Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations

Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking
July 28, 2020June 7, 2022
Organizations
June S. Beittel
Mexican Mexican drug traffickingtransnational criminal organizations ( organizations (DTOs) pose the greatest crime threat to the United States
Analyst in Latin American
and have “TCOs) significantly influence drug Analyst in Latin American trafficking in the United States and pose the greatest drug trafficking the greatest drug trafficking influence,”threat, according to according to Affairs the U.S. Drug Enforcement the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Affairs
Administration’s (DEA’s) annual Administration’s (DEA’s) annual National Drug Threat Assessment. These organizations. These organizations, often

referred to as transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), continue to diversify into crimes of
extortion, human smuggling, and oil theft, among others. Their supply chains traverse the

Western Hemisphere and the globe. Their extensive violence since 2006 has caused Mexico’s
homicide rate to spike. They produce and traffic illicit drugs into the United States, including heroin, control the market and movement of a wide range of illicit drugs destined for the United States; for this reason, they are commonly referred to as drug cartels and drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). These poly-criminal organizations also participate in extortion, human smuggling, arms trafficking, and oil theft, among other crimes. Homicide rate increases in Mexico are widely attributed to heightened DTO-related violence, often tied to territorial control over drug routes and criminal influence. Congress has tracked how Mexican TCOs affect security on the U.S.-Mexico border, perpetrate violence, and contribute to the U.S. opioid crisis. A major concern is the organizations’ trafficking of cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, methamphetamine,
marijuana, and synthetic opioidsmarijuana, and synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl. Many analysts assess that Mexican TCOs’ role in the production and trafficking of synthetic opioids into the United States has significantly expanded since 2018. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, more than 106,000 overdose deaths occurred in the United States in 2021, more than 70% of which involved opioids, including fentanyl. Evolution of Mexico’s Criminal Environment The leadership and organizational structures of Mexican DTOs remain in flux such as fentanyl, and they traffic South American cocaine.
Mexican DTO activities significantly affect the security of both the United States and Mexico. As Mexico’s DTOs expanded
their control of the opioids market, U.S. overdoses rose sharply according to the Centers for Disease Control, setting a record
in 2019 with more than 70% of overdose deaths involving opioids, including fentanyl. Many analysts believe that Mexican
DTOs’ role in the trafficking and producing of opioids is continuing to expand.
Evolution of Mexico’s Criminal Environment
Mexico’s DTOs have been in constant flux, and yet they continue to wield extensive political and criminal power. In 2006, . In 2006,
four DTOs were dominant: the Tijuana/Arellano Félix Organization (AFO), the Sinaloa Cartel, the Juárez/Vicente Carillo four DTOs were dominant: the Tijuana/Arellano Félix Organization (AFO), the Sinaloa Cartel, the Juárez/Vicente Carillo
Fuentes Organization (CFO), and the Gulf Cartel. Government operations to eliminate Fuentes Organization (CFO), and the Gulf Cartel. Government operations to eliminate the cartel leadership increased cartel leadership increased
instability among the groups instability among the groups while sparkingand sparked greater violence. Over the next dozen years, Mexico’s greater violence. Over the next dozen years, Mexico’s large and comparatively
larger and more more stable DTOs fragmented, creating at first seven and then nine major groups. Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, elected in 2018, has advocated policies that focus on the root causes of crime, but his government has not carried out counternarcotics operations consistently. Despite reform promises, the president appears to rely on a policy of using the military and a military-led national guard to address narcotics- and TCO-related concerns. He campaigned on addressing high levels of criminal impunity and official corruption, long-standing problems in Mexico. However, more than halfway through López Obrador’s six-year term, he arguably has achieved few of his anti-corruption and criminal justice aims. Congressional Action Many in the 117th Congress remain concerned about DTO-related violence in Mexico and its impact on border security. Some Members have been evaluating the amounts and effectiveness of U.S. counternarcotics and security assistance to Mexico and assessing the overall U.S.-Mexico security relationship. Additional concerns focus on how DTO-related violence has imperiled some licit economic sectors, negatively affected U.S.-Mexico trade, and contributed to the internal displacement and outmigration of Mexican citizens. Congress has engaged regularly with these issues, holding hearings, appropriating funds to support Mexico’s anti-crime efforts, and issuing directives and reporting requirements to U.S. agencies. The Biden Administration and the government of President López Obrador are shaping a new bilateral security program, the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework on Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities. Introduced in fall 2021, the framework, as announced, seeks to address insecurity inside Mexico and the U.S. opioid overdose crisis. Congress would play a role in overseeing the funding and effectiveness of this framework, which would replace the Mérida Initiative as the primary bilateral partnership for U.S.-Mexico security cooperation. Congressional Research Service link to page 4 link to page 7 link to page 10 link to page 12 link to page 15 link to page 20 link to page 21 link to page 22 link to page 25 link to page 26 link to page 26 link to page 27 link to page 30 link to page 31 link to page 32 link to page 33 link to page 34 link to page 35 link to page 35 link to page 37 link to page 38 link to page 6 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 20 link to page 24 link to page 40 link to page 42stable DTOs fragmented, creating at first seven major groups, and then nine, which are briefly described in this report.
The DEA has identified those nine organizations as Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juárez/CFO, Beltrán Leyva, Gulf, La
Familia Michoacana, the Knights Templar, and Cartel Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG).
In mid-2019, the leader of the long-dominant Sinaloa Cartel, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, was sentenced to life in a U.S.
prison, further fracturing the once-hegemonic DTO. In December 2019, Genaro García Luna, a former head of public
security in the Felipe Calderón Administration (2006-2012), was arrested in the United States on charges he had taken
enormous bribes from Sinaloa, further eroding public confidence in Mexican government efforts.
Since his inauguration in late 2018, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has implemented what some analysts
contend is an ad hoc approach to security that has achieved little sustained progress. Despite reform promises, the president
has relied on a conventional policy of using the military and a military-led national guard to help suppress violence. The
president has targeted oil theft that siphons away billions in government revenue annually.
Recent Developments
In 2019, Mexico’s national public security system reported more than 34,500 homicides, setting another record in absolute
homicides and the highest national homicide rate since Mexico has published this data. In late 2019, several cartel fragments
committed flagrant acts of violence, killing U.S.-Mexican citizens in some instances. Some Members of Congress questioned
a U.S. policy of returning Central American migrants and others to await U.S. asylum proceedings in border cities, such as
Tijuana, because these cities have reported among the highest urban homicide rates in the world. The Trump Administration
also raised concerns over whether Mexican crime groups should be listed as terror organizations.
In June 2020, two high-level attacks on Mexican criminal justice authorities stunned Mexico, including an early morning
assassination attempt targeting the capital’s police chief, allegedly by the CJNG. He survived the attack, but three others were
killed in one of Mexico City’s most affluent neighborhoods. The other was the murder of a Mexican federal judge in Colima
who had ruled in significant organized crime cases, including extradition of the CJNG’s top leader’s son to the United States.
For more background, see CRS Insight IN11205, Designating Mexican Drug Cartels as Foreign Terrorists: Policy
Implications, CRS Report R45790, The Opioid Epidemic: Supply Control and Criminal Justice Policy—Frequently Asked
Questions, and CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Congressional Concerns .................................................................................................................. 4
Escalation of DTO-Related HomicideMexico’s Criminal Landscape: Extreme Violence, Corruption, and Impunity .................................................. 6
Corruption and Government Institutions 7 A Competition for Turf and the Geography of Violence ........................................................... 9 The Administration of President López Obrador and Security ........................ 9
Criminal Landscape in Mexico ........................ 12 Crime Trends During the COVID-19 Pandemic .............................................................................. 11 17
Illicit Drugs in Mexico and Components of Its Drug Supply Market ........................................... 18 Categories of Illicit Drugs ...... 13
Evolution of the Major Drug Trafficking Groups.......................................................................... 16
Nine Major DTOs....................... 19 Evolution of the Crime Groups ..................................................................................................... 22 Profiles of Nine Major Criminal Groups Operating in Mexico .............................................. 23............... 16
Tijuana/Arellano Félix Organization ................................................................................ 1723
Sinaloa DTO ..................................................................................................................... 1924
Juárez/Carrillo Fuentes Organization ................................................................................ 2027
Gulf DTO .Cartel ......................................................................................................................... 21
Los Zetas ..................................... 28 Los Zetas and Cartel del Noreste ...................................................................................... 2229
Beltrán Leyva Organization .............................................................................................. 2430
La Familia Michoacana..................................................................................................... 25
Knights Templar31 Los Rojos ................................................................................................................ 26.......... 32
Cártel Jalisco Nuevo Generación ...................................................................................... 2732
Fragmentation, Competition, and Diversification ................................................................... 2834
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 2935

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Mexico ................................................................................................................. 2
Figure 2. Stratfor Cartel Map by Region of Influence ..3 Figure 2. 2021 Mexican Cartel Territory and Conflict Zones .................................................................. 5
Figure 3. Major Ports of Entry at the U.S.-Mexico Border 10 Figure 3. Cartel Territory by Areas of Dominance and Presence in 2021 ...................................... 11 Figure 4. Top 10 Cities for Most Homicide Victims in Mexico in 2020 .............................. 9......... 17
Figure 45. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Seizures of Fentanyl and Methamphetamine ............. 1521

Appendixes
Appendix. Drug Trafficking in Mexico and Government Efforts to Combat the DTOs ............... 31Government Efforts to Combat Drug Trafficking Organizations ................................ 37

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 3439


Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Introduction
This report analyzes Mexico’s criminal landscape, including pervasive violence and corruption. It also discusses categories of illicit drugs in Mexico and profiles nine major criminal organizations in Mexico, as well as the phenomena of fragmentation and competition among these major drug trafficking organizations (DTOs).1 An Appendix to the report summarizes the evolution of Mexican governmental efforts to combat DTOs. Mexico shares a nearly 2,000-mile border with the United States, and the two countries have Mexico shares a nearly 2,000-mile border with the United States, and the two countries have
historicallylong-standing and close trade, cultural, and demographic ties. Mexico’s close trade, cultural, and demographic ties. Mexico’s stability is of critical importance
to the United States, and the nature and intensity of violence in Mexico has been of particular
concern to the U.S. Congresstransnational criminal organizations (TCOs) supply illicit drugs to the United States and engage in a wide variety of other lucrative transnational criminal activities. TCOs’ illicit activities have contributed to a spike in U.S. drug overdoses, have provided a push factor for migration out of Mexico, and may have driven internal displacement.2 Mexican TCOs also contribute to high levels of violence and corruption in Mexico. TCO-related violence in Mexico affects U.S. individual and commercial interests as well as the stability of Mexico’s governing institutions. Despite years of effort, including substantial U.S. assistance, Mexican TCOs and their violence remain difficult to suppress. The TCOs’ evolution and activities have therefore remained of sustained concern to U.S. policymakers. Over the past decade, Congress has held numerous hearings on. Over the past decade, Congress has held numerous hearings
addressing violence in Mexico, U.S. counternarcotics assistance U.S. counternarcotics assistance, and border security issues.
According to one Mexican think tank that publishes an annual assessment, the top five cities in
the world for violence in 2019 were in Mexico.1 Increasing violence, intimidation of Mexican
politicians in advance of elections, and assassinations of journalists and media personnel have
continued to raise alarm. From 2017 through 2019, a journalist was murdered nearly once a
month on average, leading to Mexico’s status as one of the world’s most dangerous countries to
practice journalism.2 In the run-up to the 2018 local and national elections, some 37 mayors,
former mayors, or mayoral candidates were killed, and murders of nonelected public officials
rose above 500.3
Over many years, Mexico’s brutal drug-trafficking-related violence has been dramatically
punctuated by beheadings, public hanging of corpses, and murders of dozens of journalists and
officials. Violence has spread from the border with the United States into Mexico’s interior.
Organized crime groups have splintered and diversified their crime activities, turning to extortion,
kidnapping, oil theft, human smuggling, sex trafficking, retail drug sales, and other illicit
enterprises. These crimes often are described as more “parasitic” for local communities and
populations inside Mexico, degrading a sense of citizen security. The and border security issues, which often highlight TCO-perpetrated violence. Both the total number of reported murders (intentional homicides) each year and the homicide rate (per 100,000 persons) in Mexico have risen and then stayed at or near record levels in the past five years. Many analysts attribute the biggest factor in Mexico’s current homicide level rise to organized crime-style killings.3 According to an annual assessment by one Mexican think tank, five Mexican cities topped the list of the 50 most violent cities globally in 2019.4 (For the top 10 most violent Mexican cities in 2020 and their homicide rates, see Figure 4.) This increase in violence and the Mexican government’s response are of interest to some Members of Congress. The increasing DTO-related violence has had political implications in Mexico. Political violence leading up to Mexico’s mid-term elections in 2021—when reportedly more than 100 politicians 1 This report uses the terms drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), transnational criminal organization (TCOs), and drug cartels interchangeably to refer to Mexican crime groups (unless otherwise delineated). For example, some crime organizations evolve from more localized cartel fragments into full-blown TCOs, which commit drug trafficking and other illicit crimes across international borders. 2 Mary Beth Sheridan, “The War Next Door: Conflict in Mexico Is Displacing Thousands,” Washington Post, April 11, 2022. 3 The government data published have changed over time. The government of President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) published tallies of “organized-crime-related” homicides until September 2011. The administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) also issued such estimates but stopped in mid-2013 and switched to publishing data on all intentional homicides. The Justice in Mexico project has identified an average (over many years) of homicides linked to organized crime by assessing several sources. Of total homicides reported by the Mexican government, between 25% and 50% of those killings likely were linked to organized crime. Laura Y. Calderón et al., Organized Crime and Violence: 2021 Special Report, Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, San Diego, CA, October 2021. (Hereinafter, Calderón et al., Organized Crime and Violence, October 2021). 4 El Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y la Justicia Penal (Citizen’s Council for Public Safety and Criminal Justice), “Boletín Ranking 2019 de las 50 Ciudades más Violentas del Mundo,” June 1, 2020. The council survey found in 2019 that the five Mexican cities as the top of the list of the 50 most violent cities were Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, Uruapan, Irapuato, and Ciudad Obregon. In 2020, the council survey identified the top 6 of the 50 most violent cities in the world in Mexico. Julian Resendiz, “Body Count from Drug Cartel Wars Earns Mexican Cities Label of ‘Most Violent in the World,’” Border Report, April 21, 2021. Congressional Research Service 1 link to page 6 link to page 6 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations were killed and many more were threatened—led some analysts to assert that Mexican cartels have taken direct electoral interference to new levels.5 DTOs’ intimidation of Mexican politicians, candidates, and their families through threats of violence or actual homicides has raised alarm among many victims’ groups and other human rights organizations in Mexico, among Mexico’s political and trade partners, and others. Assassinations of journalists and media personnel have made Mexico one of the world’s most dangerous countries in which to practice journalism.6 Between 2017 and 2020, a journalist was murdered in Mexico nearly once a month on average. In the first five months of 2022, 11 journalists were murdered in Mexico.7 By contrast, nine Mexican journalists were killed in 2021, according to the watchdog group Committee to Protect Journalists.8 Most reporters and media personnel who have been killed covered violent crime or public corruption in Mexico.9 Violence has spread from the border with the United States into Mexico’s interior. TCO-related violence has flared in the violence has flared in the
Pacific states of Michoacán and GuerreroPacific states of Michoacán and Guerrero,; in the central states of in the central states of Guanajuato and Colima,Guanajuato, Zacatecas, Morelos, and Colima; and in and in
the the northern border states of Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, and Baja California, where Mexico’s largest border border states of Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, and Baja California, where Mexico’s largest border
cities are located (for map of Mexico, see Figure 1).
Drug traffickers exercised significant territorial influence in parts of the country near drug
production hubs and along drug trafficking routes during the six-year administration of President
Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018), much as they had under the previous president. Although
homicide rates declined early in Peña Nieto’s term, total homicides rose by 22% in 2016 and 23%
in 2017, reaching a record level. In 2018, homicides in Mexico rose above 33,000 for a national
rate of 27 per 100,000 people. According to the U.S. Department of State, Mexico exceeded
34,500 intentional homicides in 2019 for a national rate of 29 per 100,000.4 Thus, for each of the
most recent three years, records were set and then eclipsed.

1 El Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y la Justicia Penal (Citizen Council for Public Security and Criminal
Justice), “Boletín Ranking 2019 de las 50 Ciudades más Violentas del Mundo,” June 1, 2020,
http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/sala-de-prensa/1590-boletin-ranking-2019-de-las-50-ciudades-mas-violentas-
del-mundo. The survey found in 2019 the world’s top most violent cities (all in Mexico) were (1) Tijuana, (2) Ciudad
Juárez, (3) Uruapan, (4) Irapuato, and (5) Ciudad Obregon.
2cities are located (for map, see Figure 1). Organized crime groups have splintered and diversified their criminal activities, turning to extortion, kidnapping, oil theft, human smuggling, sex trafficking, retail drug sales, and other illicit enterprises. Flagrant violence in central Mexico, in the major Mexican cities along the U.S.-Mexico border, and in the Pacific states in a region known as the Tierra Caliente (Hot Land) has remained high. In April 2022, Mexico’s instability in the Tierra Caliente region was reported to be persistent and worsening.10 In February 2022, after a crime group made a death threat to a U.S. inspector of avocados in Michoacán (see Figure 1), the U.S. Department of Agriculture temporarily halted all of Mexico’s U.S.-bound avocado exports to protect inspectors and reject attempted extortion by Mexico’s criminal organizations.11 In March 2021, Head of U.S. Northern Command General Glen VanHerck stated that 30%-35% of Mexico constitutes an “ungoverned space,” where TCOs thrive.12 5 See, for instance, Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez, “La Operación Electoral del ‘Cártel de Sinaloa,’” El Financiero, June 21, 2021. 6 For background on Mexico, see CRS Report R42917, For background on Mexico, see CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations, by Clare Ribando , by Clare Ribando
Seelke. See also Juan Albarracín and Nicholas Barnes, “Criminal Violence in Latin America,” Seelke. See also Juan Albarracín and Nicholas Barnes, “Criminal Violence in Latin America,” Latin American
Research Review, vol. 55, no. 2 (June 23, 2020), pp. 397-406. , vol. 55, no. 2 (June 23, 2020), pp. 397-406.
3 For more background, see Laura Y. Calderón et al., Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico, University of San
Diego, April 2019. See also CRS Report R45199, Violence Against Journalists in Mexico: In Brief, by Clare Ribando
Seelke.
4 Testimony of Richard Glenn, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security,
and Trade, for a hearing on “Assessing U.S. Security Assistance to Mexico,” February 13, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

17 Alejandra Ibarra Chaoul and Kevin Seiff, “Why Do Journalists in Mexico Keep Getting Killed?,” Washington Post, May 10, 2022. The authors maintain more journalists have been killed in Mexico since the start of 2022 than in Ukraine, a war zone. 8 Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), “45 Journalists Killed in 2021/Motive Confirmed or Unconfirmed,” accessed on February 14, 2022. The CPJ considered the 2020 total to be nine journalists killed, with slightly over half of those confirmed to be related to the journalist’s profession based upon an investigation. 9 Sandra Pellegrini and Adam Miller, “Journalists Under Attack in Mexico,” Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, April 11, 2022, at https://acleddata.com/2022/04/11/journalists-under-attack-in-mexico/. 10 Falko Ernst, On the Front Lines in the Hot Land: Mexico’s Incessant Conflict, International Crisis Group (ICG), April 26, 2022, at https://facesofconflict.crisisgroup.org/on-the-front-lines-of-the-hot-land-mexicos-incessant-conflict/. 11 Matt Rivers, “Why Avocado Shipments from Mexico to the U.S. were Stopped: A Death Threat to a Safety Inspector,” CNN Business, February 16, 2022. 12 Glen VanHerck stated, “Counternarcotics, migration, human trafficking, they’re all symptoms of transnational criminal organizations who are operating oftentimes in ungoverned areas—30 percent to 35 percent of Mexico—that is creating some of the things we’re dealing with at the border.” General Glen VanHerck, Commander, NORAD and USNORTHCOM, USNORTHCOM-USSOUTHCOM, Commander’s Joint Press Briefing Remarks, March 16, 2021. Congressional Research Service 2 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations This heightened violence inside Mexico coincides with a transition to synthetic drug production and trafficking, including both the synthetic opioid fentanyl and methamphetamine. Mexican authorities reportedly seized nearly six times the amount of synthetic drugs in 2019 and 2020 than were seized from 2016 to 2018. This rise in seizures has stoked renewed concerns among U.S. policymakers about the effectiveness of Mexico’s anti-cartel and anti-fentanyl strategies.13 In March 2022, a large weapons seizure convinced some analysts of an accelerating “internal” war within the Sinaloa Cartel, Mexico’s oldest and most dominant TCO.14 Reportedly, police found in safe houses in Sonora gear that included millions of rounds of high-powered ammunition, what appeared to be fully automated machine guns, bulletproof vests, and other weaponry. Police suspected this gear had been stashed for combat between cartel factions (see below, “Sinaloa DTO” section), as well as for the ongoing power struggle with external competitors.15 Figure 1. Map of Mexico Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS). 13 Economist, “Latin America’s Drug Gangs Have Had a Good Pandemic: A Resilient Industry Shrugs Off Supply-Chain Problems,” December 29, 2021. The State Department’s 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume I, released on March 1, 2022, maintains that Mexican authorities seized some 1.3 metric tons of fentanyl in 2020, a 596% increase over seizures made in 2019. 14 Parker Asmann, “What Does Massive Weapons Seizure Say About Sinaloa Cartel Feud in Mexico,” InSight Crime, March 7, 2022. 15 Associated Press, “Mexico Finds 3 Million Rounds of Ammo in Biggest Bust So Far,” March 3, 2022. Congressional Research Service 3 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations The State Department’s March 16, 2022, U.S. travel advisory for Mexico, which cautioned against travel to Mexico due to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic concerns, also cautioned against travel to Mexico due to significant violent crime, such as homicide, kidnapping, carjacking, and robbery. In an April 20, 2022, update, the State Department recommended that U.S. citizens refrain from travel to Colima, Guerrero, Michoacán, Sinaloa, and Tamaulipas.16 The State Department also added an advisory for U.S. government employees not to travel to Zacatecas State due to the state’s homicide rate doubling between 2020 and 2021, reportedly based on a cartel turf war.17 Congressional Concerns Over the past decade, Congress has held numerous oversight hearings to address TCO-perpetrated crime and violence. Topics have included whether Mexican TCOs should be designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), TCO control of the U.S.-bound illicit drug supply, U.S.-Mexico security cooperation, including U.S. counternarcotics assistance for Mexico, and related border security concerns. Some Members of Congress are concerned about persistently high levels of violence in Mexico and the ineffectiveness of several efforts to curb that violence or prosecute offenders. In 2012, after U.S. consulate staff and security personnel working in Mexico came under attack, congressional concern spiked.18 Occasional use of car bombs, grenades, and rocket-propelled grenade launchers—such as the one used to bring down a Mexican army helicopter in 2015—continues to spark alarm among security analysts and policymakers. Incidents such as the late-2019 massacre of dual U.S.-Mexican citizens near the U.S.-Mexico border have prompted some Members of Congress to consider whether Mexican drug traffickers may be adopting insurgent or terrorist techniques.19 In October 2019, following the murder of an extended family that included young children in the Mexican border state of Sonora, some Members of Congress questioned whether the U.S. Secretary of State should declare the Mexican organizations to be FTOs. For example, the Drug Cartel Terrorist Designation Act (H.R. 1700) was introduced in the 116th Congress, as was the Identifying Drug Cartels as Terrorists Act of 2019 (H.R. 5509). The incident drew the attention of then-President Trump, who urged the Mexican government to accept more U.S. assistance to vanquish the DTOs.20 In the 117th 16 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Mexico Travel Advisory,” April 20, 2022, at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/mexico-travel-advisory.html. The advisory concludes, “Violent crime—such as homicide, kidnapping, carjacking, and robbery—is widespread and common in Mexico.” An added prohibition on U.S. government worker travel for Zacatecas is at https://mx.usembassy.gov/security-alert-for-u-s-citizens-new-restrictions-on-u-s-government-employee-travel/. 17 Mexico Daily News, “U.S. Embassy Issues Security Alert for Zacatecas,” April 19, 2022. 18 In 2011, a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent was killed and another was wounded in a drug gang shooting incident in San Luis Potosí, north of Mexico City. See BBC News, “U.S. Immigration Agent Shot Dead in Mexico Attack,” February 16, 2011. In another incident, two U.S. officials traveling in an embassy vehicle were wounded in an attack allegedly abetted by corrupt Mexican police. C. Archibold and Karla Zabludovsky, “Mexico Detains 12 Officers in Attack on Americans in Embassy Vehicle,” New York Times, August 28, 2012. 19 See U.S. Congressman Chip Roy, “Reps. Chip Roy and Mark Green Request Drug Cartels Be Added to Terror List,” press release, February 20, 2019, at https://roy.house.gov/media/press-releases/reps-chip-roy-and-mark-green-request-drug-cartels-be-added-terror-list. See also U.S. Congressman Chip Roy, “Congressman Roy Introduces Legislation to Designate Cartels as Terrorist Organizations,” press release, April 15, 2021, at https://roy.house.gov/media/press-releases/congressman-roy-introduces-legislation-designate-cartels-terrorist. 20 David E. Sanger, Michael D. Shear, and Eric Schmitt, “Trump’s Pentagon Chief Quashed Idea to Send 250,000 Troops to the Border,” New York Times, updated November 9, 2021. In the memoir of former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, published in May 2022, Esper alleged that President Trump proposed firing missiles into Mexico to Congressional Research Service 4 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Congress, the Security First Act (H.R. 812) was introduced; it would, among its provisions, require the U.S. Secretary of State to report to certain congressional committees on whether certain Mexican cartels meet the criteria for designation as FTOs.21 When Congress has considered whether crime syndicates should be designated as FTOs, the question arises whether the scale, purpose, and types of violence attributed to Mexican TCOs have morphed into terrorism.22 The criminal groups do not appear to be politically or ideologically motivated, which is one element of a widely recognized definition of terrorism. In December 2021, the State Department’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism maintained there was no credible evidence that international terrorist groups had bases in Mexico or “worked directly with Mexican drug cartels, or sent operatives via Mexico into the United States in 2020.”23 The primary harm to the United States identified by several security analysts and policymakers caused by the TCOs is the organizations’ control of movement of illicit drugs. Since the early 1990s, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has worked closely with Mexican authorities to investigate and prosecute Mexican trafficking organizations. DEA now identifies the TCOs’ expanded production and shipment of heroin, synthetic opioids, and methamphetamine as the major criminal threat to the United States. In May 2022, in what was perceived as a blow to U.S.-Mexico antidrug cooperation, Mexico denied DEA the landing rights for its aircraft to conduct anti-narcotics operations inside Mexico. As a result, DEA withdrew its aircraft, limiting its operational capacity.24 Current illicit drug production and trafficking trends correspond to the growing epidemic of opioid-related deaths in the United States and continued high demand for other illicit drugs. This demand was especially acute during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, when U.S. demand for illicit opioids and black market painkillers spiked.25 In addition, some Members of Congress are concerned about corruption and Mexico’s justice system failures that lead to impunity and failed prosecutions, arguably allowing criminal power to go unchecked.26 Cartel control of human smuggling related to irregular migration and the remove the “drug labs.” This allegation, if true, does not appear to have been publicly discussed or considered by Members of Congress. Maggie Haberman, “Trump Proposed Launching Missiles into Mexico to ‘Destroy the Drug Labs,’ Esper Says,” New York Times, May 5, 2022. 21 For a discussion of some of the policy impacts from the TCO designation, see CRS Insight IN11205, Designating Mexican Drug Cartels as Foreign Terrorists: Policy Implications, coordinated by Liana W. Rosen. 22 Ibid. 23 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020: Mexico, at https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/. 24 Drazen Jorgic, “EXCLUSIVE-U.S. Anti-drugs Agency Pulls Plane from Mexico in Fresh Cooperation Blow,” Reuters, May 11, 2022. 25 Steven Dudley et al., “Mexico’s Role in the Deadly Rise of Fentanyl,” Wilson Center Mexico Institute and InSight Crime, February 2019. According to a report of the Stanford-Lancet Commission, in the United States, individuals who had become addicted to prescription opioids first turned to heroin and. after illicit synthetic opioids flooded heroin markets, many turned to synthetics, such as fentanyl. See Keith Humphreys et al., “Responding to the Opioid Crisis in North America and Beyond: Recommendations of the Stanford–Lancet Commission,” Lancet, vol 399, February 5, 2022. 26 Judicial and policing deficiencies have allowed about a 95% impunity level for the resolution of crimes, on average. For decades, roughly 90% of crimes in Mexico have gone unreported, while only 4%-6% of those reported crimes reach conclusion or case closure. México Evalúa, Hallazgos 2020. Evaluación del Sistema de Justicia Penal en México, 8th ed., October 5, 2021; Juan Antonio Le Clercq, “Mexico: Measuring Impunity Through the 2020 Global Impunity Index,” Global Americans, January 11, 2021; Animal Político, “To Murder in Mexico: Impunity Guaranteed,” September 30, 2018. Congressional Research Service 5 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations exploitation of migrants awaiting immigration hearings in Mexico’s violent border cities is of concern to certain Members. The U.S. Congress provides oversight on The Mérida Initiative and Beyond U.S.-Mexico security cooperation. The Mérida Initiative was a U.S.-Mexican antidrug and rule- Congress may continue to evaluate how of-law partnership lasting 13 years for which Congress the Mexican government is combating the provided $3.3 bil ion through FY2021. Many analysts observed the need for more reporting on Mérida Initiative illicit drug trade, addressing violence, and

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Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations

Figure 1. Map of Mexico

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS).
Violence is an intrinsic feature of the trade in illicit drugs. Traffickers use it to settle disputes, and
a credible threat of violence maintains employee discipline and provides a semblance of order
with suppliers, creditors, and buyers while serving to intimidate potential competitors.5 This type
of drug-trafficking-related violence has occurred routinely and intermittently in U.S. cities since
the early 1980s. The violence now associated with drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in
Mexico is of an entirely different scale. In Mexico, the violence is not only associated with
resolving disputes, maintaining discipline, and intimidating rivals but has also been directed
toward the government, political candidates, and the media. Some observers note some of
Mexico’s violence might be considered exceptional by the typical standards of organized crime.6
Periodically, when organized-crime-related homicides in Mexico break out in important urban
centers or result in the murder of U.S. citizens, Members of Congress have considered the
possibility of designating the criminal groups as foreign terrorists, as in late 2019.7 However, the
DTOs appear to lack a discernible political goal or ideology, which is one element of a widely

5 Robert J. MacCoun and Peter Reuter, Drug War Heresies: Learning from Other Times, Vices and Places (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001); Kevin Jack Riley, Snow Job? The War Against International Cocaine Trafficking
(New Brunswick: Transactional Publishers, 1996).
6 See, for example, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Peña Nieto’s Piñata: The Promise and Pitfalls of Mexico’s New Security
Policy Against Organized Crime, Brookings Institution, February 2013; Phil Williams, “The Terrorism Debate Over
Mexican Drug Trafficking Violence,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 24, no. 2 (2012).
7 CRS Insight IN11205, Designating Mexican Drug Cartels as Foreign Terrorists: Policy Implications, coordinated by
Liana W. Rosen.
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link to page 8 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations

recognized definition of terrorism. In June 2020, the State Department’s annual Country Reports
on Terrorism affirmed that in 2019 there was not credible evidence international terrorist groups
had bases in Mexico, nor had Mexican criminals facilitated terrorist group members crossing the
U.S.-Mexico border.8
Yet Mexico’s high homicide rate is not exceptional in the region, where many countries are
plagued by high rates of violent crime, such as the “Northern Triangle” countries of Central
America—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Overall, the Latin America region has a
significantly higher homicide level than other regions worldwide, though with wide variation
within the region. According to the United Nations’ Global Study on Homicide, published in July
2019, with 13% of the world’s population in 2017, Latin America had 37% of the world’s
intentional homicides.9 Mexico’s homicide rate was once about average for the region, but the
country’s intentional homicides and homicide rates have risen steadily in the past few years. (This
increase contrasts with homicide-rate declines in the Northern Triangle countries, where high
rates decreased somewhat between 2017 and 2018.)
Accurately portraying Mexico’s criminal landscape can be challenging. Government enforcement
actions and changing patronage patterns for bribery have unpredictable consequences for criminal
groups, generating near-constant flux. This has been especially the case as new gangs emerge and
old gangs splinter, shifting power balances. Stratfor, a geopolitical intelligence company, has
broken out rival crime networks in Mexico into three regional groupings: the Tamaulipas State,
Sinaloa State, and Tierra Caliente regional group.10 This regional framework also shows several
states and regions of Mexico where the activities of these three regional groups mix or are
contested. (See Figure 2 for a 2020 map by Stratfor.)
On December 1, 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the populist leftist leader of the National
Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, took office for a six-year term after winning 53% of
the vote in the July elections. The new president pledged to make Mexico a more just and
peaceful society and vowed to govern with austerity. He said he would not pursue a war against
the DTOs and crime groups but would work to address the social conditions that allow criminal
groups to thrive.
In his first year in office, President López Obrador backed constitutional reforms to allow
military involvement in public security to continue for five more years, despite a 2018 Supreme
Court ruling that prolonged military involvement in security violated the constitution. He secured
congressional approval to stand up a new 80,000-strong National Guard (composed of former
military, federal police, and new recruits) to combat crime. The approach to the National Guard
and the continuation of an active domestic role for the military surprised many in the human
rights community, who succeeded in persuading Mexico’s Congress to modify López Obrador’s
original proposal to ensure that the National Guard would be under civilian command. The
National Guard’s first assignment for about 27,000 members of the new force was vigorous
migration enforcement to comply with Trump Administration demands. As the National Guard
continued to deploy in 2020, of the first 90,000 of the National Guard (which has now exceeded

8 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019, see Mexico country report at https://www.state.gov/
reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/.
9 United Nations, U.N. Global Study on Homicide 2019, July 8, 2019; see also “‘Breathtaking Homicidal Violence’:
Latin America in Grip of Murder Crisis,” The Guardian, April 26, 2018.
10 “Stratfor now divides Mexican organized criminal groups into the distinct geographic areas from which they
emerged. This view is not just a convenient way of categorizing an increasingly long list of independent crime groups
in Mexico, but rather it reflects the internal realities of most crime groups in Mexico.” See “Mexico’s Drug War
Update: Tamaulipas-Based Groups Struggle,” Stratfor Worldview, April 16, 2015.
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Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations

100,000 members), 80% tested did not meet basic policing training standards.11 The President
contends that Mexico’s National Guard was not prepared to handle the violence of the DTOs, and
as it is trained to carry out that task he said that the military can fill in through 2024.12
Congressional Concerns
Over the past dozen years, Congress has held numerous oversight hearings addressing the
violence in Mexico, U.S. counternarcotics assistance, and border security issues. Congressional
concern increased in 2012 after U.S. consulate staff and security personnel working in Mexico
came under attack.13 (Two U.S. officials traveling in an embassy vehicle were wounded in an
attack allegedly abetted by corrupt Mexican police.14) Occasional use of car bombs, grenades, and
rocket-propelled grenade launchers—such as the one used to bring down an Mexican army
helicopter in 2015—continue to raise concerns. Incidents such as the late 2019 massacre of dual
U.S.-Mexican citizens near to the U.S.-Mexico border have prompted Members of Congress to
consider whether Mexican drug traffickers may be adopting insurgent or terrorist techniques.
Perceived harms to the United States from the
DTOs, or transnational criminal organizations
The Mérida Initiative
(TCOs), as the U.S. Department of Justice
The Mérida Initiative is a U.S.-Mexican antidrug and
now identifies them, are due primarily to the
rule of law partnership for which Congress has
organizations’ control of and efforts to move
provided $3.1 bil ion through FY2020. Many analysts
illicit drugs to the United States and to expand
have observed the need for more reporting on Mérida
aggressively into heroin, synthetic opioids,
Initiative outcomes to help Congress oversee the funds
and methamphetamine. Mexico experienced a
it has outcomes to help Congress oversee the funds it had monitoring the effects of drug trafficking appropriated. The State Department has pointed appropriated. The State Department has pointed
to some indicators of to some and violence on the security of both the indicators of its success, such as improvements in success, such as improvements in
sharp increase in opium poppy cultivationUnited States and Mexico. Section 7211 of
intelligence sharing and police cooperation that intelligence sharing and police cooperation that has
between 2014 and 2018, and Mexico is a
helped helped to the FY2020 National Defense capture and extradite high-profile criminals. capture and extradite high-profile criminals. But
growing producer of (and transit country for)
the ongoing concerns about escalating violence in
synthetic opioids. This corresponds to an
Mexico and drug overdose deaths in the United States
epidemic of opioid-related deaths in the
have led many to question the efficacy ofEscalating violence in Mexico and drug overdose deaths in the United Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92, §7211) States, and instances of police corruption at high levels, led required unclassified and classified many observers to question the Initiative’s efficacy. reporting to Congress on foreign opioid In 2019, President López Obrador announced he planned traffickers, such as Mexico’s TCOs. A to discontinue the Mérida the Mérida
Initiative.
United States and a continued high demand
See CRS In Focus IF10578, Mexico: Evolution of the
for heroin and synthetic opioids.15
Mérida Initiative, 2007-2020.

11 Arturo Angel, “80% en Guardia Nacional Carece de Certificación Como Policía, Predominan en esta Fuerza
Militares y Marinos,” Animal Politico, July 7, 2020.
12 Mark Stevenson, “Mexico Authorizes Military Policing for 4 More Years,” Associated Press, May 11, 2020.
13 In 2011, a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent was killed and another wounded in a drug gang
shooting incident in San Luis Potosí, north of Mexico City. See “U.S. Immigration Agent Shot Dead in Mexico
Attack,” BBC News, February 16, 2011.
14 C. Archibold and Karla Zabludovsky, “Mexico Detains 12 Officers in Attack on Americans in Embassy Vehicle,”
New York Times, August 28, 2012; Michael Weissenstein and Olga R. Rodriguez, “Mexican Cops Detained in Shooting
of US Government Employees That Highlights Police Problems,” Associated Press, August 27, 2012.
15 Steven Dudley et al., “Mexico’s Role in the Deadly Rise of Fentanyl,” Wilson Center Mexico Institute and InSight
Crime, February 2019. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, of the 72,000 Americans who
died of drug overdoses in 2017, nearly 28,500 involved fentanyl or an analog of the synthetic drug—45% more than in
2016.
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Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations

Figure 2. Stratfor Cartel Map by Region of Influence
Published in January 2020

Source: Stratfor Global Intelligence, “Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2020,” https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/
stratfor-mexico-cartel-forecast-2020#/entry/jsconnect/error.
Notes: The map indicates region of influence and origin of Mexico’s TCOs, DTOs, or cartels.
Some Members of Congress are concerned about the persistent high levels of violence in Mexico,
including attacks on journalists, attacks and killings of political candidates and their families that
lead some Mexican candidates to withdraw from their races, judges fearing for their safety, and
other aggressive measures taken against citizens and officials to ensure impunity. Overt political
intimidation poses a significant threat to democracy in Mexico by the use of forced
disappearances, violent kidnapping, and robbery to intimidate politicians and citizens.16 The
major Mexican crime groups have continued to diversify their operations by engaging in such
crimes as human smuggling, extortion, and oil theft while increasing their lucrative drug business.
The U.S. Congress has expressed concern over the violence and has sought to provide oversight
on U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. Congress may continue to evaluate how the Mexican
government is combating the illicit drug trade, working to reduce related violence, and

16 Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, “Informe de Víctimas de Homocidio, Secuestro y
Extorsión 2017,” March 20, 2018; Kevin Sieff, “36 Local Candidates in Mexico Have Been Assassinated, Leading
Others to Quit,” Washington Post, May 21, 2018.
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monitoring the effects of drug trafficking and violence on the security of both the United States
and Mexico. Congress provided a new reporting requirement in the FY2020 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92, §7211) that requires unclassified and classified reporting to
Congress on foreign opioid traffickers, such as Mexico’s TCOs. There is consideration in the
FY2021 NDAA of an amendment to highlight countries that are significant sources of fentanyl.
Escalation of DTO-Related Homicide, Corruption,
and Impunity
The number of homicides and the homicide rate grew substantially beginning in 2007 in the
administration of President Felipe Calderón and stayed at elevated levels through ensuing
Mexican administrations. The sharp rise in absolute numbers of deaths was unprecedented, even
compared to other Latin American countries with similarly high rates of crime and homicides.17
Estimates of Mexico’s disappeared or missing—numbering more than 73,000 since 2007 as
reported by the Mexican government in mid-2020—have generated domestic and international
concern.18 Alarm has grown about new bouts of extreme violence and the continuing discovery of
mass graves around the country.19
Casualties are reported differently by the Mexican government and Mexican media outlets that
track the violence, so debate exists on how many have been killed.20 This report conveys Mexican
government data, but the data have not been reported consistently or completely.21 Although
different tallies diverged, during President Calderón’s tenure (2006-2012) there was a sharp
increase in total homicides, which leveled off at the end of 2012 when Calderón left office. In the
Enrique Peña Nieto administration, after a couple years’ decline, a steep increase was recorded
between 2016 to the end of 2018, which surpassed previous totals. Overall, since 2006, when
violence grew in response to a more direct government assault on the DTOs, many sources
maintain that Mexico experienced roughly 150,000 murders related to organized crime out of
more than 288,000 intentional homicides.22 These 150,000 likely organized-crime-related killings
do not include the 73,000 considered to be missing or disappeared over the last 14 years as
reported by the current government under President López Obrador, nor the continued rise
through its first 600 days in office.23

17 This finding appears in several annual reports from the University of San Diego’s Justice in Mexico program,
including in Calderón et al., Organized Crime.
18 Mary Beth Sheridan, “Mexico’s Plague of Disappearances Continues to Worsen,” Washington Post, July 14, 2020;
“Mexican Gov’t Unveils Plan to Search for Missing People,” Agencia EFE (English Edition), February 4, 2019.
19 Andrea Navarro, “Drug Cartels Muscle into Town Packed with Americans,” Bloomberg, December 4, 2019;
“Mexico: 50 Bodies Among Remains at Farm Outside Guadalajara,” Associated Press, December 15, 2019.
20 The Mexican news organizations Reforma and Milenio both keep a tally of “narco-executions.” For instance, in
2014, Reforma reported 6,400 such killings, the lowest it has reported since 2008, whereas Milenio reported 7,993
organized-crime-related murders. Kimberly Heinle, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk, Drug Violence in
Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2015, University of San Diego, April 2016.
21 The government data published has changed over time. Under the Calderón government, tallies of “organized-crime-
related” homicides were published until September 2011. The Peña Nieto administration also issued such estimates but
stopped in mid-2013, only publishing data on all intentional homicides. The Justice in Mexico project has identified an
average (over many years) of homicides linked to organized crime by assessing several sources. Of total homicides
reported by the Mexican government, between 25% and 50% of those killings were likely linked to organized crime.
22 Calderón et al., Organized Crime.
23 Sheridan, “Mexico’s Plague of Disappearances Continues to Worsen.” The author notes, “In Mexico, the
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A spate of crime in late 2019 appears to have been committed by factions of once cohesive
criminal groups. In October, Mexican security forces seized a son of imprisoned Mexican drug
kingpin Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán—until the Sinaloa Cartel responded with overwhelming
force that brought chaos to the Sinaloa state’s capital, Culiacán, and prompted authorities to
quickly release him. Reportedly, there is a split within the once all-powerful Sinaloa DTO,
involving one faction led by El Chapo’s
offspring and another led by a senior
Crime and Coronavirus Response in Mexico
top leader (see Sinaloa section, below).
In the first six months of 2020, Mexico’s homicide rate rose by
In early November, nine U.S.-Mexican
an estimated near 2% over the record set in the same period
dual citizens of an extended Mormon
of 2019. In 2020, armed battles between crime groups and
family (including children) were slain in
Mexican security forces continued. In 12 of Mexico’s 32 states,
the border state of Sonora. These
journalists reported social media depictions of cartel
operatives passing out pandemic survival supplies (some
incidents drew the attention of President
stamped with DTO logos) in direct competition with Mexican
Trump, who pushed the Mexican
authorities. Along the country’s west coast, in certain
government to invite greater assistance
municipalities (equivalent to U.S. counties) some of the larger
from the U.S. government to help
DTOs have supplied other public goods and services. In the
Mexico win the drug war.
Pacific state of Guerrero, where dozens of criminal groups
24 In 2019,
operate openly, police have been absent, and vigilante groups
Mexico City—with one of the highest
that reportedly have close links to the cartels imposed and
police-per-population ratios in the
enforced curfews.
country and traditionally considered off-
Under pandemic quarantine (declared March 30 in Mexico),
limits to overt cartel violence—
criminal groups have stil fought for territory and drug
registered its highest homicide level in
trafficking routes. In some Mexican cities, opportunistic crimes
25 years, exceeding 1,500 murders.
such as mugging, kidnapping, or extortion declined during the

COVID-19 lockdown, but powerful cartels, such as the Cártel
As Mexico faced the novel coronavirus
Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), have attacked competitors,
(COVID-19) pandemic in the spring of
keeping homicide levels elevated.1 The pandemic has become
an opportunity for the DTOs to exert greater power within
2020, organized crime groups stepped
their areas of influence, according to some analysts.
up their activities, although in other
Sources: The Guardian, “Mexican Criminal Groups See
countries in the region there were
Covid-19 Crisis as Opportunity to Gain More Power,”
temporary declines in crime. Fighting
April 20, 2020; José de Córdoba, “Mexico’s Cartels
among crime groups and cartels appears
Distribute Aid to Win Support,” Wall Street Journal, May
to have risen in Mexico, keeping
15, 2020; Ioan Gril o, “How Mexico’s Drug Cartels Are
homicides levels elevated.
Profiting from the Pandemic,” New York Times, July 7,
2020.
Fragmentation of DTOs has resulted in
increased competition over drug
infrastructure (see textbox).25
On June 16, 2020, a federal judge was killed who had supervised a case involving the son of the
CJNG leader, Rubén “El Menchito” Oseguera, also allegedly a top cartel figure. The judge, who

disappearances are blamed on a wider variety of culprits: organized crime gangs, police, the military or some
combination of the three.” For more on Mexico’s National Search Commission set up by the López Obrador
government, see Eoin Wilson, “Mexico: Coronavirus Pandemic Hasn't Stopped the Disappearances,” Al Jazeera, June
16, 2020; U.S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2019 Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, March 11, 2020.
24 For background, see CRS Insight IN11205, Designating Mexican Drug Cartels as Foreign Terrorists: Policy
Implications, coordinated by Liana W. Rosen; Ioan Grillo, “How the Sinaloa Cartel Bested the Mexican Army,” Time,
October 18, 2019; and Manuel Bojorquez, “Massacre of Mormon Family Reveals Evolution of Cartel Violence in
Mexico,” CBS News, November 9, 2019.
25 Jane Esberg, “More Than Cartels: Counting Mexico’s Crime Rings,” International Crisis Group, May 8, 2020,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/mexico/more-cartels-counting-mexicos-crime-rings.
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had ruled in a case involving El Menchito’s 2020 extradition to the United States, had also
delivered judgments in top Sinaloa Cartel cases. He and his wife were murdered outside their
home in the capital city of Colima. Colima, a small state neighboring Jalisco, has in recent years
seen Mexico’s highest per capita rate of intentional homicides.26 Less than two weeks later, on the
morning of June 26, 2020, armed men ambushed Mexico City’s police chief and secretary of
public security, Omar García Harfuch, seriously wounding him and killing two bodyguards and a
bystander. García Harfuch, from his hospital bed, accused the CJNG of launching the attack in a
tweeted message.27
Many analysts contend these attacks mark CJNG’s expansion across the country and willingness
to go after Mexican government officials in a brazen fashion.28 (For more background, see CJNG
section below.) The use of strategic violence and displays of firepower by the DTOs to message
to top public officials is a growing concern. Judges are reportedly citing the Mexico City incident
to decline organized crime cases out of concern for their personal safety.29
Since early 2019, Mexico’s northern border states of Baja California, Chihuahua, and Tamaulipas
are where a significant number of migrants have resided in temporary shelters or provisional
encampments under the Migrant Protection Protocols.30 All these border states have homicide
rates exceeding national averages. In 2019, as in the year before, Mexico’s two cities with the
highest incidence of violent crime were Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, with 1,281 murders; and
Tijuana, Baja California, with 2,000 homicides31 (see Figure 3). Migrants and border city
residents were frequent victims of predatory crime in addition to homicide, such as kidnapping,
robbery, and extortion. The battle for turf between the once predominant Sinaloa Cartel and its
aggressive competitor—the CJNG—spawned chaotic violence from the border city of Tijuana all
the way to Mexico’s east coast.
Many U.S. policymakers have expressed deep concerns about the extent of territory not under
central government control, where criminal groups and their fragments attempt to achieve
dominance and ensure impunity from government authorities.32 CJNG, for instance, was involved
in violent clashes with rivals to control border crossings and smuggling routes into the United
States.
In March 2020, Mexico experienced its most violent month, with 3,000 murder victims reported.
The central state of Guanajuato was Mexico’s most violent state in the first half of 2020, with
brutal attacks on two drug rehabilitation centers in the same city that resulted in 10 and 28
homicides, respectively. A battle over the illicit petroleum market between two major rivals,
CJNG and the oil tappers of the Cártel Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL), boosted crime related
fatalities in Guanajuato.33 Both the leader of CSRL, José Antonio Yépez, known as “El Morro,”

26 Zachary Goodwin, “Why One of Mexico’s Smallest States Is Also Its Most Violent, InSight Crime, June 24, 2020.
The article notes that the remains of a Colima congresswoman, Anel Bueno, were found in an unmarked grave two
weeks before the judge’s murder.
27 Kevin Sieff, “Mexico’s Bold Jalisco Cartel Places Elite in Its Sights,” Washington Post, July 14, 2020.
28 Ioan Grillo, “How Mexico’s Drug Cartels Are Profiting from the Pandemic;” James Bosworth, “Mexico Security
Update—June 2020,” June 29, 2020; “Mexico Security Update—July 2020,” July 6, 2020.
29 For remarks by Mexico’s attorney general, seeInitiative. In December 2020, he provision associated with FY2022 Defense supported a change in the National Security Law approved Department appropriations further directed by Mexico’s Congress restricting the activities of U.S. law enforcement officials working in Mexico, which was later the Secretary of Defense, in cooperation eased. In October 2021, the Biden and López Obrador with the Secretary of State, to submit an governments announced a new Bicentennial Framework for integrated security cooperation strategy for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities to replace Mexico.27 Pending legislation, such as the the Mérida Initiative. The new framework remained in Dark Web Interdiction Act (H.R. 7300 and development in early 2022. S. 3782), also would target fentanyl Sources: Carin Zissis, “ALMO and Biden Have Quietly Put U.S.-Mexico Relations Back on Track,” World Politics Review, traffickers in Mexico.28 December 6, 2021; and CRS Insight IN11859, New U.S.- The Bicentennial Framework for Security, Mexico Security Strategy: Issues for Congressional Consideration, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana W. Rosen Public Health, and Safe Communities, announced by the U.S. and Mexican governments in October 2021 (see textbox), focuses on the growing problems of synthetic drugs, prevention of transborder crime, and pursuit of criminal networks.29 In January 2022, an early element of the new Bicentennial Framework appeared to be combating the illicit trafficking of high-caliber arms used by crime groups in Mexico.30 27 See H.Rept. 117-88, the House Appropriations Committee report accompanying H.R. 4432, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2022. Defense Department appropriations for FY2022 ultimately were enacted as Division C of H.R. 2471, the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-103). The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying Division C of H.R. 2471 specifies that “[u]nless otherwise noted, the language set forth in H.Rept. 117-88 carries the same weight as language included in this joint explanatory statement and should be complied with unless specifically addressed to the contrary in this joint explanatory statement” (p. 1). 28 President Biden’s December 2021 Executive Order declared a national emergency with respect to international trafficking of illicit narcotics, including fentanyl. For more, see CRS Insight IN11902, Illicit Fentanyl and Weapons of Mass Destruction: International Controls and Policy Options, by Paul K. Kerr and Liana W. Rosen. 29 CRS Insight IN11859, New U.S.-Mexico Security Strategy: Issues for Congressional Consideration, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana W. Rosen. 30 Sol Prendido, “Mexico and the U.S. Seek to Stop Ammunition and Firearms Trafficking Between the Two Countries, Borderline Beat, January 28, 2022; Julian Resendiz, “Mexico Sending Agents to U.S. to Probe Gun Smuggling, Foreign Minister Says,” ABC News, January 31, 2022. Congressional Research Service 6 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Mexico’s Criminal Landscape: Extreme Violence, Corruption, and Impunity The evolution of Mexico’s cartels into more influential transnational crime syndicates has produced a higher intensity of violence, a broader range of criminality, and organizational proliferation.31 While Mexico had comparatively larger and more stable DTOs prior to 2005, the groups have fragmented into nine major groups, with potentially hundreds of smaller local crime groups and mafias. Some level of violence is a common feature of how the illicit drug trade operates in Mexico. Traffickers may commit acts of violence to settle disputes and to serve as a credible threat of future violence to coerce cooperation. Such violence may provide a semblance of order with suppliers, creditors, and buyers, and it may intimidate potential rivals and government authorities tasked with combating organized crime and drug trafficking. According to the U.S. State Department’s 2021 annual human rights report, “organized crime groups were implicated in numerous killings, acting with impunity and at times in collusion with corrupt federal, state, local and security officials.”32 Some observers contend the scale and magnitude of drug-trafficking-related violence in Mexico are significantly greater than the type and amount of violence experienced in the United States due to TCO operations. Unlike in the United States, violence in Mexico appears to be routinely directed toward government officials, political candidates, and the media.33 Levels of violent crime in Mexico have risen and ebbed over the years but have been heightened since the mid-2000s, followed by two spikes. Although tallies differ, homicides rose in 2007-2008 and appear to have increased through 2011. They plateaued during the first two years of the administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018), and began to decline before spiking again in the last two years of the Peña Nieto administration, from 2016 through late 2018.34 During Peña Nieto’s six-year term, traffickers exercised significant territorial control in parts of the country over drug trafficking routes and production hubs. Despite the early decline in homicide rates, total homicides reportedly grew by 22% in 2016 and 23% in 2017, reaching a record level, according to government data published by the Justice in Mexico program at the University of San Diego.35 Government sources reported in 2018 that homicides exceeded 31 Mary Speck, “Great Expectations and Grim Realities in AMLO’s Mexico,” Prism, vol. 8, no. 1 (2019), pp. 69-81. 32 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mexico Country Report, April 12, 2022. (Hereinafter, Department of State, 2021 Human Rights Practices Report: Mexico.) 33 For a discussion comparing cartel violence in the United States and Mexico, see CRS Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence, by Kristin Finklea. See also Calderón et al, Organized Crime and Violence, October 2021; Justice in Mexico, “Violence Against Police in Guanajuato Highlights Complex Security Situation,” April 21, 2021, at https://justiceinmexico.org/police-guanajuato-security/. 34 From Calderón et al, Organized Crime and Violence, October 2021: There have been two large surges in the number of intentional homicides in Mexico in recent decades. The first surge began with a steep increase in 2008, peaked in 2011, and was followed by a relatively sharp decrease over the next few years. The second surge began in 2015, when SNSP first began reporting the number of individual murder victims alongside the number of homicide case investigations. Both the number of cases and victims reached record highs in 2018 and 2019. In 2020 and into 2021, Mexico’s murder rate has remained at historically high levels, even amid the significant social and economic disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. 35 Ibid. and prior editions of the Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, annual reports. Congressional Research Service 7 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations 33,000, for a national rate of 27 per 100,000 persons.36 In 2019, Mexico saw more than 34,500 intentional homicides, for a national rate of 29 per 100,000.37 In 2020 and 2021, the homicide levels remained at historic high levels. Murders have continued at such high levels during the administration of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador. At its midpoint, some observers estimated López Obrador’s term in office (2018-2024) likely would be be the most violent in recent Mexican history.38 Through different analytic approaches, some scholars assess between 40% and 65% of all homicides in Mexico are organized crime-related. Thus, they attribute the biggest factor in Mexico’s growing homicide rate to the power and violence of crime groups.39 The Mexican government and Mexican media outlets often tally casualty numbers (or homicides) differently.40 Restricted government reporting and crime groups’ attempts to cover up the numbers and identities of casualties also make precise reporting difficult. 41 Criminal actors sometimes publicize their crimes in displays apparently intended to intimidate their rivals, the public, and security forces, leaving signs reporting their acts of violence or broadcasting the acts via the internet. Conversely, TCOs may seek to mask their crimes (removing all crime scene evidence) or may structure the incidents to implicate a competitor cartel. In addition, some shootouts are not reported due to media self-censorship or cartel threats against local journalists. The large number of disappeared and missing persons, and the estimated 90% of crimes in Mexico that go unreported, suggest deaths attributed to organized crime in Mexico may be far higher than officially reported.42 Homicide victim tallies do not include thousands who have been reported missing or disappeared or those found in unmarked graves. The cumulative total of Mexico’s disappeared and missing reportedly exceeds 100,000 in 2022, with 90% of disappearances reported to have taken place since 2007, according to the Mexican government.43 Some analysts maintain that enforced disappearances are a preferred cartel tactic to maintain political control.44 36 Chris Dalby and Camilo Carranza, “InSight Crime’s 2018 Homicide Round-Up,” InSight Crime, January 22, 2019. 37 Testimony of Richard Glenn, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade, Assessing U.S. Security Assistance to Mexico, February 13, 2020. 38 Calderón et al., Organized Crime and Violence, October 2021. 39 The Justice in Mexico project has identified an average (over many years) of homicides linked to organized crime by assessing several sources. Of total homicides reported by the Mexican government, between 25% and 50% of those killings were likely linked to organized crime. Some analysts point to a higher percentage of murders linked to organized crime, such as Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, “Violent Mexico: Participatory and Multipolar Violence Associated with Organised Crime,” International Journal of Conflict and Violence, vol. 10, no. 1 (2016), p. 46; Julio Ríos, “Violencia en México en Vías de Superar a las Victimas de Guerra Civil en Colombia,” University of Guadalajara, November 29, 2020. 40 The Mexican news organizations Reforma and Milenio both keep a tally of “narco-executions.” For instance, in 2014, Reforma reported 6,400 such killings, the lowest it has reported since 2008, whereas Milenio reported 7,993 organized crime-related murders. Kimberly Heinle, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2015, University of San Diego, April 2016. 41 See for instance, Christopher Sherman, “Drug War Death Tolls a Guess Without Bodies,” Associated Press, March 26, 2013. 42 Mexico News Daily, “Tijuana Journalist Believed Killed over Stories About Drug Traffickers,” March 8, 2022. 43 Mary Beth Sheridan, “Mexico’s Plague of Disappearances Continues to Worsen,” Washington Post, July 14, 2020; United Nations, “Mexico: Over 95,000 Registered as Disappeared, Impunity ‘Almost Absolute,’” U.N. News, November 29, 2021; LatinNews Daily, “Mexico: Concerns as Disappearances Reach New Milestone,” May 17, 2022. 44 See, for instance, Ivan Briscoe and David Keseberg, “Only Connect: The Survival and Spread of Organized Crime in Congressional Research Service 8 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Official efforts to accurately count the missing or disappeared have been limited. In 2019, the López Obrador government established a National Search Commission to assess the problem.45 The discovery of new mass graves continues.46 In the Gulf Coast state of Veracruz, one vast mass grave unearthed in 2017 contained some 250 skulls and other remains.47 According to the State Department’s human rights report covering 2021, Mexico’s states with the highest reported disappearances from the start of 2019 through June 2020 include many where the TCOs are most active: Guanajuato, Jalisco, Mexico, Michoacán, Nuevo Leon, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas, Zacatecas, and Mexico City.48 Mexican government data about homicides have not been reported consistently or completely. In some cases, data are incomplete due to what the president of the United Nations Committee on Enforced Disappearances decried in November 2021 as Mexico’s “forensic crisis,” which she attributed in part to an inadequate security strategy and poor investigations.49 According to a 2018 investigation by anti-corruption watchdog group Animal Político, many states in Mexico lack equipment to investigate violent crime adequately, with a majority of states lacking biological databases needed to identify unclaimed bodies. According to the Switzerland-based Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, about 380,000 people were forcibly displaced in Mexico between 2009 and 2018 due to violence and organized crime. In 2020, the center reported 9,700 newly displaced Mexicans. The U.S. State Department noted 15 incidents of mass forced internal displacement (of at least 10 families or 50 individuals) within the first seven months of 2021.50 Some Mexican government authorities have said the number may exceed 1 million, but in such a count the definition of the causes for displacement is broad and includes anyone who moved due to fear or threat of violence. Displaced Mexicans often cite clashes between armed groups or with Mexican security forces, inter-gang violence, and fear of future violence as reasons for leaving their homes and communities.51 A Competition for Turf and the Geography of Violence The major feature of the current criminal landscape in Mexico, according to several observers who monitor organized crime in Mexico, is the battle between an emergent Cartel Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG), whose primary business is synthetic drugs (both methamphetamine and fentanyl), and Sinaloa Cartel, the historically dominant and most extensive crime organization.52 Latin America,” PRISM, vol. 8, no. 1 (2019). For context, see CRS In Focus IF11669, Human Rights Challenges in Mexico: Addressing Enforced Disappearances, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Rachel L. Martin. 45 For more on the López Obrador administration’s security approach, see CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations, by Clare Ribando Seelke. 46 Mexico News Daily, “11 Bodies Found in Clandestine Graves in Sonora,” March 8, 2022. 47 Patrick J. McDonnell and Cecilia Sanchez, “A Mother Who Dug in a Mexican Mass Grave to Find the ‘Disappeared’ Finally Learns Her Son’s Fate,” Los Angeles Times, March 20, 2017; BBC News, “Mexico Violence: Skulls Found in a New Veracruz Mass Grave,” March 20, 2017. 48 Department of State, Human Rights Practices Report: Mexico. 49 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “Mexico: Prevention Must Be Central to National Policy to Stop Enforced Disappearance, UN Committee Finds,” press release, April 12, 2022, at https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/04/mexico-prevention-must-be-central-national-policy-stop-enforced. 50 International Displacement Monitoring Centre, database accessed February 24, 2022, at https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/mexico; Department of State, 2021 Human Rights Practices Report: Mexico. 51 Juan Arvizo, “Crimen Displazó a 380 Mil Personas,” El Universal, July 24, 2019. See also Parker Asmann, “Is the Impact of Violence in Mexico Similar to War Zones?” InSight Crime, October 23, 2017. 52 See, for instance, Sugeyry Romina Gándara, “Mexico Ablaze as Jalisco Cartel Seeks Criminal Hegemony,” InSight Crime, January 5, 2022. Congressional Research Service 9 link to page 35 link to page 13 link to page 14 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations (For more about CJNG’s split from Sinaloa, see “Cártel Jalisco Nuevo Generación,” below.) According to some analysts, the structure is a reassertion of the “bipolarity” between two significant crime networks in Mexico’s organized criminal environment that existed in earlier parts of the 21st century.53 Figure 2 maps the territories dominated and disputed by major cartels from data gathered by Latin America regional analyst James Bosworth from open sources and journalist interviews. The figure shows five major competitors or large cartels: CJNG, Sinaloa, Juárez, Gulf, and Los Zetas, each by their areas of dominance and contested areas. Local group challenges shown in central and western Mexico come from cartel fragments or new offshoots of groups that are among the nine organizations profiled in this report, such as La Familia Michoacana. For another way to envision the TCO territories and conflicts, the political risk firm Stratfor Worldview (previously Stratfor) provides a geographic mapping (see Figure 3) of Mexico’s 12 major cartels. This depiction has evolved from a previous Stratfor conceptualization of cartel territories within regional groupings. Figure 2. 2021 Mexican Cartel Territory and Conflict Zones Source: Created by CRS. Data provided by James Bosworth, Hxagon LLC Notes: CJNG = Cartel Jalisco Nuevo Generación. Map data was compiled through open-source research and interviews with journalists and analysts operating in Mexico. Only major organizations are shown. Updated as of late 2021. Many analysts contend that conflicts among rising splinter groups or cartel fragments are behind some of Mexico’s most virulent violence. Smaller groups, according to some analysts, may be less able to challenge the national government or engage in some types of transnational crimes, including international drug trafficking. However, cartel splinter groups continue to fight to retain the lucrative drug trafficking business, since it remains one of the most high-profit criminal 53 Nathan P. Jones et al., Mexico’s 2021 Dark Network Alliance Structure: An Exploratory Social Network Analysis of Lantia Consultores’ Illicit Network Alliance and Subgroup Data, Center for the United States and Mexico, Baker Institute for Policy Studies, April 22, 2022. (Hereinafter, Jones et al., Dark Network Alliance Structure. Congressional Research Service 10 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations activities. Some analysts report that the largest cartels have engaged in a “proxy war,” using smaller groups to control drug supply chains.54 CJNG is intensely expansionist, using displays of extreme violence to intimidate. CJNG is widely believed to be responsible for the June 2020 killing of a federal judge in Colima who had supervised a case involving the son of the CJNG leader, Rubén “El Menchito” Oseguera, himself reputedly a top cartel figure. The judge had ruled in favor of El Menchito’s 2020 extradition to the United States and had delivered judgments in significant Sinaloa Cartel cases. Figure 3. Cartel Territory by Areas of Dominance and Presence in 2021 (Stratfor Worldview) Source: Rane: Worldview Powered by Stratfor, “Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2021,” August 6, 2021, at https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/tracking-mexicos-cartels-2021?app=old. 54 See, Economist, “Latin America’s Drug Gangs Have Had a Good Pandemic: A Resilient Industry Shrugs off Supply-Chain Problems,” December 2021. Congressional Research Service 11 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations A few weeks after the judge’s killing, Mexico City’s police chief and secretary of public security, Omar García Harfuch, was ambushed in an armed attack that seriously wounded him and killed two bodyguards and a bystander. García Harfuch, from his hospital bed, accused the CJNG of launching the attack.55 As of late 2021, there had been no public reporting on the investigations of the judge’s killing in Colima or the assassination attempt in Mexico City.56 Some judges reportedly declined to accept organized crime cases, citing the Mexico City attack.57 In contrast to the experience in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s, where the sequential dismantling of the Medellín and Cali Cartels led to less overt violence, Mexico’s dismantling of major DTOs has led to a fragmentation associated with widespread and brutal violence.58 A kingpin strategy implemented by the Mexican government has largely incapacitated numerous top- and mid-level leaders in all the major TCOs by means of arrest or killings in arrest efforts. However, this strategy may spark succession struggles that reconfigure external alliances. In this process, somewhat stable criminal groups are often replaced by ones that are more violent. According to an analysis by the International Crisis Group, between 2009 and late 2020, “at least 543 armed groups operated in Mexico”; the analysis largely attributed this situation to the failures of the kingpin strategy.59 The Administration of President López Obrador and Security On December 1, 2018, President López Obrador, the populist leftist leader of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, took office after winning 53% of the vote in the July elections. The new president pledged to make Mexico a more just and peaceful society and vowed to govern with austerity. He said he would not pursue a war against the TCOs but would target the social conditions that allow criminal groups to thrive, a strategy he summarized as “hugs, not bullets.”60 After three years holding office, as of January 2022, López Obrador has avoided large-scale police actions against the cartels and U.S.-Mexico cooperation on law enforcement has declined.61 In his first year, President López Obrador backed constitutional reforms to authorize continued military involvement in public security for five years, despite a 2018 Mexican Supreme Court 55 Kevin Sieff, “Mexico’s Bold Jalisco Cartel Places Elite in Its Sights,” Washington Post, July 14, 2020 (hereinafter Sieff, “Mexico’s Bold Jalisco Cartel”); Jacobo García, “Omar García Harfuch, the Mexican Police Chief Who Survived Being Shot at 414 Times,” El País, June 21, 2021. 56 Twenty-five individuals were arrested in connection with the attack on Harfuch and some 80 bank accounts were frozen. Ibid. 57 See, for instance, Gustavo Castillo García, “Va el ‘Narco’ por el Control Político y Gustavo Castillo García, “Va el ‘Narco’ por el Control Político y
Territorial: Gertz,” Territorial: Gertz,” La Jornada, , July 7, 2020. 58 In Colombia’s case, successfully targeting the huge and wealthy Medellín and Cali Cartels and dismantling them meant that a number of smaller DTOs (cartelitos) replaced them. The smaller organizations have not behaved as violently as the larger cartels, and thus the Colombian government was seen to have reduced violence in the drug trade. However, there were critical factors in Colombia that were not present in Mexico, such as the presence of guerrilla insurgents and paramilitaries that became deeply involved in the illegal drug business. Arguably, the Colombian cartels of the 1980s and 1990s were structured and managed very differently than their contemporary Mexican counterparts. 59 International Crisis Group, Crime in Pieces: The Effects of Mexico’s ‘War on Drugs,’ Explained, Visual Explainer, May 5, 2022, at https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/crime-pieces-effects-mexicos-%E2%80%9Cwar-drugs%E2%80%9D-explained. 60 Gladys McCormick, “‘Abrazos no Balazos’—Evaluating AMLO’s Security Initiatives,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2019, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/abrazos-no-balazos%E2%80%94evaluating-amlos-security-initiatives. 61 Drazen Jorgic, “Mexico Shuts Elite Investigations Unit in Blow to U.S. Drugs Cooperation” Reuters, April 19, 2022. Congressional Research Service 12 link to page 14 link to page 40 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations ruling that prolonged military involvement in domestic security violated the constitution. He secured congressional approval to stand up a new National Guard (composed of former military, federal police, and new recruits), ostensibly to combat crime. The creation of the National Guard and the continuation of an active domestic role for the military alarmed many in the human rights community, who had persuaded Mexico’s Congress to modify López Obrador’s proposal to try to ensure the National Guard would be under civilian command. In 2019, the National Guard was primarily assigned migration enforcement in response to Trump Administration demands for Mexico to stem irregular migration. In 2020 and 2021, the National Guard could not certify some 90% of its force was fit for duty.62 López Obrador contends that Mexico’s National Guard was unprepared to handle the violent tactics of the TCOs because the National Guard lacked training to conduct such a difficult domestic security task. Critics note government investment in both state and local law enforcement has declined since 2018.63 Some analysts also question López Obrador’s commitment to combat corruption in a way that could help curb Mexico’s persistent organized crime-related violence.64 During his first three years in office, López Obrador has said he pursued unconventional antidrug approaches, such as legalization of some drugs such as cannabis, and targeted oil theft by attacking cartels that are known to steal petroleum. However, several observers maintain the administration has not issued an effective or comprehensive security policy to combat the TCOs.65 Stratfor Worldview illustrates the cartels’ widespread activity and presence throughout much of Mexico’s territory in 2021 (see Figure 3)—and how little of the country has been spared from significant activity. (See Appendix for an overview of prior government efforts to quell the cartels during Mexican administrations since 2007.) Some analysts maintain that progress to implement an anti-corruption system required by a 2017 constitutional reform has not materialized under the López Obrador administration.66 Mexico’s Secretary of Security and Citizen Protection cited a decline in homicides in January and February 2022, compared with those same months in the prior year, as evidence that President López Obrador’s anti-crime and anti-corruption strategies were working.67 Some critics who follow the homicide trends have questioned the methodology used to arrive at such a conclusion. They contend that the first two months of the year’s decline in homicides in a limited number of municipalities, reported by the Mexican government, do not constitute a significant decline.68 López Obrador has made headway on some stalled investigations, such as establishing a 62 Arturo Angel, “80% en Guardia Nacional Carece de Certificación Como Policía, Predominan en esta Fuerza Militares y Marinos,” Animal Politico, July 7, 2020; Stratfor Worldview, “Three Years In, Lopez Obrador’s Cartel Strategy Has Not Succeeded in Mexico,” September 13, 2021. 63 CRS In Focus IF10578, U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: From the Mérida Initiative to the Bicentennial Framework, by Clare Ribando Seelke. 64 Calderón et al., Organized Crime and Violence, October 2021; Gina Hinojosa and Maureen Meyer, The Future of Mexico’s National Anti-Corruption System: The Anti-Corruption Fight under President López-Obrador, Washington Office on Latin America, August 2019. 65 For more on the President Lopéz Obrador’s evolving approach, see CRS Insight IN11859, New U.S.-Mexico Security Strategy: Issues for Congressional Consideration, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana W. Rosen, and CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations, by Clare Ribando Seelke. 66 See for additional background, see CRS In Focus IF10578, U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: From the Mérida Initiative to the Bicentennial Framework, by Clare Ribando Seelke. 67 Isabel González, “Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad Funciona y Así Se Pacifica al País: SSPC,” El Excelsior, March 17, 2022. 68 See, for example, James Bosworth and Lucy Hale, “Mexico - Q1 2022 Homicide Data,” Latin America Risk Report, April 25, 2022; Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Opinion, Crime & Anti-Crime Policies in Mexico in 2022: A Bleak Outlook,” Mexico Today, January 21, 2022. Congressional Research Service 13 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations commission to address a long-unsolved case from 2014 in which a drug cartel was suspected of murdering 43 youth in Guerrero State with collusion from Mexican security authorities. In June 2020, arrest warrants were issued for more than 40 municipal officials in Guerrero in that case; information released in March 2022 indicated the Mexican Navy was involved in a cover-up concerning the students’ deaths. The government had alleged that a crime group had killed the students.69 Corrupted by the Cartels: Mexican Police, Prison Wardens, and Public Officials Police and other public officials in Mexico cooperating with the TCOs are rarely investigated. However, most violent crimes such as homicide, whether committed by corrupt police officers or others, are never ful y prosecutedJuly 7, 2020.
30 The Trump Administration’s Migration Protection Protocols allow for persons seeking asylum in the United States to
be returned to Mexico to await their U.S. hearings.
31 Data provided by the University of San Diego’s Justice in Mexico project to CRS, May 1, 2020.
32 For more on criminal fragmentation, see Esberg, “More Than Cartels.”
33 Jorgic and Sanchez, “As Mexico Focuses on Coronavirus, Drug Gang Violence Rises;” Falko Ernst, “Mexican
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and CJNG leaders threaten government officials to deter enforcement actions against them.34
Inter-cartel battles over the lucrative synthetic opioid fentanyl market in several states in central
Mexico have also expanded over the past couple of years.
Figure 3. Major Ports of Entry at the U.S.-Mexico Border

Source: Prepared by CRS Graphics
Corruption and Government Institutions
The criminal involvement of state governors with the DTOs and other criminals is one window
into the extent of corruption in the layers of government and across parties in Mexico.35 Twenty
former state governors, many from the long-dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI),
were under investigation or in jail in 2018.36 Former governors of the states of Coahuila,
Tamaulipas, and Quintana Roo have been charged with money laundering and conspiracy. Other
noteworthy examples of allegedly corrupt former governors include those prosecuted in Mexico
and the United States:
 Tomás Yarrington of Tamaulipas (1999-2005) of the PRI was arrested in Italy in
2017 and extradited to the United States in 2018 for U.S. charges of drug
trafficking, money laundering, and racketeering. Since 2012, he had been under
investigation for his links to the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas in Mexico.37

Criminal Groups See Covid-19 Crisis as Opportunity to Gain More Power,” The Guardian, April 20, 2020.
34 El Morro, for instance, threatened the state government of Guanajuato and federal officials in June 2020 when his
cousin, wife, and mother were picked up in a sweep to limit the CSRL’s oil theft.
35 For more on the issue of corruption and impunity in Mexico, see Roberto Simon and Geert Aalbers, “The Capacity to
Combat Corruption (CCC) Index,” Americas Society and the Council of the Americas (AS/COA) and Control Risks,
June 2019, https://americasquarterly.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/2019CCC_Report.pdf; CRS Report R45733,
Combating Corruption in Latin America: Congressional Considerations, coordinated by June S. Beittel.
36 In the U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018, “nearly 20 former governors
had been sentenced, faced corruption charges, or were under formal investigation,” appears in the Mexico country
report. See U.S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2018 Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, April 2019.
37 U.S. Department of Justice, “Former Mexican Governor Extradited to the Southern District of Texas,” press release,
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 César Duarte of Chihuahua (2010-2016) of the PRI was an international fugitive
wanted on a Red Notice by Interpol until his July 2020 arrest in Florida (during a
visit of President López Obrador to Washington, DC) for extradition back to
Mexico.38
 Javier Duarte of Veracruz (2010-2016) of the PRI was arrested in Guatemala and
extradited to Mexico in August 2017. During his term, the number of persons
forcibly disappeared in Veracruz is estimated to have exceeded 5,000.39
Following his trial in Mexico, Duarte received a nine-year sentence in September
2018.40
Over the six years of PRI President Peña Nieto’s term (2012-2018), Mexico fell 32 places in
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index.41 In the 2019 survey Mexican
respondents’ perceptions of corruption improved slightly due to the popularity of President Lopéz
Obrador in his first year in office. However, citizen perceptions of the security situation in
Mexico appear to have worsened in much of the country in the first months of 2020.
Another non-governmental study on combating corruption in the region examined the capacity of
15 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to uncover, prevent, and punish corruption.
Mexico’s ranking was near the middle in the 2020 survey but had moved little from the year
before due to meager progress on long-term institutional reforms and low independence and
efficiency in the legal system.42

April 20, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/former-mexican-governor-extradited-southern-district-texas.
38 Jacob Sánchez, “Gobierno de Chihuahua Anuncia Cacería de Propiedades de César Duarte en EU,” El Sol de
México, November 27, 2019; Reuters, “Fugitive Mexican Governor Arrested in Miami,” July 8, 2020.
39 Patrick J. McDonnell and Cecilia Sanchez, “A Mother Who Dug in a Mexican Mass Grave to Find the ‘Disappeared’
Finally Learns Her Son’s Fate,” Los Angeles Times, March 20, 2017.
40 “Mexico Fugitive Ex-Governor Roberto Borge Extradited,” BBC News, January 4, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-latin-america-42564581; Rafael Martínez, “Vinculan a Proceso a Exgobernador de Quintana Roo, Roberto
Borge,” El Sol de México, November 13, 2019, https://www.elsoldemexico.com.mx/republica/justicia/vinculan-a-
proceso-a-exgobernador-de-quintana-roo-roberto-borge-concesiones-isla-mujeres-4451151.html.
41 See Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, Transparency International, January 29, 2018,
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 and https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/cpi-2018-regional-analysis-
americas.
42 Roberto Simon and Geert Aalbers, The Capacity to Combat Corruption (CCC) Index: Assessing Latin America’s
Ability to Detect, Punish and Prevent Corruption Amid COVID-19 2020, Anti-Corruption Working Group, AS/COA,
Americas Quarterly, and Control Risks, June 8, 2020.
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Links Among Crime Groups, Police, and Other High-Ranking Officials
In Mexico, arrests of police and other public officials accused of cooperating with the DTOs have rarely been
fol owed by convictions, although a few prominent cases of corruption have achieved results. Police corruption . Police corruption
has been so has been so ubiquitous thatthorough, some argue, that some law enforcement officials law enforcement officials sometimes reportedly carry out carry out the violent assignments from DTOs
and other criminal groups. Purges of Mexico’s municipal, state, and federal police have not rid the police of this
enduring problem.
When El Chapo Guzmán escaped a second timeviolent assignments from TCOs. Police are considered poorly paid compared with other occupations, especial y at the local level, and, as a result, could be susceptible to TCO pressure; some police officers may occasionally moonlight for crime groups. Police security tests and purges have not rid the police of these types of corruption, and the threat of TCOs undermining police and the rule of law continues. The capture and escapes of the Sinaloa Cartel’s notorious longtime leader Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán Leora indicate the power of cartel influence in prisons. After El Chapo Guzmán escaped from a federal maximum-security prison in 2015 from a federal maximum-security prison in 2015 (his second escape from a Mexican prison), scores of , scores of
Mexican prison personnel were arrested. Mexican prison personnel were arrested. Eventually, theThe prison warden was fired. Guzmán prison warden was fired. Guzmán, who led Mexico’s
notorious Sinaloa Cartel for decades, was was captured a third time and extradited to the United States extradited to the United States in early 2017. In February 2019, he was . In February 2019, he was
convicted in federal court in New York for multiple counts of operating a continuing criminal enterprise. Some of convicted in federal court in New York for multiple counts of operating a continuing criminal enterprise. Some of
the New York the trial’s most incendiary testimony alleged that senior Mexican government officials took bribes from trial’s most incendiary testimony alleged that senior Mexican government officials took bribes from
Guzmán. One prosecution witness alleged that then-President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) received a $100 Guzmán. One prosecution witness alleged that then-President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) received a $100
mil ion bribe from Guzmán, an allegation Peña Nieto mil ion bribe from Guzmán, an allegation Peña Nieto strongly disputed. Some observers maintain disputed. Some observers maintain that this allegation allegation
was far-fetched. was far-fetched.
In December 2019, Genaro García Luna was arrested El Chapo is serving his life sentence in a maximum-security prison in Colorado. In December 2019, U.S. authorities arrested Genaro García Luna in Texas on a U.S. indictment in Texas on a U.S. indictment accused offor taking multimil ion- taking multimil ion-
dol ar bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel while holding top law enforcement positions. García Luna headed Mexico’s dol ar bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel while holding top law enforcement positions. García Luna headed Mexico’s
Federal Investigation Agency from 2001 to 2005 (under Federal Investigation Agency from 2001 to 2005 (under former President Vicente Fox of the National Action President Vicente Fox of the National Action
Party, or PAN)Party, or PAN) and then. Later, under President Felipe Calderón, also of PAN, , under President Felipe Calderón, also of PAN, heGarcia Luna became secretary of public security. became secretary of public security.
García Luna left Mexico in 2012 and sought to become a naturalized U.S. citizen. García Luna left Mexico in 2012 and sought to become a naturalized U.S. citizen. In 2019, President López Obrador President López Obrador cited
claimed García Luna’s U.S. arrest García Luna’s U.S. arrest as evidence that the preceding Calderón government’s fierce enforcement strategy had
not successful y repelled the DTOs and that his administration’s alternative approach was more effective in
reducing corruption.
Sources: Alan Feuer, “The Public Trial of El Chapo, Held Partially in Secret,” New York Times, November 21,
2018;revealed corruption in the prior Calderón administration and demonstrated how an openly aggressive enforcement strategy had failed in combating Mexico’s TCOs. In late 2020, U.S.-Mexico counternarcotics cooperation was buffeted by the U.S. arrest (and subsequent release) of former Mexican Secretary of Defense Salvador Cienfuegos on drug and money-laundering charges and by the Mexican Congress’s imposition of restrictions on U.S.-Mexico law enforcement cooperation. In 2020, under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, which renders designees ineligible for U.S. visas, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo designated former Nayarit Governor Roberto Sandoval Castañeda (2011-2017, PRI Party) and his immediate family for corruption in misappropriating state assets and accepting bribes from the CJNG and the Beltrán Leyva Organization. Some Members of the U.S. Congress have criticized the Mexican attorney general for failing to go after corruption conscientiously and for selectively prosecuting only those in the political opposition to the López Obrador government. Sources: Steven Dudley, “The End of the Big Cartels: Why There Won’t Be Another Chapo,” InSight Crime, March 18, 2019; James Bosworth and Lucy Hale, “Mexico-State Police Strike in Zacatecas,” Latin America Risk Report, April 11, 2022; Steven Dudley, “The End of the Big Cartels: Why There Won’t Be Another Chapo,” InSight Crime,
March 18, 2019; U.S. Department of Justice, “Former Mexican Secretary of Public Security Arrested for U.S. Department of Justice, “Former Mexican Secretary of Public Security Arrested for
Drug-Trafficking Conspiracy and Making False Statements,” press release, December 10, 2019Drug-Trafficking Conspiracy and Making False Statements,” press release, December 10, 2019.
In early 2020, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo designated former Nayarit Governor Roberto
Sandoval Castañeda (2011-2017, PRI Party) and his immediate family for corruption in
misappropriating state assets and accepting bribes from the CJNG and the Beltran Leyva
Organization. This designation was made under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act, rendering the designees ineligible for U.S. visas.43
Criminal Landscape in Mexico
The splintering of the large DTOs into competing factions and gangs of different sizes began in
2007 and continues today. The emergence of these different crime groups, ranging from TCOs to
small local mafias (with certain trafficking or other crime specialties), has made the crime
situation diffuse and the crime groups’ behavior harder to suppress or eradicate.
The older, large DTOs tended to be hierarchical, often bound by familial ties and led by hard-to-
capture cartel kingpins. They have been replaced by flatter, more nimble organizations that tend
to be loosely networked. Far more common in the present crime group formation is the
outsourcing of certain aspects of trafficking. The various smaller organizations have resisted
norms that might limit violence. Moreover, rivalries among a greater number of organized crime
“players” have led to more violence, although in some cases the smaller organizations are “less

43 U.S. Department of State, “Public Designation of the Former Governor of the Mexican State of Nayarit, Roberto
Sandoval Castañeda, Due to Involvement in Significant Corruption,” press release, February 28, 2020. For more
background, seeCRS In Focus IF10576, The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, by Dianne E.
Rennack; and CRS Report R46362, Foreign Officials Publicly Designated by the U.S. Department of State on
Corruption or Human Rights Grounds: A Chronology, by Liana W. Rosen and Michael A. Weber.
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able to threaten the state and less endowed with impunity.”44 However, the larger organizations
(Sinaloa, for example) that have adopted a cellular structure are able to still protect their
leadership, such as the 2015 escape orchestrated for Sinaloa leader El Chapo Guzmán through a
mile-long tunnel from a maximum-security Mexican prison.
The scope of the violence generated by Mexican crime groups has been difficult to measure due
to restricted reporting by the government and attempts by crime groups to mislead the public.
Criminal actors sometimes publicize their crimes in garish displays intended to intimidate their
rivals, the public, or security forces, or they publicize the criminal acts of violence on the internet.
Conversely, the DTOs may seek to mask their crimes by indicating that other actors, such as a
competitor cartel, are responsible. Some shootouts are not reported as a result of media self-
censorship or because the bodies disappear.45 One opposite example is the reported death in 2010
of a leader of the Knights Templar, Nazario Moreno González, but no body was recovered at the
time. Rumors of his survival persisted and were confirmed in 2014, when he was killed in a gun
battle with Mexican security forces.46 (See section on Knights Templar below.)
Forced disappearances in Mexico have also become a growing concern, and efforts to accurately
count the missing or forcibly disappeared have been limited, a problem exacerbated by
underreporting. Government estimates of the number of disappeared people in Mexico have
varied widely over time, especially of those who are missing due to force and possible homicide,
although an effort to accurately assess this problem is a focus of the current Mexican
government’s security strategy.47 The López Obrador government has established a National
Search Commission and announced in June 2020 that more than 73,000 Mexicans are missing or
disappeared.48
In the Gulf Coast state of Veracruz, a vast mass grave was unearthed in 2017 that contained some
250 skulls and other remains, some of which were found to be years old.49 Journalist watchdog
group Animal Político, which focuses on combating corruption with transparency, concluded in a
2018 investigative piece that many states lack equipment to adequately investigate violent crime.
For example, the authors found that 20 of Mexico’s 32 states lack biological databases needed to
identify unclaimed bodies. Additionally, 21 states lack access to the national munitions database
used to trace bullets and weapons.50
The State Department’s June 2020 U.S. travel advisory for Mexico, which cautioned generally
against travel to Mexico due to COVID-19 pandemic concerns, warned that five Mexican states
are not recommended for travel due to crime—Colima, Guerrero, Michoacán, Sinaloa, and

44 Patrick Corcoran, “Mexico Government Report Points to Ongoing Criminal Fragmentation,” InSight Crime, April
14, 2015.
45 Christopher Sherman, “Drug War Death Tolls a Guess Without Bodies,” Associated Press, March 26, 2013.
46 Ioan Grillo, Gangster Warlords (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2016). See also Parker Asmann, “Walled Inside
Homes, Corpses of Mexico’s Disappeared Evade Authorities,” InSight Crime, July 31, 2019.
47 For more on the López Obrador administration’s security approach, see CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background
and U.S. Relations, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
48 For more background on the commission, see State Department, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices:
Mexico.
49 McDonnell and Sanchez, “A Mother Who Dug in a Mexican Mass Grave;” “Mexico Violence: Skulls Found in a
New Veracruz Mass Grave,” BBC News, March 20, 2017.
50 Arturo Angel, “Dos Años del Nuevo Sistema Penal: Mejoran los Juicios, pero no el Trabajo de Policías, Fiscalías,”
Animal Político, June 18, 2018, https://www.animalpolitico.com/2018/06/nuevo-sistema-penal-estudio-juicios/.
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Tamaulipas—and recommended reconsideration of travel for another 11 due to crime. The total of
16 states featured in the June advisory comprise half of Mexico’s states.51
According to the Swiss-based Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, about 380,000 people
were forcibly displaced in Mexico between 2009 and 2018 as a result of violence and organized
crime. Some Mexican government authorities have said the number may exceed a million, but in
such a count the definition of the causes for displacement is broad and includes anyone who
moved due to violence. Dislocated Mexicans often cite clashes between armed groups or with
Mexican security forces, inter-gang violence, and fear of future violence as reasons for leaving
their homes and communities.52; U.S. Department of Justice, “Former Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna Charged with Engaging in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise,” press release, July 30, 2020; Joshua Goodman, “Democrats Blast Mexico’s President for Assailing Judiciary,” Associated Press, April 7, 2022; CRS Report R46362, Foreign Officials Publicly Designated by the U.S. Department of State on Corruption or Human Rights Grounds: A Chronology, by Liana W. Rosen and Michael A. Weber; María Novoa, “The Wheels of Justice in Mexico Are Failing. What Can Be Done?,” Americas Quarterly, July 9, 2020. 69 Associated Press, “New Arrest Warrants Issued in Case of Mexico’s Missing 43,” June 30, 2020; Guardian, “Mexico Armed Forces Knew the Fate of 43 Disappeared Students from Day One,” March 29, 2022. Congressional Research Service 14 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations In 2021 and early 2022, several violent incidents occurred in tourist areas that traditionally have low levels of violence, including on the coast of the Mexican state of Quintana Roo, known as the Maya Riviera. In these incidents, some tourists were killed—usually unintentionally, or not because tourists were the targets—on exclusive beachfront properties.70 The López Obrador government dispatched National Guard convoys to the Cancún-area resorts numerous times during 2021 and the first quarter of 2022 to curb TCO violence.71 This violence could affect the Mexican economy’s vital tourism sector. In mid-February 2022, Quintana Roo’s governor convened a meeting with U.S. and Canadian officials to identify crime groups in the state and establish a joint anti-crime strategy.72 According to some reports, killers have employed jet skis to approach victims and there is growing concern about cartels using weaponized drones to attack police and rivals.73 During the six-year term of President Peña Nieto, Mexico fell 32 places in the watchdog group Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI).74 Mexican respondents’ perceptions of corruption improved slightly in 2019 and in 2020, possibly due to the popularity of President López Obrador. In 2021, however, Mexico’s overall CPI score stayed the same as in 2020. In the CPI’s measurement of perceptions of corruption for 2021, released in January 2022, Mexico ranked in the bottom third regionally with a score of 31.75 Some critics maintain this ranking shows “stagnation” on a critical area of the president’s platform to address corruption.76 According to Transparency International, “despite the president’s strong anti-corruption rhetoric, major corruption cases in the country have gone unpunished.” Mexico’s score in the CPI partially reflects that a growing number of scandals, some controversially involving money laundering and the DTOs, has touched close associates of President López Obrador. The president has remained popular despite the historically high levels of homicides, a situation that he frequently discounts. López Obrador is also a frequent critic of the press in his daily morning briefings, especially of investigations or reporting that denounces the administration or his family. He has been known to label journalists during these morning briefings as enemies intent on defaming him and his anti-corruption efforts. In early 2022, López Obrador’s continued attacks on the media (and other corruption watchdogs) sparked international concern following the violent deaths of eleven journalists. According to an investigation cited by media accounts, one reporter killed in January was a crime scene photographer who was murdered by a drug cartel.77 Lourdes Madonado López, 70 David Marcial Pérez , “Extortion and Murder in the Riviera Maya: The Dark Side of Mexico’s Tourist Paradise,” El País, February 8, 2022. See also U.S. Mission to Mexico, “Security Alert – US Consulate General Merida,” January 25, 2022. 71 Laura Gamba Fadul, “Mexico to Deploy 1,500 National Guard Troops to Cancun Resorts after Shooting,” January 18, 2021. 72 Mexico Daily News, “Quintana Roo to Host North American Security Summit,” February 15, 2022. 73 Scott Mistler-Ferguson,“Sicarios of the Sea-Gunmen Ride Jet Skis in Mexico,” InSight Crime, February 7, 2022; InSight Crime, “Tepalcatepec, Mexico: A Staging Ground for Drone Warfare,” January 14, 2022. 74 See Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, January 29, 2018, at https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 and https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/cpi-2018-regional-analysis-americas. 75 Scores are on a scale of 0 to 100, where zero is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean. The Americas Ranking, a subset of the global scoring, includes Latin American and Caribbean countries, Canada, and the United States. 76 LatinNews, “Corruption Levels Stagnate, Casting Doubt over López Orbrador’s Key Pledge,” Security & Strategic Review-March 2022, March 4, 2022. 77 LatinNews Daily, “Mexico: U.S.-Mexico Tensions Rise over Killings of Journalists,” February 24, 2022; San Diego Union Tribune, “Killers of Tijuana Journalist Thought He Was Responsible for Report on Criminal Group, AG Says,” March 7, 2022. Congressional Research Service 15 link to page 20 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations a Tijuana reporter found dead in her car in mid-January, had previously petitioned President López Obrador that she needed protection due to her dangerous work. Mexican authorities had detained suspects in her case as of mid-February 2022.78 In February 2022, the Inter-American Press Association called for President López Obrador to end his series of anti-journalist rants in the wake of a spate of journalist deaths since the beginning of the year.79 José Miguel Vivanco, a longtime director at the global human rights advocacy group Human Rights Watch, stated President López Obrador is someone who “manipulates public opinion in a magisterial fashion,” and he characterized Mexico’s president as “an authoritarian” who delegitimizes free press.80 A report by a law-focused organization assessing anti-corruption efforts in Latin America ranks Mexico extremely low for implementation of what observers generally describe as a comprehensive anti-corruption legal framework. In a March 2022 report, the authors maintained, “Insufficient political will for its implementation (despite being one of the priorities of the current president), inadequate economic and human resources for anti-corruption agencies, insufficient judicial independence ... [result in] ... selective justice and impunity.”81 Crime also has increased in connection with recent migration developments between the United States and Mexico. During the pandemic, a health policy known as Title 42 increased the number of asylum seekers sent back to Mexico, mainly to border cities.82 A significant number of migrants seeking asylum hearings reside in temporary shelters or provisional encampments in Mexico’s northern border states of Baja California, Chihuahua, and Tamaulipas under the U.S. Migrant Protection Protocols.83 These border states have homicide rates exceeding the national average. Two of the U.S.-Mexico border cities with the highest incidence of violent crime were Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez (the first- and second-most violent Mexican cities from 2018 to 2021).84 Migrants and border city residents were frequent victims of predatory crime, such as kidnapping, robbery, and extortion, in addition to homicide. The turf battle between the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG spawned chaotic violence from the Pacific border city of Tijuana to Mexico’s east coast (see Figure 4). 78 Wendy Fry, “Remnants of the Arellano Felix Cartel Responsible for Tijuana Journalist Killings, Mexico Says,” San Diego Union Tribune, April 28, 2022: CRS Report R45199, Violence Against Journalists in Mexico: In Brief, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke. 79 Associated Press, “Press Group Calls on Mexican President to Stop Attacks,” February 14, 2022. 80 Michael Stott, “Crisis of US Democracy Emboldens Latin American Populists, Says Rights Chief,” Financial Times, January 26, 2022. 81 Lawyers Council for Civil & Economic Rights, LAAA 2021/2022 Latin America Anti-Corruption Assessment, Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice, March 16, 2022. 82 See CRS Infographic IG10031, U.S. Border Patrol Encounters at the Southwest Border: Titles 8 & 42. 83The Trump Administration’s Migration Protection Protocols allowed for persons seeking asylum in the United States to be returned to Mexico to await their U.S. hearings; the protocols were reinstated at the end of 2021. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Court Ordered Reimplementation of the Migrant Protection Protocols,” updated January 20, 2022. 84 Data provided by the University of San Diego’s Justice in Mexico project to CRS, January 2022. Congressional Research Service 16 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Figure 4. Top 10 Cities for Most Homicide Victims in Mexico in 2020 Sources: Created by CRS. Data from Laura Y. Calderón et al. (eds.), Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico, 2021 Special Report, October 2021, p. 14. This report tracked homicide data from the Mexican government’s National Public Security System. Note: Under each city name is the absolute number of homicides and the homicide rate per 100,000 people. Crime Trends During the COVID-19 Pandemic85 Fragmentation of Mexico’s TCOs continued during the first two years of the COVID-19 pandemic, possibly because of increased intra-cartel competition.86 However, the largest TCOs, such as CJNG, managed to consolidate expansion across Mexico. As noted earlier, CJNG’s willingness to attack Mexican government officials and its aggression in battling its primary competitor, the Sinaloa Cartel, have forged its fierce reputation. In addition, police and other security force personnel during engaged in fewer frontal attacks to curtail cartel violence during the pandemic. Reasons for this include the Mexican security forces being required to conduct curfew enforcement and other pandemic-related duties, as well as to participate in irregular migration control; illness among security force members and police; and a decision by the López Obrador government not to make engagement to counter the cartels a priority.87 Despite early supply-chain disruptions, U.S.-bound illicit drug supplies appeared to revert to pre-pandemic levels in 2021. Illicit fentanyl flows in particular appeared to thrive. The economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, according to the International Monetary Fund, caused the Mexican economy to contract deeply in 2020. After a mild recovery in 2021, Mexico experienced low growth (2.0%) in the first quarter of 2022.88 The full effects of the pandemic’s economic and social disruption over the medium and longer terms on drug trafficking, crime group recruitment, and violence in Mexico remain unknown. Its impacts on 85 For further background, see CRS Insight IN11535, Mexican Drug Trafficking and Cartel Operations amid COVID-19, by June S. Beittel and Liana W. Rosen. 86 Jane Esberg, “More Than Cartels: Counting Mexico’s Crime Rings,” International Crisis Group, May 8, 2020, at https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/mexico/more-cartels-counting-mexicos-crime-rings. 87 Ioan Grillo, “How Mexico’s Drug Cartels Are Profiting from the Pandemic;” July 7, 2020; Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez, “La Seguridad con AMLO: Balance Preelectoral,” El Financiero, April 11, 2021; Economist, “Latin America’s Drug Gangs have had a Good Pandemic: A Resilient Industry Shrugs off Supply-Chain Problems,” December 2021. 88 See LatinNews Daily, “In Brief: Mexico’s Private Sector Lowers 2022 Growth Forecast,” March 4, 2022; International Monetary Fund, “Mexico, At a Glance,” at https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/MEX#ataglance. Congressional Research Service 17 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations government revenues, security spending, and cartel adaptation to logistics and enforcement challenges continue to evolve.89 In 2020, homicide levels remained elevated during Mexico’s comparatively brief pandemic lockdown, but crimes of opportunity, such as robbery, appeared to decline.90 According to homicide data by state released in 2022, murders (intentional homicides) stayed elevated, near record levels throughout 2020 and 2021. The three most violent states in Mexico for 2020, using the rate of homicides per 100,000 persons, were (1) Colima, (2) Baja California, and (3) Guanajuato; in 2021, they were (1) Zacatecas, (2) Baja California, and (3) Colima, from data published by Mexico’s National System of Public Security. In both 2020 and 2021, all these states had homicide rates greater than 80 per 100,000 persons. Some U.S. policymakers have expressed concerns about the extent of territory in Mexico not under central government control. In such places, criminal groups and their fragments attempt to seek dominance and secure impunity from government authorities.91 The CJNG, for instance, was involved in violent clashes with rivals to control border crossings and smuggling routes into the United States, according to observers tracking the TCO’s expansion.92 Sinaloa and CJNG reportedly are competing to dominate the sport fishing and seafood production industries on both the east and the west coast of Mexico.93
Illicit Drugs in Mexico and Components of Its Drug Supply Market
Today, theThe major Mexican major Mexican DTOs are poly-drugTCOs are polydrug traffickers, handling more than one type of drug, although , handling more than one type of drug, although
they may specialize in the production or trafficking of specific products. According to the U.S. they may specialize in the production or trafficking of specific products. According to the U.S.
State Department’s State Department’s 20202022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Mexico is a (INCSR), Mexico is a
significant source and transit country for heroin, marijuana, and synthetic drugs (such as significant source and transit country for heroin, marijuana, and synthetic drugs (such as
methamphetamine and fentanyl) destined for the United States. Mexico remains the main methamphetamine and fentanyl) destined for the United States. Mexico remains the main
trafficking route for U.S.-bound cocaine from the major supply countries of Colombia andtrafficking route for U.S.-bound cocaine from the major supply countries of Colombia and, (to a to a
lesser extentlesser extent), Peru and Bolivia. Peru and Bolivia.53 The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) notes94 DEA, in its National Drug Threat Assessment (NDTA) published in March 2021, maintains that that
traffickers and retail sellers of fentanyl and heroin combine traffickers and retail sellers of fentanyl and heroin combine themthe drugs in various ways, such as in various ways, such as
pressing the combined powder drugspressing them into highly addictive and extremely powerful counterfeit into highly addictive and extremely powerful counterfeit
pillspills (appearing to be OxyContin or other prescription and over-the-counter drugs).95 The DEA has said that fentanyl provided by Mexican traffickers to certain U.S. drug 89 Many analysts have made observations about the near-term impacts of the pandemic, but there is a diversity of perspectives on the long-term effects on drug supply and other illicit criminal activity. 90 See robbery data on National System of Public Security (SESNSP), at https://www.gob.mx/sesnsp/acciones-y-programas/victimas-nueva-metodologia?state=published; Calderón et al., Organized Crime and Violence, October 2021. 91See Ernst Falco, “On the Front Lines of the Hot Land: Mexico’s Incessant Conflict,” International Crisis Group: A Visual Journey Through Latin America (series), April 26, 2022. 92 Luis Chaparro, “Mexico’s Powerful Jalisco Cartel Is Flexing Its Muscles at the Opposite Ends of Latin America,” October 18, 2021; Sugery Romina Gándara, “Mexico Ablaze as Jalisco Cartel Seeks Criminal Hegemony,” InSight Crime, January 5, 2022. 93 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Organized Crime Is Taking over Mexican Fisheries,” Brookings Institution, February 21, 2022. 94 U.S. State Department, 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), March 1, 2022. Hereinafter, State Department, 2022 INCSR. 95 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Assessment (NDTA) 2020, March 2021. Hereinafter, DEA, NDTA 2020. For additional background, Celina B. Realuya, “The New Congressional Research Service 18 link to page 40 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations markets may supplant “white powder” heroin. Still, 97% of heroin traced from U.S. seizures is sourced from Mexico, according to the 2022 INCSR. Furthermore, the State Department report maintains that addiction rates inside Mexico are rising, including the abuse of synthetic drugs. .
The west coast state of Sinaloa, with its long coastline and difficult-to-access areas, is favorable The west coast state of Sinaloa, with its long coastline and difficult-to-access areas, is favorable
for drug cultivation and remains the heartland of Mexico’s drug trade. Marijuana and opium for drug cultivation and remains the heartland of Mexico’s drug trade. Marijuana and opium
poppy cultivation poppy cultivation hashave flourished in the state for decades. flourished in the state for decades.54 It has also 96 It also has been the home of Mexico’s been the home of Mexico’s
most notorious and successful drug traffickers. most notorious and successful drug traffickers.
Categories of Illicit Drugs Cocaine. Cocaine of Colombian origin supplies most of the U.S. market, and most of that supply Cocaine of Colombian origin supplies most of the U.S. market, and most of that supply
is trafficked through Mexico. Mexican drug traffickers are the primary wholesalers of U.S. is trafficked through Mexico. Mexican drug traffickers are the primary wholesalers of U.S.
cocaine. cocaine. The international influence of Mexico’s TCOs is growing. The ability of Mexico’s cartels to transport Colombian cocaine in the 1990s was a major factor in their growth (for more, see the Appendix). In April 2022, press reports noted Mexico’s cartels appeared to be a new source of guns for Colombian insurgents and crime groups. Caches of weapons discovered by Colombian authorities included high-powered assault weapons (that appeared to be U.S.-made) provided to Colombia’s armed groups as payment for cocaine shipments. According to press reports, Mexico’s largest cartels are starting to demand coca growers in Colombia plant hyper-productive coca strains to increase their cocaine output.97 According to the White House Office of National Drug Control PolicyAccording to the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), coca , coca
cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia increased to a record 951 metric tons cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia increased to a record 951 metric tons (MT) of pure of pure
cocaine in cocaine in 2019, an 8% rise over 2018.552019 and exceeded 1,000 MT in 2020.98 Cutting cocaine with synthetic opioids (often Cutting cocaine with synthetic opioids (often
unbeknownst to users) unbeknownst to users) reportedly has become has become more commonplace and increases the commonplace and increases the dangers of overdose.danger of fatal overdose. Mexican government seizures of cocaine in the first six months of 2021 increased by 90% compared with the same period in 2020.99
Heroin and Synthetically Produced Opioids. In its In its 20192020 National Drug Threat Assessment, DEA warned
(NDTA), the DEA warns that Mexico’s crime organizations, aided by corruption and impunity, that Mexico’s crime organizations, aided by corruption and impunity,
present an acute threat to U.S. communities given their dominance in heroin and fentanyl exports. present an acute threat to U.S. communities given their dominance in heroin and fentanyl exports.
Mexico’s heroin traffickers, Mexico’s heroin traffickers, whowhich traditionally provided black or brown heroin to the western part traditionally provided black or brown heroin to the western part
of the United States, of the United States, in 2012 and 2013 began to change their opium processing methods to

51 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Mexico Travel Advisory, June 17, 2020,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/mexico-travel-advisory.html.
52 Juan Arvizo, “Crimen Displazó a 380 Mil Personas,” El Universal, July 24, 2019. See also Parker Asmann, “Is the
Impact of Violence in Mexico Similar to War Zones?,” InSight Crime, October 23, 2017.
53 U.S. State Department, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2020.
54began to change their opium processing methods in 2012 and 2013 to produce white powder heroin, a purer and more potent product. The DEA maintains that no other crime groups, foreign or domestic, have a reach comparable to that of Mexican TCOs to distribute white powder heroin and fentanyl within the United States. With Mexico being the leading source of fentanyl and fentanyl-laced counterfeit pills to the U.S. market, DEA warns that Mexican TCOs have established clandestine laboratories “for the synthesis of fentanyl.”100 The State Department maintains that Mexico has not succeeded in Opium War: A National Emergency,” PRISM, vol. 8, no. 1 (2019). 96 The region where Sinaloa comes together with the states of Chihuahua and Durango is a drug-growing area The region where Sinaloa comes together with the states of Chihuahua and Durango is a drug-growing area
sometimes called Mexico’s “Golden Trianglesometimes called Mexico’s “Golden Triangle,” after the productive area of Southeast Asia by the same name. ” after the productive area of Southeast Asia by the same name. In this
region, a third of the population is estimated to make their living from the illicit drug trade.
55 White House, ONDCP, “United States and Colombian Officials Set Bilaeral Agenda to Reduce Cocaine Supply,”
press release, March 5, 2020.
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produce white heroin, a purer and more potent product. The DEA maintains that no other crime
groups, foreign or domestic, have a comparable reach to distribute within the United States.56
According to the ONDCP, 41,800 hectares of opium poppy were cultivated in Mexico in 2018—
down 5% compared to 2017 but up 280% since 2013. 97 Reuters, “Pushing Productive Seeds, Mexican Cartels Reshape Colombia’s Drug Industry,” May 9, 2022; Luis Jaime Acosta, “Mexican Cartels Swap Arms for Cocaine, fueling Colombia Violence,” Reuters, April 12, 2022. 98 White House, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), “Updated: ONDCP Releases Data on Coca Cultivation and Potential Cocaine Production in the Andean Region,” July 16, 2021. 99 State Department, 2022 INCSR. 100 ONDCP, “New Annual Data Released by White House Office of National Drug Control Policy Shows Poppy Cultivation and Potential Heroin Production Remain at Record-High Levels in Mexico,” press release, June 14, 2019. Congressional Research Service 19 link to page 24 link to page 24 link to page 24 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations sufficiently reducing the flow of dangerous drugs across the border. It cites Mexico’s failure to deter TCOs or successfully prosecute them in court and the slowing of Mexico’s responses to U.S. extradition requests for defendants on drug-related charges.101 Mexican heroin is with increasing frequency laced with fentanyl, according to DEA, and Mexico’s potential production of pure Mexico’s potential production of pure
heroin rose to 106 metric tons (MT) in 2018 from 26 MT in 2013.57 The DEA reports that 90% of
U.S. seized heroin comes from Mexico, which is increasingly laced with fentanyl.
The extent of Mexico’s role in heroin rose to 106 MT in 2018. Subsequently, Mexican heroin production fell for three years through 2020, according to the State Department.102 The extent of Mexico’s role in the production of fentanyl, which is 30-50 times more potent than production of fentanyl, which is 30-50 times more potent than
heroin, is less well understood than heroin, is less well understood than Mexico’sits role in fentanyl trafficking role in fentanyl trafficking, which is increasingly
well documented.58.103 What is known is that seizures of fentanyl, fentanyl analogs, and What is known is that seizures of fentanyl, fentanyl analogs, and
methamphetamine—the leading synthetic lab-produced drugs entering the U.S. illicit drug methamphetamine—the leading synthetic lab-produced drugs entering the U.S. illicit drug
market—have been market—have been steadily rising along the Southwest borderrising along the Southwest border since 2017. (For U.S. Customs and Border Protection . (For U.S. Customs and Border Protection
seizure data, seeseizure data, see Figure 45.)
Illicit imports of fentanyl from Mexico involve Chinese-produced fentanyl or fentanyl precursors Illicit imports of fentanyl from Mexico involve Chinese-produced fentanyl or fentanyl precursors
coming most often from China. Many analysts contend that plant-sourced drugs, such as heroin
and morphine, may be gradually replaced in the criminal market by synthetic drugs. In the first
half of 2019, according to the State Department, Mexico seized 157.3 kilograms of fentanyl, a
94% increase over the same time period in 2018.59 Some observers suggest that if synthetic drugs
continue to expand their market share, the drug cartel structure that has relied upon control of
opium production, heroin manufacture, and distribution using the plaza system in Mexico for
trafficking drugs for sale inside the United States could be disrupted. Synthetic drug trafficking
with distribution arranged over the internet via the Dark Web would replace it. Abandoning
heroin for the cheaper-to-produce fentanyl might cause Mexican opium farmers to be thrown out
of work.60

56 ONDCP, “New Annual Data Released by White House Office of National Drug Control Policy Shows Poppy
Cultivation and Potential Heroin Production Remain at Record-High Levels in Mexico,” press release, June 14, 2019.
57sourced from China, but TCOs are reportedly seeking supplies from other sources, such as India. Many analysts contend that synthetic drugs might gradually replace plant-sourced drugs in the criminal market. Synthetic drug trafficking with distribution arranged over the internet via the Dark Web or other social media is replacing buying drugs derived from plants, such as opium or marijuana, and many Mexican farmers of opium crops have become unemployed as demand declines.104 Several analysts predict a continuing decline in Mexico’s heroin exports as synthetics continue to attract TCO interest and investment. Methamphetamine. Mexican-produced methamphetamine has overtaken U.S. sources of the drug, a more traditional source. Mexico’s illicit supply has expanded into new markets inside the United States, allowing Mexican traffickers to control the U.S. wholesale market, according to the DEA. The expansion of methamphetamine seizures inside Mexico, as reported in the 2022 INCSR, grew to 29 MT in the first six months of 2021.105 U.S. methamphetamine seizures at the Southwest border increased almost fourfold between 2016 and 2021, as shown in Figure 5. The purity and potency of methamphetamine has driven up methamphetamine overdose deaths in the United States. In addition, demand for amphetamines, especially methamphetamine, has increased inside Mexico, where use has doubled since 2017, according to the U.S. State Department.106 Cannabis. According to the State Department’s 2022 INCSR, U.S. seizures of imported marijuana began to decline in 2019. Authorities are projecting a continued decline in U.S. demand for Mexican marijuana because drugs “other than marijuana” will likely dominate the cross border traffic. This is partially due to legalized medical and nonmedical/recreational 101 State Department, 2022 INCSR. 102 For background on Mexico’s heroin and fentanyl exports, see CRS In Focus IF10400, For background on Mexico’s heroin and fentanyl exports, see CRS In Focus IF10400, Trends in Mexican Opioid
Trafficking and Implications for U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, by Liana W. Rosen and Clare Ribando Seelke. , by Liana W. Rosen and Clare Ribando Seelke.
58 DEA, 2017 National Drug Threat Assessment, DEA-DCT-DIR-040-1, October 2017. See also103 Steven Dudley, “The Steven Dudley, “The
End of the Big Cartels: Why There Won’t Be Another El Chapo,” End of the Big Cartels: Why There Won’t Be Another El Chapo,” InSight Crime, March 18, , March 18, 2019. 104 For more discussion2019.
59 U.S. State Department, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2020.
60 For sources of the concepts here, see Dudley, “The End of the Big Cartels, see Dudley, “The End of the Big Cartels;””; testimony of Bryce Pardo, RAND testimony of Bryce Pardo, RAND
Corporation, Corporation, toin U.S. Congress, House Homeland Security on Intelligence and Counterterrorism House Homeland Security on Intelligence and Counterterrorism, Subcommittee Subcommittee andon Border Security, Border Security,
Facilitation, and OperationsFacilitation, and Operations Hearing, “, Homeland Security Implications of the Opioid CrisisHomeland Security Implications of the Opioid Crisis, hearing,,” July 25, 2019; Vanda
Felbab-Brown, “Fending Off Fentanyl and Hunting Down Heroin: Controlling Opioid Supply from Mexico,”
Brookings Institution, July 2020.
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link to page 18 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations

Figure 4. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Seizures of Fentanyl and
Methamphetamine
Data from FY2014-FY2019
Fentanyl
Methamphetamine
3,000
Number of Seizures in Pounds (lbs)
80,000
2,250
60,000
1,500
40,000
750
20,000
0
0
FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19
FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Field Operations’ Nationwide Drug Seizures and U.S.
Border Patrol’s Nationwide Seizures, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics.
Notes: Prepared by CRS Graphics.
However, the economic devastation of the coronavirus pandemic, projected by the International
Monetary Fund to reduce economic growth in Mexico by more than 10% in 2020 (estimated as of
June 2020), may temporarily push former opium growers back into cultivation. The medium- and
longer-term impact of the pandemic and coming recession on drug markets and consumer
demand remains unknown.61
Methamphetamine. Mexican-produced methamphetamine has overtaken U.S. sources of the
drug and expanded into nontraditional methamphetamine markets inside the United States,
allowing Mexican traffickers to control the wholesale market inside the United States, according
to the DEA. The expansion of methamphetamine seizures inside Mexico, as reported by the
annual INCSR, is significant. As of August 2018, as reported in the 2019 INCSR, Mexican
authorities had seized 130 MT of methamphetamine, due in part to a large seizure of some 50 MT
in Sinaloa.62 U.S. methamphetamine seizures significantly increased between 2014 and 2019, as
shown in Figure 4. The purity and potency of methamphetamine has driven up overdose deaths
in the United States.
Cannabis. In the first six months of 2019, Mexico seized 91 MT of marijuana and eradicated
more than 2,250 hectares of marijuana, according to the State Department’s 2020 INCSR.

61 Many analysts have made observations about the near-term impacts of the pandemic, but there is a diversity of
perspectives on the long term. See Parker Asmann, Chris Dalby and Seth Robbins, “Six Ways Coronavirus Is
Impacting Organized Crime in the Americas,” InSight Crime, May 4, 2020; Ernst, “Mexican Criminal Groups See
Covid-19 Crisis as Opportunity to Gain More Power;” Robert Muggah, “The Pandemic Has Triggered Dramatic Shifts
in the Global Criminal Underworld,” Foreign Policy, May 8, 2020.
62 Arthur DeBruyne, “An Invisible Fentanyl Crisis Emerging on Mexico’s Northern Border,” Pacific Standard,
February 6, 2019. See also “50 Tonnes of Meth Seized in Sinaloa; Estimated Value US $5 Billion,” Mexico New Daily,
August 18, 2018; Mike La Susa, “Massive Mexico Methamphetamine Seizure Reflects Market Shifts,” InSight Crime,
August 21, 2018.
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Authorities are projecting a continued decline in U.S. demand for Mexican marijuana because
drugs “other than marijuana” will likely predominate. This is also the case due to legalized
cannabis or medical cannabis in several U.S. states and Canada, reducing its value as part of
Mexican trafficking organizations’ portfolio. Mexico is also considering cannabis legalization and
regulation.
Evolution of the Major Drug Trafficking Groups
The DTOs have been in constant flux in recent years.63 By some accounts, when President
Calderón came to office in 2006, there were four dominant DTOs: the Tijuana/Arellano Félix
organization (AFO), the Sinaloa Cartel, the Juárez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes Organization (CFO),
and the Gulf Cartel. Since then, the large, formerly stable organizations that existed in the earlier
years of the Calderón administration have fractured into many more groups.
For several years, the July 25, 2019; Claire Fetter, “The U.S. Opioid Epidemic,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 12, 2022, at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-opioid-epidemic. 105 Arthur DeBruyne, “An Invisible Fentanyl Crisis Emerging on Mexico’s Northern Border,” Pacific Standard, February 6, 2019; State Department, 2022 INCSR. 106 State Department, 2022 INCSR. Congressional Research Service 20 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations cannabis in many U.S. states and Canada, reducing its value as part of Mexican trafficking organizations’ portfolio. Mexico’s Congress is continuing to consider legislation to legalize adult use of cannabis. A shift in the drug supply is underway, especially in terms of synthetic drugs displacing heroin and cocaine, but its implications remain unclear.107 Some analysts are exploring why violence has continued to rise in rural areas as Mexico’s drug trade moves away from plant-based drugs (e.g., marijuana and opium poppy) to laboratory-made synthetics, with less need to control farmers and land.108 In the rural western state of Michoacán, for instance, crime groups have used explosive devices, such as improvised explosive devices, to destroy army vehicles and drones to bomb police infrastructure and rivals.109 These tactics expand beyond existing TCO tools ranging from lengthy underground tunnels, use of cartel branded armed tanks, submersible crafts, ultralights, and cryptocurrencies.110 Figure 5. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Seizures of Fentanyl and Methamphetamine (FY2016-FY2021) Sources: CRS. For FY2019-FY2021, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and Office of Field Operations “Drug Seizure Statistics,” at https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/drug-seizure-statistics. For FY2016-FY2018, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and Office of Field Operations, “CBP Enforcement Statistics FY2018,” at https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics-fy2018. 107 See Vanda Felbab-Brown, China and Synthetic Drugs Control: Fentanyl, Methamphetamines, and Precursors, Brookings Institution, March 2022. 108 For background, see U.S. Senate et al., Commission on Combatting Synthetic Opioid Trafficking, Final Report, February 2022, pp. xi, 19-20. 109 Scott Mistler-Ferguson, “Tepalcatepec, Mexico: A Staging Ground for Drone Warfare,” InSight Crime, January 14, 2022. 110 See, for instance, “Drug Smuggling Tunnel with Rail System Uncovered on US-Mexico Border,” Associated Press, May 16, 2022, at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/may/16/california-drug-smuggling-tunnel-us-mexcio-border; Sol Prendido, “Pimp My Ride, The Cartel Tanks of Mexico,” Borderland Beat, May 8, 2022. Congressional Research Service 21 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Evolution of the Crime Groups The TCOs have been in constant flux since the middle of the 20th century.111 This section focuses on the nine TCOs that are currently most prominent (and about which the most information is available). For several years, DEA identified the following seven organizations as dominant: Sinaloa, DEA identified the following seven organizations as dominant: Sinaloa,
Los Zetas, Tijuana/Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juárez/CFO Arellano Félix Organization (AFO), Juárez/ Carrillo Fuentes Organization (CFO), Beltrán Leyva, Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. In some , Beltrán Leyva, Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. In some
sense, these sense, these seven might be viewed as the “traditional” DTOs. Many analysts suggest those seven “traditional” groups have fragmented. The current wave of splintering of the large DTOs into competing factions and gangs of different sizes started in 2008. Reconfiguration of the major DTOs—preceding the contemporary fragmentation—was common. For example, themight be viewed as the “traditional” DTOs. However, many analysts suggest that
those seven groups have fragmented. In the past decade, as fragmentation has produced many
more criminal actors, it has been accompanied by many groups’ diversification into other types of
criminal activity, as noted earlier. The following section focuses on the nine currently most
prominent DTOs (about which the most information is readily available) and whose current status
illuminates the fluidity of all the crime groups in Mexico as they face new challenges from
competition and changing market dynamics. Some analysts maintain there may be as many as 20
major organizations and more than 200 criminal groups overall.64
Nine Major DTOs
Reconfiguration of the major DTOs—often referred to as TCOs due to their diversification—
preceded the intensive fragmentation that exists today. The Gulf Cartel, based in northeastern Gulf Cartel, based in northeastern
Mexico, had a long history of Mexico, had a long history of dominant power and profitsdominance at the end of the 20th century, with the height of its power in the , with the height of its power in the
early 2000s. However, the Gulf Cartel’s enforcers—Los Zetas, who were organized from highly early 2000s. However, the Gulf Cartel’s enforcers—Los Zetas, who were organized from highly
trained Mexican military deserters—splittrained Mexican military deserters—split in 2010 to form a separate DTO and turned against their former to form a separate DTO and turned against their former
employers, engaging in a employers, engaging in a hyper-particularly violent competition for territory.112 As discussed below, the Gulf Cartel now lacks its former power and reach. In the past decade, as many criminal groups and their splinters proliferated, groups expanded the range and diversity of the criminal businesses they pursued, often forming powerful poly-crime syndicates. Some crime groups specialize in one illegal business. Other crime groups target licit businesses to hide their criminal earnings and launder their profits. Many groups in their territories extort businesses in agriculture, mining, seafood, and timber and provide security from other criminal groups. Their evolving status illuminates the fluidity of all the crime groups in Mexico as they face new challenges from competition and changing drug market dynamics. Some analysts maintain the true scale and impact of the fracturing of organized crime in Mexico remains unknown and contend that making effective policy requires maximum comprehension of the character of these changes.113 One analyst assessed in 2015 that the smaller organizations are “less able to threaten the state and less endowed with impunity.”114 The emergence of new crime groups, ranging from TCOs with their international reach to small domestic mafias, has made the crime situation in Mexico diffuse and arguably has made it more difficult to suppress or eradicate violence. The older, large DTOs tended to be hierarchical, often bound by familial ties and led by hard-to-capture cartel kingpins. Those DTOs have been replaced by flatter, more nimble organizations that tend to be loosely networked and to outsource certain aspects of trafficking. The various smaller organizations or splinter groups also have resisted norms that might limit violence. Rivalries among a greater number of organized crime “players” 111 See Patrick Corcoran, “How Mexico’s Underworld Became Violent,” InSight Crime, April 2, 2013. According to this article, constant organizational flux, which continues today, characterizes violence in Mexico. Patrick Corcoran, “Mexico Government Report Points to Ongoing Criminal Fragmentation,” InSight Crime, April 14, 2015; Jane Esberg, “More Than Cartels: Counting Mexico’s Crime Rings,” International Crisis Group, May 8, 2020. 112 George W. Grayson, The Evolution of Los Zetas in Mexico and Central America: Sadism as an Instrument of Cartel Warfare (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2014). 113 Jane Esberg, “More Than Cartels: Counting Mexico’s Crime Rings,” International Crisis Group, May 8, 2020. Esberg notes when small cartels disappear due to their special, localized niche or their intimidation of media to prevent public notice of their presence, they may become unseen and yet play “a large role in Mexico’s rising rates of violence and hold sway over many people’s lives.” 114 Patrick Corcoran, “Mexico Government Report Points to Ongoing Criminal Fragmentation,” InSight Crime, April 14, 2015. Congressional Research Service 22 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations have led to chaotic violence and criminal impunity equivalent, according to some observers, to “open war zones.”115 Open-source research about the traditional DTOs and their successors, as mentioned above, is more available than information about smaller factions. No steady, open-source information is available about most of the 200-400 current criminal groups. It is difficult to ascertain these groups’ longevity or assess which qualify as major actors. The enduring major organizations and their successors are still operating, at times either cooperating or in internecine conflict with one another. Profiles of Nine Major Criminal Groups Operating in Mexico The major cartels operating in Mexico today are arranged below in terms of roughly when the organization rose to prominence. The identification of each as a “major” crime group or DTO draws from the 2020 National Drug Threat Assessment published by DEA in March 2021. Tijuana/Arellano Félix Organization The Tijuana/Arellano Félix Organization (AFO) historically has controlled the important drug smuggling route between Baja California (Mexico) and Southern California.116 The cartel is based violent competition for territory.
The well-established Sinaloa DTO, with roots in western Mexico, has fought brutally for
increased control of routes through the border states of Chihuahua and Baja California, with the
goal of remaining the dominant DTO in the country. Sinaloa has a more decentralized structure of
loosely linked smaller organizations, which has been susceptible to conflict when units break
away. Nevertheless, the decentralized structure has enabled it to be quite adaptable in the highly
competitive and unstable environment that now prevails.65
Sinaloa survived the arrest of its billionaire founder El Chapo Guzmán in 2014. The federal
operation to capture and detain Guzmán, which gained support from U.S. intelligence, was
viewed as a major victory for the Peña Nieto government. Initially the kingpin’s arrest did not

63 See Patrick Corcoran, “How Mexico’s Underworld Became Violent,” InSight Crime, April 2, 2013. According to
this article, constant organizational flux, which continues today, characterizes violence in Mexico.
64 Muggah, “The Pandemic Has Triggered Dramatic Shifts in the Global Criminal Underworld;” Esberg, “More Than
Cartels.”
65 Oscar Becerra, “Traffic Report: Battling Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel,” Jane’s Information Group, May 7, 2010. The
author describes the networked structure: “The Sinaloa Cartel is not a strictly vertical and hierarchical structure, but
instead is a complex organization containing a number of semiautonomous groups.”
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spawn a visible power struggle within the DTO. His dramatic escape in July 2015 followed by his
re-arrest in January 2016, however, raised speculation that his role in the Sinaloa Cartel might
have become more as a figurehead rather than a functional leader.
The Mexican government’s decision to extradite Guzmán to the United States, carried out on
January 19, 2017, appears to have led to violent competition from a competing cartel, the CJNG,
which had split from Sinaloa in 2010. Over 2016 and the early months of 2017, the CJNG’s quick
rise and a possible power struggle inside of Sinaloa between El Chapo’s sons and a successor to
their father, a longtime associate known as “El Licenciado,” reportedly caused increasing
violence.66
In the Pacific Southwest, La Familia Michoacana—a DTO once based in the state of Michoacán
and influential in surrounding states—split apart in 2015. It eventually declined in importance as
its successor, the Knights Templar, grew in prominence in the region known as the Tierra
Caliente of Michoácan, Guerrero, and in parts of neighboring states Colima and Jalisco. At the
same time, the CJNG rose to prominence between 2013 and 2015 and is currently deemed by
many analysts as Mexico’s largest and most dangerous DTO. The CJNG has thrived with the
decline of the Knights Templar, which was targeted by the Mexican government.67 The CJNG has
assassinated numerous public officials in an effort to intimidate the Mexican government.
Open-source research about the traditional DTOs and their successors mentioned above is more
available than information about smaller factions. With as many as 200-400 criminal groups, it is
hard to assess longevity or even do a census of which ones are major actors. Current information
about the array of new regional and local crime groups is more difficult to assess. The once-
coherent organizations and their successors are still operating, both in conflict with one another
and, at times, cooperatively.
Tijuana/Arellano Félix Organization
The AFO is a regional “tollgate” organization that has historically controlled the drug smuggling
route between Baja California (Mexico) to southern California.68 It is based in the border city of in the border city of
Tijuana. One of the founders of modern Mexican DTOs, Tijuana. Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, a former Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, a former
police officer from Sinaloa, created a networkpolice officer from Sinaloa, created a network of paramount drug traffickers that involved that included the Arellano Félix family the Arellano Félix family and
numerous other DTO leaders (such as , including Rafael Caro Quintero, Amado Carrillo Fuentes, and El Rafael Caro Quintero, Amado Carrillo Fuentes, and El
Chapo Chapo Guzman)Guzmán. The seven “Arellano Félix” brothers and four sisters inherited the AFO from . The seven “Arellano Félix” brothers and four sisters inherited the AFO from
their uncle, Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, after his arrest in 1989 for the murder of DEA Special their uncle, Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, after his arrest in 1989 for the murder of DEA Special
Agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena.Agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena.69

66 Anabel Hernández, “The Successor to El Chapo: Dámaso López Núñez,” InSight Crime, March 13, 2017.
67 Juan Montes and José de Córdoba, “Cartel Becomes Top Mexico Threat,” Wall Street Journal, July 9, 2020; Luis
Alonso Pérez, “Mexico’s Jalisco Cartel—New Generation: From Extinction to World Domination,” InSight Crime and
Animal Politico, December 26, 2016.
68 John Bailey, “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Democratic Governance,” in The Politics of Crime in Mexico:
Democratic Governance in a Security Trap (Boulder: FirstForum Press, 2014), p. 121. Mexican political analyst
Eduardo Guerrero-Gutiérrez of the Mexican firm Lantia Consulting defines a “toll-collector” cartel or DTO as one that
derives much of the organization’s income from charging fees to other DTOs using its transportation points across the
U.S.-Mexican border.
69 Special Agent Camarena was an undercover DEA agent working in Mexico who was kidnapped, tortured, and killed
in 1985. The Guadalajara-based Félix Gallardo network broke up in the wake of the investigation of its role in the
murder.
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The AFO was once one of the two dominant DTOs in Mexico, infamous for brutally controlling
the drug trade in Tijuana in the 1990s and early 2000s.70 The other was the Juárez DTO, also
known as the Carrillo Fuentes Organization. The Mexican government and U.S. authorities took
vigorous enforcement action against the AFO in the early years of the 2000s, with the arrests and
killings of the five brothers involved in the drug trade—the last of whom was captured in 2008.
In 2008, Tijuana became one of the most violent cities in Mexico. That year, the AFO split into
two competing factions when Eduardo Teodoro “El Teo” García Simental, an AFO lieutenant,
broke from Fernando “El Ingeniero” Sánchez Arellano (the nephew of the Arellano Félix brothers
who had taken over the management of the DTO). García Simental formed another faction of the
AFO, reportedly allied with the Sinaloa DTO.71 Further contributing to the escalation in violence,
other DTOs sought to gain control of the profitable Tijuana/Baja California–San Diego/California
plaza in the wake of the power vacuum left by the earlier arrests of the AFO’s key leadership.
Some observers believe that the 2010 arrest of García Simental created a vacuum for the Sinaloa
DTO117 The AFO was once one of two dominant criminal groups in Mexico, infamous for brutal control of the drug trade in Tijuana in the 1990s and early 2000s.118 The other was the Juárez Cartel, also known as the Carrillo Fuentes Organization. The Mexican government and U.S. authorities took vigorous enforcement action against the AFO in the early 2000s, which saw the arrests or killings of the five brothers involved in the drug trade, the last of whom was captured in 2008. In 2008, the AFO split into two competing factions when Eduardo Teodoro “El Teo” García Simental, an AFO lieutenant, broke from Fernando “El Ingeniero” Sánchez Arellano (the nephew of the Arellano Félix brothers who had taken over the group’s management). García Simental formed another faction of the AFO, reportedly allied with the Sinaloa Cartel.119 Tijuana became one of the most violent cities in Mexico, as other criminal groups sought to gain control of the 115 See commentary in James Frederick, “Mexico’s Journalists Speak Truth to Power, And Lose Their Lives for It,” National Public Radio, September 4, 2021. See also Mary Beth Sheridan, “The War Next Door: Conflict in Mexico is Displacing Thousands,” Washington Post, April 11, 2022. 116 John Bailey, “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Democratic Governance,” in The Politics of Crime in Mexico: Democratic Governance in a Security Trap (Boulder: FirstForum Press, 2014), p. 121 (hereinafter Bailey, “Drug Trafficking Organizations”). 117 Special Agent Camarena was an undercover DEA agent working in Mexico who was kidnapped, tortured, and killed in 1985. The Guadalajara-based Félix Gallardo network broke up in the wake of a U.S.-led investigation of its role in the murder. 118 Mark Stevenson, “Mexico Arrests Suspected Drug Trafficker Named in U.S. Indictment,” Associated Press, October 24, 2013. 119 Steven Dudley, “Who Controls Tijuana?,” InSight Crime, May 3, 2011. Sánchez Arellano took control in 2006 after the arrest of his uncle, Javier Arellano Félix. Congressional Research Service 23 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations profitable plaza (or trafficking route) between Tijuana and San Diego, CA, filling a power vacuum left by the arrests of the AFO’s key leaders. Some observers suggested the arrest of García Simental enabled the Sinaloa Cartel to gain control of the Tijuana to gain control of the Tijuana/-San Diego smuggling corridor.San Diego smuggling corridor.72120 Despite its weakened state, Despite its weakened state,
the AFO the AFO appears to have maintainedappeared to maintain control of the control of the plazaroute through an agreement through an agreement made between between
Sánchez Arellano and Sánchez Arellano and the Sinaloa DTOSinaloa’s leadership, with Sinaloa and other ’s leadership, with Sinaloa and other traffickingcriminal groups groups
paying a fee to use the plaza.paying a fee to use the plaza.73
In 2013, the DEA identified121 DEA identified a nephew of the Arellano Félix brothers, Sánchez Arellano Sánchez Arellano, as one of the six most influential traffickers in the as one of the six most influential traffickers in the
region.74region in 2013.122 Following his arrest in 2014, Following his arrest in 2014, however, Sánchez Arellano’s mother, Enedina Arellano Sánchez Arellano’s mother, Enedina Arellano
Félix, who was trained as an accountant, Félix, reportedly took over. It remains unclear if the AFO reportedly took over. It remains unclear if the AFO
retains enough power through itsretains enough power through its own trafficking and other crimes to continue to operate as a trafficking and other crimes to continue to operate as a
tollgate cartel. Violence in Tijuana rose to more than 100 murders a month in late 2016, with the
uptick in violence attributed to Sinaloa battling its new challenger, the CJNG.75 The CJNG has
apparently taken an interest in both local drug trafficking inside Tijuana and cross-border
trafficking into the United States. As in other parts of Mexico, the role of the newly powerful
CJNG organization may determine the nature of the area’s DTO configuration in coming years.76
Some analysts maintain that the resurgence of violence in Tijuana and the spiking homicide rate
in the nearby state of Southern Baja California are linked to the CJNG forging an alliance with
remnants of the AFO. As noted previously, Tijuana was the city with the highest number of
homicides in the country in both 2018 and 2019.

70 Mark Stevenson, “Mexico Arrests Suspected Drug Trafficker Named in US Indictment,” Associated Press, October
24, 2013.
71 Steven Dudley, “Who Controls Tijuana?,” InSight Crime, May 3, 2011. Sánchez Arellano took control in 2006 after
the arrest of his uncle, Javier Arellano Félix.
72 E. Eduardo Castillo and Elliot Spagat, “Mexico Arrests Leader of Tijuana Drug Cartel,” Associated Press, June 24,
2014.
73“tollgate” cartel.123 Some analysts assess that the 2019 resurgence of violence in Tijuana and the spiking homicide rate in the nearby state of Southern Baja California are linked to the CJNG forging an alliance with remnants of the AFO (in direct competition with the Sinaloa DTO). Tijuana was the city with the highest number of homicides in the country from 2018 to 2021. Due to the strategically important Baja California trafficking corridor, Tijuana’s importance to crime organizations has grown. This arguably may empower the group or groups that control the key trafficking route, and the related law enforcement corruption, to facilitate cross-border smuggling. AFO may yet serve as either a useful ally or a significant obstacle to other trafficking groups. Mexican law enforcement has focused on Tijuana cartel splinter groups, known collectively as AFO holdouts. The holdouts appear to be playing a role in the Tijuana drug market, and these residual cells reportedly have been linked to homicides taking place in the Tijuana drug distribution area. Some analysts maintain that AFO also may be involved in a simmering Sinaloa Cartel internal conflict between two factions: the sons of El Chapo and the faction that is loyal to El Chapo’s former co-leader and partner, “El Mayo,” described below.124 Sinaloa DTO Sinaloa, considered Mexico’s most enduring criminal organization, comprises a network of smaller organizations. The U.S. Treasury Department designated each of Sinaloa’s major leaders a kingpin in the early 2000s. At the top of the hierarchy was El Chapo Guzmán, listed in 2001; Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada García, listed in 2002; and Juan José “El Azul” Esparragoza Moreno, listed in 2003. In April 2009, then-President Barack Obama designated the Sinaloa Cartel as a drug kingpin entity pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (P.L. 106-120).125 120 E. Eduardo Castillo and Elliot Spagat, “Mexico Arrests Leader of Tijuana Drug Cartel,” Associated Press, June 24, 2014 (hereinafter, Castillo and Spagat, “Mexico Arrests Leader”). 121 Stratfor Worldview, “Mexico Security Memo: Torreon Leader Arrested, Violence in Tijuana,” April 24, 2013, at “Mexico Security Memo: Torreon Leader Arrested, Violence in Tijuana,” Stratfor Worldview, April 24, 2013,
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico-security-memo-torreon-leader-arrested-violence-tijuana#axzz37Bb5rDDg. In http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico-security-memo-torreon-leader-arrested-violence-tijuana#axzz37Bb5rDDg. In
2013, Nathan Jones at the Baker Institute for Public Policy asserted that the Sinaloa-AFO agreement allows those allied 2013, Nathan Jones at the Baker Institute for Public Policy asserted that the Sinaloa-AFO agreement allows those allied
with the Sinaloa DTO, such as the CJNG, or otherwise not affiliated with Los Zetaswith the Sinaloa DTO, such as the CJNG, or otherwise not affiliated with Los Zetas, to to also use the plaza. For more use the plaza. For more
information, see Nathan P. Jones, “Explaining the Slight Uptick in Violence in Tijuana,” Baker Institute, September information, see Nathan P. Jones, “Explaining the Slight Uptick in Violence in Tijuana,” Baker Institute, September 17,
2013, http://bakerinstitute.org/files/3825/.
742013. 122 Castillo and Spagat, “Mexico Arrests Leader.” 123 A “tollgate” cartel takes a fee for providing access to a trafficking route; the fee permits entry through an area under its control for the shipment of contraband and sometimes legal goods. Mexican political analyst Eduardo Guerrero-Gutiérrez of the Mexican firm Lantia Consulting defines a toll-collector cartel or DTO as one that derives much of the organization’s income from charging fees to other DTOs using its transportation points across the U.S.-Mexican border. 124 Justice in Mexico, “Remnants of Arellano-Félix Organization Attracting Renewed Interest in Baja California,” March 11, 2021, at https://justiceinmexico.org/remnants-afo-baja-california/. 125 Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, P.L. 106-120. At the same time, President Barack Obama identified Congressional Research Service 24 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Castillo and Spagat, “Mexico Arrests Leader.”
75 Christopher Woody, “Mexico Is Settling into a Violent Status Quo,” Houston Chronicle, March 21, 2017.
76 Sandra Dibble, “New Group Fuels Tijuana’s Increased Drug Violence,” San Diego Union-Tribune, February 13,
2016; Christopher Woody, “Tijuana’s Record Body Count Is a Sign That Cartel Warfare Is Returning to Mexico,”
Business Insider, December 15, 2016.
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Sinaloa DTO
Sinaloa, described as Mexico’s oldest and most established DTO, is comprised of a network of
smaller organizations. In April 2009, President Barack Obama designated the notorious Sinaloa
Cartel as a drug kingpin entity pursuant to the Kingpin Act.77 Frequently regarded as the most Frequently regarded as the most
powerful drug trafficking syndicate in the Western Hemisphere, the Sinaloa Cartel was an powerful drug trafficking syndicate in the Western Hemisphere, the Sinaloa Cartel was an
expansive network at its apex: Sinaloa leaders successfully corrupted public officials from the
local to the national level inside Mexico and abroad to operate in some 50 countries. Traditionally
one of Mexico’s most prominent organizations, each of its major leaders was designated a
kingpin in the early 2000s. At the top of the hierarchy was El Chapo Guzmán, listed in 2001;
Ismael Zambada García (“El Mayo”), listed in 2002; and Juan José “El Azul” Esparragoza
Moreno, listed in 2003.
By some estimates, Sinaloa had grown to control 40%-60% of Mexico’s drug trade by 2012 and
had annual earnings calculated to be as high as $3 billion.78 The Sinaloa Cartel has long been
identified by the DEA as the primary trafficker of drugs to the United States.79expansive network at its apex. By some estimates, Sinaloa had grown to control 40%-60% of Mexico’s drug trade by 2012 and had annual earnings estimated to be as high as $3 billion.126 DEA has long identified the Sinaloa Cartel as the primary trafficker of drugs to the United States. In 2020, DEA estimated the Sinaloa Cartel, active in 15 of 32 Mexican states, remained the Mexican crime organization with the largest international footprint.127 Sinaloa leaders successfully corrupted public officials from the local to the national level inside Mexico.128 The cartel’s operations spanned more than 50 countries, according to several analysts and journalists.129 The corruption of top officials—especially in Mexico but also in Central America and Colombia—is the modus operandi of Sinaloa, which arguably was disinclined toward violence initially in favor of bribery to avoid greater state repression.130 In 2008, a In 2008, a
federation dominated by the Sinaloa Cartel (which included the Beltrán Leyva Organization and federation dominated by the Sinaloa Cartel (which included the Beltrán Leyva Organization and
the Juárez the Juárez DTOCartel) broke apart, leading to a battle among the former partners that sparked) broke apart, leading to a battle among the former partners that sparked one of the most the most
violent violent period periods in recent Mexican history.in recent Mexican history.
Since its 2009 kingpin designation of Sinaloa, the The United States has attempted to dismantle United States has attempted to dismantle
Sinaloa’s operations by targeting individuals and financial entities Sinaloa’s operations by targeting individuals and financial entities alliedassociated with the cartel since its designation as a kingpin in 2009. with the cartel. For
example, in August 2017, the U.S. Department of Treasury, sanctioned the Flores DTO and its
leader, Raúl Flores Hernández, as kingpins.80
The Sinaloa Cartel’s The Sinaloa Cartel’s longtime most visiblemost visible longtime leader, El Chapo Guzmán, escaped twice from leader, El Chapo Guzmán, escaped twice from
Mexican prisonsMexican prisons —in 2001 and again in 2015. The in 2001 and again in 2015. The second escape in July 2015—after re-arrestJuly 2015 escape, after his rearrest the the
year prior, was a major embarrassment to the Peña Nieto administration, and that incident may year prior, was a major embarrassment to the Peña Nieto administration, and that incident may
have convinced the Mexican government to extradite have convinced the Mexican government to extradite the alleged kingpinGuzmán rather than try him in rather than try him in
Mexico after his recapture.
In January 2017, the Mexican government extradited Guzmán to the United States. He was
indicted in New York District’s federal court in Brooklyn and tried for four months from
November 2018 to February 2019. His lawyers maintained he was not the head of the Sinaloa
enterprise.81 Nevertheless, he was convicted by a federal jury in February 2019 and sentenced by
a U.S. district judge in July 2019 to a life term in prison, with the addition of 30 years, and
ordered to pay $12.6 billion in forfeiture for being the principal leader of the Sinaloa Cartel and
for 26 drug-related charges, including a murder conspiracy.82

77 At the same time, the President identified two other Mexican DTOs as KingpinsMexico after his recapture. After Guzmán’s trusted deputy El Azul Esparragoza Moreno died (unconfirmed) in 2014, El Mayo Zambada continued his leadership role, at least for a major faction.131 However, Sinaloa may operate with a more horizontal leadership structure than previously thought. Some observers dispute the extent to which Guzmán made key strategic decisions for Sinaloa. They contend that El Chapo was a figurehead whose arrest had little impact on Sinaloa’s functioning, as he had ceded operational tasks to El Mayo and Esparragoza long before his arrest.132 two other Mexican DTOs as kingpins: La Familia Michoacana and Los : La Familia Michoacana and Los
Zetas. The Zetas. The Kingpinkingpin designation is one of two major programs by the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposing designation is one of two major programs by the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposing
sanctions on drug traffickers. Congress enacted the program sanctioning individuals and entities globally in 1999. sanctions on drug traffickers. Congress enacted the program sanctioning individuals and entities globally in 1999.
78 From 2012 on126 For several years, cartel leader El Chapo Guzmán was ranked in , cartel leader El Chapo Guzmán was ranked in Forbes Magazine’s listing of self-made billionaires. ’s listing of self-made billionaires.
79 “Profile: Sinaloa Cartel,” InSight Crime, January 8, 2016.
80 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Longtime Mexican Drug Kingpin Raul Flores Hernandez and
His Vast Network: OFAC Kingpin Act Action Targets 22 Mexican Nations and 43 Entities in Mexico,” press release,
August 9, 2017.
81 Alan Feuer, “El Chapo May Not Have Been Leader of Drug Cartel, Lawyers Say,” New York Times, June 26, 2018.
82 DEA, “Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán, Sinaloa Cartel Leader, Sentenced to Life in Prison Plus 30 Years,” press
release, July 17, 2019.
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After Guzmán’s trusted deputy El Azul Esparragoza Moreno was reported to have died in 2014,
the head of the Sinaloa DTO was assumed to be Guzmán’s partner, Ismael Zambada García, alias
“El Mayo,” who is thought to continue in that leadership role.83 Sinaloa may operate with a more
horizontal leadership structure than previously thought.84Patrick Radden Keefe, “Cocaine Incorporated,” New York Times, June 15, 2012; Patrick Radden Keefe, “The Hunt for El Chapo,” New Yorker, April 28, 2014. 127 DEA, NDTA 2020. 128 Patrick Radden Keefe, “Cocaine Incorporated,” New York Times, June 15, 2012, at https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/how-a-mexican-drug-cartel-makes-its-billions.html. 129 InSight Crime, “Sinaloa Cartel,” last updated May 4, 2021; Cecilia Anesi and Giulio Rubino, “Inside the Sinaloa Cartel’s Move Toward Europe,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, December 15, 2020. 130 See, for example, description of the Sinaloa Cartel in Reynell Badillo and Victor J. Mijares, “Politicized Crime: Causes for the Discursive Politicisation of Organized Crime in Latin America,” Global Crime, vol. 22, no. 4 (2021), pp. 312-335. 131 Kyra Gurney, “Sinaloa Cartel Leader ‘El Azul’ Dead? ‘El Mayo’ Now in Control?,” InSight Crime, June 9, 2014. Juan José Esparragoza Moreno supposedly died of a heart attack while recovering from injuries sustained in a car accident. 132 Sinaloa operatives control certain Sinaloa operatives control certain
territories, making up a decentralized network of bossesterritories, making up a decentralized network of bosses who conduct who conduct business and violence
illicit activities through alliances with each other and local gangs. Local gangs throughout the region specialize in through alliances with each other and local gangs. Local gangs throughout the region specialize in
specific specific operations and are thenservices for which they are they contracted by the Sinaloa contracted by the Sinaloa DTO network.85 The shape of the cartel
in the current criminal landscape is evolving, however, as Sinaloa’s rivals eye a formidable drug
empire built on the proceeds from trafficking South American cocaine and locally sourced
methamphetamine, marijuana, and heroin to the U.S. market.
The Sinaloa Cartel has appeared under a certain amount of pressure thus far in 2020. Some
analysts warn that Sinaloa remains powerful given its dominance internationally and its
infiltration of the upper reaches of the Mexican government. Other analysts maintain that Sinaloa
is in decline, citing its breakup into factions and violence from inter- and intra-organizational
tensions. The CJNG has evidently battled against its former partner, Sinaloa, in a number of
regions and has been deemed by several authorities to be Mexico’s new most expansive cartel.
Friction between the two factions of the Sinaloa organization intensified in May and June 2020,
with violent infighting between a faction led by El Chapo’s children (criminal network. Excélsior, “Revelan Estructura y Enemigos de ‘El Chapo’,” March 26, 2014; Bailey, “Drug Trafficking Organizations,” p. 119. Congressional Research Service 25 link to page 14 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations In January 2017, the Mexican government extradited Guzmán to the United States. He was indicted in New York’s Eastern District Federal Court in Brooklyn and tried from November 2018 to February 2019. His lawyers maintained he was not the head of the Sinaloa enterprise.133 Nevertheless, a federal jury convicted him in February 2019 on 26 drug-related charges, including a murder conspiracy charge.134 A U.S. district judge in July 2019 sentenced him to a life term in prison, with the addition of 30 years, and ordered him to pay $12.6 billion in forfeiture.135 Since El Chapo’s most recent imprisonment, the Sinaloa Cartel reportedly has broken into four key factions. One is led by El Mayo; another by the brother of El Chapo, Aurelio “El Guano” Guzmán Loera; a third by a cofounder of the founding mega-syndicate, the Guadalajara Cartel; and a fourth by El Chapo’s four sons, known collectively as “Los Chapitos.”136 In October 2019, Mexican security forces seized a son of Guzmán, until the Sinaloa Cartel quickly reacted with overwhelming force that brought chaos to Sinaloa State’s capital, Culiacán. This reaction prompted police and military authorities (based on high-level governmental direction) to release him. The Sinaloa Cartel appeared to face many challenges in 2020 and 2021. Sinaloa’s rivals inside and outside the group saw a formidable drug empire built on the proceeds from trafficking South American cocaine and smuggling methamphetamine, marijuana, fentanyl, and heroin into the United States, and they arguably sought to supersede the once-hegemonic criminal syndicate. Some analysts have warned that Sinaloa remains powerful given its dominance internationally, its infiltration of the upper reaches of the Mexican government, and its resilient “networked alliance” structure.137 Other analysts maintain that Sinaloa is in decline, citing its breakup into battling factions and its conflict with CJNG. Numerous authorities consider CJNG to be the most expansive cartel (although not necessarily the most powerful) inside Mexico (see Figure 3).138 Friction between two factions—Los Chapitos and the faction under El Mayo—was intense during 2021.139 The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned El Mayo in December 2021, and the State Department announced a reward of up to $15 million for information leading to his arrest or conviction. El Chapo’s sons also are sanctioned as specially designated narcotics traffickers and are indicted on federal drug charges; the State Department has offered a reward of up to $5 million for each son.140 DEA estimated in the 2020 NDTA that the Sinaloa Cartel demonstrated the greatest capacity to manufacture fentanyl in hidden laboratories; therefore, DEA estimates it is a major driver of fentanyl trafficked to the United States. 133 Alan Feuer, “El Chapo May Not Have Been Leader of Drug Cartel, Lawyers Say,” New York Times, June 26, 2018. 134 DEA, “Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán, Sinaloa Cartel Leader, Sentenced to Life in Prison Plus 30 Years,” press release, July 17, 2019. 135 Ibid. 136 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “How the Sinaloa Cartel Rules,” Mexico Today, April 4, 2022. 137 For more background on alliance structure analysis, see, Jones et al., Dark Network Alliance Structure. 138 See also, InSight Crime, “Territorial Presence of the CJNG,” May 2020; Victoria Dittmar, “Why the Jalisco Cartel Does Not Dominate Mexico’s Criminal Landscape,” June 11, 2020. Published prior to CJNG’s activities during the COVID-19 pandemic, this article may not capture CJNG’s present status. 139 See, for instance, ‘The Fuse Is Already Lit’: Officials Expect Full-Blown War to Replace Aging Sinaloa Cartel Kingpin ‘El Mayo,’” Mexico Daily News, December 30, 2021; Sinaloa Cartel, Profile Update, InSight Crime, May 4, 2021. 140 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Uses New Sanctions Authority to Combat Global Illicit Drug Trade,” press release, December 15, 2021. Congressional Research Service 26 link to page 20 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Juárez/Carrillo Fuentes Organization Based in the border city of Ciudad Juárez in the central northern state of Chihuahua, the once-powerful Juárez Cartel controlled the smuggling corridor between Ciudad Juárez and El Paso, Texas, in the 1980s and 1990s.141 By some accounts, the Juárez Cartel controlled at least half of all Mexican narcotics trafficking under the leadership of its founder, Amado Carrillo Fuentes. Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, Amado’s brother, took over the leadership of the cartel when Amado died during plastic surgery in 1997 and reportedly led the Juárez organization until his arrest in October 2014. In 2008, the Juárez Cartel broke from the Sinaloa federation, with which it had been allied since 2002.142 The ensuing rivalry between the Juárez and Sinaloa Cartels helped turn Ciudad Juárez into one of the most violent cities in the world. Reportedly, of Mexicansknown collectively as “Los
Chapitos”) and those aligned with a faction under El Mayo.86
Juárez/Carrillo Fuentes Organization
Based in the border city of Ciudad Juárez in the central northern state of Chihuahua, the once-
powerful Juárez DTO controlled the smuggling corridor between Ciudad Juárez and El Paso, TX,
in the 1980s and 1990s.87 By some accounts, the Juárez DTO controlled at least half of all
Mexican narcotics trafficking under the leadership of its founder, Amado Carrillo Fuentes.
Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, Amado’s brother, took over the leadership of the cartel when Amado
died during plastic surgery in 1997 and reportedly led the Juárez organization until his arrest in
October 2014.
In 2008, the Juárez DTO broke from the Sinaloa federation, with which it had been allied since
2002.88 The ensuing rivalry between the Juárez DTO and the Sinaloa DTO helped to turn Ciudad
Juárez into one of the most violent cities in the world. From 2008 to 2011, the Sinaloa DTO and
the Juárez DTO fought a “turf war,” and Ciudad Juárez experienced a wave of violence with

83 Kyra Gurney, “Sinaloa Cartel Leader ‘El Azul’ Dead? ‘El Mayo’ Now in Control?,” InSight Crime, June 9, 2014.
Juan José Esparragoza Moreno supposedly died of a heart attack while recovering from injuries sustained in a car
accident.
84 Observers dispute the extent to which Guzmán made key strategic decisions for Sinaloa. Some maintain he was a
figurehead whose arrest had little impact on Sinaloa’s functioning, as he ceded operational tasks to “El Mayo” and
Esparragoza long before his arrest.
85 “Revelan Estructura y Enemigos de ‘El Chapo’,” Excélsior, March 26, 2014; Bailey, “Drug Trafficking
Organizations and Democratic Governance,” p. 119.
86 Parker Asmann, “Three Massacres Expose Weakness of Mexico’s ‘Catch-all’ Security Policy,” InSight Crime, July
9, 2019.
87 Bailey, “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Democratic Governance,” p. 121.
88 Some analysts trace the origins of the split to a personal feud between El Chapo Guzmán of the Sinaloa DTO and
former ally Vicente Carrillo Fuentes. In 2004, Guzmán allegedly ordered the killing of Rodolfo Carrillo Fuentes,
another of Vicente’s brothers. Guzmán’s son, Edgar, was killed in May 2008, allegedly on orders from Carrillo
Fuentes. See Alfredo Corchado, “Juárez Drug Violence Not Likely to Go Away Soon, Authorities Say,” Dallas
Morning News, May 17, 2010.
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spikes in homicides, extortion, kidnapping, and theft—at one point reportedly experiencing 10
murders a day.89 From 2008 to 2012, the violence in Juárez cost about 10,000 lives. Reportedly,
more than 15% of the population displaced by drug-related violence inside Mexico between 2006 displaced by drug-related violence inside Mexico between 2006
and 2010 came from the border city, even though it had only slightly more than 1% of Mexico’s
population.90and 2010, more than 10% came from Ciudad Juárez, which had less than 1% of Mexico’s population. As a result, the border city experienced a significant decline in its population due to individuals and families fleeing violence.143
Traditionally a major trafficker of both marijuana and cocaine, the Juárez Cartel Traditionally a major trafficker of both marijuana and cocaine, the Juárez Cartel became active inalso controlled
opium cultivation and heroin production, according to the DEA. Between 2012 and 2013, opium cultivation and heroin production, according to the DEA. Between 2012 and 2013,
violence dropped considerably, which some analysts attributed to both violence dropped considerably, which some analysts attributed to both thepolice actions and former actions of the police
and President Calderón’s socioeconomic program President Calderón’s socioeconomic program Todos Somos Juárez,, or We Are All Juárez.or We Are All Juárez.91
144 Some analysts Some analysts posit Sinaloa’s success in its battle over the Juárez DTO after 2012 abetted by
local authorities as the reason for theposited Sinaloa won its battle to dominate the city as a drug trafficking route, leading to its relatively peaceful and unchallenged control relatively peaceful and unchallenged control of the border
cityfor some years, despite the Juárez despite the Juárez DTOCartel’s continued presence in the ’s continued presence in the state.92 The El Paso and Juárez transit
routesurrounding state.145 However, the transit route between Ciudad Juárez and El Paso, TX, has experienced regular violence with the rise in killings on the Mexican side of the border experienced regular violence with the rise in killings on the Mexican side of the border
since 2016, however, largely thought to be a since 2016 (see Figure 4). Some observers consider the violence largely a proxy battle for control between Sinaloa and CJNG, whereas others contend the Juárez Cartel split and began fighting for its own control of Ciudad Juárez and the state of Chihuahua.146 Although not as expansive as other Mexican cartels, Juárez and its powerful affiliate, La Linea, retain wide influence in the border state of Chihuahua. 141 Bailey, “Drug Trafficking Organizations,” p. 121. 142 Some analysts trace the origins of the split to a personal feud between El Chapo Guzmán of the Sinaloa DTO and former ally Vicente Carrillo Fuentes. In 2004, Guzmán allegedly ordered the killing of Rodolfo Carrillo Fuentes, one of Vicente’s brothers. Guzmán’s son, Edgar, was killed in May 2008, allegedly on orders from Carrillo Fuentes. See Alfredo Corchado, “Juárez Drug Violence Not Likely to Go Away Soon, Authorities Say,” Dallas Morning News, May 17, 2010. 143battle for control between Sinaloa and CJNG and
through their proxies.93
Gulf DTO
Based in the border city of Matamoros, Tamaulipas, with operations in other Mexican states on
the Gulf side of Mexico, the Gulf DTO was a transnational smuggling operation with agents in
Central and South America.94 The Gulf DTO was the main competitor challenging Sinaloa for
trafficking routes in the early 2000s, but it now battles its former enforcement wing, Los Zetas,
over territory in northeastern Mexico. The Gulf DTO has reportedly split into several competing
gangs. Some analysts no longer consider it a whole entity and maintain that it is so fragmented
that factions of its original factions are fighting.95
The Gulf DTO arose in the bootlegging era of the 1920s. In the 1980s, its leader, Juan García
Ábrego, developed ties to Colombia’s Cali Cartel as well as to the Mexican federal police. García
Ábrego was captured in 1996 near Monterrey, Mexico.96 His violent successor, Osiel Cárdenas
Guillén, successfully corrupted elite Mexican military forces to become his hired assassins. Those
corrupted military personnel became known as Los Zetas when they fused with the Gulf Cartel.
In the early 2000s, Gulf was considered one of the most powerful Mexican DTOs. Cárdenas was

89 Steven Dudley, “Police Use Brute Force to Break Crime’s Hold on Juárez,” InSight Crime, February 13, 2013. Some
Mexican newspapers such as El Diario reported more than 300 homicides a month in 2010 when the violence peaked.
90 For an in-depth narrative of the conflict in Juárez and its aftermath, see Steven Dudley, “Juárez: After the War,” For an in-depth narrative of the conflict in Juárez and its aftermath, see Steven Dudley, “Juárez: After the War,”
InSight Crime, February 13, 2013. For a discussion of out-migration from the city due to drug-related violence, see , February 13, 2013. For a discussion of out-migration from the city due to drug-related violence, see
Viridiana Rios Contreras, “The Role of Drug-Related Violence and Extortion in Promoting Mexican Migration: Viridiana Rios Contreras, “The Role of Drug-Related Violence and Extortion in Promoting Mexican Migration:
Unexpected Consequences of a Drug War,” Unexpected Consequences of a Drug War,” Latin America Research Review, vol. 49, no. 3 (2014). , vol. 49, no. 3 (2014).
91144 Calderón launched Calderón launched Todos Somos Juárez and sent the Mexican military into Ciudad Juárez in an effort to drive out and sent the Mexican military into Ciudad Juárez in an effort to drive out
DTO proxies and operatives. “Calderón Defiende la Estrategia en Ciudad Juárez en Publicación de Harvard,” DTO proxies and operatives. “Calderón Defiende la Estrategia en Ciudad Juárez en Publicación de Harvard,” CNN
Mexico, February 17, 2013., February 17, 2013. See also CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative
and Beyond, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea.
92 145 See Steven Dudley, “How Juárez’s Police, Politicians Picked Winners of Drug War,” See Steven Dudley, “How Juárez’s Police, Politicians Picked Winners of Drug War,” InSight Crime, February 13, , February 13,
2013. 2013.
93 Daniel Borunda, “Mexican Army Again to Patrol Juárez; Military to Increase Presence After Surge in Violence
Across Chihuahua,” El Paso Times, May 14, 2018.
94 Bailey, “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Democratic Governance,” p. 120.
95 Scott Stewart, “Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2018,” Stratfor Worldview, February 1, 2018.
96 Steven Dudley and Sandra Rodríguez, Civil Society, the Government and the Development of Citizen Security,
Wilson Center Mexico Institute, Working Paper, August 2013, p. 11.
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arrested by Mexican authorities in 2003, but146 Associated Press, “El Chapo’s Sons vs. ‘El Mencho’: Mexico Sees Rising Cartel Bloodshed,” March 19, 2020. See also Victoria Dittmar, “The Three Criminal Fronts Sparking Violence in Sonora, Mexico,” InSight Crime, January 7, 2022. Congressional Research Service 27 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations This position on the border facilitates drug smuggling of heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana from Ciudad Juárez to El Paso, according to the 2020 NDTA.147 Gulf Cartel Based in the border city of Matamoros, Tamaulipas, with operations in other Mexican states on the Gulf side of Mexico, the Gulf Cartel was a transnational smuggling operation with agents in Central and South America.148 The Gulf Cartel was the main competitor challenging Sinaloa for trafficking routes in the early 2000s, but it now battles its former enforcement wing, Los Zetas, and Zeta Cartel splinter groups over territory in northeastern Mexico. The Gulf Cartel reportedly has split into several competing gangs. Some analysts no longer consider it a whole entity, and one argued in 2018 that it had become so fragmented that its original factions were fighting.149 Notorious Gulf Cartel leader Osiel Cárdenas Guillén reportedly corrupted the elite Mexican military forces known as Los Zetas to become his hired assassins. Gulf remained one of the most powerful Mexican DTOs until Mexican authorities arrested Cárdenas in 2003, though he continued to run his drug enterprise from prison he continued to run his drug enterprise from prison
until his extradition to the United States in 2007.until his extradition to the United States in 2007.97
150 Tensions between the Gulf Tensions between the Gulf DTOCartel and Los Zetas culminated in their split in 2010. Antonio “Tony and Los Zetas culminated in their split in 2010. Antonio “Tony
Tormenta” Cárdenas Guillén, Osiel’s brother, was killed that year, and leadership of the Gulf Tormenta” Cárdenas Guillén, Osiel’s brother, was killed that year, and leadership of the Gulf
Cartel went to went to anothera high-level Gulf lieutenant, Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sánchez, also known as “El high-level Gulf lieutenant, Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sánchez, also known as “El
Coss,” until his arrest in 2012Coss,” until his arrest in 2012. Exactly what instigated the Zetas and Gulf split has not been
determined, but the growing strength of the paramilitary group and its leader was a factor. Some
analysts say Los Zetas blamed the Gulf DTO for the murder of a Zeta close to their leader, which
sparked the rift.98 Others posit that the split happened earlier, but the Zetas organization that had
brought both military discipline and sophisticated firepower to cartel combat was clearly acting
independently by 2010. .
Mexican federal forces identified and targeted a dozen Gulf and Zeta bosses they believed Mexican federal forces identified and targeted a dozen Gulf and Zeta bosses they believed
responsible for the wave of violence in Tamaulipas in 2014.responsible for the wave of violence in Tamaulipas in 2014.99 Analysts have reported151 An analyst said in 2014 that the that the
structures of both the Gulf structures of both the Gulf DTOCartel and Los Zetas and Los Zetas have beenwere decimated by decimated by the federal action,federal action and combat
between each other, and both groups now operate largely as fragmented cells that do not do not
communicate with each othercommunicate with each other, and and often take on new names.take on new names.100152
From 2014 through 2016, Tamaulipas state reported daily kidnappings, daytime shootings, and From 2014 through 2016, Tamaulipas state reported daily kidnappings, daytime shootings, and
burnedburned -down bars and restaurants in towns and cities in many parts of the state, such as the port down bars and restaurants in towns and cities in many parts of the state, such as the port
city of Tampico. city of Tampico. Like Los Zetas, fragmentedFragmented cells of the Gulf cells of the Gulf DTOCartel and of Los Zetas have expanded into other have expanded into other
criminal operations, such as fuel theft, kidnapping, and widespread extortion. In the criminal operations, such as fuel theft, kidnapping, and widespread extortion. In the 20192020 NDTA, NDTA,
the DEA the DEA maintainsmaintained that the Gulf Cartel, which that the Gulf Cartel, which has been around for several decades, traditionally traditionally
focused on the cocaine and marijuana trade but focused on the cocaine and marijuana trade but has expanded intonow specializes in heroin and heroin and methamphetamine,
and it smuggles a majority of its drug shipments into South Texas.101
Los Zetas
This group originally consisted of former elite airborne special force members of the Mexican
army who defected to the Gulf DTO and became its hired assassins.102 Although Zeta members
are part of a prominent transnational DTO, their main asset is not drug smuggling but organized
violence. They evolved from the armed wing of the Gulf Cartel to an outfit in their own right that
amassed significant power to carry out an extractive business model, thus generating revenue
from crimes such as fuel theft, extortion, human smuggling, piracy, and kidnapping, which are

97 George W. Grayson, Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers,
2010).
98 Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez, “El Dominio del Miedo,” Nexos, July 1, 2014. Suspecting the Gulf DTO of the death of
Sergio Mendoza, the founder of Los Zetas, Heriberto “El Lazco” Lazcano reportedly offered a 24-hour amnesty period
for Gulf operatives to claim responsibility, which they never did. This event, some scholars maintain, was the origin of
the split between the groups.
99cocaine, has its “power base” in Tamaulipas and the central state of Zacatecas, and may have alliances in some states with CJNG.153 Factional fights continue, however, and the Mexican Army continues its efforts to take out Gulf leaders.154 147 2020 NDTA, March 2021. 148 Bailey, “Drug Trafficking Organizations,” p. 120. 149 Scott Stewart, “Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2018,” Stratfor Worldview, February 1, 2018. 150 George W. Grayson, Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2010). 151 Jorge Monroy, “Caen Tres Lideres de Los Zetas y Cartel de Golfo,” Jorge Monroy, “Caen Tres Lideres de Los Zetas y Cartel de Golfo,” El Economista, June 18, 2014. In June 2014, , June 18, 2014. In June 2014,
Mexican marines captured three of those identified. Mexican marines captured three of those identified.
100 Interview152 CRS interview with Eduardo Guerrero, June 2014. “Balkanization,” or decentralization of the structure of the with Eduardo Guerrero, June 2014. “Balkanization,” or decentralization of the structure of the
organization, does not necessarily indicate that a criminal group is weak but simply organization, does not necessarily indicate that a criminal group is weak but simply that itindicates that the group lacks a strong central lacks a strong central
leadership. leadership. Also, news outlets inside Tamaulipas remain some ofReportedly, Tamaulipas news outlets became among the most threatened by DTO cells, so they the most threatened by DTO cells, so they are
were reluctant to report on criminal violencereluctant to report on criminal violence, its sources, and its consequences. and its consequences.
101 DEA, 2019153 2020 NDTA, March 2021. 154 Santiago Caicedo, “State Police: Mexican Gulf Cartel Leader among those Killed in Deadly Matamoros Shooting,” KRGV, Channel 5 News, October 23, 2021. Congressional Research Service 28 NDTA.
102 Most reports indicate that Los Zetas were created by a group of 30 lieutenants and sublieutenants who deserted from
the Mexican military’s Special Mobile Force Group (Grupos Aeromóviles de Fuerzas Especiales, GAFES) to join the
Gulf Cartel in the late 1990s.
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widely seen to inflict more suffering on the Mexican public than does transnational drug
trafficking.103
Los Zetas had a significant presence in several Mexican states on the Gulf (eastern) Los Zetas and Cartel del Noreste Los Zetas originally consisted of about 30 former elite airborne special forces members of the Mexican army who defected to the Gulf Cartel and became its hired assassins.155 Although Zeta members are part of a prominent transnational criminal syndicate, their main skillset is not drug smuggling but organized violence. They evolved to form an organization of their own lucrative illicit activities such as fuel theft, extortion, human smuggling, piracy, arms smuggling, and kidnapping.156 Los Zetas held a significant presence in several Mexican states on the Gulf side of the side of the
country and extended their reach to Ciudad Juárez (Chihuahua) and some Pacific statescountry and extended their reach to Ciudad Juárez (Chihuahua) and some Pacific states in the beginning years of the second decade of the 2000s. They . They
also also operateoperated in Central and South America. More aggressive than other groups, Los Zetas in Central and South America. More aggressive than other groups, Los Zetas used
intimidation as a strategy to maintain control of territory, making use of social media and public
displays of bodies and body parts to send messages to frightenmaintained control of territory by publicly displaying and posting on social media mutilated bodies to intimidate Mexican security forces, the local Mexican security forces, the local
citizenry, and rival organizations. Sometimes smaller gangs and organizations use the “Zeta” citizenry, and rival organizations. Sometimes smaller gangs and organizations use the “Zeta”
name name or brand to tap into the benefits of the Zeta reputationto tap into the benefits of the Zeta reputation or “brand.”
.157 Unlike many other Unlike many other DTOsTCOs in Mexico, Los Zetas have , Los Zetas have beenappeared less inclined to attempt to win less inclined to attempt to win support of local
populations oflocal populations’ support in the territory in which they operate. They are linked to a number of massacres, such the territory in which they operate. They are linked to a number of massacres, such
as the 2011 firebombing of a casino in Monterrey that killed 53 people and the 2011 torture and as the 2011 firebombing of a casino in Monterrey that killed 53 people and the 2011 torture and
mass execution of 193 migrants who were traveling through northern Mexico by bus.mass execution of 193 migrants who were traveling through northern Mexico by bus.104158 Los Zetas Los Zetas
are known to kill those who cannot pay extortion fees or who refuse to work for them, often are known to kill those who cannot pay extortion fees or who refuse to work for them, often
targeting migrants.targeting migrants.105159
In 2012, Mexican marines killed longtime Zeta leader Heriberto Lazcano (alias “El Lazca”), In 2012, Mexican marines killed longtime Zeta leader Heriberto Lazcano (alias “El Lazca”), one
of the foundersa cofounder of Los Zetas, in a shootout in the northern state of Coahuila. of Los Zetas, in a shootout in the northern state of Coahuila.106160 The capture of his The capture of his
successor, Miguel Ángel Treviño Morales (alias “Z-40”), successor, Miguel Ángel Treviño Morales (alias “Z-40”), notorious for his brutality, in 2013 by in 2013 by
Mexican federal authorities was a second blow to the group. Some analysts date the beginning of Mexican federal authorities was a second blow to the group. Some analysts date the beginning of
the “loss of coherence” of Los ZetasLos Zetas’ loss of coherence as a single cartel to Lazcano’s killing. According to Mexico’s former attorney to Lazcano’s killing. According to Mexico’s former attorney
general, federal government efforts against the cartels through April 2015 hit Los Zetas general, federal government efforts against the cartels through April 2015 hit Los Zetas the
hardest, with more than 30 of their leaders removed.107particularly hard, removing more than 30 leaders.161
Los Zetas are known for their Los Zetas are known for their diversification and expansion into otherdominance in various criminal activities, such as criminal activities, such as
fuel theft, extortion, kidnapping, human smuggling, and arms trafficking. According to media
coverage, losses by Pemex, Mexico’s state oil company, from siphoned off oil in recent years
have exceeded $3 billion. In 2017, the Atlantic Council released a report estimating that Los
Zetas controls about 40% of the market in stolen oil. Los Zetas have resisted government attempts
to curtail their sophisticated networks.108
Although many observers dispute the scope of the territory now held by major Los Zetas factions
and how that fragmentation influenced the formerly cohesive group’s prospects, most concur that
the organization is no longer as powerful as it was during the peak of its dominance in 2011 and
2012. Two rival factions are Cartel del Noreste (CDN), a re-branded version of the traditional
core of Los Zetas, and the Old School Zetas, known by their Spanish acronym EV. One scholar
has characterized how Los Zetas succeeded in spinning off powerful franchises or cells after

103 Bailey, “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Democratic Governance,” p. 120; interview with Alejandro Hope,
Wilson Center, July 2014.
104fuel smuggling. They siphoned off billions of dollars of oil annually from Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), Mexico’s state oil company.162 In 2017, the Atlantic Council released a report estimating that Los 155 Ioan Grillo, El Narco: Inside Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2011), pp. 96-98. 156 Bailey, “Drug Trafficking Organizations,” p. 120; CRS interview with Alejandro Hope, July 2014. 157 George Grayson, George Grayson, The Evolution of Los Zetas in Mexico and Central America: Sadism as an Instrument of Cartel
Warfare (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2014), p. 9. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2014), p. 9.
105158 Ibid. 159 According to Grayson According to Grayson’s book, Los Zetas , Los Zetas are alsoalso are believed to kill members of law enforcement officials’ families in revenge believed to kill members of law enforcement officials’ families in revenge
for action taken against the organization, reportedly even targeting families of fallen military men. for action taken against the organization, reportedly even targeting families of fallen military men.
106160 Will Grant, “Heriberto Lazcano: The Fall of a Mexican Drug Lord,” Will Grant, “Heriberto Lazcano: The Fall of a Mexican Drug Lord,” BBC News, October 13, 2012. , October 13, 2012.
107161 Southernpulse.info, “Los Zetas Are the Criminal Organization Hardest Hit by the Mexican Government,” “Los Zetas Are the Criminal Organization Hardest Hit by the Mexican Government,” Southernpulse.info, May 13,
2015.
108 Michael Lohmuller, “Will Pemex’s Plan to Fight Mexico Oil Thieves Work?,” InSight Crime, February 18, 2015;
Ian M. Ralby, Downstream Oil Theft: Global Modalities, Trends, and Remedies, Atlantic Council, January 2017May 13, 2015. 162 Reuters, “Mexico Fuel Theft Crackdown Sparks Shortages, Puts Government on Defensive,” January 7, 2019. .
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leadership decapitation.109 According to the 2019 NDTA, Los Zetas Zetas controlled about 40% of the market in stolen oil.163 By early 2018, oil theft was costing the government oil company more than $1.6 billion annually.164 One author reviewed the history of Los Zetas and its split into major factions.165 This evolution influenced the organization’s once-coherent prospects, so that its power declined from the peak of its dominance in 2011 and 2012.166 A prominent faction is Cartel del Noreste (Northeast Cartel), a rebranded version of the traditional core of Los Zetas. One scholar characterized how Los Zetas as succeeding in spinning off powerful franchises or cells after leadership decapitation.167 According to the 2020 NDTA, Los Zetas and Cartel del Noreste continue to traffic a range of continue to traffic a range of
drugs, including heroin and cocaine, through distribution hubs in Laredo, Dallas, and New drugs, including heroin and cocaine, through distribution hubs in Laredo, Dallas, and New
Orleans.Orleans.168 According to one analyst, the Zetas “model” of extreme violence to achieve dominance continues to be widely emulated.169 Press reports in March 2022 indicated that gunfire in Nuevo Laredo resulted from the arrest of a Cartel del Noreste leader, and that during the violence U.S. consulate buildings were hit.170
Beltrán Leyva Organization
Before 2008, the Beltrán Leyva Organization (BLO) was part of the Sinaloa federation and Before 2008, the Beltrán Leyva Organization (BLO) was part of the Sinaloa federation and
controlled access to the U.S. border in Mexico’s Sonora controlled access to the U.S. border in Mexico’s Sonora stateState. The Beltrán Leyva brothers . The Beltrán Leyva brothers
developed close ties with Sinaloa head El Chapo Guzmán and his family, along with other developed close ties with Sinaloa head El Chapo Guzmán and his family, along with other
Sinaloa-based top leadership. The January 2008 arrest of BLO’s leader, Alfredo Beltrán Leyva, Sinaloa-based top leadership. The January 2008 arrest of BLO’s leader, Alfredo Beltrán Leyva,
through intelligence reportedly provided by Guzmánthrough intelligence reportedly provided by Guzmán, triggered BLO’s split from the Sinaloa triggered BLO’s split from the Sinaloa
DTO.110Cartel.171 The two organizations have remained bitter rivals since. The two organizations have remained bitter rivals since.
The organizationBLO suffered a series of setbacks at the hands of the Mexican security forces, suffered a series of setbacks at the hands of the Mexican security forces,
beginning with the 2009 killing of Arturo Beltrán Leyva, followed closely by the arrest of Carlos beginning with the 2009 killing of Arturo Beltrán Leyva, followed closely by the arrest of Carlos
Beltrán Levya. In 2010, the organization broke up when the remaining brother, Héctor Beltrán Beltrán Levya. In 2010, the organization broke up when the remaining brother, Héctor Beltrán
Leyva, took the remnants of BLO and rebranded it as the South Pacific (Leyva, took the remnants of BLO and rebranded it as the South Pacific (Pacifico Sur) Cartel. ) Cartel.
Another top lieutenant, Edgar “La Barbie” Valdez Villarreal, took a faction loyal to him and Another top lieutenant, Edgar “La Barbie” Valdez Villarreal, took a faction loyal to him and
formed the Independent Cartel of Acapulco, which he led until his arrest in 2010.formed the Independent Cartel of Acapulco, which he led until his arrest in 2010.111172 The South The South
Pacific Cartel appeared to retake the name Beltrán Leyva Organization and achieved renewed
prominence under Hector Beltrán Leyva’s leadership, until his arrest in 2014.
Splinter organizations have arisen since 2010, such as the Guerreros Unidos and Los Rojos,
among at least five others with roots in BLO. Los Rojos operates in Guerrero and relies heavily
on kidnapping and extortion for revenue as well as trafficking cocaine, although analysts dispute
the scope of its involvement in the drug trade.112 The Guerreros Unidos traffics cocaine as far
north as Chicago in the United States and reportedly operates primarily in the central and Pacific
states of Guerrero, México, and Morelos. The Guerreros Unidos, according to authorities in the
Peña Nieto government, murdered 43 Mexican teacher trainees, who were handed to them by
local authorities in Guerrero, and then burned their bodies.113
Like other DTOs, the BLO was believed to have infiltrated the upper levels of the Mexican
government for at least part of its history, but whatever reach it once had has likely declined
significantly after Mexican authorities arrested many of its leaders. According to the 2019 NDTA,

109 See, for example, Guadaulpe Correa-Cabrera, Los Zetas Inc.: Criminal Corporations, Energy, and Civil War in
Mexico (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2017).
110Pacific Cartel 163 Ian M. Ralby, Downstream Oil Theft: Global Modalities, Trends, and Remedies, Atlantic Council, January 2017. 164 Markets Insider, “Mexico’s Drug Cartels Are Stealing Oil Again,” July 17, 2021. 165 Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, Los Zetas Inc.: Criminal Corporations, Energy, and Civil War in Mexico (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2017). 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid. 168 DEA, NDTA 2020. 169 Steven Dudley, “The Zetas’ Model of Organized Crime is Leaving Mexico in Ruins,” InSight Crime, August 30, 2021. 170 Associated Press, “Mexican Border Shootings Close US Crossing After Capo Arrest,” March 15, 2022. 171 See See InSight Crime profile, “Beltrán Leyva Organization.” The profile suggests that Guzmán gave authorities profile, “Beltrán Leyva Organization.” The profile suggests that Guzmán gave authorities
information on Alfredo Beltrán Leyva to secure information on Alfredo Beltrán Leyva to secure the release of Guzmán’s sonGuzmán’s son’s release from prison. from prison.
111172 Edgar Valdez is an American-born smuggler from Laredo, TX, and allegedly started his career in the United States Edgar Valdez is an American-born smuggler from Laredo, TX, and allegedly started his career in the United States
dealing marijuana. His nickname is “La Barbie” due to his fair hair and eyes. Nicholas Casey and José de Córdoba, dealing marijuana. His nickname is “La Barbie” due to his fair hair and eyes. Nicholas Casey and José de Córdoba,
“Alleged Drug Kingpin Is Arrested in Mexico,” “Alleged Drug Kingpin Is Arrested in Mexico,” Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2010. La Barbie, a former Beltrán , August 31, 2010. La Barbie, a former Beltrán
Leyva Organization Leyva Organization (BLO) operative and Sinaloa Cartel ally, was arrested in Mexico in 2010 and operative and Sinaloa Cartel ally, was arrested in Mexico in 2010 and laterwas extradited to the extradited to the
United States in 2015. After United States in 2015. After originallyinitially pleading not guilty, he eventually reached a plea deal with U.S. prosecutors and pleading not guilty, he eventually reached a plea deal with U.S. prosecutors and
in June 2018 was sentenced to nearly 50 years in prison. Parker Asmann, “Was Mexico Cartel Enforcer ‘La Barbie’ a in June 2018 was sentenced to nearly 50 years in prison. Parker Asmann, “Was Mexico Cartel Enforcer ‘La Barbie’ a
U.S. Informant?U.S. Informant?,” ” InSight Crime, June 15, 2020, Crime, June 15, 2020, at https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/mexico-la-barbie-https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/mexico-la-barbie-
informant/.
112 Marguerite Cawley, “Murder Spike in Guerrero, Mexico Points to Criminal Power Struggle,” InSight Crime, May
30, 2014; “Mexico Nabs Drug Gang Leader in State of Guerrero,” Associated Press, May 17, 2014.
113 According to the profile of Guerreros Unidos on the InSight Crime website, an alleged leader of the group is the
brother-in-law of the former mayor of Iguala.
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theinformant/. Congressional Research Service 30 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations appeared to retake the name Beltrán Leyva Organization and achieved renewed prominence under Hector Beltrán Leyva’s leadership until his arrest in 2014. BLO splinter organizations have arisen since 2010, such as the Guerreros Unidos and Los Rojos (see Los Rojos section, below), among at least five others with roots in BLO. The Guerreros Unidos traffics cocaine as far north as Chicago but reportedly operates primarily in the central and Pacific states of Guerrero, México, and Morelos. The Guerreros Unidos, according to authorities in the Peña Nieto government, murdered 43 Mexican teacher trainees in Ayotzinapa, who were handed to them by local authorities in Guerrero, and then burned their bodies.173 Like other TCOs, BLO was believed to have infiltrated the upper levels of the Mexican government for at least part of its history, but whatever reach it once had likely declined significantly after Mexican authorities arrested many of its leaders. According to the NDTA published annually by DEA, BLO splinter factions rely on loose alliances with the CJNG, the Juárez Cartel, and elements BLO splinter factions rely on loose alliances with the CJNG, the Juárez Cartel, and elements
of Los Zetas to move drugs across the border.of Los Zetas to move drugs across the border.114 Those drugs include heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana.174
La Familia Michoacana
Based originally in the Pacific state of Michoacán, La Familia Michoacana (LFM) traces its roots Based originally in the Pacific state of Michoacán, La Familia Michoacana (LFM) traces its roots
back to the 1980s. Formerly aligned with Los Zetas before the groupto the 1980s. Formerly aligned with Los Zetas before the group’s split from the Gulf split from the Gulf DTO,
Cartel, LFM announced its intent to operate independently from Los Zetas in 2006, declaring that LFM’s LFM announced its intent to operate independently from Los Zetas in 2006, declaring that LFM’s
mission was to protect Michoacán from drug traffickers, including its new enemies, Los Zetas.mission was to protect Michoacán from drug traffickers, including its new enemies, Los Zetas.115175
From 2006 to 2010, LFM acquired notoriety for its use of extreme, symbolic violence, military From 2006 to 2010, LFM acquired notoriety for its use of extreme, symbolic violence, military
tactics gleaned from Los Zetastactics gleaned from Los Zetas, and a pseudo-ideological or religious justification for its and a pseudo-ideological or religious justification for its
existence.existence.116176 LFM members reportedly LFM members reportedly made donations ofdonated food, medical care, schools, and other food, medical care, schools, and other
social services to benefit the poor in rural communities to project a populist “Robin Hood” image. social services to benefit the poor in rural communities to project a populist “Robin Hood” image.
InBy 2010, however, LFM played a less prominent role 2010, however, LFM played a less prominent role, and in. In November 2010, LFM reportedly November 2010, LFM reportedly
called for a truce with the Mexican government and announced it would disband.called for a truce with the Mexican government and announced it would disband.117177 A month A month
later, spiritual leader and later, spiritual leader and co-foundercofounder Nazario “El Más Loco” Moreno González was reportedly Nazario “El Más Loco” Moreno González was reportedly
killed, although authorities claimedkilled, although authorities claimed that his body was stolen. his body was stolen.118178 The body was never recovered, The body was never recovered,
and Moreno González reappeared in another shootout with Mexican federal police in 2014, after and Moreno González reappeared in another shootout with Mexican federal police in 2014, after
which his death was officially confirmed.which his death was officially confirmed.119179 Moreno González had been nurturing the Moreno González had been nurturing the
development of a new criminal organization that emerged in early 2011, calling itself the Knights development of a new criminal organization that emerged in early 2011, calling itself the Knights
Templar and claiming to be a successor Templar and claiming to be a successor or offshoot of LFM.120
Though “officially” disbanded, LFM remained in operation, even after the 2011 arrest of leader
José de Jesús Méndez Vargas (alias “El Chango”), who allegedly took over after Moreno
González’s disappearance.121 Though largely fragmented, remaining cells of LFM are still active
in trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion in Guerrero and Mexico states, especially in the
working-class suburbs around Mexico City through 2014.122 Observers report that LFM had been
largely driven out of Michoacán by the Knights Templar, although a group calling itself the New
Family Michoacan, La Nueva Familia Michoacana, has been reported to be active in parts of
Guerrero and Michoacán. As a DTO, LFM has specialized in methamphetamine production and
smuggling, along with some trafficking of other synthetic drugs. It has also been known to traffic
marijuana and cocaine and to tax and regulate the production of heroin.

114 DEA, 2019 NDTA.
115of LFM.180 173 According to the profile of Guerreros Unidos on the InSight Crime website, an alleged leader of the group is the brother-in-law of the former mayor of Iguala, the town where the 43 students disappeared in 2014 and likely died. 174 2020 NDTA, March 2021. 175 Nexos, Alejandro Suverza, “El Evangelio Según La Familia,” Alejandro Suverza, “El Evangelio Según La Familia,” Nexos, January 1, 2009. For more on its early history, see January 1, 2009. For more on its early history, see
InSight Crime’s profile on La Familia Michoacana (LFM). ’s profile on La Familia Michoacana (LFM).
116176 In 2006, LFM gained notoriety when it rolled five severed heads allegedly of rival criminals across a discotheque In 2006, LFM gained notoriety when it rolled five severed heads allegedly of rival criminals across a discotheque
dance floor in Uruapan. dance floor in Uruapan. La Familia MichoacanaLFM was known for leaving signs ( was known for leaving signs (“narcomantas”narcomantas) on corpses and at crime ) on corpses and at crime
scenes that referred to LFM actions as “divine justice.” William Finnegan, “Silver or Lead,” scenes that referred to LFM actions as “divine justice.” William Finnegan, “Silver or Lead,” New Yorker, May 31, , May 31,
2010. 2010.
117 177 Stratfor Worldview, “Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date,” “Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date,” Stratfor Worldview, December 20, 2010. December 20, 2010.
118178 Dudley Althaus, “Ghost of ‘The Craziest One’ Is Alive in Mexico,” Dudley Althaus, “Ghost of ‘The Craziest One’ Is Alive in Mexico,” InSight Crime, June 11, 2013. , June 11, 2013.
119179 Mark Stevenson and E. Eduardo Castillo, “Mexico Cartel Leader Thrived by Playing Dead,” Associated Press, Mark Stevenson and E. Eduardo Castillo, “Mexico Cartel Leader Thrived by Playing Dead,” Associated Press,
March 10, 2014. March 10, 2014.
120180 The Knights Templar was purported to be founded and led by Servando “La Tuta” Gómez, a former The Knights Templar was purported to be founded and led by Servando “La Tuta” Gómez, a former school teacherschoolteacher
and a lieutenant to Moreno Gonzáles. However, after Moreno González’s faked demise, taking advantage of his death and a lieutenant to Moreno Gonzáles. However, after Moreno González’s faked demise, taking advantage of his death
in the eyes of Mexican authorities, Moreno González and Gómez founded the Knights Templar together in the wake of in the eyes of Mexican authorities, Moreno González and Gómez founded the Knights Templar together in the wake of
a dispute with LFM leader José de Jesús Méndez Vargas, who stayed on with the LFM. See Falko A. Ernst, “Seeking a
Place in History—Nazario Moreno’s Narco Messiah,” InSight Crime, March 13, 2014.
121 Adriana Gómez Licón, “Mexico Nabs Leader of Cult-Like La Familia Cartel,” Associated Press, June 21, 2011.
122 CRS interview with Dudley Althaus, June 2014.
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25 Congressional Research Service 31 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Though officially disbanded, LFM remained in operation, even after the 2011 arrest of leader José de Jesús Méndez Vargas (alias “El Chango”), who allegedly took over after Moreno González’s disappearance.181 Remaining cells of LFM reportedly remain active in trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion in Guerrero and Mexico States, especially in the working-class suburbs around Mexico City.182 Observers report that LFM was largely driven out of Michoacán by the Knights Templar, although a group calling itself the New Family Michoacán (La Nueva Familia Michoacana) reportedly has been active in parts of Guerrero and Michoacán. LFM has specialized in methamphetamine production and smuggling, along with some trafficking of other synthetic drugs. It has also been known to traffic marijuana and cocaine and to tax and regulate heroin production. DEA maintains that, in some cases, LFM has developed ties to the CJNG. According to a study of alliances in the current Mexican crime landscape conducted by Rice University’s Baker Institute for Policy Studies, LFM derivative groups and others of the Tierra Caliente region have alliances with either of the center poles of the two major TCOs, CJNG or Sinaloa, which the study described as dense and complex.183 Los Rojos As noted above, Los Rojos split from the Beltran Leyva Organization in 2010. Los Rojos has operated primarily in Guerrero and has relied heavily on kidnapping and extortion for revenue as well as trafficking cocaine, although some analysts have disputed the scope of its drug trade involvement. In early 2022, a Mexican judge handed down a 48-year sentence to eight Los Rojos gang members for kidnapping and forced disappearances (breaking laws regarding burials and exhumations).184 DEA maintains that Los Rojos operates in Guerrero, Morelos, and other Mexican states. Although this cartel is identified as a major TCO in DEA’s annual NDTA published in March 2021, some analysts contend it is not a significant drug trafficking organization. Cártel Jalisco Nuevo Generación Originally known as the Zeta Killers, the CJNG made its first appearance in 2011 with a roadside display of the bodies of 35 alleged members of Los Zetas. The group is based in Jalisco State with operations in central Mexico, including the states of Colima, Michoacán, México, Guerrero, and Guanajuato.185 It has grown into a dominant force in the states of the Tierra Caliente, including parts of Guerrero, Michoacán, and the state of Mexico. The CJNG has early roots in the Milenio Cartel, which was active before 2010 in the Tierra Caliente region.186 The CJNG reportedly served as an enforcement group for the Sinaloa cartel until the summer of 2013.187 Analysts and Mexican authorities have suggested the split between Sinaloa and the a dispute with LFM leader José de Jesús Méndez Vargas, who stayed with LFM. See Falko A. Ernst, “Seeking a Place in History—Nazario Moreno’s Narco Messiah,” InSight Crime, March 13, 2014. 181 Adriana Gómez Licón, “Mexico Nabs Leader of Cult-Like La Familia Cartel,” Associated Press, June 21, 2011. 182 CRS interview with Dudley Althaus, June 2014. 183 For more background, see Jones et al., Dark Network Alliance Structure. 184 Marguerite Cawley, “Murder Spike in Guerrero, Mexico Points to Criminal Power Struggle,” InSight Crime, May 30, 2014; Associated Press, “Mexico Nabs Drug Gang Leader in State of Guerrero,” May 17, 2014; “Judge Hands Out 48-Year Prison Term to 8 Members of Los Rojos Cartel,” February 22, 2022. 185 El Siglo de Torreón, “Se Pelean el Estado de México 4 Carteles,” March 2, 2014; CRS interview with Dudley Althaus, 2014. 186 Stratfor Worldview, “Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2017,” February 3, 2017. 187 Reportedly, the CJNG’s leadership was originally composed of former associates of slain Sinaloa DTO leader Congressional Research Service 32 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations CJNG is one of the many indications of a general fragmentation of crime groups in Mexico. The Mexican

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Knights Templar
The Knights Templar began as a splinter group from LFM, announcing its presence in Michoacán
in 2011. Similar to LFM, the Knights Templar began as a vigilante group, claiming to protect the
residents of Michoacán from other criminal groups, such as Los Zetas, but in reality it operated as
a DTO. The Knights Templar is known for the trafficking and manufacture of methamphetamine,
but the organization also moves cocaine and marijuana north. Like LFM, it preaches its own
version of evangelical Christianity and claims to have a commitment to “social justice” while
being the source of much of the insecurity in Michoacán and surrounding states.
Frustration with the perceived ineffectiveness of Mexican law enforcement in combating
predatory criminal groups led to the birth in Michoacán of “autodefensa” or self-defense
organizations, particularly in the Tierra Caliente region in the southwestern part of the state.
Composed of citizens from a wide range of backgrounds—farmers, ranchers, businessmen,
former DTO operatives, and others—the self-defense militias primarily targeted members of the
Knights Templar. Local business owners, who had grown weary of widespread extortion and
hyper-violent crime that was ignored by corrupt local and state police, provided seed funding to
resource the militias, but authorities cautioned that some of the self-defense groups had extended
their search for resources and weapons to competing crime syndicates, such as the CJNG. Despite
some analysts’ contention that ties to rival criminal groups are highly likely, other observers are
careful not to condemn the entire self-defense movement. They note some gains in the effort to
combat the Knights Templar when government security forces had been unsuccessful, although
conflict between self-defense groups has also led to violence.
The Knights Templar has reportedly emulated LFM’s penchant for diversification. The Knights
Templar battled the LFM, and by 2012 its control of Michoacán was nearly as widespread as
LFM’s had once been, especially by demanding that local businesses pay it tribute through hefty
levies. The Knights Templar also moved aggressively into illegal mining, such as mining iron ore
from illegally operated mines. Through mid-2014, the Knights Templar had reportedly been using
Mexico’s largest port, Lázaro Cárdenas, located in the southern tip of Michoacán, to smuggle
illicit goods.123 Analysts and Mexican officials, however, suggest that a 2014 federal occupation
of Lázaro Cárdenas resulted in an “impasse,” rendering DTOs unable to receive and send
shipments.124
The Mexican government and self-defense forces delivered heavy blows to the Knights Templar,
especially with the confirmed killing in March 2014 of Nazario Moreno González, who led the
Knights, and the killing of Enrique Plancarte, another top leader, weeks later.125 Previously, the
self-defense forces and the Knights Templar had reportedly split Michoacán roughly into two,
although other criminal organizations continued to operate successfully in the area. In February
2015, the Knights Templar DTO leader Servando “La Tuta” Gómez was captured. The former
schoolteacher had taken risks by being interviewed in the media. With La Tuta’s arrest, the
fortunes of the Knights Templar plummeted.

123 Reuters, “Mexico Seizes Tonnes of Minerals in Port Plagued by Drug Gangs,” March 3, 2014. The Knights Templar
shared control with the powerful Sinaloa DTO. Both groups reportedly received shipments of cocaine from South
America and precursor chemicals used to produce methamphetamines largely from Asia.
124 Interview with Eduardo Guerrero, July 2014.
125 Olga R. Rodriguez, “Mexican Marines Kill Templar Cartel’s Leader,” Associated Press, April 1, 2014.
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Cártel Jalisco Nuevo Generación
Originally known as the Zeta Killers, the CJNG made its first appearance in 2011 with a roadside
display of the bodies of 35 alleged members of Los Zetas. The group is based in Jalisco state with
operations in central Mexico, including the states of Colima, Michoacán, México State, Guerrero,
and Guanajuato.126 It has grown into a dominant force in the states of the Tierra Caliente,
including parts of Guerrero, Michoacán, and the state of Mexico. The CJNG has early roots in the
Milenio Cartel, which was active before 2010 in the Tierra Caliente region of southern Mexico.127
The CJNG reportedly served as an enforcement group for the Sinaloa DTO until the summer of
2013.128 Analysts and Mexican authorities have suggested that the split between Sinaloa and
CJNG is one of the many indications of a general fragmentation of crime groups. The Mexican
military delivered a blow to the CJNG with the July 2013 capture of its leader’s deputy, Victor military delivered a blow to the CJNG with the July 2013 capture of its leader’s deputy, Victor
Hugo “El Tornado” Delgado Renteria. He was replaced by the current leader, Nemesio Oseguera Hugo “El Tornado” Delgado Renteria. He was replaced by the current leader, Nemesio Oseguera
Cervantes, known as El Mencho. In January 2014, the Mexican government arrested Cervantes, known as El Mencho. In January 2014, the Mexican government arrested the leader’s
El Mencho’s son, Rubén “El Menchito” Oseguera, believed to be the CJNG’s second-in-command. However, son, Rubén “El Menchito” Oseguera, believed to be the CJNG’s second-in-command. However,
El Menchito, who was released by Mexican judges twice, was El Menchito, who was released by Mexican judges twice, was re-arrestedrearrested by Mexican authorities by Mexican authorities
and later extradited to the United States in February 2020.and later extradited to the United States in February 2020.129188
In 2015, the Mexican government declared the CJNG one of the most dangerous cartels in the In 2015, the Mexican government declared the CJNG one of the most dangerous cartels in the
country. In 2016, the U.S. Department of the Treasury echoed the Mexican government when it country. In 2016, the U.S. Department of the Treasury echoed the Mexican government when it
described the group as one of the world’s “most prolific and violent drug trafficking described the group as one of the world’s “most prolific and violent drug trafficking
organizations.”organizations.”130189 According to some analysts, the CJNG has operations throughout the Americas, According to some analysts, the CJNG has operations throughout the Americas,
Asia, and Europe. The group is allegedly responsible for distributing cocaine and Asia, and Europe. The group is allegedly responsible for distributing cocaine and
methamphetamine methamphetamine alongwith its significant international reach, which was described as early as 2016 as “10,000 kilometers of the Pacific coast in a route that extends from the “10,000 kilometers of the Pacific coast in a route that extends from the
Southern Cone to the border of the United States and Canada.”Southern Cone to the border of the United States and Canada.”131
To best understand the CJNG’s international reach, it is important to first consider its expansion
within190 The CJNG built its dominance internationally first through extending its presence through a rapid expansion inside Mexico. In 2016, many analysts maintained Mexico. In 2016, many analysts maintained thatthe CJNG controlled a territory equivalent to CJNG controlled a territory equivalent to
almost half of Mexico. The group has battled Los Zetas and Gulf Cartel factions in Tabasco, almost half of Mexico. The group has battled Los Zetas and Gulf Cartel factions in Tabasco,
Veracruz, and Guanajuato, Veracruz, and Guanajuato, and it has battledas well as the Sinaloa federation in the Baja the Sinaloa federation in the Baja peninsulasPeninsula and and
Chihuahua.Chihuahua.132191 The CJNG’s ambitious expansion campaign The CJNG’s ambitious expansion campaign has led towas characterized by high levels of violence, high levels of violence,
particularly in Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana.particularly in Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana.133 The group has also 192 The DTO also has been linked to several mass been linked to several mass
graves in southwestern Mexico and was responsible for shooting down a Mexican army graves in southwestern Mexico and was responsible for shooting down a Mexican army
helicopter in 2015, the first successful takedown of a military asset of its kind in Mexico.helicopter in 2015, the first successful takedown of a military asset of its kind in Mexico.134

126 “Se Pelean el Estado de México 4 Carteles,” El Siglo de Torreón, March 2, 2014; CRS interview with Dudley
Althaus, 2014.
127 “Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2017,” Stratfor Worldview, February 3, 2017.
128 Reportedly, CJNG’s leadership was originally composed of former associates of slain Sinaloa DTO leader Ignacio
193 The CJNG’s battle to dominate the key ports on both the Pacific and the Gulf Coasts have allowed it to consolidate important components of the global narcotics supply chain. In particular, the CJNG maintains reported control over the ports of Veracruz, Manzanillo, and Lázaro Cárdenas, which has given the group access to precursor chemicals that flow into Mexico from China and other parts of Latin America.194 As a result, according to some analysts, the CJNG has pursued an aggressive growth strategy underwritten by U.S. demand for Mexican methamphetamine, heroin, and fentanyl.195 According to reporting in 2022, the CJNG, whose base of operations is Jalisco State, “holds” the coastal tourist city of Puerto Vallarta, an important Ignacio “Nacho” Coronel, who operated his Sinaloa faction in Jalisco until he was killed by security forces in July 2010. “Nacho” Coronel, who operated his Sinaloa faction in Jalisco until he was killed by security forces in July 2010.
129 188 Juan Carlos Huerta Vázquez, “‘El Menchito’, un Desafío para la PGR,” Juan Carlos Huerta Vázquez, “‘El Menchito’, un Desafío para la PGR,” Proceso, January 15, 2016, January 15, 2016.
130; Andrew Denney, “’El Menchito,’ Son of Feared Mexican Drug Kingpin, Extradited to U.S.,” New York Post, February 1, 2020. 189 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Individuals Supporting Powerful Mexico-Based Drug U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Individuals Supporting Powerful Mexico-Based Drug
Cartels,” press release, October 27, 2016. Cartels,” press release, October 27, 2016.
131190 Luis Alonso Pérez, “Mexico’s Jalisco Cartel—New Generation: From Extinction to World Domination,” Luis Alonso Pérez, “Mexico’s Jalisco Cartel—New Generation: From Extinction to World Domination,” InSight
Crime andand Animal Político, December 26, 2016. , December 26, 2016.
132 191 Stratfor Worldview, “Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2017,” “Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2017,” Stratfor Worldview, February 3, 2017. February 3, 2017.
133192 Deborah Bonello, “After Decade-Long Drug War, Mexico Needs New Ideas,” Deborah Bonello, “After Decade-Long Drug War, Mexico Needs New Ideas,” InSight Crime 2016 GameChangers:
Tracking the Evolution of Organized Crime in the Americas, January 4, 2017, January 4, 2017 (hereinafter Bonello, “After Decade-Long Drug War”). 193.
134 Angel Rabasa et al., Angel Rabasa et al., Counterwork: Countering the Expansion of Transnational Criminal Networks, RAND , RAND
Corporation, 2017. Corporation, 2017.
194 Stratfor Worldview, “Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2017,” February 3, 2017. 195 Bonello, “After Decade-Long Drug War.” Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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The CJNG’s efforts to dominate key ports on both the Pacific and Gulf Coasts have allowed it to
consolidate important components of the global narcotics supply chain. In particularnode of its synthetic drug trafficking operations and source of revenues from extortion, money laundering, and human trafficking.196 In addition, the CJNG and other DTOs are frequently reported to be imposing “extortion rackets” on legal agricultural products, such as limes and avocados.197, the CJNG
asserts control over the ports of Veracruz, Mazanillo, and Lázaro Cárdenas, which has given the
group access to precursor chemicals that flow into Mexico from China and other parts of Latin
America.135 As a result, the CJNG has been able to pursue an aggressive growth strategy
underwritten by U.S. demand for Mexican methamphetamine, heroin, and fentanyl.136
Despite leadership losses, the CJNG has extended its geographic reach and maintained its own Despite leadership losses, the CJNG has extended its geographic reach and maintained its own
cohesion while exploiting the cohesion while exploiting the splinteringinfighting among factions of the Sinaloa organization. It is considered an of the Sinaloa organization. It is considered an
extremely powerful cartel, with a presence in 27 of 32 Mexican states in 2020. Its reputation for extremely powerful cartel, with a presence in 27 of 32 Mexican states in 2020. Its reputation for
extreme and intimidating violence continues. The extreme and intimidating violence continues. The previously described daylight ambush of Mexico Citydaylight ambush of Mexico City’s chief Chief of Police of
police Omar García Harfuch in late June 2020 was preceded by publicized threats that targeted Omar García Harfuch in late June 2020 was preceded by publicized threats that targeted
him and the Jalisco him and the Jalisco stateState governor governor, Enrique Alfaro..198 Press reports Press reports say the tally of indicate the CJNG’s attacks CJNG’s attacks
on Jalisco public officials on Jalisco public officials exceeds 100, including lawmakers, federal, state and local police,
soldiers, andexceeded 100 murders, with victims including lawmakers; federal, state, and local police; soldiers; and, allegedly, Jalisco’s minister of tourism. Jalisco’s minister of tourism. Notably, the DEA considersDEA considers the CJNG a top U.S. threat CJNG a top U.S. threat
and Mexico’s and Mexico’s most well-armed DTO andbest-armed criminal group. It has offered a $10 million reward for information has offered a $10 million reward for information
leading to the arrest of El Mencho, who is believed to be hiding in the mountains of Jalisco, leading to the arrest of El Mencho, who is believed to be hiding in the mountains of Jalisco,
Michoacán, and Colima. He is a former police officer who once served time for heroin trafficking Michoacán, and Colima. He is a former police officer who once served time for heroin trafficking
in California. in California. The CJNG was the target of a major DEA operation in March 2020CJNG was the target of a major DEA operation in March 2020 that, which resulted in some resulted in some
600 arrests.600 arrests.137199 While searching for El Mencho in late 2021, Mexican authorities arrested his wife, Rosalinda González Valencia; the arrest was presumed to be an indication of continued efforts to maintain pressure on the CJNG leader by the López Obrador government. She is under investigation for her role in money laundering.
Fragmentation, Competition, and Diversification
As stated earlier, DTOs todayTCOs are more fragmented and more competitive than in the past are more fragmented and more competitive than in the past.
However, analysts 10-20 years. Analysts disagree about the extent of disagree about the extent of thiscartel fragmentation fragmentation, its importance, and and about whether whether
the group of the smaller organizations will be easier to dismantle. smaller organizations will be easier to dismantle. FragmentationIn response to the Calderón government’s strong anti-drug efforts, fragmentation that began in 2010 that began in 2010
and accelerated in 2011 and accelerated in 2011 redefined the “battlefield” and brought new actorsbrought new actors into the criminal environment, such as Los Zetas and , such as Los Zetas and
the Knights Templarthe Knights Templar, to the fore. In. By 2018, an array of smaller organizations 2018, an array of smaller organizations werewas active, and some active, and some
of the once-small groups, such as the CJNG, of the once-small groups, such as the CJNG, enteredhad filled the the space left after other criminal groups had been disrupted by arrests, deaths, and internal dynamics. As noted above, several flagrant incidents of violence involving the DTOs in Sinaloa State, the Tierra Caliente region, and the Mexican border states (such as in late 2019) were committed by fragments of formerly cohesive criminal groups. Some gangs and small DTOs burn brightly for a few years and then disappear. The ephemeral lifespan of some DTOs can unsettle the power 196 Scott Mistler-Ferguson, “Booming Mexico Resort Town of Puerto Vallarta Is Hostage to CJNG,” InSight Crime, February 22, 2022. 197 Emily Green, “A Drug Cartel War Is Making Lime Prices Skyrocket,” VICE, January 31, 2022; Mark Stevenson, “Mexico’s Avocados Face Fallout from Violence, Deforestation,” Associated Press, February 16, 2022; María Luisa Paúl, “United States Lifts Mexican Avocado Ban—Averting What Could Have Been a Costly Crisis,” Washington Post, February 18, 2022. 198 Marco Fragoso, “Omar García Harfuch Revela que Sabía de su Atentado Meses Atrás,” 24 Horas, March 30, 2022, at https://www.24-horas.mx/2022/03/30/omar-garcia-harfuch-revela-que-sabia-de-su-atentado-meses-atras-2/. 199 Juan Montes and José de Córdoba, “Cartel Becomes Top Mexico Threat,” Wall Street Journal, July 9, 2020; Sieff, “Mexico’s Bold Jalisco Cartelspace left after other DTOs were
dismantled. Recently, some analysts have identified the CJNG as a cartel with national reach like
the Sinaloa DTO, although it was originally an allied faction or the armed wing of Sinaloa
organization.
A newer cartel, known as Los Cuinis, was also identified as a major organization in 2015. In April
2015, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s OFAC named both the CJNG and Los Cuinis as
Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act.
According to an OFAC statement, the Los Cuinis DTO has become “one of the most powerful
and violent drug cartels in Mexico.”138 Other analysts view the fragments as the cause of
heightened violence but note that groups appear less able to challenge the national government
and engage in some types of transnational crimes, including drug trafficking.
Contrary to the experience in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s, with the sequential dismantling
of the enormous Medellín and Cali cartels, fragmentation in Mexico has been associated with

135 “Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2017,” Stratfor Worldview, February 3, 2017.
136 Bonello, “After Decade-Long Drug War.”
137 Montes and Córdoba, “Cartel Becomes Top Mexico Threat.” Sieff, “Mexico’s Bold Jalisco Cartel Places Elite in Its
Sights.” See also U.S. Department of Justice, “DEA-Led Operation Nets More Than 600 Arrests Targeting Cártel .” See also U.S. Department of Justice, “DEA-Led Operation Nets More Than 600 Arrests Targeting Cártel
Jalisco Nueva Generación,” press release, March 11, 2020. Jalisco Nueva Generación,” press release, March 11, 2020.
138 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Business Network of the Los Cuinis Drug Trafficking
Organization,” press release, August 19, 2015.
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link to page 34 34 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations balance and equilibrium among remaining DTOs. These shifts reorder allegiances and influence the stability of the criminal environment. Some analysts contend that the diversification of the DTOs’ criminal repertoire, and their evolution into poly-crime outfits, may be evidence of organizational vitality and growth. Other analysts maintain that diversification signals that U.S. and Mexican drug enforcement measures are cutting into profits from drug trafficking, or that the diversification efforts are a response to shifting U.S. drug consumption patterns. Changes in the illegal drug markets in the United States and Canada from marijuana legalization; increased demand for opioids, especially synthetic opioids; and changing patterns of use of methamphetamine and other drugs have contributed to the DTOs’ continuing evolution.200 The cartels’ broad reach and control of large territories inside Mexico, as well as their production of illicit drugs, has been termed “alarming” by the U.S. State Department.201 Outlook Successive Mexican governments have soughtMexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations

resurging violence.139 A kingpin strategy implemented by the Mexican government has
incapacitated numerous top- and mid-level leaders in all the major DTOs either through arrest or
deaths in arrest efforts. However, this strategy contributed to violent succession struggles, shifting
alliances among the DTOs, a proliferation of new gangs and small DTOs, and the replacement of
existing leaders and criminal groups by even more violent ones.
The ephemeral prominence of some new gangs and DTOs, regional changes in the power balance
among different groups, and their shifting allegiances often catalyzed by government enforcement
actions make elusive an accurate portrait of the current criminal landscape. As noted earlier, in the
last months of 2019, almost all the investigations of flagrant incidents of violence involving the
DTOs in Sinaloa state, the Tierra Caliente region, and the Mexican border states were committed
by fragments of formerly cohesive criminal groups. Diversification of the DTOs and their
evolution into poly-crime outfits may be evidence of organizational vitality and growth. Others
contend that diversification signals that U.S. and Mexican drug enforcement measures are cutting
into profits from drug trafficking or constitutes a response to shifting U.S. drug consumption
patterns, such as legalization of marijuana in some states and Canada and a large increase in
demand for plant-based and synthetic opioids.140
Outlook
The goal of successive Mexican governments has been to diminish the extent and character of the to diminish the extent and character of the
DTOs’ activity from a national security threat to a law-and-order problemDTOs’ activity from a national security threat to a law-and-order problem and, once this is
achieved, to return responsibility for addressing this challenge from military forces back to the
police. Former President Peña Nieto did not succeed in a stated objective to reduce the scope of
the military’s role in domestic policing, and military enforcement activities led to serious
allegations of torture and human rights abuses. Current President López Obrador decided to
continue a militarized policing strategy. He reauthorized a continuation of Mexican armed forces
. If this is accomplished, domestic security enforcement responsibilities may be returned from the military to Mexican law enforcement. President López Obrador continued the militarized security strategy of the two Mexican administrations before him. He authorized the Mexican armed forces to continue their role in domestic law enforcement through the remainder of his tenure. The National Guardin domestic law enforcement through the remainder of his tenure. The National Guard he, which President López Obrador began began
deploying in July 2019 has had, thus far, fewer abuse allegations.141 The government of President
López Obrador continues to face DTO-related corruption charges against public officials,
politicians, and members of the nation’s police forces. As of mid-2020, President López
Obrador’s campaign pledges to carry out broader anti-corruption efforts have not been fully
implemented.142

139 In Colombia’s case, successfully targeting the huge and wealthy Medellín and Cali cartels and dismantling them
meant that a number of smaller DTOs (cartelitos) replaced them. The smaller organizations have not behaved as
violently as the larger cartels, and thus the Colombian government was seen to have reduced violence in the drug trade.
However, there were critical factors in Colombia that were not present in Mexico, such as the presence of guerrilla
insurgents and paramilitaries that became deeply involved in the illegal drug business. Some have argued that the
Colombian cartels of the 1980s and 1990s were structured and managed very differently than their contemporary
Mexican counterparts.
140 Morris Panner, “Latin American Organized Crime’s New Business Model,” ReVista, vol. 11, no. 2 (Winter 2012).
The author comments thatdeploying in mid-2019, has had fewer abuse allegations than the military under the prior Peña Nieto government, but the militarized strategy to combat the TCOs has not effectively weakened the crime groups.202 The continued revelation of high-level corruption linked to the crime groups and their apparent control of Mexican territory demonstrates that the TCOs are more deeply entrenched than ever. Moreover, in 2022, U.S.-Mexico law enforcement cooperation remains weaker than during the previous 15 years.203 The López Obrador government faces some allegations of DTO-related corruption of public officials, its party’s politicians, and members of the nation’s police forces. The growing diversity of cartel criminality, the continuing high global demands for narcotics, and weak cooperation between Mexican and U.S. law enforcement all point to a continued TCO threat to both the United States and Mexico. Despite DEA activities becoming more limited inside Mexico, the DEA has offered rewards of up to $45 million for information about the top leaders of the Sinaloa Cartel.204 On May 11-12, 2022, 200 Morris Panner, “Latin American Organized Crime’s New Business Model,” ReVista, vol. 11, no. 2 (winter 2012). The author comments, “the business is moving away from monolithic cartels toward a series of mercury-like mini- “the business is moving away from monolithic cartels toward a series of mercury-like mini-
cartels. Whether diversification is a growth strategy or a survival strategy in the face of shifting narcotics consumption cartels. Whether diversification is a growth strategy or a survival strategy in the face of shifting narcotics consumption
patterns, it is clear that organized crime is pursuing a larger, more extensive agenda.” patterns, it is clear that organized crime is pursuing a larger, more extensive agenda.”
141 Maureen Meyer, “Strengthening Security and Rule of Law in Mexico,” testimony before theU.S. Senate, et al., Commission on Combatting Synthetic Opioid Trafficking, Final Report, February 2022. 201 State Department, 2022 INCSR. 202 Testimony of Maureen Meyer, in U.S. Congress, House Committee of House Committee of
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade, Strengthening Security and Rule of Law in Mexico, hearings, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., January 15, 2020; Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Crime and Anti-Crime Policies in Mexico in 2022: A Bleak Outlook,” Brookings (blog), January 29, 2022. 203 Air Force General Glen D. VanHerck, Commander, U.S. Northern Command; Navy Admiral Craig S. Fuller, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, USNORTHCOM-USSOUTHCOM Joint Press Briefing, March 16, 2021; Mary Beth Sheridan, “The War Next Door: Conflict in Mexico is Displacing Thousands,” Washington Post, April 11, 2022. 204 Telemundo, “DEA Launches New Reward Campaign Targeting Cartel Leaders,” May 11, 2022. Congressional Research Service 35 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs traveled to Mexico to work with Mexican authorities to restore and strengthen joint efforts to reduce the flow of dangerous narcotics, including fentanyl, from Mexico and to improve border security.205 Many analysts have questioned the utility of the kingpin strategy, or a high-value targeting approach to enforcement, to combat the TCOs or reduce TCO-perpetrated violence.206 The kingpin strategy has often been encouraged by the U.S. government and has been adopted by Mexican officials in different administrations. López Obrador initially rejected (but then sporadically embraced) a kingpin strategy.207 Some analysts endorse a modified strategy that would target the middle operational layer of each major criminal group to handicap the groups’ regeneration capacity.208 Structural factors plaguingWestern Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade, January 15, 2020.
142 Calderón et al., Organized Crime; Gina Hinojosa and Maureen Meyer, The Future of Mexico’s National Anti-
Corruption System: The Anti-Corruption Fight under President López-Obrador, Washington Office on Latin America,
August 2019. For more background, see Appendix.
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As discussed in this report, the splintering of the large criminal organizations has led to increased
violence. What is apparent is that the demise of the traditional kingpins, envisioned as ruling their
cartel armies in a hierarchical fashion from a central position, has led to equally violent, smaller,
highly fractured groups.143 The central states of Jalisco, Colima, and Guanajuato, where criminal
markets were in flux, saw Mexico’s most intense violence during 2019 and into early 2020. Two
causes of the current violence may be the decline of Sinaloa Cartel’s dominance and the
heightened competition to profit from the increasing production and distribution of heroin and
synthetic opioids and methamphetamine. Some observers remain convinced of the capacity of
both the Sinaloa organization and its primary competitor, the expansive CJNG, using their well-
established bribery and corruption networks backed by violence, to retain significant power.
Many U.S. government officials and policymakers have deep concerns about the Mexican
government’s capacity to reduce violence in Mexico or curb the power of the DTOs. Many
analysts have viewed a continued reliance on the kingpin strategy, which they argue has not
lowered violence in a sustainable way, as problematic. Some analysts back a new strategy of
targeting the middle operational layer of each major criminal group to handicap the groups’
regeneration capacity.144 Other structural factors that plague Mexico’s struggle for security and Mexico’s struggle for security and
stability include very high criminal impunity and continued high demand for drugs from the
United States and Europe.

143 Patrick Corcoran, “Why Are More People Being Killed in Mexico in 2019?,” InSight Crime, August 8, 2019.
144 See, for example, Vanda Felbab-Brown, AMLO’s Security Policy: Creative Ideas, Tough Reality, Brookings
Institution, March 2019.
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Appendix. Drug Trafficking in Mexico and
Government Efforts to Combat the DTOs
DTOs have operated in Mexico for more than a century. The DTOs can be described as global
businesses with forward and backward linkages for managing supply and distribution of all
manner of narcotics in many countries. As businesses, their goal is to bring their product to
market in the most efficient way to maximize their profits.
Mexican DTOs are the major wholesalers of illegal drugs in the United States and are
increasingly gaining control of U.S. retail-level distribution through alliances with U.S. gangs.
Their operations, however, are markedly less violent in the United States than in Mexico, despite
their reported significant presence in many U.S. jurisdictions.
The DTOs use bribery and violence as complementary tactics. Violence is used to discipline
employees, enforce agreements, limit the entry of competitors, and coerce. Bribery and corruption
help to neutralize government action against the DTOs, ensure impunity, and facilitate smooth
operations. The proceeds of drug sales (either laundered or as cash smuggled back to Mexico) are
used in part to corrupt U.S. and Mexican border officials,145 Mexican law enforcement, security
forces, and public officials tend to either ignore DTO activities or to actively support and protect
the DTOs. Mexican DTOs advance their operations through widespread corruption. When
corruption fails to achieve cooperation and acquiescence, violence is the ready alternative.
stability include persistent criminal impunity, entrenched corruption, and consistent demand for illegal drugs by U.S. and European drug users. The demise of the traditional kingpins, who had long associations, often familial, and were understood to have ruled their cartel armies in a hierarchical fashion from a central position, has led to smaller, highly fractured, competitive, and often ultra-violent groups.209 Two causes of the current violence may be erosion of Sinaloa Cartel’s dominance and the heightened competition to profit from increasing production and distribution of heroin, synthetic opioids, and methamphetamine. Some observers remain convinced of the capacity of both the Sinaloa organization and its primary competitor, the CJNG, to retain significant power by backing their well-established bribery and corruption networks with their demonstrated capacity for violence.210 205 U.S. Department of State, “Assistant Secretary Robinson’s Travel to Mexico,” media note, May 10, 2022. 206 See Latin America Daily Briefing, “The Failures of the Kingpin Strategy in Mexico,” May 5, 2022; Calderón et al, Organized Crime and Violence, October 2021; Council on Foreign Relations, “Mexico’s Long War: Drugs, Crime, and the Cartels,” last updated February 26, 2021. 207 Mary Beth Sheridan, “Violent Criminal Groups Are Eroding Mexico’s Authority and Claiming More Territory,” Washington Post, October 29, 2020. 208 See, for example, Vanda Felbab-Brown, AMLO’s Security Policy: Creative Ideas, Tough Reality, Brookings Institution, March 2019. 209 Patrick Corcoran, “Why Are More People Being Killed in Mexico in 2019?,” InSight Crime, August 8, 2019. 210 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “How the Sinaloa Cartel Rules,” Mexico Today, April 4, 2022. Congressional Research Service 36 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Appendix. Government Efforts to Combat Drug Trafficking Organizations The relationship of Mexico’s drug traffickers to the government and to one another is rapidly The relationship of Mexico’s drug traffickers to the government and to one another is rapidly
evolving, and any snapshot (such as the one provided in this report) must be continually adjusted evolving, and any snapshot (such as the one provided in this report) must be continually adjusted
to current realities. In the early 20th century, Mexico was a source of marijuana and heroin to current realities. In the early 20th century, Mexico was a source of marijuana and heroin
trafficked to the United Statestrafficked to the United States, and; by the 1940s, Mexican drug smugglers were notorious in the by the 1940s, Mexican drug smugglers were notorious in the
United States. The growth and entrenchment in Mexico of drug trafficking networks occurred United States. The growth and entrenchment in Mexico of drug trafficking networks occurred
during a period of one-party rule during a period of one-party rule in Mexico by the PRIby the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which governed the country, which governed for 71 years. During that for 71 years. During that
period, the government was centralized and hierarchicalperiod, the government was centralized and hierarchical, and, to . To a large degree, a large degree, itthe PRI government tolerated and tolerated and
protected some drug production and trafficking in certain regions of the country, even though protected some drug production and trafficking in certain regions of the country, even though the
PRI governmentit did not generally tolerate crime. did not generally tolerate crime.146
Mexico is a long-time recipient of U.S. counterdrug assistance, but cooperation was limited
between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s due to U.S. distrust of Mexican officials and Mexican
sensitivity about U.S. involvement in the country’s internal affairs. Numerous accounts maintain
that for many years the Mexican government pursued an overall policy of accommodation of
DTOs. Under this system, arrests and eradication of drug crops took place, but due to the effect of
widespread corruption, the system was “characterized by a working relationship between
Mexican authorities and drug lords” through the 1990s.147
The system’s stability began to fray in the 1990s, as Mexican political power decentralized and
the push toward democratic pluralism began, first at the local level and then nationally with the
election of PAN candidate Vicente Fox as president in 2000.148 The process of democratization

145 For further discussion of corruption of U.S. and Mexican officials, see Loren Riesenfeld, “Mexico Cartels
Recruiting US Border Agents: Inspector General,” InSight Crime, April 16, 2015; CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican
Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea.
146 Luis Astorga and David A. Shirk, Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies, University of
California-San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, Working Paper 10-01, 2010, p. 5.
147 Francisco E. González, “Mexico’s Drug Wars Get Brutal,” Current History, February 2009.
148 Shannon O’Neil, “The Real War in Mexico: How Democracy Can Defeat the Drug Cartels,” Foreign Affairs, vol.
88, no. 4 (July/August 2009).
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211 Other transformations of the drug trade took place during the 1980s and early 1990s. As Colombian drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) were forcibly broken up, Mexican traffickers gradually took over the highly profitable traffic in cocaine to the United States. Intense U.S. government enforcement efforts led to the shutdown of the Caribbean trafficking route used by the Colombians. Colombian DTOs subcontracted the trafficking of Andean cocaine to the Mexican DTOs, which they paid in cocaine rather than cash. These already-strong Mexican organizations gradually took over the cocaine trafficking business, evolving from being couriers for the Colombians to being the wholesalers they are today. Numerous accounts maintain that for many years the Mexican government largely pursued a policy to accommodate the DTOs. Under this framework, arrests and eradication of drug crops took place, but with widespread corruption; a system “characterized by a working relationship between Mexican authorities and drug lords” prevailed through the 1990s.212 Mexico is a longtime recipient of U.S. counterdrug assistance, but cooperation was limited between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s due to U.S. distrust of Mexican officials and Mexican sensitivity about U.S. involvement in the country’s internal affairs. As Mexican political power decentralized and the push toward democratic pluralism began, the system’s stability started to fray in the 1990s, first at the local level and then nationally, with the election of National Action Party candidate Vicente Fox as president in 2000.213 The process of democratization upended the equilibrium that had developed between state actors (such as the Federal Security upended the equilibrium that had developed between state actors (such as the Federal Security
Directorate, which oversaw domestic security from 1947 to 1985) and organized crime. No Directorate, which oversaw domestic security from 1947 to 1985) and organized crime. No
longer were certain officials able to ensure longer were certain officials able to ensure the impunity of drug traffickersdrug traffickers’ impunity to the same degree to the same degree
and to regulate competition among Mexican DTOs for drug trafficking routesand to regulate competition among Mexican DTOs for drug trafficking routes, or plazas. To a . To a
large extent, DTO violence directed at the government appears to be an attempt to reestablish large extent, DTO violence directed at the government appears to be an attempt to reestablish
impunity, impunity, whilewhereas the inter-cartel violence seems to be an attempt to establish dominance over the inter-cartel violence seems to be an attempt to establish dominance over
specific drug trafficking specific drug trafficking plazasroutes. The intra-DTO violence (or violence inside the organizations) . The intra-DTO violence (or violence inside the organizations)
reflects a reflects a reaction to suspected betrayals and the competition to succeed killed or arrested leaders. 211 Luis Astorga and David A. Shirk, Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies, University of California-San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, working paper 10-01, 2010, p. 5. 212 Francisco E. González, “Mexico’s Drug Wars Get Brutal,” Current History, February 2009. 213 Shannon O’Neil, “The Real War in Mexico: How Democracy Can Defeat the Drug Cartels,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 88, no. 4 (July/August 2009). Congressional Research Service 37 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations As Mexico’s DTOs rose to dominate the U.S. drug markets in the 1990s, the business became even more lucrative. This shift raised the financial stakes, which encouraged the use of violence in Mexico to protect and promote market share. The violent struggles among DTOs is now over strategic routes and warehouses where drugs are consolidated before entering the United States, reflecting these higher stakes. The number of homicides and Mexico’s homicide rate began to grow substantially in 2007 and remain at elevated levels. In Mexico, the sharp rise in absolute numbers of deaths in the past 14 years is unprecedented, even compared with other Latin American countries with high rates of crime and homicides.214 This increase not reversed during the years of bilateral efforts under the Mérida Initiative, according to several observers.215 Former Mexican President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) initiatedreaction to suspected betrayals and the competition to succeed killed or arrested leaders.
Other transformations of the drug trade took place during the 1980s and early 1990s. As
Colombian DTOs were forcibly broken up, Mexican traffickers gradually took over the highly
profitable traffic in cocaine to the United States. Intense U.S. government enforcement efforts led
to the shutdown of the traditional trafficking route used by the Colombians through the
Caribbean. As Colombian DTOs lost this route, they increasingly subcontracted the trafficking of
cocaine produced in the Andean region to the Mexican DTOs, which they paid in cocaine rather
than cash. These already-strong Mexican organizations gradually took over the cocaine
trafficking business, evolving from being mere couriers of cocaine for the Colombians to being
the wholesalers they are today.
As Mexico’s DTOs rose to dominate the U.S. drug markets in the 1990s, the business became
even more lucrative. This shift raised the financial stakes, which encouraged the use of violence
in Mexico to protect and promote market share. The violent struggles among DTOs is now over
strategic routes and warehouses where drugs are consolidated before entering the United States,
reflecting these higher stakes.
Former President Calderón (2006-2012) made an aggressive campaign against criminal groups, an aggressive campaign against criminal groups,
especially the large DTOsespecially the large DTOs, the central focus of his administration’s policy. He. He made it a central administration policy that he sustained throughout his term in office. His government sent several sent several
thousand Mexican military troops and federal police to combat the organizations in thousand Mexican military troops and federal police to combat the organizations in drug
trafficking “hot spots” around the country. His government made some dramatic arrests, but few “hot spots” around the country. His government made some dramatic arrests, but few
of the captured kingpins were convicted. of the captured kingpins were convicted. Between 2007 and 2012, as part ofPresident Calderón and President Bush developed much closer U.S.- much closer U.S.-
Mexican security Mexican security cooperation, thecooperation and launched the Mérida Initiative, a bilateral anticrime assistance program, in 2008. The initiative initially focused on providing Mexico with hardware, such as planes, scanners, and other equipment, to combat the DTOs. The Mexican government significantly increased extraditions to the Mexican government significantly increased extraditions to the
United States, with a majority of the suspects wanted by the U.S. government on drug trafficking United States, with a majority of the suspects wanted by the U.S. government on drug trafficking
and related charges. The number of extraditions grew through 2012 and remained steady during and related charges. The number of extraditions grew through 2012 and remained steady during
PresidentPresident Enrique Peña Nieto’s term Peña Nieto’s term. (2012-2018). A consequence of the A consequence of the “militarized”militarized strategy used in successive strategy used in successive
Mexican administrations was an increase in accusations of human rights violations Mexican administrations was an increase in accusations of human rights violations againstby the the
Mexican military, which was largely untrained in domestic policing. Mexican military, which was largely untrained in domestic policing.
According to a press investigation of published Mexican government statistics, Mexican armed According to a press investigation of published Mexican government statistics, Mexican armed
forces injured or killed some 3,900 individuals in forces injured or killed some 3,900 individuals in their domestic domestic operations between 2007 and 2014. operations between 2007 and
2014, labeled by the military civilian aggressors.149 According to the report, the government data
did not explain the high death rate (about 500 were injuries and the rest killings) or specify which
of the military’s victims were armed and which were bystanders. (Significantly, the military’s Significantly, the military’s
role in injuries and killings ceased to be made public after 2014, according to the account.role in injuries and killings ceased to be made public after 2014, according to the account.150)
216 Few incidents of suspected police and security force torture are reported in Mexico (less than Few incidents of suspected police and security force torture are reported in Mexico (less than
10%), according to several estimates, in large part because of a belief that nothing will be done. 10%), according to several estimates, in large part because of a belief that nothing will be done.
Impunity for Impunity for Mexico’s military and police is likely to follow an established pattern of high levels of military and police is likely to follow an established pattern of high levels of
impunity for most impunity for most crimes. Peña Nieto pledged a new direction in his security policy, with a focus on reducing criminal violence that affected civilians and businesses rather than on removing the leaders of the large DTOs.217 Ultimately, that promise was not kept. Peña Nieto’s attorney general, Jesús Murillo Karam, said in 2012 that Mexico faced challenges from some 60-80 crime groups, a proliferation he attributed to his predecessor Calderón’s kingpin strategy.218 However, despite Peña Nieto’s 214 This finding appears in several annual reports from the University of San Diego’s Justice in Mexico program. 215 Mary Beth Sheridan, “Facing Stunning Levels of Deaths, U.S. and Mexico Revamp Strained Security Cooperation,” Washington Post, October 8, 2021. 216 Steve Fisher and Patrick J. McDonnell, “Mexico Sent in the Army to Fight the Drug War. Many Question the Toll on Society and the Army Itself,” Los Angeles Times, June 18, 2018. 217 The Peña Nieto government’s emphasis on crime prevention, which received significant attention early in his term, ended prematurely due to budget cutbacks. See, See CRS In Focus IF10578, U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: From the Mérida Initiative to the Bicentennial Framework, by Clare Ribando Seelke. 218 Patrick Corcoran, “Mexico Has 80 Drug Cartels: Attorney General,” InSight Crime, December 20, 2012. Congressional Research Service 38 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations pledge to alter his approach, continuity largely prevailed.crimes. Judicial and policing weaknesses have allowed about a 95% impunity

149 Steve Fisher and Patrick J. McDonnell, “Mexico Sent in the Army to Fight the Drug War. Many Question the Toll
on Society and the Army Itself,” Los Angeles Times, June 18, 2018.
150 Fisher and McDonnell, “Mexico Sent in the Army to Fight the Drug War.”
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level for the resolution of crimes on average. For decades, roughly 90% of crimes in Mexico have
gone unreported, while of those crimes that are reported only 4%-6% of the total reach conclusion
adequately.151
President Peña Nieto (2012-2018) pledged a new direction in his security policy to focus more on
reducing criminal violence that affects civilians and businesses and less on removing the leaders
of the large DTOs. Ultimately, that promise was not met. His attorney general, Jesús Murillo
Karam, said in 2012 that Mexico faced challenges from some 60-80 crime groups, a proliferation
he attributed to his predecessor Calderón’s kingpin strategy.152 However, despite Peña Nieto’s
pledge to alter his approach, analysts found considerable continuity between the strategies of
Calderón and Peña Nieto.153 The Peña Nieto government recentralized control over security and The Peña Nieto government recentralized control over security and
continued the strategy of taking down top drug kingpins, adopting Calderón’s list of top trafficker continued the strategy of taking down top drug kingpins, adopting Calderón’s list of top trafficker
targets, targets, updatedupdating it as needed. as needed. Significantly, the219 The resulting fragmentation resulting fragmentation hasappears to have continued to splinter continued to splinter
Mexico’s criminal groups with attendant violence and instability.Mexico’s criminal groups with attendant violence and instability.154220
Following some reorganization, Following some reorganization, President Peña Nieto continued Peña Nieto continued cooperationto cooperate with the United with the United
States under States under the Mérida Initiative the Mérida Initiative begun during President Calderón’s term. The Mérida Initiative,
a bilateral anticrime assistance program launched in 2008, initially focused on providing Mexico
with hardware, such as planes, scanners, and other equipment, to combat the DTOs. The Peña
Nieto government continued the Mérida programs. However, the focus on crime prevention, However, the focus on crime prevention,
which received significant attention early in which received significant attention early in hisPeña Nieto’s term, ended prematurely due to budget term, ended prematurely due to budget
cutbacks.cutbacks.155221
President Andrés Manuel López Obrador President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who took office in 2018, pledged to make Mexico a
more just and peaceful society and vowed to govern with austerity. López Obrador took office in 2018. He made broad made broad
promises to fight promises to fight corruption andcorruption, reduce violence, and promote socioeconomic programs.222 With the onset of economic and fiscal shocks due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, many observers questioned whether López Obrador’s social goals were attainable.223 He announced he would shift away from the Mérida Initiative and joined the Biden Administration in a new security approach, the Bicentennial Framework, which remains under development in 2022. Author Information June S. Beittel Analyst in Latin American Affairs Acknowledgments Research Librarian Carla Davis-Castro provided invaluable research for this report. 219 reduce violence, build infrastructure in southern Mexico, revive
the state oil company, and promote social programs.156 Given the oil price collapse in early 2020,
fiscal constraints, rising violence, and significant health effects and projected severe recession
linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, many observers question whether his goals are attainable.157
López Obrador launched a new presidential commission to coordinate the investigation of a high-
profile, unsolved case from 2014 in which a drug cartel allegedly murdered 43 youth in Guerrero
state. In June 2020, arrest warrants were issued for more than 40 municipal officials in Guerrero
after years of flawed investigations.158 President López Obrador has remained popular, although
his denial that homicide levels have continued to increase and his criticism of the press for not
providing more positive coverage have raised concerns. Some analysts question his commitment

151 María Novoa, “The Wheels of Justice in Mexico Are Failing. What Can Be Done?,” Americas Quarterly, July 9,
2020.
152 Patrick Corcoran, “Mexico Has 80 Drug Cartels: Attorney General,” In Sight Crime, December 20, 2012.
153 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Changing the Game or Dropping the Ball? Mexico’s Security and Anti-Crime Strategy Under
President Peña Nieto, Brookings Institution, November 2014. Velbab-Brown maintains that the government of Peña , Brookings Institution, November 2014. Velbab-Brown maintains that the government of Peña
Nieto “Nieto “has largely slipped into many of the same policies of President Felipe Calderón.” largely slipped into many of the same policies of President Felipe Calderón.”
154220 Scott Stewart, “Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2019,” Scott Stewart, “Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2019,” Stratfor WorldviewStratfor Worldview, January 29, 2019. , January 29, 2019.
155221 With the sharp oil price declines in 2014 onward, the administration was forced to impose budget austerity With the sharp oil price declines in 2014 onward, the administration was forced to impose budget austerity
measures, including on aspects of security. See CRS In Focus IF10578, measures, including on aspects of security. See CRS In Focus IF10578, Mexico: Evolution ofU.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: From the Mérida Initiative,
2007-2020 to the Bicentennial Framework, by Clare Ribando Seelke. , by Clare Ribando Seelke.
156 CRS In Focus IF10578, Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2020222 For more background, see CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations, by Clare Ribando Seelke, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
157 and Joshua Klein; Laura Weiss, “Can AMLO End Mexico’s Drug War?,” Laura Weiss, “Can AMLO End Mexico’s Drug War?,” World Politics Review, May 16, 2019, May 16, 2019; Arturo Angel,
“Mandan Fondo Anticrimen a COVID-19, pese al Aumento de Violencia y Depuración Policial Incompleta,” Animal
Político, April 14, 2020.
158 “New Arrest Warrants Issued in Case of Mexico’s Missing 43,” Associated Press, June 30, 2020.
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to combat corruption and to curb Mexico’s persistent organized-crime-related violence. During
his presidential campaign, López Obrador said he would consider unconventional approaches,
such as legalization of some drugs. However, several observers maintain that the administration
has not issued an effective or comprehensive security policy to combat the DTOs (beyond
measures to deter vulnerable youth from crime).159

Author Information

June S. Beittel

Analyst in Latin American Affairs


Acknowledgments
Research Librarian Carla Davis-Castro provided invaluable research for this report.
. 223 Nathaniel Parish Flannery, “Is Mexico’s López Obrador Latin America’s Newest Autocrat?,” Forbes, April 19, 2021; Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Crime and Anti-crime Policies in Mexico in 2022: A Bleak Outlook,” Mexico Today, January 21, 2022, at https://mexicotoday.com/2022/01/21/opinion-crime-anti-crime-policies-in-mexico-in-2022-a-bleak-outlook/; Ryan C. Berg, “The Bicentennial Framework for Security Cooperation: New Approach or Shuffling the Pillars of Mérida?, Center for Strategic & International Studies, October 29, 2021. Congressional Research Service 39 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations
Disclaimer
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159 For more on the President Lopéz Obrador’s evolving approach to security, see CRS Report R42917, Mexico:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
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