Issues in the Reauthorization of Amtrak

Changes from August 17, 2020 to January 5, 2021

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Issues in the Reauthorization of Amtrak
~~August 17, 2020~~January 5, 2021
Amtrak—officially the National Railroad Passenger Corporation—has been the national intercity Amtrak—officially the National Railroad Passenger Corporation—has been the national intercity
passenger railroad since 1971, and currently serves over 500 stations on a network approximately passenger railroad since 1971, and currently serves over 500 stations on a network approximately
Ben Goldman
22,000 miles long. In some markets, such as the busy Northeast Corridor (NEC) connecting 22,000 miles long. In some markets, such as the busy Northeast Corridor (NEC) connecting
Analyst in Transportation Analyst in Transportation
Washington, DC; New York; and Boston, it has captured a greater share of intercity passengers Washington, DC; New York; and Boston, it has captured a greater share of intercity passengers
Policy Policy
than domestic airlines. In other, more rural markets, some see it as a vital link to the national than domestic airlines. In other, more rural markets, some see it as a vital link to the national

transportation system despite low levels of ridership. Though Amtrak is legally a private for- transportation system despite low levels of ridership. Though Amtrak is legally a private for-
profit corporation, the federal government controls the company’s operations. A profit corporation, the federal government controls the company’s operations. A ~~five-year~~multiyear

authorization of federal funding for Amtrak was included in the Fixing America’s Surface authorization of federal funding for Amtrak was included in the Fixing America’s Surface
Transportation (FAST) Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-94), which expires at the end of Transportation (FAST) Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-94), which expires at the end of ~~FY2020.~~
FY2021. Since its inception, Amtrak has depended on annual appropriations from the federal government to cover its Since its inception, Amtrak has depended on annual appropriations from the federal government to cover its ~~cap ital~~capital
(infrastructure, vehicles) and operating (train crews, maintenance) costs. Prior to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) (infrastructure, vehicles) and operating (train crews, maintenance) costs. Prior to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
global pandemic, Amtrak’s financial health had improved in recent years. In global pandemic, Amtrak’s financial health had improved in recent years. In ~~2019~~FY2019, according to the railroad, revenue covered , according to the railroad, revenue covered
79% of its expenses, among the highest such ratios it has ever reported. Amtrak’s preferred metric for financial performance, 79% of its expenses, among the highest such ratios it has ever reported. Amtrak’s preferred metric for financial performance,
its adjusted operating loss, declined to $30 million,its adjusted operating loss, declined to $30 million, but this figure does not take its capital needs into account. Increased but this figure does not take its capital needs into account. Increased
contributions from commuter railroads that use the NEC have played an important role in reducing the need for federal contributions from commuter railroads that use the NEC have played an important role in reducing the need for federal
support. Amtrak’s pre-pandemic ridership had been increasing, as had its relative share of passenger miles traveled, though support. Amtrak’s pre-pandemic ridership had been increasing, as had its relative share of passenger miles traveled, though
both remain small on a national scale when compared to road and air traffic. both remain small on a national scale when compared to road and air traffic.
Despite these improvements, a large backlog of capital projects remains unfunded, and Amtrak remains under pressure to Despite these improvements, a large backlog of capital projects remains unfunded, and Amtrak remains under pressure to
further reduce its need for operating subsidies. Capacity constraints make further ridership increases difficult to achieve further reduce its need for operating subsidies. Capacity constraints make further ridership increases difficult to achieve
without capital expenditures for additional equipment and track improvements. Before the COVID-19 pandemic led to a without capital expenditures for additional equipment and track improvements. Before the COVID-19 pandemic led to a
sudden drop in travel demand in March 2020, requiring emergency federal funding to sustain reduced service, Amtrak had sudden drop in travel demand in March 2020, requiring emergency federal funding to sustain reduced service, Amtrak had
predicted that adjusted operating losses would be completely eliminated by the end of FY2020.predicted that adjusted operating losses would be completely eliminated by the end of FY2020.
The Amtrak system is divided into two subsets for funding purposes, the NEC and the National Network (everything else), The Amtrak system is divided into two subsets for funding purposes, the NEC and the National Network (everything else),
each facing its own set of challenges. Congress may want to explore opportunities to further differentiate these systems in each facing its own set of challenges. Congress may want to explore opportunities to further differentiate these systems in
terms of how they are funded and managed. Comparatively high revenues on the NEC terms of how they are funded and managed. Comparatively high revenues on the NEC ~~compared~~in relation to operating costs have to operating costs have
prompted occasional proposals to either partially or fully privatize the existing service, while its large capital backlog and prompted occasional proposals to either partially or fully privatize the existing service, while its large capital backlog and
lack of a long-term dedicated funding source have raised questions about whether a new NEC-only funding mechanism is lack of a long-term dedicated funding source have raised questions about whether a new NEC-only funding mechanism is
needed. The National Network, meanwhile, encompasses both short-distance corridors supported by state governments and needed. The National Network, meanwhile, encompasses both short-distance corridors supported by state governments and
long-distance routes that require the largest federal subsidies in the Amtrak system. Amtrak is under pressure to accomplish long-distance routes that require the largest federal subsidies in the Amtrak system. Amtrak is under pressure to accomplish
two goals that at times seem to work against one another: to serve as the national passenger railroad, including through the two goals that at times seem to work against one another: to serve as the national passenger railroad, including through the
operation of long-distance routes, and to reduce or eliminate the need for federal subsidies. While Congress has repeatedly operation of long-distance routes, and to reduce or eliminate the need for federal subsidies. While Congress has repeatedly
taken steps to preserve long-distance passenger trains, taken steps to preserve long-distance passenger trains, ~~both the Trump Administration~~past presidential Administrations and Amtrak have voiced support for and Amtrak have voiced support for
shifting focus away from long-distance trains and toward serving a larger number of shorter corridors. Any such rebalancing, shifting focus away from long-distance trains and toward serving a larger number of shorter corridors. Any such rebalancing,
however, would be contingent on state support that is far from certain. however, would be contingent on state support that is far from certain.
Apart from funding, other issues facing Amtrak have been on the congressional agenda for years. On -time performance has Apart from funding, other issues facing Amtrak have been on the congressional agenda for years. On -time performance has
seen only sporadic improvement since the enactment of a 2008 law designed to enforce the preferential treatment, codified in seen only sporadic improvement since the enactment of a 2008 law designed to enforce the preferential treatment, codified in
statute since the 1970s, of Amtrak trains running on freight tracks. Onboard food and beverage service, long seen by critics as statute since the 1970s, of Amtrak trains running on freight tracks. Onboard food and beverage service, long seen by critics as
a contributor to financial losses but by supporters as integral to the rail travel experience, has mirrored Amtrak as a whole in a contributor to financial losses but by supporters as integral to the rail travel experience, has mirrored Amtrak as a whole in
improving its financial performance while still falling short of goals set by Congress. Installation of a key safety technology improving its financial performance while still falling short of goals set by Congress. Installation of a key safety technology
mandated in 2008 mandated in 2008 ~~is continuing~~was completed according to federally approved schedules, but according to federally approved schedules, but ~~Amtrak routes that operate on track owned by~~
~~freight or commuter railroads face the additional hurdle of demonstrating interoperability with those railroads’ safety~~
~~systems, putting the timeline to full implementation at risk~~auditors have questioned whether rapid implementation has left the system with potentially costly flaws . .
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Background and Context
Amtrak—legal y the National Railroad Passenger Corporation—was created by the Rail Amtrak—legal y the National Railroad Passenger Corporation—was created by the Rail
Passenger Service Act of 19701 and began operating in 1971, taking over intercity passenger Passenger Service Act of 19701 and began operating in 1971, taking over intercity passenger
service from financial y distressed private railroad companies. It original y did not own any rail service from financial y distressed private railroad companies. It original y did not own any rail
infrastructure, eventual y coming to own some assets cast off by bankrupt private railroads. It is infrastructure, eventual y coming to own some assets cast off by bankrupt private railroads. It is
operated as a private company and not a government corporation, but the President appoints the operated as a private company and not a government corporation, but the President appoints the
members of its Board of Directors and its primary stockholder is the U.S. Department of members of its Board of Directors and its primary stockholder is the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), with a smal proportion of common stock held by other railroad Transportation (DOT), with a smal proportion of common stock held by other railroad
companies. Amtrak companies. Amtrak ~~currently~~normal y serves over 500 stations in 46 states and the District of Columbia, serves over 500 stations in 46 states and the District of Columbia,
running running ~~over~~more than 300 trains per day on a network approximately 22,000 miles long 300 trains per day on a network approximately 22,000 miles long (Figure 1).2 ).2
Figure 1. Amtrak System Map

Source: Amtrak, Amtrak, General and Legislative Annual Report & Fiscal Year 2020 Grant Request. .
Notes: Numbers on map correspond to the fol owing routes: 1. Numbers on map correspond to the fol owing routes: 1. Cascades; 2. ; 2. Coast Starlight; 3. ; 3. Capitol Corridor,
San Joaquin; 4. ; 4. Pacific Surfliner; 5. ; 5. Empire Builder; 6. ; 6. California Zephyr; 7. ; 7. Southwest Chief; 8. ; 8. Sunset Limited; 9. ; 9. Blue
Water, Carl Sandburg, , Hiawatha, Hoosier State (discontinued as of July 2019)(discontinued as of July 2019), Il ini, Il inois Zephyr, Lincoln, Pere
Marquette, Saluki, Wolverine; 10. ; 10. Missouri River Runner; 11. ; 11. Heartland Flyer; 12. ; 12. Texas Eagle; 13. ; 13. City of New Orleans; ;
14. 14. Lake Shore Limited; 15. ; 15. Capitol Limited; 16. ; 16. Cardinal; 17. ; 17. Crescent; 18. ; 18. Maple Leaf; 19. ; 19. Adirondack, Empire, Ethan
Al en; 20. ; 20. Keystone, , ~~Pennsylvanian;~~ Pennsylvanian; 21. 21. Vermonter, Val ey Flyer (initiated August 2019); 22. (initiated August 2019); 22. Downeaster; 23. ; 23. Northeast
Corridor; 24. ; 24. Carolinian, Piedmont, Virginia; 25. ; 25. Auto Train, Palmetto; 26. ; 26. Silver Meteor, Silver Star. Where State-. Where State-
Supported and Long-Distance routes overlap, the State-Supported route is shown. Amtrak does not serve Supported and Long-Distance routes overlap, the State-Supported route is shown. Amtrak does not serve
Alaska or Hawai . Alaska or Hawai .

1 P.L. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1327. 1 P.L. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1327.
2 Amtrak, 2 Amtrak, FY ~~2018~~2019 Company Profile, https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/public/documents/, https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/public/documents/
corporate/nationalfactsheets/Amtrak-Corporate-Profile-corporate/nationalfactsheets/Amtrak-Corporate-Profile-~~FY2018-0319~~FY2019-033120.pdf. .pdf.
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Since 2008, Amtrak services have been grouped into three business lines: (1) the Washington DC- Since 2008, Amtrak services have been grouped into three business lines: (1) the Washington DC-
New York-Boston Northeast Corridor (NEC), (2) short-distance corridors under 750 miles long New York-Boston Northeast Corridor (NEC), (2) short-distance corridors under 750 miles long
with service supported by state governments, and (3) long-distance trains serving destinations with service supported by state governments, and (3) long-distance trains serving destinations
over 750 miles apart, usual y once per day on an overnight schedule. Under the Fixing America’s over 750 miles apart, usual y once per day on an overnight schedule. Under the Fixing America’s
Surface Transportation (FAST) Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-94), the state-supported short-distance and Surface Transportation (FAST) Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-94), the state-supported short-distance and
long-distance routes were grouped together into the National Network. Amtrak’s Thruway long-distance routes were grouped together into the National Network. Amtrak’s Thruway
network of over 150 intercity bus routes serves as a feeder service for passenger trips originating network of over 150 intercity bus routes serves as a feeder service for passenger trips originating
or terminating in cities off the rail system. or terminating in cities off the rail system.
~~Amtrak’s FY2020 ridership and revenue forecasts were revised downward~~Amtrak and the COVID-19 Pandemic Amtrak’s FY2020 financial performance suffered as a result of the as a result of the
combined effects of a general reluctance to travel, reduced economic activity, and strained state combined effects of a general reluctance to travel, reduced economic activity, and strained state
government finances stemming government finances stemming from the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. After several months of similar or improved performance relative to FY2019, ridership in March 2020 was nearly 60% below what it had been a year prior, and revenue fel nearly 40%. The following month, ridership was down 95% and revenue was down 60% compared to April 2019 (Figure 2). Amtrak’s monthly expenses had returned to pre-pandemic levels by September, while revenues were stil down over 50% and ridership down nearly 80% compared with the previous year. The year-end result was a 50% drop in annual ridership, and adjusted operating losses—once projected to be near zero—of over $800 mil ion. Figure 2. FY2020 Amtrak Monthly Performance Relative to Previous Year Source: Compiled by CRS from Amtrak monthly performance reports. In ~~from the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. In~~
response, Amtrak furloughed workers and reduced or eliminated service on many of its routes. response, Amtrak furloughed workers and reduced or eliminated service on many of its routes. To To
maintain even this reduced level of service through the end of FY2020, Amtrak requested and maintain even this reduced level of service through the end of FY2020, Amtrak requested and
received an additional $1 bil ion from the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136). Amtrak also requested received an additional $1 bil ion from the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136). Amtrak also requested
supplemental appropriations of $1.45 bil ion beyond the $2 bil ion included in its FY2021 request supplemental appropriations of $1.45 bil ion beyond the $2 bil ion included in its FY2021 request
to Congressto Congress~~, without which many routes would see further or enduring service cuts.~~ but received less than its requested amount, which could lead Amtrak to consider further or enduring service cuts. Ridership has been slow to recover since bottoming out in April. Long-distance routes have recovered a greater proportion of riders than the other two business lines, but it is worth noting that these already made up the smal est share of Amtrak’s overal Congressional Research Service 2 link to page 6 link to page 7 Issues in the Reauthorization of Amtrak ridership, and some long-distance trains were already operating just three times per week and therefore saw no reductions in service relative to pre-pandemic levels (Figure 3). Figure 3. FY2020 Amtrak Monthly Ridership Relative to Prior Year, by Business Line Source: Compiled by CRS from Amtrak monthly performance reports. This report primarily ~~This report~~
~~primarily~~ discusses the implications of reauthorizing Amtrak based on long-term discusses the implications of reauthorizing Amtrak based on long-term trends through trends through
the end of FY2019the end of FY2019~~, not its~~. However, Amtrak’s near-term prospects for recovery to pre-pandemic levels of service and near-term prospects for recovery to pre-pandemic levels of service and
~~performance~~performance could depend on the funding levels and priorities included in its next multiyear authorization. The current authorization, which was original y included in the FAST Act and has been subsequently extended, wil expire at the end of FY2021. .
Ridership Performance
Over 32 mil ion trips were taken on Amtrak in 2019, a company record.3 Amtrak system ridership Over 32 mil ion trips were taken on Amtrak in 2019, a company record.3 Amtrak system ridership
~~has~~ had exceeded 30 mil ion trips every year since 2011, and exceeded 30 mil ion trips every year since 2011, and ~~has~~had increased 29% over the increased 29% over the ~~last~~previous 16 16
years, with much of that growth coming on Amtrak’s state-supported short-distance corridorsyears, with much of that growth coming on Amtrak’s state-supported short-distance corridors, before ridership plunged by half in FY2020 (Figure 4
(Figure 2). Approximately 47% of al Amtrak trips were taken on state-supported routes in 2019, . Approximately 47% of al Amtrak trips were taken on state-supported routes in 2019,
compared with 39% on the Northeast Corridor and the remaining 14% on long-distance trains. compared with 39% on the Northeast Corridor and the remaining 14% on long-distance trains.
State-supported routes have accounted for the State-supported routes have accounted for the plurality of Amtrak trips among its three business plurality of Amtrak trips among its three business
lines every year since 2005. One contributing factor to the growth of state-supported route traffic lines every year since 2005. One contributing factor to the growth of state-supported route traffic
over that period is that Amtrak and its state over that period is that Amtrak and its state partners have added new routes and additional dailypartners have added new routes and additional daily
trains. trains.

3 Amtrak, 3 Amtrak, FY 2019 Company Profile, https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/public/documents/, https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/public/documents/
corporate/nationalfactsheets/Amtrak-Corporate-Profile-FY2019-033120.pdf. corporate/nationalfactsheets/Amtrak-Corporate-Profile-FY2019-033120.pdf.
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Figure 24. Amtrak Ridership by Business Line, FY2004-~~FY2019~~FY2020
(in mil ions of trips) (in mil ions of trips)

Source: Compiled by CRS from Amtrak monthly performance reports. Compiled by CRS from Amtrak monthly performance reports.
Despite record ridership levels, Amtrak trains in 2019 were roughly as full as they have been at Despite record ridership levels, Amtrak trains in 2019 were roughly as full as they have been at
any point in the past decade (see discussion of load factor below), and Amtrak passengers any point in the past decade (see discussion of load factor below), and Amtrak passengers
accounted for a smal fraction of intercity passenger travel volume nationwide. In 2018, Amtrak accounted for a smal fraction of intercity passenger travel volume nationwide. In 2018, Amtrak
generated 6.4 bil ion passenger-miles (one passenger-mile is equal to one passenger traveling one generated 6.4 bil ion passenger-miles (one passenger-mile is equal to one passenger traveling one
mile) of traffic volume; by comparison, domestic air travel generated 730 bil ion passenger-miles, mile) of traffic volume; by comparison, domestic air travel generated 730 bil ion passenger-miles,
over 100 times as many as Amtrak. Highway users generated an estimated 5.6 over 100 times as many as Amtrak. Highway users generated an estimated 5.6 trillion passenger- passenger-
miles in 2018, including 388 bil ion on buses, though this includes trips that are not intercity in miles in 2018, including 388 bil ion on buses, though this includes trips that are not intercity in
nature. However, Amtrak passenger-miles saw a greater cumulative percent increase than nature. However, Amtrak passenger-miles saw a greater cumulative percent increase than
highway passenger-miles from 2007 to 2018, and a greater cumulative percent increase than highway passenger-miles from 2007 to 2018, and a greater cumulative percent increase than
domestic air passenger-miles from 2008 to domestic air passenger-miles from 2008 to 2015 (Figure 35). Though Amtrak ridership ). Though Amtrak ridership ~~has been~~
~~steady~~ was steady or rising in terms of trips takenor rising in terms of trips taken through early 2020, Amtrak passenger-miles , Amtrak passenger-miles ~~have~~had declined somewhat since declined somewhat since
2013, suggesting an increase in shorter trips. The NEC is the only market in which Amtrak serves 2013, suggesting an increase in shorter trips. The NEC is the only market in which Amtrak serves
a larger proportion of intercity trips than airlines, with both lagging far behind highway travel.4 a larger proportion of intercity trips than airlines, with both lagging far behind highway travel.4
Lack of equipment and track capacity have inhibited Amtrak from Lack of equipment and track capacity have inhibited Amtrak from increasing service on the NEC. increasing service on the NEC.

4 Northeast Corridor Commission, 4 Northeast Corridor Commission, Northeast Corridor Intercity Travel Study, September 2015, p. 9, http://nec-, September 2015, p. 9, http://nec-
commission.com/app/uploads/2018/04/2015-09-14_NEC-Intercity-Travel-Summary-Report_Website.pdf. See also commission.com/app/uploads/2018/04/2015-09-14_NEC-Intercity-Travel-Summary-Report_Website.pdf. See also
Amtrak, Amtrak, Am trak Five Year Service Line Plans, Base (FY 2019) + Five Year Strategic Plan (FY 2020 -2024), 2019, p. , 2019, p.
35, available at https://www.amtrak.com/reports-documents under “ FY20-24 Service Line Plans.” 35, available at https://www.amtrak.com/reports-documents under “ FY20-24 Service Line Plans.”
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Figure 35. Passenger-Miles Traveled by Mode, 2004-2018

Source: Calculated by CRS using data from Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Table 1-40, https://www.bts.gov/Calculated by CRS using data from Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Table 1-40, https://www.bts.gov/
content/us-passenger-miles. content/us-passenger-miles.
Notes: Calendar-year data. Highway passenger-miles include Calendar-year data. Highway passenger-miles include ~~nonintercity~~non-intercity travel. travel.
Amtrak’s Finances5
Amtrak’s expenses exceed its revenues each year. In FY2019, Amtrak’s revenues totaled $3.3 Amtrak’s expenses exceed its revenues each year. In FY2019, Amtrak’s revenues totaled $3.3
bil ion, against expenses of $4.2 bil ion, for a net loss of $875 mil ion. That loss was covered by bil ion, against expenses of $4.2 bil ion, for a net loss of $875 mil ion. That loss was covered by
federal grants made to Amtrak by DOT (see the discussion of funding issues later in this report). federal grants made to Amtrak by DOT (see the discussion of funding issues later in this report).
Revenues covered 79% of the railroad’s total expenses in FY2019, among the highest such ratios Revenues covered 79% of the railroad’s total expenses in FY2019, among the highest such ratios
over the 16 years for which comparable data are available (se over the 16 years for which comparable data are available (see Figure 46 aand Table 1).

5 T his report cites financial reports published on a regular basis by Amtrak. T hese reports contain revenue and expense 5 T his report cites financial reports published on a regular basis by Amtrak. T hese reports contain revenue and expense
data at the system, business line, and route level. However, Amtrak does not disaggregate expenses into those that are data at the system, business line, and route level. However, Amtrak does not disaggregate expenses into those that are
fixed costs and those that are avoidable (i.e., costs Amtrak would no longer incur if the routes were discontinued). fixed costs and those that are avoidable (i.e., costs Amtrak would no longer incur if the routes were discontinued).
Notably, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the DOT Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found that Notably, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the DOT Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found that
Amtrak allocates estimated costs to individual routes rather than identifying and assigning direct costs, which reduces Amtrak allocates estimated costs to individual routes rather than identifying and assigning direct costs, which reduces
the precision of Amtrak’s financial reports. See GAO Report GAO-16-67, the precision of Amtrak’s financial reports. See GAO Report GAO-16-67, Amtrak: Better Reporting, Planning, and
Im proved Financial Inform ation Could Enhance Decision Making , January 2016. , January 2016.
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Figure 46. Amtrak Ratio of Revenues to Expenses, FY2004-~~FY2019~~FY2020
(total revenues/total expenses) (total revenues/total expenses)

Source: Calculated by CRS using data from Amtrak monthly performanceCalculated by CRS using data from Amtrak monthly performance reports. reports.
Notes: Fiscal-year data. Fiscal-year data. ~~FY2019~~FY2020 figures are preliminary. Starting in FY2017, Amtrak changed its definition of figures are preliminary. Starting in FY2017, Amtrak changed its definition of
“total expenses” to exclude depreciation and other items. Total expenses for FY2017-“total expenses” to exclude depreciation and other items. Total expenses for FY2017-~~FY2019~~FY2020 are therefore are therefore
calculated as total revenue plus amount of net loss. calculated as total revenue plus amount of net loss.
Table 1. Amtrak Revenues, Expenses, and Federal Support, ~~FY2015-FY2019~~FY2016-FY2020
(in mil ions of nominal dol ars) (in mil ions of nominal dol ars)

~~FY2015~~
~~FY2016~~
~~FY2017~~
~~FY2018~~
~~FY2019~~FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020
Operating revenue Operating revenue

Ticket revenue Ticket revenue
~~$2,124~~
~~$2,136~~
~~$2,181~~
~~$2,207~~
~~$2,289~~2,136 2,181 2,207 2,289 1,192
Food and beverage revenue Food and beverage revenue
132 132
~~132~~
~~139~~
~~141~~
~~144~~139 141 144 77
State-supported train revenue State-supported train revenue
~~223~~
227 227
224 224
234 234
234 234
342 Total passenger-related revenue Total passenger-related revenue
2, 2,~~479~~
2,495 495
2,544 2,544
2,582 2,582
2,667 2,667 1,611
Commuter/other core revenue Commuter/other core revenue
~~123~~
226 226
260 260
285 285
300 300 303
Other/ancil ary revenue Other/ancil ary revenue
~~556~~
425 425
371 371
342 342
357 357
~~Total revenue~~
~~3,157~~350 Total revenue
3,146 3,146
3,175 3,175
3,208 3,208
3,323 3,323
~~Total expenses~~
~~4,333~~2,265 Total expenses
4,261 4,261
4,144 4,144
4,025 4,025
4,198 4,198
3,066 Net loss Net loss
(1, (1,~~286)~~
~~(1,~~081) 081)
(969) (969)
(817) (817)
(875) (875)
~~Adjustments~~
~~996~~(1,691) Adjustments
850 850
775 775
646 646
845 845
890 Adjusted operating loss Adjusted operating loss
( (~~290~~230) )
( (~~230~~194) )
( (~~194~~171) )
( (~~171~~30) )
( (30801) )
Federal capital and operating grants Federal capital and operating grants
$1,390 1,390
~~$1,390~~
~~$1,495~~
~~$1,942~~
~~$1,942~~1,495 1,942 1,942 3,018
Source: Amtrak monthly performance reports. Amtrak monthly performance reports.
Federal grants taken from annual appropriations; see Table 3. Notes: FY2020~~Notes:~~ ~~FY2019~~ figures are preliminary. Starting in FY2017, Amtrak changed its definition of “total expenses” to figures are preliminary. Starting in FY2017, Amtrak changed its definition of “total expenses” to
exclude depreciation and other items. Total expenses for FY2017-exclude depreciation and other items. Total expenses for FY2017-~~FY2019~~FY2020 are therefore calculated as total are therefore calculated as total
revenue plus amount of net loss.revenue plus amount of net loss. Federal grants in FY2020 include emergency COVID-19 relief funds.
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Under pressure from Congress and several Administrations, Amtrak reduced—but did not Under pressure from Congress and several Administrations, Amtrak reduced—but did not
eliminate—its reliance on federal subsidies to support its operations prior to the COVID-19 eliminate—its reliance on federal subsidies to support its operations prior to the COVID-19
pandemic. Amtrak had net losses of roughly $900 mil ion in each of FY2017-FY2019, the first pandemic. Amtrak had net losses of roughly $900 mil ion in each of FY2017-FY2019, the first
three years in the past 16 in which net losses were less than $1 bil ion. One important reason for three years in the past 16 in which net losses were less than $1 bil ion. One important reason for
this improvement is a doubling of revenue from commuter railroads using the NEC this improvement is a doubling of revenue from commuter railroads using the NEC ~~from pre-~~
~~2016 to post-~~since 2016, due to higher payments required under the cost al ocation policy established 2016, due to higher payments required under the cost al ocation policy established
by Section 212 of the by Section 212 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA; Division Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA; Division
B of P.L. 110-432) and enforceable by the Surface Transportation Board (STB) under Section B of P.L. 110-432) and enforceable by the Surface Transportation Board (STB) under Section
11305 of the FAST 11305 of the FAST Act. Act.
By Amtrak’s preferred metric, which adjusts the net loss by removing depreciation and certain By Amtrak’s preferred metric, which adjusts the net loss by removing depreciation and certain
other expenses, annual operating losses have been reduced to a figure smal er than $250 mil ion other expenses, annual operating losses have been reduced to a figure smal er than $250 mil ion
in each of the past six fiscal years; this figure was over twice as large in nominal terms in the in each of the past six fiscal years; this figure was over twice as large in nominal terms in the
years prior to 2007 years prior to 2007 (Figure 57). The effect is more dramatic when taking the effects of inflation . The effect is more dramatic when taking the effects of inflation
into account; in constant 2019 dollars, the figure was four times as large in 2007 as it was in into account; in constant 2019 dollars, the figure was four times as large in 2007 as it was in
2018.6 This metric, dubbed the 2018.6 This metric, dubbed the adjusted operating result, is seen by Amtrak as more closely , is seen by Amtrak as more closely
reflecting the need for federal operating support, but it does not take the railroad’s capital reflecting the need for federal operating support, but it does not take the railroad’s capital
investment needs into account. investment needs into account.
Figure 57. Amtrak Net Loss and Adjusted Operating Result, FY2004-~~FY2019~~FY2020
(in nominal dol ars) (in nominal dol ars)

Source: Amtrak monthly performance reports. Amtrak monthly performance reports.
By another measure, which al ocates costs and revenues to each available seat-mile of passenger By another measure, which al ocates costs and revenues to each available seat-mile of passenger
capacity offered, Amtrak has recovered at least 96% of operating costs every year since 2014, up capacity offered, Amtrak has recovered at least 96% of operating costs every year since 2014, up
from below 80% in the preceding years, and recovered an amount greater than operating costs in from below 80% in the preceding years, and recovered an amount greater than operating costs in
2019 for the first time 2019 for the first time (Figure 68). One contributing factor to this improved financial performance . One contributing factor to this improved financial performance
is likely the requirement, contained in PRIIA, that operating losses on short-distance routes is likely the requirement, contained in PRIIA, that operating losses on short-distance routes
located off the NEC be offset by state funds, effective on the first day of FY2014. located off the NEC be offset by state funds, effective on the first day of FY2014.

6 Figures were inflated to current (2019) dollars using the Direct Capital Nondefense Composite Outlay Deflator 6 Figures were inflated to current (2019) dollars using the Direct Capital Nondefense Composite Outlay Deflator
column (column P) from T able 10.1, “Gross Domestic Product and Deflators Used in the Historical T ables: 1940 – column (column P) from T able 10.1, “Gross Domestic Product and Deflators Used in the Historical T ables: 1940 –
2024,” published in the Office of Management and Budget, 2024,” published in the Office of Management and Budget, President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2020, Historical T ables , Historical T ables
volume, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/. volume, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/.
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Figure 68. Amtrak Revenue and Cost per Available Seat Mile, FY2009-~~FY2019~~FY2020
(in nominal cents) (in nominal cents)

Source: Amtrak monthly performance reports. Amtrak monthly performance reports.
Notes: Operating costs only; does not include capital costs or depreciation. Data on revenue per available seat- Operating costs only; does not include capital costs or depreciation. Data on revenue per available seat-
mile (RASM), cost per available seat-mile (CASM), and cost recovery ratio (CRR) are unavailable prior to mile (RASM), cost per available seat-mile (CASM), and cost recovery ratio (CRR) are unavailable prior to
FY2009. FY2009.
One measure of efficiency is the passenger load factor, which measures the percentage of One measure of efficiency is the passenger load factor, which measures the percentage of
available seats being used by passengers. Amtrak’s load factor has varied within a fairly narrow available seats being used by passengers. Amtrak’s load factor has varied within a fairly narrow
band since 2004. Its band since 2004. Its ~~current~~pre-pandemic load factor, 52%, load factor, 52%, iswas near the record load factor Amtrak reported in near the record load factor Amtrak reported in
FY1988. Load factor FY1988. Load factor ~~varies~~varied across Amtrak’s three business lines, with NEC and Long Distance across Amtrak’s three business lines, with NEC and Long Distance
trains at 59% and 58%, respectively, in FY2019, while state-supported routes lagged at trains at 59% and 58%, respectively, in FY2019, while state-supported routes lagged at 41%. During the COVID-19 pandemic, load factors decreased sharply across al three business lines, due both to decreased travel demand and Amtrak’s decision to leave a percentage of seats unoccupied to reduce the risk of virus transmission. ~~41%.~~
Improving load factor is one way of boosting revenue without increasing costs, but this can be Improving load factor is one way of boosting revenue without increasing costs, but this can be
difficult if passenger traffic is not distributed evenly along a route. Routes on which one station difficult if passenger traffic is not distributed evenly along a route. Routes on which one station
generates a large share of originating and terminating traffic are likely to have relatively low load generates a large share of originating and terminating traffic are likely to have relatively low load
factors in some segments but higher load factors in the “peak segment.” For example, if a train on factors in some segments but higher load factors in the “peak segment.” For example, if a train on
the NEC is sold out between Philadelphia and New York, Amtrak may not be able to the NEC is sold out between Philadelphia and New York, Amtrak may not be able to
accommodate passengers who wish to travel between Baltimore and New York, resulting in accommodate passengers who wish to travel between Baltimore and New York, resulting in
empty seats between Baltimore and Philadelphia. If Amtrak were to accommodate these riders empty seats between Baltimore and Philadelphia. If Amtrak were to accommodate these riders
with additional cars, this could reduce load factor even as it increases ridership. with additional cars, this could reduce load factor even as it increases ridership.
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Figure 79. Amtrak Passenger Load Factor, FY2004-~~FY2019~~FY2020
(passenger miles/seat miles) (passenger miles/seat miles)

Source: Amtrak monthly performance reports. Amtrak monthly performance reports.
Note: Amtrak did not report passenger load factor by business line in performance reports prior to FY2017. Amtrak did not report passenger load factor by business line in performance reports prior to FY2017.
Funding Issues
As discussed above, Amtrak has never generated sufficient revenue to cover its operating and As discussed above, Amtrak has never generated sufficient revenue to cover its operating and
capital expenses. The Administration requests funding for Amtrak each year as part of its DOT capital expenses. The Administration requests funding for Amtrak each year as part of its DOT
budget request. Amtrak also submits a separate appropriation request to Congress each year;7 budget request. Amtrak also submits a separate appropriation request to Congress each year;7
typical y, that request is larger than the Administration’s requesttypical y, that request is larger than the Administration’s request. Table 2 shows the difference in shows the difference in
the requests submitted for FY2021, including a supplemental request issued in response to the the requests submitted for FY2021, including a supplemental request issued in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 pandemic.

7 Per 49 U.S.C. §24315(b)(1)(B). 7 Per 49 U.S.C. §24315(b)(1)(B).
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Table 2. Amtrak Grant Requests, FY2021
(in mil ions of dol ars) (in mil ions of dol ars)
FY2021
FY2021 Amtrak
FY2021 Amtrak
~~FY2020 Enacted~~
Administration
Request to
Supplemental
~~Grants~~FY2021 Enacted
Grants*
Budget Request
Congress
Request Grants*
Northeast Corridor Northeast Corridor
$ $~~1,192~~
~~$326~~
~~$714~~
~~$909~~326 $714 $909 $1,355
National network National network
~~1,826~~
611 611
1,326 1,326
567 567 1,645
Other** Other**
—
550 550
300 300
— —
— Total grants
~~$3,018~~
$1,487
$2,340
$1,475
$3,000 Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Department of Transportation, Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Highlights, p. 38, , p. 38,
https://www.transportation.gov/mission/budget/fiscal-year-2020-budget-highlights; Amtrak, https://www.transportation.gov/mission/budget/fiscal-year-2020-budget-highlights; Amtrak, General and Legislative
Annual Report & FY2021 Budget Request, p. 3, https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/, p. 3, https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/
public/documents/corporate/reports/Amtrak-General-Legislative-Annual-Report-FY2020-Grant-Request.pdf. public/documents/corporate/reports/Amtrak-General-Legislative-Annual-Report-FY2020-Grant-Request.pdf.
Notes: Although Amtrak’s Inspector General is part of Amtrak, its funding is not included in Amtrak’s direct Although Amtrak’s Inspector General is part of Amtrak, its funding is not included in Amtrak’s direct
budget request. Congress appropriated $budget request. Congress appropriated $2325 mil ion for the Inspector General in mil ion for the Inspector General in ~~FY2019~~FY2021. .
* Includes $2 bil ion in regular annual appropriations and $1* Includes $2 bil ion in regular annual appropriations and $1~~.018~~ bil ion bil ion in additional support in the in additional support in the ~~CARES Act~~
~~(P.L. 116-136) COVID-19 relief legislation. CARES Act~~Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260). These funds may be “merged” between business lines. See funds may be “merged” between business lines. See CRS CRS
Insight IN11293, Insight IN11293, Public Transportation and Amtrak Funding in the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136), by Wil iam J. Mal ett and , by Wil iam J. Mal ett and
Ben Goldman. Ben Goldman.
** The Trump Administration requested $550 mil ion for a one-year “transition grants” program that would be ** The Trump Administration requested $550 mil ion for a one-year “transition grants” program that would be
used to convert long-distance routes into state-supported routes. Amtrak requested $300 mil ion for “network used to convert long-distance routes into state-supported routes. Amtrak requested $300 mil ion for “network
development” grants to expand the state-supported route network without necessarily suspending or truncating development” grants to expand the state-supported route network without necessarily suspending or truncating
long-distance routes. long-distance routes.
Congress addresses Amtrak’s subsidy in the annual Transportation, Housing and Urban Congress addresses Amtrak’s subsidy in the annual Transportation, Housing and Urban
Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. For most of Amtrak’s existence, Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. For most of Amtrak’s existence,
Congress has divided Amtrak’s grant into two categories, operating and capital grants. The Congress has divided Amtrak’s grant into two categories, operating and capital grants. The
operating grant could be thought of as relating to Amtrak’s annual cash loss, and the capital grant operating grant could be thought of as relating to Amtrak’s annual cash loss, and the capital grant
as relating to the depreciation of Amtrak’s assets, as wel as an amount for Amtrak debt as relating to the depreciation of Amtrak’s assets, as wel as an amount for Amtrak debt
repayments. repayments.
Congress changed the structure of federal grants to Amtrak in Title XI of the FAST Act. Starting Congress changed the structure of federal grants to Amtrak in Title XI of the FAST Act. Starting
in FY2017, Amtrak’s appropriation has been divided between funding for the operational y self-in FY2017, Amtrak’s appropriation has been divided between funding for the operational y self-
sufficient NEC, which has large capital needs, and the National Network, which has modest sufficient NEC, which has large capital needs, and the National Network, which has modest
capital needs (as the tracks are almost entirely owned and maintained by freight railroads) but capital needs (as the tracks are almost entirely owned and maintained by freight railroads) but
runs an operating deficit of several hundred mil ion dollars. The change was intended to increase runs an operating deficit of several hundred mil ion dollars. The change was intended to increase
transparency of the costs of Amtrak’s two major lines of business and eliminate cross-transparency of the costs of Amtrak’s two major lines of business and eliminate cross-
subsidization between them; operating profits from the NEC and state access payments for use of subsidization between them; operating profits from the NEC and state access payments for use of
the NEC wil be reinvested in that corridor, and passenger revenue, state payments, and federal the NEC wil be reinvested in that corridor, and passenger revenue, state payments, and federal
grants for the National Network wil be used for that account.8 grants for the National Network wil be used for that account.8

8 H.Rept. 114-30. 8 H.Rept. 114-30.
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Table 3. Amtrak Authorized and Appropriated Funding, FY2016-FY2020
(in mil ions of nominal dol ars) (in mil ions of nominal dol ars)

Authorized Funding
Appropriated Funding
Fiscal Year
NEC
NN
Total Auth.
NEC
NN
Total Appr.
2016 2016
450 450
1,000 1,000
1,450
a
a
1,390
2017 2017
474 474
1,026 1,026
1,500
328 328
1,167 1,167
1,495
2018 2018
515 515
1,085 1,085
1,600
650 650
1,292 1,292
1,942
2019 2019
557 557
1,143 1,143
1,700
650 650
1,292 1,292
1,942
2020b
$600 600
$1,200 1,200
$1,800
$1,192 1,192
$1,826 1,826
~~$3,018~~
3,018 2021c 600 1,200 1,800 1,355 1,645 3,000 Source: Congress.gov (P.L. 114-94, P.L. 114-57, P.L. 115-31, P.L. 115-141, P.L. 116-6, P.L. 116-94, P.L. 116-136Congress.gov (P.L. 114-94, P.L. 114-57, P.L. 115-31, P.L. 115-141, P.L. 116-6, P.L. 116-94, P.L. 116-136, P.L. 116-159, P.L. 116-260). ).
Notes: NEC= Northeast Corridor.NEC= Northeast Corridor. NN=National Network. Appropriated funding does not include funding for NN=National Network. Appropriated funding does not include funding for
Amtrak Inspector General’s Office or security grant funding received from the Department of Homeland Amtrak Inspector General’s Office or security grant funding received from the Department of Homeland
Security. Security.
a. Congress appropriated $289 mil ion for Amtrak operating expenses and $1,102 mil ion for Amtrak capital a. Congress appropriated $289 mil ion for Amtrak operating expenses and $1,102 mil ion for Amtrak capital
and debt service expenses in 2016, retaining the pre-FAST Act grant structure for one additional year to and debt service expenses in 2016, retaining the pre-FAST Act grant structure for one additional year to
al ow Amtrak time to update its internal accounting.al ow Amtrak time to update its internal accounting.
b. Appropriated funds include $2 bil ion in regular annual appropriations and $1.018 bil ion in additional b. Appropriated funds include $2 bil ion in regular annual appropriations and $1.018 bil ion in additional
support in the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136) COVID-19 relief legislation. CARES Act funds may be “merged” support in the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136) COVID-19 relief legislation. CARES Act funds may be “merged”
between business lines. between business lines.
c. Appropriated funds include $2 bil ion in regular annual appropriations and $1 bil ion in additional support in the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021 ( P.L. 116-260). These funds may be “merged” between business lines. Amtrak’s reliance on annual appropriations has made it difficult to fund long-term capital Amtrak’s reliance on annual appropriations has made it difficult to fund long-term capital
projects. DOT’s Inspector General has noted that the lack of long-term funding “has significantly projects. DOT’s Inspector General has noted that the lack of long-term funding “has significantly
affected Amtrak’s ability to maintain safe and reliable infrastructure and equipment, and affected Amtrak’s ability to maintain safe and reliable infrastructure and equipment, and
increased its capital program’s annual cost.”9 Amtrak’s budget requests have suggested a increased its capital program’s annual cost.”9 Amtrak’s budget requests have suggested a
multiyear appropriation to provide some additional stability without fundamental y altering the multiyear appropriation to provide some additional stability without fundamental y altering the
mechanism by which Amtrak receives its federal funding.10 mechanism by which Amtrak receives its federal funding.10
In June 2020, the House of Representatives passed a surface transportation bil (H.R. 2) that In June 2020, the House of Representatives passed a surface transportation bil (H.R. 2) that
would would ~~authorize~~have authorized a total of $28.8 bil ion a total of $28.8 bil ion for Amtrak from FY2021 through FY2025, a sharp for Amtrak from FY2021 through FY2025, a sharp
increase over prior years. Among other reforms, H.R. 2 would increase over prior years. Among other reforms, H.R. 2 would ~~further deemphasize~~ have further deemphasized Amtrak’s for-Amtrak’s for-
profit status, highlighting its mandate to serve the public interest. Separately, on July 31, 2020, profit status, highlighting its mandate to serve the public interest. Separately, on July 31, 2020,
the House passed an FY2021 appropriations bilthe House passed an FY2021 appropriations bil (H.R. 7617) that would continue (H.R. 7617) that would continue to fund Amtrak to fund Amtrak
in line with FY2020 pre-pandemic levels—$750 mil ion for the NEC, $1.3 bil ion for the in line with FY2020 pre-pandemic levels—$750 mil ion for the NEC, $1.3 bil ion for the
National Network—plus an additional infusion of $8 bil ion inNational Network—plus an additional infusion of $8 bil ion in emergency recovery funding. A emergency recovery funding. A
portion of the emergency funds would be set aside for certain purposes, such as advancing major portion of the emergency funds would be set aside for certain purposes, such as advancing major
infrastructure projects or offsetting payments from states and commuter railroads. At the time of infrastructure projects or offsetting payments from states and commuter railroads. At the time of
these legislativethese legislative actions, competing proposals had not yet been actions, competing proposals had not yet been introduced by the relevant introduced by the relevant
~~committees in the Senate.~~
committees in the Senate. 9 Department of T ransportation Office of Inspector General, Amtrak Made Significant Improvements in Its Long-Term Capital Planning Process, CR-2011-036, January 27, 2011, p. 1. 10 Amtrak, General and Legislative Annual Report & FY2020 Grant Request, March 2019, pp. 11-12. Congressional Research Service 11 Issues in the Reauthorization of Amtrak Most federal funding for highway and transit programs is provided by a special form of budget Most federal funding for highway and transit programs is provided by a special form of budget
authority, contract authority, which al ows DOT to obligate funds from the Highway Trust Fund authority, contract authority, which al ows DOT to obligate funds from the Highway Trust Fund
in advance of an appropriation. This permits DOT to commit to support highway projects that in advance of an appropriation. This permits DOT to commit to support highway projects that
may take several years to complete. There have been proposals to create a similar trust fund for may take several years to complete. There have been proposals to create a similar trust fund for
Amtrak, to provide a greater level of financial stability and permit such long-term funding of Amtrak, to provide a greater level of financial stability and permit such long-term funding of
capital projects. Such efforts have faced objections from some Members of Congress opposed to capital projects. Such efforts have faced objections from some Members of Congress opposed to

~~9 Department of T ransportation Office of Inspector General,~~ ~~Amtrak Made Significant Improvements in Its Long-Term~~
~~Capital Planning Process,~~ ~~CR-2011-036, January 27, 2011, p. 1.~~
~~10 Amtrak, General and Legislative Annual Report & FY2020 Grant Request, March 2019, pp. 11-12.~~
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~~Issues in the Reauthorization of Amtrak~~

Amtrak receiving federal funding. There is also a practical chal enge to identifying a revenue Amtrak receiving federal funding. There is also a practical chal enge to identifying a revenue
source for an Amtrak trust fund. The Highway Trust Fund, which receives revenue from taxes on source for an Amtrak trust fund. The Highway Trust Fund, which receives revenue from taxes on
motor fuels and heavy trucks, is not authorized to spend money on intercity rail services; in any motor fuels and heavy trucks, is not authorized to spend money on intercity rail services; in any
event, the revenues flowing into the fund are far below the level required to support the levels of event, the revenues flowing into the fund are far below the level required to support the levels of
federal highway and transit spending authorized by Congress, necessitating several transfers of federal highway and transit spending authorized by Congress, necessitating several transfers of
money from the general fund since 2008.11 If a passenger rail trust fund were to be funded solely money from the general fund since 2008.11 If a passenger rail trust fund were to be funded solely
from a tax on passengers, the cost of Amtrak tickets could rise by several dollars per ticket at from a tax on passengers, the cost of Amtrak tickets could rise by several dollars per ticket at
current ridership levels, potential y contravening the purpose of the fund by reducing ridership. current ridership levels, potential y contravening the purpose of the fund by reducing ridership.
Issues for Congress
Maintaining and Improving the Northeast Corridor
Amtrak has stated that there is a $31 bil ion backlog of state-of-good-repair projects on the Amtrak has stated that there is a $31 bil ion backlog of state-of-good-repair projects on the
NEC,12 which Amtrak revenue alone is unable to fund, and which does not include capital NEC,12 which Amtrak revenue alone is unable to fund, and which does not include capital
projects deemed necessary to increase capacity. Private investors are unlikely to provide that projects deemed necessary to increase capacity. Private investors are unlikely to provide that
funding in exchange for a share of the operating profits generated by NEC passenger trains. The funding in exchange for a share of the operating profits generated by NEC passenger trains. The
obstacles facing such an investor would be largely the same as the ones currently facing Amtrak: obstacles facing such an investor would be largely the same as the ones currently facing Amtrak:
operating profits are insufficient to cover capital costs, and the ability to increase revenue by operating profits are insufficient to cover capital costs, and the ability to increase revenue by
running additional trains into Penn Station in New York City, by far the most popular origin and running additional trains into Penn Station in New York City, by far the most popular origin and
destination point on the NEC, wil be limited until and unless major capital improvements not destination point on the NEC, wil be limited until and unless major capital improvements not
included within the state-of-good-repair backlog, including a new tunnel under the Hudson River, included within the state-of-good-repair backlog, including a new tunnel under the Hudson River,
are completed. The fragmented control of NEC infrastructure, some of which is owned by state are completed. The fragmented control of NEC infrastructure, some of which is owned by state
governments, would persist even if Amtrak’s assets in the corridor were operated by some private governments, would persist even if Amtrak’s assets in the corridor were operated by some private
entity. A provision of the FAST Act required the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to solicit entity. A provision of the FAST Act required the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to solicit
proposals to design, build, operate, and maintain high-speed rail systems on federal y designated proposals to design, build, operate, and maintain high-speed rail systems on federal y designated
high-speed rail corridors, including the NEC. No such proposal was submitted for the NEC. high-speed rail corridors, including the NEC. No such proposal was submitted for the NEC.
Plans to create a separate entity to own and/or operate the NEC, including as part of larger plans Plans to create a separate entity to own and/or operate the NEC, including as part of larger plans
to reorganize or privatize the entire passenger rail system, have been proposed but have never to reorganize or privatize the entire passenger rail system, have been proposed but have never
been adopted in full. In 2002, the Amtrak Reform Council submitted its recommendations to been adopted in full. In 2002, the Amtrak Reform Council submitted its recommendations to
Congress for a “restructured and rationalized national intercity rail passenger system” as required Congress for a “restructured and rationalized national intercity rail passenger system” as required
by the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997.13 Among other measures, the council by the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997.13 Among other measures, the council
endorsed organizing NEC infrastructure assets under a separate government corporation that endorsed organizing NEC infrastructure assets under a separate government corporation that
would control the assets and manage rail operations and capital improvements. The council would control the assets and manage rail operations and capital improvements. The council
admitted in its recommendations that this new infrastructure company would not be able to fund admitted in its recommendations that this new infrastructure company would not be able to fund
its own capital needs, and endorsed continued federal funding in addition to funds committed by its own capital needs, and endorsed continued federal funding in addition to funds committed by
the states. A similar suggestion, which was known as the Competition for Intercity Passenger Rail the states. A similar suggestion, which was known as the Competition for Intercity Passenger Rail
~~in America Act, was proposed in 2011 by the leadership of the House Committee on~~
~~Transportation and Infrastructure but never introduced.~~
~~Some proposals have cal ed for a dedicated funding source, backed by taxes or fees within the~~
~~region served by the NEC. The thinking behind this is that restructuring of the NEC would be~~
~~more attractive political y if it were dependent mainly on revenue raised within the region rather~~

11 See CRS Report R44674, 11 See CRS Report R44674, Funding and Financing Highways and Public Transportation , by Robert S. Kirk and , by Robert S. Kirk and
William J. Mallett . William J. Mallett .
12 Amtrak, 12 Amtrak, FY21-25 Asset Line Plans, 2020, p. 53, https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/, 2020, p. 53, https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/
public/documents/corporate/businessplanning/Amtrak-Asset-Line-Plans-FY21-25.pdf. public/documents/corporate/businessplanning/Amtrak-Asset-Line-Plans-FY21-25.pdf.
13 P.L. 105-134. 13 P.L. 105-134.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
1112 Issues in the Reauthorization of Amtrak in America Act, was proposed in 2011 by the leadership of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure but never introduced. Some proposals have cal ed for a dedicated funding source, backed by taxes or fees within the region served by the NEC. The thinking behind this is that restructuring of the NEC would be more attractive political y if it were dependent mainly on revenue raised within the region rather

~~Issues in the Reauthorization of Amtrak~~

than on federal government resources. As the NEC passes through eight states and the District of than on federal government resources. As the NEC passes through eight states and the District of
Columbia, creation of a dedicated regional funding source is likely to require some form of Columbia, creation of a dedicated regional funding source is likely to require some form of
interstate agreement, with each state concerned that its contribution is commensurate with the interstate agreement, with each state concerned that its contribution is commensurate with the
benefits it expects to receive. benefits it expects to receive.
The Future of the National Network
Critics of Amtrak have often questioned the necessity of continuing to operate long-distance Critics of Amtrak have often questioned the necessity of continuing to operate long-distance
trains, which usual y require the largest operating subsidies, both in total dollars and in dollars per trains, which usual y require the largest operating subsidies, both in total dollars and in dollars per
trip or per passenger-mile.14 Proponents of passenger rail have contended that these operating trip or per passenger-mile.14 Proponents of passenger rail have contended that these operating
losses are distorted by Amtrak accounting practices, pointing to the losses are distorted by Amtrak accounting practices, pointing to the ~~allocation~~al ocation of fixed costs to of fixed costs to
individual routes and the differing treatment of state and federal grant funds.15 Amtrak has individual routes and the differing treatment of state and federal grant funds.15 Amtrak has
responded that its accounting practices, based on a performance tracking system developed by responded that its accounting practices, based on a performance tracking system developed by
DOT’s Volpe Transportation Systems Center in conjunction with the Federal Railroad DOT’s Volpe Transportation Systems Center in conjunction with the Federal Railroad
Administration and Amtrak, accurately al ocate costs among its various routes. Amtrak points out, Administration and Amtrak, accurately al ocate costs among its various routes. Amtrak points out,
for example, that while its California Zephyr between Chicago and Emeryvil e, CA, has greater for example, that while its California Zephyr between Chicago and Emeryvil e, CA, has greater
revenue per trip than an average Northeast Regional train on the NEC, the long-distance train revenue per trip than an average Northeast Regional train on the NEC, the long-distance train
requires nine times as many employees, twice as much equipment, and more switching operations requires nine times as many employees, twice as much equipment, and more switching operations
in rail yards for every trip.16 Amtrak has proposed shifting its focus from maintaining existing in rail yards for every trip.16 Amtrak has proposed shifting its focus from maintaining existing
levels of service on al 15 long-distance routes currently in the Amtrak system to shorter corridors levels of service on al 15 long-distance routes currently in the Amtrak system to shorter corridors
that would be supported by the states. Amtrak also announced plans to reduce service frequency that would be supported by the states. Amtrak also announced plans to reduce service frequency
on al daily long-distance trains to cut costs and meet reduced travel demand due to the COVID-on al daily long-distance trains to cut costs and meet reduced travel demand due to the COVID-
19 pandemic. 19 pandemic.
Amtrak is under pressure to accomplish two goals that at times seem to work against one another: Amtrak is under pressure to accomplish two goals that at times seem to work against one another:
to serve as the national passenger railroad, including through the operation of long-distance to serve as the national passenger railroad, including through the operation of long-distance
routes, and to reduce or eliminate the need for federal subsidies. Federal law provides that routes, and to reduce or eliminate the need for federal subsidies. Federal law provides that
“Amtrak shal operate a national rail passenger transportation system which ties together existing “Amtrak shal operate a national rail passenger transportation system which ties together existing
and emergent regional rail passenger service and other intermodal passenger service.”17 The and emergent regional rail passenger service and other intermodal passenger service.”17 The
phrase “national rail passenger transportation system” is defined to include “long-distance routes phrase “national rail passenger transportation system” is defined to include “long-distance routes
of more than 750 miles between endpoints operated by Amtrak as of the date of enactment of the of more than 750 miles between endpoints operated by Amtrak as of the date of enactment of the
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008.”18 However, Amtrak also has statutory Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008.”18 However, Amtrak also has statutory
power to discontinue routes, notwithstanding the above provisions.19 power to discontinue routes, notwithstanding the above provisions.19
In its FY2021 budget request, the Trump Administration proposed a reduction in annual In its FY2021 budget request, the Trump Administration proposed a reduction in annual
appropriations to the National Network, with the expectation that either states would support appropriations to the National Network, with the expectation that either states would support
~~continued operation of long-distance routes or Amtrak would discontinue them. The~~
~~Administration proposed to offset this reduction with a $550 mil ion appropriation to a new~~
~~Restoration and Enhancements discretionary grant program, which would al ow states to~~

14 Amtrak monthly performance reports. 14 Amtrak monthly performance reports.
15 For one recent example, see Rail Passengers Association, “Amtrak’s Route Accounting: Fatally Flawed, Misleading 15 For one recent example, see Rail Passengers Association, “Amtrak’s Route Accounting: Fatally Flawed, Misleading
& Wrong,” August 23, 2018, https://www.railpassengers.org/happening-now/news/releases/amtraks-route-accounting-& Wrong,” August 23, 2018, https://www.railpassengers.org/happening-now/news/releases/amtraks-route-accounting-
fatally-flawed-misleading-wrong/. fatally-flawed-misleading-wrong/.
16 Amtrak, “Amtrak Long-Distance T rains: Cost Allocation and Economics,” 2019. 16 Amtrak, “Amtrak Long-Distance T rains: Cost Allocation and Economics,” 2019.
17 49 U.S.C. §24701. 17 49 U.S.C. §24701.
18 49 U.S.C. §24102(7)(C). 18 49 U.S.C. §24102(7)(C).
19 49 U.S.C. §24706. 19 49 U.S.C. §24706.
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continued operation of long-distance routes or Amtrak would discontinue them. The Administration proposed to offset this reduction with a $550 mil ion appropriation to a new Restoration and Enhancements discretionary grant program, which would al ow states to gradual y ramp up to their full contributions, with a federal subsidy decreasing each year over a gradual y ramp up to their full contributions, with a federal subsidy decreasing each year over a
five-year period.20 five-year period.20
In its own FY2021 budget request, Amtrak requested an appropriation equal to the full $1.8 In its own FY2021 budget request, Amtrak requested an appropriation equal to the full $1.8
bil ion authorization contained in the final year of the FAST Act plus inflation, plus an additional bil ion authorization contained in the final year of the FAST Act plus inflation, plus an additional
$300 mil ion to expand the state-supported route network without necessarily truncating or $300 mil ion to expand the state-supported route network without necessarily truncating or
terminating long-distance routes. (Amtrak subsequently requested an additional $1.5 bil ion in terminating long-distance routes. (Amtrak subsequently requested an additional $1.5 bil ion in
emergency relief.) However, in its budget request for the previous year, Amtrak also stated some emergency relief.) However, in its budget request for the previous year, Amtrak also stated some
support for changing the way the National Network is funded in the future (emphasis added): support for changing the way the National Network is funded in the future (emphasis added):
Amtrak appreciates the Administration’s focus on expanding intercity passenger rail Amtrak appreciates the Administration’s focus on expanding intercity passenger rail
service to today’s many underserved cities and corridors across the nation. We believe that service to today’s many underserved cities and corridors across the nation. We believe that
a modernization of the National Network, with the right level of a modernization of the National Network, with the right level of dedicated and enhanced
federal funding, would allow Amtrak to serve more passengers efficiently while preserving , would allow Amtrak to serve more passengers efficiently while preserving
our ability to maintain appropriate Long Distance routes.21 our ability to maintain appropriate Long Distance routes.21
In the 116th Congress, the House passed an appropriations bil (H.R. 7617) In the 116th Congress, the House passed an appropriations bil (H.R. 7617) ~~exceeding~~ that exceeded Amtrak’s Amtrak’s
emergency request for FY2021, but emergency request for FY2021, but ~~did not provide funding to expand~~which would not have expanded or otherwise or otherwise ~~alter~~ altered the ~~the~~
composition of the National Network. composition of the National Network.
Amtrak’s combined appropriations for FY2021 totaled less than its annual and supplemental requests, which may have repercussions for service levels until travel demand returns to pre-pandemic levels. Removing federal support for long-distance service could create a circumstance in which, if one Removing federal support for long-distance service could create a circumstance in which, if one
state along state along ~~the~~a route declined to contribute to its operating costs, Amtrak might be left with little route declined to contribute to its operating costs, Amtrak might be left with little
recourse other than to discontinue the route. Proponents of continued long-distance train service recourse other than to discontinue the route. Proponents of continued long-distance train service
point to the large proportion of trips taken on long-distance trains between origins and point to the large proportion of trips taken on long-distance trains between origins and
destinations other than the endpoints, and to the trains’ relatively high load factor (58% in destinations other than the endpoints, and to the trains’ relatively high load factor (58% in
FY2019) compared to other Amtrak routes (59% on the NEC, 41% on state-supported routes), an FY2019) compared to other Amtrak routes (59% on the NEC, 41% on state-supported routes), an
indicator of efficient utilization of passenger space. However, depending on the number of cars in indicator of efficient utilization of passenger space. However, depending on the number of cars in
each train, this could conceal an each train, this could conceal an inefficient utilization of engines and utilization of engines and ~~engineers~~employees, as a short train , as a short train
may require the same crew as a longer one no matter how many passengers are aboard. may require the same crew as a longer one no matter how many passengers are aboard.
Existing state-supported routes could also face service cuts due to a lack of state support, Existing state-supported routes could also face service cuts due to a lack of state support,
particularly because many state governments are experiencing revenue shortfal s due to the particularly because many state governments are experiencing revenue shortfal s due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. The Chicago-Indianapolis COVID-19 pandemic. The Chicago-Indianapolis Hoosier State route was created in 1980 to route was created in 1980 to
provide service on days when the thrice-weekly provide service on days when the thrice-weekly Cardinal long-distance train did not operate. long-distance train did not operate.
When PRIIA Section 209 went into effect at the beginning of FY2014, requiring the State of When PRIIA Section 209 went into effect at the beginning of FY2014, requiring the State of
Indiana to cover al operating losses associated with the route, state political support began to Indiana to cover al operating losses associated with the route, state political support began to
wane, and the route was threatened with discontinuance. Under a different section of PRIIA, the wane, and the route was threatened with discontinuance. Under a different section of PRIIA, the
state contracted with a private railroad company to operate the route, but that company withdrew state contracted with a private railroad company to operate the route, but that company withdrew
from the agreement before the base contract period had expired, returning responsibility to the from the agreement before the base contract period had expired, returning responsibility to the
state government. The state government. The Hoosier State was discontinued on June 30, 2019, after Indiana declined to was discontinued on June 30, 2019, after Indiana declined to
provide further funding. provide further funding.
Section 210 of PRIIA required Amtrak to generate performance improvement plans for al 15 of Section 210 of PRIIA required Amtrak to generate performance improvement plans for al 15 of
its long-distance routes, starting with the its long-distance routes, starting with the 5five worst-performing routes based on 2008 data.22 20 U.S. DOT , Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Highlights, pp. 38-39, at https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2020-02/BudgetHightlightFeb2021.pdf. 21 Amtrak, General and Legislative Annual Report & FY2020 Grant Request, March 2019, p. 17. 22 49 U.S.C. §24710. Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 19 Issues in the Reauthorization of Amtrak ~~worst-performing routes based on 2008 data.22~~ These These
reports contained a number of recommended actions to improve long-distance train performance reports contained a number of recommended actions to improve long-distance train performance
according to various metrics: the Customer Satisfaction Index (CSI), on-time performanceaccording to various metrics: the Customer Satisfaction Index (CSI), on-time performance ~~(OTP),~~
, and cost recoveryand cost recovery ~~(CR)~~. There has been uneven improvement in long-distance train performance . There has been uneven improvement in long-distance train performance
in the intervening years. Two routes have higher CSI scores (now referred to as eCSI scores) than in the intervening years. Two routes have higher CSI scores (now referred to as eCSI scores) than
they did in 2008, six routes have better on-time performance, and five have improved they did in 2008, six routes have better on-time performance, and five have improved cost ~~cost~~

~~20 U.S. DOT , Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Highlights, pp. 38-39, at https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/~~
~~2020-02/BudgetHightlightFeb2021.pdf.~~
~~21 Amtrak, General and Legislative Annual Report & FY2020 Grant Request, March 2019, p. 17.~~
~~22 49 U.S.C. §24710.~~
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recovery rates. Al other scores for these routes have stayed the same or worsened. The recovery rates. Al other scores for these routes have stayed the same or worsened. The extent to extent to
which any actions taken as a result of the Section 210 plans either improved route which any actions taken as a result of the Section 210 plans either improved route performance or performance or
mitigated its decline is unclear. mitigated its decline is unclear.
Access to Freight Rail Infrastructure and On-Time Performance
Freight train interference is one cause of poor on-time performance on Amtrak routes. By law, Freight train interference is one cause of poor on-time performance on Amtrak routes. By law,
Amtrak is to be given “preference” over other railroad traffic when using tracks it does not own.23 Amtrak is to be given “preference” over other railroad traffic when using tracks it does not own.23
In practice this preference has been difficult to enforce, as freight railroads have little incentive to In practice this preference has been difficult to enforce, as freight railroads have little incentive to
be overly accommodating to Amtrak trains, for which they are reimbursed only the incremental be overly accommodating to Amtrak trains, for which they are reimbursed only the incremental
cost of Amtrak’s use of their tracks. Sections 207 and 213 of PRIIA directed FRA, Amtrak, and cost of Amtrak’s use of their tracks. Sections 207 and 213 of PRIIA directed FRA, Amtrak, and
the STB to develop minimum on-time performance standards, and gave the STB enforcement the STB to develop minimum on-time performance standards, and gave the STB enforcement
power over railroads that failed to meet these standards. Final metrics and standards went into power over railroads that failed to meet these standards. Final metrics and standards went into
effect in 2010, before being suspended in 2012 amid court chal enges.24 effect in 2010, before being suspended in 2012 amid court chal enges.24
Following a series of court decisions that ultimately upheld Amtrak’s role in developing Following a series of court decisions that ultimately upheld Amtrak’s role in developing
performance standards but altered the role of the STB, FRA and Amtrak began to reformulate performance standards but altered the role of the STB, FRA and Amtrak began to reformulate
new on-time performance standards. new on-time performance standards. ~~A proposal~~The new final rule, published in the published in the Federal Register in in ~~March 2020~~
~~would evaluate performance using a new metric, customer on-time performance~~December 2020, specifies that Amtrak wil use a new metric, customer on-time performance, to track the share of passengers whose trips arrived on or near schedule.25 This differs .25 This differs
from Amtrak’s past practice of measuring how many trains adhered to scheduled arrival and from Amtrak’s past practice of measuring how many trains adhered to scheduled arrival and
departure departure times without consideration for the number of passengers on board.times without consideration for the number of passengers on board. ~~Host railroads have~~
In their comments on the proposed rule, host railroads objected to the new standards, claiming that current schedules objected to the new standards, claiming that current schedules dodid not take customer not take customer ~~OTP~~on-time performance into into
account and should account and should ~~be renegotiated before enforcement measures are al owed to take effect~~have been renegotiated first. The final rule incorporated a grace period for host railroads to renegotiate schedules with Amtrak before the new standards can be enforced. It is . It is
not clear to what extent, if any, the current schedules are any less realistic under a customer not clear to what extent, if any, the current schedules are any less realistic under a customer ~~OTP~~
~~standard~~ on-time performance standard than under endpoint or althan under endpoint or al ~~stations OTP~~ -stations standards such as were promulgated in 2010.26 Amtrak began reporting route-level customer on-time performance in FY2018, and it has not yielded radical y different results when compared to other measures (Figure 10). 23 P.L. 93-146. For more information, see archived CRS Report R42512, Passenger Train Access to Freight Railroad Track, by John Frittelli. 24 75 Federal Register 26839. 25 85 Federal Register 72971. 26 At that time, host railroads’ chief objection concerned Amtrak’s relative position within the industry, not the viability of its schedules. Congressional Research Service 15 Issues in the Reauthorization of Amtrak Figure 10. Amtrak Endpoint, All-Stations, and Customer On-Time Performance by Business Line, FY2018-FY2019 Source: Amtrak host railroad reports. ~~standards such as were promulgated in 2010.26~~
Current law permits the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to enforce Amtrak’s statutory track Current law permits the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to enforce Amtrak’s statutory track
preference. Amtrak’s leadership has noted in communications with lawmakers that DOJ has done preference. Amtrak’s leadership has noted in communications with lawmakers that DOJ has done
so only once in Amtrak’s history, against the Southern Pacific railroad in 1979. Amtrak has so only once in Amtrak’s history, against the Southern Pacific railroad in 1979. Amtrak has
requested that a similar enforcement power be granted statutorily to Amtrak, going so far as to requested that a similar enforcement power be granted statutorily to Amtrak, going so far as to
recommend specific bil language that would al ow Amtrak to sue host railroads.27 The recommend specific bil language that would al ow Amtrak to sue host railroads.27 The
infrastructure bil passed by the House in the 116th Congress (H.R. 2) contained such language in infrastructure bil passed by the House in the 116th Congress (H.R. 2) contained such language in
its surface transportation reauthorization title. its surface transportation reauthorization title.
Another option is to make funding available to states to assist them in purchasing tracks used by Another option is to make funding available to states to assist them in purchasing tracks used by
passenger trains from their freight railroad owners. The State of Michigan pursued this strategy, passenger trains from their freight railroad owners. The State of Michigan pursued this strategy,
using roughly $150 mil ion in federal grant funds awarded in 2011 to purchase the 135-mile rail using roughly $150 mil ion in federal grant funds awarded in 2011 to purchase the 135-mile rail
corridor from Kalamazoo to Dearborn on the Chicago-Detroit corridor. At the time of the corridor from Kalamazoo to Dearborn on the Chicago-Detroit corridor. At the time of the
transaction in 2012, previous owner Norfolk Southern Railway had placed several sections of the transaction in 2012, previous owner Norfolk Southern Railway had placed several sections of the
corridor under slow orders due to poor infrastructure conditions. After several years of repairs and corridor under slow orders due to poor infrastructure conditions. After several years of repairs and
construction funded in part by additional federal grants beyond those used to purchase the line, construction funded in part by additional federal grants beyond those used to purchase the line,
Amtrak’s on-time performance on the Chicago-Detroit Amtrak’s on-time performance on the Chicago-Detroit Wolverine service rose from 53% in service rose from 53% in

~~23 P.L. 93-146. For more information, see archived CRS Report R42512,~~ ~~Passenger Train Access to Freight Railroad~~
~~Track, by John Frittelli.~~
~~24 75 Federal Register 26839.~~
~~25 85 Federal Register 17835.~~
~~26 At that time, host railroads’ chief objection concerned Amtrak’s relative position within the industry, not the viability~~
~~of its schedules.~~
~~27 Letter from Amtrak CEO Richard Anderson t o Senator Jerry Moran, May 20, 2019.~~
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~~link to page 19~~ ~~Issues in the Reauthorization of Amtrak~~

FY2015 to nearly 70% in FY2016, though it has since declined (and 70% is stil below the 80% FY2015 to nearly 70% in FY2016, though it has since declined (and 70% is stil below the 80%
standard initial y set under PRIIA 207). standard initial y set under PRIIA 207).
Using a slightly different ownership structure, the State of North Carolina supports several Using a slightly different ownership structure, the State of North Carolina supports several
passenger trains per day between Raleigh and Charlotte on tracks owned by the North Carolina passenger trains per day between Raleigh and Charlotte on tracks owned by the North Carolina
Railroad, a state-owned entity that leases its tracks to Norfolk Southern. Norfolk Southern agreed Railroad, a state-owned entity that leases its tracks to Norfolk Southern. Norfolk Southern agreed
to increased passenger service on the line in return for extensive public investment in improving to increased passenger service on the line in return for extensive public investment in improving
and expanding the infrastructure. The number of daily trains offered by the state-supported and expanding the infrastructure. The number of daily trains offered by the state-supported
27 Letter from Amtrak CEO Richard Anderson to Senator Jerry Moran, May 20, 2019. Congressional Research Service 16 link to page 21 Issues in the Reauthorization of Amtrak Piedmont service has increased, and the service has exceeded the 80% on-time performance service has increased, and the service has exceeded the 80% on-time performance
standard initial y adopted for state-supported routes in five of the past seven years. standard initial y adopted for state-supported routes in five of the past seven years.
Public ownership of rail infrastructure can be beneficial for passenger rail on-time performance Public ownership of rail infrastructure can be beneficial for passenger rail on-time performance
because of the lessened incentive to give priority to freight traffic. Where a freight railroad may because of the lessened incentive to give priority to freight traffic. Where a freight railroad may
find it more profitable to delay passenger trains to accommodate freight trains, a public owner find it more profitable to delay passenger trains to accommodate freight trains, a public owner
might give preference to passenger services instead. However, in situations that involve public-might give preference to passenger services instead. However, in situations that involve public-
sector purchases of busy freight lines, it is likely that the affected freight railroads would demand sector purchases of busy freight lines, it is likely that the affected freight railroads would demand
protection for their services as a condition in any sale agreements. Freight railroads are less likely protection for their services as a condition in any sale agreements. Freight railroads are less likely
to give up control of their busiest main lines than to give up control of their busiest main lines than ~~in the case of~~to cede paral el or secondary lines. paral el or secondary lines.
One issue that has hindered congressional efforts to encourage competition in passenger rail One issue that has hindered congressional efforts to encourage competition in passenger rail
service is that freight railroads’ statutory obligation to carry passenger trains applies only to trains service is that freight railroads’ statutory obligation to carry passenger trains applies only to trains
operated by Amtrak. This may be one reason that states that have initiated state-supported routes operated by Amtrak. This may be one reason that states that have initiated state-supported routes
have uniformly contracted with Amtrak to be the operator. For other operators to be able to have uniformly contracted with Amtrak to be the operator. For other operators to be able to
compete with Amtrak on equal footing, legislation may be needed to address their rights to make compete with Amtrak on equal footing, legislation may be needed to address their rights to make
use of freight railroads’ infrastructure. use of freight railroads’ infrastructure.
Food and Beverage Service
Amtrak has served food and beverages since it began operating in 1971, continuing the practice Amtrak has served food and beverages since it began operating in 1971, continuing the practice
of its predecessor companies. As far back as 1981, Congress prohibited Amtrak from providing of its predecessor companies. As far back as 1981, Congress prohibited Amtrak from providing
food and beverage service at a loss,28 and this prohibition is stil in the statutes governing Amtrak: food and beverage service at a loss,28 and this prohibition is stil in the statutes governing Amtrak:
“Amtrak may ... provide food and beverage services on its trains only if revenues from the “Amtrak may ... provide food and beverage services on its trains only if revenues from the
services each year at least equal the cost of providing the services.”29 services each year at least equal the cost of providing the services.”29
The law does not define what is to be included in the “cost of providing the services.” Amtrak has The law does not define what is to be included in the “cost of providing the services.” Amtrak has
stated that providing food and beverage service is essential to meeting the needs of passengers, stated that providing food and beverage service is essential to meeting the needs of passengers,
especial y on long-distance trains, and it has interpreted the law as requiring that revenues cover especial y on long-distance trains, and it has interpreted the law as requiring that revenues cover
the costs of food and beverage items and commissary operations but not the labor cost of Amtrak the costs of food and beverage items and commissary operations but not the labor cost of Amtrak
employees providing food service aboard trains. When on-board labor costs are excluded, Amtrak employees providing food service aboard trains. When on-board labor costs are excluded, Amtrak
says, the service covers its costs. When labor costs are included, however, the service operates at says, the service covers its costs. When labor costs are included, however, the service operates at
a significant deficit (se a significant deficit (see Table 4).

28 P.L. 97-35, §1177. 28 P.L. 97-35, §1177.
29 49 U.S.C. §24305(c)(4). 29 49 U.S.C. §24305(c)(4).
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Table 4. Amtrak Food and Beverage Service Revenues and Expenses
(in mil ions of nominal dol ars) (in mil ions of nominal dol ars)
Total
Revenues as %
Total
Nonlabor
Labor
Total
of Total
Fiscal Year
Revenues
Expenses
Expenses
Expenses
Expenses
~~2015~~
~~145.6~~
~~84.7~~
~~114.5~~
~~199.2~~
~~73%~~
2016 2016
146.1 146.1
79.1 79.1
111.3 111.3
190.4 190.4
77% 77%
2017 2017
153.8 153.8
82.3 82.3
112.9 112.9
195.2 195.2
79% 79%
2018 2018
155.5 155.5
85.2 85.2
108.4 108.4
193.6 193.6
80% 80%
2019 2019
$160.7 160.7
$90.0 90.0
$112.1 112.1
$202.1 202.1
7980% 2020 94.2 58.9 87.3 146.2 64% %
Source: CRS, using data provided in personal communications from Amtrak. CRS, using data provided in personal communications from Amtrak.
Notes: Amtrak provides figures for revenue, but not cost, for its food and beverage service in its monthly Amtrak provides figures for revenue, but not cost, for its food and beverage service in its monthly
performance reports. Percentages calculated by CRS. “Total Revenues” includes cash food and beverage sales, a performance reports. Percentages calculated by CRS. “Total Revenues” includes cash food and beverage sales, a
partial transfer of revenue from first-class ticket sales, and state contributions to food and beverage service. partial transfer of revenue from first-class ticket sales, and state contributions to food and beverage service.
Amtrak has taken measures, at Congress’s direction, to reduce costs for food and beverage Amtrak has taken measures, at Congress’s direction, to reduce costs for food and beverage
service. In 1999, it shifted from handling food and beverage supplies internal y to contracting out service. In 1999, it shifted from handling food and beverage supplies internal y to contracting out
such activities. More recently, Amtrak announced it would be discontinuing its traditional dining such activities. More recently, Amtrak announced it would be discontinuing its traditional dining
car service on several long-distance routes, in part to save money.30 A House proposal in the 112th car service on several long-distance routes, in part to save money.30 A House proposal in the 112th
Congress would have required FRA to contract out Amtrak’s onboard food and beverage service Congress would have required FRA to contract out Amtrak’s onboard food and beverage service
but acknowledged that the service may operate at a loss.31 Section 11207 of the FAST Act but acknowledged that the service may operate at a loss.31 Section 11207 of the FAST Act
requires Amtrak to develop a plan to eliminate food and beverage service losses, and prohibits requires Amtrak to develop a plan to eliminate food and beverage service losses, and prohibits
federal funds from being used to cover losses starting five years after enactment—but also federal funds from being used to cover losses starting five years after enactment—but also
provides that no Amtrak employee shal lose his or her job as a result of any changes made to provides that no Amtrak employee shal lose his or her job as a result of any changes made to
eliminate losses. Congress provided that Amtrak could eliminate the losses on food and beverage eliminate losses. Congress provided that Amtrak could eliminate the losses on food and beverage
service through “ticket revenue al ocation.”32 Although that phrase is not defined in the law, it service through “ticket revenue al ocation.”32 Although that phrase is not defined in the law, it
implies that Amtrak could declare that a portion of the ticket prices paid by certain passengers is implies that Amtrak could declare that a portion of the ticket prices paid by certain passengers is
dedicated to food and beverage service, as it already does for passengers traveling in first-class dedicated to food and beverage service, as it already does for passengers traveling in first-class
accommodations. accommodations.
Positive Train Control ~~Interoperability~~ Issues
Positive train control (PTC) is an interconnected system of signals and communication devices Positive train control (PTC) is an interconnected system of signals and communication devices
designed to prevent collisions and derailments by automatical y slowing or stopping a train if its designed to prevent collisions and derailments by automatical y slowing or stopping a train if its
engineer fails to do so.33 The Railway Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA; Division A of P.L. engineer fails to do so.33 The Railway Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA; Division A of P.L.
110-432) required al tracks used by passenger trains to be equipped with PTC by the end of 110-432) required al tracks used by passenger trains to be equipped with PTC by the end of
2015 2015~~, now~~; this was effectively extended to December 31, 2020, by subsequent laws and regulations.34 effectively extended to December 31, 2020, by subsequent laws and regulations.34

30 Luz Lazo, “T he End of an American T radition: T he Amtrak Dining Car,” 30 Luz Lazo, “T he End of an American T radition: T he Amtrak Dining Car,” Washington Post, September 21, 2019, , September 21, 2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/the-end-of-an-american-tradition-the-amtrak-dining-car/https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/the-end-of-an-american-tradition-the-amtrak-dining-car/
2019/09/21/d63cca3a-d888-11e9-bfb1-849887369476_story.html. 2019/09/21/d63cca3a-d888-11e9-bfb1-849887369476_story.html.
31 H.R. 7 (112th Congress), §8106. 31 H.R. 7 (112th Congress), §8106.
32 49 U.S.C. 24321(b)(6). 32 49 U.S.C. 24321(b)(6).
33 See CRS Report R42637, 33 See CRS Report R42637, Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues, by John Frittelli. , by John Frittelli.
34 P.L. 114-73, and 49 C.F.R. §236 as amended by 81 34 P.L. 114-73, and 49 C.F.R. §236 as amended by 81 Federal Register 10126. 10126.
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Amtrak announced on August 13, 2020, that PTC had been instal ed on al tracks it owns or Amtrak announced on August 13, 2020, that PTC had been instal ed on al tracks it owns or
controls.35 However, to fully comply with the PTC mandate, PTC-equipped Amtrak trains controls.35 However, to fully comply with the PTC mandate, PTC-equipped Amtrak trains ~~must~~had to
be certified interoperable with al PTC systems instal ed by host railroads, and Amtrak’s PTC be certified interoperable with al PTC systems instal ed by host railroads, and Amtrak’s PTC
system system ~~must~~had to be interoperable with other railroads’ PTC-equipped trains that use its tracks. be interoperable with other railroads’ PTC-equipped trains that use its tracks. ~~At the~~
~~end of June 2020, Amtrak had achieved interoperability with 3 railroads out of a total of 16 that~~
~~use its tracks, though this does not necessarily reflect Amtrak’s progress achieving~~
~~interoperability with its host railroads.36 If Amtrak does not achieve 100% interoperability with its~~
~~host railroads by the deadline, absent a waiver or subsequent extension, Amtrak would need to~~
~~suspend rail service on noncompliant lines or risk enforcement action in the form of financial~~
~~penalties for each day it operates in violation of the mandate.~~On December 29, 2020, two days before the final deadline, FRA announced that al railroads had successfully complied with the PTC mandate, including its interoperability requirements.36 A December 2020 report by the Amtrak Office of Inspector General (OIG) raised issues with how Amtrak measures the reliability of its PTC system, despite the railroad having met its legislative mandate. Amtrak actual y uses three different PTC systems depending on where its trains are operating; two of these, in use on the NEC and in Michigan, contain elements that predate the federal mandate by nearly a decade. Railroads must submit regular reports on the effectiveness of their PTC systems to FRA, but Amtrak uses a number of manual data collection processes that can introduce a greater risk of human error than the newer systems that store and report on al relevant data automatical y. Amtrak indicated it intends to address the OIG’s findings in 2021, but it is not clear what technological and financial burdens this could place on Amtrak.37

Author Information

Ben Goldman Ben Goldman

Analyst in Transportation Policy Analyst in Transportation Policy

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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35 Amtrak, “Amtrak Announces Positive Train Control Completion,” press release, August 13, 2020, at 35 Amtrak, “Amtrak Announces Positive Train Control Completion,” press release, August 13, 2020, at
https://media.amtrak.com/2020/08/amtrak-announces-positive-train-control-completion/. https://media.amtrak.com/2020/08/amtrak-announces-positive-train-control-completion/.
36 Federal Railroad Administration, 36 Federal Railroad Administration, ~~Steps T oward Full PT C System Implementation of Mandated~~ “Federal Railroad Administration Announces Landmark Achievement with Full Implementation of Positive T rain Control,” press release, December 29, 2020, https://railroads.dot.gov/newsroom/press-releases/fra-announces-landmark-achievement-full-implementation-positive-train. 37 Amtrak Office of Inspector General, “Safety and security: Amtrak expects positive train control will be interoperable with other railroads but could better measure system reliability,” December 11, 2020, https://amtrakoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/OIG-A-2021-004%20PTC.pdf. Congressional Research Service R45942 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED 19~~Positive T rain~~
~~Control (PT C) Systems, https://explore.dot.gov/t/FRA/views/PT CImplementationStatusReport/Overview. T he~~
~~Government Accountability Office found that of all railroads subject to the statutory mandate, only two comm uter~~
~~railroads had achieved full operation and full interoperability with less than two years remaining before the deadline;~~
~~Government Accountability Office,~~ ~~Positive Train Control: As Im plem entation Progresses, Focus Turns to the~~
~~Com plexities of Achieving System Interoperability, July 31, 2019. FRA data indicate that seven commuter railroads had~~
~~achieved full interoperability as of June 30, 2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
~~R45942 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED~~
17