Emerging Military Technologies: Background 
July 17August 4, 2020 , 2020 
and Issues for Congress 
Kelley M. Sayler 
Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing 
Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing 
Analyst in Advanced 
Analyst in Advanced 
emerging military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with 
emerging military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with 
Technology and Global 
Technology and Global 
U.S. competitors. The U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to 
U.S. competitors. The U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to 
Security 
Security 
ensure its dominance in conflict and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, 
ensure its dominance in conflict and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, 
  
  
however, technology has both rapidly evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a 
however, technology has both rapidly evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a 
 
 
result of advances in the commercial sector. As former Secretary of Defense Chuck 
result of advances in the commercial sector. As former Secretary of Defense Chuck 
Hagel observed, this development has threatened to erode the United States’ traditional sources of military Hagel observed, this development has threatened to erode the United States’ traditional sources of military 
advantage. The Department of Defense (DOD) has undertaken a number of initiatives to arrest this trend. For advantage. The Department of Defense (DOD) has undertaken a number of initiatives to arrest this trend. For 
example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging technologies for example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging technologies for 
military and security purposes as well as associated strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation. In support of military and security purposes as well as associated strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation. In support of 
this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations focused on defense innovation, including the Defense this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations focused on defense innovation, including the Defense 
Innovation Unit and the Defense Wargaming Alignment Group.  Innovation Unit and the Defense Wargaming Alignment Group.  
More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy echoed the underpinnings of the Third Offset Strategy, noting 
More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy echoed the underpinnings of the Third Offset Strategy, noting 
that U.S. national security will likely be  that U.S. national security will likely be  
affected  by  rapid  technological  advancements  and  the  changing  character  of  war….  New  technologies 
affected  by  rapid  technological  advancements  and  the  changing  character  of  war….  New  technologies 
include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy, include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy, 
hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars 
of the future.  of the future.  
The United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies. However, China and Russia—key 
The United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies. However, China and Russia—key 
strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military technologies. As these strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military technologies. As these 
technologies are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, they could hold significant technologies are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, they could hold significant 
implications for the future of international security writ large, and will have to be a significant focus for Congress, implications for the future of international security writ large, and will have to be a significant focus for Congress, 
both in terms of funding and program oversight. both in terms of funding and program oversight. 
This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, China, and 
This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, China, and 
Russia: Russia: 
  artificial intelligence, 
  artificial intelligence, 
  lethal autonomous weapons,   lethal autonomous weapons, 
  hypersonic weapons,   hypersonic weapons, 
  directed energy weapons,   directed energy weapons, 
  biotechnology, and   biotechnology, and 
  quantum technology.   quantum technology. 
It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these technologies, 
It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these technologies, 
considers the potential implications of emerging military technologies for warfighting, and outlines associated considers the potential implications of emerging military technologies for warfighting, and outlines associated 
issues for Congress. These issues include the level and stability of funding for emerging technologies, the issues for Congress. These issues include the level and stability of funding for emerging technologies, the 
management structure for emerging technologies, the challenges associated with recruiting and retaining management structure for emerging technologies, the challenges associated with recruiting and retaining 
technology workers, the acquisitions process for rapidly evolving and dual-use technologies, the protection of technology workers, the acquisitions process for rapidly evolving and dual-use technologies, the protection of 
emerging technologies from theft and expropriation, and the governance and regulation of emerging technologies. emerging technologies from theft and expropriation, and the governance and regulation of emerging technologies. 
Such issues could hold implications for congressional authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making. Such issues could hold implications for congressional authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making. 
 
 
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Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress 
 
Contents 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) ............................................................................................................... 2 
United States ............................................................................................................................. 3 
China ......................................................................................................................................... 5 
Russia ........................................................................................................................................ 5 
International Institutions ........................................................................................................... 67 
Potential Questions for Congress .............................................................................................. 7 
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) ............................................................................... 7 
United States ............................................................................................................................. 8 
China ......................................................................................................................................... 9 
Russia ........................................................................................................................................ 9 
International Institutions ........................................................................................................... 9 10 
Potential Questions for Congress ............................................................................................ 10 
Hypersonic Weapons ..................................................................................................................... 10 
United States ............................................................................................................................ 11 
China ........................................................................................................................................ 11 12 
Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 1213 
International Institutions ......................................................................................................... 13 
Potential Questions for Congress ............................................................................................ 1314 
Directed-Energy (DE) Weapons .................................................................................................... 14 
United States ........................................................................................................................... 1415 
China ....................................................................................................................................... 16 
Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 16 
International Institutions ......................................................................................................... 16 
Potential Questions for Congress ............................................................................................ 1617 
Biotechnology ............................................................................................................................... 17 
United States ........................................................................................................................... 18 
China ....................................................................................................................................... 19 
Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 1920 
International Institutions ......................................................................................................... 20 
Potential Questions for Congress ............................................................................................ 2021 
Quantum Technology .................................................................................................................... 21 
United States ........................................................................................................................... 22 
China ....................................................................................................................................... 2223 
Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 23 
International Institutions ......................................................................................................... 2324 
Potential Questions for Congress ............................................................................................ 2324 
Potential Implications of Emerging Technologies for Warfighting ............................................... 2324 
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 2526 
Funding Considerations .......................................................................................................... 26 
Management ............................................................................................................................ 2627 
Personnel ................................................................................................................................. 27 
Acquisition .............................................................................................................................. 2728 
Intellectual Property .......................................................................................................... 2829 
Supply Chain Security ...................................................................................................... 29 
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3536  Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress 
 
Technology Protection............................................................................................................. 2930 
Governance and Regulation .................................................................................................... 30 
Oversight ................................................................................................................................. 3032 
 
 
Figures 
Figure 1. AI Failure in Image Recognition ...................................................................................... 3 
    
Contacts 
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 3132 
  
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Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress 
 
Introduction 
Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging 
military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The 
U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict 
and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly 
evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As 
former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has observed, this development has threatened to erode former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has observed, this development has threatened to erode 
the United States’ traditional sources of military advantage.1 The Department of Defense (DOD) the United States’ traditional sources of military advantage.1 The Department of Defense (DOD) 
has undertaken a number of initiatives in recent years in an effort to arrest this trend. For has undertaken a number of initiatives in recent years in an effort to arrest this trend. For 
example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging 
technologies for military and security purposes as well as associated strategies, tactics, and technologies for military and security purposes as well as associated strategies, tactics, and 
concepts of operation.2 In support of this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations concepts of operation.2 In support of this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations 
focused on defense innovation, including the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense focused on defense innovation, including the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense 
Wargaming Alignment Group.  Wargaming Alignment Group.  
More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy has echoed the underpinnings of the Third 
More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy has echoed the underpinnings of the Third 
Offset Strategy, noting that U.S. national security will likely be  Offset Strategy, noting that U.S. national security will likely be  
affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New 
affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New 
technologies  include  advanced  computing,  “big  data”  analytics,  artificial  intelligence, technologies  include  advanced  computing,  “big  data”  analytics,  artificial  intelligence, 
autonomy,  robotics,  directed  energy,  hypersonics,  and  biotechnology—the  very autonomy,  robotics,  directed  energy,  hypersonics,  and  biotechnology—the  very 
technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.3  technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.3  
Although the United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies, China and 
Although the United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies, China and 
Russia—key strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military Russia—key strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military 
technologies. As they are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, these technologies. As they are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, these 
technologies could hold significant implications for congressional considerations and the future technologies could hold significant implications for congressional considerations and the future 
of international security writ large. of international security writ large. 
This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, 
This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, 
China, and Russia: China, and Russia: 
  artificial intelligence, 
  artificial intelligence, 
  lethal autonomous weapons,   lethal autonomous weapons, 
  hypersonic weapons,   hypersonic weapons, 
  directed energy weapons,   directed energy weapons, 
  biotechnology,   biotechnology, 
  and quantum technology.   and quantum technology. 
It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these 
It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these 
technologies, considers the potential implications of emerging military technologies, and outlines technologies, considers the potential implications of emerging military technologies, and outlines 
                                                 
                                                 1 Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, “Defense Innovation Days 1 Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, “Defense Innovation Days 
Opening Keynote,” September 3, 2014, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605602/. Opening Keynote,” September 3, 2014, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605602/. 
2 The Third Offset Strategy is a strategy for maintaining U.S. military superiority. It succeeds the First and Second 
2 The Third Offset Strategy is a strategy for maintaining U.S. military superiority. It succeeds the First and Second 
Offsets—nuclear weapons and the precision-guided munitions regime, respectively. Remarks as prepared for delivery Offsets—nuclear weapons and the precision-guided munitions regime, respectively. Remarks as prepared for delivery 
by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, “National Defense University Convocation,” August 5, 2014, at by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, “National Defense University Convocation,” August 5, 2014, at 
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605598/.  https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605598/.  
3 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” 2018, p. 
3 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” 2018, p. 
3, at https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 3, at https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
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Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress 
 
associated issues for Congress. Such issues could hold implications for congressional 
associated issues for Congress. Such issues could hold implications for congressional 
authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making. authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making. 
Artificial Intelligence (AI)4  
Although the U.S. government has no official definition of artificial intelligence, policymakers Although the U.S. government has no official definition of artificial intelligence, policymakers 
generally use the term AI to refer to a computer system capable of human-level cognition. AI is generally use the term AI to refer to a computer system capable of human-level cognition. AI is 
further divided into two categories: narrow AI and general AI. Narrow AI systems can perform further divided into two categories: narrow AI and general AI. Narrow AI systems can perform 
only the specific task that they were trained to perform, while general AI systems would be only the specific task that they were trained to perform, while general AI systems would be 
capable of performing a broad range of tasks, including those for which they were not specifically capable of performing a broad range of tasks, including those for which they were not specifically 
trained. General AI systems do not yet—and may never—exist.5  trained. General AI systems do not yet—and may never—exist.5  
Narrow AI is currently being incorporated into a number of military applications by both the 
Narrow AI is currently being incorporated into a number of military applications by both the 
United States and its competitors. Such applications include but are not limited to intelligence, United States and its competitors. Such applications include but are not limited to intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance;6 logistics; cyber operations; command and control; and semi-surveillance, and reconnaissance;6 logistics; cyber operations; command and control; and semi-
autonomous and autonomous vehicles. These technologies are intended in part to augment or autonomous and autonomous vehicles. These technologies are intended in part to augment or 
replace human operators, freeing them to perform more complex and cognitively demanding replace human operators, freeing them to perform more complex and cognitively demanding 
work. In addition, AI-enabled systems could (1) react significantly faster than systems that rely on work. In addition, AI-enabled systems could (1) react significantly faster than systems that rely on 
operator input; (2) cope with an exponential increase in the amount of data available for analysis; operator input; (2) cope with an exponential increase in the amount of data available for analysis; 
and (3) enable new concepts of operations, such as swarming (i.e., cooperative behavior in which and (3) enable new concepts of operations, such as swarming (i.e., cooperative behavior in which 
unmanned vehicles autonomously coordinate to achieve a task) that could confer a warfighting unmanned vehicles autonomously coordinate to achieve a task) that could confer a warfighting 
advantage by overwhelming adversary defensive systems. advantage by overwhelming adversary defensive systems. 
Narrow AI, however, could introduce a number of challenges. For example, such systems may be 
Narrow AI, however, could introduce a number of challenges. For example, such systems may be 
subject to algorithmic bias as a result of their training data. Researchers have repeatedly subject to algorithmic bias as a result of their training data. Researchers have repeatedly 
discovered instances of racial bias in AI facial recognition programs due to the lack of diversity in discovered instances of racial bias in AI facial recognition programs due to the lack of diversity in 
the images on which the systems were trained, while some natural language processing programs the images on which the systems were trained, while some natural language processing programs 
have developed gender bias.7 Such biases could hold significant implications for AI applications have developed gender bias.7 Such biases could hold significant implications for AI applications 
in a military context. For example, incorporating undetected biases into systems with lethal in a military context. For example, incorporating undetected biases into systems with lethal 
effects could lead to cases of mistaken identity and the unintended killing of civilians or effects could lead to cases of mistaken identity and the unintended killing of civilians or 
noncombatants.  noncombatants.  
Similarly, narrow AI algorithms can produce unpredictable and unconventional results that could 
Similarly, narrow AI algorithms can produce unpredictable and unconventional results that could 
lead to unexpected failures if incorporated into military systems. In a commonly cited lead to unexpected failures if incorporated into military systems. In a commonly cited 
demonstration of this phenomenon (illustrated idemonstration of this phenomenon (illustrated i
n Figure 1), researchers combined a picture that , researchers combined a picture that 
an AI system correctly identified as a panda with random distortion that the computer labeled an AI system correctly identified as a panda with random distortion that the computer labeled 
“nematode.” The difference in the combined image is imperceptible to the human eye, but it “nematode.” The difference in the combined image is imperceptible to the human eye, but it 
resulted in the AI system labeling the image as a gibbon with 99.3% confidence. Such resulted in the AI system labeling the image as a gibbon with 99.3% confidence. Such 
vulnerabilities could be exploited intentionally by adversaries to disrupt AI-reliant or -assisted vulnerabilities could be exploited intentionally by adversaries to disrupt AI-reliant or -assisted 
target identification, selection, and engagement. This could, in turn, raise ethical concerns—or, target identification, selection, and engagement. This could, in turn, raise ethical concerns—or, 
                                                 
                                                 
4 For more information about artificial intelligence, see CRS Report R45178, 4 For more information about artificial intelligence, see CRS Report R45178, 
Artificial Intelligence and National 
Security, by Kelley M. Sayler. , by Kelley M. Sayler. 
5 For a discussion of narrow versus general artificial intelligence, as well as a range of expert opinions about the future 
5 For a discussion of narrow versus general artificial intelligence, as well as a range of expert opinions about the future 
of general artificial intelligence, see Nick Bostrom, of general artificial intelligence, see Nick Bostrom, 
Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford, United  (Oxford, United 
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014). Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
6 For a discussion of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, see CRS Report R46389, 
6 For a discussion of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, see CRS Report R46389, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance Design for Great Power Competition, by Nishawn S. Smagh.  , by Nishawn S. Smagh.  
7 Brian Barrett, “Lawmakers Can’t Ignore Facial Recognition’s Bias Anymore,” Wired, July 26, 2018, at 
7 Brian Barrett, “Lawmakers Can’t Ignore Facial Recognition’s Bias Anymore,” Wired, July 26, 2018, at 
https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-facial-recognition-congress-bias-law-enforcement/; and Will Knight, “How to https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-facial-recognition-congress-bias-law-enforcement/; and Will Knight, “How to 
Fix Silicon Valley’s Sexist Algorithms,” MIT Technology Review, November 23, 2016, at Fix Silicon Valley’s Sexist Algorithms,” MIT Technology Review, November 23, 2016, at 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602950/how-to-fix-silicon-valleys-sexist-algorithms/. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602950/how-to-fix-silicon-valleys-sexist-algorithms/. 
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potentially, lead to violations of the law of armed conflict—if it results in the system selecting 
potentially, lead to violations of the law of armed conflict—if it results in the system selecting 
and engaging a target or class of targets that was not approved by a human operator.and engaging a target or class of targets that was not approved by a human operator.
      
Figure 1. AI Failure in Image Recognition 
 
 
Source: AndrewAndrew
 Ilachinski, Ilachinski, 
AI, Robots, and Swarms, Issues Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval , Center for Naval 
Analyses, January 2017, p. 61. Analyses, January 2017, p. 61. 
Finally, recent news reports and analyses have highlighted the role of AI in enabling increasingly 
Finally, recent news reports and analyses have highlighted the role of AI in enabling increasingly 
realistic photo, audio, and video digital forgeries, popularly known as “deep fakes.” Adversaries realistic photo, audio, and video digital forgeries, popularly known as “deep fakes.” Adversaries 
could deploy this AI capability as part of their information operations in a “gray zone” conflict.8 could deploy this AI capability as part of their information operations in a “gray zone” conflict.8 
Deep fake technology could be used against the United States and its allies to generate false news Deep fake technology could be used against the United States and its allies to generate false news 
reports, influence public discourse, erode public trust, and attempt blackmail of government reports, influence public discourse, erode public trust, and attempt blackmail of government 
officials. For this reason, some analysts argue that social media platforms—in addition to officials. For this reason, some analysts argue that social media platforms—in addition to 
deploying deep fake detection tools—may need to expand the means of labeling and deploying deep fake detection tools—may need to expand the means of labeling and 
authenticating content.9 Doing so might require that users identify the time and location at which authenticating content.9 Doing so might require that users identify the time and location at which 
the content originated or properly label content that has been edited. Other analysts have the content originated or properly label content that has been edited. Other analysts have 
expressed concern that regulating deep fake technology could impose an undue burden on social expressed concern that regulating deep fake technology could impose an undue burden on social 
media platforms or lead to unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and artistic expression.10 media platforms or lead to unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and artistic expression.10 
These analysts have suggested that existing law is sufficient for managing the malicious use of These analysts have suggested that existing law is sufficient for managing the malicious use of 
deep fakes and that the focus should be instead on the need to educate the public about deep fakes deep fakes and that the focus should be instead on the need to educate the public about deep fakes 
and minimize incentives for creators of malicious deep fakes. and minimize incentives for creators of malicious deep fakes. 
United States 
DOD’s unclassified investments in AI have grown from just over $600 million in FY2016 to DOD’s unclassified investments in AI have grown from just over $600 million in FY2016 to 
$927 million in FY2020, with the department reportedly maintaining over 600 active AI $927 million in FY2020, with the department reportedly maintaining over 600 active AI 
projects.11 Pursuant to the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 115-232), projects.11 Pursuant to the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 115-232),                                                                                                   
8 “Gray zone” conflicts are those that occur below the threshold of formally declared war. For more information about 8 “Gray zone” conflicts are those that occur below the threshold of formally declared war. For more information about 
information operations, see CRS In Focus IF10771, information operations, see CRS In Focus IF10771, 
Defense Primer: Information Operations, by Catherine A. , by Catherine A. 
Theohary.  Theohary.  
9 Some social media platforms such as Twitter have established rules for labeling and removing certain types of 
9 Some social media platforms such as Twitter have established rules for labeling and removing certain types of 
synthetic or manipulated media. See Yoel Roth and Ashita Achuthan, “Building rules in public: Our approach to synthetic or manipulated media. See Yoel Roth and Ashita Achuthan, “Building rules in public: Our approach to 
synthetic & manipulated media,” synthetic & manipulated media,” 
Twitter, February 4, 2020, at https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/, February 4, 2020, at https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/
new-approach-to-synthetic-and-manipulated-media.html.  new-approach-to-synthetic-and-manipulated-media.html.  
10 Jessica Ice, “Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment,” 
10 Jessica Ice, “Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment,” 
Case Western Reserve Law Review, 2019, , 2019, 
at https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol70/iss2/12at https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol70/iss2/12
.  
11 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United 
11 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United 
States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request, March 2019, p. 9; and Brendan McCord, “Eye on AI,” States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request, March 2019, p. 9; and Brendan McCord, “Eye on AI,” 
August 28, 2019, transcript available at https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b75ac0285ede1b470f58ae2/t/August 28, 2019, transcript available at https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b75ac0285ede1b470f58ae2/t/
5d6aa8edb91b0c0001c7a05f/1567. DOD requested $800 million in FY2021 to “continue the AI pathfinders, Joint 5d6aa8edb91b0c0001c7a05f/1567. DOD requested $800 million in FY2021 to “continue the AI pathfinders, Joint 
Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) and Project Maven” and an additional $1.7 billion for autonomy. Office of the Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) and Project Maven” and an additional $1.7 billion for autonomy. Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, “Defense Budget Overview: United States Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, “Defense Budget Overview: United States 
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DOD established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC, pronounced “jake”) to coordinate 
DOD established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC, pronounced “jake”) to coordinate 
DOD projects of over $15 million.12 The JAIC has identified its priority DOD projects of over $15 million.12 The JAIC has identified its priority 
national mission initiativesNational Mission Initiatives for AI as predictive maintenance,13 humanitarian aid and disaster relief, cyberspace,  for AI as predictive maintenance,13 humanitarian aid and disaster relief, cyberspace, 
and automation. DOD requested $800 million for JAIC and Project Maven, an image processing and automation. DOD requested $800 million for JAIC and Project Maven, an image processing 
program, in FY2021.14  program, in FY2021.14  
The FY2019 NDAA additionally directed DOD to publish a strategic roadmap for AI 
The FY2019 NDAA additionally directed DOD to publish a strategic roadmap for AI 
development and fielding, as well as to develop guidance on “appropriate ethical, legal, and other development and fielding, as well as to develop guidance on “appropriate ethical, legal, and other 
policies for the Department governing the development and use of artificial intelligence enabled policies for the Department governing the development and use of artificial intelligence enabled 
systems and technologies in operational situations.”15 In support of this mandate, the Defense systems and technologies in operational situations.”15 In support of this mandate, the Defense 
Innovation Board (DIB), an independent federal advisory committee to the Secretary of Defense, Innovation Board (DIB), an independent federal advisory committee to the Secretary of Defense, 
drafted recommendations for the ethical use of artificial intelligence.16 Based on these drafted recommendations for the ethical use of artificial intelligence.16 Based on these 
recommendations, DOD then adopted five ethical principles for AI based on the DIB’s recommendations, DOD then adopted five ethical principles for AI based on the DIB’s 
recommendations: responsibility, equitability, traceability, reliability, and governability.17 The recommendations: responsibility, equitability, traceability, reliability, and governability.17 The 
JAIC has been charged with implementing the ethical principles.18 JAIC has been charged with implementing the ethical principles.18 
The FY2019 NDAA also established a National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence to 
The FY2019 NDAA also established a National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence to 
conduct a comprehensive assessment of militarily relevant AI technologies and to provide conduct a comprehensive assessment of militarily relevant AI technologies and to provide 
recommendations for strengthening U.S. competitiveness.19 The commission’s interim report to recommendations for strengthening U.S. competitiveness.19 The commission’s interim report to 
Congress identifies five key lines of effort for driving U.S. AI competitiveness: (1) investing in Congress identifies five key lines of effort for driving U.S. AI competitiveness: (1) investing in 
research and development, (2) applying AI to national security missions, (3) training and research and development, (2) applying AI to national security missions, (3) training and 
recruiting AI talent, (4) protecting and building upon U.S. technology advantages, and (5) recruiting AI talent, (4) protecting and building upon U.S. technology advantages, and (5) 
marshalling global AI cooperation. The commission is releasing quarterly memos, which are to marshalling global AI cooperation. The commission is releasing quarterly memos, which are to 
provide recommendations for implementing these lines of effort, with a final report due in March provide recommendations for implementing these lines of effort, with a final report due in March 
2021.  2021.  
Per Section 256 of the FY2020 NDAA, DOD is also to “develop a strategy for educating servicemembers in relevant occupational fields on matters relating to artificial intelligence”; 
                                                 
                                                 Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request,” February 2020, pp. 1-9. Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request,” February 2020, pp. 1-9. 
12 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §1051. 12 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §1051. 
13 Predictive maintenance uses AI “to predict the failure of critical parts, automate diagnostics, and plan maintenance 13 Predictive maintenance uses AI “to predict the failure of critical parts, automate diagnostics, and plan maintenance 
based on data and equipment condition.” Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense based on data and equipment condition.” Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense 
Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” February 12, 2019, p. 11, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” February 12, 2019, p. 11, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/
1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF. 1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF. 
14 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, “Defense Budget Overview: United 
14 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, “Defense Budget Overview: United 
States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request,” February 2020, p. 1-9, at States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request,” February 2020, p. 1-9, at 
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/fy2021_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf  https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/fy2021_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf  
15 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §238.  
15 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §238.  
16 For a discussion of DOD’s rationale for developing principles for ethical AI, as well as DOD’s existing ethical 16 For a discussion of DOD’s rationale for developing principles for ethical AI, as well as DOD’s existing ethical 
commitments related to AI, see Defense Innovation Board, “AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of commitments related to AI, see Defense Innovation Board, “AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of 
Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense,” October 31, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense,” October 31, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/
2002204458/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_PRIMARY_DOCUMENT.PDF. 2002204458/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_PRIMARY_DOCUMENT.PDF. 
17 For definitions of these principles, see Department of Defense, “DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial 
17 For definitions of these principles, see Department of Defense, “DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial 
Intelligence,” February 24, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-Intelligence,” February 24, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-
adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/. adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/. 
18 For information about the JAIC’s implementation plan, see “The DoD AI Ethical Principles
18 For information about the JAIC’s implementation plan, see “The DoD AI Ethical Principles
 -—  Shifting From Principles to Practice,” April 1, 2020, at https://www.ai.mil/blog_04_01_20-Shifting From Principles to Practice,” April 1, 2020, at https://www.ai.mil/blog_04_01_20-
shifting_from_principles_to_practice.html. shifting_from_principles_to_practice.html. 
19 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title X, §1051. The Commission’s Interim Report, which assesses the 
19 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title X, §1051. The Commission’s Interim Report, which assesses the 
challenges and opportunities of militarily relevant AI technologies, is available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/challenges and opportunities of militarily relevant AI technologies, is available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/
153OrxnuGEjsUvlxWsFYauslwNeCEkvUb/view. Its first quarter recommendations, released in March 2020, are 153OrxnuGEjsUvlxWsFYauslwNeCEkvUb/view. Its first quarter recommendations, released in March 2020, are 
available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wkPh8Gb5drBrKBg6OhGu5oNaTEERbKss/view. available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wkPh8Gb5drBrKBg6OhGu5oNaTEERbKss/view. 
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Section 260 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit through 2023 biannual reports on the JAIC to the congressional defense committees.20 These reports are to include a description of the JAIC’s mission, objectives, activities, workforce, and organizational structure, as well as a description of any new AI-related policies or ethical guidelines and “any steps taken by the Center to protect systems that use artificial intelligence from any attempts to misrepresent or alter information used or provided by artificial intelligence.”21 Finally, Section 5711 tasks the Director of National Intelligence with periodically briefing the congressional intelligence committees on major intelligence community AI initiatives and coordination efforts.22   
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China 
China is widely viewed as the United States’ closest competitor in the international AI market.China is widely viewed as the United States’ closest competitor in the international AI market.
2023  China’s 2017 “Next Generation AI Development Plan” describes AI as a “strategic technology” China’s 2017 “Next Generation AI Development Plan” describes AI as a “strategic technology” 
that has become a “focus of international competition.”that has become a “focus of international competition.”
2124 Recent Chinese achievements in the  Recent Chinese achievements in the 
field demonstrate China’s potential to realize its goals for AI development. In particular, China field demonstrate China’s potential to realize its goals for AI development. In particular, China 
has pursued language and facial recognition technologies, many of which it plans to integrate into has pursued language and facial recognition technologies, many of which it plans to integrate into 
the country’s domestic surveillance network. Such technologies could be used to counter the country’s domestic surveillance network. Such technologies could be used to counter 
espionage and aid military targeting. In addition to developing various types of air, land, sea, and espionage and aid military targeting. In addition to developing various types of air, land, sea, and 
undersea autonomous military vehicles, China is actively pursuing swarm technologies, which undersea autonomous military vehicles, China is actively pursuing swarm technologies, which 
could be used to overwhelm adversary missile defense interceptors. Moreover, open-source could be used to overwhelm adversary missile defense interceptors. Moreover, open-source 
publications indicate that China is developing a suite of AI tools for cyber operations.publications indicate that China is developing a suite of AI tools for cyber operations.
2225    
China’s management of its AI ecosystem stands in stark contrast to that of the United States.
China’s management of its AI ecosystem stands in stark contrast to that of the United States.
2326 In  In 
general, few boundaries exist between Chinese commercial companies, university research general, few boundaries exist between Chinese commercial companies, university research 
laboratories, the military, and the central government. China’s National Intelligence Law, for laboratories, the military, and the central government. China’s National Intelligence Law, for 
example, requires companies and individuals to “support, assist, and cooperate with national example, requires companies and individuals to “support, assist, and cooperate with national 
intelligence work.”intelligence work.”
2427 As a result, the Chinese government has a direct means of guiding military  As a result, the Chinese government has a direct means of guiding military 
AI development priorities and accessing technology developed for civilian purposes. AI development priorities and accessing technology developed for civilian purposes. 
Russia 
Russian president Vladimir Putin has stated that “whoever becomes the leader in [AI] will Russian president Vladimir Putin has stated that “whoever becomes the leader in [AI] will 
become the ruler of the world.”become the ruler of the world.”
2528 At present, however, Russian AI development lags significantly  At present, however, Russian AI development lags significantly 
behind that of the United States and China. As part of Russia’s effort to close this gap, Russia has behind that of the United States and China. As part of Russia’s effort to close this gap, Russia has 
released a national strategy that outlines 5- and 10-year benchmarks for improving the country’s released a national strategy that outlines 5- and 10-year benchmarks for improving the country’s 
AI expertise, educational programs, datasets, infrastructure, and legal regulatory system.26 Russia has indicated it will continue to pursue its 2008 defense modernization agenda, which called for robotizing 30% of the country’s military equipment by 2025.27 
The Russian military has been researching a number of AI applications, with a heavy emphasis on semiautonomous and autonomous military vehicles. Russia has also reportedly built a combat module for unmanned ground vehicles that may be capable of autonomous target identification—and, potentially, target engagement—and it plans to develop a suite of AI-enabled autonomous 
                                                 20
                                                 20 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §256 and §260.   21 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §260.   22 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division E, Title LVII, §5711.  23 See, for example, Kai-Fu Lee,  See, for example, Kai-Fu Lee, 
AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order (Boston, MA:  (Boston, MA: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 2018). Houghton Mifflin Co., 2018). 
2124 China State Council, “A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” p. 2.  China State Council, “A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” p. 2. 
2225 Elsa Kania,  Elsa Kania, 
Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power, , 
Center for a New American Security, November 28, 2017, p. 27. Center for a New American Security, November 28, 2017, p. 27. 
2326 Ibid., p. 6.  Ibid., p. 6. 
2427 Arjun Kharpal, “Huawei says it would never hand data to China’s government. Experts say it wouldn’t have a  Arjun Kharpal, “Huawei says it would never hand data to China’s government. Experts say it wouldn’t have a 
choice,” choice,” 
CNBC, March 5, 2019. , March 5, 2019. 
2528 “‘Whoever leads in AI will rule the world’: Putin to Russian children on Knowledge Day,”  “‘Whoever leads in AI will rule the world’: Putin to Russian children on Knowledge Day,” 
RT.com, September 1, , September 1, 
2017, at https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-putin/. 2017, at https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-putin/. 
26 Office of the President of the Russian Federation, “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the Development of Artificial Intelligence in the Russian Federation” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Trans.), October 10, 2019, at https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Decree-of-the-President-of-the-RussianFederation-on-the-Development-of-Artificial-Intelligence-in-the-Russian-Federation-.pdf. 
27 Tom Simonite, “For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race,” Wired, August 8, 2017. 
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AI expertise, educational programs, datasets, infrastructure, and legal regulatory system.29 Russia has indicated it will continue to pursue its 2008 defense modernization agenda, which called for robotizing 30% of the country’s military equipment by 2025.30 
The Russian military has been researching a number of AI applications, with a heavy emphasis on semiautonomous and autonomous military vehicles. Russia has also reportedly built a combat module for unmanned ground vehicles that may be capable of autonomous target identification—and, potentially, target engagement—and it plans to develop a suite of AI-enabled autonomous systems.31 In addition, the Russian military plans to incorporate AI into unmanned aerial, naval,  In addition, the Russian military plans to incorporate AI into unmanned aerial, naval, 
and undersea vehicles and is reportedly developing swarming capabilities.and undersea vehicles and is reportedly developing swarming capabilities.
2932 These technologies  These technologies 
could reduce both cost and manpower requirements, potentially enabling Russia to field more could reduce both cost and manpower requirements, potentially enabling Russia to field more 
systems with fewer personnel. Russia is also exploring innovative uses of AI for remote sensing systems with fewer personnel. Russia is also exploring innovative uses of AI for remote sensing 
and electronic warfare, which could in turn reduce an adversary’s ability to effectively and electronic warfare, which could in turn reduce an adversary’s ability to effectively 
communicate and navigate on the battlefield.communicate and navigate on the battlefield.
3033 Finally, Russia has made extensive use of AI  Finally, Russia has made extensive use of AI 
technologies for domestic propaganda and surveillance, as well as for information operations technologies for domestic propaganda and surveillance, as well as for information operations 
directed against the United States and U.S. allies.directed against the United States and U.S. allies.
3134    
Despite Russia’s aspirations, analysts argue that it may be difficult for Russia to make significant 
Despite Russia’s aspirations, analysts argue that it may be difficult for Russia to make significant 
progress in AI development. In 2017, Russian military spending dropped by 20% in constant progress in AI development. In 2017, Russian military spending dropped by 20% in constant 
dollars, with subsequent cuts in 2018.dollars, with subsequent cuts in 2018.
3235 In addition, many analysts note that Russian academics  In addition, many analysts note that Russian academics 
have produced few research papers on AI and that the Russian technology industry has yet to have produced few research papers on AI and that the Russian technology industry has yet to 
produce AI applications on par with those produced by the United States and China.produce AI applications on par with those produced by the United States and China.
3336 Other  Other 
analysts counter that such factors may be irrelevant, arguing that while Russia has never been a analysts counter that such factors may be irrelevant, arguing that while Russia has never been a 
leader in internet technology, it has managed to become a notably disruptive force in leader in internet technology, it has managed to become a notably disruptive force in 
cyberspace.34 Russia may also be able to draw upon its growing technological cooperation with China.35  
International Institutions 
A number of international institutions have examined issues surrounding AI, including the Group of Seven (G7), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which developed the first intergovernmental 
                                                 28
                                                 29 Office of the President of the Russian Federation, “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the Development of Artificial Intelligence in the Russian Federation” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Trans.), October 10, 2019, at https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Decree-of-the-President-of-the-Russian-Federation-on-the-Development-of-Artificial-Intelligence-in-the-Russian-Federation-.pdf. 
30 Tom Simonite, “For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race,” Wired, August 8, 2017. 31 Tristan Greene, “Russia is Developing AI Missiles to Dominate the New Arms Race,”  Tristan Greene, “Russia is Developing AI Missiles to Dominate the New Arms Race,” 
The Next Web, July 27, 2017, , July 27, 2017, 
at https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2017/07/27/russia-is-developing-ai-missiles-to-dominate-the-new-at https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2017/07/27/russia-is-developing-ai-missiles-to-dominate-the-new-
arms-race/; and Kyle Mizokami, “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Popular Mechanics, July 19, arms-race/; and Kyle Mizokami, “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Popular Mechanics, July 19, 
2017, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27393/kalashnikov-to-make-ai-directed-2017, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27393/kalashnikov-to-make-ai-directed-
machine-guns/. machine-guns/. 
2932 Samuel Bendett, “Red Robots Rising: Behind the Rapid Development of Russian Unmanned Military Systems,”  Samuel Bendett, “Red Robots Rising: Behind the Rapid Development of Russian Unmanned Military Systems,” 
The 
Strategy Bridge, December 12, 2017. , December 12, 2017. 
3033 Jill Dougherty and Molly Jay, “Russia Tries to Get Smart about Artificial Intelligence”;  Jill Dougherty and Molly Jay, “Russia Tries to Get Smart about Artificial Intelligence”; 
The Wilson Quarterly, , 
Spring 2018; and Margarita Konaev and Samuel Bendett, “Russian AI-Enabled Combat: Coming to a City Near You?,” Spring 2018; and Margarita Konaev and Samuel Bendett, “Russian AI-Enabled Combat: Coming to a City Near You?,” 
War on the Rocks, July 31, 2019, at https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/russian-ai-enabled-combat-coming-to-a-city-, July 31, 2019, at https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/russian-ai-enabled-combat-coming-to-a-city-
near-you/. near-you/. 
3134 Alina Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution,  Alina Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution, 
November 15, 2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-November 15, 2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-
warfare/; and Chris Meserole and Alina Polyakova, “Disinformation Wars,” warfare/; and Chris Meserole and Alina Polyakova, “Disinformation Wars,” 
Foreign Policy, May 25, 2018, at , May 25, 2018, at 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/25/disinformation-wars/. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/25/disinformation-wars/. 
3235 “Military expenditure by country, in constant (2017) US$ m., 1988-2018,” Stockholm International Peace Research  “Military expenditure by country, in constant (2017) US$ m., 1988-2018,” Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/
Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932018%20in%20constant%20%282017%29%20USDData%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932018%20in%20constant%20%282017%29%20USD
%20%28pdf%29.pdf.  %20%28pdf%29.pdf.  
3336 Leon Bershidsky, “Take Elon Musk Seriously on the Russian AI Threat,”  Leon Bershidsky, “Take Elon Musk Seriously on the Russian AI Threat,” 
Bloomberg, September 5, 2017, at , September 5, 2017, at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-09-05/take-elon-musk-seriously-on-the-russian-ai-threat; and Alina https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-09-05/take-elon-musk-seriously-on-the-russian-ai-threat; and Alina 
Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution, November 15, Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution, November 15, 
2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/. 2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/. 
34 Gregory C. Allen, “Putin and Musk Are Right: Whoever Masters AI Will Run the World,” CNN, September 5, 2017. 35 See Samuel Bendett and Elsa Kania, A New Sino-Russian High-tech Partnership, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 29, 2019, at https://www.aspi.org.au/report/new-sino-russian-high-tech-partnership. 
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cyberspace.37 Russia may also be able to draw upon its growing technological cooperation with China.38  
International Institutions A number of international institutions have examined issues surrounding AI, including the Group of Seven (G7), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which developed the first intergovernmental set of principles for AI.39 These principles are intended to “promote AI that is innovative and  These principles are intended to “promote AI that is innovative and 
trustworthy and that respects human rights and democratic values.”trustworthy and that respects human rights and democratic values.”
3740 The United States is one of  The United States is one of 
42 countries—including the OECD’s 36 member countries, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa 42 countries—including the OECD’s 36 member countries, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Peru, and Romania—to have adopted the OECD AI Principles. These principles serve as the Rica, Peru, and Romania—to have adopted the OECD AI Principles. These principles serve as the 
foundation for the Group of Twenty’s (G20’s) June 2019 Ministerial Statement on human-foundation for the Group of Twenty’s (G20’s) June 2019 Ministerial Statement on human-
centered AI.centered AI.
3841 In addition, the OECD established the AI Policy Observatory in 2019 to develop  In addition, the OECD established the AI Policy Observatory in 2019 to develop 
policy options that will “help countries encourage, nurture, and monitor the responsible policy options that will “help countries encourage, nurture, and monitor the responsible 
development of trustworthy AI systems for the benefit of society.” development of trustworthy AI systems for the benefit of society.” 
Potential Questions for Congress 
  What measures is DOD taking to implement its ethical principles for artificial 
  What measures is DOD taking to implement its ethical principles for artificial 
intelligence? Are such measures sufficient to ensure DOD’s adherence to the 
intelligence? Are such measures sufficient to ensure DOD’s adherence to the 
principles?  principles?  
  Do DOD and the intelligence community have adequate information about the 
  Do DOD and the intelligence community have adequate information about the 
state of foreign military AI applications and the ways in which such applications 
state of foreign military AI applications and the ways in which such applications 
may be used to harm U.S. national security? may be used to harm U.S. national security? 
  How should national security considerations with regard to deep fakes be 
  How should national security considerations with regard to deep fakes be 
balanced with free speech protections, artistic expression, and beneficial uses of 
balanced with free speech protections, artistic expression, and beneficial uses of 
the underlying technologies? What efforts, if any, should the U.S. government the underlying technologies? What efforts, if any, should the U.S. government 
undertake to ensure that the public is educated about deep fakes? undertake to ensure that the public is educated about deep fakes? 
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)3942 
Although there is no internationally agreed definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems, Although there is no internationally agreed definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems, 
Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09 defines LAWS as a class of weapon systems Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09 defines LAWS as a class of weapon systems 
capable of both independently identifying a target and employing an onboard weapon to engage capable of both independently identifying a target and employing an onboard weapon to engage 
and destroy the target without manual human control. This concept of autonomy is also known as and destroy the target without manual human control. This concept of autonomy is also known as 
“human out of the loop” or “full autonomy.” The directive contrasts LAWS with human-supervised, or “human on the loop,” autonomous weapon systems, in which operators have the ability to monitor and halt a weapon’s target engagement. Another category is semi-autonomous, or “human in the loop,” weapon systems that “only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected by a human operator.”40  
LAWS would require computer algorithms and sensor suites to classify an object as hostile, make an engagement decision, and guide a weapon to the target. This capability would enable the system to operate in communications-degraded or -denied environments where traditional systems may not be able to operate. Some analysts have noted that LAWS could additionally                                                  36
                                                 37 Gregory C. Allen, “Putin and Musk Are Right: Whoever Masters AI Will Run the World,” CNN, September 5, 2017. 38 See Samuel Bendett and Elsa Kania, A New Sino-Russian High-tech Partnership, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 29, 2019, at https://www.aspi.org.au/report/new-sino-russian-high-tech-partnership. 
39 In May 2020, the United States joined the G7’s Global Partnership on AI, which is “to guide the responsible adoption  In May 2020, the United States joined the G7’s Global Partnership on AI, which is “to guide the responsible adoption 
of AI based on shared principles of ‘human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation and economic growth.’” Matt of AI based on shared principles of ‘human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation and economic growth.’” Matt 
O’Brien, “US joins G7 artificial intelligence group to counter China,” Associated Press, May 28, 2020. O’Brien, “US joins G7 artificial intelligence group to counter China,” Associated Press, May 28, 2020. 
3740 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Principles on AI,” June 2019, at  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Principles on AI,” June 2019, at 
https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles/.  https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles/.  
3841 “G20 Ministerial Statement on Trade and Digital Economy,” June 9, 2019, at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/ “G20 Ministerial Statement on Trade and Digital Economy,” June 9, 2019, at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/
000486596.pdf. 000486596.pdf. 
3942 For additional information about LAWS, see CRS Report R44466,  For additional information about LAWS, see CRS Report R44466, 
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Issues for 
Congress, by Nathan J. Lucas. , by Nathan J. Lucas. 
40 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at https://www.esd.whs. 
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“human out of the loop” or “full autonomy.” The directive contrasts LAWS with human-supervised, or “human on the loop,” autonomous weapon systems, in which operators have the ability to monitor and halt a weapon’s target engagement. Another category is semi-autonomous, or “human in the loop,” weapon systems that “only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected by a human operator.”43  
LAWS would require computer algorithms and sensor suites to classify an object as hostile, make an engagement decision, and guide a weapon to the target. This capability would enable the system to operate in communications-degraded or -denied environments where traditional systems may not be able to operate. Some analysts have noted that LAWS could additionally “allow weapons to strike military objectives more accurately and with less risk of collateral “allow weapons to strike military objectives more accurately and with less risk of collateral 
damage” or civilian casualties.damage” or civilian casualties.
4144    
Others, including approximately 
Others, including approximately 
2530 countries and  countries and 
100165 nongovernmental organizations, have  nongovernmental organizations, have 
called for a preemptive ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns such as a perceived lack of called for a preemptive ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns such as a perceived lack of 
accountability for use and a perceived inability to comply with the proportionality and distinction accountability for use and a perceived inability to comply with the proportionality and distinction 
requirements of the laws of armed conflict. Some analysts have also raised concerns about the requirements of the laws of armed conflict. Some analysts have also raised concerns about the 
potential operational risks posed by lethal autonomous weapons.potential operational risks posed by lethal autonomous weapons.
4245 These risks could arise from  These risks could arise from 
“hacking, enemy behavioral manipulation, unexpected interactions with the environment, or “hacking, enemy behavioral manipulation, unexpected interactions with the environment, or 
simple malfunctions or software errors.”simple malfunctions or software errors.”
4346 Although such risks could be present in automated  Although such risks could be present in automated 
systems, they could be heightened in autonomous systems, in which the human operator would be systems, they could be heightened in autonomous systems, in which the human operator would be 
unable to physically intervene to terminate engagements—potentially resulting in wider-scale or unable to physically intervene to terminate engagements—potentially resulting in wider-scale or 
more numerous instances of fratricide, civilian casualties, or other unintended consequences.more numerous instances of fratricide, civilian casualties, or other unintended consequences.
4447  
United States 
The United States is not known to be developing LAWS currently, nor does it currently have The United States is not known to be developing LAWS currently, nor does it currently have 
LAWS in its inventory; however, there is no prohibition on the development, fielding, or LAWS in its inventory; however, there is no prohibition on the development, fielding, or 
employment of LAWS. DODD 3000.09 establishes department guidelines for the future employment of LAWS. DODD 3000.09 establishes department guidelines for the future 
development and fielding of LAWS to ensure that they comply with “the law of war, applicable development and fielding of LAWS to ensure that they comply with “the law of war, applicable 
treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement.”treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement.”
4548 This directive  This directive 
includes a requirement that LAWS be designed to “allow commanders and operators to exercise includes a requirement that LAWS be designed to “allow commanders and operators to exercise 
appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”
4649 “Human judgment over the use of  “Human judgment over the use of 
force” does not require manual human “control” of the weapon system, as is often reported, but force” does not require manual human “control” of the weapon system, as is often reported, but 
instead requires broader human involvement in decisions about how, when, where, and why the instead requires broader human involvement in decisions about how, when, where, and why the 
weapon will be employed. weapon will be employed. 
In addition, DODD 3000.09 requires that the software and hardware of all systems, including lethal autonomous weapons, be tested and evaluated to ensure they 
[f]unction as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries; complete engagements in a timeframe consistent with commander and operator intentions and, if  unable to do so, terminate engagements or seek additional human operator input before  continuing  the  engagement;  and  are  sufficiently  robust  to  minimize  failures  that could lead to unintended engagements or to loss of control of the system to unauthorized parties. 
                                                 41
                                                 43 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at https://www.esd.whs. 
44 U.S. Government, “Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons,”  U.S. Government, “Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons,” 
March 28, 2018, at March 28, 2018, at 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/7C177AE5BC10B588C125825F004B06BE/$file/CCW_GGE.https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/7C177AE5BC10B588C125825F004B06BE/$file/CCW_GGE.
1_2018_WP.4.pdf.  1_2018_WP.4.pdf.  
4245 See, for example, Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security,  See, for example, Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security, 
February 2016, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-February 2016, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-
risk.pdf.  risk.pdf.  
4346 Ibid.  Ibid. 
4447 Ibid.  Ibid. 
4548 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at  Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at 
https://www.esd.whs. For an explanation of this directive, see CRS In Focus IF11150, https://www.esd.whs. For an explanation of this directive, see CRS In Focus IF11150, 
Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on 
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelley M. Sayler.  , by Kelley M. Sayler.  
4649 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at  Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at 
https://www.esd.whs. https://www.esd.whs. 
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In addition, DODD 3000.09 requires that the software and hardware of all systems, including lethal autonomous weapons, be tested and evaluated to ensure they 
[f]unction as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries; complete engagements in a timeframe consistent with commander and operator intentions and, if  unable to do so, terminate engagements or seek additional human operator input before  continuing  the  engagement;  and  are  sufficiently  robust  to  minimize  failures  that could lead to unintended engagements or to loss of control of the system to unauthorized parties. 
Any changes to a system’s operating state—for example, due to machine learning—would Any changes to a system’s operating state—for example, due to machine learning—would 
require the system to be retested and reevaluated to ensure that it has retained its safety features require the system to be retested and reevaluated to ensure that it has retained its safety features 
and ability to operate as intended. In addition to the standard weapons review process, LAWS and ability to operate as intended. In addition to the standard weapons review process, LAWS 
must undergo a secondary senior-level review by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the must undergo a secondary senior-level review by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and either the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and either the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
and Sustainment or the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering prior to both and Sustainment or the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering prior to both 
development and fielding. development and fielding. 
China 
According to U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, some Chinese weapons manufacturers, such According to U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, some Chinese weapons manufacturers, such 
as Ziyan, have advertised their weapons as having the ability to select and engage targets as Ziyan, have advertised their weapons as having the ability to select and engage targets 
autonomously.autonomously.
4750 It is unclear whether these claims are accurate; however, China has no  It is unclear whether these claims are accurate; however, China has no 
prohibition on the development of LAWS, which it has characterized as weapons that exhibit—at prohibition on the development of LAWS, which it has characterized as weapons that exhibit—at 
a minimum—five attributes:  a minimum—five attributes:  
The first is lethality, which means sufficient pay load (charge) and for means [
The first is lethality, which means sufficient pay load (charge) and for means [
sic] to be ] to be 
lethal. The second is autonomy, which means absence of human intervention and control lethal. The second is autonomy, which means absence of human intervention and control 
during  the  entire  process  of  executing  a  task.  Thirdly,  impossibility  for  termination, during  the  entire  process  of  executing  a  task.  Thirdly,  impossibility  for  termination, 
meaning that once started there is no way to terminate the device. Fourthly, indiscriminate meaning that once started there is no way to terminate the device. Fourthly, indiscriminate 
effect, meaning that the device will execute the task of killing and maiming regardless of effect, meaning that the device will execute the task of killing and maiming regardless of 
conditions, scenarios and targets. Fifthly evolution, meaning that through interaction with conditions, scenarios and targets. Fifthly evolution, meaning that through interaction with 
the environment the device can learn autonomously, expand its functions and capabilities the environment the device can learn autonomously, expand its functions and capabilities 
in a way exceeding human expectations.in a way exceeding human expectations.
4851  
Russia 
Russia has proposed the following definition of LAWS: “unmanned technical means other than Russia has proposed the following definition of LAWS: “unmanned technical means other than 
ordnance that are intended for carrying out combat and support missions without any involvement ordnance that are intended for carrying out combat and support missions without any involvement 
of the operator” beyond the decision of whether and how to deploy the system.of the operator” beyond the decision of whether and how to deploy the system.
4952 Russia has noted  Russia has noted 
that LAWS could “ensure the increased accuracy of weapon guidance on military targets, while that LAWS could “ensure the increased accuracy of weapon guidance on military targets, while 
contributing to lower rate of unintentional strikes against civilians and civilian targets.”contributing to lower rate of unintentional strikes against civilians and civilian targets.”
5053  Although Russia has not publicly stated that it is developing LAWS, Russian weapons Although Russia has not publicly stated that it is developing LAWS, Russian weapons 
manufacturer Kalashnikov has reportedly built a combat module for unmanned ground vehicles capable of autonomous target identification and, potentially, target engagement.51  
International Institutions 
Since 2014, the United States has participated in international discussions of LAWS under the auspices of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW). The UN CCW has considered proposals by states parties to issue political declarations about LAWS, as well as proposals to regulate or ban them. At the UN CCW, the United States and Russia have opposed a preemptive ban on LAWS, while China has supported a ban on the use—but not                                                  47
                                                 50 Patrick Tucker, “SecDef: China is Exporting Killer Robots to the Mideast,”  Patrick Tucker, “SecDef: China is Exporting Killer Robots to the Mideast,” 
Defense One, November 5, 2019. , November 5, 2019. 
4851 UN CCW, “China: Position Paper,” April 11, 2018, p. 1, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/ UN CCW, “China: Position Paper,” April 11, 2018, p. 1, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/
(httpAssets)/E42AE83BDB3525D0C125826C0040B262/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.7.pdf.  (httpAssets)/E42AE83BDB3525D0C125826C0040B262/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.7.pdf.  
4952 UN CCW, “Russian Federation: Potential opportunities and limitations of military uses of lethal autonomous  UN CCW, “Russian Federation: Potential opportunities and limitations of military uses of lethal autonomous 
weapons systems,” 2019, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/weapons systems,” 2019, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/
(httpAssets)/B7C992A51A9FC8BFC12583BB00637BB9/$file/CCW.GGE.1.2019.WP.1_R+E.pdf. (httpAssets)/B7C992A51A9FC8BFC12583BB00637BB9/$file/CCW.GGE.1.2019.WP.1_R+E.pdf. 
50 Ibid.  51 Kyle Mizokami, “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Popular Mechanics, July 19, 2017. 
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53 Ibid.  
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manufacturer Kalashnikov has reportedly built a combat module for unmanned ground vehicles capable of autonomous target identification and, potentially, target engagement.54  
International Institutions Since 2014, the United States has participated in international discussions of LAWS under the auspices of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW). The UN CCW has considered proposals by states parties to issue political declarations about LAWS, as well as proposals to regulate or ban them. At the UN CCW, the United States and Russia have opposed a preemptive ban on LAWS, while China has supported a ban on the use—but not development—of LAWS, which it defines as weapon systems that are inherently indiscriminate development—of LAWS, which it defines as weapon systems that are inherently indiscriminate 
and thus in violation of the law of war. and thus in violation of the law of war. 
Potential Questions for Congress 
  To what extent are potential U.S. adversaries developing LAWS? How, if at all, 
  To what extent are potential U.S. adversaries developing LAWS? How, if at all, 
should this affect U.S. LAWS research and development?  
should this affect U.S. LAWS research and development?  
  What role should the United States play in UN CCW discussions of LAWS? 
  What role should the United States play in UN CCW discussions of LAWS? 
Should the United States support the status quo, propose a political declaration, 
Should the United States support the status quo, propose a political declaration, 
or advocate regulation of or a ban on LAWS?  or advocate regulation of or a ban on LAWS?  
  If the United States chooses to develop LAWS, are current weapons review 
  If the United States chooses to develop LAWS, are current weapons review 
processes and legal standards for their employment in conflict sufficient? 
processes and legal standards for their employment in conflict sufficient? 
  Should the United States continue to oppose a ban on LAWS? If so, should it 
  Should the United States continue to oppose a ban on LAWS? If so, should it 
consider some form of their regulation short of a complete ban?  
consider some form of their regulation short of a complete ban?  
Hypersonic Weapons52Weapons55  
A number of countries, including the United States, Russia, and China, are developing hypersonic A number of countries, including the United States, Russia, and China, are developing hypersonic 
weapons—those that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound. There are weapons—those that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound. There are 
two categories of hypersonic weapons: two categories of hypersonic weapons: 
  
  
Hypersonic glide vehicles are launched from a rocket before gliding to a are launched from a rocket before gliding to a 
target.
target.
5356  
  
  
Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered by high-speed engines throughout the are powered by high-speed engines throughout the 
duration of their flight. 
duration of their flight. 
In contrast to ballistic missiles, which also travel at hypersonic speeds, hypersonic weapons do 
In contrast to ballistic missiles, which also travel at hypersonic speeds, hypersonic weapons do 
not follow a parabolic ballistic trajectory and can maneuver en route to their destination, making not follow a parabolic ballistic trajectory and can maneuver en route to their destination, making 
defense against them difficult.  defense against them difficult.  
Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified 
Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified 
two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: (1) the weapon’s short two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: (1) the weapon’s short 
time-of-flight, which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response, and (2) its unpredictable time-of-flight, which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response, and (2) its unpredictable 
                                                 54 Kyle Mizokami, “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Popular Mechanics, July 19, 2017. 55 For additional information about hypersonic weapons, see CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.  
56 When hypersonic glide vehicles are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to as a hypersonic boost-glide weapon. 
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flight path, which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore flight path, which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore 
heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict.heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict.
5457    
Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal 
Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal 
because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia already possess the ability to strike the United because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia already possess the ability to strike the United 
States with intercontinental ballistic missiles, which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm States with intercontinental ballistic missiles, which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm 
U.S. missile defenses.U.S. missile defenses.
5558 Furthermore, these analysts note that in the case of hypersonic weapons,  Furthermore, these analysts note that in the case of hypersonic weapons, 
traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it is really a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it is really a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the 
                                                 52 For additional information about hypersonic weapons, see CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background 
and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.  
53 When hypersonic glide vehicles are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to as a hypersonic boost-glide weapon. 54 See, for example, Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of 
Weapons, RAND Corporation, 2017, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html. 
55 David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” The Daily Beast, January 16, 2019, at https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B. Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14.  
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world that would be so suicidal that it would even think threating to use—not to mention to world that would be so suicidal that it would even think threating to use—not to mention to 
actually use—hypersonic weapons against the United States ... would end well.”actually use—hypersonic weapons against the United States ... would end well.”
5659  
United States 
The Pentagon has requested $3.2 billion in its FY2021 budget request for all hypersonic-related The Pentagon has requested $3.2 billion in its FY2021 budget request for all hypersonic-related 
research. This amount includes $206.8 million for hypersonic defense programs. DOD is research. This amount includes $206.8 million for hypersonic defense programs. DOD is 
currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program, currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program, 
which is intended to provide the U.S. military with the ability to strike hardened or time-sensitive which is intended to provide the U.S. military with the ability to strike hardened or time-sensitive 
targets with conventional warheads, as well as through several Air Force, Army, and DARPA targets with conventional warheads, as well as through several Air Force, Army, and DARPA 
programs.programs.
5760 Analysts who support these development efforts argue that hypersonic weapons could  Analysts who support these development efforts argue that hypersonic weapons could 
enhance deterrence, as well as provide the U.S. military with an ability to defeat capabilities such enhance deterrence, as well as provide the U.S. military with an ability to defeat capabilities such 
as advanced air and missile defense systems that form the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-as advanced air and missile defense systems that form the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-
access/area denial strategies.access/area denial strategies.
5861 Others have argued that hypersonic weapons confer little to no  Others have argued that hypersonic weapons confer little to no 
additional warfighting advantage and note that the U.S military has yet to identify any mission additional warfighting advantage and note that the U.S military has yet to identify any mission 
requirements for hypersonic weapons.  requirements for hypersonic weapons.  
The United States is unlikely to field an operational hypersonic weapon before 2023; however, in 
The United States is unlikely to field an operational hypersonic weapon before 2023; however, in 
contrast to Russia and China, the United States is not developing hypersonic weapons for contrast to Russia and China, the United States is not developing hypersonic weapons for 
potential use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, the United States is seeking to develop potential use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, the United States is seeking to develop 
hypersonic weapons that can attack targets with greater accuracy, which could be more hypersonic weapons that can attack targets with greater accuracy, which could be more 
technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed—and less accurate—Russian and Chinese technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed—and less accurate—Russian and Chinese 
systems. systems. 
China 
According to Tong Zhao, a fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S. military technology” such as U.S. regional missile defenses.59 China’s pursuit of hypersonic weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the United States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s ability to conduct a retaliatory strike against the United States.60  
                                                 56
                                                 57 See, for example, Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons, RAND Corporation, 2017, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html. 
58 David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” The Daily Beast, January 16, 2019, at https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B. Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14.  59 Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” The National Interest, January 5, 2019, at  Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” The National Interest, January 5, 2019, at 
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632. 
5760 In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a common glide vehicle  In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a common glide vehicle 
for use across the services. The services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide Body Board of Directors for use across the services. The services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide Body Board of Directors 
with rotating chairmanship. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army Ramps Up Funding for Laser Shield, Hypersonic Sword,” with rotating chairmanship. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army Ramps Up Funding for Laser Shield, Hypersonic Sword,” 
Breaking Defense, February 28, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-Breaking Defense, February 28, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-
shield-hypersonic-sword/. For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see CRS Report R41464, shield-hypersonic-sword/. For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see CRS Report R41464, 
Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf. , by Amy F. Woolf. 
5861 Roger Zakheim and Tom Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” remarks at  Roger Zakheim and Tom Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” remarks at 
the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army 
Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580. Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580. 
59 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-pub-76894. 
60 Ibid.; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide,” August 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace 
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China According to Tong Zhao, a fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S. military technology” such as U.S. regional missile defenses.62 China’s pursuit of hypersonic weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the United States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s ability to conduct a retaliatory strike against the United States.63  
China has developed the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which, according to a 
China has developed the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which, according to a 
2014 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, could carry a nuclear 2014 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, could carry a nuclear 
hypersonic glide vehicle.hypersonic glide vehicle.
6164 General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, the current commander of U.S.  General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, the current commander of U.S. 
Northern Command, seemed to confirm this assessment in February 2020, when he testified that Northern Command, seemed to confirm this assessment in February 2020, when he testified that 
“China is testing a [nuclear-armed] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle … which is “China is testing a [nuclear-armed] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle … which is 
designed to fly at high speeds and low altitudes, complicating our ability to provide precise designed to fly at high speeds and low altitudes, complicating our ability to provide precise 
warning.”warning.”
6265  
In addition, China has tested the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle at least nine times since 2014. 
In addition, China has tested the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle at least nine times since 2014. 
U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately 1,200 U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately 1,200 
miles and have stated that the missile may be capable of performing evasive maneuvers during miles and have stated that the missile may be capable of performing evasive maneuvers during 
flight.flight.
6366 Although unconfirmed by intelligence agencies, some analysts project the DF-ZF will be  Although unconfirmed by intelligence agencies, some analysts project the DF-ZF will be 
operational as early as 2020.operational as early as 2020.
6467 In addition, in August 2018 China successfully tested Starry Sky-2,  In addition, in August 2018 China successfully tested Starry Sky-2, 
a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype.a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype.
6568 Some reports indicate that the Starry Sky-2  Some reports indicate that the Starry Sky-2 
could be operational by 2025.could be operational by 2025.
6669 U.S. officials have declined to comment on the program. U.S. officials have declined to comment on the program.
67 
Russia 
Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002.68 Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated in 2018 that “the US is permitting constant, uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality, and creating new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in the complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could simply be intercepted.”69 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they 
                                                 70 
                                                 62 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-pub-76894. 
63 Ibid.; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide,” August 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide.  Research Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide.  
6164  U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2014 Annual Report, p. 292, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/ p. 292, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/Complete%20Report.PDF. default/files/annual_reports/Complete%20Report.PDF. 
6265 General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” February, 13, 2020,  General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” February, 13, 2020, 
at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/OShaughnessy_02-13-20.pdf. at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/OShaughnessy_02-13-20.pdf. 
6366 “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,”  “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” 
The Economist, April 6, 2019, at , April 6, 2019, at 
https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-
coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems,” coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems,” 
The 
Diplomat, April 28, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-, April 28, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-
missile-defense-systems/. missile-defense-systems/. 
6467  U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2015 Annual Report, p. 20, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/, p. 20, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF.  default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF.  
6568 Jessie Yeung, “China claims to have successfully tested its first hypersonic aircraft,”  Jessie Yeung, “China claims to have successfully tested its first hypersonic aircraft,” 
CNN, August 7, 2018, at , August 7, 2018, at 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft-intl/index.html. See also https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft-intl/index.html. See also 
U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission 2018 Annual Report, p. 220, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/, p. 220, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/
2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf. 2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf. 
6669  U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20.  p. 20. 
6770 Bill Gertz, “China Reveals Test of New Hypersonic Missile,”  Bill Gertz, “China Reveals Test of New Hypersonic Missile,” 
The Washington Free Beacon, August 10, 2018, at , August 10, 2018, at 
https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/.  https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/.  
68 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic 
Arms Control, February 2019, at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/.  
69 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957.  
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Russia Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002.71 Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated in 2018 that “the US is permitting constant, uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality, and creating new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in the complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could simply be intercepted.”72 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they approach their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its approach their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its 
sense of strategic stability.sense of strategic stability.
7073    
Russia is pursuing two nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons: the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon 
Russia is pursuing two nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons: the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon 
(or Zircon). Avangard is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an ICBM, giving it “effectively (or Zircon). Avangard is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an ICBM, giving it “effectively 
‘unlimited’ range.”‘unlimited’ range.”
7174 Russian news sources claim that Avangard entered into service in December  Russian news sources claim that Avangard entered into service in December 
2019.2019.
7275 Tsirkon, a ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile, may become operational as early as  Tsirkon, a ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile, may become operational as early as 
2023.2023.
7376  
International Institutions 
No international treaty or agreement is dedicated to overseeing the development of hypersonic No international treaty or agreement is dedicated to overseeing the development of hypersonic 
weapons. Although the New START Treaty—a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United weapons. Although the New START Treaty—a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United 
States and Russia—does not specifically limit hypersonic weapons, it does limit ICBMs, which States and Russia—does not specifically limit hypersonic weapons, it does limit ICBMs, which 
could be used to launch hypersonic glide vehicles.could be used to launch hypersonic glide vehicles.
7477 Because Russia has deployed its Avangard  Because Russia has deployed its Avangard 
hypersonic glide vehicle on an SS-19 ICBM, it has agreed that missiles equipped with Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle on an SS-19 ICBM, it has agreed that missiles equipped with Avangard 
count under New START. Furthermore, Article V of the treaty states that “when a Party believes count under New START. Furthermore, Article V of the treaty states that “when a Party believes 
that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the 
question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative 
Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that it would be possible to negotiate Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that it would be possible to negotiate 
provisions that would count additional types of hypersonic weapons under the New START provisions that would count additional types of hypersonic weapons under the New START 
limits.limits.
7578 However, because New START is due to expire in 2021, unless extended through 2026,  However, because New START is due to expire in 2021, unless extended through 2026, 
this solution may be temporary.76 In addition, the treaty would not cover hypersonic weapons developed in countries other than the United States and Russia.  
Potential Questions for Congress 
  What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons 
the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions?  
  Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how 
should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or 
                                                 70
                                                 71 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic Arms Control, February 2019, at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/.  
72 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957.  
73 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See Tong  In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See Tong 
Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security 
Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/
conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-
pub-76894.  pub-76894.  
7174 Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,”  Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” 
Aviation Week, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20. , January 14-27, 2019, p. 20. 
7275 “First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,”  “First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,” 
TASS, December 27, 2019, , December 27, 2019, 
at https://tass.com/defense/1104297. at https://tass.com/defense/1104297. 
7376 “Russian Navy to accept latest Tsirkon hypersonic missile for service in 2023—source,”  “Russian Navy to accept latest Tsirkon hypersonic missile for service in 2023—source,” 
TASS, March 20, 2019. , March 20, 2019. 
7477 For example, Russia’s Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle is reportedly launched by an intercontinental ballistic  For example, Russia’s Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle is reportedly launched by an intercontinental ballistic 
missile. See Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or Tactical Tool?,” missile. See Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or Tactical Tool?,” 
Air Force Magazine, May 7, , May 7, 
2019, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-weapons-strategic-asset-or-tactical-tool/. 2019, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-weapons-strategic-asset-or-tactical-tool/. 
7578 James Acton notes: “during [New START] negotiations, Russia argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a  James Acton notes: “during [New START] negotiations, Russia argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a 
new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussions about whether and how they would be regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?: 
Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013, p. 139, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf.  
76 CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf.  
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this solution may be temporary.79 In addition, the treaty would not cover hypersonic weapons developed in countries other than the United States and Russia.  
Potential Questions for Congress 
  What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons 
the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions?  
  Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how 
should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling 
technologies, and supporting test infrastructure?  technologies, and supporting test infrastructure?  
  How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability? Is 
  How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability? Is 
there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, 
there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, 
negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking 
transparency and confidence-building activities? transparency and confidence-building activities? 
Directed-Energy (DE) Weapons 
DOD defines directed-energy (DE) weapons as those using concentrated electromagnetic energy, DOD defines directed-energy (DE) weapons as those using concentrated electromagnetic energy, 
rather than kinetic energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment, rather than kinetic energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment, 
facilities, and/or personnel.”facilities, and/or personnel.”
7780 DE weapons could be used by ground forces in short-range air  DE weapons could be used by ground forces in short-range air 
defense (SHORAD), counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), or counter-rocket, artillery, defense (SHORAD), counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), or counter-rocket, artillery, 
and mortar (C-RAM) missions.and mortar (C-RAM) missions.
7881 DE weapons could offer low costs per shot and—assuming  DE weapons could offer low costs per shot and—assuming 
access to a sufficient power access to a sufficient power 
supply79supply82—nearly limitless magazines that, in contrast to existing —nearly limitless magazines that, in contrast to existing 
conventional systems, could enable an efficient and effective means of defending against missile conventional systems, could enable an efficient and effective means of defending against missile 
salvos or swarms of unmanned systems. Theoretically, DE weapons could also provide options salvos or swarms of unmanned systems. Theoretically, DE weapons could also provide options 
for boost-phase missile intercept, given their speed-of-light travel time; however, as in the case of for boost-phase missile intercept, given their speed-of-light travel time; however, as in the case of 
hypersonic missile defense, experts disagree on the affordability, technological feasibility, and hypersonic missile defense, experts disagree on the affordability, technological feasibility, and 
utility of this application.utility of this application.
80  
High-powered microwave weapons, a subset of DE weapons, could be used as a nonkinetic means of disabling electronics, communications systems, and improvised explosive devices, or as a nonlethal “heat ray” system for crowd control.  
United States81 
Although the United States has been researching directed energy since the 1960s, some experts have observed that “actual directed-energy programs … have frequently fallen short of expectations,” with DOD investing billions of dollars in programs that were ultimately 
                                                 7783  
                                                 new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussions about whether and how they would be regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?: Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013, p. 139, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf.  
79 CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf.  80 Joint Chiefs of Staff,  Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Electronic Warfare, Joint Publication 3-13.1, February 8, 2012, p. 1-16. , February 8, 2012, p. 1-16. 
7881 For more information about the role of DE weapons in C-UAS missions, see CRS In Focus IF11426,  For more information about the role of DE weapons in C-UAS missions, see CRS In Focus IF11426, 
Department of 
Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.  , by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.  
7982 Although research has been conducted on chemically fueled lasers, most countries are now pursuing solid state  Although research has been conducted on chemically fueled lasers, most countries are now pursuing solid state 
lasers, which are fueled by electrical power. As a result, the cost per shot is equivalent to the cost of the electrical lasers, which are fueled by electrical power. As a result, the cost per shot is equivalent to the cost of the electrical 
power required to fire the shot. Some analysts have noted that the cost per shot could thus be between $1 and $20. See power required to fire the shot. Some analysts have noted that the cost per shot could thus be between $1 and $20. See 
Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” 
National Defense, July 1, 2015, at , July 1, 2015, at 
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-
ready.  ready.  
8083 See, for example, James N. Miller and Frank A. Rose, “Bad Idea: Space-Based Interceptors and Space-Based  See, for example, James N. Miller and Frank A. Rose, “Bad Idea: Space-Based Interceptors and Space-Based 
Directed Energy Systems,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2018, at Directed Energy Systems,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2018, at 
https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-space-based-interceptors-and-space-based-directed-energy-systems/; and Justin https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-space-based-interceptors-and-space-based-directed-energy-systems/; and Justin 
Doubleday, “Pentagon punts MDA‘s laser ambitions, shifts funding toward OSD-led ‘laser scaling,’” Doubleday, “Pentagon punts MDA‘s laser ambitions, shifts funding toward OSD-led ‘laser scaling,’” 
Inside Defense, , 
February 19, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/pentagon-punts-mdas-laser-ambitions-shifts-funding-February 19, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/pentagon-punts-mdas-laser-ambitions-shifts-funding-
toward-osd-led-laser-scaling.  toward-osd-led-laser-scaling.  
81 For additional information about U.S. directed-energy programs, see CRS Report R44175, Navy Lasers, Railgun, 
and Gun-Launched Guided Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R45098, U.S. Army Weapons-Related Directed Energy (DE) Programs: Background and Potential Issues for 
Congress, by Andrew Feickert. 
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cancelled.82Congressional Research Service  
 
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High-powered microwave weapons, a subset of DE weapons, could be used as a nonkinetic means of disabling electronics, communications systems, and improvised explosive devices, or as a nonlethal “heat ray” system for crowd control.  
United States84 Although the United States has been researching directed energy since the 1960s, some experts have observed that “actual directed-energy programs … have frequently fallen short of expectations,” with DOD investing billions of dollars in programs that were ultimately cancelled.85 Others contend that developments in commercial lasers could be leveraged for  Others contend that developments in commercial lasers could be leveraged for 
military applications.military applications.
8386 Directed-energy weapons programs continue, however, to face questions  Directed-energy weapons programs continue, however, to face questions 
about their technological maturity, including questions about the ability to improve beam quality about their technological maturity, including questions about the ability to improve beam quality 
and control to militarily useful levels and the ability to meet power, cooling, and size and control to militarily useful levels and the ability to meet power, cooling, and size 
requirements for integration into current platforms.requirements for integration into current platforms.
8487    
The U.S. Navy fielded the first operational U.S. DE weapon, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS), 
The U.S. Navy fielded the first operational U.S. DE weapon, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS), 
in 2014 aboard the USS in 2014 aboard the USS 
Ponce. LaWS was a 30-kilowatt (-kW) laser prototype that “was capable . LaWS was a 30-kilowatt (-kW) laser prototype that “was capable 
of blinding enemy forces as a warning, shooting down drones, disabling boats, or damaging of blinding enemy forces as a warning, shooting down drones, disabling boats, or damaging 
helicopters.”helicopters.”
8588 The Navy plans to deploy its 60-kW laser, HELIOS, aboard the USS  The Navy plans to deploy its 60-kW laser, HELIOS, aboard the USS 
Preble in  in 
2021, while the Army plans to field its first “combat relevant” laser—the 50-kW Directed Energy 2021, while the Army plans to field its first “combat relevant” laser—the 50-kW Directed Energy 
Mobile Short-Range Air Defense System—on Stryker fighting vehicles in FY2022.Mobile Short-Range Air Defense System—on Stryker fighting vehicles in FY2022.
8689 Similarly,  Similarly, 
the Air Force is currently conducting field assessments of several counter-UAS DE systems, the Air Force is currently conducting field assessments of several counter-UAS DE systems, 
including both laser and high-powered microwave systems.including both laser and high-powered microwave systems.
8790  
The Army, Navy, Air Force, and DARPA each have DE development programs underway, with 
The Army, Navy, Air Force, and DARPA each have DE development programs underway, with 
the Pentagon requesting $235 million for directed-energy weapons and directed-energy defensive the Pentagon requesting $235 million for directed-energy weapons and directed-energy defensive 
capabilities in FY2020; the FY2021 budget overview does not provide the topline funding request capabilities in FY2020; the FY2021 budget overview does not provide the topline funding request 
for DE weapons.for DE weapons.
8891 These programs are intended to scale up power levels from around 150 kW, as  These programs are intended to scale up power levels from around 150 kW, as 
is currently feasible, to around 300 kW, a level at which cruise missiles could potentially be intercepted, by FY2022 and to around 500 kW by FY2024.89  
                                                 82
                                                 84 For additional information about U.S. directed-energy programs, see CRS Report R44175, Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched Guided Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R45098, U.S. Army Weapons-Related Directed Energy (DE) Programs: Background and Potential Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert. 
85 Paul Scharre, Preface to “Directed-Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects,” Center for a New American Security,  Paul Scharre, Preface to “Directed-Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects,” Center for a New American Security, 
April 2015, p. 4. April 2015, p. 4. 
8386 See Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,”  See Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” 
National Defense, July 1, 2015, at , July 1, 2015, at 
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-
ready. ready. 
8487 Ibid.  Ibid. 
8588 Kyle Mizokami, “The U.S. Army Plans To Field the Most Powerful Laser Weapon Yet,”  Kyle Mizokami, “The U.S. Army Plans To Field the Most Powerful Laser Weapon Yet,” 
Popular Mechanics, , 
August 7, 2019. August 7, 2019. 
8689 Lockheed Martin, “Lockheed Martin’s HELIOS Laser Weapon System Takes Step Toward Ship Integration,” March  Lockheed Martin, “Lockheed Martin’s HELIOS Laser Weapon System Takes Step Toward Ship Integration,” March 
11, 2020, at https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2020-03-11-Lockheed-Martins-HELIOS-Laser-Weapon-System-Takes-11, 2020, at https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2020-03-11-Lockheed-Martins-HELIOS-Laser-Weapon-System-Takes-
Step-Toward-Ship-Integration; and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Step-Toward-Ship-Integration; and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, 
“Defense Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request,” February 2020, “Defense Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request,” February 2020, 
at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/
fy2021_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. fy2021_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. 
8790 Kyle Mizokami, “The Air Force Mobilizes Its Laser and Microwave Weapons Abroad,”  Kyle Mizokami, “The Air Force Mobilizes Its Laser and Microwave Weapons Abroad,” 
Popular Mechanics, April 9, , April 9, 
2020, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a32083799/laser-microwave-weapons/. 2020, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a32083799/laser-microwave-weapons/. 
8891 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United 
States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request, March 2019, p. 9.  States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request, March 2019, p. 9.  
89 Although there is no consensus regarding the precise power level that would be needed to neutralize different target sets, it is generally believed that a laser of around 100 kW could engage UAVs, small boats, rockets, artillery, and mortar, whereas a laser of around 300 kW laser could additionally engage cruise missiles flying in certain profiles (i.e., flying across—rather than at—the laser). See, for example, CRS Report R41526, Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, 
Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; and Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Lasers to Kill Cruise Missiles Sought by Navy, Air Force, Army,” Breaking Defense, October 29, 2019. For information about DOD’s Laser Scaling Plan, see Jason Sherman, “New Laser Scaling Plan sets directed-energy efforts, FY-19 contracts,” Inside Defense, April 17, 2019, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/new-laser-scaling-plan-sets-directed-energy-efforts-fy-19-contracts. 
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is currently feasible, to around 300 kW, a level at which cruise missiles could potentially be intercepted, by FY2022 and to around 500 kW by FY2024.92  
China 
China has reportedly developed a 30-kilowatt road-mobile DE system, LW-30, designed to China has reportedly developed a 30-kilowatt road-mobile DE system, LW-30, designed to 
engage unmanned aerial vehicles and precision-guided weapons.engage unmanned aerial vehicles and precision-guided weapons.
9093 Reports indicate that China is  Reports indicate that China is 
also developing an airborne DE weapon pod and has used or proposed using DE weapons to also developing an airborne DE weapon pod and has used or proposed using DE weapons to 
interfere with U.S. and allied military aircraft and to disrupt U.S. freedom of navigation interfere with U.S. and allied military aircraft and to disrupt U.S. freedom of navigation 
operations in the Indo-Pacific.operations in the Indo-Pacific.
9194  
According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, China is additionally pursuing DE weapons  
According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, China is additionally pursuing DE weapons  
to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites and their sensors and possibly already has a limited 
to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites and their sensors and possibly already has a limited 
capability  to  employ  laser  systems  against  satellite  sensors.  China  likely  will  field  a capability  to  employ  laser  systems  against  satellite  sensors.  China  likely  will  field  a 
ground-based laser weapon that can counter low-orbit space-based sensors by 2020, and ground-based laser weapon that can counter low-orbit space-based sensors by 2020, and 
by the mid-to-late 2020s, it may field higher power systems that extend the threat to the by the mid-to-late 2020s, it may field higher power systems that extend the threat to the 
structures of non-optical satellites.structures of non-optical satellites.
9295  
Russia 
Russia claims to have fielded the Peresvet ground-based DE weapon system in December 2018. Russia claims to have fielded the Peresvet ground-based DE weapon system in December 2018. 
Although little is publicly known about Peresvet, including its power level, the weapon can Although little is publicly known about Peresvet, including its power level, the weapon can 
reportedly disrupt Global Positioning System (GPS) and communications signals and may be able reportedly disrupt Global Positioning System (GPS) and communications signals and may be able 
to perform C-UAS and antisatellite missions.to perform C-UAS and antisatellite missions.
9396    
International Institutions 
DE weapons “are not authoritatively defined under international law, nor are they currently on the DE weapons “are not authoritatively defined under international law, nor are they currently on the 
agenda of any existing multilateral mechanism.”agenda of any existing multilateral mechanism.”
9497 However, certain applications of DE weapons  However, certain applications of DE weapons 
are prohibited. For example, Protocol IV of the CCW “Protocol on Blinding Lasers” prohibits are prohibited. For example, Protocol IV of the CCW “Protocol on Blinding Lasers” prohibits 
“excessively injurious” applications of DE weapons, including the use of DE weapons to permanently blind enemy combatants. Similarly, some analysts have suggested that multilateral agreements should be established to restrict certain military applications of lasers—such as aircraft interference—in peacetime.95 
Potential Questions for Congress 
  Does the technological maturity of DE weapons warrant current funding levels? 
To what extent, if at all, can advances in commercial lasers be leveraged for military applications? 
                                                 90
                                                 92 Although there is no consensus regarding the precise power level that would be needed to neutralize different target sets, it is generally believed that a laser of around 100 kW could engage UAVs, small boats, rockets, artillery, and mortar, whereas a laser of around 300 kW laser could additionally engage cruise missiles flying in certain profiles (i.e., flying across—rather than at—the laser). See, for example, CRS Report R41526, Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; and Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Lasers to Kill Cruise Missiles Sought by Navy, Air Force, Army,” Breaking Defense, October 29, 2019. For information about DOD’s Laser Scaling Plan, see Jason Sherman, “New Laser Scaling Plan sets directed-energy efforts, FY-19 contracts,” Inside Defense, April 17, 2019, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/new-laser-scaling-plan-sets-directed-energy-efforts-fy-19-contracts. 
93 Nikolai Novichkov, “Airshow China 2018: CASIC’s LW-30 laser weapon system breaks cover,”  Nikolai Novichkov, “Airshow China 2018: CASIC’s LW-30 laser weapon system breaks cover,” 
Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, November 9, 2018. , November 9, 2018. 
9194 Andrew Tate, “China aiming to procure airborne laser-based weapon pod,”  Andrew Tate, “China aiming to procure airborne laser-based weapon pod,” 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 8, 2020; , January 8, 2020; 
and Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at and Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at 
https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/. https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/. 
9295 Defense Intelligence Agency,  Defense Intelligence Agency, 
Challenges to Security in Space, February 2019, p. 20, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/, February 2019, p. 20, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/
27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf. 27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf. 
9396 Defense Intelligence Agency,  Defense Intelligence Agency, 
Challenges to Security in Space, p. 23, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/, p. 23, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/
News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf; and “Putin hails new Russian laser News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf; and “Putin hails new Russian laser 
weapons,” weapons,” 
Associated Press, May 17, 2019, at https://apnews.com/ff03960c48a6440bacc1c2512a7c197a. , May 17, 2019, at https://apnews.com/ff03960c48a6440bacc1c2512a7c197a. 
9497 “Directed Energy Weapons: Discussion paper for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),”  “Directed Energy Weapons: Discussion paper for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),” 
Article 36, November 2017. Article 36, November 2017. 
95 Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/. 
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“excessively injurious” applications of DE weapons, including the use of DE weapons to permanently blind enemy combatants. Similarly, some analysts have suggested that multilateral agreements should be established to restrict certain military applications of lasers—such as aircraft interference—in peacetime.98 
Potential Questions for Congress 
  Does the technological maturity of DE weapons warrant current funding levels? 
To what extent, if at all, can advances in commercial lasers be leveraged for military applications? 
  How successful have U.S. field tests of DE weapons been? Are any changes to 
  How successful have U.S. field tests of DE weapons been? Are any changes to 
operational concepts, rules of engagement, or tactics required to optimize the use 
operational concepts, rules of engagement, or tactics required to optimize the use 
of DE weapons or deconflict the use of DE weapons with other U.S. military of DE weapons or deconflict the use of DE weapons with other U.S. military 
operations? operations? 
  Are any additional restrictions on the use of DE weapons necessary and, if so, 
  Are any additional restrictions on the use of DE weapons necessary and, if so, 
what kind? 
what kind? 
Biotechnology  
Biotechnology leverages life sciences for technological applications. A number of developments Biotechnology leverages life sciences for technological applications. A number of developments 
in biotechnology hold potential implications for the U.S. military and for international security in biotechnology hold potential implications for the U.S. military and for international security 
writ large. As a 2018 Government Accountability Office report notes, the Departments of writ large. As a 2018 Government Accountability Office report notes, the Departments of 
Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
assess that biotechnologies, such as the low-cost gene-editing tool CRISPR,assess that biotechnologies, such as the low-cost gene-editing tool CRISPR,
9699 have the potential  have the potential 
to to 
alter genes or create DNA to modify plants, animals, and humans. Such biotechnologies 
alter genes or create DNA to modify plants, animals, and humans. Such biotechnologies 
could  be  used  to  enhance  [or  degrade]  the  performance  of  military  personnel.  The could  be  used  to  enhance  [or  degrade]  the  performance  of  military  personnel.  The 
proliferation  of  synthetic  biology—used  to  create  genetic  code  that  does  not  exist  in proliferation  of  synthetic  biology—used  to  create  genetic  code  that  does  not  exist  in 
nature—may  increase  the  number  of  actors  that  can  create  chemical  and  biological nature—may  increase  the  number  of  actors  that  can  create  chemical  and  biological 
weapons.weapons.
97100    
Similarly, the U.S. intelligence community’s 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment cited genome 
Similarly, the U.S. intelligence community’s 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment cited genome 
editing as a potential weapon of mass destruction.editing as a potential weapon of mass destruction.
98101  
In addition, biotechnology could be used to create adaptive camouflage, cloaking devices, or 
In addition, biotechnology could be used to create adaptive camouflage, cloaking devices, or 
lighter, stronger, and—potentially—self-healing body and vehicle armor.lighter, stronger, and—potentially—self-healing body and vehicle armor.
99102 Concerns have been  Concerns have been 
raised that U.S. competitors may not hold the same ethical standards in the research and raised that U.S. competitors may not hold the same ethical standards in the research and 
application of biotechnologies, particularly regarding biological weapons, genome editing, or more invasive forms of human performance modification.100 
                                                 96
                                                 98 Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/. 
99 For a general overview of CRISPR, see CRS Report R44824,  For a general overview of CRISPR, see CRS Report R44824, 
Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9, by Marcy E. , by Marcy E. 
Gallo et al.  Gallo et al.  
97100 Government Accountability Office,  Government Accountability Office, 
National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States as 
Identified by Federal Agencies, December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. , December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. 
98101 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”  James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” 
delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016. delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016. 
99102 Patrick Tucker, “The US Army Is Making Synthetic Biology a Priority,”  Patrick Tucker, “The US Army Is Making Synthetic Biology a Priority,” 
Defense One, July 1, 2019; and “Army , July 1, 2019; and “Army 
scientists explore synthetic biology potential,” U.S. Army, June 24, 2019, at https://www.army.mil/article/223495/scientists explore synthetic biology potential,” U.S. Army, June 24, 2019, at https://www.army.mil/article/223495/
army_scientists_explore_synthetic_biology_potential.  army_scientists_explore_synthetic_biology_potential.  
100 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016; and Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018. Although the U.S. military has long used certain drugs such as caffeine, modafinil, dextroamphetamine, and various sleep aids to enhance soldier performance, it bans other performance-enhancing drugs and techniques such as anabolic steroids and blood doping. See Paul Scharre and Lauren Fish, Human 
Performance Enhancement, Center for a New American Security, November 7, 2018, at https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/human-performance-enhancement-1.  
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application of biotechnologies, particularly regarding biological weapons, genome editing, or more invasive forms of human performance modification.103 
United States 
Pursuant to Section 1086 of the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328),Pursuant to Section 1086 of the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328),
101104 the Trump Administration  the Trump Administration 
released the released the 
National Biodefense Strategy, which outlines “how the United States Government , which outlines “how the United States Government 
will manage its activities more effectively to assess, prevent, detect, prepare for, respond to, and will manage its activities more effectively to assess, prevent, detect, prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from biological threats, coordinating its biodefense efforts with those of international recover from biological threats, coordinating its biodefense efforts with those of international 
partners, industry, academia, non-governmental entities, and the private sector.”partners, industry, academia, non-governmental entities, and the private sector.”
102105 As some  As some 
analysts have noted, however, this strategy was not accompanied by a resourced action plan and, analysts have noted, however, this strategy was not accompanied by a resourced action plan and, 
thus, was “largely unimplemented.”thus, was “largely unimplemented.”
103106 Furthermore, there is no DOD-specific biotechnology  Furthermore, there is no DOD-specific biotechnology 
research strategy.research strategy.
104107  
Unclassified U.S. biotechnology programs with military applications center primarily on 
Unclassified U.S. biotechnology programs with military applications center primarily on 
improving “readiness, resilience, and recovery.” DARPA, for example, has a number of improving “readiness, resilience, and recovery.” DARPA, for example, has a number of 
biotechnology programs devoted to battlefield medicine, diagnostics, and prognostics. It is also biotechnology programs devoted to battlefield medicine, diagnostics, and prognostics. It is also 
exploring options for mitigating the effects of traumatic brain injury, treating neuropsychiatric exploring options for mitigating the effects of traumatic brain injury, treating neuropsychiatric 
illnesses such as depression and post-traumatic stress, and protecting against infectious diseases illnesses such as depression and post-traumatic stress, and protecting against infectious diseases 
and bio-engineered threats to the U.S. food supply. In addition, DARPA’s Safe Genes program and bio-engineered threats to the U.S. food supply. In addition, DARPA’s Safe Genes program 
seeks “to [protect] service members from accidental or intentional misuse of genome editing seeks “to [protect] service members from accidental or intentional misuse of genome editing 
technologies.”technologies.”
105108 Biotechnology research is also being conducted at the service laboratories,  Biotechnology research is also being conducted at the service laboratories, 
which recently completed a $45 million, three-year joint research initiative in synthetic biology which recently completed a $45 million, three-year joint research initiative in synthetic biology 
“intended to develop new bio-based materials and sensors.”“intended to develop new bio-based materials and sensors.”
106109    
In addition, some reports suggest that the United States is researching or has previously 
In addition, some reports suggest that the United States is researching or has previously 
researched biotechnology and neuroscience applications to increase soldier lethality, including researched biotechnology and neuroscience applications to increase soldier lethality, including 
applications to make soldiers “stronger, smarter, [and] more capable, and … give them more applications to make soldiers “stronger, smarter, [and] more capable, and … give them more 
endurance than other humans.”endurance than other humans.”
107110 Some groups have expressed ethical concerns about this  Some groups have expressed ethical concerns about this 
research; although the United States had a series of presidential bioethics commissions between 1974 and 2017, there is no current national framework for examining ethical concerns.108  
                                                 101 P.L. 114-328, Section 2, Division A, Title X, §1086.  102                                                 103 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016; and Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018. Although the U.S. military has long used certain drugs such as caffeine, modafinil, dextroamphetamine, and various sleep aids to enhance soldier performance, it bans other performance-enhancing drugs and techniques such as anabolic steroids and blood doping. See Paul Scharre and Lauren Fish, Human Performance Enhancement, Center for a New American Security, November 7, 2018, at https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/human-performance-enhancement-1.  
104 P.L. 114-328, Section 2, Division A, Title X, §1086.  105 The White House,  The White House, 
National Biodefense Strategy, 2018, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/, 2018, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf. National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf. 
103106 See, for example, Tara O’Toole, “Remarks at ‘Synthetic Biology and National Security: Risks and Opportunities,’”  See, for example, Tara O’Toole, “Remarks at ‘Synthetic Biology and National Security: Risks and Opportunities,’” 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 14, 2020. Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 14, 2020. 
104107 Diane Dieuliis, “Biotechnology for the Battlefield: In Need of a Strategy,”  Diane Dieuliis, “Biotechnology for the Battlefield: In Need of a Strategy,” 
War on the Rocks, November 27, 2018. , November 27, 2018. 
There is, however, a coordinated framework for biotechnology regulation. See “Modernizing the Regulatory System There is, however, a coordinated framework for biotechnology regulation. See “Modernizing the Regulatory System 
for Biotechnology Products: Final Version of the 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of for Biotechnology Products: Final Version of the 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of 
Biotechnology,” January 2017, at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-01/documents/Biotechnology,” January 2017, at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-01/documents/
2017_coordinated_framework_update.pdf.  2017_coordinated_framework_update.pdf.  
105108 See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Our Research: Biological Technologies Office,” at  See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Our Research: Biological Technologies Office,” at 
https://www.darpa.mil/our-research?tFilter=&oFilter=1. https://www.darpa.mil/our-research?tFilter=&oFilter=1. 
106109 Marisa Alia-Novobilski, “Tri-Service effort leverages synthetic biology expertise to address future warfighter  Marisa Alia-Novobilski, “Tri-Service effort leverages synthetic biology expertise to address future warfighter 
needs,” Wright-Patterson AFB, September 27, 2017. needs,” Wright-Patterson AFB, September 27, 2017. 
107110 Annie Jacobsen,  Annie Jacobsen, 
The Pentagon’s Brain: An Uncensored History of DARPA, America’s Top-Secret Military 
Research Agency (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2015). See also Michael Joseph Gross, “The Pentagon’s Push to Program Soldiers’ Brains,” The Atlantic, November 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/the-pentagon-wants-to-weaponize-the-brain-what-could-go-wrong/570841/.  
108 For a history of these commissions, see Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, “History of Bioethics Commissions,” archived January 15, 2017, at https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/history.html.  
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research; although the United States had a series of presidential bioethics commissions between 1974 and 2017, there is no current national framework for examining ethical concerns.111  
Finally, per Section 263 of the FY2020 NDAA, DOD is to conduct “a review of the military understanding and relevancy of applications of emerging biotechnologies to national security requirements of the Department of Defense,” as well as “an assessment of the technical basis within the Department used to inform the intelligence community of the Department’s collection and analysis needs relating to emerging biotechnologies.”112 DOD is additionally to develop a recommendation on the appropriate definition of “emerging biotechnologies” and provide recommendations for future legislative and administrative activities.113 
China 
Motivated by an aging population and growing health care needs, China has been particularly Motivated by an aging population and growing health care needs, China has been particularly 
interested in conducting biotechnology research. Biotechnology is cited as a key strategic priority interested in conducting biotechnology research. Biotechnology is cited as a key strategic priority 
within China’s within China’s 
Made in China 2025 initiative and is additionally highlighted within China’s  initiative and is additionally highlighted within China’s 
current five-year development plan.current five-year development plan.
109114 In particular, China is aggressively pursuing  In particular, China is aggressively pursuing 
biotechnologies for genetic testing and precision medicine. In 2016, Chinese scientists became biotechnologies for genetic testing and precision medicine. In 2016, Chinese scientists became 
the first to use the CRISPR gene-editing tool on humans, and in 2018, a Chinese scientist the first to use the CRISPR gene-editing tool on humans, and in 2018, a Chinese scientist 
produced—perhaps with the approval of the Chinese government—the first “gene-edited produced—perhaps with the approval of the Chinese government—the first “gene-edited 
babies.”babies.”
110115 In addition, China maintains one of the world’s largest repositories of genetic  In addition, China maintains one of the world’s largest repositories of genetic 
information, the National Genebank, which includes U.S. genetic data. Such information could be information, the National Genebank, which includes U.S. genetic data. Such information could be 
used to develop personalized disease treatment plans or, potentially, precision bioweapons.used to develop personalized disease treatment plans or, potentially, precision bioweapons.
111116    
Open-source information about China’s research into specific military applications of 
Open-source information about China’s research into specific military applications of 
biotechnology is limited; however, China’s policy of military-civil fusion would enable the biotechnology is limited; however, China’s policy of military-civil fusion would enable the 
Chinese military to readily leverage developments in civilian biotechnology.Chinese military to readily leverage developments in civilian biotechnology.
112117 Furthermore,  Furthermore, 
reports indicate that China’s Central Military Commission “has funded projects on military brain reports indicate that China’s Central Military Commission “has funded projects on military brain 
science, advanced biomimetic systems, biological and biomimetic materials, human performance science, advanced biomimetic systems, biological and biomimetic materials, human performance 
enhancement, and ‘new concept’ biotechnology,” while the Chinese military’s medical institutions have conducted extensive research on CRISPR gene editing.113 
Russia 
Although Russia released BIO2020—a whole-of-government strategy for improving the standing of Russia’s biotechnology sector—in 2012, biotechnology research in Russia continues to lag behind that of the United States and China.114 BIO2020 identifies Russia’s priority areas for biotechnology research as biopharmaceutics and biomedicine, industrial biotechnology and bioenergetics, agricultural and food biotechnology, forest biotechnology, environmental protection biotechnology, and marine biotechnology.115  
Little information is publicly available on how Russia might employ such dual-use technologies within a military or national security context. However, the accusation that the country recently attempted to assassinate a former double agent for the United Kingdom using a Novichok nerve agent—in violation of the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention—suggests that it may be 
                                                 109 Shannon Ellis, “Biotech Booms in China,” Nature, January 17, 2018. 110
                                                 Research Agency (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2015). See also Michael Joseph Gross, “The Pentagon’s Push to Program Soldiers’ Brains,” The Atlantic, November 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/the-pentagon-wants-to-weaponize-the-brain-what-could-go-wrong/570841/.  
111 For a history of these commissions, see Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, “History of Bioethics Commissions,” archived January 15, 2017, at https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/history.html.  
112 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §263.  113 Ibid. 114 Shannon Ellis, “Biotech Booms in China,” Nature, January 17, 2018. 115 Amidst international outcry, China later sentenced the scientist to three years in jail and termed his work “extremely  Amidst international outcry, China later sentenced the scientist to three years in jail and termed his work “extremely 
abominable in nature.” Michael Standaert, “'Extremely abominable’: Chinese gene-editing scientist faces law,” abominable in nature.” Michael Standaert, “'Extremely abominable’: Chinese gene-editing scientist faces law,” 
Al 
Jazeera, November 26, 2018. See also, Elsa Kania, “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a , November 26, 2018. See also, Elsa Kania, “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a 
‘New Domain of Warfare,’” ‘New Domain of Warfare,’” 
Defense One, August 14, 2019. , August 14, 2019. 
111116 David J. Lynch, “Biotechnology: the US-China dispute over genetic data,”  David J. Lynch, “Biotechnology: the US-China dispute over genetic data,” 
Financial Times, July 31, 2017. See also , July 31, 2017. See also 
Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New 
Revolution in Military Affairs,” Revolution in Military Affairs,” 
The Jamestown Foundation, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/
chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/. chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/. 
112117 Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a ‘New Domain of  Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a ‘New Domain of 
Warfare,’” Warfare,’” 
Defense One, August 14, 2019, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/08/chinas-military-pursuing-, August 14, 2019, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/08/chinas-military-pursuing-
biotech/159167/. biotech/159167/. 
113 Ibid. 114 Russian Federation, “BIO2020: Summary of the State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology in the Russian Federation,” 2012. 115 Ibid. 
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enhancement, and ‘new concept’ biotechnology,” while the Chinese military’s medical institutions have conducted extensive research on CRISPR gene editing.118 
Russia Although Russia released BIO2020—a whole-of-government strategy for improving the standing of Russia’s biotechnology sector—in 2012, biotechnology research in Russia continues to lag behind that of the United States and China.119 BIO2020 identifies Russia’s priority areas for biotechnology research as biopharmaceutics and biomedicine, industrial biotechnology and bioenergetics, agricultural and food biotechnology, forest biotechnology, environmental protection biotechnology, and marine biotechnology.120  
Little information is publicly available on how Russia might employ such dual-use technologies within a military or national security context. However, the accusation that the country recently attempted to assassinate a former double agent for the United Kingdom using a Novichok nerve agent—in violation of the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention—suggests that it may be similarly unrestrained in weaponizing biological agents, including those derived from synthetic biology.121 Indeed, the Soviet Union is known to have maintained an extensive, long-standing  Indeed, the Soviet Union is known to have maintained an extensive, long-standing 
biological weapons program, Biopreparat, in violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons biological weapons program, Biopreparat, in violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention.Convention.
117122    
International Institutions 
Only the weaponization of biotechnology is prohibited under international law.Only the weaponization of biotechnology is prohibited under international law.
118123 Some  Some 
international institutions have demonstrated interest in considering broader implications of international institutions have demonstrated interest in considering broader implications of 
biotechnologies. For example, since 1983, ASEAN has maintained a subcommittee on biotechnologies. For example, since 1983, ASEAN has maintained a subcommittee on 
biotechnology that facilitates coordination of regional biotechnology projects. Similarly, since biotechnology that facilitates coordination of regional biotechnology projects. Similarly, since 
1993, the OECD has maintained an Internal Co-ordination Group for Biotechnology that 1993, the OECD has maintained an Internal Co-ordination Group for Biotechnology that 
monitors developments in biotechnology and facilitates coordination among various sectors monitors developments in biotechnology and facilitates coordination among various sectors 
involved in biotechnology research (e.g., agriculture, science and technology, environment, involved in biotechnology research (e.g., agriculture, science and technology, environment, 
industry). In addition, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity is charged with industry). In addition, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity is charged with 
governing the development and use of genetically modified organisms.governing the development and use of genetically modified organisms.
119124 These entities are not,  These entities are not, 
however, focused specifically on military applications of biotechnology.  however, focused specifically on military applications of biotechnology.  
In terms of potential militarization, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention requires review 
In terms of potential militarization, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention requires review 
conferences, which every five years assess both the implementation of the treaty and ongoing conferences, which every five years assess both the implementation of the treaty and ongoing 
developments in biotechnology. Annual meetings are held between review conferences to developments in biotechnology. Annual meetings are held between review conferences to 
informally consider relevant topics, as well as to address national bilateral and multilateral efforts to enhance biosecurity. Some analysts have argued that an international framework should be established to consider the militarization of biotechnologies and discuss potential regulation of or limits on certain applications.120 
Potential Questions for Congress 
  Is a DOD biotechnology strategy or organization needed to identify research 
priorities and coordinate department-wide research? What, if any, resources or organizational changes would be required to fully implement a national biodefense strategy? 
  What military applications of biotechnologies are U.S. competitors developing? 
Is the U.S. military appropriately balancing the potential warfighting utility of biotechnologies with ethical considerations? 
  What, if any, national and international frameworks are needed to consider the 
ethical, moral, and legal implications of military applications of biotechnologies 
                                                 116
                                                 118 Ibid. 119 Russian Federation, “BIO2020: Summary of the State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology in the Russian Federation,” 2012. 120 Ibid. 121 Mark Urban, “Salisbury attack ‘evidence’ of Russian weapon stockpile,” Mark Urban, “Salisbury attack ‘evidence’ of Russian weapon stockpile,”
 BBC, March 4, 2019. For a full assessment , March 4, 2019. For a full assessment 
of the potential national security threats posed by synthetic biology, see the Committee on Strategies for Identifying of the potential national security threats posed by synthetic biology, see the Committee on Strategies for Identifying 
and Addressing Potential Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic Biology Consensus Report: and Addressing Potential Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic Biology Consensus Report: 
Biodefense in the 
Age of Synthetic Biology, National Academy of Sciences, 2018, at http://nap.edu/24890. , National Academy of Sciences, 2018, at http://nap.edu/24890. 
117122 Lukas Trakimavičius “Is Russia Violating the Biological Weapons Convention?,” Atlantic Council, May 23, 2018,  Lukas Trakimavičius “Is Russia Violating the Biological Weapons Convention?,” Atlantic Council, May 23, 2018, 
at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-russia-violating-the-biological-weapons-convention/.  at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-russia-violating-the-biological-weapons-convention/.  
118123 The United States, China, and Russia have ratified the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which is a legally  The United States, China, and Russia have ratified the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which is a legally 
binding treaty that bans the development and production of biological weapons. binding treaty that bans the development and production of biological weapons. 
119124 The United States is not a party to this convention or its associated protocols.  The United States is not a party to this convention or its associated protocols. 
120 See, for example, Brett Edwards, “We’ve got to talk: The militarization of biotechnology,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, August 4, 2017, at https://thebulletin.org/2017/08/weve-got-to-talk-the-militarization-of-biotechnology/.  
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informally consider relevant topics, as well as to address national bilateral and multilateral efforts to enhance biosecurity. Some analysts have argued that an international framework should be established to consider the militarization of biotechnologies and discuss potential regulation of or limits on certain applications.125 
Potential Questions for Congress 
  Is a DOD biotechnology strategy or organization needed to identify research 
priorities and coordinate department-wide research? What, if any, resources or organizational changes would be required to fully implement a national biodefense strategy? 
  What military applications of biotechnologies are U.S. competitors developing? 
Is the U.S. military appropriately balancing the potential warfighting utility of biotechnologies with ethical considerations? 
  What, if any, national and international frameworks are needed to consider the 
ethical, moral, and legal implications of military applications of biotechnologies such as synthetic biology, genome editing, and human performance such as synthetic biology, genome editing, and human performance 
modification?  modification?  
Quantum Technology 
Quantum technology translates the principles of quantum physics into technological Quantum technology translates the principles of quantum physics into technological 
applications.applications.
121126 In general, quantum technology has not yet reached maturity; however, it could  In general, quantum technology has not yet reached maturity; however, it could 
hold significant implications for the future of military communications, encryption, and stealth hold significant implications for the future of military communications, encryption, and stealth 
technologies. GAO reports that DOD, State, DHS, and the ODNI have assessed that “quantum technologies. GAO reports that DOD, State, DHS, and the ODNI have assessed that “quantum 
communications could enable adversaries to develop secure communications that U.S. personnel communications could enable adversaries to develop secure communications that U.S. personnel 
would not be able to intercept or decrypt. Quantum computing may allow adversaries to decrypt would not be able to intercept or decrypt. Quantum computing may allow adversaries to decrypt 
[unclassified, classified, or sensitive] information, which could enable them to target U.S. [unclassified, classified, or sensitive] information, which could enable them to target U.S. 
personnel and military operations.”personnel and military operations.”
122127    
Quantum technology could have other military applications, such as quantum radar systems 
Quantum technology could have other military applications, such as quantum radar systems 
hypothesized to be capable of identifying the performance characteristics (e.g., radar cross-hypothesized to be capable of identifying the performance characteristics (e.g., radar cross-
section, speed) of objects with a greater level of accuracy than conventional radar systems. If section, speed) of objects with a greater level of accuracy than conventional radar systems. If 
realized, these systems could significantly ease the tracking and targeting of U.S. low-observable, or stealth, aircraft such as the F-22, F-35, and B-2 by adversaries.123 Similarly, advances in quantum sensing could theoretically enable significant improvements in submarine detection, rendering the oceans “transparent.”124 This could, in turn, compromise the survivability of the U.S. sea-based nuclear deterrent.  
Military application of such technologies could be constrained, however, by the fragility of quantum states, which can be disrupted by minute movements, changes in temperature, or other environmental factors. As physicist Mikkel Hueck has explained, “if future devices that use quantum technologies [continue to] require cooling to very cold temperatures, then this will make them expensive, bulky, and power hungry.” As a result, widespread adoption will likely require significant advances in materials science and fabrication techniques.  
                                                 121
                                                 125 See, for example, Brett Edwards, “We’ve got to talk: The militarization of biotechnology,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 4, 2017, at https://thebulletin.org/2017/08/weve-got-to-talk-the-militarization-of-biotechnology/.  
126 These principles include superposition—in which “a quantum system can exist in two or more states at once”—and  These principles include superposition—in which “a quantum system can exist in two or more states at once”—and 
entanglement—in which “two or more quantum objects in a system can be intrinsically linked such that measurement entanglement—in which “two or more quantum objects in a system can be intrinsically linked such that measurement 
of one dictates the possible measurement outcomes for another, regardless of how far apart the two objects are.” Emily of one dictates the possible measurement outcomes for another, regardless of how far apart the two objects are.” Emily 
Grumbling and Mark Horowitz, eds., Grumbling and Mark Horowitz, eds., 
Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Sciences, 
2019, at https://www.nap.edu/read/25196/chapter/1. For additional information about quantum technology, see CRS 2019, at https://www.nap.edu/read/25196/chapter/1. For additional information about quantum technology, see CRS 
Report R45409, Report R45409, 
Quantum Information Science: Applications, Global Research and Development, and Policy 
Considerations, by Patricia Moloney Figliola.  , by Patricia Moloney Figliola.  
122127 Government Accountability Office,  Government Accountability Office, 
National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States as 
Identified by Federal Agencies, December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. Significant advances , December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. Significant advances 
in quantum computing will likely be required to break current encryption methods. Indeed, some analysts believe that a in quantum computing will likely be required to break current encryption methods. Indeed, some analysts believe that a 
quantum computer with around 20 million qubits—shorthand for “quantum bits,” or computing units that leverage the quantum computer with around 20 million qubits—shorthand for “quantum bits,” or computing units that leverage the 
principle of superposition—would be required to break these methods; the most advanced quantum computers today principle of superposition—would be required to break these methods; the most advanced quantum computers today 
have around 53 qubits. See “How a quantum computer could break 2048-bit RSA encryption in 8 hours,” have around 53 qubits. See “How a quantum computer could break 2048-bit RSA encryption in 8 hours,” 
MIT 
Technology Review, May 30, 2019, at https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/05/30/65724/how-a-quantum-, May 30, 2019, at https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/05/30/65724/how-a-quantum-
computer-could-break-2048-bit-rsa-encryption-in-8-hours/.  computer-could-break-2048-bit-rsa-encryption-in-8-hours/.  
123 Martin Giles, “The US and China are in a quantum arms race that will transform warfare,” MIT Technology Review, January 3, 2019, at https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/01/03/137969/us-china-quantum-arms-race/.  
124 Michael J. Biercuk and Richard Fontaine, “The Leap into Quantum Technology: A Primer for National Security Professionals,” War on the Rocks, November 17, 2017, at https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/leap-quantum-technology-primer-national-security-professionals/.  
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realized, these systems could significantly ease the tracking and targeting of U.S. low-observable, or stealth, aircraft such as the F-22, F-35, and B-2 by adversaries.128 Similarly, advances in quantum sensing could theoretically enable significant improvements in submarine detection, rendering the oceans “transparent.”129 This could, in turn, compromise the survivability of the U.S. sea-based nuclear deterrent.  
Military application of such technologies could be constrained, however, by the fragility of quantum states, which can be disrupted by minute movements, changes in temperature, or other environmental factors. As physicist Mikkel Hueck has explained, “if future devices that use quantum technologies [continue to] require cooling to very cold temperatures, then this will make them expensive, bulky, and power hungry.” As a result, widespread adoption will likely require significant advances in materials science and fabrication techniques.  
United States 
According to a Defense Science Board’s Task Force on Applications of Quantum Technologies According to a Defense Science Board’s Task Force on Applications of Quantum Technologies 
assessment, three applications of quantum technologies demonstrate the most promise for the assessment, three applications of quantum technologies demonstrate the most promise for the 
U.S. military: quantum sensing, quantum computing, and quantum communications.U.S. military: quantum sensing, quantum computing, and quantum communications.
125130 The task  The task 
force notes that quantum sensing could “dramatically improve” DOD’s ability to conduct certain force notes that quantum sensing could “dramatically improve” DOD’s ability to conduct certain 
missions, providing precision navigation and timing options in environments in which GPS is missions, providing precision navigation and timing options in environments in which GPS is 
degraded or denied; that quantum computers could “potentially give DOD substantial degraded or denied; that quantum computers could “potentially give DOD substantial 
computation power” for decryption, signals processing, and AI; and that quantum computation power” for decryption, signals processing, and AI; and that quantum 
communications could improve networking technologies.communications could improve networking technologies.
126131 The task force concludes that  The task force concludes that 
“quantum sensing applications are currently poised for mission use whereas quantum computing “quantum sensing applications are currently poised for mission use whereas quantum computing 
and communications are in earlier stages of development…. Quantum radar will not provide and communications are in earlier stages of development…. Quantum radar will not provide 
upgraded capability to DOD.”upgraded capability to DOD.”
127132 Both DARPA and the services fund an array of quantum  Both DARPA and the services fund an array of quantum 
technology programs across these and other research areas.  technology programs across these and other research areas.  
Per Section 234 of the FY2019 NDAA, the Secretary of Defense—acting through the Under 
Per Section 234 of the FY2019 NDAA, the Secretary of Defense—acting through the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering—is tasked with coordinating these programs Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering—is tasked with coordinating these programs 
and providing “for interagency cooperation and collaboration on quantum information science and providing “for interagency cooperation and collaboration on quantum information science 
and technology research and development between the Department of Defense and other and technology research and development between the Department of Defense and other 
departments and agencies of the United States and appropriate private sector entities.”departments and agencies of the United States and appropriate private sector entities.”
128133 DOD is  DOD is 
additionally to develop a research and investment plan for quantum technologies and to submit to additionally to develop a research and investment plan for quantum technologies and to submit to 
the congressional defense committees, by December 31, 2020, an assessment of U.S. and foreign the congressional defense committees, by December 31, 2020, an assessment of U.S. and foreign 
efforts to use quantum technologies for military applications.efforts to use quantum technologies for military applications.
129 
China 
China has increasingly prioritized quantum technology research within its development plans.130 Indeed, President Xi has cited quantum communications and quantum computing as key research initiatives “prioritized for major breakthroughs by 2030,” an objective that is also cited in the country’s National Science and Technology Innovation Program.131 China is already a world leader in quantum technology. In 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum satellite to provide a “global quantum encrypted communications capability.” In 2017, China hosted the first quantum-secured intercontinental videoconference.132 Furthermore, China is investing heavily in terrestrial quantum communications networks. It completed construction of a 2,000 kilometer                                                  125134 Furthermore, Section 220 of the FY2020 NDAA requires DOD to develop ethical guidelines for the use of quantum technologies, 
                                                 128 Martin Giles, “The US and China are in a quantum arms race that will transform warfare,” MIT Technology Review, January 3, 2019, at https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/01/03/137969/us-china-quantum-arms-race/.  
129 Michael J. Biercuk and Richard Fontaine, “The Leap into Quantum Technology: A Primer for National Security Professionals,” War on the Rocks, November 17, 2017, at https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/leap-quantum-technology-primer-national-security-professionals/.  
130 Defense Science Board,  Defense Science Board, 
Applications of Quantum Technologies: Executive Summary, October 2019, at , October 2019, at 
https://dsb.cto.mil/reports.htm. https://dsb.cto.mil/reports.htm. 
126131 Ibid.  Ibid. 
127132 Ibid.  Ibid. 
128133 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §234.  P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §234. 
129134 Ibid. A DOD representative also sits on the National Quantum Coordination Office’s Subcommittee on Quantum  Ibid. A DOD representative also sits on the National Quantum Coordination Office’s Subcommittee on Quantum 
Information Sciences, as required by the National Quantum Initiative Act (P.L. 115-368).  Information Sciences, as required by the National Quantum Initiative Act (P.L. 115-368).  
130 For a history of China’s quantum technology research and development initiatives, see Elsa B. Kania and John Costello, Quantum Hegemony?: China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation Leadership, Center for a New American Security, September 2018, p. 8, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-Quantum-Tech_FINAL.pdf?mtime=20180912133406.  
131 Ibid., p. 6. 132 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 101, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf. 
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as well as plans for supporting the quantum workforce and reducing the cybersecurity risks associated with quantum technologies.135 It additionally requires DOD to  
establish or designate [at least one] defense laboratory or establish activities to engage with appropriate public and private sector organizations, including academic organizations, to enhance  and  accelerate  the  research,  development,  and  deployment  of  quantum information  sciences  and  quantum  information  science-enabled  technologies  and systems.136 
China China has increasingly prioritized quantum technology research within its development plans.137 Indeed, President Xi has cited quantum communications and quantum computing as key research initiatives “prioritized for major breakthroughs by 2030,” an objective that is also cited in the country’s National Science and Technology Innovation Program.138 China is already a world leader in quantum technology. In 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum satellite to provide a “global quantum encrypted communications capability.” In 2017, China hosted the first quantum-secured intercontinental videoconference.139 Furthermore, China is investing heavily in terrestrial quantum communications networks. It completed construction of a 2,000 kilometer (approximately 1250 miles) Beijing-Shanghai quantum network in 2016 and plans to expand that (approximately 1250 miles) Beijing-Shanghai quantum network in 2016 and plans to expand that 
network nationwide in the years to come.network nationwide in the years to come.
133140 While such advances in quantum technology have  While such advances in quantum technology have 
been driven primarily by academia, China has expressed its intent to leverage them for military been driven primarily by academia, China has expressed its intent to leverage them for military 
applications in the country’s Thirteenth Five-Year S&T Military-Civil Fusion Special Projects applications in the country’s Thirteenth Five-Year S&T Military-Civil Fusion Special Projects 
Plan.  Plan.  
Russia 
Russian development of quantum technology, as with artificial intelligence, lags significantly Russian development of quantum technology, as with artificial intelligence, lags significantly 
behind that of the United States and China, with some analysts noting that Russia is likely “5 to behind that of the United States and China, with some analysts noting that Russia is likely “5 to 
10 years behind” in quantum computing.10 years behind” in quantum computing.
134141 In an effort to spur development, Russia announced  In an effort to spur development, Russia announced 
plans in December 2019 to invest $790 million in quantum research over the next five years and plans in December 2019 to invest $790 million in quantum research over the next five years and 
adopted a five-year Russian Quantum Technologies Roadmap.adopted a five-year Russian Quantum Technologies Roadmap.
135142 These initiatives are not  These initiatives are not 
military-specific, however, and limited information is available in open sources about how Russia military-specific, however, and limited information is available in open sources about how Russia 
might apply them to its military.  might apply them to its military.  
                                                 135 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §220. 136 Ibid.  137 For a history of China’s quantum technology research and development initiatives, see Elsa B. Kania and John Costello, Quantum Hegemony?: China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation Leadership, Center for a New American Security, September 2018, p. 8, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-Quantum-Tech_FINAL.pdf?mtime=20180912133406.  
138 Ibid., p. 6. 139 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 101, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf. 
140 Elsa B. Kania and John Costello, Quantum Hegemony?: China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation Leadership, p. 14.  
141 Quirin Schiermeier, “Russia joins race to make quantum dreams a reality,” Nature, December 17, 2019, at https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03855-z. 
142 For comparison, the U.S. National Quantum Initiative Act (P.L. 115-368), signed into law in December 2018, commits the United States to investing $1.25 billion in quantum research over five years. 
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International Institutions 
No major international institutions have formal initiatives devoted to monitoring or regulating No major international institutions have formal initiatives devoted to monitoring or regulating 
military or other applications of quantum technology. military or other applications of quantum technology. 
Potential Questions for Congress 
  Does the maturity of military applications of quantum technology warrant current 
  Does the maturity of military applications of quantum technology warrant current 
funding levels? To what extent, if at all, can advances in commercial quantum 
funding levels? To what extent, if at all, can advances in commercial quantum 
technology be leveraged for military applications? technology be leveraged for military applications? 
  Are adequate measures being taken to develop quantum-resistant encryption and 
  Are adequate measures being taken to develop quantum-resistant encryption and 
to protect data that has been encrypted using current methods? 
to protect data that has been encrypted using current methods? 
  How mature are U.S. competitor efforts to develop military applications of 
  How mature are U.S. competitor efforts to develop military applications of 
quantum technologies? To what extent, if at all, could such efforts threaten 
quantum technologies? To what extent, if at all, could such efforts threaten 
advanced U.S. military capabilities such as submarines and fifth-generation advanced U.S. military capabilities such as submarines and fifth-generation 
stealth aircraft?  stealth aircraft?  
Potential Implications of Emerging Technologies 
for Warfighting 
The implications of emerging technologies for warfighting and strategic stability are difficult—if The implications of emerging technologies for warfighting and strategic stability are difficult—if 
not impossible—to predict, as they will be a function of many factors, including the rate of not impossible—to predict, as they will be a function of many factors, including the rate of 
technological advancement in both the United States and competitor nations, the manner in which technological advancement in both the United States and competitor nations, the manner in which 
emerging technologies are integrated into existing military forces and concepts of operation, the emerging technologies are integrated into existing military forces and concepts of operation, the 
                                                 133 Elsa B. Kania and John Costello, Quantum Hegemony?: China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation 
Leadership, p. 14.  
134 Quirin Schiermeier, “Russia joins race to make quantum dreams a reality,” Nature, December 17, 2019, at https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03855-z. 
135 For comparison, the U.S. National Quantum Initiative Act (P.L. 115-368), signed into law in December 2018, commits the United States to investing $1.25 billion in quantum research over five years. 
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interactions between emerging technologies, and the extent to which national policies and interactions between emerging technologies, and the extent to which national policies and 
international law enable or inhibit their development, integration, and use.  international law enable or inhibit their development, integration, and use.  
Nonetheless, many emerging technologies exhibit characteristics that could potentially affect the 
Nonetheless, many emerging technologies exhibit characteristics that could potentially affect the 
future character of war. For example, developments in technologies such as AI, big data analytics, future character of war. For example, developments in technologies such as AI, big data analytics, 
and lethal autonomous weapons could diminish or remove the need for a human operator. This and lethal autonomous weapons could diminish or remove the need for a human operator. This 
could, in turn, increase combat efficiency and accelerate the pace of combat—potentially with could, in turn, increase combat efficiency and accelerate the pace of combat—potentially with 
destabilizing consequences.  destabilizing consequences.  
Emerging technologies such as low-cost drones could shift the balance between quality—upon 
Emerging technologies such as low-cost drones could shift the balance between quality—upon 
which U.S. military forces have traditionally relied—and quantity, as well as between offense and which U.S. military forces have traditionally relied—and quantity, as well as between offense and 
defense. For example, swarms of coordinated, unmanned vehicles could overwhelm defensive defense. For example, swarms of coordinated, unmanned vehicles could overwhelm defensive 
systems, providing a greater advantage to the attacker, while directed-energy weapons that systems, providing a greater advantage to the attacker, while directed-energy weapons that 
provide a low-cost means of neutralizing such attacks, could favor the defender. Thus, emerging provide a low-cost means of neutralizing such attacks, could favor the defender. Thus, emerging 
technologies could shift the offense-defense balance multiple times over the coming decades. technologies could shift the offense-defense balance multiple times over the coming decades. 
Interactions among emerging technologies could also improve existing military capabilities or 
Interactions among emerging technologies could also improve existing military capabilities or 
enable new capabilities—with unforeseen consequences for warfighting and strategic stability. enable new capabilities—with unforeseen consequences for warfighting and strategic stability. 
For example, an enabling technology like AI could be paired with quantum computing to produce For example, an enabling technology like AI could be paired with quantum computing to produce 
more powerful methods of machine learning, potentially leading to improvements in image more powerful methods of machine learning, potentially leading to improvements in image 
recognition and target identification and enabling more sophisticated autonomous weapons. recognition and target identification and enabling more sophisticated autonomous weapons. 
Similarly, AI could be paired with 5G communications technologies to enable virtual training Similarly, AI could be paired with 5G communications technologies to enable virtual training 
environments or with biotechnology in a “brain-computer interface” to enhance human cognition environments or with biotechnology in a “brain-computer interface” to enhance human cognition 
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or control prosthetics or robotic systems.or control prosthetics or robotic systems.
136143 Such developments could, in turn, require new  Such developments could, in turn, require new 
strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation.strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation.
137144  
Emerging military technologies—particularly complex systems such as AI and LAWS—could 
Emerging military technologies—particularly complex systems such as AI and LAWS—could 
additionally produce unintended consequences if they fail to perform as anticipated. These additionally produce unintended consequences if they fail to perform as anticipated. These 
consequences could range from system failure to violations of the law of armed conflict. As consequences could range from system failure to violations of the law of armed conflict. As 
analyst Paul Scharre has noted, “in the most extreme case, an autonomous weapon could continue analyst Paul Scharre has noted, “in the most extreme case, an autonomous weapon could continue 
engaging inappropriate targets until it exhausts its magazine, potentially over a wide area.”engaging inappropriate targets until it exhausts its magazine, potentially over a wide area.”
138145 This  This 
could, in turn, result in mass fratricide or civilian casualties—a possibility that has led some could, in turn, result in mass fratricide or civilian casualties—a possibility that has led some 
analysts to call for a pre-emptive ban on LAWS.  analysts to call for a pre-emptive ban on LAWS.  
Finally, emerging military technologies could raise an array of ethical considerations. For 
Finally, emerging military technologies could raise an array of ethical considerations. For 
example, some analysts have argued that the use of LAWS would be inherently immoral—example, some analysts have argued that the use of LAWS would be inherently immoral—
 regardless of whether the weapon could be used legally—because a human operator would not regardless of whether the weapon could be used legally—because a human operator would not 
make specific target selection and engagement decisions.make specific target selection and engagement decisions.
139146 Others have countered that human  Others have countered that human 
operators would continue to exercise “appropriate levels of human judgement over the use of operators would continue to exercise “appropriate levels of human judgement over the use of 
force” and would remain accountable for ensuring that the deployment of LAWS conforms to the force” and would remain accountable for ensuring that the deployment of LAWS conforms to the 
requirements of the laws of armed conflict.147 Those supporting a pre-emptive ban on LAWS have additionally appealed to the Martens Clause, which appears in the1899 Hague Convention preamble and states that weapons usage should conform to the “principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.”148 These analysts believe that LAWS contravene that requirement; however, others have noted that the Martens Clause has not been used previously to ban a weapons system and, furthermore, that the legal status of the Martens Clause is questionable and instead constitutes “merely a recognition of ‘customary international law’.”149 Similarly, some analysts have raised ethical concerns about applications of biotechnology that involve human testing or modification as well as the weaponization of biotechnology, which could potentially be used for targeted genetic attacks.150  
                                                 143
                                                 136 For additional information about military applications of 5G, see CRS In Focus IF11251,  For additional information about military applications of 5G, see CRS In Focus IF11251, 
National Security 
Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.  , by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.  
137144 For a discussion of these and other military and security implications—including implications for deterrence, crisis  For a discussion of these and other military and security implications—including implications for deterrence, crisis 
stability, force posture, and military roles and missions—see Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, stability, force posture, and military roles and missions—see Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, 
20YY: Preparing for 
War in the Robotic Age, Center for a New American Century, January 22, 2014, pp. 31-35, at https://www.cnas.org/, Center for a New American Century, January 22, 2014, pp. 31-35, at https://www.cnas.org/
publications/reports/20yy-preparing-for-war-in-the-robotic-age.  publications/reports/20yy-preparing-for-war-in-the-robotic-age.  
138145 Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security, February 2016,  Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security, February 2016, 
at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf. at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf. 
139146 See, for example, Bonnie Docherty,  See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, 
Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots, Human , Human 
Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-
killer-robots. killer-robots. 
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requirements of the laws of armed conflict.140 Those supporting a pre-emptive ban on LAWS have additionally appealed to the Martens Clause, which appears in the1899 Hague Convention preamble and states that weapons usage should conform to the “principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.”141 These analysts believe that LAWS contravene that requirement; however, others have noted that the Martens Clause has not been used previously to ban a weapons system and, furthermore, that the legal status of the Martens Clause is questionable and instead constitutes “merely a recognition of ‘customary international law’.”142 Similarly, some analysts have raised ethical concerns about applications of biotechnology that involve human testing or modification as well as the weaponization of biotechnology, which could potentially be used for targeted genetic attacks.143     147 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at https://www.esd.whs. 
148 See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots, Human Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-killer-robots. 
149 Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018), pp. 263-266.  
150 For a more in-depth discussion of ethical considerations related to biotechnology, see CRS Report R44824, Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9, by Marcy E. Gallo et al. See also Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” The Jamestown Foundation, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/. 
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Issues for Congress 
Congress has previously demonstrated interest in conducting oversight of emerging military Congress has previously demonstrated interest in conducting oversight of emerging military 
technologies beyond technology-specific activities. In Section 247 of the FY2019 NDAA, technologies beyond technology-specific activities. In Section 247 of the FY2019 NDAA, 
Congress specified “a set of classified reports that set forth a direct comparison between the Congress specified “a set of classified reports that set forth a direct comparison between the 
capabilities of the United States in emerging technology areas and the capabilities of adversaries capabilities of the United States in emerging technology areas and the capabilities of adversaries 
of the United States.”of the United States.”
144151 These areas include hypersonic weapons, AI, quantum technology,  These areas include hypersonic weapons, AI, quantum technology, 
directed energy weapons, and other relevant technologies as determined by the Secretary of directed energy weapons, and other relevant technologies as determined by the Secretary of 
Defense. Section 225 of the FY2019 NDAA additionally tasked the Under Secretary of Defense Defense. Section 225 of the FY2019 NDAA additionally tasked the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Research and Engineering with generating procedures for developing “technologies that are for Research and Engineering with generating procedures for developing “technologies that are 
urgently needed to react to a technological development of an adversary of the United States or to urgently needed to react to a technological development of an adversary of the United States or to 
respond to a significant and urgent emerging technology [that are] not receiving appropriate respond to a significant and urgent emerging technology [that are] not receiving appropriate 
research funding or attention from the Department of Defense.”  research funding or attention from the Department of Defense.”  
Furthermore, Section 232 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) tasked the Secretary of Defense 
Furthermore, Section 232 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) tasked the Secretary of Defense 
with developing “a process to ensure that the policies of the Department of Defense relating to with developing “a process to ensure that the policies of the Department of Defense relating to 
emerging technology are formulated and updated continuously as such technology is developed emerging technology are formulated and updated continuously as such technology is developed 
by the Department.”by the Department.”
145  
                                                 140 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at https://www.esd.whs. 
141 See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots, Human Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-killer-robots. 
142 Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018), pp. 263-266.  
143 For a more in-depth discussion of ethical considerations related to biotechnology, see CRS Report R44824, Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9, by Marcy E. Gallo et al. See also Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” The 
Jamestown Foundation, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/. 
144152  
As Congress continues to review the Pentagon’s plans for emerging military technologies during the annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider issues surrounding funding considerations, management, personnel, acquisition, technology protection, and governance and regulation.  
Funding Considerations A number of emerging military technologies, including hypersonic weapons and directed energy weapons, have experienced fluctuations in funding over the years. According to a U.S. government interagency task force on the defense industrial base, such “fluctuations challenge the viability of suppliers within the industrial base by diminishing their ability to hire and retain a skilled workforce, [achieve] production efficiencies, and in some cases, [stay] in business.”153 Other analysts have noted that such fluctuations are often due to unavoidable tradeoffs between technology investment priorities or to questions about a given technology’s feasibility or maturity.154  
                                                 151 Each report is to include the following elements: “(1) an evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries  Each report is to include the following elements: “(1) an evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries 
on such technology, (2) an evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology, (3) an evaluation of on such technology, (2) an evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology, (3) an evaluation of 
the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology, (4) an assessment of the technological progress of the the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology, (4) an assessment of the technological progress of the 
United States and adversaries on such technology, (5) descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such United States and adversaries on such technology, (5) descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such 
technology, [and] (6) an assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.” technology, [and] (6) an assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.” 
145152 Section 232 defines emerging technology as “technology determined to be in an emerging phase of development by  Section 232 defines emerging technology as “technology determined to be in an emerging phase of development by 
the Secretary of Defense, including quantum computing, technology for the analysis of large and diverse sets of data the Secretary of Defense, including quantum computing, technology for the analysis of large and diverse sets of data 
(commonly known as ‘big data analytics’), artificial intelligence, autonomous technology, robotics, directed energy, (commonly known as ‘big data analytics’), artificial intelligence, autonomous technology, robotics, directed energy, 
hypersonics, biotechnology, and such other technology as may be identified by the Secretary.” hypersonics, biotechnology, and such other technology as may be identified by the Secretary.” 
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As Congress continues to review the Pentagon’s plans for emerging military technologies during the annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider issues surrounding funding considerations, management, personnel, acquisition, technology protection, and governance and regulation.  
Funding Considerations 
A number of emerging military technologies, including hypersonic weapons and directed energy weapons, have experienced fluctuations in funding over the years. According to a U.S. government interagency task force on the defense industrial base, such “fluctuations challenge the viability of suppliers within the industrial base by diminishing their ability to hire and retain a skilled workforce, [achieve] production efficiencies, and in some cases, [stay] in business.”146 Other analysts have noted that such fluctuations are often due to unavoidable tradeoffs between technology investment priorities or to questions about a given technology’s feasibility or maturity.147  153 Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806, Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States, September 2018, p. 21, at https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-STRENGTHENING-THE-MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF. 
154 See, for example, Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-ready. 
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Some analysts have suggested that, given the potential for technological surprise, funding for 
Some analysts have suggested that, given the potential for technological surprise, funding for 
overall research and development is inadequate—particularly in light of the 9% reduction in the overall research and development is inadequate—particularly in light of the 9% reduction in the 
FY2021 President’s budget request for federal research and development. Summarizing such FY2021 President’s budget request for federal research and development. Summarizing such 
views, technology expert Martjin Rasser notes that reducing overall research and development in views, technology expert Martjin Rasser notes that reducing overall research and development in 
order to enable “big bets” or heavy investments in a particular technology or technologies, can be order to enable “big bets” or heavy investments in a particular technology or technologies, can be 
a risky approach because “we just don’t know where the next breakthroughs will come from.”a risky approach because “we just don’t know where the next breakthroughs will come from.”
148155    
Management  
In general, DOD manages each of the aforementioned emerging military technologies separately In general, DOD manages each of the aforementioned emerging military technologies separately 
due to the distinct expertise required. For example, within the Office of the Under Secretary of due to the distinct expertise required. For example, within the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]), there are separate technical directors or Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]), there are separate technical directors or 
assistant directors for artificial intelligence, autonomy, hypersonic weapons, directed energy, assistant directors for artificial intelligence, autonomy, hypersonic weapons, directed energy, 
biotechnology, and quantum science—among other technology areas—which report through the biotechnology, and quantum science—among other technology areas—which report through the 
Director for Modernization to USD(R&E).Director for Modernization to USD(R&E).
149156 Development of each of these technologies is  Development of each of these technologies is 
guided by a standalone technology roadmap and, in the case of AI, a classified strategy. Although guided by a standalone technology roadmap and, in the case of AI, a classified strategy. Although 
the Director for Modernization has oversight over emerging military technologies, some analysts the Director for Modernization has oversight over emerging military technologies, some analysts 
have suggested that there is a need for a more holistic approach to portfolio management that have suggested that there is a need for a more holistic approach to portfolio management that 
better considers how such technologies might be combined and integrated.better considers how such technologies might be combined and integrated.
150    
                                                 146 Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806, Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing 
and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States, September 2018, p. 21, at https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-STRENGTHENING-THE-MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF. 
147 See, for example, Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-ready. 
148157  
Furthermore, senior leaders do not always agree on the priorities among emerging military technologies—both in terms of effort and funding—and such priorities can shift frequently. This fluctuation has led some analysts to suggest that DOD should adopt a technology strategy “to set spending priorities that can be sustained over time, outlasting individual leaders.”158  
Personnel Some reports indicate that DOD and the defense industry have difficulty recruiting and retaining personnel with expertise in emerging technologies because research funding and salaries significantly lag behind those of commercial companies.159 Other reports suggest that such challenges stem from quality-of-life factors, as well as from a belief among many technology workers that “they can achieve large-scale change faster and better outside the government than within it.”160 DOD faces additional challenges in training and educating its standing workforce.                                                  155 See, for example, Will Knight, “Trump Proposes a Cut in Research Spending, but a Boost for AI,”  See, for example, Will Knight, “Trump Proposes a Cut in Research Spending, but a Boost for AI,” 
Wired, February , February 
11, 2020, at https://www.wired.com/story/trump-proposes-cut-research-spending-boost-ai/. For more information about 11, 2020, at https://www.wired.com/story/trump-proposes-cut-research-spending-boost-ai/. For more information about 
federal R&D funding, including a discussion of DOD R&D funding, see CRS Report R46341, federal R&D funding, including a discussion of DOD R&D funding, see CRS Report R46341, 
Federal Research and 
Development (R&D) Funding: FY2021, coordinated by John F. Sargent Jr.  , coordinated by John F. Sargent Jr.  
149156 CRS In Focus IF10834,  CRS In Focus IF10834, 
Defense Primer: Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, by Marcy E. , by Marcy E. 
Gallo.  Gallo.  
150157 See, for example, Government Accountability Office,  See, for example, Government Accountability Office, 
Weapon System Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve 
the Department of Defense’s Portfolio Management, August 2015, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672205.pdf; and , August 2015, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672205.pdf; and 
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Furthermore, senior leaders do not always agree on the priorities among emerging military technologies—both in terms of effort and funding—and such priorities can shift frequently. This fluctuation has led some analysts to suggest that DOD should adopt a technology strategy “to set spending priorities that can be sustained over time, outlasting individual leaders.”151  
Personnel 
Some reports indicate that DOD and the defense industry have difficulty recruiting and retaining personnel with expertise in emerging technologies because research funding and salaries significantly lag behind those of commercial companies.152 Other reports suggest that such challenges stem from quality-of-life factors, as well as from a belief among many technology workers that “they can achieve large-scale change faster and better outside the government than within it.”153 DOD faces additional challenges in training and educating its standing workforce. Pete Modigliani, After the divorce: How the Pentagon can position itself for speed, agility, and innovation in the new era of acquisitions, MITRE, March 2019, at https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-18-03404-3-after-the-divorce-white-paper.pdf. 
158 Paul Scharre and Ainikki Riikonen, “The Defense Department Needs a Real Technology Strategy,” Defense One, April 21, 2020, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/04/pentagon-needs-technology-strategy/164764/. 
159 M.L. Cummings, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare,” Chatham House, January 2017, p. 11, at https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-01-26-artificial-intelligence-future-warfare-cummings-final.pdf.  
160 Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, “The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington Is a National-Security Threat,” The Atlantic, December 13, 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/growing-gulf-between-silicon-
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Examples of recommendations for addressing this set of challenges include increasing technology Examples of recommendations for addressing this set of challenges include increasing technology 
education opportunities at military academies, enhancing partnerships between DOD and research education opportunities at military academies, enhancing partnerships between DOD and research 
universities, creating government fellowships and accelerated promotion tracks for technology universities, creating government fellowships and accelerated promotion tracks for technology 
workers, and improving the technology literacy of human resource teams.workers, and improving the technology literacy of human resource teams.
154161    
Acquisition  
DOD may need to continue adjusting its acquisition process to account for rapidly evolving dual-DOD may need to continue adjusting its acquisition process to account for rapidly evolving dual-
use technologies such as AI.use technologies such as AI.
155162 For example, a 2017 internal study of the process found that it  For example, a 2017 internal study of the process found that it 
takes an average of 81 months for information technology programs to move from the initial takes an average of 81 months for information technology programs to move from the initial 
Analysis of Alternatives, defining the requirements for a system, to an Initial Operational Analysis of Alternatives, defining the requirements for a system, to an Initial Operational 
Capability.Capability.
156163 In contrast, commercial companies typically execute an iterative development  In contrast, commercial companies typically execute an iterative development 
process for software systems (such as those involved in AI capabilities), delivering an initial process for software systems (such as those involved in AI capabilities), delivering an initial 
product in six to nine months.product in six to nine months.
157164 These findings prompted DOD to issue an interim software acquisition policy intended to “[simplify] the acquisition model to enable continuous integration and delivery of software capability on timelines relevant to the Warfighter/end user.”165 Similar efforts may be needed for other emerging military technologies. 
Furthermore, the commercial companies that are often at the forefront of innovation in emerging technologies may be reluctant to partner with DOD due to the complexity of the defense acquisition process. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of this issue found that, of 12 U.S. commercial companies who choose not to do business with DOD, all 12 cited the complexity of the defense acquisition process as a rationale for their decision.166 DOD has created a number of avenues for rapid acquisitions—including the Strategic Capabilities Office, the Defense Innovation Unit, and Project Maven—that are intended to streamline cumbersome processes and accelerate the acquisitions timeline.167 Project Maven, for example, was established                                                  valley-and-washington/577963/.  
161 These findings prompted DOD to issue an interim software                                                  Pete Modigliani, After the divorce: How the Pentagon can position itself for speed, agility, and innovation in the new 
era of acquisitions, MITRE, March 2019, at https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-18-03404-3-after-the-divorce-white-paper.pdf. 
151 Paul Scharre and Ainikki Riikonen, “The Defense Department Needs a Real Technology Strategy,” Defense One, April 21, 2020, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/04/pentagon-needs-technology-strategy/164764/. 
152 M.L. Cummings, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare,” Chatham House, January 2017, p. 11, at https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-01-26-artificial-intelligence-future-warfare-cummings-final.pdf.  
153 Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, “The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington Is a National-Security Threat,” The Atlantic, December 13, 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/growing-gulf-between-silicon-valley-and-washington/577963/.  
154 See Defense Science Board,  See Defense Science Board, 
Applications of Quantum Technologies: Executive Summary; National Security ; National Security 
Commission on Artificial Intelligence, Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 
First Quarter Recommendations, March 2020, pp. 21-43, at , March 2020, pp. 21-43, at 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wkPh8Gb5drBrKBg6OhGu5oNaTEERbKss/view; and Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wkPh8Gb5drBrKBg6OhGu5oNaTEERbKss/view; and Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, 
“The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington.” For example, DOD is establishing a university consortium for “The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington.” For example, DOD is establishing a university consortium for 
hypersonic research and workforce development, while the Defense Digital Service now offers one- to two-year hypersonic research and workforce development, while the Defense Digital Service now offers one- to two-year 
assignments for commercial technology workers. Similarly, the National Security Innovation Network seeks to create assignments for commercial technology workers. Similarly, the National Security Innovation Network seeks to create 
models and pathways for recruiting technologists to the U.S. government.  models and pathways for recruiting technologists to the U.S. government.  
155162 Andrew Ilachinski,  Andrew Ilachinski, 
AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval , Center for Naval 
Analysis, January 2017, pp. 190-191. For an overview of recent acquisition reform efforts, see CRS Report R45068, Analysis, January 2017, pp. 190-191. For an overview of recent acquisition reform efforts, see CRS Report R45068, 
Acquisition Reform in the FY2016-FY2018 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs), by Heidi M. Peters. , by Heidi M. Peters. 
156163 Andrew Ilachinski,  Andrew Ilachinski, 
AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, p. 189. , p. 189. 
157164 Defense Science Board, “Design and Acquisition of Software for Defense Systems,” February 2018, at  Defense Science Board, “Design and Acquisition of Software for Defense Systems,” February 2018, at 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1048883.pdf. See also Defense Innovation Board, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1048883.pdf. See also Defense Innovation Board, 
Software is Never Done: 
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acquisition policy intended to “[simplify] the acquisition model to enable continuous integration and delivery of software capability on timelines relevant to the Warfighter/end user.”158 Similar efforts may be needed for other emerging military technologies. 
Furthermore, the commercial companies that are often at the forefront of innovation in emerging technologies may be reluctant to partner with DOD due to the complexity of the defense acquisition process. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of this issue found that, of 12 U.S. commercial companies who choose not to do business with DOD, all 12 cited the complexity of the defense acquisition process as a rationale for their decision.159 DOD has created a number of avenues for rapid acquisitions—including the Strategic Capabilities Office, the Defense Innovation Unit, and Project Maven—that are intended to streamline cumbersome processes and accelerate the acquisitions timeline.160 Project Maven, for example, was established in April 2017; by December, the team was fielding a commercially acquired prototype AI system in combat.161Refactoring the Acquisition Code for Competitive Advantage, May 3, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/30/2002124828/-1/-1/0/SOFTWAREISNEVERDONE_REFACTORINGTHEACQUISITIONCODEFORCOMPETITIVEADVANTAGE_FINAL.SWAP.REPORT.PDF. 
165 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, “Software Acquisition Pathway Interim Policy and Procedures,” January 3, 2020, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/ae/assets/docs/USA002825-19%20Signed%20Memo%20(Software).pdf.  
166 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Acquisitions, DOD is Taking Step to Address Challenges Faced by Certain Companies, GAO-17-644, July 20, 2017, p. 9. Other rationales cited include unstable budget environment, lengthy contracting timeline, government-specific contract terms and conditions, and inexperienced DOD contracting workforce. 
167 In certain circumstances, DOD may also use other transaction authorities (OTAs) to accelerate research, 
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in April 2017; by December, the team was fielding a commercially acquired prototype AI system in combat.168 Although some analysts argue that these are promising developments, critics point  Although some analysts argue that these are promising developments, critics point 
out that the department must replicate such results at scale and implement more comprehensive out that the department must replicate such results at scale and implement more comprehensive 
acquisitions reform.acquisitions reform.
162169  
Intellectual Property 
Commercial technology companies are often reluctant to partner with DOD due to concerns about 
Commercial technology companies are often reluctant to partner with DOD due to concerns about 
intellectual property and data rights.intellectual property and data rights.
163170 As an official interviewed for a 2017 GAO report on  As an official interviewed for a 2017 GAO report on 
broader challenges in military acquisitions noted, intellectual property is the “life blood” of broader challenges in military acquisitions noted, intellectual property is the “life blood” of 
commercial technology companies, yet “DOD is putting increased pressure on companies to grant commercial technology companies, yet “DOD is putting increased pressure on companies to grant 
unlimited technical data and software rights or government purpose rights rather than limited or unlimited technical data and software rights or government purpose rights rather than limited or 
restricted rights.”restricted rights.”
164171 In an effort to manage these concerns, DOD released an instruction that  In an effort to manage these concerns, DOD released an instruction that 
“establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the acquisition, “establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the acquisition, 
licensing, and management of IP.”licensing, and management of IP.”
165172 The instruction additionally establishes a DOD IP Cadre to advise and assist the acquisition workforce on matters related to IP and calls for the development of an IP strategy to “identify and manage the full spectrum of IP and related matters” for each acquisition program.173 
Supply Chain Security  
A number of recent reports have raised concerns about the security of the U.S. supply chain for emerging military technologies. For example, one assessment found that China “may have opportunities to jeopardize the development of hypersonics through industrial espionage, transfers of technology, or providing unreliable components” due to its potential exposure to low-level U.S. suppliers.174 Similarly the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence found that “the United States lacks domestic facilities capable of producing, integrating, assembling, and testing” the microelectronics needed to enable AI, forcing the U.S. “to rely on foreign fabrication and complex global supply chains for production.”175  
                                                  The instruction additionally establishes a DOD IP Cadre to 
                                                 Refactoring the Acquisition Code for Competitive Advantage, May 3, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/30/2002124828/-1/-1/0/SOFTWAREISNEVERDONE_REFACTORINGTHEACQUISITIONCODEFORCOMPETITIVEADVANTAGE_FINAL.SWAP.REPORT.PDF. 
158 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, “Software Acquisition Pathway Interim Policy and Procedures,” January 3, 2020, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/ae/assets/docs/USA002825-19%20Signed%20Memo%20(Software).pdf.  
159 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Acquisitions, DOD is Taking Step to Address Challenges Faced 
by Certain Companies, GAO-17-644, July 20, 2017, p. 9. Other rationales cited include unstable budget environment, lengthy contracting timeline, government-specific contract terms and conditions, and inexperienced DOD contracting workforce. 
160 In certain circumstances, DOD may also use other transaction authorities (OTAs) to accelerate research, prototyping, and production. For additional information about OTAs, see CRS Report R45521, prototyping, and production. For additional information about OTAs, see CRS Report R45521, 
Department of Defense 
Use of Other Transaction Authority: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Heidi M. Peters.  , by Heidi M. Peters.  
161168 Marcus Weisgerber, “The Pentagon’s New Artificial Intelligence is Already Hunting Terrorists,”  Marcus Weisgerber, “The Pentagon’s New Artificial Intelligence is Already Hunting Terrorists,” 
Defense One, , 
December 21, 2017, at http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/12/pentagons-new-artificial-intelligence-already-December 21, 2017, at http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/12/pentagons-new-artificial-intelligence-already-
hunting-terrorists/144742/. hunting-terrorists/144742/. 
162169 Andrew Ilachinski,  Andrew Ilachinski, 
AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval , Center for Naval 
Analysis, January 2017, p. 190. Analysis, January 2017, p. 190. 
163170 U.S. Government Accountability Office,  U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
Military Acquisitions, DOD is Taking Steps to Address Challenges Faced 
by Certain Companies.    
164171 Ibid., p. 20.  Ibid., p. 20. 
165172 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, “DOD Instruction 5010.44 Intellectual  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, “DOD Instruction 5010.44 Intellectual 
Property (IP) Acquisition and Licensing,” October 16, 2019, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/Property (IP) Acquisition and Licensing,” October 16, 2019, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/
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advise and assist the acquisition workforce on matters related to IP and calls for the development of an IP strategy to “identify and manage the full spectrum of IP and related matters” for each acquisition program.166 
Supply Chain Security  
A number of recent reports have raised concerns about the security of the U.S. supply chain for emerging military technologies. For example, one assessment found that China “may have opportunities to jeopardize the development of hypersonics through industrial espionage, transfers of technology, or providing unreliable components” due to its potential exposure to low-level U.S. suppliers.167 Similarly theissuances/dodi/501044p.PDF?ver=2019-10-16-144448-070. 
173 Ibid., pp. 8-11. 174 Govini, The 2020 Federal Scorecard: High-Intensity Warfare Edition, p. 67, at https://www.govini.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Govini-2020-Federal-Scorecard.pdf. 
175 National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence
, First Quarter Recommendations, p. 46. 
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  found that “the United States lacks domestic facilities capable of producing, integrating, assembling, and testing” the microelectronics needed to enable AI, forcing the U.S. “to rely on foreign fabrication and complex global supply chains for production.”168  
Technology Protection 
Estimates indicate “that American industry loses more than $600 billion dollars [each year] to Estimates indicate “that American industry loses more than $600 billion dollars [each year] to 
theft and expropriation,” including the theft and expropriation of emerging military technologies theft and expropriation,” including the theft and expropriation of emerging military technologies 
and related intellectual property.and related intellectual property.
169176 The United States has a number of programs devoted to  The United States has a number of programs devoted to 
addressing this issue. For example, pursuant to the Foreign Investment Risk Review addressing this issue. For example, pursuant to the Foreign Investment Risk Review 
Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (CFIUS) now reviews certain foreign investments, including those involving “emerging States (CFIUS) now reviews certain foreign investments, including those involving “emerging 
and foundational technologies.” In addition, FIRRMA authorized CFIUS to consider “whether a and foundational technologies.” In addition, FIRRMA authorized CFIUS to consider “whether a 
covered transaction involves a country of special concern that has a demonstrated or declared covered transaction involves a country of special concern that has a demonstrated or declared 
strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure that would affect strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure that would affect 
United States leadership in areas related to national security.”United States leadership in areas related to national security.”
170177 Similarly, DOD’s Protecting  Similarly, DOD’s Protecting 
Critical Technology Task Force helps protect universities, labs, and the U.S. defense industrial Critical Technology Task Force helps protect universities, labs, and the U.S. defense industrial 
base against the theft of “classified information, controlled unclassified information, and key base against the theft of “classified information, controlled unclassified information, and key 
data.”data.”
171178 As part of this effort, the task force intends to institute cybersecurity training programs  As part of this effort, the task force intends to institute cybersecurity training programs 
for small businesses, enhance DOD’s understanding of supply chain vulnerabilities, and develop for small businesses, enhance DOD’s understanding of supply chain vulnerabilities, and develop 
a prioritized list of technologies that are critical to national security—as mandated by Section a prioritized list of technologies that are critical to national security—as mandated by Section 
                                                 issuances/dodi/501044p.PDF?ver=2019-10-16-144448-070. 
166 Ibid., pp. 8-11. 167 Govini, The 2020 Federal Scorecard: High-Intensity Warfare Edition, p. 67, at https://www.govini.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Govini-2020-Federal-Scorecard.pdf. 
168 National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, First Quarter Recommendations, p. 46. 1691049 of the FY2019 NDAA—among other activities.179 Some analysts have recommended expanding technology protection efforts to include U.S. allies and partners.180 
Governance and Regulation According to then-Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats, “technology developments … are likely to outpace regulation, which could create international norms that are contrary to US interests and increase the likelihood of technology surprise.”181 To address this concern, some analysts have argued that “the United States should undertake broad, sustained diplomatic engagement to advance collaboration on emerging technologies, norms, and standards setting.”182 
                                                 176 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Technology Task  Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Technology Task 
Force,” October 24, 2018, at https://insidecybersecurity.com/sites/insidecybersecurity.com/files/documents/2018/nov/Force,” October 24, 2018, at https://insidecybersecurity.com/sites/insidecybersecurity.com/files/documents/2018/nov/
cs2018_0459.pdf. cs2018_0459.pdf. 
170177 The specific technologies that qualify as “emerging and foundational technologies” are to be identified by an  The specific technologies that qualify as “emerging and foundational technologies” are to be identified by an 
interagency process led by the Department of Commerce. See P.L. 115-232, Title XVII, §1702(c). For more interagency process led by the Department of Commerce. See P.L. 115-232, Title XVII, §1702(c). For more 
information on FIRRMA, see CRS In Focus IF10952, information on FIRRMA, see CRS In Focus IF10952, 
CFIUS Reform Under FIRRMA, by James K. Jackson and , by James K. Jackson and 
Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs. Some entities, including the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, have Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs. Some entities, including the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, have 
argued that the U.S. government should consider additional measures of technology protection, such as “heavier argued that the U.S. government should consider additional measures of technology protection, such as “heavier 
scrutiny of the potential end use and end user of specific items.” See National Security Commission on Artificial scrutiny of the potential end use and end user of specific items.” See National Security Commission on Artificial 
Intelligence, Intelligence, 
Interim Report, November 2019, p. 42, at https://drive.google.com/file/d/, November 2019, p. 42, at https://drive.google.com/file/d/
153OrxnuGEjsUvlxWsFYauslwNeCEkvUb/view. 153OrxnuGEjsUvlxWsFYauslwNeCEkvUb/view. 
171178 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Technology Task Force.”  
179 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Technology Task Force.”  
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1049 of the FY2019 NDAA—among other activities.172 Some analysts have recommended expanding technology protection efforts to include U.S. allies and partners.173 
Governance and Regulation 
According to then-Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats, “technology developments … are likely to outpace regulation, which could create international norms that are contrary to US interests and increase the likelihood of technology surprise.”174 To address this concern, some analysts have argued that “the United States should undertake broad, sustained diplomatic engagement to advance collaboration on emerging technologies, norms, and standards setting.”175 
Oversight176 
As Congress conducts oversight of emerging military technologies, it may be challenged in its ability to independently evaluate and assess complex, disparate technical disciplines. In 1972, Congress established the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to provide expert “assessments, background papers, technical memoranda, case studies, and workshop proceedings” that were to inform congressional decisionmaking and legislative activities.177 Congress eliminated funding for OTA in 1995 “amid broader efforts to reduce the size of government.178 Since then, Congress has continued to debate the need for OTA or a similar technology assessment organization.179  
  
                                                 172 C. Todd Lopez, “Task Force Curbs Technology Theft to Keep Joint Force Strong,” DOD News, November 26,  C. Todd Lopez, “Task Force Curbs Technology Theft to Keep Joint Force Strong,” DOD News, November 26, 
2019, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2027555/task-force-curbs-technology-theft-to-keep-2019, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2027555/task-force-curbs-technology-theft-to-keep-
joint-force-strong/. joint-force-strong/. 
173180 See, for example, Daniel Kliman, Ben FitzGerald, Kristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt,  See, for example, Daniel Kliman, Ben FitzGerald, Kristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt, 
Forging an Alliance Innovation 
Base, Center for a New American Security, March 2020, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/, Center for a New American Security, March 2020, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/
CNAS-Report-Alliance-Innovation-Base-Final.pdf?mtime=20200329174909. CNAS-Report-Alliance-Innovation-Base-Final.pdf?mtime=20200329174909. 
174181 Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”  Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” 
delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018. delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018. 
175182 Samuel J. Brannen, Christian S. Haig, Katherine Schmidt, and Kathleen H. Hicks,  Samuel J. Brannen, Christian S. Haig, Katherine Schmidt, and Kathleen H. Hicks, 
Twin Pillars: Upholding National 
Security and National Innovation in Emerging Technologies Governance, Center for Strategic and International , Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, January 2020, at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200123_Brannen_TwinPillars_WEB_FINAL.pdf?eljUpAKOjVauOujYfnvuSGDK0xvsQGZF.  
176 For a full discussion of issues surrounding congressional oversight of technology, see CRS Report R46327, The 
Office of Technology Assessment: History, Authorities, Issues, and Options, by John F. Sargent Jr.. 
177 Ibid.  178 Ibid. 179 For an overview of OTA/technology assessment-related legislation in the 107th-116th Congresses, see Appendix C in CRS Report R46327, The Office of Technology Assessment: History, Authorities, Issues, and Options, by John F. Sargent Jr.. 
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Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress 
 
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Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress 
 
                                                 Studies, January 2020, at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200123_Brannen_TwinPillars_WEB_FINAL.pdf?eljUpAKOjVauOujYfnvuSGDK0xvsQGZF.  
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Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress 
 
Oversight183 As Congress conducts oversight of emerging military technologies, it may be challenged in its ability to independently evaluate and assess complex, disparate technical disciplines. In 1972, Congress established the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to provide expert “assessments, background papers, technical memoranda, case studies, and workshop proceedings” that were to inform congressional decisionmaking and legislative activities.184 Congress eliminated funding for OTA in 1995 “amid broader efforts to reduce the size of government.185 Since then, Congress has continued to debate the need for OTA or a similar technology assessment organization.186  
  
 
 
Author Information 
 
 Kelley M. Sayler Kelley M. Sayler 
   
   
Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global 
Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global 
Security Security         
 
 
 
Disclaimer  
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan 
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                                                 183 For a full discussion of issues surrounding congressional oversight of technology, see CRS Report R46327, The Office of Technology Assessment: History, Authorities, Issues, and Options, by John F. Sargent Jr.. 
184 Ibid.  185 Ibid. 186 For an overview of OTA/technology assessment-related legislation in the 107th-116th Congresses, see Appendix C in CRS Report R46327, The Office of Technology Assessment: History, Authorities, Issues, and Options, by John F. Sargent Jr.. 
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