~~The investigation is ongoing.~~
~~Section 232 Tariffs and International Trade158~~
~~The Trump Administration’s increased~~ and of titanium mil products for the aerospace industry, also opposed the Section 232 measure.146 Commerce concluded its investigation and delivered its report to President Biden on February 22, 2021; it has not been made public.147 President Biden has until May 23, 2021, to act if there was an affirmative finding. Section 232 Tariffs and International Trade148 Increased U.S. tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminum (10%) under Section tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminum (10%) under Section
232 currently affect 232 currently affect ~~$23.3 billion~~ $13.1 bil ion of U.S. annual of U.S. annual ~~import~~simports (Figure 4). The scale of imports affected by the actions fluctuated over the past several years with various changes by the Trump Administration since it first imposed the additional tariffs in March 2018. For example, in 2019, the Trump ~~(Figure 4), excluding countries currently~~
~~exempted from the additional tariffs. The scale of imports affected by the actions declined in~~
~~2019, as the~~ Administration exempted Canada and Mexico from increased tariffs on both Administration exempted Canada and Mexico from increased tariffs on both
metals—Canada and Mexico accounted for metals—Canada and Mexico accounted for ~~one-third~~40% of relevant U.S. steel and aluminum imports of relevant U.S. steel and aluminum imports
~~in 2019. However, in February~~. In 2020, President 2020, President Trump expanded the steel and aluminum tariffs to Trump expanded the steel and aluminum tariffs to
~~cover additional derivative products, and more significantly, on August 16, 2020, reinstated tariffs~~
~~on selected aluminum imports from Canada, accounting for $2.5 billion of annual U.S. imports.~~
~~The Trump Administration has also proposed or is investigating potential increased tariffs on~~
~~several additional products under Section 232 authority. Among these products, the most~~
~~economically significant are U.S. auto imports from the European Union ($62 billion in 2019).159~~
~~U.S.~~ cover additional derivative products.149 The Biden Administration is reviewing and could modify the various tariff increases enacted by the Trump Administration, including the existing Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum.150 U.S. trading partners have responded to the U.S. tariff actions with retaliatory tariffs on trading partners have responded to the U.S. tariff actions with retaliatory tariffs on
approximately approximately ~~$6.5 billion~~ $7.2 bil ion in U.S. annual exports (see in U.S. annual exports (see “Retaliatory Tariffs”). Figure 4. U.S. Trade Affected by Section 232 Tariffs in 2020 (U.S. dol ars) Source: CRS calculations with data from the U.S. Census Bureau sourced through Trade Data Monitor. Notes: Based on annual 2020 trade values. Excludes exempted countries. The outcome of the Commerce Department’s Section 232 investigation on vanadium has not been publicly released, but if the investigation found such imports pose a threat to U.S. national security, the President would have until May 23, 2021, to determine the appropriate response. As a result of an April 2021 Court of International Trade (CIT) decision invalidating President Trump’s expansion of the Section 232 tariffs to cover certain steel-derivative products, CBP could 146 See comments in https://regulations.gov, BIS-2020-0002. 147 According to email from BIS Congressional Affairs to CRS on April 2, 2021. 148 U.S. trade data cited throughout this section is from the U.S. Census Bureau accessed via T rade Data Monitor. Calculations based on products included in the Administration’s various tariff proclamations, and adjusted for exempted countries as noted. 149 In April 2021, the Court of International T rade (CIT ) determined that the presidential proclamation imposing the steel-derivative tariffs was “ invalid as contrary to law.” It also held that one importer was entitled to a refund of any duties it had already paid on those products under the proclamation. For more information on the tariffs on derivative products and court challenges, please see “ Proclamation Imposing T ariffs on Steel-Derivative Products” 150 T he outcome of the Commerce Department’s Section 232 investigation on vanadium has not been publicly released, but if the investigation found such imports pose a threat to U.S. national security, the President would have until late May 2021 to determine the appropriate response. Congressional Research Service 25 link to page 32 link to page 72 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress potential y refund duties that companies paid on the import of such products, lowering the total amount col ected. Steel and Aluminum Trade151 In 2020, total ”).

~~156 Comments of David F. Carey, General Manager, Bear Metallurgical Company, July 20, 2020,~~
~~https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2020-0002-0015.~~
~~157 See comments in https://regulations.gov, BIS-2020-0002.~~
~~158 U.S. trade data cited throughout this section is from the U.S. Census Bureau accessed via Trade Data Monitor.~~
~~Calculations based on products included in the Administration’s various tariff proclamations, and adjusted for~~
~~exempted countries as noted.~~
~~159 President Trump’s proclamation under Section 232 declaring auto and parts imports a national security threat,~~
~~focused on U.S. imports from the European Union and Japan. However, following the January 2020 entry into force of~~
~~the U.S.-Japan Trade Agreements, the Trump Administration has stated it has no intent to pursue auto tariffs with Japan~~
~~at this time. For more information, see CRS Report R46140, “Stage One” U.S.-Japan Trade Agreements, coordinated~~
~~by Brock R. Williams.~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~Figure 4. U.S. Trade Affected by Section 232 Tariffs~~
~~(U.S. dollars)~~

Source: CRS calculations with data from the U.S. Census Bureau sourced through Trade Data Monitor.
Notes: Based on annual 2019 trade values. Excludes exempted countries (aluminum imports from Canada under
~~HTS 760110 included). Motor vehicles and parts import figure includes only U.S. imports from the European~~
~~Union (EU). Proposed retaliatory tariffs consist of Canada’s proposed retaliation to the Trump Administration’s~~
~~reinstated tariffs on certain aluminum imports from Canada.~~
~~(*) Derivative data excludes two products covered by the expanded tariffs, notably 8HTS codes 87081030 and~~
~~87082921, because only a portion of 2019 trade under these product categories is subject to the tariff actions.~~
~~The USITC created new 10HTS codes for the covered products and data are available from February 2020.~~
~~Steel and Aluminum Trade160~~
~~In 2019,~~ U.S. imports of steel and aluminum products covered by the Section 232 tariffs U.S. imports of steel and aluminum products covered by the Section 232 tariffs totaled $16.5 bil ion and $12.2 bil ion, respectively.152~~totaled~~
~~$23.8 billion and $15.8 billion, respectively, including all U.S. trading partners.161~~ Over the past Over the past
decade, steel imports have decade, steel imports have fluctuated significantly, by value and quantityfluctuated significantly, by value and quantity~~. Imports~~, while imports of aluminum of aluminum
~~generally~~general y increased increased through 2017 (see Figure 5). Compared to 2017, the year before the additional tariffs took effect, ~~through 2018, but saw a slight decline in 2019. Compared to 2017,~~ imports of imports of
both metals have decreased, by value and quantityboth metals have decreased, by value and quantity~~. Steel~~, with particularly sharp declines in 2020 during the global pandemic and recession. Since 2017, steel imports have decreased imports have decreased ~~17.8%~~ 43.0% by value by value
~~(-$5.2 billion) and 24.0~~(-$12.5 bil ion) and 43.6% by quantity (-% by quantity (-~~8.3 million~~15.0 mil ion metric tons). Aluminum imports metric tons). Aluminum imports have have
decreased decreased 930.2% by value (-$.2% by value (-$~~1.6 billion), and 12.7~~5.3 bil ion), and 25.3% by quantity (-% by quantity (-~~0.9 million~~1.8 mil ion metric tons). metric tons).
U.S. imports from individual countries U.S. imports from individual countries have fluctuated since the tariffs went into effect (seefluctuated since the tariffs went into effect (see Appendix
D). When comparing . When comparing ~~2019~~2020 trade data to 2017, trade data to 2017, the year before the tariffs took effect, before the tariffs took effect, the largest declines in the largest declines in
U.S. steel imports were from U.S. steel imports were from ~~Turkey (-$995.1 million, -83.3%), the European Union (-$891.8~~
~~million, -14.9%), Russia (-$815.3 million, -57.6%), and South Korea (-$554.7 million, -19.9%),~~
~~with notable increases in trade from Brazil (+$248.9, +10.2%) and Mexico (+$173.4, +7.0%)~~the European Union (-$2,411.8 mil ion, -43.7%), South Korea (-$1,272.4 mil ion, -45.6%), Russia (-$1,266.6 mil ion, -86.7%), and Canada (-$1,223.7 mil ion, -23.6%), with no major trade partners seeing significant increases. .
The largest declines in aluminum imports were from Canada (-$1,The largest declines in aluminum imports were from Canada (-$1,~~410.9 million, -20.0~~413.8 mil ion, -20.1%), China %), China
(-$1,(-$1,~~099.4 million, -59.4~~277.9 mil ion, -69.1%), Russia (-$1,%), Russia (-$1,~~024.8 million, -62.8%), and Argentina (-$134.7 million,~~
~~-24.6~~237.8 mil ion, -75.8%), and the United Arab Emirates (- $595.3 mil ion, -42.8%). Aluminum imports increased by value from %). Aluminum imports increased by value from ~~Australia (+$361.1 million, +169.1%), the~~
~~European Union (+$581.6 million, +46.6%), and Turkey (+$195.6 million, +389.1%).~~

~~160 Data in this section from the U.S. Census Bureau accessed via Trade Data Monitor.~~
~~161 Figures include countries currently exempted from the Section 232 tariffs.~~
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~~The countries with permanent exclusions from the tariffs accounted for 52.5% of U.S. steel~~
~~imports in 2019 and 27.1% of U.S. aluminum imports.162~~
~~Figure 5. U.S. Steel and Aluminum Imports~~

Source: CRS compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data, based on the HTS codes listed in the 2018 Section 232
~~proclamations.~~
Notes: Data includes U.S. imports from all trading partners, but does not include derivative products.
~~As mentioned, in February 2020, the Administration declared that while steel and aluminum~~
~~imports decreased, a perceived~~Turkey (+$114.2 mil ion, +227.2%), Saudi Arabia (+$112.4 mil ion, +75.9%), and South Korea (+$102.5 mil ion, +91.9%). The countries with permanent exclusions from the tariffs accounted for 57.7% of U.S. steel imports and 51.6% of U.S. aluminum imports in 2020.153 151 Data in this section from the U.S. Census Bureau accessed via T rade Data Monitor. 152 Figures include countries currently exempted from the Section 232 tariffs. 153 Countries with permanent tariff exemptions for steel include Brazil, South Korea, Argentina, Australia, Canada and Mexico. Countries with permanent tariff exemptions for aluminum include Argentina, Australia, Canada and Mexico. Congressional Research Service 26 link to page 33 link to page 72 link to page 72 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress Figure 5. U.S. Steel and Aluminum Imports Source: CRS compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data, based on the HTS codes listed in the 2018 Section 232 proclamations. Notes: Data includes U.S. imports from al trading partners, but does not include derivative products. In February 2020, the Trump Administration declared that an increase in imports of certain derivatives of steel and aluminum increase in imports of certain derivatives of steel and aluminum
~~undermined~~were undermining the purpose of the Section 232 steel and the purpose of the Section 232 steel and aluminum actions.aluminum actions.~~163~~154 In response, In response, ~~the~~
~~President~~President Trump proclaimed tariffs on selected derivatives products, namely steel nails and aluminum proclaimed tariffs on selected derivatives products, namely steel nails and aluminum
wire, as wire, as ~~well~~ wel as certain automobile bumpers and body stampings for tractors made of steel and as certain automobile bumpers and body stampings for tractors made of steel and
aluminum. An examination of U.S. trade data shows that U.S. imports of both steel nails and aluminum. An examination of U.S. trade data shows that U.S. imports of both steel nails and
aluminum wire increased from 2017 to 2019 aluminum wire increased from 2017 to 2019 ~~(Figure 6).164 In 2019, the United States imported a~~
~~total of $347.6 million of steel nails, and $46.1 million of aluminum wire. In comparison to 2017,~~
~~imports of steel nails have increased by 37% ($94.1 million), while imports of aluminum wire~~
~~have increased by 104.6% ($23.5 million).~~

~~162 On August 16, 2020, the Trump Administration reinstated tariffs on aluminum imports from Canada under HTS~~
~~760110. The aluminum figure for exempted countries, reflects the fact that Canada is only partially exempted from the~~
~~Section 232 tariffs.~~
~~163 Presidential~~(Figure 6).155 For data on country-level trade on imports of steel, aluminum, derivative products, see Appendix D. 154 President T rump, Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020, “Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020, “Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and
Derivative Steel Articles Into the United StatesDerivative Steel Articles Into the United States,” https://go.usa.gov/xHW5J. 155.”
~~164~~ Historic data on U.S. Historic data on U.S. imports of bumpers (imports of bumpers (~~HTS~~HT S 87081030) and body stampings for tractors ( 87081030) and body stampings for tractors (~~HTS~~HT S 87082921) subject 87082921) subject
to the tariffs are not available, becauseto the tariffs are not available, because only a portion of trade under these product categories is covered by the tariff only a portion of trade under these product categories is covered by the tariff
actions. actions. ~~The USITC~~T he USIT C created two new created two new ~~10HTS~~ 10HT S codes for the covered products and data are available codes for the covered products and data are available ~~from February~~ f rom February 2020. 2020.
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Figure 6. U.S. Imports of Select Derivative Products

Source: CRS compiledCRS compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data for HTS codes listed in Presidentialfrom U.S. Census Bureau data for HTS codes listed in Presidential Proclamation 9980 Proclamation 9980
(January 24, 2020) on steel and aluminum derivative products. (January 24, 2020) on steel and aluminum derivative products.
Notes: U.S. imports U.S. imports, from al trading partners, of steel ~~of steel~~ and aluminum derivative products identified in and aluminum derivative products identified in ~~the Presidential~~ Presidential Proclamation 9980. Proclamation 9980.
Steel nails consist of HTS codes: 73170030, 7317005503, 7317005505, 7317005507, 7317005560, 7317005580, Steel nails consist of HTS codes: 73170030, 7317005503, 7317005505, 7317005507, 7317005560, 7317005580,
and 7317006560, and aluminum wireand 7317006560, and aluminum wire consists of HTS 76141050, 76149020, 76149040, and 76149050. Bumpers consists of HTS 76141050, 76149020, 76149040, and 76149050. Bumpers
(HTS 87081030) and body stampings for tractors (HTS 87082921) were also included in the new derivatives (HTS 87081030) and body stampings for tractors (HTS 87082921) were also included in the new derivatives
tariffs, but historicaltariffs, but historical data for the portion of these product data for the portion of these product ~~categories~~ categories covered by the tariffs are not available. As a result of an April 2021 Court of International Trade (CIT) decision invalidating President Trump’s expansion of the Section 232 tariffs to cover certain steel-derivative products, CBP could potential y refund duties that companies paid on the import of such products.~~covered by the tariffs are not available.~~
Retaliatory Tariffs
As noted above, several major U.S. trading partners who are As noted above, several major U.S. trading partners who are ~~challenging~~chal enging the Section 232 actions the Section 232 actions
on steel and aluminum in the WTO are imposing retaliatory tariffs (on steel and aluminum in the WTO are imposing retaliatory tariffs (~~see~~see Figure 7).~~165 Retaliatory~~
~~tariffs~~ 156 These tariffs are currently in effect on approximately $are currently in effect on approximately $~~6.5 billion~~ 7.2 bil ion of U.S. annual exports (of U.S. annual exports (~~2019~~2020 value). value).~~166~~
157 The scale and scope of annual U.S. exports targeted for retaliation declined significantly The scale and scope of annual U.S. exports targeted for retaliation declined significantly ~~during~~
~~the past year as~~ in 2019 when Canada and Mexico withdrew their Canada and Mexico withdrew their ~~retaliatory tariffs~~retaliation (covering U.S. exports of (covering U.S. exports of

~~165~~$14.1 bil ion in 2019) 156 Products targeted by retaliatory tariffs were identified in countries’ World Products targeted by retaliatory tariffs were identified in countries’ World ~~Trade~~T rade Organization notifications (China Organization notifications (China
(G/L/1218, March 29, 2018); India (G/L/1237/Rev 1, June(G/L/1218, March 29, 2018); India (G/L/1237/Rev 1, June 13, 2018); EU (G/L/1237, May 18, 2018); 13, 2018); EU (G/L/1237, May 18, 2018); ~~Turkey~~T urkey
(G/L/1242/Supplement 2, May 22, 2019); Russia(G/L/1242/Supplement 2, May 22, 2019); Russia (G/L/1241, May 22, 2018), and in the notices published by(G/L/1241, May 22, 2018), and in the notices published by ~~Canada,~~
~~Mexico, Russia, and India~~ the EU, Russia, India, and the UK on their own government websites. on their own government websites. ~~Canada: Department of Finance (Canada),~~
~~“Countermeasures in Response to Unjustified Tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum products,” June 29~~EU: European Commission, “Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/886,” Official Journal of the European Union, June 20, 2018, , 2018,
~~https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/programs/international-trade-finance-policy/measures-steel-aluminum-~~
~~businesses/countermeasures-response-unjustified-tariffs-canadian-steel-aluminum-products.html; Mexico: Ministry of~~
~~Finance (Mexico), Diario Oficial de la Federacion, June 5, 2018,~~
~~http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5525036&fecha=05/06/2018; Russia: Russian Federation, “~~https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A32018R0886 ;’ Russia: Russian Federation, “ Approval Approval
of rates of of rates of ~~import duties~~ imp ort duties in respect to certain goods from the United States,” Decision no. 788, July 6, 2018, in respect to certain goods from the United States,” Decision no. 788, July 6, 2018,
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201807060023; India: Ministry of Finance (India), Notification http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201807060023; India: Ministry of Finance (India), Notification
no. 17, June 15, 2019, https://www.cbic.gov.in/resources//htdocs-cbec/customs/cs-act/notifications/notfns-2019/cs-no. 17, June 15, 2019, https://www.cbic.gov.in/resources//htdocs-cbec/customs/cs-act/notifications/notfns-2019/cs-
tarr2019/cs17-2019.pdftarr2019/cs17-2019.pdf~~. Canada’s proposed retaliatory tariffs in response to the Trump Administration’s reinstatement~~
~~of Section 232 tariffs on certain aluminum products are available at https://www.canada.ca/en/department-~~
~~finance/programs/consultations/2020/notice-intent-impose-countermeasures-action-against-united-states-response-~~
~~tariffs-canadian-aluminum-products.html.~~
~~166 U.S.~~ ; United Kingdom: Department of International T rade (UK), “ UK Announces New Approach on US T ariffs,” December 8, 2020, press release, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-new-approach-on-us-tariffs. 157 U.S. exports are estimated using partner country import data in order to match trade values withexports are estimated using partner country import data in order to match trade values with retaliatory tariff retaliatory tariff
lists. lists.
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~~$14.1 billion in 2019)~~ following the Trump Administration’s following the Trump Administration’s ~~May 2019~~ decision to exempt both decision to exempt both
countries from Section 232 steel and aluminum duties. countries from Section 232 steel and aluminum duties. ~~The EU, however,~~In 2020, the EU slightly expanded its slightly expanded its
~~retaliatory tariffs~~retaliation (covering additional U.S. (covering additional U.S. exports of $31.7 mil ion)~~exports of $42 million in 2019), effective May 8,~~
~~2020~~, in response to the Trump Administration’s decision to expand the U.S. steel and aluminum , in response to the Trump Administration’s decision to expand the U.S. steel and aluminum
~~tariffs to derivative products.167 Most recently, Canada has announced new proposed retaliatory~~
~~tariffs on approximately $2.5 billion of U.S. exports, effective September 16, 2020, in response to~~
~~the Trump Administration’s decision to reinstate Section 232 tariffs on certain aluminum imports~~
~~from Canada. U.S. exports subject to retaliatory tariffs have declined significantly compared to~~
~~their 2017 pre-tariff levels, suggesting the tariffs have had a negative impact on several U.S.~~
~~industries (see “Retaliation”).~~
~~Figure 7. Retaliatory Actions by U.S. Trading Partners~~tariffs to derivative products.158 The EU also planned to enact a second stage of retaliation from June 1, 2021, but suspended this action as part of U.S.-EU negotiations on global overcapacity of both metals.159 If enacted, the second-stage EU tariffs would greatly increase the EU’s retaliation, both in terms of the tariff levels (e.g., from 25% to 50% on whiskies) and in terms of products covered (roughly double the current value of trade affected).160 Figure 7. Retaliatory Actions by U.S. Trading Partners, 2020

Source: CRS analysis of Trade Data Monitor trade data. Retaliatory tariff listsCRS analysis of Trade Data Monitor trade data. Retaliatory tariff lists sourced fromsourced from WTO notifications WTO notifications
and partner country notifications. See and partner country notifications. See ~~footnote 165~~footnote 156 for complete sourcing. for complete sourcing.
Notes: U.S. exports approximated by using partner country import U.S. exports approximated by using partner country import data. Steeldata. Steel and aluminum are among the top and aluminum are among the top
exports facing retaliation by severalexports facing retaliation by several U.S. trading partners as highlighted above. EU refers to the European Union and excludes the United Kingdom. (1) The EU expanded its tariffs to additional products in May 2020 in response to new U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum derivative products. (2) Turkey temporarily increased its retaliatory tariffs up to 140% in August 2018 in response to the Trump Administration’s tariff increase on Turkish steel to 50%, but in May 2019 both countries withdrew the additional increases. (3) India’s retaliatory tariffs were first announced in June 2018, but were repeatedly postponed until June 2019. (4) When the United Kingdom began its independent trade regime in January 2021, it maintained the Section 232 retaliation scheme previously implemented from 2018 as part of the EU. (5) Russia published its list of retaliatory tariff~~U.S. trading partners as highlighted above. Canada’s proposed retaliatory~~
~~tariffs are in response to the Trump Administration’s reinstatement of tariffs on selected aluminum imports from~~
~~Canada, effective August 16, 2020. They are to take effect September 16, 2020 and cover a value of U.S. exports~~
~~commensurate with the U.S. action.~~
~~(1) The EU expanded its retaliatory tariffs to cover additional products in May 2020 in response to the Trump~~
~~Administration’s expansion of U.S. tariffs to include steel and aluminum derivative products.~~

~~167 European Commission, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/502, April 6, 2020, https://eur-~~
~~lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020R0502&from=EN.~~
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~~(2) Turkey temporarily increased its retaliatory tariffs up to 140% in August 2018 in response to the Trump~~
~~Administration’s tariff increase on Turkish steel to 50%, but in May 2019 both countries withdrew the additional~~
~~increases.~~
~~(3) India’s retaliatory tariffs were first announced in June 2018, but were repeatedly postponed until June 2019.~~
~~(4) Russia published its list of retaliatory tariffs~~ rates and products on July 6, 2018. The tariffs appear to have rates and products on July 6, 2018. The tariffs appear to have
gone gone into effect within 30 days of the publication. 158 European Commission, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/502, April 6, 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/T XT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020R0502&from=EN. 159 European Commission, “Joint EU-US Statement on Addressing Global Steel and Aluminum Excess Capacity,” May 17, 2021, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2271. 160 See Annex II in European Commission, “Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/886,” Official Journal of the European Union, June 20, 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A32018R0886 . Congressional Research Service 29 link to page 11 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress ~~into effect within 30 days of the publication.~~
U.S. Steel and Aluminum Manufacturing and
Employment
As discussed earlier (see As discussed earlier (see “Commerce Findings and Recommendations””), a stated goal of the ), a stated goal of the
~~metal tariffs is~~Trump Administration’s tariffs on metals was to spur U.S. producers of steel and aluminum to to spur U.S. producers of steel and aluminum to operate at an average of 80% or operate at an average of 80% or
more of their production capacity. Commerce’s Section 232 reports deemed this as necessary to more of their production capacity. Commerce’s Section 232 reports deemed this as necessary to
sustain adequate profitability, to reopen idled capacity, and to continue capital investment in both sustain adequate profitability, to reopen idled capacity, and to continue capital investment in both
manufacturing sectors.manufacturing sectors.~~168~~161 Currently, domestic steel producers operate at 80% or less of production Currently, domestic steel producers operate at 80% or less of production
capacity (it was capacity (it was ~~64% over the first half of~~65.1% in 2020, 77.1% in 2019, and about the same in 2018). 2020, 77.1% in 2019, and about the same in 2018).~~169~~
162 Domestic producers of primary aluminum operated at an estimated Domestic producers of primary aluminum operated at an estimated 6049% of % of production capacity in production capacity in
~~2019, a rise~~2020, a drop from about from about 5560% of capacity in % of capacity in ~~2018.170~~
2019, and 55% in 2018.163 Domestic Steel Manufacturing
U.S. raw steel production U.S. raw steel production ~~increased to 87 million~~decreased to 72 mil ion metric tons in metric tons in ~~2019~~2020, compared to , compared to ~~82 million~~
approximately 82 mil ion metric tons in 2017, the year before the Section 232 trade action took effect.metric tons in 2017, the year before the Section 232 trade action took effect.~~171~~164 According to the According to the
USGS, nationwide in USGS, nationwide in ~~2019~~2020 three companies three companies ~~in nine locations~~ operated large integrated steel operated large integrated steel
~~mills~~mil s in eleven locations—once the chief method of producing steel in the United States—and —once the chief method of producing steel in the United States—and 5051 companies companies
operated 98 operated 98 ~~minimills—with~~minimil s, which use electric arc furnaces to melt raw materials (primarily iron and recycled steel scrap metal) to produce steel in the United States.165 The minimil sector has lower capital and energy costs and a largely nonunion workforce. lower capital and energy costs and a largely nonunion workforce.~~172~~
~~One~~166 An effect of the steel tariff is that U.S. hot-rolled band steel prices effect of the steel tariff is that U.S. hot-rolled band steel prices ~~initially~~ initial y rose, registering a 10-rose, registering a 10-
year high of more than $1,000 per metric ton at the beginning of July 2018. year high of more than $1,000 per metric ton at the beginning of July 2018. ~~Since then~~Thereafter, the , the
domestic price of steel domestic price of steel ~~has been~~general y began dropping, dropping, ~~reaching~~averaging around $ around $~~570~~525 per metric ton in per metric ton in ~~June~~ August 2020, 2020,
which was lower than before the United States applied the steel tariff.which was lower than before the United States applied the steel tariff.~~173~~167 One reason One reason isfor this initial drop was slowing slowing
global demand for steel products from major steel-using sectors, such as automotiveglobal demand for steel products from major steel-using sectors, such as automotive~~, in recent~~
~~months, thus lessening the effect of the steel tariff. U.S. downstream industries that use steel have~~
~~had to contend, at least for a time, with higher costs of inputs into production. Any price increases~~
~~may put U.S. exporters of products made of steel at a disadvantage as they compete against~~
~~foreign rivals who may pay a lower price for steel in the global market when buying materials for~~
~~production.~~
~~Figures from the U.S. government show a modest increase in steel manufacturing jobs, and it is~~
~~possible that the tariffs may have prevented some additional steel jobs from disappearing. U.S.~~
~~steelmakers directly employed 144,000 workers in 2019 (see Figure 8), accounting for 1.1% of~~
~~the nation’s 12.8 million factory jobs. Steel manufacturers added a total of 6,600 jobs in 2018 and~~

~~168 Steel Report, p. 4, and Aluminum Report, p. 107.~~
~~169 The U.S. Federal Reserve Board publishes industrial production and capacity utilization data by industry.~~
~~170 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), Mineral Commodity Summary, Aluminum, 2019 and 2020.~~
~~171 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summary, Iron and Steel, 2020.~~
~~172 Ibid..~~
~~173 World Steel Dynamics, Steelbenchmarker: Price History, Tables and Charts, February 10, 2020.~~
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~~2019, a rise of 4.8% from 2017.174 Nevertheless, steelmakers employed 7,300 fewer people than~~
~~in 2014. Despite the recent uptick, the U.S. government expects steel industry employment to~~
~~shrink to 124,100 jobs by 2028.175 In the first five months of 2020, there were 7% fewer steel~~
~~industry jobs compared to the same period in the previous year.~~, thus lessening the effect of the steel tariff. The COVID-19 pandemic has led to temporary production shutdowns and idling of some steelmaking furnaces in the United States.168 The resulting supply-demand imbalance for steel has pushed current prices in the United States to the highest level since 2017. According to the steel pricing website, Steelbenchmarker, hot-rolled band steel in the United States sold at an average of $1,490 per metric ton in April 2021 as compared with an average of about $700 per metric ton in March 2017.169 Analysts at IHSMarkit, 161 Steel Report, p. 4, and Aluminum Report, p. 107. 162 T he U.S. Federal Reserve Board publishes industrial production and capacity utilization data by industry, accessed March 17, 2021, https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G17/default.htm . 163 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), Mineral Commodity Summary, Aluminum, February 2019, January 2020, and January 2021, https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/aluminum-statistics-and-information. 164 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summary, Iron and Steel, January 2021 and February 2019, https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/iron-and-steel-statistics-and-information. 165 Ibid. 166 Matthew Miller and Wilson Ko, Metals and Mining, CFRA, January 2021, pp. 19-20. 167 World Steel Dynamics, Steelbenchmarker: Price History, Tables and Charts, March 8, 2021, http://steelbenchmarker.com/files/history.pdf. 168 Fabien Mercier, Valentina Burrai, and T omohiro Hiijkata, Steel Market Developments Q4 2020, OECD, 2020, pp. 52-3, https://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/steel-market -developments-Q4-2020.pdf. 169 World Steel Dynamics, Steelbenchmarker: Price History, Tables and Charts, March 8, 2021, http://steelbenchmarker.com/files/history.pdf. Congressional Research Service 30 link to page 37 link to page 21 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress an industry research firm, attributed the rising price to idle capacity as demand rose; they also predict that as capacity that sat idle in 2020 restarts, supply should improve and prices should fal .170 U.S. downstream industries that use steel to manufacture products have had to contend, at least for a time, with higher costs of inputs to production. Any domestic price increases may put U.S. exporters of products made of steel at a disadvantage as they compete against foreign rivals who may pay a lower price for steel in the global market when buying materials for production. In March 2021, with U.S. prices for hot-rolled band steel 36% above Europe and 106% above mainland China, producers may prefer purchasing imported steel even with the additional 25% tariff.171 The effect of tariffs on steel manufacturing jobs is difficult to measure. U.S. steelmakers directly employed 137,200 workers in 2020 (see Figure 8), accounting for 1.1% of the nation’s 12.2 mil ion factory jobs. Steel manufacturers added a total of 8,500 jobs in 2018 and 2019, up 6.2% from 2017. In 2020, the number of steel manufacturing jobs in the United States shrank 6% from the previous year.172 Thus, overal employment at steel mil s is little changed from three years ago. The U.S. government expects steel industry employment to fal about 7% from 2019 to 2029.173 What is not yet known and What is not yet known and
difficult to assess is the employment effect of increased input costs on other U.S. manufacturing difficult to assess is the employment effect of increased input costs on other U.S. manufacturing
industries that use steel intensively, such as manufacturers of automobiles and parts, household industries that use steel intensively, such as manufacturers of automobiles and parts, household
appliances, and farm machinery. The possible effects of the steel and aluminum tariffs on the appliances, and farm machinery. The possible effects of the steel and aluminum tariffs on the
automotive supply chain are discussed in the section automotive supply chain are discussed in the section “Automobiles and Parts”. .”Beyond the Beyond the
various U.S. tariff actions over the years meant to protect the industry from foreign competition, various U.S. tariff actions over the years meant to protect the industry from foreign competition,
employment in the steel industry has been affected by new employment in the steel industry has been affected by new technology, particularly the increased technology, particularly the increased
use of electric arc furnaces to make steel, which has reduced the demand for workers.use of electric arc furnaces to make steel, which has reduced the demand for workers.~~176~~
~~According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, labor productivity in steelmaking nearly tripled since~~
~~1987 and rose 10% over the past decade.177 Hence~~174 According to American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), the number of labor hours needed to produce one finished ton of steel has fal en 81% since 1980, from 10.1 to 1.9 in 2019.175 As a result, even a significant increase in domestic steel , even a significant increase in domestic steel
production is production is ~~likely~~ likely to result in a relatively to result in a relatively ~~small~~ smal number of additional jobs. In the past two years, number of additional jobs. In the past two years,
a few steel a few steel plant expansions have been realized or announced, and some blast furnaces have plant expansions have been realized or announced, and some blast furnaces have
~~reopened.178 Nevertheless, industry experts are skeptical domestic steelmakers will make long-~~
~~term capital expenditures solely on the basis of trade and tariff policy that could change or be~~
~~eliminated in the future at the President’s discretion. Some analysts argue the uncertainty~~
~~associated with the tariff actions could discourage steelmakers from adding new capacity.179 Over~~
~~the same period, other steelmakers have closed mills, idled employees, or cut back on work~~
~~hours.180~~

~~174 Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Current Employment Statistics (CES), Iron and Steel Mills (NAICS 3311) and~~
~~Steel Products (NAICS 3312), accessed July 15, 2020, https://www.bls.gov/ces/.~~
~~175 BLS, Employment and Output by Industry, Table 2.7, September 4, 2019, https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/industry-~~
~~employment-and-output.htm.~~
176 See CRS In Focus IF10902, Trade Actions and U.S. Steel Manufacturing~~, by Michaela D. Platzer,~~ reopened.176 In April 2021, U.S. Steel announced it was canceling a large industrial investment to modernize its operations in western Pennsylvania.177 As of May 2021, the company has not said whether it 170 IHS Markit, Steel Markets in Turmoil, with Record Prices and Rationing, March 16, 2021, https://connect.ihsmarkit.com/Document/Show/phoenix/3919638. 171 World Steel Dynamics, Steelbenchmarker: Price History, Tables and Charts, March 8, 2021, http://steelbenchmarker.com/files/history.pdf. 172 Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Current Employment Statistics (CES), Iron and Steel Mills (NAICS 3311) and Steel Products (NAICS 3312), accessed March 8, 2021, https://www.bls.gov/ces/. 173 BLS, Employment and Output by Industry, T able 2.7, September 1, 2020, https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/industry-employment -and-output.htm. 174 See CRS In Focus IF10902, Trade Actions and U.S. Steel Manufacturing, for a related discussion ~~for a related~~
~~discussion~~ on the domestic on the domestic steel indust ry. 175 American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), 2019 Annual Statistical Report (ASR), August 12, 2020, p.15, https://www.steel.org/2020/08/2019-statistical-report/. 176 Joseph S. Pete, “U.S. Steel Restarts Blast Furnace #4 at Gary Works as Conditions Recover,” NWITIMES, December 1, 2020 Updated March 15, 2021, https://www.nwitimes.com/business/local/u-s-steel-restarts-blast-furnace-4-at-gary-works-as-conditions-recover/article_61b32de8-143e-5cf7-9eef-0d9a7cada5dd.html. 177 U.S. Steel is an American integrated steel producer headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. T he company has production operations in North America and Europe. David Burritt, Christie Breves, and Rich Fruehauf, First Quarter 2021 Earnings Call, U.S. Steel, April 30, 2021, p. 10, https://investors.ussteel.com/events-and- Congressional Research Service 31 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress plans to bring back furnaces idled during the pandemic or to add more workers.178 In contrast, some steelmakers, such as Nucor, are expanding or are constructing new facilities.179 Figure 8. Steel and Aluminum Manufacturing Employment Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Survey for North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 3311 (iron and steel mil s), 3312 (steel products), and NAICS 3313 (aluminum). Domestic Aluminum Manufacturing Domestic production of primary~~steel industry.~~
~~177 BLS, Industry Productivity and Costs, https://www.bls.gov/lpc/.~~
~~178 Bob Tita, “U.S. Steel’s Turnaround Plan Runs Through Big River Mill,” Wall Street Journal, February 20, 2020.~~
~~179 Shawn Donnan and Joe Deaux, “Trump’s Tariffs Revived a Steel Town, but Industry is Unforgiving,”~~ ~~Bloomberg~~
~~News, December 18, 2019.~~
~~180 As one example, AK Steel’s plant in Ashland, KY, closed permanently at the end of 2019.~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~Figure 8. Steel and Aluminum Manufacturing Employment~~

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Survey for North American Industry Classification
~~System (NAICS) 3311 (iron and steel mil s), 3312 (steel products), and NAICS 3313 (aluminum).~~
~~Domestic Aluminum Manufacturing~~
~~Figures from the USGS indicate that domestic production of raw~~ aluminum has risen over the aluminum has risen over the
past past ~~two~~three years, reaching 1. years, reaching 1.~~1 million~~ 0 mil ion metric tons in metric tons in ~~2019~~2020, up from 741,000 metric tons in 2017, , up from 741,000 metric tons in 2017, which was the the
lowest level lowest level since 1951. since 1951. ~~Three~~180 At the end of 2020, three companies operated companies operated ~~eight~~six primary aluminum smelters in the primary aluminum smelters in the
United StatesUnited States ~~in 2019~~, compared with five companies that operated nine primary aluminum , compared with five companies that operated nine primary aluminum
smelters in 2010.181 In April 2020, Alcoa, the largest domestic producer, announced that it would smelters in 2010.181 In April 2020, Alcoa, the largest domestic producer, announced that it would
curtail its Intalco aluminum smelting facility in curtail its Intalco aluminum smelting facility in ~~Washington State by August 2020, thereby~~
~~reducing its~~Ferndale, WA, which reduced U.S. production of primary aluminum by 230,000 metric tons.182 The action suggests U.S. production of primary aluminum by 230,000 metric tons.182 The action suggests
that the 10% tariff has not been enough that the 10% tariff has not been enough of a factor to of a factor to ~~allow~~al ow Alcoa to maintain its current domestic Alcoa to maintain its current domestic
capacity or to reopen curtailed capacity. Century Aluminum, the main proponent of the tariff and capacity or to reopen curtailed capacity. Century Aluminum, the main proponent of the tariff and
chiefly a domestic producer, has restarted some of its U.S. production capacity since the chiefly a domestic producer, has restarted some of its U.S. production capacity since the
imposition of the tariff, but it has not imposition of the tariff, but it has not led to a substantial rebuild of its domestic production of led to a substantial rebuild of its domestic production of
~~primary aluminum.183~~
~~U.S. production of aluminum accounted for a tiny fraction of the world’s primary aluminum~~
~~production at 1.7% in 2019, whereas China constituted more than half.184 A main source of~~
~~imported aluminum for the United States is Canada, which was exempted from the aluminum~~
~~tariff in mid-May 2019.185 However, as noted, on August 6, 2020 President Trump re-imposed the~~
~~tariff on some aluminum imports from Canada.186~~
~~One aim of the 10% tariff was to raise the price of imported aluminum as a way to encourage~~
~~domestic manufacturers to restart idled capacity. In March 2020, the average spot price of~~
~~primary aluminum ingot produced in the United States was $1,909 per metric ton, or 19% higher~~

~~181 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summary, Aluminum, January 2011 and January 2020.~~
~~182 Alcoa, "Alcoa Corporation Reports First Quarter 2020 Results," press release, April 22, 2020,~~
~~https://investors.alcoa.com/news-releases/2020/04-22-2020-210941017.~~
~~183 Century Aluminum, 2020 Chairman’s Letter, April 28, 2020.~~
~~184 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summary, Aluminum, January 2019.~~
~~185 The Section 232 U.S. aluminum tariffs on Canada and Mexico applied from June 1, 2018 to May 19, 2019.~~
~~186 See “Country Exemptions”~~primary aluminum.183 presentations/default.aspx. 178 Joe Deaux, “Biden's Rust Belt Revival Plan Risks Luring More Foreign Steel,” Chicago Tribune, April 2, 2021, https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct -biz-biden-infrastructure-steelmakers-20210402-e5nj64xcvfecbnz2uyzy7ae43y-story.html. 179 As one example, AK Steel’s plant in Ashland, KY, closed permanently at the end of 2019. See, AK Steel, 2019 Annual Report, Form-10K, Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2019, p. 29. As another example, Nucor plans to build a new plate mill in Brandenburg, KY, which it expects to complete in late 2022. See, Nucor, 2020 Annual Report, Form-10K, Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2020, February 26, 2021, pp. 3 and 7, https://www.nucor.com/reports-filings/#. 180 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summary, Aluminum, January 2011 and January 2021, https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/aluminum-statistics-and-information. 181 Ibid. 182 Alcoa, 2020 Annual Report, Form 10-K, For the Year Ended December 31, 2020, February 25, 2021, p. 39, https://investors.alcoa.com/sec-filings/default.aspx. 183 Century Aluminum, 2020 Annual Report, Form 10-K, For the Year Ended December 31, 2020, March 4, 2021, pp.
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~~than the London price (the global price of aluminum). However, in the first three months of 2020,~~
~~the average price of primary aluminum in the United States fell by 8.4%, according to USGS.187~~
~~Aluminum manufacturers directly employed 59,800 workers in 2019, 2,200 more than in 2017,~~
~~and an increase of 1,100 jobs from 2014 (see Figure 8).188 According to federal employment~~
~~figures, aluminum industry employment shrank nearly 7% in the first five months of 2020,~~
~~compared to the same period in 2019.189~~ U.S. production of aluminum accounted for a relative smal fraction of the world’s primary aluminum production at 1.5% in 2020, whereas China constituted more than half.184 A prominent source of imported aluminum for the United States is Canada, which was exempted from the aluminum tariff after negotiations in mid-May 2019.185 As discussed earlier, Argentina, Australia, and Mexico also gained exemptions from the 10% tariff as are individual product imports that receive a product exclusion from Commerce. One aim of the 10% tariff was to raise the price of imported aluminum as a way to encourage domestic manufacturers to restart idled capacity and increase hiring. In 2020, the average spot price of primary aluminum ingot produced in the United States was $1,976 per metric ton, or 16% higher than the London price (the global price of aluminum).186 Aluminum manufacturers directly employed 56,900 workers in 2020, 700 fewer than in 2017, and shrinking by 2,200 jobs from 2015 (see Figure 8).187 Similar to the trend in steelmaking, the U.S. Bureau of Similar to the trend in steelmaking, the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) expects employment in aluminum manufacturing to Labor Statistics (BLS) expects employment in aluminum manufacturing to ~~shrink, falling to~~
~~52,800 jobs by 2028.190~~further shrink, fal ing 7% by 2029.188 A reason for this is that domestic smelting of aluminum from bauxite ore, A reason for this is that domestic smelting of aluminum from bauxite ore,
which requires large amounts of electricity, has been in long-term declinewhich requires large amounts of electricity, has been in long-term decline~~, and secondary~~
for multiple reasons. Secondary aluminum produced from recycled scrap melted in a smelter now aluminum produced from recycled scrap melted in a smelter now accounts for the majority of accounts for the majority of
domestic aluminum production.domestic aluminum production.~~191~~189 Secondary aluminum production, which has been fairly steady Secondary aluminum production, which has been fairly steady
over the past two decades, accounted for three-fourths of U.S. aluminum production in over the past two decades, accounted for three-fourths of U.S. aluminum production in ~~2019~~2020, and , and
the United States was the world’s the United States was the world’s second largest producer of secondary aluminumlargest producer of secondary aluminum~~.192 China ranked~~
~~second.~~ after China.190 Imports of secondary unwrought aluminum are not covered Imports of secondary unwrought aluminum are not covered by the Section 232 aluminum by the Section 232 aluminum
trade action.trade action.~~193~~
191 Another development affecting aluminum is Another development affecting aluminum is ~~that the President’s Commerce budget request for~~
~~FY2021 published in February 2020 seeks funds to create a formal aluminum import monitoring~~
~~system~~the implementation by the Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration (ITA) of the aluminum import monitoring and analysis (AIM) system, “to track imports of aluminum products and provide an early warning “to track imports of aluminum products and provide an early warning system for import system for import
surges.”surges.”~~194~~192 The aluminum program The aluminum program ~~would be~~is similar to the import monitoring and analysis system similar to the import monitoring and analysis system
~~for steel administered by ITA’s Enforcement and Compliance unit.195 In April 2020, Commerce~~
~~requested comments on its proposed rule for a new Aluminum Import Monitoring and Analysis~~
~~(AIM) system.196~~
~~Global Production Trends~~
~~Tariffs to protect the domestic steel industry do not address the underlying issue of global~~
~~overcapacity. The steel committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and~~
~~Development (OECD) estimates global steel overcapacity was at 440 million metric tons in~~
~~2019.197 Although China is the world’s largest steel producer, accounting for roughly 45% of~~

~~187 USGS, Aluminum Mineral Industry Survey, Table 6, March 2020.~~
~~188 (BLS), Current Employment Statistics (CES), Alumina and aluminum production (NAICS 3313), accessed July 15,~~
~~2020, https://www.bls.gov/ces/.~~
~~189 CRS analysis of average employment data for 2020 are from BLS’s CES program.~~
~~190 BLS, Employment and Output by Industry, Table 2.7, September 4, 2019.~~
~~191 For more information on domestic aluminum manufacturing, see CRS In Focus IF10998,~~ ~~Effects of U.S. Tariff~~
~~Action on U.S. Aluminum Manufacturing, by Michaela D. Platzer.~~
~~192 Secondary aluminum can be substituted for primary aluminum in most uses, although primary aluminum is favored~~
~~in some applications, such as electronics or aerospace manufacturing.~~
~~193 Section 232 trade action includes certain semi-finished wrought aluminum products, such as bars, rods, foil, and~~
~~wire, which can be manufactured using primary aluminum, secondary aluminum, or a combination of the two.~~
~~194 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration (ITA), Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2021,~~
~~February 24, 2020, p. 41.~~
~~195 See Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis (SIMA) system, https://enforcement.trade.gov/steel/license/index.html.~~
~~196 Department of Commerce, Enforcement and Compliance, International Trade Administration, “Aluminum Import~~
~~Monitoring and Analysis System,” 85 Federal Register 23748, April 29, 2020.~~
~~197 See Fabien Mercier, Valentina Burrai, and Daichi Mabashi, Steel Market Developments Q4 2019, OECD, 2019, p.~~
~~38, https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/steel-market-developments.htm; and, G20 Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity,~~
~~Ministerial Report, September 20, 2018, p.6, https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2018/pdf/0921_003a.pdf.~~
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~~global capacity in 2018, relatively little~~ for steel administered by ITA’s Enforcement and Compliance unit.193 The AIM system is set to launch in June 2021, and has garnered the support of several Members.194 Both 1-2, https://centuryaluminum.com/investors/filings-and-financials/annual-reports-and-proxy/default.aspx. 184 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summary, Aluminum, January 2021. 185 T he Section 232 U.S. aluminum tariffs on Canada and Mexico applied from June 1, 2018 to May 19, 2019. On August 6, 2020, President T rump re-imposed the tariff on some aluminum imports from Canada and then issued a proclamation lifting the tariffs in October 27, 2020 retroactive to September 1, 2020. 186 USGS, Aluminum Mineral Industry Surveys, T able 6, December 2020. 187 (BLS), Current Employment Statistics (CES), Alumina and aluminum production (NAICS 3313), accessed March 8, 2021, https://www.bls.gov/ces/. 188 BLS, Employment and Output by Industry, T able 2.7, September 1, 2020. 189 See CRS In Focus IF11787, U.S. Aluminum Manufacturing: National Security and Tariffs, for a related discussion on the domestic aluminum industry. 190 Secondary aluminum can be substituted for primary aluminum in most uses, although primary aluminum is favored in some applications, such as electronics or aerospace manufacturing. 191 Section 232 trade action includes certain semi-finished wrought aluminum products, such as bars, rods, foil, and wire, which can be manufactured using primary aluminum, secondary aluminum, or a combination of the two. 192 See Aluminum Import Monitoring and Analysis (AIM) System, https://www.trade.gov/updates-aluminum-import-licensing. 193 See Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis (SIMA) System, https://enforcement.trade.gov/steel/license/index.html. 194 Letter to House Appropriations Committee from Representatives Bucschon and Stevens, “ Support the Aluminum Import Monitoring (AIM) System.” Congressional Research Service 33 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress the American Primary Aluminum Association (APAA), a group representing two chiefly primary aluminum producers Century and Magnitude 7 Metals, and the Aluminum Association, the industry’s broadest trade group representing Alcoa and others in the industry’s value chain, support the expeditious launch and implementation of AIM.195 Global Production Trends Tariffs to protect the domestic steel industry do not address the underlying and longstanding issue of global overcapacity. The steel committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) forecasts global steel overcapacity of 703.8 mil ion metric tons in 2020, up 24% from 2019.196 Although China is the world’s largest steel producer, accounting for roughly 55% of global production in 2020,197 relatively little Chinese steel enters the U.S. market directly, due to Chinese steel enters the U.S. market directly, due to
extensive U.S. AD/CVD duties, but the large amount of Chinese production depresses extensive U.S. AD/CVD duties, but the large amount of Chinese production depresses prices global y. Between 2019 and 2023, China could add 208.57 mil ion metric tons per year of new crude steel capacity, with closures totaling 170.92 mil ion metric tons per annum over the same period, according to S&P Global Platts. Platts’ estimate suggests China’s net crude steel capacity may expand by 37.65 mil ion metric tons a year through 2023.198 USTR noted China’s government’s role in excess capacity in its annual report stating: In manufacturing industries such as steel and aluminum, China’s economic planners have contributed to massive excess capacity in China through various government support measures. For steel, the resulting over-production has distorted global markets, harming U.S. manufacturers and workers in both the U.S. market and third country markets, where U.S. exports compete with Chinese exports…. Excess capacity in China hurts various U.S. industries and workers not only through direct exports from China to the United States, but also through its impact on global prices and supply, which makes it difficult for competitive manufacturers throughout the world to remain viable.199 In March 2021, China’s National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology published a notice it wil analyze steel capacity reduction that “wil focus on the inspection of the implementation of steel capacity reduction work and the implementation of rectification in al relevant regions since 2016.”200 It is not clear if the report or analysis wil be made public or what specific policy changes or actions China may take as a result. In addition, according to a press report, Chinese authorities have begun employing various tactics to rein in steel production, such as imposing environmental fines on older polluting 195 See American Primary Aluminum Association, “U.S. Primary Aluminum Industry Lauds Import Monitoring Program; Calls for Immediate Action to Address Current Canadian Surge,” press release, May 2020, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/us-primary-aluminum-industry-lauds-import -monitoring-program-calls-for-immediate-action-to-address-current -canadian-surge-301051925.html and T he Aluminum Association, “ Newly Launched Aluminum Import Monitoring Program Critical to T rade Enforcement,” press release, January 4, 2021, https://www.aluminum.org/news/newly-launched-aluminum-import -monitoring-program-critical-trade-enforcement. 196 Fabien Mercier, Valentina Burrai, and T omohiro Hiijkata, Steel Market Developments Q4 2020, OECD, 2020, p. 51, https://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/steel-market -developments-Q4-2020.pdf. 197 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summary, Iron and Steel, January 2021. 198 Matthew Miller and Wilson Ko, Metals and Mining, CFRA, January 2021, p. 14. 199 U.S. T rade Representative, 2021 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, March 2021, p. 100, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2021/2021NTE.pdf. 200 Brett Fortnam, “China orders analysis, reduction of crude steel production,” Inside U.S. Trade, April 2, 2021. Congressional Research Service 34 link to page 31 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress factories, though it is unclear how effective they wil be in lowering overal production and excess capacity.201 ~~prices~~
~~globally. China has indicated that it plans to reduce its crude steelmaking capacity by 100-150~~
~~million metric tons over the five-year period from 2016 to 2020.198 According to the Chinese~~
~~government, the country’s crude steel capacity has fallen by more than 120 million metric tons~~
~~since it announced its steel reduction goal in 2016.199~~
No OECD or other multinational forum has been established to monitor global aluminum No OECD or other multinational forum has been established to monitor global aluminum
overcapacity, though aluminum industry groups have overcapacity, though aluminum industry groups have ~~called~~cal ed for such a forum. for such a forum.~~200~~202 Although China Although China
accounted for more than half of the world’s primary aluminum production in accounted for more than half of the world’s primary aluminum production in ~~2019~~2020, it does not , it does not
export aluminum in commodity form to the United States.export aluminum in commodity form to the United States.~~201~~203 China ships semi-finished aluminum China ships semi-finished aluminum
such as bars, rods, and wire to the United States. These such as bars, rods, and wire to the United States. These imports are subject to the Section 232 tariffs.are subject to the Section 232 tariffs.~~202~~
204 APAA is the main proponent of the Section 232 tariffs.205 The Aluminum Association opposes the Section 232 tariff program, instead favoring a country-specific approach.206 Metals imports should be put in the context of U.S. production. In Metals imports should be put in the context of U.S. production. In ~~2019~~2020, the United States , the United States
produced more than three times the amount of steel it imported.produced more than three times the amount of steel it imported.~~203~~207 According to Commerce, According to Commerce,
import penetration—the share of U.S. demand met by steel imports—import penetration—the share of U.S. demand met by steel imports—~~rose to~~averaged 24.5% in 2019, down from 28.3% in 2018, from 28.3% in 2018, from
2322.7% in 2009.% in 2009.~~204~~208 Some segments of the domestic steel industry, such as slab converters, import a Some segments of the domestic steel industry, such as slab converters, import a
sizable share of their semi-finished feedstock from foreign suppliers, totaling sizable share of their semi-finished feedstock from foreign suppliers, totaling ~~nearly 6.1 million~~
~~tons in 2019.205~~5.1 mil ion tons in 2020.209 In the primary aluminum market, U.S. net import reliance In the primary aluminum market, U.S. net import reliance ~~fell to 22% in 2019~~
~~from 41% in 2015~~fel to 13% in 2020 from 53% in 2016, according to USGS., according to USGS.~~206~~210 Most U.S. foreign trade in Most U.S. foreign trade in steel and aluminum is with steel and aluminum is with
~~Canada (see Appendix D).~~
Canada (see “Steel and Aluminum Trade”). International Efforts to Address Overcapacity
OECD analysis has found that ongoing global steel overcapacity and excess production are OECD analysis has found that ongoing global steel overcapacity and excess production are
largely caused by government intervention, subsidization, and other market-distorting practices, largely caused by government intervention, subsidization, and other market-distorting practices,
although these are not the only factors.although these are not the only factors.~~207~~211 Other reasons for excess capacity include cyclical Other reasons for excess capacity include cyclical
market downturns. The situation is similar in the aluminum industry, where government financial market downturns. The situation is similar in the aluminum industry, where government financial
support for large aluminum stockpiles has delayed the response to lower demand. support for large aluminum stockpiles has delayed the response to lower demand.
Previous U.S. Administrations worked to address the issue of steel overcapacity. President George Previous U.S. Administrations worked to address the issue of steel overcapacity. President George
W. Bush, for example, initiated international discussions on global capacity reduction and W. Bush, for example, initiated international discussions on global capacity reduction and
improved trade disciplines in the steel industry as part of his general steel announcement of improved trade disciplines in the steel industry as part of his general steel announcement of

~~198 OECD, Latest Developments in Steelmaking Capacity, July 2019, p. 11, https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/~~
~~steelcapacity.htm.~~
~~199 In October 2019, China blocked the continuation of the Global Forum on Excess Capacity in the G20; however,~~
~~more than 30 countries, including the United States, have pledged to continue the work of the Global Forum to reduce~~
~~the global overcapacity of this metal. G20 Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity, Ministerial Report, September 20,~~
~~2018, p. 10.~~
~~200 European Aluminum, G7 Makes Explicit Urgency to Avoid Aluminum Overcapacity, June 10, 2018.~~
~~201 USGS, Aluminum, Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2020, p. 2.~~
~~202 CRS In Focus IF10998, Effects of U.S. Tariff Action on U.S. Aluminum Manufacturing, by Michaela D. Platzer.~~
~~203 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries, Iron and Steel, January 2020.~~
~~204 DOC, ITA, Steel Imports Report: United States, Global Steel Trade Monitor, September 2019, p. 6.~~
~~205 DOC, ITA, Enforcement & Compliance, U~~~~.S. Steel Import Monitor, Import by Country and Product Category,~~
~~2019.~~
~~206 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries, Iron and Steel, January 2020.~~
~~207 OECD, “Excess Capacity in the Global Steel Industry: The~~ 201 T homas Hale and Christian Shepherd, “ China struggles to rein in steel production,” The Financial Times, April 12, 2021. 202 OECD, “Measuring Distortions in International Markets: the Aluminum Value Chain,” OECD Trade Policy Papers, January 8, 2019, p. 48, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/measuring-distortions-in-international-markets-the-aluminium-value-chain_c82911ab-en. 203 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries, Aluminum, January 2021, p. 2. 204 CRS In Focus IF11787, U.S. Aluminum Manufacturing: National Security and Tariffs. 205 APAA, “APAA Congratulates President -Elect Biden and Calls for the Preservation of the Section 232 Aluminum T ariffs,” press release, January 13, 2021, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/apaa-congratulates-president-elect-biden-and-calls-for-the-preservation-of-the-section-232-aluminum-tariffs-301207595.html. 206 T he Aluminum Association, “Aluminum Association Calls for T arget ed, Multilateral Approach to Address Aluminum Subsidies and Overcapacity,” press release, January 14, 2021, https://www.aluminum.org/news/aluminum-association-calls-targeted-multilateral-approach-address-aluminum-subsidies-and. 207 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries, Iron and Steel, January 2021. 208 DOC, IT A, Steel Imports Report: United States, Global Steel T rade Monitor, May 2020, p. 5. 209 DOC, IT A, Enforcement & Compliance, U.S. Steel Import Monitor, https://www.trade.gov/data-visualization/sima-import -monitor. 210 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries, Aluminum, January 2021. 211 OECD, “Excess Capacity in the Global Steel Industry: T he Current Situation and Ways Forward,” 2015, p. 4, Current Situation and Ways Forward,” 2015, p. 4,
https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/excess-capacity-in-the-global-steel-industry.pdf. https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/excess-capacity-in-the-global-steel-industry.pdf.
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2001. 2001.~~208~~212 Other governments agreed to join the Bush Administration in discussing overcapacity Other governments agreed to join the Bush Administration in discussing overcapacity
and trade issues at the OECD in a process that started in mid-2001. The industrial, steel-and trade issues at the OECD in a process that started in mid-2001. The industrial, steel-
producing members of the OECD were joined by major non-OECD steel producers, such as producing members of the OECD were joined by major non-OECD steel producers, such as
India, Russia, and, during later stages of the talks, China. Negotiations were suspended India, Russia, and, during later stages of the talks, China. Negotiations were suspended
indefinitelyindefinitely in 2004, and by 2005, the OECD had abandoned this effort to negotiate an agreement in 2004, and by 2005, the OECD had abandoned this effort to negotiate an agreement
among among ~~all~~ al major steel-producing countries to ban domestic subsidies for steel major steel-producing countries to ban domestic subsidies for steel ~~mills~~mil s. .
The Obama Administration also participated in international efforts to curb steel imports, The Obama Administration also participated in international efforts to curb steel imports,
including the launch of the G-20 Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity in 2016, another venue including the launch of the G-20 Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity in 2016, another venue
that sought to address the that sought to address the ~~challenges~~chal enges of excess capacity in steel worldwide. of excess capacity in steel worldwide.~~209~~213 In December 2016, In December 2016,
the G-20 convened its first meeting of more than 30 economies—the G-20 convened its first meeting of more than 30 economies—~~all~~ al G-20 members plus G-20 members plus
interested OECD members—as a global platform to discuss steel issues among the world’s major interested OECD members—as a global platform to discuss steel issues among the world’s major
producers.producers.~~210~~214 The same year, as part of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SE&D) The same year, as part of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SE&D)
established in 2009, the Obama Administration agreed to address excess steel production and also established in 2009, the Obama Administration agreed to address excess steel production and also
to communicate and exchange information on surplus production in the aluminum sector.to communicate and exchange information on surplus production in the aluminum sector.~~211~~
215 In September 2018, the OECD Forum agreed on a process to identify and remove subsidies and In September 2018, the OECD Forum agreed on a process to identify and remove subsidies and
take other measures to reduce the global steel overcapacity. The OECD issued a consensus report take other measures to reduce the global steel overcapacity. The OECD issued a consensus report
outlining six principles and specific policy recommendations to address excess steel capacity.outlining six principles and specific policy recommendations to address excess steel capacity.~~212~~216
The The ~~USTR~~former USTR under the Trump Administration, while supportive of the recommendations, questioned the Forum’s ability to pursue , while supportive of the recommendations, questioned the Forum’s ability to pursue
effective implementation and did not rule out unilateral action.effective implementation and did not rule out unilateral action.~~213~~217 Some Members have expressed Some Members have expressed
support of U.S. participation in the Forum and other global coalitions to address overcapacity.support of U.S. participation in the Forum and other global coalitions to address overcapacity.~~214~~
~~Despite calls~~218 Despite cal s from international steel industry associations and most Forum members, including from international steel industry associations and most Forum members, including
the United States, the G-20 was unable to the United States, the G-20 was unable to overcome objections by China to extend the Forum’s overcome objections by China to extend the Forum’s
mandate past November 2019.mandate past November 2019.~~215~~219 However, the Chair noted that a large majority of members However, the Chair noted that a large majority of members
agreed to continue and USTR stated that it “agreed to continue and USTR stated that it “~~will~~ wil continue to work with like-minded partners to continue to work with like-minded partners to
seek long-term solutions” to global overcapacity.seek long-term solutions” to global overcapacity.~~216~~
220 During the OECD Steel Committee’s latest meeting in September 2020, the parties discussed the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and countries’ related trade actions on steel trade flows.221 The aluminum industry argues it is also suffering because of China’s excess production of The aluminum industry argues it is also suffering because of China’s excess production of
primary aluminum. According to the aluminum associations of Japan, Europe, Canada, and the primary aluminum. According to the aluminum associations of Japan, Europe, Canada, and the
United States, global overcapacity amounted to 11 United States, global overcapacity amounted to 11 ~~million~~ mil ion metric tons in 2017. A June 2019 212~~metric tons in 2017. A June 2019~~
~~OECD report found that subsidies, especially in China and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation~~
~~Council, and other market-distorting practices impact global competition in the aluminum~~

~~208~~ President George W. Bush, Statement by the President Regarding President George W. Bush, Statement by the President Regarding a Multilateral Initiative on Steel, June 5, 2001, a Multilateral Initiative on Steel, June 5, 2001,
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010605-4.html. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010605-4.html.
~~209 The~~213 T he White House, Fact Sheet: White House, Fact Sheet: ~~The~~T he 2016 G-20 Summit in Hangzhou, China, September 5, 2016, 2016 G-20 Summit in Hangzhou, China, September 5, 2016,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/05/fact-sheet-2016-g-20-summit-hangzhou-china. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/05/fact-sheet-2016-g-20-summit-hangzhou-china.
~~210~~214 European Commission, European Commission, Steel: Commission Welcomes New Global Forum to Tackle Root Causes of Overcapacity, ,
December 16, 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IPDecember 16, 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP -16-4435_en.pdf. -16-4435_en.pdf.
~~211~~215 U.S. U.S. Department of the Department of the ~~Treasury~~T reasury, 2016 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, 2016 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue U.S.-Fact Sheet, June 7, 2016, U.S.-Fact Sheet, June 7, 2016,
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0485.aspx. https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0485.aspx.
~~212~~216 Global Global Forum on Excess Steel Capacity, Ministerial Report, September 20, 2018Forum on Excess Steel Capacity, Ministerial Report, September 20, 2018,.
~~213 The U.S. Trade~~. 217 T he U.S. T rade Representative, “ Representative, “~~USTR~~UST R Statement on Meeting of the Global Forum on Steel Statement on Meeting of the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity,” Excess Capacity,”
~~USTR~~ UST R Press Releases,Press Releases, September 2018. September 2018.
~~214~~218 Senators Portman, Brown, Braun, and Senators Portman, Brown, Braun, and Casey, “Portman, Brown, Braun, Casey Urge Casey, “Portman, Brown, Braun, Casey Urge ~~USTR~~ UST R to Prioritize Extension of to Prioritize Extension of
the Globalthe Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity,” October 24, 2019. Forum on Steel Excess Capacity,” October 24, 2019.
~~215~~219 G-20 Chair, Japanese Ministry of Economy, “ G-20 Chair, Japanese Ministry of Economy, “~~Trade~~T rade and Industry, Ministerial Meeting on the Global and Industry, Ministerial Meeting on the Global Forum on Steel Forum on Steel
Excess Capacity (GFSEC)Excess Capacity (GFSEC) Held,”Held,” October 26, 2019, https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2019/1026_001.html. October 26, 2019, https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2019/1026_001.html.
~~216 USTR, “USTR~~220 UST R, “ UST R Statement on Meeting of the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity,” October 26, 2019. Statement on Meeting of the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity,” October 26, 2019.
221 http://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/88th-session-of-the-steel-committee.htm. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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~~industry.217As~~ OECD report found that subsidies, especial y in China and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and other market-distorting practices impact global competition in the aluminum industry.222As noted, the U.S. Aluminum Association and some of its international counterparts noted, the U.S. Aluminum Association and some of its international counterparts
seek to establish a global forum to address aluminum excess capacity. seek to establish a global forum to address aluminum excess capacity.
In an April 2021 policy document, A Trade Policy Framework for the U.S. Aluminum Industry, the Aluminum Association, among other policy recommendations, urged the Biden Administration to engage in multilateral efforts to address unfair industrial policies, especial y in China, as it views overcapacity in the global aluminum market as a major chal enge.223 The Trump Administration’s Section 232 actions have led multiple U.S. trading partners, such as The Trump Administration’s Section 232 actions have led multiple U.S. trading partners, such as
the EU, the UK, and Canada, to initiatethe EU, the UK, and Canada, to initiate their own safeguard investigations and quota restrictions their own safeguard investigations and quota restrictions
to prevent dumping of steel and aluminum exports and protect domestic industries. Unlike the to prevent dumping of steel and aluminum exports and protect domestic industries. Unlike the
OECD efforts, the individual country safeguard actions are uncoordinated. OECD efforts, the individual country safeguard actions are uncoordinated.
In addition to the Section 232 action, the Trump Administration In addition to the Section 232 action, the Trump Administration ~~is pursuing~~pursued joint action on joint action on
industrial overcapacity in other forums. The industrial overcapacity in other forums. The ~~USTR began meeting~~then-USTR met with EU and Japanese with EU and Japanese
counterparts in May 2018, to address “nonmarket-oriented policies and practices that lead to counterparts in May 2018, to address “nonmarket-oriented policies and practices that lead to
severe overcapacity, create unfair competitive conditions for our workers and businesses, hinder severe overcapacity, create unfair competitive conditions for our workers and businesses, hinder
the development and the development and use of innovative technologies, and undermine the proper functioning of use of innovative technologies, and undermine the proper functioning of
international trade.”international trade.”~~218~~ 224 The parties also agreed to cooperate on their concerns with third parties’ The parties also agreed to cooperate on their concerns with third parties’
technology transfer policies and technology transfer policies and ~~practices219~~practices225 and issued a joint statement containing a list of and issued a joint statement containing a list of
factors that identify if market conditions for competition exist.factors that identify if market conditions for competition exist.~~220~~226 In January 2020, the three In January 2020, the three
parties issued a statement with specific recommendations and proposed reforms to strengthen the parties issued a statement with specific recommendations and proposed reforms to strengthen the
existing WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) rules.existing WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) rules.~~221~~227 Some Some
analysts suggested that the analysts suggested that the UK might join the trilateral effort. China opposes several of the proposed ASCM reforms.228 With the Biden Administration’s emphasis on working with al ies to address issues with China, it is expected to continue with the trilateral efforts.229 The G-7 Trade Ministers also agreed to “discuss the impact market-distorting practices, such as harmful industrial subsidies, including those causing excess capacity in some sectors, are having on our economies and chart a way to address these collectively.”230 In addition, in November 2018, the United States, the EU, Japan, Argentina, and Costa Rica put forward a joint proposal in the WTO to increase transparency, proposing incentives for 222 OECD (2019), “Measuring Distortions in International Markets: the Aluminum Value Chain”, OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 218, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c82911ab-en. 223 T he Aluminum Association, A Trade Policy Framework for the U.S. Aluminum Industry, April 6, 2021, p. 2, https://www.aluminum.org/sites/default/files/T AA_T rade%20Framework -FINAL.pdf. 224 U.S. T rade Representative, “Joint Statement on T rilateral Meeting of the T rade Ministers of the United States, Japan, and the European Union,” May 2018. 225 Ibid, Annex Statement 2, Joint Statement on T echnology T ransfer Policies and Practices. 226 Ibid, Annex Statement 3, Joint Statement on Market Oriented Conditions. 227 U.S. T rade Representative, “Joint Statement on T rilateral Meeting of the T rade Ministers of Japan, the United States and the European Union,” January 14, 2020. 228 Statement by Zhang Xiangchen, China's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the WTO, July 15, 2020. 229 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, Hearing to Consider the Nomination of Katherine C. Tai, of the District of Colum bia, to be United States Trade Representative, with the rank of Am bassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, 117th Cong., February 25, 2021. 230 UK Government, “ G7 T rade Ministers’ Meeting – Chair’s Statement,” March 31, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/g7-trade-ministers-meeting-chairs-statement . Congressional Research Service 37 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress compliance or penalties for noncompliance with WTO notification reporting requirements regarding subsidies.231 The Biden Administration may continue the efforts to pursue new subsidy and transparency rules in the WTO. U.S. unilateral tariff actions, however, may limit other countries’ wil ingness to participate or support U.S. reform proposals in multilateral forums. How the Biden Administration decides to act on the Section 232 tariffs, whether to retain, withdraw or amend them, may influence the actions and attitudes of individual U.S. trading partners, potential y impacting the likelihood for coordinated action, whether at the trilateral or multilateral level. Preparations for the planned WTO November 2021 Ministerial meeting may provide an opportunity to revisit debate on the proposed WTO reforms. Policy and Economic Issues Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum imports into the United States raise a number of issues for Congress. The economic repercussions of U.S. and foreign actions may be felt not only by domestic steel and aluminum producers, but by downstream manufacturers or other industries targeted for retaliation, and consumers. Some companies have chal enged President Trump’s actions through domestic litigation,232 and may also seek alternative markets for their own products to avoid U.S. tariffs.~~UK might join the trilateral effort once it is no longer part of the EU~~
~~trade regime. China opposes several of the proposed ASCM reforms.222~~
~~In addition, in November 2018, the United States, the EU, Japan, Argentina, and Costa Rica put~~
~~forward a joint proposal in the WTO to increase transparency, proposing incentives for~~
~~compliance or penalties for noncompliance with WTO notification reporting requirements~~
~~regarding subsidies.223 U.S. unilateral tariff actions, however, may limit other countries’~~
~~willingness to participate or support U.S. reform proposals in multilateral forums.~~
~~Policy and Economic Issues~~
~~Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum imports into the United States raise a number of issues~~
~~for Congress. The economic repercussions of U.S. and foreign actions may be felt not only by~~
~~domestic steel and aluminum producers, but by downstream manufacturers or other industries~~
~~targeted for retaliation, and consumers. Some companies have challenged the president’s actions~~
~~through domestic litigation,224 and may also seek alternative markets for their own products to~~
~~avoid U.S. tariffs.~~

~~217 OECD (2019), “Measuring Distortions in International Markets: the Aluminum Value Chain”,~~ ~~OECD Trade Policy~~
~~Papers, No. 218, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c82911ab-en.~~
~~218 U.S. Trade Representative, “Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States,~~
~~Japan, and the European Union,” May 2018.~~
~~219 Ibid, Annex Statement 2, Joint Statement on Technology Transfer Policies and Practices.~~
~~220 Ibid, Annex Statement 3, Joint Statement on Market Oriented Conditions.~~
~~221 U.S. Trade Representative, “Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of Japan, the United States~~
~~and the European Union,” January 14, 2020.~~
~~222 Statement by Zhang Xiangchen, China's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the WTO, July 15, 2020.~~
~~223 “Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements Under WTO Agreements,”~~
~~JOB/GC/204, November 1, 2018.~~
~~224 See, e.g., Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 18-00152 (Ct. Int’l Trade filed June 27, 2018); Severstal~~
~~Exp. GmbH v. United States, No. 18-00057 (Ct. Int’l Trade May 3, 2018) (order granting joint stipulation of dismissal).~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

The response by other countries can have implications for the U.S. economy and multilateral The response by other countries can have implications for the U.S. economy and multilateral
world trading system. Also, other countries may be hesitant in the future to cooperate with the world trading system. Also, other countries may be hesitant in the future to cooperate with the
United States to address broader global issues, including steel and aluminum overcapacity, if their United States to address broader global issues, including steel and aluminum overcapacity, if their
exports are subject to U.S. tariffs. U.S. trading partners’ responses to Section 232 actions have exports are subject to U.S. tariffs. U.S. trading partners’ responses to Section 232 actions have
varied based on the country’s relationship with the United States. Some countries are pursuing varied based on the country’s relationship with the United States. Some countries are pursuing
direct negotiations, while keeping other countermeasures in reserve, and raising actions at the direct negotiations, while keeping other countermeasures in reserve, and raising actions at the
WTO (see below). Others have proposed or pursued retaliation with their own tariffs. WTO (see below). Others have proposed or pursued retaliation with their own tariffs.
Domestic Court Challenges
~~The President~~President Trump’s actions under Section 232 ’s actions under Section 232 ~~have~~ resulted in legal resulted in legal ~~challenges~~chal enges in the U.S. domestic in the U.S. domestic
court system. court system. ~~Specifically~~Specifical y, the Section 232 actions on steel and aluminum have been , the Section 232 actions on steel and aluminum have been ~~challenged~~chal enged
in cases before the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT). In one case, Severstal Export GmbH, in cases before the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT). In one case, Severstal Export GmbH,
a U.S. subsidiary of a Russian steel producer, sought a preliminary injunction from the CIT to a U.S. subsidiary of a Russian steel producer, sought a preliminary injunction from the CIT to
prevent the United States from collecting the import tariffs on certain steel products.prevent the United States from collecting the import tariffs on certain steel products.~~225~~233 The The
company and its Swiss affiliate argued that the President acted outside of the authority delegated company and its Swiss affiliate argued that the President acted outside of the authority delegated
by Congress because the tariffs were not truly imposed for national security purposes.by Congress because the tariffs were not truly imposed for national security purposes.~~226~~234 The The
court denied the motion, determining that the plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on the merits of court denied the motion, determining that the plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on the merits of
their their ~~challenge.227~~chal enge.235 According to the case docket, the parties agreed to dismiss the case in May According to the case docket, the parties agreed to dismiss the case in May
2018. 231 “Procedures to Enhance T ransparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements Under WT O Agreements,” JOB/GC/204, November 1, 2018. 232 See, e.g., Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 18-00152 (Ct. Int’l T rade filed June 27, 2018); Severstal Exp. GmbH v. United States, No. 18-00057 (Ct. Int’l T rade May 3, 2018) (order granting joint stipulation of dismissal). 233 See Severstal Export GmbH v. United States, No. 18-00057, 2018 WL 1705298, at *2 (Ct. of Int’l T rade April 5, 2018). 234 See ibid. at *9. 235 See ibid. at *10. Another case filed in December 2019 against the steel and aluminum tariffs challenges the Congressional Research Service 38 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress ~~2018.~~
In another case, which was heard by a three-judge panel of the CIT, the American Institute for In another case, which was heard by a three-judge panel of the CIT, the American Institute for
International Steel (AIIS), a trade association, International Steel (AIIS), a trade association, ~~challenged~~chal enged the constitutionality of Congress the constitutionality of Congress ’s ’s
delegation of authority to the President under Section 232.delegation of authority to the President under Section 232.~~228~~236 The plaintiffs argued that “Congress The plaintiffs argued that “Congress
created an unconstitutional regime in section 232, in which there are created an unconstitutional regime in section 232, in which there are ~~essentially~~essential y no limits or no limits or
guidelines on the trigger or the remedies availableguidelines on the trigger or the remedies available to the President, and no alternative protections to the President, and no alternative protections
to assure that the President stays within the law, instead of making the law himself.”to assure that the President stays within the law, instead of making the law himself.”~~229~~237
On March 25, 2019, the CIT issued an opinion rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments that Congress On March 25, 2019, the CIT issued an opinion rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments that Congress
delegated too much of its legislative power to the President in Section 232 in violation of the delegated too much of its legislative power to the President in Section 232 in violation of the
Constitution’s separation of powers established.Constitution’s separation of powers established.~~230~~238 In granting the United States’ motion for In granting the United States’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the CIT held that it was bound by a 1976 Supreme Court precedent judgment on the pleadings, the CIT held that it was bound by a 1976 Supreme Court precedent
determining that Section 232 did not amount to an unconstitutional delegation because it determining that Section 232 did not amount to an unconstitutional delegation because it
established an “established an “~~intelligible~~ intel igible principle” to guide presidential action.principle” to guide presidential action.~~231~~239 One member of the three- One member of the three-
judge panel, Judge Katzmann, wrote separately to express his significant concerns about the judge panel, Judge Katzmann, wrote separately to express his significant concerns about the
ruling without openly dissenting.ruling without openly dissenting.~~232~~240 Judge Katzmann wrote that he was bound to follow Supreme Judge Katzmann wrote that he was bound to follow Supreme

~~225 See Severstal Export GmbH v. United States, No. 18-00057, 2018 WL 1705298, at *2 (Ct. of Int’l Trade April 5,~~
~~2018).~~
~~226 See ibid. at *9.~~
~~227 See ibid. at *10. Another case filed in December 2019 against the steel and aluminum tariffs challenges the~~
~~executive branch’s alleged~~ Court precedent and uphold the delegation, but questioned whether the nondelegation doctrine retained any significant meaning if a delegation as broad as that in Section 232 was permissible.241 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) affirmed the CIT’s decision, agreeing that the case was controlled by the Supreme Court precedent that “declare[d] section 232 not to violate the nondelegation doctrine.”242 AIIS asked the Supreme Court to review the Federal Circuit’s decision, but in June 2020, the Court declined to hear the case, denying AIIS’s petition for a writ of certiorari.243 Later, the CIT issued a preliminary decision in a case in which U.S. importers of Turkish steel al eged that President Trump’s increase of the Section 232 steel tariffs from 25% to 50% on U.S. imports from Turkey did not have a sufficient national security rationale, did not follow statutory procedural mandates, and violated the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment Due Process rights because the action “creates an arbitrary distinction between importers of steel products from Turkey and importers of steel products from al other sources.”244 In a decision denying the United States’ motion to dismiss the company’s complaint in Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, the CIT executive branch’s alleged failure to meet Section 232’s statutory requirements, and its purportedly overbroad failure to meet Section 232’s statutory requirements, and its purportedly overbroad
interpretation of “threat to national security” in Section 232. Complaint at 14-17, Universal Steel Prods., Inc. v. United interpretation of “threat to national security” in Section 232. Complaint at 14-17, Universal Steel Prods., Inc. v. United
States, No. 19-00209 (Ct. Int’l States, No. 19-00209 (Ct. Int’l ~~Trade~~T rade Dec. 3, 2019). Dec. 3, 2019). ~~The case remains pending before the court.~~
~~228 Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1337 (Ct. Int’l Trade~~In February 2021, the court granted the government’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that: (1) the Section 232 steel report was not a final agency action subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act; (2) the President’s determination that the imports threatened national security was unreviewable; and (3) the duration of the tariffs did not violate Section 232. Opinion and Order at 9-28, Universal Steel Prods., Inc. v. United States, No. 19 -00209 (Ct. Int’l T rade Feb. 4, 2021). 236 Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1337 (Ct. Int’l T rade 2019), 2019), aff’d, No. 2019-, No. 2019-
1727, 2020 WL 967925 (Fed. Cir. February 28, 2020). 1727, 2020 WL 967925 (Fed. Cir. February 28, 2020).
~~229~~237 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, at 3 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, at 3 –4, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. –4, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v.
United States, No. 18-00152 (Ct. Int’l United States, No. 18-00152 (Ct. Int’l ~~Trade~~T rade July 19, 2018). July 19, 2018).
~~230~~238 Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 1344–45. Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 1344–45.
~~231~~239 Ibid Ibid. at 1340–41 (citing Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquinat 1340–41 (citing Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin ~~SNG~~ SNG Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559 –60 (1976)). –60 (1976)).
~~232~~240 IbidIbid. at 1345 (Katzmann, J., dubitante). 241 Ibid. at 1352. 242 Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 2019-1727, 2020 WL 967925, at *1 (Fed. Cir. February 28, 2020). 243 Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 19-1177, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3353, at *1 (S. Ct. June 22, 2020). See also Sarah Martinson, “ Steel Importers T ake National Security T ariff Fight T o Justices,” Law360, March 25, 2020. 244 Complaint at 1-3, T ranspacific Steel LLC v. United States, No.19-00009 (Ct. Int’l T rade January 17, 2019). Congressional Research Service 39 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress ~~at 1345 (Katzmann, J., dubitante).~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~Court precedent and uphold the delegation, but questioned whether the nondelegation doctrine~~
~~retained any significant meaning if a delegation as broad as that in Section 232 was~~
~~permissible.233 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit)~~
~~affirmed the CIT’s decision, agreeing that the case was controlled by the Supreme Court~~
~~precedent that “declare[d] section 232 not to violate the nondelegation doctrine.”234 AIIS asked~~
~~the Supreme Court to review the Federal Circuit’s decision, but in June 2020, the Court declined~~
~~to hear the case, denying AIIS’s petition for a writ of certiorari.235~~
~~More recently, the CIT issued a preliminary decision in a case in which U.S. importers of Turkish~~
~~steel alleged that the President’s increase of the Section 232 steel tariffs from 25% to 50% on~~
~~U.S. imports from Turkey did not have a sufficient national security rationale, did not follow~~
~~statutory procedural mandates, and violated the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment Due Process rights~~
~~because the action “creates an arbitrary distinction between importers of steel products from~~
~~Turkey and importers of steel products from all other sources.”236 In a decision denying the~~
~~United States’ motion to dismiss the company’s complaint in~~ ~~Transpacific Steel LLC v. United~~
~~States, the CIT~~ indicated that the President’s power to impose tariffs under Section 232, while indicated that the President’s power to impose tariffs under Section 232, while
broad, is not unlimited.broad, is not unlimited.~~237 Specifically~~245 Specifical y, the court suggested that the President must closely adhere , the court suggested that the President must closely adhere
to the procedural requirements of the statute when exercising such authority.to the procedural requirements of the statute when exercising such authority.~~238~~246 The court also The court also
determined that the company raised a plausible argument that the Executive violated determined that the company raised a plausible argument that the Executive violated
constitutional guarantees of equal protection protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process constitutional guarantees of equal protection protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause when imposing, without a rational basis, the additional steel tariffs only on imports from Clause when imposing, without a rational basis, the additional steel tariffs only on imports from
Turkey.Turkey.~~239~~247 In a July 2020 opinion, the CIT ruled that the President violated Section 232’s In a July 2020 opinion, the CIT ruled that the President violated Section 232’s
mandated procedures and the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection guarantees when issuing the mandated procedures and the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection guarantees when issuing the
proclamation doubling the tariffs on steel imports from Turkey.proclamation doubling the tariffs on steel imports from Turkey.~~240~~248
The decision in The decision in Transpacific Steel indicates that courts might scrutinize whether the executive indicates that courts might scrutinize whether the executive
branch has followed the proper procedures, including meeting statutory deadlines, when branch has followed the proper procedures, including meeting statutory deadlines, when
exercising Section 232 authority.exercising Section 232 authority.~~241~~249 Presidential action that does not follow these statutory Presidential action that does not follow these statutory
procedures may be deemed in excess of the President’s authority.procedures may be deemed in excess of the President’s authority.~~242~~

~~233 Ibid. at 1352.~~
~~234 Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 2019-1727, 2020 WL 967925, at *1 (Fed. Cir. February 28,~~
~~2020).~~
~~235 Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 19-1177, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3353, at *1 (S. Ct. June 22, 2020).~~
~~See also Sarah Martinson, “Steel Importers Take National Security Tariff Fight To Justices,” Law360, March 25, 2020.~~
~~236 Complaint at 1-3, Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, No.19-00009 (Ct. Int’l Trade January 17, 2019).~~
~~237 Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1276 (Ct. of Int’l Trade 2019).~~
~~238 Ibid. at 1275–76.~~
~~239 Ibid. at 1270.~~
~~240 Opinion at 22, Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, No. 19-00009 (Ct. of Int’l Trade July 14, 2020).~~
~~241 See ibid. at 1276.~~
~~242 See ibid. At least one U.S. importer has challenged the Department of Commerce’s exclusion process for Section~~
~~232 tariffs. In JSW Steel, Inc. v. United States, the plaintiff argues that Commerce’s failure to grant the company’s~~
~~products an exclusion from the steel tariffs violated the Administrative Procedure Act because the Agency improperly~~
~~determined that the U.S. market could furnish the products “in a sufficient quantity or quality on a timely basis to~~
~~replace the steel slab [the plaintiff] currently imports.” Complaint at 13-14, JSW Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 19-~~
~~00133 (July 30, 2019). On August 5, 2020, the CIT remanded the case to the Department of Commerce, instructing the~~
~~agency to (1) supplement the administrative record that it relied upon when denying the company’s exclusion requests,~~
~~and (2) to reconsider its decisions on those requests.~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~
250 Companies have also had some success chal enging the government’s denial of an exclusion request. U.S. importers have chal enged the Department of Commerce’s exclusion process for Section 232 tariffs. In JSW Steel, Inc. v. United States, the plaintiff argued that Commerce’s failure to grant the company’s products an exclusion from the steel tariffs violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The company asserted that the Agency improperly determined the U.S. market could furnish the products “in a sufficient quantity or quality on a timely basis to replace the steel slab [the plaintiff] currently imports.”251 According to the case docket, on August 5, 2020, the CIT remanded the case to the Department of Commerce, instructing the agency to (1) supplement the administrative record that it relied upon when denying the company’s exclusion requests, and (2) to reconsider its decisions on those requests. In September 2020, the federal government settled the case with JSW, agreeing to refund the duties paid on the items that would have benefited from an approved exclusion request without admitting liability.252 Although plaintiffs have had some success in chal enging the denial of individual requests, in March 2021, the CIT rejected a broad constitutional chal enge to the tariff exclusion process.253 The court held that the Department of Commerce could grant tariff exclusions on imports of a particular metal product only to those companies that requested the exclusion without violating the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution.254 245 T ranspacific Steel LLC v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1276 (Ct. of Int’l Trade 2019). 246 Ibid. at 1275–76. 247 Ibid. at 1270. 248 Opinion at 22, T ranspacific Steel LLC v. United States, No. 19-00009 (Ct. of Int’l Trade July 14, 2020). 249 See ibid. at 1276. 250 See ibid. 251 Complaint at 13-14, JSW Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 19-00133 (Ct. Int’l T rade July 30, 2019). 252 Confidential Order, JSW Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 19-00133 (Ct. Int’l Trade Sept. 21, 2020). 253 Opinion at 21, T hyssenkrupp Materials NA Inc. v. United States, No. 20 -00093 (Ct. Int’l T rade Mar. 10, 2021). 254 Id. T he court also dismissed the plaintiff’s claims that the exclusion process reflects an unlawful interpretation of the President’s tariff proclamations. Id. T he Uniformity Clause requires that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art I. § 8, cl. 1. Congressional Research Service 40 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress
Proclamation Imposing Tariffs on Steel-Derivative Products
As noted, in a January 2020 proclamation, President Trump expanded the steel and aluminum As noted, in a January 2020 proclamation, President Trump expanded the steel and aluminum
tariffs to cover derivative products (e.g., steel nails, tacks, drawing pins, and stranded wire).tariffs to cover derivative products (e.g., steel nails, tacks, drawing pins, and stranded wire).~~243~~255 On On
February 4, 2020, a U.S. importer of steel-derivative products sued the United States in the CIT, February 4, 2020, a U.S. importer of steel-derivative products sued the United States in the CIT,
seeking a temporary restraining order preventing CBP from collecting the additional duties.seeking a temporary restraining order preventing CBP from collecting the additional duties.~~244~~
256 The company The company ~~argues~~argued that the that the ~~President’s~~ imposition of the tariffs failed to follow required imposition of the tariffs failed to follow required
statutory procedures; occurred after the statutory deadline for action; and violated the company’s statutory procedures; occurred after the statutory deadline for action; and violated the company’s
constitutional rights, among other things.constitutional rights, among other things.~~245~~257 On February 13, On February 13, 2020, with the consent of both parties, a with the consent of both parties, a
judge issued an order enjoining CBP from collecting the additionaljudge issued an order enjoining CBP from collecting the additional duties and requiring the duties and requiring the
plaintiff-company to post a bond for the duties until the CIT reaches a final judgment on the plaintiff-company to post a bond for the duties until the CIT reaches a final judgment on the
merits of the plaintiff’s complaint.merits of the plaintiff’s complaint.~~246 The case remains pending before the CIT.247~~
~~WTO Cases~~
~~The President’s~~258 In February 2021, the court dismissed al but one of the company’s claims: that the presidential proclamation is invalid because it was issued after the statutory deadline for action.259 In April 2021, the CIT granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on this claim, determining that the untimely presidential proclamation was “invalid as contrary to law.”260 WTO Cases The U.S. imposition of tariffs on certain imports of steel and aluminum products, imposition of tariffs on certain imports of steel and aluminum products,~~248 as well~~
as 261 as wel as Commerce’s exemption of certain WTO members’ products from such tariffs, may also have Commerce’s exemption of certain WTO members’ products from such tariffs, may also have
implications for the United States under WTO agreements. As an example, on April 9, 2018, implications for the United States under WTO agreements. As an example, on April 9, 2018,
China took the first step in China took the first step in ~~challenging~~chal enging the executive branch’s actions as violating U.S. the executive branch’s actions as violating U.S.
obligations under the WTO agreements (particularly the Agreement on Safeguards) by requesting obligations under the WTO agreements (particularly the Agreement on Safeguards) by requesting
consultations with the United States.consultations with the United States.~~249~~262 Under WTO dispute settlement rules, members must first Under WTO dispute settlement rules, members must first
attempt to settle their disputes through consultations. If consultations fail, the member initiating a attempt to settle their disputes through consultations. If consultations fail, the member initiating a
dispute may request the establishment of a dispute settlement panel composed of trade experts to dispute may request the establishment of a dispute settlement panel composed of trade experts to
determine whether a country has violated WTO rules.determine whether a country has violated WTO rules.~~250~~263 In October 2018, China requested the In October 2018, China requested the
~~formation of such a panel.251 Other WTO members have requested consultations with the United~~

~~243~~ 255 Presidential Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020, Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Presidential Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020, Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and
Derivative Steel Articles into the United States, 85Derivative Steel Articles into the United States, 85 Federal Register 5281 (January 29, 2020). 5281 (January 29, 2020).
~~244~~256 Motion for Motion for ~~Temporary~~T emporary Restraining Order at 1-6, PrimeSource Bldg. Restraining Order at 1-6, PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United States, No. 20-00032 Prods., Inc. v. United States, No. 20-00032
(February 4, 2020). (February 4, 2020).
~~245~~257 Id.
~~246~~258 Order at 1-3, PrimeSource Bldg. Order at 1-3, PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United States, No. 20-00032 (February 13, 2020). Prods., Inc. v. United States, No. 20-00032 (February 13, 2020).
~~247~~259 PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United States, 2021 WL 276338, *1 (Ct. Int’l T rade Jan. 27, 2021). 260 PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United States, 2021 Ct. Intl. T rade LEXIS 36, *12-13 (Ct. Int’l T rade Apr. 5, 2021). Several other companies have also filed Several other companies have also filed cases at the CITcases at the CIT challenging the President’s January 2020 Proclamation challenging the President’s January 2020 Proclamation
imposing tariffs on steel- and aluminum- derivative products. imposing tariffs on steel- and aluminum- derivative products. See, e.g.,, Complaint at 19-25, J. Conrad Ltd. Complaint at 19-25, J. Conrad Ltd. Vv. United . United
States, No. 20-00052 (Ct. Int’l States, No. 20-00052 (Ct. Int’l ~~Trade~~T rade Mar. 2, 2020); Complaint at 17 Mar. 2, 2020); Complaint at 17 -23, Aslanbas Nail & Wire Co. v. United States,-23, Aslanbas Nail & Wire Co. v. United States,
No. 20-00049 (Ct. Int’l Trade Feb. 26, 2020). In June 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motions for temporary No. 20-00049 (Ct. Int’l Trade Feb. 26, 2020). In June 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motions for temporary
restraining orders and preliminary injunctions against implementation of the proclamation in the restraining orders and preliminary injunctions against implementation of the proclamation in the J. Conrad case, stating case, stating
that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate the likelihood of irreparable harm from the proclamation. Slip op. at 2, J. that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate the likelihood of irreparable harm from the proclamation. Slip op. at 2, J.
Conrad Ltd. V.Conrad Ltd. V. United States, No. 20-00052 (Ct. Int’l United States, No. 20-00052 (Ct. Int’l ~~Trade~~T rade June 1, 2020). June 1, 2020).
~~248~~261 For legal For legal ~~background~~ background on the tariff measures, see CRSon the tariff measures, see CRS Legal SidebarLegal Sidebar LSB10097, LSB10097, UPDATE: Threats to National
Security Foiled? A Wrap Up of New ~~Tariffs~~ Tariffs on Steel and ~~Aluminum~~Alum inum , by Brandon J. Murrill. , by Brandon J. Murrill.
~~249~~262 Request Request for Consultations by China, for Consultations by China, U.S.—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, WT/DS/544/1 (Apr. , WT/DS/544/1 (Apr.
9, 2018) [hereinafter 9, 2018) [hereinafter Request for Consultations]. ]. ~~This~~T his report does not examine potential implications under other report does not examine potential implications under other
international agreements to which the United States isinternational agreements to which the United States is a party, such as other U.S. freea party, such as other U.S. free trade agreements. trade agreements.
~~250 WTO~~263 WT O Understanding on Rules Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) arts. 3-6. A and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) arts. 3-6. A ~~WTO~~WT O
Member may appeal a panel’s report to the Member may appeal a panel’s report to the ~~WTO~~WT O Appellate Body, id. art. 17(1), however that Body stopped Congressional Research Service 41 link to page 50 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress formation of such a panel.264 Other WTO members have requested consultations with the United ~~Appellate Body, id. art. 17(1), however that Body stopped~~
~~functioning as of December 11, 2019, when it lost its quorum, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10385,~~ ~~The WTO’s~~
~~Appellate Body Loses Its Quorum: Is This the Beginning of the End for the “Rules-Based Trading System”?, by~~
~~Brandon J. Murrill. The text of the DSU and other WTO agreements discussed in this report are available at~~
~~https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/final_e.htm.~~
~~251 Items proposed for consideration at the next meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body, WTO/AIR/DSB/70, Oct. 19,~~
~~2018.~~
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~~link to page 48~~ ~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

States, or have joined existing requests, and panels have been composed to hear the cases (see States, or have joined existing requests, and panels have been composed to hear the cases (see
Figure 9).
In its request, China In its request, China ~~alleged~~al eged that the U.S. tariff measures and exemptions are contrary to U.S. that the U.S. tariff measures and exemptions are contrary to U.S.
obligations under several provisions of the GATT, the foundational WTO agreement that sets obligations under several provisions of the GATT, the foundational WTO agreement that sets
forth binding rules on internationalforth binding rules on international trade in goods.trade in goods.~~252~~265 In particular, China In particular, China ~~alleged~~al eged that the that the
measures violate GATT Article II, which measures violate GATT Article II, which ~~generally~~general y prohibits members from imposing duties on prohibits members from imposing duties on
imported goods in excess of upper limits to which they agreed in their Schedules of Concessions imported goods in excess of upper limits to which they agreed in their Schedules of Concessions
and Commitments.and Commitments.~~253~~266 It further It further ~~alleged~~al eged that Commerce’s granting of exemptions from the import that Commerce’s granting of exemptions from the import
tariffs to some WTO member countries, but not to China, violates GATT Article I, which tariffs to some WTO member countries, but not to China, violates GATT Article I, which
obligates the United States to treat China’s goods no less favorably than the goods of other WTO obligates the United States to treat China’s goods no less favorably than the goods of other WTO
members (i.e., the so-members (i.e., the so-~~called~~cal ed most-favored-nation treatment principle). most-favored-nation treatment principle).~~254~~267 China also maintained China also maintained
that the Section 232 tariff measures are “in substance” a safeguard measure intended to that the Section 232 tariff measures are “in substance” a safeguard measure intended to ~~alleviate~~al eviate
injury to a domestic industry from increased quantities of imported steel that compete with injury to a domestic industry from increased quantities of imported steel that compete with
domestic steel, but that the United States did not make the proper findings and follow the proper domestic steel, but that the United States did not make the proper findings and follow the proper
procedures for imposing such a measure, as required by the GATT and WTO Safeguards procedures for imposing such a measure, as required by the GATT and WTO Safeguards
Agreement.Agreement.~~255~~268
The United States has invoked the so- The United States has invoked the so-~~called~~cal ed national security exception in GATT Article XXI in national security exception in GATT Article XXI in
defense of the steel and aluminum tariffs. GATT Article XXI states, in relevant part, that the defense of the steel and aluminum tariffs. GATT Article XXI states, in relevant part, that the
~~GATT256 will not~~
be GATT269 wil not be construed ...construed ... ~~(b) to prevent any [member country] from taking any action which~~ (b) to prevent any [member country] from taking any action wh ich it it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
~~(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;~~
~~(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in~~
~~other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying~~
~~a military establishment; [or]~~
~~(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.~~

~~252 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT) art. II.~~
~~253 GATT Article II limits the charges that WTO~~ functioning as of December 11, 2019, when it lost its quorum, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10385, The WTO’s Appellate Body Loses Its Quorum: Is This the Beginning of the End for the “Rules-Based Trading System”?, by Brandon J. Murrill. T he text of the DSU and other WT O agreements discussed in this report are available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/final_e.htm. 264 Items proposed for consideration at the next meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body, WT O/AIR/DSB/70, Oct. 19, 2018. 265 General Agreement on T ariffs and T rade 1994 (GAT T ) art. II. 266 GAT T Article II limits the charges that WT O Members can impose in connection with the import of products. It Members can impose in connection with the import of products. It
provides that a provides that a ~~WTO~~WT O Member shall not impose “ordinary customs duties” in excess of the bound Member shall not impose “ordinary customs duties” in excess of the bound tariff rates set forth in tariff rates set forth in
that Member’s Schedulethat Member’s Schedule of Concessions. It also barsof Concessions. It also bars “other duties and charges of any kind imposed in “other duties and charges of any kind imposed in ~~connection~~conn ection with with
the importation” of products in excess of charges levied on the date of the tariff concession. A member’s schedulethe importation” of products in excess of charges levied on the date of the tariff concession. A member’s schedule is a is a
list of specific commitments as to tariffs and other trade barriers. list of specific commitments as to tariffs and other trade barriers. Goods Schedules: ~~Members’ Commitments~~~~, WORLD~~
~~TRADE~~Mem bers’ Com m itm ents, WORLD T RADE ORG, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm. ORG, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm. ~~The GATT~~ T he GAT T provides limited provides limited
waysways in whichin which ~~WTO~~ WT O members may modify the bound tariff rates. members may modify the bound tariff rates. E.g., , ~~GATT~~ GAT T art. XXVIII (establishing procedures for art. XXVIII (establishing procedures for
negotiations among negotiations among ~~WTO~~WT O members on changes to a member’s bound members on changes to a member’s bound tariff rates in its schedules). tariff rates in its schedules).
~~254~~267 Request for Consultations at 2; at 2; ~~GATT~~ GAT T art. I:1 (“With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on art. I:1 (“With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on
or in connection with importation or exportation ..., and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, or in connection with importation or exportation ..., and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges,
and with respect to all rulesand with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation ... any advantage, favour, and formalities in connection with importation and exportation ... any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country
shall be accordedshall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destinedimmediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all for the territories of all
other contracting parties.”). China also alleged that the measures violate other contracting parties.”). China also alleged that the measures violate ~~GATT~~ GAT T Article X:3(a), arguingArticle X:3(a), arguing that the United that the United
States “failed to administer its laws,States “failed to administer its laws, regulations, decisions,regulations, decisions, and rulingsand rulings in relation to the measures at issuein relation to the measures at issue in a uniform,in a uniform,
impartial and reasonable manner.” impartial and reasonable manner.”
~~255~~268 Request for Consultations at 2. at 2.
~~256~~269 As noted, China has also alleged As noted, China has also alleged that the United States’ imposition of steel and aluminumthat the United States’ imposition of steel and aluminum tariffs violated the tariffs violated the ~~WTO~~WT O
SafeguardsSafeguards Agreement, which lacks an exception for national security interests. Agreement, which lacks an exception for national security interests. ~~This~~T his report does not analyze whether report does not analyze whether
the United States could invoke the the United States could invoke the ~~GATT~~GAT T ’s national security exception to justify a violation of the Safeguards ’s national security exception to justify a violation of the Safeguards
Agreement. Agreement.
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Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; (ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment; [or] (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.
While some analysts argue that a WTO panel may evaluate whether a WTO member’s use of the While some analysts argue that a WTO panel may evaluate whether a WTO member’s use of the
national security exception national security exception ~~falls~~fal s within one of the three provisions listed above, within one of the three provisions listed above, ~~historically~~historical y, the , the
United States has taken the position that this exception is self-judging—or, in other words, once a United States has taken the position that this exception is self-judging—or, in other words, once a
WTO member has invoked the exception to justify a measure WTO member has invoked the exception to justify a measure ~~potentially~~potential y inconsistent with its inconsistent with its
WTO obligations, a WTO panel may not proceed to the merits of the dispute to evaluate whether WTO obligations, a WTO panel may not proceed to the merits of the dispute to evaluate whether
the WTO member’s use of the exception is proper.the WTO member’s use of the exception is proper.~~257~~270 In the past, however, WTO members have In the past, however, WTO members have
expressed concern that overuse of the exception expressed concern that overuse of the exception ~~will~~ wil undermine the world trading system because undermine the world trading system because
countries might enact a multitude of protectionist measures under the guise of national security.countries might enact a multitude of protectionist measures under the guise of national security.~~258~~271
In April In April 2019, a WTO panel interpreted the national security exception in Article XXI of the 2019, a WTO panel interpreted the national security exception in Article XXI of the
GATT for the first time. In GATT for the first time. In Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, the panel determined , the panel determined
that it had jurisdiction to review whether a member’s actions were justified under Article XXI’s that it had jurisdiction to review whether a member’s actions were justified under Article XXI’s
national security exception and whether the member satisfied the requirements for invoking the national security exception and whether the member satisfied the requirements for invoking the
exception.exception.~~259~~272 As of December 11, 2019, however, the WTO’s As of December 11, 2019, however, the WTO’s ~~Appellate~~Appel ate Body lost its quorum of Body lost its quorum of
three members necessary for the Body to decide appeals of WTO dispute settlement panel three members necessary for the Body to decide appeals of WTO dispute settlement panel
decisions and issue final reports.decisions and issue final reports.~~260~~273 Because of this, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) (i.e., the Because of this, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) (i.e., the
committee composed of committee composed of ~~all~~ al WTO members that oversees the dispute settlement mechanism) can WTO members that oversees the dispute settlement mechanism) can
no longer adopt panel reports in line with the WTO’s Understanding on Rules and Procedures no longer adopt panel reports in line with the WTO’s Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).~~261~~274 Consequently, unless WTO members agree to Consequently, unless WTO members agree to
consider unadopted dispute reports as final, the DSB cannot oversee the losing member’s consider unadopted dispute reports as final, the DSB cannot oversee the losing member’s
implementation of a panel ruling or authorize the prevailingimplementation of a panel ruling or authorize the prevailing member to engage in trade retaliation member to engage in trade retaliation
if the losing member ignores the dispute panel’s recommendations. Thus, even if the United if the losing member ignores the dispute panel’s recommendations. Thus, even if the United
States or one of its trading partners prevails in a dispute over the Section 232 or retaliatory tariffs, States or one of its trading partners prevails in a dispute over the Section 232 or retaliatory tariffs,
there are significant doubts as to whether the ruling would be enforceable under WTO there are significant doubts as to whether the ruling would be enforceable under WTO
procedures.procedures.
Prior to December 2019, if one of the WTO panels had rendered an adverse decision against the Prior to December 2019, if one of the WTO panels had rendered an adverse decision against the
United States, the United States would be expected to remove the tariffs, United States, the United States would be expected to remove the tariffs, ~~generally within a~~
~~reasonable period of time, or face the possibility of paying compensation to the complaining~~
~~member or be subject to certain countermeasures allowed under the rules.262 Such~~

~~257~~general y within a 270 See, e.g.,, Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting HeldDispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on October 23, 2017, in the Centre William Rappard on October 23, 2017,
¶ 4.9, WT¶ 4.9, WT /DSB/M/403 (Feb. 20, 2018) (noting that a U.S. representative, in commenting on the United Arab Emirates’ /DSB/M/403 (Feb. 20, 2018) (noting that a U.S. representative, in commenting on the United Arab Emirates’
invocation of national security exceptions in a dispute with Qatar, had maintained that national security issues “invocation of national security exceptions in a dispute with Qatar, had maintained that national security issues “ were were
political and were not matters appropriate for adjudication in the political and were not matters appropriate for adjudication in the ~~WTO~~WT O dispute settlement system”); dispute settlement system”); ~~GATT~~ GAT T Panel Panel
Report, Report, United States—Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, ¶ 1.2, L/6053 (October 13, 1986) (noting the United 1.2, L/6053 (October 13, 1986) (noting the United
States’ argument that the national security exception in the States’ argument that the national security exception in the ~~GATT~~ GAT T “left it to each [“left it to each [~~GATT~~GAT T party] to judge what actions it party] to judge what actions it
consideredconsidered necessary for the protection of its essential security interests” and that “[a] necessary for the protection of its essential security interests” and that “[a] ~~panel~~p anel could therefore not address could therefore not address
the validity of, nor the motivation for, the United States’ invocation of [the exception]”).the validity of, nor the motivation for, the United States’ invocation of [the exception]”).
~~258~~ 271 See, See, e.g.e.g., ~~WTO~~WT O Council for Council for ~~Trade~~T rade in Goods, in Goods, National Security Cited in Two Trade Concerns at Goods Council
Meeting, WORLD , WORLD ~~TRADE~~T RADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/good_10jul17_e.htm (June 30, 2017) ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/good_10jul17_e.htm (June 30, 2017)
(discussing(discussing potential systemic risks to the world trading system from overuse of the national security exception). potential systemic risks to the world trading system from overuse of the national security exception).
~~259~~272 Report of the Panel at ¶¶ 8.1(d)(i)-(iv), Report of the Panel at ¶¶ 8.1(d)(i)-(iv), Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WT, WT /DS512/R (Apr. 5, /DS512/R (Apr. 5,
2019). 2019).
~~260~~273 Alan H. Price, Real Alan H. Price, Real ~~WTO~~WT O Reform Now Reform Now Possible With Demise of Appellate BodyPossible With Demise of Appellate Body , BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 20, , BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 20,
2019). For more on this issue, see2019). For more on this issue, see ~~CRS~~ CRS Legal SidebarLegal Sidebar LSB10385, LSB10385, The WTO’s Appellate Body Loses Its Quorum : Is
This the Beginning of the End for the “Rules-Based Trading System”?, by Brandon J. Murrill. , by Brandon J. Murrill.
~~261 WTO~~274 WT O Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 16, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm#16. Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 16, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm#16.
~~262 DSU arts. 21-22. Members whose measures are deemed inconsistent with its WTO obligations and unjustified under~~
~~one of the GATT exceptions are expected to implement the panel and/or Appellate Body’s report. Id. art. 21.3. That is,~~
~~the defending member must withdraw, modify, or replace its violative measures. See id. If a disagreement arises as to~~
~~whether the defending member has, in fact, implemented the report, a WTO panel may be convened to hear a dispute~~
~~over compliance issues. Id. art. 21.5. The WTO Appellate Body hears appeals of these compliance panel reports. Id. art.~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

Congressional Research Service 43 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress reasonable period of time, or face the possibility of paying compensation to the complaining member or be subject to certain countermeasures al owed under the rules.275 Such countermeasures might include the complaining member imposing higher duties on imports of countermeasures might include the complaining member imposing higher duties on imports of
selected products from the United States.selected products from the United States.~~263~~276 Nonetheless, several trading partners have already Nonetheless, several trading partners have already
imposed retaliatory duties on selected U.S. exports without awaiting the outcome of a dispute imposed retaliatory duties on selected U.S. exports without awaiting the outcome of a dispute
settlement proceeding.settlement proceeding.~~264~~
277 In turn, the United States has argued that unilateral imposition of tariffs in response to the U.S. In turn, the United States has argued that unilateral imposition of tariffs in response to the U.S.
Section 232 measures cannot be justified under WTO rules.Section 232 measures cannot be justified under WTO rules.~~265~~278 On July 16, 2018, the United States On July 16, 2018, the United States
filed its own WTO complaints over the retaliatory tariffs imposed by five countries (Canada, filed its own WTO complaints over the retaliatory tariffs imposed by five countries (Canada,
China, the EU, Mexico, and Turkey) in response to U.S. actions; in late August 2018, it filed a China, the EU, Mexico, and Turkey) in response to U.S. actions; in late August 2018, it filed a
similar case against Russia;similar case against Russia;~~266~~279 and in July 2019, it filed a similar case against India. and in July 2019, it filed a similar case against India.~~267~~280 Canada, Canada,
Mexico, and the United States withdrew their cases regarding the Section 232 tariffs and Mexico, and the United States withdrew their cases regarding the Section 232 tariffs and
corresponding retaliatory measures in May 2019 when the parties agreed to settle the disputes.corresponding retaliatory measures in May 2019 when the parties agreed to settle the disputes.~~268~~281
Dispute settlement panels have been composed to hear the other cases, but, as noted, there are Dispute settlement panels have been composed to hear the other cases, but, as noted, there are
questions about the viabilityquestions about the viability of the WTO’s dispute settlement system because the of the WTO’s dispute settlement system because the ~~Appellate~~Appel ate Body Body
has suspended its operations. has suspended its operations.

~~17.1.~~
263 See id. ~~art. 22.3. Ultimately, when a defending~~ According to the WTO’s website, WTO panels wil delay issuing final reports in these disputes (and the original disputes brought against the United States) until the second half of 2021 because of the global COVID-19 pandemic. 275 DSU arts. 21-22. Members whose measures are deemed inconsistent with its WT O obligations and unjustified under one of the GAT T exceptions are expected to implement the panel and/or Appellate Body ’s report. Id. art. 21.3. T hat is, the defending member must withdraw, modify, or replace its violative measures. See id. If a disagreement arises as to whether the defending member has, in fact, implemented the report, a WT O panel may be convened to hear a dispute over compliance issues. Id. art. 21.5. T he WT O Appellate Body hears appeals of these compliance panel reports. Id. art. 17.1. 276 See id. art. 22.3. Ultimately, when a defending member fails to implement a panel or Appellate Body report within member fails to implement a panel or Appellate Body report within
the established compliance period, the prevailing member may requestthe established compliance period, the prevailing member may request that the defending member negotiate a that the defending member negotiate a
compensation agreement. compensation agreement. Id. art. 22.2. If such negotiations are not requested, or if an agreement is not reached, the art. 22.2. If such negotiations are not requested, or if an agreement is not reached, the
prevailing member may also requestprevailing member may also request authorization to impose certain trade sanctions against the noncomplying member. authorization to impose certain trade sanctions against the noncomplying member.
Id. art. 22.2-22.3. Specifically, the art. 22.2-22.3. Specifically, the ~~WTO may authorize~~WT O may aut horize the prevailing member to suspend tariff concessions or other the prevailing member to suspend tariff concessions or other
trade obligations that it otherwise owes the noncomplying member under a trade obligations that it otherwise owes the noncomplying member under a ~~WTO~~WT O agreement. agreement. Id.
~~264~~277 Charles Hutzler, Charles Hutzler, China Retaliates Against Trump Tariffs with Duties on American Meat and Fruit, WALL STREET J. , WALL STREET J.
(April 1, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-retaliates-with-new-tariffs-on-u-s-meat-and-other-products-(April 1, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-retaliates-with-new-tariffs-on-u-s-meat-and-other-products-
1522618533. 1522618533.
~~265~~278 See, e.g., Committee on Safeguards,, Committee on Safeguards, Imposition of a SafeguardImposition of a Safeguard ~~Measure~~ Measure by the United States on Imports of by the United States on Imports of
AluminumAluminum and Steel: Communication from the United States in Response to China’s Requestsand Steel: Communication from the United States in Response to China’s Requests ~~Circulated~~ Circulated on 26 March on 26 March
2018, 1-2, G/SG/161/Suppl.12018, 1-2, G/SG/161/Suppl.1 (Apr. 4, 2018) (“(Apr. 4, 2018) (“ Because the actions under the Steel and Aluminum Proclamations are Because the actions under the Steel and Aluminum Proclamations are
not safeguardnot safeguard measures, the United States considers that Article 8.2 of the measures, the United States considers that Article 8.2 of the ~~Agreement~~Agreem ent on Safeguards does not justify does not justify
China’s suspension of concessions or other obligations. China has asserted no other justification for its measures, and China’s suspension of concessions or other obligations. China has asserted no other justification for its measures, and
the United States is awarethe United States is aware of none. of none. ~~Therefore~~T herefore, it appears that China’s actions have no basis under, it appears that China’s actions have no basis under ~~WTO~~ WT O rules.”) rules.”) . 279 UST R.
~~266 USTR~~, “United States Challenges, “United States Challenges ~~Five WTO~~ Five WT O Members Imposing Illegal Members Imposing Illegal ~~Tariffs~~ T ariffs Against U.S. Against U.S. Products,” press Products,” press
release, July 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/july/united-states-release, July 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/july/united-states-
challenges-five-wto. challenges-five-wto.
~~267~~280 Request for Consultations at 1-2, at 1-2, India—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States,
WTWT /DS585/1 (July 4, 2019). /DS585/1 (July 4, 2019).
~~268~~281 Notification of a Mutually Agreed Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, Solution, Mexico—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, ,
WTWT /DS560/4 (June 3, 2019); Notification of a Mutually Agreed/DS560/4 (June 3, 2019); Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, Solution, United States—Certain Measures on Steel
and ~~Aluminum~~ Alum inum Products, WT/DS551/13 (June 3, 2019); Notification of a Mutually AgreedWT/DS551/13 (June 3, 2019); Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, Solution, Canada—
Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States,, WTWT /DS557/4 (May 27, 2019); Notification of a /DS557/4 (May 27, 2019); Notification of a
Mutually AgreedMutually Agreed Solution, Solution, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and ~~Aluminum~~Alum inum Products,, WTWT /DS550/13 (May /DS550/13 (May
27, 2019). 27, 2019).
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Figure 9. WTO Cases Challenging the United States’ Section 232 Actions

Source: CRS based on WTO filings. CRS based on WTO filings.
Notes: The UK is included as a member The UK is included as a member of the EU for cases filed prior to January 31, 2020. Independent of the of the EU for cases filed prior to January 31, 2020. Independent of the
EU, the UK has not been a complainant or third party in the WTO Section 232 disputes. EU, the UK has not been a complainant or third party in the WTO Section 232 disputes.
Retaliation
The process of retaliation is complex given multiple layers of relevant international rules and the The process of retaliation is complex given multiple layers of relevant international rules and the
potential for unilateral action, which may or may not adhere to those existing rules. Both through potential for unilateral action, which may or may not adhere to those existing rules. Both through
agreements at the WTO and in bilateralagreements at the WTO and in bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs), the United and regional free trade agreements (FTAs), the United
States and its trading partners have agreed to maintain certain tariff levels. Those same States and its trading partners have agreed to maintain certain tariff levels. Those same
agreements include rules on potential responses, including formal dispute settlement procedures agreements include rules on potential responses, including formal dispute settlement procedures
and in some cases commensurate tariffs, when one party increases its tariffs above agreed-upon and in some cases commensurate tariffs, when one party increases its tariffs above agreed-upon
limits.282 Increased tariffs are permitted under these agreements, under specific circumstances, including for example,~~limits.269 In addition to the~~ national security considerations, national security considerations, which the Trump Administration the Trump Administration ~~has cited as~~
~~justification~~argued was the basis for its Section 232 actions for its Section 232 actions~~, increased tariffs are permitted~~. Other tariff increases al owed under these agreements under these agreements,
~~under specific circumstances, including for example,~~ include antidumping tariffs, countervailing duties, antidumping tariffs, countervailing duties,
and safeguard tariffs.and safeguard tariffs.~~270~~

~~269 Chad P. Bown,~~ 283 282 Chad P. Bown, Trump’s Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: How WTO Retaliation Typically Works,, Peterson Institute for Peterson Institute for
International Economics, March 5, 2018, https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trumps-steel-and-International Economics, March 5, 2018, https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trumps-steel-and-
aluminum-tariffs-how-wto-retaliation-typically. aluminum-tariffs-how-wto-retaliation-typically.
~~270~~283 Antidumping duties are imposed when a domestic industry is materially injured, or threatened with material injury, Antidumping duties are imposed when a domestic industry is materially injured, or threatened with material injury,
by salesby sales found to be at less than fair value in the U.S. marketfound to be at less than fair value in the U.S. market ; countervailing ; countervailing ~~duties~~dut ies are imposed when a domestic are imposed when a domestic
industry is materially injured, or threatened with material injury, as a result of sales in the U.S. market of products industry is materially injured, or threatened with material injury, as a result of sales in the U.S. market of products
found to be subsidizedfound to be subsidized by a foreign government or other public entities; and safeguardsby a foreign government or other public entities; and safeguards are provided in response to are provided in response to
injury to a domestic industry from a sharp increase in imports. For more information, see CRSinjury to a domestic industry from a sharp increase in imports. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10786, In Focus IF10786,
Safeguards: Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 , by Vivian, by Vivian C. Jones, and CRSC. Jones, and CRS In Focus IF10018, In Focus IF10018, Trade ~~Remedies:~~
~~Antidumping~~Rem edies: Antidum ping and Countervailing Duties, by Vivian C. Jones. , by Vivian C. Jones.
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Retaliatory actions have magnified the effects of U.S. Section 232 tariffs. From an economic Retaliatory actions have magnified the effects of U.S. Section 232 tariffs. From an economic
perspective, retaliation increases the scope of industries affected by the tariffs. U.S. agricultural perspective, retaliation increases the scope of industries affected by the tariffs. U.S. agricultural
exports, for example, are among the largest categories of U.S. exports targeted for retaliation, exports, for example, are among the largest categories of U.S. exports targeted for retaliation,
which may have contributed to reduced sales of certain U.S. farm products.which may have contributed to reduced sales of certain U.S. farm products.~~271 Given the scale of~~
~~U.S. motor vehicle and parts imports, if the Trump Administration moves forward with Section~~
~~232 tariffs on that sector, and U.S. trading partners respond with retaliation of a similar~~
~~magnitude, it could have significant negative effects on U.S. exporters. For example, the United~~
~~States imported roughly $62 billion of motor vehicles and parts from the EU in 2019,272 and the~~
~~EU has announced potential retaliatory tariffs on nearly $40 billion of U.S. exports should the~~
~~United States decide to impose Section 232 auto tariffs.273~~284
Retaliatory actions may also heighten concerns over the potential strain the U.S. Section 232 Retaliatory actions may also heighten concerns over the potential strain the U.S. Section 232
tariffs place on the international trading system. Many U.S. trading partners view the Section 232 tariffs place on the international trading system. Many U.S. trading partners view the Section 232
actions as protectionist and in violation of U.S. commitments at the WTO and have initiated actions as protectionist and in violation of U.S. commitments at the WTO and have initiated
WTO dispute settlement proceedings against the United States, while the Trump Administration WTO dispute settlement proceedings against the United States, while the Trump Administration
~~views~~ viewed the actions within its rights under those same commitments (see the actions within its rights under those same commitments (see “WTO Cases”~~).274~~”). The The
retaliating countries notified their retaliation to the WTO pursuant to the WTO Agreement on retaliating countries notified their retaliation to the WTO pursuant to the WTO Agreement on
Safeguards, arguing that U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs are intended to protect U.S. industry and Safeguards, arguing that U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs are intended to protect U.S. industry and
therefore are effectively safeguard tariffstherefore are effectively safeguard tariffs~~, the tariffs have not been authorized by a WTO dispute~~
~~settlement panel.275~~.285 The Trump Administration The Trump Administration ~~argues~~argued, in turn, that the retaliation violates WTO , in turn, that the retaliation violates WTO
~~rules and has~~rules, as it has not been authorized by a WTO dispute settlement panel, and responded by initiating responded by initiating additional WTO disputes. If the WTO dispute settlement additional WTO disputes. If the WTO dispute settlement
process process cannot satisfactorily resolve this conflict, it could lead to further unilateral actions and cannot satisfactorily resolve this conflict, it could lead to further unilateral actions and
increasing increasing retaliation. The Biden Administration has not yet stated a position on the ongoing WTO cases~~retaliation~~. .
Economic Impacts
The Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs and resulting retaliation affect various stakeholders in The Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs and resulting retaliation affect various stakeholders in
the U.S. economy, prompting reactions from several Members of Congress, some in support and the U.S. economy, prompting reactions from several Members of Congress, some in support and
others voicing concern. Congress has others voicing concern. Congress has ~~also~~ held a number of hearings to examine the issueheld a number of hearings to examine the issue~~.276~~
since the tariffs were enacted.286 Press reports, company earnings statements, government data, and Press reports, company earnings statements, government data, and academic studies academic studies ~~to date~~ have have
suggested the U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs raised the tariff inclusive cost of imports leading to suggested the U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs raised the tariff inclusive cost of imports leading to
declining demand for U.S. imports of the products subject to the tariffs, which declining demand for U.S. imports of the products subject to the tariffs, which ~~allowed~~al owed domestic domestic
steel and aluminum producers to increase domestic prices and expand output for a time.steel and aluminum producers to increase domestic prices and expand output for a time.~~277~~287 In turn, downstream domestic industries (e.g., manufacturers using steel and aluminum as inputs) and consumers have likely faced higher costs than they would have without the tariffs in place.288 Trade data suggest other countries’ retaliatory tariffs have also had negative effects on U.S. industry by reducing demand for certain U.S. exports (see “Retaliation”). Most studies assessing the tariffs’ overal economic impact estimate a negative effect on U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) (see “Aggregate Effects on the U.S. Economy”). Some groups supporting the tariff actions, however, argue that potential negative effects on the broader economy are exaggerated and that such effects are outweighed by the benefits to the domestic 284 For more information, see CRS Report R45903, Retaliatory Tariffs and U.S. Agriculture, by Anita Regmi. 285 For example, see European Union, “United States – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Union,” WT O WT /DS548/14, October 19, 2018. 286 See, ~~In turn,~~

~~271 For more information, see CRS Report R45903, Retaliatory Tariffs and U.S. Agriculture, by Anita Regmi.~~
~~272 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. International Transactions,” Table 1.3, June 19, 2020 release,~~
~~https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=62&step=1.~~
~~273 “Threat of Auto Import Tariffs Remains Despite Lapsed Deadline,” Wall Street Journal, November 21, 2019.~~
~~274 For example, see China, “United States – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products Request for~~
~~Consultations by China,” WTO WT/DS544/1, April 9, 2018; and United States, “Certain Measures on Steel and~~
~~Aluminum Products,” WTO WT/DS544/2, April 17, 2018.~~
~~275 For example, see European Union, “United States – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products Request for~~
~~the Establishment of a Panel by the European Union,” WTO WT/DS548/14, October 19, 2018.~~
~~276 See,~~ for example, 115th Congress, the House Ways and Means Committee held hearings examining the potential for example, 115th Congress, the House Ways and Means Committee held hearings examining the potential
economic implications of the tariffs and the product exclusion process, andeconomic implications of the tariffs and the product exclusion process, and ~~its Trade~~ its T rade Subcommittee held a hearing on Subcommittee held a hearing on
the effects on U.S. agriculturalthe effects on U.S. agricultural producers. producers. ~~The~~T he Senate Finance Committee also held a hearing during Senate Finance Committee also held a hearing during ~~the 115th~~ the 115 th Congress Congress
with Commerce Secretary Rosswith Commerce Secretary Ross to discussto discuss the Administration’s Section 232 investigations and the potential impacts of the Administration’s Section 232 investigations and the potential impacts of
Section 232 auto tariffs. In the 116th Congress, the House Committee on Financial Services held a hearing on the Section 232 auto tariffs. In the 116th Congress, the House Committee on Financial Services held a hearing on the
impact of recent trade policies on the U.S. economy. impact of recent trade policies on the U.S. economy.
~~277~~287 Sources Sources cited throughout this section. For an overview of the estimated effects of the tariffs on the U.S. economy, cited throughout this section. For an overview of the estimated effects of the tariffs on the U.S. economy,
see Congressional Budgetsee Congressional Budget Office, Office, The Budget and ~~Economic~~Econom ic Outlook: 2020 to 2030 , January 28, 2020, p. 33, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-01/56020-CBO-Outlook.pdf. 288 Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David E. Weinstein, "T he Impact of the 2018 T ariffs on Prices and Welfare," Journal of Econom ic Perspectives, vol. 33, no. 4 (Fall 2019), pp. 188-189. Congressional Research Service 46 link to page 53 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress steel and aluminum industries in any case.289 Over the past year, the global pandemic and recession caused major disruptions to both supply and demand for many industrial goods making it difficult to separate the effect of the tariffs from broader economic shifts. Industry-Level Dynamics of the Tariff Increase Changes in tariffs affect economic activity directly by influencing the price of imported goods ~~, January 28, 2020, p. 33,~~
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~~downstream domestic industries (e.g., manufacturers using steel and aluminum as inputs) and~~
~~consumers have faced higher costs. Trade data suggest other countries’ retaliatory tariffs have had~~
~~negative effects on U.S. industry by reducing demand for certain U.S. exports (see “Retaliation”).~~
~~Most studies attempting to measure the overall economic effects of the tariffs estimate a negative~~
~~impact on U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) as a result of the tariffs. Some groups supporting~~
~~the tariff actions, however, argue that potential negative effects on the broader economy are~~
~~exaggerated and that such effects are outweighed by the benefits to the domestic steel and~~
~~aluminum industries in any case.278 President Trump’s May 2019 decision to exempt Canada and~~
~~Mexico, which accounted for more than 30% of affected steel and aluminum imports, have likely~~
~~lessened the effects of the Section 232 tariffs. However, on August 16, 2020, President Trump~~
~~reinstated tariffs on a significant share of aluminum imports from Canada (covering $2.5 billion~~
~~of U.S. imports in 2019). In addition, academic studies suggest that the Administration’s broader~~
~~tariff actions—including Section 301 tariffs on imports from China and China’s subsequent~~
~~retaliation—and increased uncertainty from the Administration’s various tariff actions may~~
~~further depress U.S. and global economic growth, which would have negative implications for~~
~~U.S. steel and aluminum producers as well as downstream industries (see~~ ~~“Aggregate Effects on~~
~~the U.S. Economy”). In the near term, however, the supply and demand shocks resulting from the~~
~~COVID-19 pandemic and associated economic downturn may outweigh tariff-related economic~~
~~effects in steel, aluminum, and downstream industries.~~
~~Industry-Level Dynamics of the Tariff Increase~~
~~Changes in tariffs affect economic activity directly by influencing the price of imported goods~~
and indirectly through changes in exchange rates and real incomes. The extent of the price change and indirectly through changes in exchange rates and real incomes. The extent of the price change
and its impact on trade flows, employment, and production in the United States and abroad and its impact on trade flows, employment, and production in the United States and abroad
depend on resource constraints and how various economic actors (foreign producers of the goods depend on resource constraints and how various economic actors (foreign producers of the goods
subject to the tariffs, producers of domestic substitutes, producers in downstream industries, and subject to the tariffs, producers of domestic substitutes, producers in downstream industries, and
consumers) respond as the effects of the increased tariffs reverberate throughout the economy. consumers) respond as the effects of the increased tariffs reverberate throughout the economy.
Several industry-level dynamics that occurred after the increase in steel and aluminum tariffs are Several industry-level dynamics that occurred after the increase in steel and aluminum tariffs are
described below. Tariffs, however, are only one of many variables influencing market conditions. described below. Tariffs, however, are only one of many variables influencing market conditions.
  Tariffs raise the costs of imports relative to domestic goods, which may have
given domestic steel and aluminum producers the ability to raise prices, at least temporarily,
relative to foreign competitors. Both foreign and domestic producers may Both foreign and domestic producers may
respond to increased tariffs. Domestic firms are likely to increase their prices in respond to increased tariffs. Domestic firms are likely to increase their prices in
response to the new tariff protection, while foreign producers may lower their response to the new tariff protection, while foreign producers may lower their
prices and absorb a portion of the tariff increase in order to remain competitive in prices and absorb a portion of the tariff increase in order to remain competitive in
the U.S. market.the U.S. market.~~279~~290 Foreign producers’ response determines the Foreign producers’ response determines the tariff “pass-tariff “pass-
through” rate, and most early economic studies of the tariff actions through” rate, and most early economic studies of the tariff actions found that the U.S. Section 232 tariffs had largely been passed through to downstream industries and consumers with little effect on foreign export prices.291 A more recent study, however, found that foreign steel producers absorbed some share of the tariff increases, potential y lowering their export prices by as much as 50%.292 BLS data on domestic producer and import price indices for broad categories of steel and aluminum suggest that price differences between domestic and imported steel and aluminum increased after the Section 232 tariffs took effect in March 2018. For steel, the domestic producer price index increased by 20.5% from January to December 2018, while the price index for imports (excluding tariffs) increased by 8.5% (see Figure 10). By the end of 2019, after Canada and Mexico were exempted from the additional duties, domestic and imported steel 289 See ~~found that the~~

~~https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-01/56020-CBO-Outlook.pdf.~~
~~278 See~~ for example: Jeff Ferry, for example: Jeff Ferry, Steel & Aluminum Tariffs Produce Minimal Impact on Jobs, GDP, Coalition for a , Coalition for a
Prosperous America, March 2018, https://www.prosperousamerica.org/Prosperous America, March 2018, https://www.prosperousamerica.org/
steel_aluminum_tariffs_produce_minimal_impact_on_jobs_gdpsteel_aluminum_tariffs_produce_minimal_impact_on_jobs_gdp ; and Robert E. Scott, ; and Robert E. Scott, ~~Aluminum~~ Alum inum Tariffs Have Led to a
Strong Recovery in ~~Employment~~Em ploym ent, Production, and ~~Investment in Primary Aluminum and Downstream~~ Investm ent in Prim ary Alum inum and Downst ream Industries, ,
Economic Policy Institute, December 11, 2018, https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-tariffs-have-led-to-a-strong-Economic Policy Institute, December 11, 2018, https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-tariffs-have-led-to-a-strong-
recovery-in-employment-production-and-investment-in-primary-aluminum-and-downstream-industries/. recovery-in-employment-production-and-investment-in-primary-aluminum-and-downstream-industries/.
~~279~~290 Mary Amiti, Sebastian Mary Amiti, Sebastian Heise, and Noah Kwicklis,Heise, and Noah Kwicklis, “ “Will New SteelWill New Steel ~~Tariffs~~ T ariffs Protect U.S. Jobs?,” Federal Protect U.S. Jobs?,” Federal Reserve Reserve
Bank of NewBank of New York, York, Liberty Street ~~Economics~~Econom ics (blog), April 19, 2018, http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/, April 19, 2018, http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/
2018/04/will-new-steel-tariffs-protect-us-jobs.html. 2018/04/will-new-steel-tariffs-protect-us-jobs.html.
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~U.S. Section 232 tariffs had largely been passed through to downstream~~
~~industries and consumers with little effect on foreign export prices.280 A more~~
~~recent study, however, found that foreign steel producers absorbed some share of~~
~~the tariff increases, potentially lowering their export prices by as much as 50%.281~~

~~BLS data on domestic producer and import price indices for broad categories of~~
~~steel and aluminum suggest that price differences between domestic and~~
~~imported steel and aluminum increased after the Section 232 tariffs took effect in~~
~~March 2018. For steel, the domestic producer price index increased by 20.5%~~
~~from January to December 2018, while the price index for imports (excluding~~
~~tariffs) increased by 8.5% (see Figure 10). By the end of 2019, after Canada and~~
~~Mexico were exempted from the additional duties, domestic and imported steel~~
~~prices had become more closely aligned, but by June 2020 had widened again, at~~
~~5.7% and 9.3% below their January 2018 levels, respectively~~291 For example, see Alberto Cavallo, et al., Tariff Passthrough at the Border and at the Store: Evidence from U.S. Trade Policy, Becker Friedman Institute, Working Paper No. 2019-124, October 2019, https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/BFI_WP_2019124-1.pdf. 292 Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David E. Weinstein, Who’s Paying for the U.S. Tariffs? A Longer-Term Perspective, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 26610, January 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26610. Congressional Research Service 47 link to page 53 link to page 54 link to page 54 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress prices had become more closely aligned. For aluminum, . For aluminum,
both domestic and import prices both domestic and import prices ~~have~~ drifted lower in 2019 and drifted lower in 2019 and the first half of 2020 after 2020 after
peaking in mid-2018peaking in mid-2018~~. Import~~, but import prices prices ~~fell~~ fel at a faster rate throughout the periodat a faster rate throughout the period~~, but~~
~~as of~~. Since June 2020, June 2020, ~~domestic and imported~~both imported and domestic aluminum prices have increased significantly (see ~~aluminum prices had largely converged~~
~~at 14.1% and 13.3% below their January 2018 levels (see~~ Figure 11).
Figure 10. Steel Price Indices
Figure 11. Aluminum Price Indices
(monthly % change from January 2018) (monthly % change from January 2018)
(monthly % change from January 2018) (monthly % change from January 2018)

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Notes: Based period set to January 2018. Based period set to January 2018.
Notes: Base period set to January 2018. Base period set to January 2018.
Production series Production series ID = PCU3311 and import ID = PCU3311 and import
Production series Production series ID = PCU3313 and import ID = PCU3313 and import
series series ID = EIUIZ3311. Import price index ID = EIUIZ3311. Import price index
series series ID = EIUIZ3313. Import price index ID = EIUIZ3313. Import price index
excludes tariffs. excludes tariffs.
excludes tariffs. excludes tariffs.
  U.S. steel and aluminum production initially expanded and U.S. imports
declined as demand for goods produced domestically increased relative to
demand for imported goods ( (~~see Figure 12 and~~ se e Figure 12 and Figure 13).). Although U.S. steel Although U.S. steel
and aluminum producers increased prices relative to foreign producers in 2018 and aluminum producers increased prices relative to foreign producers in 2018
and 2019, the additional tariff costs on imports, which were largely passed and 2019, the additional tariff costs on imports, which were largely passed
through to downstream firms (as discussed above), put downward pressure on through to downstream firms (as discussed above), put downward pressure on

~~280 For example, see Alberto Cavallo, et al.,~~ ~~Tariff Passthrough at the Border and at the Store: Evidence from U.S.~~
~~Trade Policy, Becker Friedman Institute, Working Paper No. 2019-124, October 2019, https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-~~
~~content/uploads/BFI_WP_2019124-1.pdf.~~
~~281 Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David E. Weinstein,~~ ~~Who’s Paying for the U.S. Tariffs? A Longer-Term~~
~~Perspective, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 26610, January 2020, https://www.nber.org/~~
~~papers/w26610.~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~demand for imports.282~~demand for imports.293 By the first quarter of 2020, U.S. real imports of steel and By the first quarter of 2020, U.S. real imports of steel and
aluminum (adjusted for price fluctuations) had decreased by more than 30% and aluminum (adjusted for price fluctuations) had decreased by more than 30% and
16%, respectively, compared to their average quarterly values in 2017, the year 16%, respectively, compared to their average quarterly values in 2017, the year
before the tariffs went into effect.before the tariffs went into effect.~~283~~
294
By contrast, U.S. production increased By contrast, U.S. production increased ~~over much of the period since~~in the first two years after the tariffs the tariffs
took took effect.~~effect. Anticipating higher domestic demand and less foreign competition,~~
~~U.S. producers announced investment and production increases, including a new~~
~~electric arc furnace (which uses scrap metal to make steel), near Birmingham,~~
~~AL,284 and increased capacity at an aluminum facility in Hawesville, KY,~~
~~resulting from a multiyear project underway to restart previously curtained~~
~~capacity, among others.285~~ The increase in domestic steel and aluminum The increase in domestic steel and aluminum
production peaked in the fourth quarter of 2018 at 13.5% and 9.0%, respectively, production peaked in the fourth quarter of 2018 at 13.5% and 9.0%, respectively,
above average 2017 above average 2017 values.295 In the first and second quarters of 2020, domestic production of both metals fel ~~values.286~~

~~More recently, however, domestic production has fallen~~ sharply in line with sharply in line with
broader declines in U.S. economic activity associated with the COVID-19 broader declines in U.S. economic activity associated with the COVID-19
~~pandemic—from January to May 2020, U.S. steel and aluminum production~~
~~declined by 36% and 25%, respectively.287~~pandemic, but rebounded significantly by the end of the year. Imports remained significantly depressed throughout 2020. In April 2020, citing declining market In April 2020, citing declining market
~~conditions including the global oversupply of aluminum, falling prices, and the~~
~~economic fallout from the pandemic, Alcoa announced plans to cut production at~~
~~its aluminum smelter in Ferndale, WA, and began layoffs at the facility in June.288~~
~~Various U.S. steel facilities have announced similar plant closures, or reductions~~
~~in capacity, in recent months.289~~

~~282~~conditions including the global oversupply of 293 Downstream firms’ demand Downstream firms’ demand sensitivity to higher import prices (their price elasticity of demand) depends on the sensitivity to higher import prices (their price elasticity of demand) depends on the
degreedegree to which the steel and aluminum products produced domestically are sufficient substitutesto which the steel and aluminum products produced domestically are sufficient substitutes for the products for the products
facing the tariffs, and the availability of domestic supplies. facing the tariffs, and the availability of domestic supplies.
~~283~~294 Import statistics sourced from U.S. Census Import statistics sourced from U.S. Census ~~Bureau.~~
~~284 Bob Tita, “U.S. Steel to Expand Under Tariffs,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2019.~~
~~285 Alan Rappeport, “Trump’s Tariffs are Paying Off for Century Aluminum,” New York Times, August 20, 2018.~~
~~286 Production data are from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.~~
~~287 Monthly production data from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (series~~
~~IPN3311A2RS and IPG3313S).~~
~~288 Geoff Baker, "Alcoa Begins Laying Off Workers at its Ferndale Aluminum Plant Ahead of Schedule,"~~ ~~Seattle~~
~~Times, June 4, 2020.~~
~~289 For example, see Letter from Michael P. Madar, Vice President and General Manager, ArcelorMittal Cleveland, to~~
~~Ohio Office of Workforce Development, Rapid Response Program Manager, July 24, 2020,~~
~~https://jfs.ohio.gov/warn/pdf/ArcelorMittalClevelandIncArcelorMittalUSALLC.stm.~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~
Bureau. 295 Production data are from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Congressional Research Service 48 link to page 35 link to page 35 link to page 37 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress aluminum, fal ing prices, and the economic fal out from the pandemic, Alcoa announced plans to cut production at its Intalco aluminum smelter in Ferndale, WA, and began layoffs at the facility in June.296 Some U.S. steel facilities have announced similar plant closures, or reductions in capacity (see “U.S. Steel and Aluminum Manufacturing and Employment”).
Figure 12. Domestic Production and
Figure 13. Domestic Production and
Imports: Steel
Imports: Aluminum
(quarterly % change from 2017, real values) (quarterly % change from 2017, real values)
(quarterly % change from 2017, real values) (quarterly % change from 2017, real values)

Source: Production data fromProduction data from FederalFederal Reserve Reserve
Source: Production data fromProduction data from FederalFederal Reserve Reserve
Economic Data (FRED) and imports from U.S. Economic Data (FRED) and imports from U.S.
Economic Data (FRED) and imports from U.S. Economic Data (FRED) and imports from U.S.
Census Bureau. Census Bureau.
Census Bureau. Census Bureau.
Notes: Base period set to 2017 average. Base period set to 2017 average.
Notes: Base period set to 2017 average. Base period set to 2017 average.
Production series Production series ~~seasonally~~ seasonal y adjusted, ID = adjusted, ID =
Production series Production series ~~seasonally~~ seasonal y adjusted, ID = adjusted, ID =
IPN3311A2RSQ. Import classification IPN3311A2RSQ. Import classification = NAICS = NAICS
IPG3313S. Import classification = NAICS 3313. IPG3313S. Import classification = NAICS 3313.
3311. Data are in real terms 3311. Data are in real terms (adjusted for price (adjusted for price
Data are in real terms Data are in real terms (adjusted for price (adjusted for price
fluctuations). fluctuations).
fluctuations). fluctuations).
  The combination of higher domestic prices and the added duties on imports
led to higher input costs for some downstream industries. ~~Domestic industries~~
Academic studies suggest U.S. industries that use steel and aluminum in their products (“downstream” industries, that use steel and aluminum in their products (“downstream” industries,
including auto manufacturers and oil producers) faced higher input costs including auto manufacturers and oil producers) faced higher input costs ~~relative~~
~~to producers in other markets. Higher~~ as a result of the tariffs.297 These studies suggest that higher input costs led to some combination of input costs led to some combination of
lower profits for producers and higher lower profits for producers and higher prices for importers and consumers, which prices for importers and consumers, which
in turn may have dampened demand for downstream products, leading to some in turn may have dampened demand for downstream products, leading to some
contraction in these sectors. A study by researchers at the Federal Reserve Board, contraction in these sectors. A study by researchers at the Federal Reserve Board,
which examined effects on the manufacturing sector from which examined effects on the manufacturing sector from ~~all~~ al U.S. tariff actions U.S. tariff actions
in 2018, found that higher input costs from the tariffs were associated with higher in 2018, found that higher input costs from the tariffs were associated with higher
prices, employment declines, prices, employment declines, and reductions in output for affected firms.and reductions in output for affected firms.~~290~~
298 Another study found that the higher input costs associated with the tariffs may Another study found that the higher input costs associated with the tariffs may
have led to a decrease in U.S. exports for firms reliant on imported intermediate have led to a decrease in U.S. exports for firms reliant on imported intermediate
~~inputs. This study suggests export growth was approximately 2% lower for~~
~~products made with steel and aluminum or other goods subject to higher U.S.~~
~~tariffs, relative to unaffected products.291~~

~~Some have also pointed to higher costs for several industries relying on both~~
~~domestic and imported steel and aluminum. For example, Ford CEO James~~

~~290~~inputs. This study suggests export 296 Geoff Baker, “ Alcoa Begins Laying Off Workers at its Ferndale Aluminum Plant Ahead of Schedule,” Seattle T imes, June 4, 2020. For more information, see “ Domestic Aluminum Manufacturing”. 297 Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David E. Weinstein, "T he Impact of the 2018 T ariffs on Prices and Welfare," Journal of Econom ic Perspectives, vol. 33, no. 4 (Fall 2019), pp. 188 -189. 298 Aaron Flaaen and Justin Pierce, Aaron Flaaen and Justin Pierce, Disentangling the Effects of the 2018-2019 Tariffs on a Globally Connected U.S.
Manufacturing Sector, Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve , Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve ~~System~~Sy stem, Finance and Economics , Finance and Economics
DiscussionDiscussion ~~Series~~ Series 2019-086, December 23, 2019, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2019086pap.pdf. 2019-086, December 23, 2019, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2019086pap.pdf.
~~291 The authors suggest that the U.S. import increases had the equivalent effect of U.S. trading partners applying a 2%~~
~~tariff on U.S. exports. Kyle Handley, Fariha Kamal, and Ryan Monarch,~~ ~~Rising Import Tariffs, Falling Export Growth:~~
~~When Modern Supply Chains Meet Old-Style Protectionism, National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working~~
~~Paper No. 26611, January 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26611.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~link to page 12 link to page 54~~

~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~Hackett suggested the metal tariffs cost the auto manufacturer roughly $1 billion~~
~~in profits in 2018.292 The~~Congressional Research Service 49 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress growth was approximately 2% lower for products made with steel and aluminum or other goods subject to higher U.S. tariffs, relative to unaffected products.299 Some groups supporting the tariffs refute these estimates; a report by the Economic Policy Institute argues that increased domestic steel prices had a negligible effect on downstream manufacturers and consumer good prices.300 Several U.S companies have stated that the tariffs have increased their operating costs, and that these higher input costs for U.S. downstream firms potential y ~~higher input costs for U.S. downstream firms~~
~~potentially~~ gives their foreign competitors an advantage in the U.S. market and gives their foreign competitors an advantage in the U.S. market and
abroad.abroad. ~~Allegheny~~301 Al egheny Technologies, which uses imported steel slabs in its Technologies, which uses imported steel slabs in its
production of stainless steel sheet, cited the production of stainless steel sheet, cited the ~~Administration’s~~Section 232 tariffs in its April tariffs in its April
2020 decision to 2020 decision to close a facility in western Pennsylvania.close a facility in western Pennsylvania.~~293~~302 In January 2020, the In January 2020, the
Trump Administration expanded the Section 232 tariff actions to certain steel and Trump Administration expanded the Section 232 tariff actions to certain steel and
aluminum derivative productsaluminum derivative products ~~(see “Presidential Actions”~~), arguing that higher , arguing that higher
input costs had disadvantaged these downstream domestic manufacturers relative input costs had disadvantaged these downstream domestic manufacturers relative
to their foreign counterparts, in turn leading to more imports of the downstream to their foreign counterparts, in turn leading to more imports of the downstream
products. products.
  U.S. exports subject to ~~retaliatory~~
retaliatory tariffs declined. ~~Five U.S. trading~~Six
Figure 14. U.S. Exports Subject to Section
U.S. trading partners (China, EU, partners (China, EU, ~~India, Russia,~~
232 Retaliation
~~and Turkey) are currently imposing~~
~~(quarterly~~ India, Turkey, UK, and Russia) (% change from 2017) % change from 2017)
are currently imposing retaliatory tariffs in response to U.S. retaliatory tariffs in response to U.S.
Section 232 tariffs affecting Section 232 tariffs affecting
approximately $approximately $~~6.5 billion of~~ 7.2 bil ion of U.S. U.S.
~~annual exports (2019 value).294~~
~~Products targeted include agricultural~~
~~goods, particularly pork and nuts, as~~
~~well as steel and aluminum.295 The~~
~~retaliatory tariffs have led to~~
~~decreased demand for these U.S.~~
~~exports as they lower the~~
~~competitiveness of U.S. firms relative~~

~~to other suppliers in foreign markets.~~
Source: CRS analysis with data from the U.S. Census
~~In each of the seven quarters since the~~
~~Bureau and partner country customs agencies via~~
~~retaliatory tariffs took effect, U.S.~~
~~Trade Data Monitor.~~
~~exports to China, the EU, Russia, and~~
Notes: Base period set to 2017 average. Includes
~~Turkey subject to the additional~~
~~U.S. exports to China, the EU, Russia, and Turkey~~
~~subject to retaliation since Q2 2018. Exports~~
~~duties were roughly 25% or more~~
~~estimated using partner country import data. India~~
~~below their average quarterly value in~~
~~began imposing retaliatory tariffs in Q2 2019 and is~~
~~2017 (Figure 14).296 During the same~~
~~not included. Total U.S. exports includes all products~~
~~period, overall U.S. exports were as~~
~~exported to all countries globally.~~
~~much as 10% higher in each quarter relative to 2017 levels, suggesting the tariffs~~
~~played a large role in the product-specific export declines.~~

~~Retaliatory tariffs also have given U.S. exporters an incentive to manufacture~~

~~292 “Trump Metal Tariffs will Cost Ford $1 Billion in Profits, CEO Says,” Reuters, September 26, 2018, Business~~
~~News.~~
~~293 "Allegheny Technologies to Shutter Steel Plant, Cites Tariffs," U.S. News, April 1, 2020.~~
~~294 Canada has announced plans to reinstate retaliatory tariffs on approximately $2.5 billion of U.S. annual exports on~~
~~September 16, 2020, in response to the Trump Administration’s recent decision to resume tariff increases on certain~~
~~aluminum imports from Canada.~~
~~295 Canada and Mexico removed retaliatory tariffs affecting approximately $14.1 billion of U.S. annual exports (2019~~
~~value) after the Trump Administration exempted both countries from Section 232 tariffs in May 2019.~~
~~296 India’s retaliatory tariffs were delayed until June 2019.~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~
annual exports (2020 value).303 The retaliatory tariffs affect many products, including agricultural goods (e.g., pork, fruits, and nuts), whiskies, and Source: CRS analysis with data from partner country customs agencies via Trade Data Monitor. Notes: Base period set to 2017. Exports estimated using partner country import data. India began imposing retaliatory tariffs in 2019. 299 T he authors suggest that the U.S. import increases had the equivalent effect of U.S. trading partners applying a 2% tariff on U.S. exports. Kyle Handley, Fariha Kamal, and Ryan Monarch, Rising Im port Tariffs, Falling Export Growth: When Modern Supply Chains Meet Old-Style Protectionism , National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper No. 26611, January 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26611. 300 Adam S. Hersh and Robert E. Scott, Why Global Steel Surpluses Warrant U.S. Section 232 Import Measures, Economic Policy Institute, March 24, 2021, https://files.epi.org/pdf/218728.pdf. 301 Coalition of American Metal Manufacturers and Users, “Letter to Honorable Gina Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce,” March 15, 2021, https://www.tariffsaretaxes.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/CAMMU_232%20Raimondo_%20March%2015%202021.pdf . 302 "Allegheny T echnologies to Shutter Steel Plant, Cites T ariffs," U.S. News, April 1, 2020. 303 U.S. exports estimated using partner country import data in order to match retaliatory tariff lists with trade data. Partner country trade data accessed via T rade Data Monitor. Congressional Research Service 50 link to page 55 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress steel and aluminum.304 General y, the retaliatory tariffs appear to have led to decreased demand for these U.S. exports as they lower the competitiveness of U.S. firms relative to other suppliers in foreign markets. U.S. exports facing retaliation in the EU, UK, Russia, and Turkey have seen the largest declines, decreasing by nearly 50% since 2017 (Figure 14). U.S. exports to China subject to retaliation declined in 2018 and 2019, but increased in 2020—many of these products are included in China’s purchase commitments under the U.S.-China Phase One agreement.305 India delayed its retaliatory tariffs until 2019, after which U.S. exports of the targeted products declined. Retaliatory tariffs also have given U.S. exporters an incentive to manufacture
abroad to avoid the retaliation. Facing retaliatory tariffs on U.S. motorcycle abroad to avoid the retaliation. Facing retaliatory tariffs on U.S. motorcycle
exports to the European Union, Harley-Davidson announced its intent to shift exports to the European Union, Harley-Davidson announced its intent to shift
some of its production out of the United States to remain competitive in the EU some of its production out of the United States to remain competitive in the EU
market.market.~~297~~306 In July 2019, the company received approval from the European In July 2019, the company received approval from the European
Union to begin importing motorcycles from Thailand, facing a 6% tariff, as Union to begin importing motorcycles from Thailand, facing a 6% tariff, as
compared to the 31% tariff applied to motorcycles exported to the European compared to the 31% tariff applied to motorcycles exported to the European
Union from the United States.Union from the United States.~~298~~307 In April 2021, however, the European Commission issued a ruling requiring the EU to treat imports of Harley-Davidson motorcycles as originating from the United States, and thus subject to EU retaliatory tariffs, regardless of their production origin.308
Aggregate Effects on the U.S. Economy
In addition to industry-level effects, tariffs also have the potential to affect the broader U.S. In addition to industry-level effects, tariffs also have the potential to affect the broader U.S.
economy. For example, economy. For example, ~~several academic studies and preliminary accounts of other industry~~
~~observers appear to~~ academic studies suggest the ad hoc nature of the tariffs suggest the ad hoc nature of the tariffs ~~has~~ may have increased uncertainty in the increased uncertainty in the
U.S. business environment placing a drag on investment activity. One study found that uncertainty business environment placing a drag on investment activity. One study found that uncertainty
resulting from U.S. trade policy reduced investment by roughly 1.5% in 2018.resulting from U.S. trade policy reduced investment by roughly 1.5% in 2018.~~299~~309 U.S. tariffs may U.S. tariffs may
also reduce national consumption patterns, as the higher costs of also reduce national consumption patterns, as the higher costs of imported goods imported goods ~~potentially~~
potential y reduces consumers’ discretionary income and therefore aggregate demand. Similarly, retaliatory reduces consumers’ discretionary income and therefore aggregate demand. Similarly, retaliatory
tariffs may dent U.S. consumption to the extent they cause export declines and lower incomes in tariffs may dent U.S. consumption to the extent they cause export declines and lower incomes in
affected industries. For example, some research suggests U.S. counties most exposed to China’s affected industries. For example, some research suggests U.S. counties most exposed to China’s
retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural exports saw auto sales decline by 4%-5% relative to retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural exports saw auto sales decline by 4%-5% relative to
unaffected counties after the retaliatory tariffs were imposed.unaffected counties after the retaliatory tariffs were imposed.~~300~~ 310 304 Canada and Mexico removed retaliatory tariffs affecting approximately $14.1 billion of U.S. annual exports (2019 value) after the T rump Administration exempted both countries from Section 232 tariffs in May 2019. 305 For more information, see CRS Insight IN11208, U.S. Signs Phase One Trade Deal with China, by Karen M. Sutter. 306 “U.S. T rade War with Europe Revs Up as Harley-Davidson Shifts Production,” Financial Times, June 25, 2018. 307 “Harley-Davidson Gets EU Approval for Plan to Dodge $100-million T ariff Hit,” Los Angeles Times, July 23, 2019. 308 According to the Commission, the company’s shift in production location was motivated in part by a desire to avoid the EU’s retaliatory tariffs and therefore is not “economically justifiable” as defined in EU law. European Commission, “Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/563,” Official Journal of the European Union, April 7, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021D0563&from=EN. 309 Dario Caldara, et al., “T he Economic Effects of T rade Policy Uncertainty,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 109 (January 2020), pp. 38-59. 310 Michael E. Waugh, The Consumption Response to Trade Shocks: Evidence from the U.S.-China Trade War, National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER W orking Paper 26353, December 2019, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26353. Congressional Research Service 51 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress Some groups that support the Some groups that support the
tariffs, however, argue that estimates of their impact may tariffs, however, argue that estimates of their impact may exaggerate potential negative effects.exaggerate potential negative effects.~~301~~311
Assessing the tariffs Assessing the tariffs ~~overall~~ overal impact on the U.S. economy is in part a distributional question, given impact on the U.S. economy is in part a distributional question, given
the tariffs varied effects on producers in protected industries, downstream industries, consumers, the tariffs varied effects on producers in protected industries, downstream industries, consumers,
and exporters subject to retaliation. From a policy perspective some analysts see the and exporters subject to retaliation. From a policy perspective some analysts see the
~~Administration’s~~ Section 232 trade actions as addressing long-standing issues of fairness that are intended to trade actions as addressing long-standing issues of fairness that are intended to
provide U.S. steel and aluminum producers with a more level playing field.provide U.S. steel and aluminum producers with a more level playing field.312 Research by Research by
academic economists, however, academic economists, however, ~~generally~~general y argues the negative impact of higher prices on argues the negative impact of higher prices on
consumers and industries using consumers and industries using the imported goods outweighs the benefit of higher profits and the imported goods outweighs the benefit of higher profits and
expanded production in the import-competing industries and the additional government revenue expanded production in the import-competing industries and the additional government revenue
generated by the tariffs, generated by the tariffs, ~~especially~~especial y if the negative effects of retaliatory tariffs are taken into if the negative effects of retaliatory tariffs are taken into
consideration.consideration.~~302~~313 Quantitative estimates of the effects vary based on modeling assumptions and Quantitative estimates of the effects vary based on modeling assumptions and
techniques, but most suggest a techniques, but most suggest a ~~negative overall~~ negative overal effect on U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) as a effect on U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) as a
result of the tariffs. result of the tariffs.
The Congressional Budget Office, for example, The Congressional Budget Office, for example, ~~estimates~~estimated that the increased tariffs in effect as of that the increased tariffs in effect as of
December 2019 would reduce U.S. GDP by 0.5% in 2020, below a baseline without the tariffs, December 2019 would reduce U.S. GDP by 0.5% in 2020, below a baseline without the tariffs,

~~297 “U.S. Trade War with Europe Revs Up as Harley-Davidson Shifts Production,” Financial Times, June 25, 2018.~~
~~298 “Harley-Davidson Gets EU Approval for Plan to Dodge $100-million Tariff Hit,” Los Angeles Times, July 23, 2019.~~
~~299 Dario Caldara, et al., “The Economic Effects of Trade Policy Uncertainty,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.~~
~~109 (January 2020), pp. 38-59.~~
~~300 Michael E. Waugh, The Consumption Response to Trade Shocks: Evidence from the U.S.-China Trade War,~~
~~National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper 26353, December 2019, https://www.nber.org/papers/~~
~~w26353.~~
~~301 Robert E. Scott,~~ ~~Estimates of Jobs Lost and Economic Harm Done by Steel and Aluminum Tariffs Are Wildly~~
~~Exaggerated, Economic Policy Institute, March 21, 2018, https://www.epi.org/publication/estimates-of-jobs-lost-and-~~
~~economic-harm-done-by-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-are-wildly-exaggerated/.~~
~~302 For example, see Pablo D. Fajgelbaum, et al., “The Return to Protectionism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,~~
~~vol. 135, no. 1 (January 2020), pp. 1-55.~~
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~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~while raising consumer prices by 0.5%, thereby reducing average real household income by~~
~~$1,277.303~~while raising consumer prices by 0.5%, thereby reducing average real household income by $1,277.314 From a global perspective, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the From a global perspective, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the
tariffs would reduce global GDP in 2020 by 0.8%.tariffs would reduce global GDP in 2020 by 0.8%.~~304~~315 As these studies examine the effects of As these studies examine the effects of ~~all~~
al recent U.S. recent U.S. ~~tariffs~~tariff actions, the impact directly attributable to the Section 232 tariffs on steel and actions, the impact directly attributable to the Section 232 tariffs on steel and
aluminum is likelyaluminum is likely ~~smaller, although this could grow if the Section 232 tariffs were expanded to~~
~~U.S. motor vehicle imports.305 U.S. steel and aluminum imports subject to Section 232 tariffs~~
smal er as these tariffs accounted for less than 10% of imports affected by the accounted for less than 10% of imports affected by the Trump Administration’s tariff actionsAdministration’s tariff actions~~—imports~~
~~from China subject to Section 301 tariffs accounted for more than 90%.306~~
~~In early 2020, the~~ in 2020. The United States entered a recession United States entered a recession in 2020, as a result of the economic as a result of the economic ~~fallout~~fal out from the from the
global COVID-19 pandemic with the scale of economic disruption far outweighing estimated global COVID-19 pandemic with the scale of economic disruption far outweighing estimated
negative effects of the negative effects of the Trump Administration’s tariff actions, cited above.Administration’s tariff actions, cited above.~~307 In the second quarter of~~
~~2020, U.S. GDP declined at annualized rate of 32.9%, highlighting further deterioration in U.S.~~
~~economic conditions following a 5% decline (annualized rate) in the first quarter of 2020.308~~
316 U.S. and global GDP decreased by 3.5% and 3.3%, respectively, in 2020.317 Various stakeholders, including some Members of Congress, Various stakeholders, including some Members of Congress, ~~have called~~cal ed for suspending the for suspending the ~~tariff~~
~~increases~~U.S. tariff increases during the economic downturn, including actions under Section 232, in an effort to enhance U.S. economic growth.318 311 Robert E. Scott, Estimates of Jobs Lost and Economic Harm Done by Steel and Aluminum Tariffs Are Wildly Exaggerated, Economic Policy Institute, March 21, 2018, https://www.epi.org/publication/estimates-of-jobs-lost-and-economic-harm-done-by-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-are-wildly-exaggerated/. 312 Adam S. Hersh and Robert E. Scott, Why Global Steel Surpluses Warrant U.S. Section 232 Import Measures, Economic Policy Institute, March 24, 2021, https://files.epi.org/pdf/218728.pdf. 313 For example, see Pablo D. Fajgelbaum, et al., “T he Return to Protectionism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 135, no. 1 (January 2020), pp. 1 -55. 314 Congressional Budget ~~, including actions under Section 232, in an effort to enhance U.S. economic growth~~
~~during the downturn.309 Some beneficiaries of the increased tariffs, however, argue they are~~
~~necessary to maintain domestic production and employment during the pandemic.310~~
~~Issues for Congress~~
~~As Congress debates the Administration’s Section 232 actions it may consider the following~~
~~issues, many of which include potential legislative responses.~~
~~Possible Long-Term Effects~~
~~Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum imports have now been in place for over two years and~~
~~have no statutory expiration. Congress may explore the long-term economic consequences of the~~
~~tariffs on U.S. domestic industry, including steel and aluminum producers, downstream~~
~~manufacturers, and those sectors targeted by retaliatory tariffs. Impacts may include increased~~
~~prices and costs for steel and aluminum producers and users, respectively; changes in workforce~~

~~303 Congressional Budget~~ Office, Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2020 to 2030, January 28, 2020, p. 33, , January 28, 2020, p. 33,
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-01/56020-CBO-Outlook.pdf. https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-01/56020-CBO-Outlook.pdf.
~~304~~315 International Monetary Fund, International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Global Manufacturing Downturn, Rising Trade Barriers, ,
October 2019, pp. 31-33, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2019/10/01/world-economic-outlook-October 2019, pp. 31-33, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2019/10/01/world-economic-outlook-
october-2019. october-2019.
~~305 Motor vehicle and parts imports from Japan and the EU (the two trading partners targeted in the Administration’s~~
~~Section 232 proclamation on motor vehicles) totaled $119 billion in 2018 according to BEA data.~~
~~306 CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade, coordinated by Brock R. Williams.~~
~~307~~316 For more, see CRS For more, see CRS Report R46270, Report R46270, Global Economic Effects of COVID-19, coordinated by James K. Jackson. , coordinated by James K. Jackson.
~~308~~317 Bureau Bureau of Economic Analysis, "Gross Domestic Product, 2nd Quarter 2020 and Annual Update," press release, July of Economic Analysis, "Gross Domestic Product, 2nd Quarter 2020 and Annual Update," press release, July
30, 2020, https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/gross-domestic-product30, 2020, https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/gross-domestic-product -2nd-quarter-2020-advance-estimate-and-annual--2nd-quarter-2020-advance-estimate-and-annual-
update. update.
~~309~~318 Ana Swanson, Ana Swanson, "U.S. Weighs "U.S. Weighs ~~Tariff~~T ariff Relief but Some Fear China Will Relief but Some Fear China Will ~~Take~~T ake Advantage," Advantage," New York Times, March 15, , March 15,
2020. Representative Stephany Murphy, "Murphy, Cunningham Urge Congressional Leadership to Suspend2020. Representative Stephany Murphy, "Murphy, Cunningham Urge Congressional Leadership to Suspend ~~Tariffs~~ T ariffs in in
Upcoming Coronavirus Response Bill," press release, March 18, 2020, Upcoming Coronavirus Response Bill," press release, March 18, 2020,
https://murphy.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1254https://murphy.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1254.
~~310 United Steelworkers, "USW Calls on Congress to Continue Strict Enforcement of Trade Rules," press release,~~
~~March 26, 2020, https://m.usw.org/news/media-center/releases/2020/usw-calls-on-congress-to-continue-strict-~~
~~enforcement-of-trade-rules~~ . .
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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~~levels; shifts in global supply chains as firms seek to avoid tariffs; and potential loss of foreign~~
~~markets for domestic producers facing retaliatory tariffs.~~
~~In a 2018 Ways and Means Committee hearing on the Section 232 tariff exclusion process,~~
~~Commerce stated the “Secretary has directed Commerce Department economists to conduct semi-~~
~~annual reviews of the impacts of the steel and aluminum tariffs, including on downstream~~
~~sectors.”311 As part of its own assessment, Congress may request the Administration’s analyses.~~
~~Some Members, including~~ Some beneficiaries of the increased tariffs, however, argue they are necessary to help the industry recover from the pandemic and maintain a level playing field in the face of global overcapacity.319 Issues for Congress As Congress debates the Trump Administration’s Section 232 actions and potential action under the Biden Administration it may consider the following issues, many of which include potential legislative responses. Possible Long-Term Effects Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum imports have now been in place for over three years and have no statutory expiration. President Biden has not indicated if he wil remove or amend the tariffs, but various industry groups and Members of Congress have reached out to the Biden Administration both for and against the tariffs.320 Some Members, including then Senate Finance ~~Senate Finance~~ Chair Grassley, have Chair Grassley, have ~~suggested that the Administration~~
~~consider immediate~~also urged for tariff relief to help U.S. importers in the wake of the tariff relief to help U.S. importers in the wake of the economic downturn of economic downturn of
~~the Covid-19 pandemic.312 Representative Ron Kind noted that the re-imposition of~~ the COVID-19 pandemic.321 Congress may explore the long-term economic consequences of the tariffs on U.S. domestic industry, including steel and aluminum producers, downstream manufacturers, and those sectors targeted by retaliatory tariffs. Impacts may include increased prices and costs for steel and aluminum producers and users, respectively; changes in workforce levels; shifts in global supply chains as firms seek to avoid tariffs; and potential loss of foreign markets for domestic producers facing retaliatory tariffs. In a 2018 Ways and Means Committee hearing on the Section 232 tariff exclusion process, Commerce stated the “Secretary has directed Commerce Department economists to conduct semi-annual reviews of the impacts of the steel and aluminum tariffs, including on downstream sectors.”322 As part of its own assessment, Congress may request the Commerce Department’s analysis.~~tariffs on~~
~~Canadian aluminum will “disproportionately harm Wisconsin’s storied beer industry, which is~~
~~already facing weakened demand due to a national shortage of aluminum cans and a stagnant~~
~~economy.”313~~
Appropriate Delegation of Constitutional Authority
In enacting Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, Congress delegated aspects of its authority to In enacting Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, Congress delegated aspects of its authority to
regulate international commerce to the executive branch. Use of the statute to restrict imports regulate international commerce to the executive branch. Use of the statute to restrict imports
does not require any formal approval by Congress or an affirmative finding by an independent does not require any formal approval by Congress or an affirmative finding by an independent
agency, such as the USITC, granting the President broad discretion in applying this authority. agency, such as the USITC, granting the President broad discretion in applying this authority.
Should Congress disapprove of the President’s use of the statute, its current recourse is limited to Should Congress disapprove of the President’s use of the statute, its current recourse is limited to
passing new legislation or using informal tools to pressure the Administration (e.g., putting holds passing new legislation or using informal tools to pressure the Administration (e.g., putting holds
319 See January 2021 letters from various U.S. steel associations and the American Primary Aluminum Association to then President -Elect Biden, at https://www.steel.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Steel-Coalition-Letter-to-President -Elect -Biden-011121.pdf and https://mma.prnewswire.com/media/1419331/APAA_Biden_letter.pdf?p=pdf . 320 See, for example, Americans for Free T rade letter to President -Elect Biden, December 7, 2020, http://americansforfreetrade.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/AFT-FFT-Biden-Transition-Team-Letter-Final-120720.pdf; American Iron and Steel Institute, et al., letter to President -Elect Biden, January 11, 2021, https://www.steel.org/2021/01/urge-biden-keep-steel-tariffs/. 321 Adam Beshudi, “ Grassley: White House, Congress should consider tariff easing measures,” PoliticoPro, March 16, 2020. 322 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on T rade, Hearing on Product Exclusion Process for, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 2018, Serial No. 115-T R06, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/WM/WM04/20180724/108591/HHRG-115-WM04-Transcript-20180724.pdf. Congressional Research Service 53 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress on presidential nominee confirmations in the Senate). Some Members and observers have on presidential nominee confirmations in the Senate). Some Members and observers have
suggested that Congress should require additional steps in the Section 232 process. In the 116th suggested that Congress should require additional steps in the Section 232 process. In the 116th
Congress, a variety of proposals Congress, a variety of proposals ~~have been~~were introduced to amend Section 232, in various ways, introduced to amend Section 232, in various ways,
such as such as by:  placing the Department of Defense in charge of the investigation stage and/or determination of a national security threat,  ~~by:~~
 requiring an economic impact study by the USITC, congressional consultation, or requiring an economic impact study by the USITC, congressional consultation, or
approval of any new tariffs, approval of any new tariffs,
  ~~allowing~~al owing for a resolution of disapproval of trade actions, or for a resolution of disapproval of trade actions, or
 mandating a transparent exclusion process to limit potential negative domestic  mandating a transparent exclusion process to limit potential negative domestic
effects. effects.
In addition, the 2020 expansion of the steel and aluminum tariffs, In addition, the 2020 expansion of the steel and aluminum tariffs, ~~initially~~ initial y imposed in 2018, has imposed in 2018, has
raised questions about Section 232 authority expiration. Some stakeholders have suggested that raised questions about Section 232 authority expiration. Some stakeholders have suggested that
Section 232 reform should include new or clarified timelines, deadlines, or expiration dates for Section 232 reform should include new or clarified timelines, deadlines, or expiration dates for
any tariffs or quotas imposed or on the authority to impose new or expanded trade actions. any tariffs or quotas imposed or on the authority to impose new or expanded trade actions.
~~Some Members, including~~ During the 116th Congress, then-Senate Finance Chair Senator Grassley, Senate Finance Chair Senator Grassley, ~~have~~ sought to draft a sought to draft a
consensus consensus ~~bill~~ bil to restore certain congressional authority that would gain sufficient bipartisan to restore certain congressional authority that would gain sufficient bipartisan
support to withstand a possible presidential veto. Contentious issues have included whether any support to withstand a possible presidential veto. Contentious issues have included whether any
changes would be retroactive, changes would be retroactive, ~~potentially~~potential y affecting the steel and aluminum tariffs, or whether they affecting the steel and aluminum tariffs, or whether they
would only apply to future actions, and whether Congress’s role should be consultative or would only apply to future actions, and whether Congress’s role should be consultative or

~~311 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade,~~ ~~Hearing on Product Exclusion~~
~~Process for, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 2018, Serial No. 115-TR06, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/WM/WM04/~~
~~20180724/108591/HHRG-115-WM04-Transcript-20180724.pdf.~~
~~312 Adam Beshudi, “Grassley: White House, Congress should consider tariff easing measures,” PoliticoPro, March 16,~~
~~2020.~~
~~313 Representative Ron Kind, Twitter, August 6, 2020.~~
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~~decisive (e.g., requiring congressional approval). The Chairman noted that, “the president’s use of~~
~~tariffs has brought to our attention the shortcomings of the 1962 and 1974 legislation on trade that~~
~~delegated too much authority from Congress’ constitutional power [over trade] to the executive~~
~~branch.”314 After multiple meetings, the Chairman admitted that the efforts had stalled as it was~~
~~“difficult to get bipartisan agreement on what to do and, secondly, there’s some Republicans who~~
~~don’t want to advance [the bill] because they might be seen as doing it in an anti-Trump~~
~~fashion.”315~~
decisive (e.g., requiring congressional approval). At the time, the Grassley noted that, “the president’s use of tariffs has brought to our attention the shortcomings of the 1962 and 1974 legislation on trade that delegated too much authority from Congress’ constitutional power [over trade] to the executive branch.”323 After multiple meetings, Grassley stated that the efforts had stal ed. The current Senate Finance Chair Senator Wyden has not stated how he wants to proceed in the 117th Congress, although he previously supported legislative reform efforts.324 The Biden Administration’s stance on potential changes to the Section 232 authority and the subsequent need for a veto-proof congressional majority to enact any amendments is also unclear. To date, Senator Portman has re-introduced his previous proposal (see S. 746) with some of the same bipartisan co-sponsors as in the last Congress (see 116-S. 365). According to press reports, Senator Toomey may reintroduce his proposed amendment from the previous session (see 116-S. 287).325 The bil s sponsored by Senators Portman and Toomey were the focus of then-Chair Grassley’s consensus efforts in the last Congress. Ways and Means Ranking Member Brady indicated that there is stil “real interest” in strengthening Congress’ authority and sees an opportunity to work with the Administration on the issue.326 323 Megan Cassella, “Grassley Still Hopes to Craft 232 Reform Bill with Wyden,” PoliticoPro, March 4, 2020. 324 In reference to reform efforts in the 116th Congress, Senator Wyden stated “ I am all for putting some guardrails in this administration’s unpredictable and chaotic trade policy. We haven’t been able to find the solution yet, but I am ready to continue to work with the chairman to find a legislative solution that will garner wide bipartisan support.” Niv Elia, “ Grassley says he wants to rein in T rump tariff powers,” The Hill, January 8, 2020. 325 “Senators re-introduce bill to expand Pentagon’s role in Section 232 probes,” Inside U.S. Trade, March 16, 2021. 326 Representative Kevin Brady speaking during CSIS event, “A Conversation with Representative Kevin Brady on the Republican Party's T rade Agenda,” April 15, 2021, https://www.csis.org/events/conversation-representative-kevin-brady-republican-partys-trade-agenda. Congressional Research Service 54 link to page 69 link to page 69 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress Others have proposed revisiting the delegation of congressional constitutional authority more Others have proposed revisiting the delegation of congressional constitutional authority more
broadly, such as by requiring congressional approval of executive branch trade actions more broadly, such as by requiring congressional approval of executive branch trade actions more
~~generally~~general y. The Tariff Reform Coalition, a cross-sectoral coalition of industry associations, have . The Tariff Reform Coalition, a cross-sectoral coalition of industry associations, have
advocated for “greater Congressional oversight with respect to Presidential use of tariff advocated for “greater Congressional oversight with respect to Presidential use of tariff
authority.”authority.”~~316~~
~~For a list of proposals in the 116th Congress, see~~327 USTR Tai endorsed modernizing Section 232 during her testimony to the Senate Finance Committee. “I would real y like to strengthen the trade tools that we have to address the problems that we have today, whether that is global overcapacity or other chal enges that weren't contemplated 50 or 60 years ago when many of our trade statutes were drafted… We should plug in the gaps we see in countering the unfair trade practices we see today.”328 For a list of proposals in the 117th and 116th Congresses, see Appendix C.
Legislative Responses to Retaliatory Tariffs
Several major U.S. trading partners are currently imposing retaliatory tariffs in response to the Several major U.S. trading partners are currently imposing retaliatory tariffs in response to the
U.S. actions. In the 116th Congress, some Members of Congress proposed legislation to respond U.S. actions. In the 116th Congress, some Members of Congress proposed legislation to respond
to the potential economic impact of these foreign retaliatory tariffs. Some proposals to the potential economic impact of these foreign retaliatory tariffs. Some proposals ~~expand~~
would have expanded programs like trade adjustment assistance to include assistance for workers, firms, and programs like trade adjustment assistance to include assistance for workers, firms, and farmers farmers
harmed by foreign retaliation.harmed by foreign retaliation.~~317 The Administration announced an assistance program for~~
~~farmers harmed by~~ 329 The Trump Administration established trade aid packages in 2018 and 2019 to provide both direct and indirect assistance for farmers affected by “trade damage” from foreign retaliation to Section 232 and other tariffs through the U.S. foreign retaliation to Section 232 and other tariffs through the U.S.
Department of Agriculture.Department of Agriculture.~~318~~330 While many of the retaliatory tariffs remain, the subsidy programs have expired. Congress may review the impact of the assistance program and examine whether they should be renewed in part or in whole. Others have suggested broader trade adjustment assistance reform Others have suggested broader trade adjustment assistance reform
is needed to help U.S. workers and firms harmed by globalization, supply chain shifts, global over-capacity to help U.S. workers and firms harmed by globalization, supply chain shifts, global over-capacity
in certain sectors, and depressed demand due to the COVID-19 in certain sectors, and depressed demand due to the COVID-19 pandemic. For a list of proposals pandemic. For a list of proposals
from the 116th Congress, sefrom the 116th Congress, see Appendix C.
Establishing Threshold
It is relatively It is relatively easy for a stakeholder to prompt the Section 232 investigation process. The statute easy for a stakeholder to prompt the Section 232 investigation process. The statute
states that “Upon request of the head of any department or agency, upon application of an states that “Upon request of the head of any department or agency, upon application of an
interested party, or upon his own motion, the Secretary of Commerce ..interested party, or upon his own motion, the Secretary of Commerce ..~~. shall~~ shal immediately initiate immediately initiate
an appropriate investigation.” To limitan appropriate investigation.” To limit the volume of Section 232 petitions and the volume of Section 232 petitions and help ensure that any ensure that any
requests are sufficiently justified, Congress may consider establishing criteria or a threshold requests are sufficiently justified, Congress may consider establishing criteria or a threshold that a that a
request must meet before Commerce and Defense agencies invest resources in conducting a request must meet before Commerce and Defense agencies invest resources in conducting a
Section 232 investigation. Similarly, Congress may consider limiting the types of imported Section 232 investigation. Similarly, Congress may consider limiting the types of imported
articles that may be considered under Section 232 (e.g., articles that may be considered under Section 232 (e.g., 116- S. 287, H.R. 940). 327 T ariff~~S. 287, H.R. 940).~~

~~314 Megan Cassella, “Grassley Still Hopes to Craft 232 Reform Bill with Wyden,” PoliticoPro, March 4, 2020.~~
~~315 Hannah Monicken, “Grassley: Section 232 reform efforts have stalled, could be over,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 28,~~
~~2020.~~
~~316 Tariff~~ Reform Coalition, letter to Chair and Ranking Members of Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Reform Coalition, letter to Chair and Ranking Members of Senate Finance and House Ways and Means
Committee, September 19, 2020, http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/Committee, September 19, 2020, http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/~~Tariff~~T ariff%20Reform%20Coalition%20Letter.pdf. %20Reform%20Coalition%20Letter.pdf.
~~317~~328 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, The President’s 2021 Trade Policy Agenda, 117th Cong., May 12, 2021. 329 For more information on trade adjustment assistance, see CRS For more information on trade adjustment assistance, see CRS In Focus IF10570, In Focus IF10570, Trade Adjustment Assistance for
Workers (TAA), by Benjamin Collins, CRS, by Benjamin Collins, CRS Report RS20210, Report RS20210, Trade ~~Adjustment~~Adjustm ent Assistance for ~~Firms~~Firm s, by Rachel F. , by Rachel F.
Fefer, and CRSFefer, and CRS Report R40206, Report R40206, Trade ~~Adjustment~~Adjustm ent Assistance for ~~Farmers~~Farm ers, by Mark A. McMinimy. , by Mark A. McMinimy.
~~318~~330 For more information see CRS For more information see CRS ~~Report R45310,~~ ~~Farm~~ In Focus IF11289, Farm Policy: Comparison of 2018 and 2019 MFP Programs, by Randy Schnepf and CRS Report R45310, Farm Policy: USDA’s 2018 Trade Aid Package, by Randy, by Randy Schnepf Schnepf
et al.et al.
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Interpreting National Security
Congress created the Section 232 process to try to ensure that U.S. imports do not cause undue Congress created the Section 232 process to try to ensure that U.S. imports do not cause undue
harm to U.S. national security. Some observers have raised concerns that restrictions on U.S. harm to U.S. national security. Some observers have raised concerns that restrictions on U.S.
imports under Section 232, however, may harm U.S. imports under Section 232, however, may harm U.S. ~~allies~~al ies, which could also have negative , which could also have negative
implications for U.S. national security. For example, Canadaimplications for U.S. national security. For example, Canada ~~is considered part of the~~ , a top source of U.S. imports of steel and aluminum, was initial y subject to the Section 232 tariffs even though U.S. law considers the country part of the U.S. defense industrial base.331 ~~U.S.~~
~~defense industrial base according to U.S. law and is also a top source of U.S. imports of steel and~~
~~aluminum.319~~
National security is not clearly defined in the statute, National security is not clearly defined in the statute, ~~allowing~~al owing for ambiguity and alternative for ambiguity and alternative
interpretations by interpretations by ~~an Administration~~the Executive Branch. International trade commitments both at the multilateral and . International trade commitments both at the multilateral and
FTA level FTA level ~~generally~~general y include broad exceptions on the basis of national security. The Trump include broad exceptions on the basis of national security. The Trump
AdministrationAdministration ~~argues~~ argued its Section 232 actions its Section 232 actions ~~are~~were permissible under these exceptions, while many permissible under these exceptions, while many
U.S. trading partners claim the actions are unrelated to national security. If the United States U.S. trading partners claim the actions are unrelated to national security. If the United States
invokes the national security exemption in what may be perceived to be an arbitrary way, it invokes the national security exemption in what may be perceived to be an arbitrary way, it could could
similarly encourage other countries to use national security as a rationale to enact similarly encourage other countries to use national security as a rationale to enact protectionist protectionist
measures and limit the scope of potential U.S. responses to such actions. measures and limit the scope of potential U.S. responses to such actions.
Congress may consider amending Section 232 to address these concerns. For example, some Congress may consider amending Section 232 to address these concerns. For example, some
Members Members ~~have proposed to~~proposed legislation that would narrowly define “national security” under Section 232 and the factors narrowly define “national security” under Section 232 and the factors
to be considered in a Section 232 investigation. One to be considered in a Section 232 investigation. One ~~bill limits it~~bil from the 116th Congress would have limited the scope of national security under the statute to protection against foreign to protection against foreign
aggression (S. 287, H.R. 940). aggression (S. 287, H.R. 940). ~~Congress could also consider~~Some Members have also proposed changing the changing the primary investigative authority investigative authority
from Commerce to Defense to provide more weight to the military from Commerce to Defense to provide more weight to the military ~~perspective or interpretation as~~
to perspective on what constitutes a national security threat. what constitutes a national security threat.
Establishing New International Rules
Addressing the specific market-distorting practices that are the root causes of steel and aluminum Addressing the specific market-distorting practices that are the root causes of steel and aluminum
overcapacity (e.g., government intervention, subsidization) may require updating or amending overcapacity (e.g., government intervention, subsidization) may require updating or amending
existing trade agreements. In addition to the international efforts discussed, existing trade agreements. In addition to the international efforts discussed, ~~recent~~ U.S. FTA U.S. FTA
negotiations, including the recentlynegotiations, including the recently- implemented USMCA, include related disciplines (e.g., by implemented USMCA, include related disciplines (e.g., by
establishing rules on state-owned enterprises or anticorruption). To address these issues, Congress establishing rules on state-owned enterprises or anticorruption). To address these issues, Congress
could consider establishing specific or enhanced new negotiating objectives for trade agreement could consider establishing specific or enhanced new negotiating objectives for trade agreement
negotiations, negotiations, ~~potentially through new or modified Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation~~potential y through TPA legislation as the current version expires in July 2020. .
Congress could also consider directing the executive branch to prioritize engagement in such Congress could also consider directing the executive branch to prioritize engagement in such
negotiations, by, for example, endorsing the negotiations, by, for example, endorsing the new U.S.-EU discussions on overcapacity, continuation of the OECD discussions or the continuation of the OECD discussions or the
trilateral proposals by USTR with the EU and Japan to address nonmarket practices, including trilateral proposals by USTR with the EU and Japan to address nonmarket practices, including
subsidies, state-owned enterprises, and technology transfer requirements, mostly aimed at China. subsidies, state-owned enterprises, and technology transfer requirements, mostly aimed at China.
Congressional oversight on ongoing reform efforts at the WTO may examine efforts to establish Congressional oversight on ongoing reform efforts at the WTO may examine efforts to establish
new international trade rules on these issues (see new international trade rules on these issues (see below). below).
Impact on the Multilateral Trading System
Some analysts argue that the United States risks undermining the international system it helped Some analysts argue that the United States risks undermining the international system it helped
create when it invokes unilateral trade actions that may violate core commitments and with regard create when it invokes unilateral trade actions that may violate core commitments and with regard
to broad uses of national security exemptions. These observers fear that disagreements at the to broad uses of national security exemptions. These observers fear that disagreements at the
WTO on these issues may be difficult to resolve through the existing dispute settlement WTO on these issues may be difficult to resolve through the existing dispute settlement
procedures given the concerns over national sovereignty that would likely be raised if a WTO procedures given the concerns over national sovereignty that would likely be raised if a WTO
331 10 U.S.C. §148. Congressional Research Service 56 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress dispute settlement panel issued a ruling relating to the U.S. use of national securitydispute settlement panel issued a ruling relating to the U.S. use of national security exemptions. . Furthermore, Furthermore,
actions by the United States that do not make use of the multilateral system’s actions by the United States that do not make use of the multilateral system’s dispute settlement ~~dispute settlement~~

~~319 10 U.S.C. §148.~~
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process may open the United States to criticism and could impede U.S. efforts to use the process may open the United States to criticism and could impede U.S. efforts to use the
~~multilateral~~ multilateral system for its own enforcement purposes. For example, China system for its own enforcement purposes. For example, China ~~called~~cal ed on other parties on other parties
~~such as the EU~~ to join it in opposition to the U.S. actions on Section 232, while simultaneously to join it in opposition to the U.S. actions on Section 232, while simultaneously
promoting domestic policies often seen as undermining WTO rules.promoting domestic policies often seen as undermining WTO rules.~~320~~332 Congress could Congress could ~~potentially~~
potential y address these concerns by conducting increased oversightaddress these concerns by conducting increased oversight ~~of the Administration’s actions by~~
by inviting testimony from multiple parties, considering legislation to establish more stringent inviting testimony from multiple parties, considering legislation to establish more stringent
criteria for Section 232 investigations, criteria for Section 232 investigations, or requiring congressional approval of any use of Section or requiring congressional approval of any use of Section
232, among other possible actions. 232, among other possible actions.
The WTO The WTO ~~overall~~ overal is at a critical point and many observers believe is at a critical point and many observers believe ~~the WTO~~it needs to adopt needs to adopt
reforms to retain its credibility and continue its role as the foundation of the world trading system. reforms to retain its credibility and continue its role as the foundation of the world trading system.
Potential areas of reform could include addressing the issues underlying the Section 232 actions Potential areas of reform could include addressing the issues underlying the Section 232 actions
including: the proposal on subsidies and nonmarket practices, reforming certain aspects of the including: the proposal on subsidies and nonmarket practices, reforming certain aspects of the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism, or clarifying the national security exception and the WTO’s WTO dispute settlement mechanism, or clarifying the national security exception and the WTO’s
role. The role. The growing debate over the role and future direction of the WTO may be of interest to growing debate over the role and future direction of the WTO may be of interest to
Congress as it conducts oversight over the U.S. position and role in reform efforts as some Congress as it conducts oversight over the U.S. position and role in reform efforts as some
Members have Members have expressed support to address long-standing concerns of the United States.expressed support to address long-standing concerns of the United States. ~~321~~333
Impact on Broader International Relationships
The U.S. unilateral actions under Section 232 have raised the level of tension with U.S. trading The U.S. unilateral actions under Section 232 have raised the level of tension with U.S. trading
partners and could pose risks to broader international economic cooperation. The strain on partners and could pose risks to broader international economic cooperation. The strain on
international trading relationships also could have broader policy implications, including for international trading relationships also could have broader policy implications, including for
cooperation between the United States and cooperation between the United States and ~~allies~~al ies on foreign policy issues and U.S. credibility in on foreign policy issues and U.S. credibility in
future trade negotiations. future trade negotiations. ~~After the United States re-imposed tariffs on Canada, the Ontario~~
~~premier commented, “I just have to say how disappointed I am with President Trump right~~
~~now.”322 The EU Trade Commissioner cited the U.S. Section 232 unilateral investigations and~~
~~actions as part of the justification for establishing expanded retaliatory powers, potentially for use~~
~~against the United States.323 On the other hand, WTO reform provides~~The Biden Administration has expressed support for stronger relationships with al ies and support of multilateral institutions, creating a potential opportunity to lower the tension and stress. For example, WTO reform could provide an opportunity for the an opportunity for the
United States to address issues of joint concern, such as rules for subsidies, with U.S. United States to address issues of joint concern, such as rules for subsidies, with U.S. ~~allies~~al ies and and
trading partners, and strengthen those relationships. trading partners, and strengthen those relationships.

~~320~~ 332 Lyubov Pronina, “China Seeks EU’s Support in Standing Lyubov Pronina, “China Seeks EU’s Support in Standing Up to U.S.Up to U.S. ~~Trade Threat~~ T rade T hreat ,” ,” Bloomberg BNA, April 9, 2018. , April 9, 2018.
For more information on U.S.-China trade, see CRSFor more information on U.S.-China trade, see CRS Report RL33536, Report RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne M. , by Wayne M.
Morrison. Morrison.
~~321~~333 For more information, see CRS For more information, see CRS Report R45417, Report R45417, World Trade Organization: Overview and Future Direction , ,
coordinated by Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs. coordinated by Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs.
~~322 “Canada to impose $3.6B in tariffs in response to Trump's move against Canadian aluminum,” CBC News, August~~
~~7, 2020.~~
~~323 “Hogan cites U.S. Section 232 probes in call for new retaliatory powers,” Inside U.S. Trade, July 7, 2020.~~
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Appendix A. Amendments to ~~and Past Uses of~~
Section 232 (19 U.S.C. §1862)
Concern over national security, trade, and domestic industry was first raised by the Trade Concern over national security, trade, and domestic industry was first raised by the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-464 §2). The 1954 act prohibited the President from Agreements Extension Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-464 §2). The 1954 act prohibited the President from
decreasing duties on any article if the President determined that such a reduction might threaten decreasing duties on any article if the President determined that such a reduction might threaten
domestic production needed for national defense.domestic production needed for national defense.~~324~~334 In 1955, the provision was amended to also In 1955, the provision was amended to also
~~allow~~al ow the President to increase trade restrictions, in cases where national security may be the President to increase trade restrictions, in cases where national security may be
threatened.threatened.~~325~~335
The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-686 §8) expanded the 1955 provisions, by The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-686 §8) expanded the 1955 provisions, by
outlining specific factors to be considered during an investigation, outlining specific factors to be considered during an investigation, ~~allowing~~al owing the private sector to the private sector to
petition for relief, and requiring the President to publish a report on each petition.petition for relief, and requiring the President to publish a report on each petition.~~326~~336 The factors The factors
to be considered during an investigation included (1) the domestic production capacity needed for to be considered during an investigation included (1) the domestic production capacity needed for
U.S. national security requirements, (2) the effect of imports on domestic production needed for U.S. national security requirements, (2) the effect of imports on domestic production needed for
national security requirements, and (3) “the impact of foreign competition on the economic national security requirements, and (3) “the impact of foreign competition on the economic
welfare of individualwelfare of individual domestic industries.” domestic industries.”
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-794) continued the provisions of the Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-794) continued the provisions of the
1958 Act. Section 232 has been amended multiple times over the years, including (1) to change 1958 Act. Section 232 has been amended multiple times over the years, including (1) to change
the time limits for investigations and actions; (2) to change the advisory responsibility from the the time limits for investigations and actions; (2) to change the advisory responsibility from the
Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of Commerce; and (3) to limit presidential authority to Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of Commerce; and (3) to limit presidential authority to
adjust petroleum imports.adjust petroleum imports.~~327~~337
Section 232: Joint Disapproval Resolution Provision for Petroleum Products
In 1980, Congress amended Section 232 to create a joint disapproval resolution provision under In 1980, Congress amended Section 232 to create a joint disapproval resolution provision under
which Congress could override presidential actions to adjust petroleum or petroleum product which Congress could override presidential actions to adjust petroleum or petroleum product
imports.imports.~~328~~338 Congress included the joint disapproval resolution provision in the Crude Oil Congress included the joint disapproval resolution provision in the Crude Oil ~~Windfall~~
Windfal Profit Tax Act of 1980. The Profit Tax Act of 1980. The ~~bill~~ bil was signed into law on Aprilwas signed into law on April 2, 1980, the same day that President 2, 1980, the same day that President

~~324~~ 334 P.L. 83-464, §2. P.L. 83-464, §2.
~~325 The~~335 T he original inclusion of the 1955 provision appears to be due original inclusion of the 1955 provision appears to be due to considerations about specific minerals, namely to considerations about specific minerals, namely
petroleum, fluorspar, lead, and zinc. However, according to the committee report, the committee chose not to focus on petroleum, fluorspar, lead, and zinc. However, according to the committee report, the committee chose not to focus on
specific commodities, but to create a more general provision requiring the President to adjust imports where national specific commodities, but to create a more general provision requiring the President to adjust imports where national
security may be threatened. (See S.Rpt. 84-232, p. 4.) security may be threatened. (See S.Rpt. 84-232, p. 4.)
~~326~~336 P.L. 85-686, §8. For a review of the committee’s rationale for these changes see, H.Rpt. 85 P.L. 85-686, §8. For a review of the committee’s rationale for these changes see, H.Rpt. 85 -2502, H.Rpt. 85-1761, -2502, H.Rpt. 85-1761,
and S.Rpt. 85-1838. and S.Rpt. 85-1838.
~~327~~337 Following Following the reorganization of trade functions in 1973, the the reorganization of trade functions in 1973, the ~~Trade~~T rade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618, §127(d)) changed the Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618, §127(d)) changed the
responsibility to advise responsibility to advise ~~the~~t he President from the Director of Office of Emergency Preparedness to the Secretary of the President from the Director of Office of Emergency Preparedness to the Secretary of the
~~Treasury~~T reasury with requirements to consult with the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, and other appropriate departments with requirements to consult with the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, and other appropriate departments
and agencies. and agencies. ~~The~~T he 1974 Act also placed a one-year time limit on the investigation. Following the reorganization of 1974 Act also placed a one-year time limit on the investigation. Following the reorganization of
trade functions in the Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, the Omnibus trade functions in the Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, the Omnibus ~~Trade~~T rade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. (P.L.
100-418, §402) changed the advisory responsibility from the Secretary of the 100-418, §402) changed the advisory responsibility from the Secretary of the ~~Treasury~~T reasury to the Secretary of Commerce. to the Secretary of Commerce.
~~The Omnibus Trade~~T he Omnibus T rade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 and Competitiveness Act of 1988 also reducedalso reduced the investigation timeline from one year to 270 the investigation timeline from one year to 270
days and created the 15-day implementation period for the President to actdays and created the 15-day implementation period for the President to act . T he~~. The~~ Crude Oil Crude Oil Windfall Profit Windfall Profit ~~Tax~~T ax Act of Act of
1980 (P.L. 96-223, §402) created an option for Congress to override presidential actions to adjust petroleum imports 1980 (P.L. 96-223, §402) created an option for Congress to override presidential actions to adjust petroleum imports
through a joint disapproval resolution. through a joint disapproval resolution.
~~328~~338 P.L. 96-223, §402, the Crude Oil Windfall Profit P.L. 96-223, §402, the Crude Oil Windfall Profit ~~Tax~~T ax Act of 1980. Act of 1980.
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Carter proclaimed a license fee on crude oil and gasoline pursuant to Section 232 in Proclamation Carter proclaimed a license fee on crude oil and gasoline pursuant to Section 232 in Proclamation
4744.4744.~~329~~339
On April On April 15, 1980, two weeks after the President’s proclamation on the crude oil and gasoline 15, 1980, two weeks after the President’s proclamation on the crude oil and gasoline
license fee, Representative James Shannon introduced House Joint Resolution 531 to disapprove license fee, Representative James Shannon introduced House Joint Resolution 531 to disapprove
and effectively nullify the presidential action. The House Ways and Means Subcommittee on and effectively nullify the presidential action. The House Ways and Means Subcommittee on
Trade voted 14 to 4 to disapprove the presidential action; the resolution was favorably reported Trade voted 14 to 4 to disapprove the presidential action; the resolution was favorably reported
out of the full committee on a 27 to 7 vote. Dissenting views were voiced by Members who out of the full committee on a 27 to 7 vote. Dissenting views were voiced by Members who
supported the fee program and were concerned about U.S. dependence on foreign oil. While the supported the fee program and were concerned about U.S. dependence on foreign oil. While the
measure passed the House, it was indefinitely postponed in the Senate.measure passed the House, it was indefinitely postponed in the Senate.~~330~~340 Multiple joint Multiple joint
resolutions of disapproval were introduced in Congress in 1980, but none passed both resolutions of disapproval were introduced in Congress in 1980, but none passed both ~~chambers~~c hambers. .
In addition to the disapproval mechanism created in the Crude Oil In addition to the disapproval mechanism created in the Crude Oil ~~Windfall~~ Windfal Profit Tax Act of Profit Tax Act of
1980, President Carter’s action in Proclamation 4744 was also 1980, President Carter’s action in Proclamation 4744 was also ~~challenged~~chal enged in court and through in court and through
separate legislation in Congress. On May 13, 1980, a federal district court struck down the separate legislation in Congress. On May 13, 1980, a federal district court struck down the
President’s action on petroleum imports as unlawful, thereby preventing the government from President’s action on petroleum imports as unlawful, thereby preventing the government from
implementingimplementing the program. The court’s decision, however, was appealable to the higher courts.the program. The court’s decision, however, was appealable to the higher courts.~~331~~341
Before a court could consider an appeal, Congress enacted an amendment to a Before a court could consider an appeal, Congress enacted an amendment to a ~~bill~~ bil to extend the to extend the
public debt limit (P.L. 96-264, Section 2) on June 6, 1980, which terminated Proclamation 4744’s public debt limit (P.L. 96-264, Section 2) on June 6, 1980, which terminated Proclamation 4744’s
petroleum import program. Section 2 of P.L. 96-264 did not use the disapproval mechanism petroleum import program. Section 2 of P.L. 96-264 did not use the disapproval mechanism
established in the Crude Oil established in the Crude Oil ~~Windfall~~ Windfal Profit Tax Act of 1980; it was a separate piece of legislation Profit Tax Act of 1980; it was a separate piece of legislation
that was attached as an amendment to an unrelated that was attached as an amendment to an unrelated ~~bill.332~~bil .342
On June 19, 1980, the President On June 19, 1980, the President ~~formally~~formal y rescinded Proclamation 4744 “in its entirety, effective rescinded Proclamation 4744 “in its entirety, effective
March 15, 1980.”March 15, 1980.”~~333~~

~~329~~343 339 Presidential Proclamation 4744, “Petroleum Import Adjustment Program,” Presidential Proclamation 4744, “Petroleum Import Adjustment Program,” Federal Register volume 45, No. 66, volume 45, No. 66,
April 3, 1980. April 3, 1980.
~~330~~340 H.J.Res H.J.Res 531. 531.
~~331~~341 Indep. Gasoline Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp., 492 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1980). 614 (D.D.C. 1980).
~~332~~342 H.R. 7428 (P.L. 96-264). H.R. 7428 (P.L. 96-264).
~~333~~343 “Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products,” Proclamation 4766, June 19, 1980, (45 “Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products,” Proclamation 4766, June 19, 1980, (45 Federal Register 41899). 41899).
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
5759

Appendix B. Section 232 Investigations
Table B-1. Section 232 Investigations and Presidential Actions, 1962-~~2019~~2020
Treasury or
Commerce

Subject of Investigation
Year Initiated
Initiator
Determination
Presidential Action
1 1
Manganese and chromium Manganese and chromium ~~ferroalloys~~ ferroal oys
1963 1963
Manufacturing Chemists Manufacturing Chemists
Negative Negative
- -
Association, Association, Inc. Inc.
2 2
Tungsten mil Tungsten mil products products
1964 1964
General General Electric Company Electric Company
Negative Negative
- -
(Co.) (Co.)
3 3
Antifriction bearings Antifriction bearings
1964 1964
Anti-Friction Bearing Anti-Friction Bearing
Terminated at request of Terminated at request of
- -
Manufacturers Association Manufacturers Association
petitioner petitioner
4 4
Watches, watch movements Watches, watch movements and parts and parts
1965 1965
Presidential Presidential Request Request
Negative Negative
- -
5 5
Manganese, silicon Manganese, silicon and chromium and chromium
1968 1968
Committee Committee of Producers of of Producers of
Negative Negative
- -
~~ferroalloys~~ ferroal oys and refined metals and refined metals
~~Ferroalloys~~ Ferroal oys and Related and Related
Products Products
6 6
Miniature and instrument precision Miniature and instrument precision ~~ball~~
bal 1969 1969
Anti-Friction Bearing Anti-Friction Bearing
Negative Negative
- -
bearings bearings
Manufacturers Association Manufacturers Association
7 7
Extra high voltage power circuit Extra high voltage power circuit
1972 1972
General General Electric Co. Electric Co.
Negative Negative
- -
breakers, breakers, transformers,transformers, and reactors and reactors
8 8
Petroleum Petroleum
1973 1973
Chairman of the Oil Policy Chairman of the Oil Policy
Positive Positive
Transitioned away from existing quota Transitioned away from existing quota
Committee Committee
system system to a license fee (Proclamation to a license fee (Proclamation
4210, 38 FR 9645). 4210, 38 FR 9645).
9 9
Petroleum Petroleum
1975 1975
Secretary of the Treasury Secretary of the Treasury
Positive Positive
Added supplemental fee to the license Added supplemental fee to the license
fee (Proclamation 4341); fee was later fee (Proclamation 4341); fee was later
reduced to zero (Proclamation 4655). reduced to zero (Proclamation 4655).
10 10
Iron and steel nuts, bolts, large screws Iron and steel nuts, bolts, large screws
1978 1978
Presidential Presidential Directive Directive
Negative Negative
- -
11 11
Petroleum Petroleum
1978 1978
Secretary of the Treasury Secretary of the Treasury
Positive Positive
Conservation fee added, but found to Conservation fee added, but found to
be il egalbe il egal and blocked by District and blocked by District
Court in 492 F. Supp. 614. Court in 492 F. Supp. 614.
CRS- CRS-5860

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Treasury or
Commerce

Subject of Investigation
Year Initiated
Initiator
Determination
Presidential Action
12 12
Petroleum Petroleum from Iran from Iran
1979 1979
Secretary of the Treasury Secretary of the Treasury
Positive Positive
Embargo imposed Embargo imposed on petroleumon petroleum from from
Iran on Nov. 12, 1979 (Proclamation Iran on Nov. 12, 1979 (Proclamation
4702). 4702).
13 13
Glass-lined Glass-lined chemical processing chemical processing
1981 1981
Ceramic Ceramic Coating Co. Coating Co.
Negative Negative
- -
equipment equipment
14 14
Manganese, silicon Manganese, silicon and chromium and chromium
1981 1981
~~Ferroalloys~~ Ferroal oys Association Association
Negative Negative
~~ferroalloys~~ ferroal oys and related metals and related metals
-a
15 15
Iron and steel nuts, bolts, large screws Iron and steel nuts, bolts, large screws
1982 1982
Secretary of Defense Secretary of Defense
Negative Negative
- -
16 16
Petroleum Petroleum from Libya from Libya
1982 1982
Presidential Presidential Request Request
Positive Positive
Embargo imposed Embargo imposed on petroleumon petroleum from from
Libya on Mar. 10, 1982 (Proclamation Libya on Mar. 10, 1982 (Proclamation
4907). 4907).
17 17
Metal-cutting and Metal Forming Metal-cutting and Metal Forming
1983 1983
National Machine Tool National Machine Tool
Positive Positive
Deferred Deferred a formala formal decision on the decision on the
Machine Tools Machine Tools
Builders’ Builders’ Association Association
Section 232 case and instead sought Section 232 case and instead sought
voluntary restraint agreements voluntary restraint agreements
starting in 1986 with leading foreign starting in 1986 with leading foreign
suppliers and developed a domestic suppliers and developed a domestic
plan of programs to help revitalize the plan of programs to help revitalize the
industrindustry.b
18 18
Antifriction bearings Antifriction bearings
1987 1987
Anti-Friction Bearing Anti-Friction Bearing
Negative Negative
- -
Manufacturers Association Manufacturers Association
19 19
Petroleum Petroleum
1987 1987
National Energy Security National Energy Security
Positive Positive
No action No action ~~taken.~~taken. c
Committee Committee (an industry (an industry
group) group)
20 20
Plastic injection molding machinery Plastic injection molding machinery
1988 1988
Society of the Plastic Society of the Plastic
Negative Negative
- -
Industry, Inc. Industry, Inc.
21 21
Uranium Uranium
1989 1989
Secretary of Energy Secretary of Energy
Negative Negative
- -
22 22
Gears and gearing products Gears and gearing products
1991 1991
American American Gear Gear
Negative Negative
- -
Manufacturers Association Manufacturers Association
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Treasury or
Commerce

Subject of Investigation
Year Initiated
Initiator
Determination
Presidential Action
23 23
Ceramic Ceramic Semiconductor Packaging Semiconductor Packaging
1992 1992
Coors Electronic Package Coors Electronic Package
Negative Negative
- -
Co. and Ceramic Co. and Ceramic Process Process
SystemsSystems Corporation Corporation
24 24
Crude Oil Crude Oil and Petroleumand Petroleum Products Products
1994 1994
Independent Petroleum Independent Petroleum
Positive Positive
No action No action ~~taken.~~taken. c
Association Association of America of America
25 25
Crude Oil Crude Oil
1999 1999
Secretary of Commerce Secretary of Commerce
Positive Positive
No action No action ~~taken.~~taken. c
26 26
Iron ore and finished steel Iron ore and finished steel
2001 2001
Representatives Representatives James James
Negative Negative
- -
Oberstar and Bart Stupak Oberstar and Bart Stupak
27 27
Steel Steel
2017 2017
Secretary of Commerce Secretary of Commerce
Positive Positive
Imposed tariffs of 25% on steel Imposed tariffs of 25% on steel
imports,imports, from from ~~all~~ al countries,countries, with an with an
initial exception for Canada and initial exception for Canada and
Mexico, with other potential future Mexico, with other potential future
exceptions (Proclamation 9705).exceptions (Proclamation 9705).
28 28
Aluminum Aluminum
2017 2017
Secretary of Commerce Secretary of Commerce
Positive Positive
Imposed tariffs of 10% on aluminum Imposed tariffs of 10% on aluminum
imports,imports, from from ~~all~~ al countries,countries, with an with an
initial exception for Canada and initial exception for Canada and
Mexico, with other potential future Mexico, with other potential future
exceptions (Proclamation 9704).exceptions (Proclamation 9704).
29 29
Automobiles, Automobiles, including SUVs, vans and including SUVs, vans and
2018 2018
Secretary of Commerce Secretary of Commerce
Positive Positive
Directed Directed USTR to negotiate with USTR to negotiate with
light trucks, and automotive parts light trucks, and automotive parts
European Union (EU), Japan, and European Union (EU), Japan, and
others to resolveothers to resolve national security national security
threat (Proclamation 9888).threat (Proclamation 9888).
30 30
Uranium ore and products Uranium ore and products
2018 2018
U.S. uranium mining U.S. uranium mining
Positive Positive
President did not concur with President did not concur with
companies (UR-Energy and companies (UR-Energy and
Commerce Commerce findings. Established U.S. findings. Established U.S.
Energy Fuels) Energy Fuels)
Nuclear Fuel Working Nuclear Fuel Working Group to Group to
develop recommendationsdevelop recommendations to revive to revive
domesticdomestic industrindustry.d
31 31
Titanium Sponge Titanium Sponge
2019 2019
Titanium Metals Corp. Titanium Metals Corp.
Positive Positive
President concurred with Commerce President concurred with Commerce
findings but did not restrictfindings but did not restrict imports. imports.
Established working group with Japan Established working group with Japan
to ensure access to titanium to ensure access to titanium ~~sponge~~sponge.e .e
CRS- CRS-6062

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Treasury or
Commerce

Subject of Investigation
Year Initiated
Initiator
Determination
Presidential Action
32 32
Transformers Transformers and certain grain-and certain grain-
2020 2020
Secretary of Commerce Secretary of Commerce
~~Ongoing~~
[Determination Unknown]f N/A N/A
oriented electrical oriented electrical ~~steel~~ steel parts parts
33 33
Mobile Cranes Mobile Cranes
2020 2020
Manitowoc Company, Inc. Manitowoc Company, Inc.
~~Ongoing~~
~~N/A~~
Terminated at request of N/A petitioner 34 34
Vanadium Vanadium
2020 2020
AMG Vanadium and U.S. AMG Vanadium and U.S.
~~Ongoing~~[Determination
N/A N/A
Vanadium Vanadium Unknown]g
Source: CRS compiledCRS compiled from the Bureau of Industry and Security’sfrom the Bureau of Industry and Security’s (BIS) “Section 232 Investigations Program Guide,” June 2007, “Section 232 Investigations Program Guide,” June 2007, ~~at https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-~~
~~documents/section-232-investigations/86-section-232-booklet/file,~~ and other Department of Commerce sources. and other Department of Commerce sources.
a. Although this investigation concluded with a negative threat determination,a. Although this investigation concluded with a negative threat determination, the President accepted Commerce’sthe President accepted Commerce’s ~~recommendation~~ recommendation to start a 10-year program to to start a 10-year program to
upgrade the National Defense upgrade the National Defense Stockpile oreStockpile ore into high-carbon ferrochromiuminto high-carbon ferrochromium and ferromanganeseand ferromanganese and to removeand to remove ~~certain ferroalloy imports~~ certain ferroal oy imports from eligibilityfrom eligibility for duty-for duty-
free entry under the Generalizedfree entry under the Generalized System of PreferencesSystem of Preferences (49 FR 21391).(49 FR 21391).
b. For the announcement of the action, see, U.S. b. For the announcement of the action, see, U.S. President (R. Reagan), “Statement on the Machine Tool Industry,” May 20, 1986. For an announcement of the President (R. Reagan), “Statement on the Machine Tool Industry,” May 20, 1986. For an announcement of the
voluntary restraint agreements voluntary restraint agreements with Japan and Taiwan, see “Statement on the Revitalization of the Machine Tool Industry,” with Japan and Taiwan, see “Statement on the Revitalization of the Machine Tool Industry,” ~~December~~ Dec ember 16, 1986. The agreement was 16, 1986. The agreement was
modifiedmodified in 1991 and extended through Decemberin 1991 and extended through December 1993, (see U.S. President (G. H.W.1993, (see U.S. President (G. H.W. Bush), “Statement by Press SecretaryBush), “Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Extension of Machine Fitzwater on Extension of Machine
Tool Voluntary Restraint AgreementsTool Voluntary Restraint Agreements With Japan and Taiwan,” DecemberWith Japan and Taiwan,” December 27, 1991). 27, 1991).
c. In the 1987, 1994, and 1999 investigations into petroleum and crude oil, c. In the 1987, 1994, and 1999 investigations into petroleum and crude oil, the Commercethe Commerce Department determinedDepartment determined that certain oil importsthat certain oil imports threatened to impair threatened to impair
national security but did not recommend national security but did not recommend that the President use his authority to adjust imports.that the President use his authority to adjust imports. In not acting, the PresidentIn not acting, the President fol owed the Commerce fol owed the Commerce
recommendationrecommendation in these three investigations. In the 1989 report, Commercein these three investigations. In the 1989 report, Commerce did not recommenddid not recommend that the President adjust importsthat the President adjust imports using quotas, fees, or tariffs using quotas, fees, or tariffs
under the authority of Section 232 because any such actions would not be “cost beneficial and, in the long run, impair rather than enhance national security.” In the under the authority of Section 232 because any such actions would not be “cost beneficial and, in the long run, impair rather than enhance national security.” In the
1994 and 1999 investigations into oil imports,1994 and 1999 investigations into oil imports, ~~Commerce~~ Commerce found that existing government programs and activitiesfound that existing government programs and activities related to energy security were morerelated to energy security were more appropriate appropriate
and cost effective than import adjustments.and cost effective than import adjustments. (Also see Department of Commerce,(Also see Department of Commerce, “The Effect of Crude Oil“The Effect of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleumand Refined Petroleum Product Imports on the National Product Imports on the National
Security,” January 1989Security,” January 1989~~, https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/section-232-investigations/78-crude-oil-and-petroleum-products-1989/file~~.) .)
d. President Donald Trump, “Memorandum on the Effect of Uranium Imports on the National Security and Establishment of the United States Nuclear Fuel Working d. President Donald Trump, “Memorandum on the Effect of Uranium Imports on the National Security and Establishment of the United States Nuclear Fuel Working
Group,” July 12, 2019. Group,” July 12, 2019.
e. President Donald Trump, “Memorandum on the Effect of Titanium Sponge Imports on the National Security,” February 27, 2020. e. President Donald Trump, “Memorandum on the Effect of Titanium Sponge Imports on the National Security,” February 27, 2020.
f. According to CRS communication with BIS, Commerce sent its investigation report to the White House on October 16, 2020. g. According to CRS communication with BIS, Commerce sent its investigation report on vanadium to the White House on February 22, 2021. CRS-63
~~CRS-61~~

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Appendix C. Proposals Concerning Section 232
Table CA-1. Select Proposals on Section 232: ~~116th~~117th Congress
(Through (Through ~~July 2020)~~
~~Legislation~~
~~Title~~
~~Brief Description~~
~~Select Proposals on Congressional-Executive Powers~~
~~H.R. 3673~~
~~Promoting Responsible and~~
~~To require congressional approval of certain trade~~
~~Free Trade Act of 2019~~
~~remedies,~~ May 2021) Legislat ion Title Brief Description S. 691 Global Trade To require congressional approval, Accountability Act through a joint resolution, of certain trade actions under Sec. 232 and other trade authorities. Would require the President to report to Congress on the proposed trade action and provide an analysis of its economic impact. S. 746 Trade Security Act of To amend Sec. 232 to al ow for a 2021 congressional joint disapproval resolution to override presidential actions. Bil would also transfer investigatory authority to the Secretary of Defense and would outline the scope of a national security assessment. Source: CRS, compiled from Congress.gov Notes: Sec. 232 = Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962; IEEPA = International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Table C-1. Select Proposals on Section 232: 116th Congress Legislation Title Brief Description Select Proposals on Congressional-Executive Powers H.R. 3673 Promoting Responsible and Free To require congressional approval of certain trade Trade Act of 2019 remedies, including a joint resolution for approval of including a joint resolution for approval of
Sec. 232 investigation report; and to change Sec. 232 investigation report; and to change
investigatory authority to the Secretary of Defense, investigatory authority to the Secretary of Defense,
and recommendationand recommendation authority to the Secretary of authority to the Secretary of
Commerce. Commerce.
S. 899 / H.R. 3477 S. 899 / H.R. 3477
Reclaiming Reclaiming ~~Congressional~~ Congressional Trade
To require To require congressional approval of duty rate changes congressional approval of duty rate changes
~~Trade~~ Authority Act of 2019 Authority Act of 2019
under Sec. 232 and IEEPA, and to under Sec. 232 and IEEPA, and to ~~allow~~al ow for for
congressionalcongressional disapproval of actions under Section 301 disapproval of actions under Section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974. of the Trade Act of 1974.
S. 365 / H.R. 1008 S. 365 / H.R. 1008
Trade Security Act of 2019 Trade Security Act of 2019
To amend Sec. To amend Sec. 232 to 232 to ~~allow~~al ow for a congressional for a congressional joint joint
disapproval resolution to overridedisapproval resolution to override ~~presidential~~ presidential actions; actions;
to transfer investigatory authority to the Secretary of to transfer investigatory authority to the Secretary of
Defense; and to outline the scope of a national Defense; and to outline the scope of a national
security assessment. security assessment.
S. 287 / H.R. 940 S. 287 / H.R. 940
Bicameral Bicameral ~~Congressional~~ Congressional Trade
To amend Sec. To amend Sec. 232 to require congressional232 to require congressional approval approval
~~Trade~~ Authority Act of 2019 Authority Act of 2019
of presidential of presidential actions; to transfer investigatory actions; to transfer investigatory
authority to the Secretary of Defense.authority to the Secretary of Defense. The bil also The bil also
outlines specific national security-relatedoutlines specific national security-related items to be items to be
covered under Sec. 232 investigations. covered under Sec. 232 investigations.
Congressional Research Service 64 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress Legislation Title Brief Description H.R. 723 / S. 1284 ~~H.R. 723 / S. 1284~~
Global Trade Accountability Global Trade Accountability
Act To amend Sec. To amend Sec. 232 and other trade authorities to 232 and other trade authorities to
~~Act~~ of 2019 of 2019
require require congressional approval of unilateral trade congressional approval of unilateral trade
actions. Both measuresactions. Both measures would requirewould require the President to the President to
report to Congress on the proposed trade action and report to Congress on the proposed trade action and
provide an analysis of its economicprovide an analysis of its economic impact, and impact, and
Congress would need to pass a resolutionCongress would need to pass a resolution before the before the
action would go into effect. H.R. 723 provides the action would go into effect. H.R. 723 provides the
President 90-day temporary authority to act for President 90-day temporary authority to act for
national security reasons,national security reasons, after which congressional after which congressional
approve would be required. approve would be required.
Select Proposals on the Auto Investigation
H.R. 1158 H.R. 1158
Consolidated Appropriations Consolidated Appropriations
Requires the Administration Requires the Administration to publish the Sec. 232 to publish the Sec. 232
Act, 2020 Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93)
report on automotive imports report on automotive imports ~~publically~~ publical y, and to , and to
provide any classifiedprovide any classified ~~information from~~ information from the report to the report to
Congress. Congress.
S. 121 / H.R. 1710 S. 121 / H.R. 1710;
Automotive Automotive Jobs Act of 2019Jobs Act of 2019;
To require To require a study of the U.S. auto industry by USITC a study of the U.S. auto industry by USITC
~~and to stall the~~ H.R. 8352 Automotive Jobs Act of 2020. and to stal any action relating to the 2018 Sec. 232 investigation into auto importsSec. 232 investigation into auto imports
until such a study is until such a study is ~~complete~~completed and reviewed by the President. .
Select Proposals on Tariff Exclusions and Tariff Revenue
S. 2551 S. 2551
Tariff Rebate Act Tariff Rebate Act
To establish the Tariff Rebate Program to disburse To establish the Tariff Rebate Program to disburse
revenues fromrevenues from tariffs to certain eligibletariffs to certain eligible individuals. S. 2362 American Business Tariff Relief ~~individuals.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
62

~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~Legislation~~
~~Title~~
~~Brief Description~~
~~S. 2362~~
~~American Business Tariff Relief~~ To establish a process for U.S. businessesTo establish a process for U.S. businesses to obtain to obtain
Act of 2019 Act of 2019
exclusions from certain duties imposed exclusions from certain duties imposed under Sec. 301 under Sec. 301
of the Trade Act of 1974 and Sec. 232 of the Trade of the Trade Act of 1974 and Sec. 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, and for other purposes. Expansion Act of 1962, and for other purposes.
Select Proposals to Mitigate the Impact of Retaliatory Tariffs
S. 1984 S. 1984
To amend the Magnuson- To amend the Magnuson-
Stevens To provide reliefTo provide relief for fisheriesfor fisheries targeted for retaliation, targeted for retaliation,
~~Stevens Fishery Conservation~~Fishery Conservation and
in response in response to Sec. 232 actions. to Sec. 232 actions.
~~and~~ Management Act to Management Act to
~~provide fisheries disaster relief~~
~~for commercial fishery failures~~
~~that~~ provide fisheries disaster relief for commercial fishery failures that are due to certain duties, are due to certain duties,
and for other purposes. and for other purposes.
H.R. 2690 / S. 1453H.R. 2690 / S. 1453
~~Assistance~~ Assistance for Farmersfor Farmers Harmed
To provide trade adjustment assistance to farmers To provide trade adjustment assistance to farmers
~~Harmed~~ by Tariffs on Exports by Tariffs on Exports
Act affected by retaliatory affected by retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports in tariffs on U.S. exports in
~~Act~~
response to Sec. 232 actions. response to Sec. 232 actions.
H.R. 6124 H.R. 6124
Assistance Assistance for Firmsfor Firms ~~Harmed~~ Harmed by
To provide trade adjustment assistance to firms To provide trade adjustment assistance to firms
by Tariffs on Exports Act Tariffs on Exports Act
affected by retaliatory affected by retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports in tariffs on U.S. exports in
response to Sec. 232 actions. response to Sec. 232 actions.
H.R. 2362 / S. 3980 American Agriculture First Act To prioritize ~~H.R. 2362~~
~~American Agriculture First Act To prioritize~~ the purchase of agricultural commodities the purchase of agricultural commodities
~~from domestically~~ from domestical y owned enterprises,owned enterprises, and for other and for other
purposes. The bil cites trade damage from retaliation purposes. The bil cites trade damage from retaliation
by foreign nations, as primaryby foreign nations, as primary determining factor. Select Other Measures Congressional Research Service 65 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress Legislation Title Brief Description S. 5049 National Critical Capabilities To set up a Committee on National Critical Defense Act of 2020 Capabilities to review certain investments and other transactions that could result in a threat to one or more national critical capabilities. If the committee determines a transaction poses such a threat, it would recommend that the President take certain appropriate actions; initiation of a Sec. 232 investigation is one such action named in the bil ~~determining factor~~. .
Source: CRS, compiled from Congress.govCRS, compiled from Congress.gov. Notes:
~~Notes:~~ Sec. 232 = Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962; USITC = U.S. International Trade Sec. 232 = Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962; USITC = U.S. International Trade
Commission;Commission; IEEPA = International Emergency Economic PowersIEEPA = International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Act.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
63

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Appendix D. 2019 U.S. Steel and Aluminum Imports
Table ~~D-1~~A-2. Top U.S. Import Suppliers of Aluminum and Steel Products
( (~~2019, Millions~~2020, Mil ions of U.S. of U.S. ~~Dollars~~Dol ars) )
Aluminum
Steel
Change
Change
Trading
Import
Import
since
Trading
Import
Import
since
Partner
Value
Share
2017
Partner
Value
Share
2017
~~Exempted~~
~~Exempted~~
~~Canada-exempta~~
~~$3,126.7~~
~~19.8%~~
~~-17.9% Canada~~
~~$4,428.9~~
~~18.6%~~
~~-14.7%~~
~~Australia~~
~~$574.6~~
~~3.6%~~
~~169.1% *Brazil~~
~~$2,700.1~~
~~11.3%~~
~~10.2%~~
*Argentina
~~$412.0~~
~~2.6%~~
~~-24.6% Mexico~~
~~$2,666.9~~
~~11.2%~~
~~7.0%~~
~~Mexico~~
~~$176.0~~
~~1.1%~~
~~-31.1% *South Korea~~
~~$2,235.2~~
~~9.4%~~
~~-19.9~~Tariff Exempt Tariff Exempt Canada $5,629.1 46.3% -20.1% Canada $3,967.0 24.0% -23.6% *Argentina $318.4 2.6% -41.8% Mexico $2,182.1 13.2% -12.5% Mexico $173.2 1.4% -32.2% *Brazil $1,641.5 9.9% -33.0% Australia $154.5 1.3% -27.6% *South Korea $1,517.5 9.2% -45.6% Total Exempt $6,275.4 51.6% -22%
~~Total~~
~~$4,289.4~~
~~27.1%~~
~~-11~~.1% Australia .1% Australia
$ $~~239.3~~199.6
1. 1.02% %
~~20.5%~~
~~Exempted~~
~~Not-Exempted~~0.6% Not Exempt
*Argentina *Argentina
$ $~~234.7~~
~~1.0%~~
~~5.9%~~
~~Canada-~~
~~$2,505.2~~
~~15.8%~~
-22.5% Total
~~$12,505.1~~
~~52.5%~~
~~-6.3%~~
~~nonexempta~~
~~Exempted~~
EU
~~$1,830.9~~
~~11.6%~~
46.6% Not-Exempted
~~U.A.E.~~
~~$1,256.6~~
~~7.9%~~
~~-9.7% EU~~
~~$5,096.1~~
~~21.4%~~
~~-14.9%~~
~~China~~
~~$750.3~~
~~4.7%~~
~~-59.4% Japan~~
~~$1,487.2~~
~~6.2%~~
~~-10.2%~~
~~Bahrain~~
~~$705.4~~
~~4.5%~~
~~20.6% Taiwan~~
~~$886.0~~
~~3.7%~~
~~-29.8%~~
~~Russia~~
~~$607.4~~
~~3.8%~~
~~-62.8% China~~
~~$735.4~~
~~3.1%~~
~~-26.0%~~
~~India~~
~~$550.8~~
~~3.5%~~
~~44.2% Russia~~
~~$598.9~~
~~2.5%~~
~~-57.6%~~
~~Qatar~~
~~$414.9~~
~~2.6%~~
~~35.1% Vietnam~~
~~$488.2~~
~~2.0%~~
~~-8.2%~~
~~South Africa~~
~~$387.2~~
~~2.4%~~
~~13.7% India~~
~~$323.9~~
~~1.4%~~
~~-57.3%~~
~~Saudi Arabia~~
~~$294.7~~
~~1.9%~~
~~99.2% Thailand~~
~~$250.3~~
~~1.1%~~
~~-29.2%~~
~~South Korea~~
~~$290.4~~
~~1.8%~~
~~160.4% Ukraine~~
~~$223.1~~
~~0.9%~~
~~30.3%~~
**Total
~~$11,519.~~
~~72.9%~~
~~-8.4% **Total~~
~~$11,319.3~~
~~47.5%~~
~~-27.7%~~
~~Nonexempted~~
8
~~Nonexempted~~
~~U.S. Total~~
~~$15,809.~~
~~100.0%~~
-9.2% U.S. Total
~~$23,824.3~~
~~100.0%~~
~~-17.8%~~
~~(All Countries)~~
2
~~(All Countries)~~
Source: CRS compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data on HTS products included in the Section 232
~~proclamations. (These data do not include derivative products. For select derivative products see Table 2~~27.3 0.2% -87.7% EU $1,169.8 9.6% -2.3% Total Exempt $9,535.1 57.7% -28.6% U.A.E. $795.7 6.5% -42.8% Not Exempt China $571.8 4.7% -69.1% EU $3,112.5 18.8% -43.7% Germany $405.2 3.3% 8.6% Japan $985.9 6.0% -40.5% Russia $394.3 3.2% -75.8% Germany $872.0 5.3% -42.7% Bahrain $339.1 2.8% -42.0% Taiwan $607.7 3.7% -51.9% South Africa $319.1 2.6% -6.3% China $497.5 3.0% -49.9% India $295.9 2.4% -22.5% Italy $370.3 2.2% -49.2% Saudi Arabia $260.3 2.1% 75.9% Netherlands $330.0 2.0% -35.6% South Korea $214.0 1.8% 91.9% Sweden $290.4 1.8% -41.1% Oman $188.5 1.6% 102.5% United Kingdom $279.5 1.7% -39.7% Qatar $180.6 1.5% -41.2% Austria $274.5 1.7% -35.9% **Total Not $5,879.8 48.4% -37.1% **Total Not $7,003.0 42.3% -55.2% Exempt Exempt U.S. Total $12,155. 100.0% -30.2% U.S. Total $16,538.1 100.0% -43.0% (All Countries) 2 (All Countries) Source: CRS, compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data on HTS products included in the Section 232 proclamations. These data do not include derivative products, see next table. .
Notes: Percentage change comparisons are made to 2017 annual data, as a baseline before tariff actions took Percentage change comparisons are made to 2017 annual data, as a baseline before tariff actions took
effect. effect. ~~European Union (EU) includes 28 member states. U.A.E. refers~~ EU refers to the European Union (EU) and excludes the United Kingdom. U.A.E. refers to the United Arab Emirates.to the United Arab Emirates. ~~(*)~~ (*)Absolute Absolute
quota effective in place of additional tariffs. quota effective in place of additional tariffs.
(**)(**) ~~Total nonexempted~~Total not exempt includes additional includes additional countries not listed. Congressional Research Service 67~~countries not listed.~~
~~a. Most aluminum imports from Canada are exempted from the Section 232 tariffs, with the exception of non-~~
~~alloy unwrought aluminum products from Canada, which are subject to a 10% tariff as of Aug. 16, 2020. The~~
~~Canada-exempt figure is a sum of the aluminum imports exempted from the tariffs; the Canada-nonexempt~~
~~figure is a sum of imports of non-alloy unwrought aluminum products subject to tariffs.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
64

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Table ~~D-2~~A-3. Top U.S. Import Suppliers of Steel and Aluminum Derivatives
( (~~2019, Millions~~2020, Mil ions of U.S. of U.S. ~~Dollars~~Dol ars) )
Aluminum ~~Wire~~Derivatives Steel Derivatives
~~Steel Nails~~
~~Change~~
~~Change~~
Trading
Import
Import
~~since~~
Trading
Import
Import
~~since~~
Partner
Value
Share
~~2017~~
Partner
Value
Share
~~2017~~
~~Exempted~~
~~Exempted~~Tariff Exempt Tariff Exempt
Canada Canada
$9. $9.6
~~20.8%~~
~~182.6~~1 22.9% South Korea % South Korea
$ $~~33.1~~30.4 9.7
~~9.5%~~
~~19.3~~% %
Mexico Mexico
$ $~~7.6~~
~~16.6%~~
~~72.3% Mexico~~
~~$16.4~~
~~4.7%~~
~~80.4~~8.1 20.5% Canada $28.8 9.2% %
Australia Australia
$0.0 $0.0
0.0% 0.0%
~~- Canada~~
~~$9.5~~
~~2.7%~~
~~-29.0~~ Mexico $23.6 7.5% %
Argentina Argentina
$0.0 $0.0
0.0% 0.0%
~~- Australia~~ Argentina
$0.0 $0.0
0.0% 0.0%
-
~~Total~~
~~$17.2~~
~~37.4%~~
~~120.1% Brazil~~Total Exempt $17.3 43.4% Australia $0.0 0.0% Not Exempt Brazil $0.0 0.0% EU $5.6 14.1% Total Exempt $82.8 26.4% Bahrain $4.8 12.0% Not Exempt India $4.4 11.0% Oman $51.2 16.3% Turkey $4.4 11.0% Taiwan $28.5 9.1% Belgium $2.4 5.9% Thailand $26.1 8.3% China $1.6 4.1% Turkey $25.9 8.3% Italy $1.4 3.4% Sri Lanka $18.5 5.9% Sweden $0.6 1.6% India $15.7 5.0% Spain $0.6 1.5% Liechtenstein $15.5 4.9% Vietnam $0.6 1.4% EU $14.1 4.5% Ecuador $0.5 1.3% China $12.2 3.9% Austria $0.5 1.3% Malaysia $9.9 3.2% *Total Not $22.5 56.6% *Total Not $230.8 73.6% Exempt Exempt U.S. Total $39.8 100.0% U.S. Total $313.6 100.0% (All Countries) (All Countries) Source: CRS, compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data on HTS products included in Presidential Proclamation 9980 (January 24, 2020), concerning steel and aluminum derivative products. Notes: This table includes data on steel
~~$0.0~~
~~0.0%~~
~~-100.0%~~
~~Exempted~~
~~Not-Exempted~~
~~Total~~
~~$59.0~~
~~17.0%~~
~~17.6%~~
~~Exempted~~
~~Turkey~~
~~$9.2~~
~~20.0%~~
101.6% Not-Exempted
~~India~~
~~$7.6~~
~~16.5%~~
~~288.4% Oman~~
~~$61.8~~
~~17.8%~~
~~95.9%~~
~~China~~
~~$5.5~~
~~12.0%~~
~~88.9% Taiwan~~
~~$33.0~~
~~9.5%~~
~~-14.5%~~
EU
~~$3.8~~
~~8.4%~~
~~662.1% Turkey~~
~~$30.5~~
~~8.8%~~
~~43.4%~~
~~Colombia~~
~~$1.0~~
~~2.1%~~
~~- Thailand~~
~~$28.0~~
~~8.1%~~
~~178.2%~~
~~Indonesia~~
~~$0.5~~
~~1.0%~~
~~-32.3% India~~
~~$26.3~~
~~7.6%~~
~~18.1%~~
~~South Korea~~
~~$0.4~~
~~0.9%~~
~~-37.5% Sri Lanka~~
~~$24.1~~
~~6.9%~~
~~503.6%~~
~~Japan~~
~~$0.3~~
~~0.6%~~
~~-86.8% China~~
~~$17.3~~
~~5.0%~~
~~-31.9%~~
~~Vietnam~~
~~$0.2~~
~~0.4%~~
~~- Liechtenstein~~
~~$13.9~~
~~4.0%~~
~~96.1%~~
~~Thailand~~
~~$0.1~~
~~0.2%~~
~~226.5% Malaysia~~
~~$13.1~~
~~3.8%~~
~~59.4%~~
~~Ecuador~~
~~$0.1~~
~~0.2%~~
~~-86.6% Austria~~
~~$10.4~~
~~3.0%~~
~~19.2%~~
***Total
~~$28.8~~
~~62.6%~~
~~96.4% ***Total~~
~~$288.6~~
~~83.0%~~
~~41.9%~~
~~Nonexempted~~
~~Nonexempted~~
~~U.S. Total~~
~~$46.1~~
~~100.0%~~
104.6% U.S. Total
~~$347.6~~
~~100.0%~~
~~37.1%~~
~~(All Countries)~~
~~(All Countries)~~
Source: CRS, compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data on HTS products included in Presidential Proclamation
~~9980 (January 24, 2020), concerning steel and aluminum derivative products.~~
~~Notes:~~ ~~Due to insufficient data, the table does not include information on steel~~ and aluminum bumpers and and aluminum bumpers and
tractor tractor ~~stamping, which are also in the scope of Proclamation 9980. Percentage change comparisons are made to~~
~~2017 annual data, as a baseline before tariff actions took effect. European Union (EU) includes 28 member states,~~
~~including the United Kingdom.~~

~~Congressional Research Service~~
65

~~link to page 71 link to page 71 link to page 71~~ ~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

~~Table D-3. Estimates of U.S. Imports Under Ongoing Section 232 Investigations~~
~~(2019, Millions of U.S. Dollars)~~
~~2019 Import~~
~~Import~~
~~Top Trading Partners~~
~~Value~~
~~Share~~
Transformers, GOES, NOESa
~~Total U.S. Imports~~
~~$2,435.0~~
~~100.0%~~
~~Mexico~~
~~$1,063.7~~
~~43.7%~~
~~European Union~~
~~$547.6~~
~~22.5%~~
~~Canada~~
~~$369.3~~
~~15.2%~~
~~South Korea~~
~~$174.9~~
~~7.2%~~
~~Taiwan~~
~~$63.9~~
~~2.6%~~
Mobile Cranesb

~~Total U.S. Imports~~
~~$923.5~~
~~100.0%~~
~~European Union~~
~~$552.2~~
~~59.8%~~
~~Japan~~
~~$353.5~~
~~38.3%~~
~~Thailand~~
~~$5.8~~
~~0.6%~~
~~Canada~~
~~$5.6~~
~~0.6%~~
~~China~~
~~$4.9~~
~~0.5%~~
Vanadiumc

~~Total U.S. Imports~~
~~$192.4~~
~~100.0%~~
~~European Union~~
~~$89.9~~
~~46.7%~~
~~Canada~~
~~$64.5~~
~~33.6%~~
~~Japan~~
~~$11.4~~
~~5.9%~~
~~Ukraine~~
~~$11.4~~
~~5.9%~~
~~South Africa~~
~~$8.2~~
~~4.3%~~
~~Source:~~ ~~CRS, compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data, based on HTS codes likely~~ stampings, which are only available from 2020. EU refers to the European Union (EU) and excludes the United Kingdom. (*)Total not exempt includes additional countries not listed. Table A-4. Estimates of U.S. Imports Under Section 232 Vanadium Investigation (2020, Mil ions of U.S. Dol ars) Top Trading Partners Import Value Import Share Total U.S. Imports $126.8 100.0% EU-27 $39.1 30.8% South Africa $40.4 31.8% Congressional Research Service 68 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress Canada $22.7 17.9% Czech Republic $19.5 15.3% Brazil $17.8 14.0% Source: CRS, compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data, based on HTS codes likely within the scope of the Section 232 vanadium investigation~~within the scope of~~
~~announced Section 232 investigations~~. .
Notes: These are estimatesThese are estimates based, narrowly, on the products described in based, narrowly, on the products described in ~~publically~~publicly available Section 232 petitions and includes: HTS 2825300050, 2850002000, 7202920000, 2841901000. The ful scope of the investigation has not been made public. EU refers to the European Union (EU) and excludes the United Kingdom. ~~available Section 232~~
~~petitions and a BIS survey; however, the investigations are on-going and the ful scope is not yet public. European~~
~~Union (EU) includes 28 member states, including the United Kingdom.~~
~~a. The transformer investigation estimates include grain-oriented electrical steel (GOES) and non-oriented~~
~~electrical steel (NOES), as well as transformer products. The estimates are based on the products~~
~~described in BIS’s survey and assessment of the U.S. electrical steel and transformer products industry,~~
~~available at https://bis.doc.gov/index.php/esproducts232.~~
~~b. The mobile crane estimate is based on the products outlined in the company’s Section 232 petition; HTS~~
~~842641, 842649, 84314910.~~
~~c. The vanadium estimate is based on the products narrowly described by the companies petitioning for a~~
~~Section 232 investigation; HTS 2825300050, 2850002000, 7202920000, 2841901000.~~

~~Congressional Research Service~~
66

~~Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress~~

Author Information

Rachel F. Fefer, Coordinator Rachel F. Fefer, Coordinator
Brandon J. Murrill Brandon J. Murrill
Analyst in International Trade and Finance Analyst in International Trade and Finance
Legislative Attorney Legislative Attorney

Keigh E. Hammond Keigh E. Hammond
Michaela D. Platzer Michaela D. Platzer
Senior Research Librarian Senior Research Librarian
Specialist in Industrial Organization and Business Specialist in Industrial Organization and Business

Vivian C. Jones Vivian C. Jones
Brock R. Williams Brock R. Williams
Specialist in International Trade and Finance Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Specialist in International Trade and Finance Specialist in International Trade and Finance

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