Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress

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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background
July July 813, 2020 , 2020
and Issues for Congress
Andrew Feickert
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Army and the Marine Corps The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Army and the Marine Corps
Specialist in Military Specialist in Military
as a successor to the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), which has been in as a successor to the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), which has been in
Ground Forces Ground Forces
service since 1985. On October 28, 2008, awards were made for the JLTV Technology service since 1985. On October 28, 2008, awards were made for the JLTV Technology

Development (TD) Phase to three industry teams: (1) BAE Systems, (2) the team of Lockheed Development (TD) Phase to three industry teams: (1) BAE Systems, (2) the team of Lockheed
Martin and General Tactical Vehicle, and (3) AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems. Martin and General Tactical Vehicle, and (3) AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems.

On January 26, 2012, the Army issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the JLTV’s Engineering Manufacturing On January 26, 2012, the Army issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the JLTV’s Engineering Manufacturing
Development (EMD) phase. The period of performance for EMD contracts was 27 months, and the overall EMD phase was Development (EMD) phase. The period of performance for EMD contracts was 27 months, and the overall EMD phase was
scheduled to last 33 months. Vendors were required to provide 22 JLTV prototypes for testing 12 months after contract scheduled to last 33 months. Vendors were required to provide 22 JLTV prototypes for testing 12 months after contract
award. The target cost for the base vehicle was $250,000, excluding add-on armor and other kits. award. The target cost for the base vehicle was $250,000, excluding add-on armor and other kits.
On August 22, 2012, the Army announced the award of three firm-fixed price JLTV EMD contracts totaling approximately On August 22, 2012, the Army announced the award of three firm-fixed price JLTV EMD contracts totaling approximately
$185 million. The three companies awarded the EMD contracts were AM$185 million. The three companies awarded the EMD contracts were AM General,General, LLCLLC (South Bend, IN); Lockheed Martin (South Bend, IN); Lockheed Martin
CorporationCorporation (Grand Prairie, TX); and Oshkosh Corporation (Oshkosh, WI). (Grand Prairie, TX); and Oshkosh Corporation (Oshkosh, WI).
On September 3, 2013, the Army began JLTV testing at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; Yuma, AZ; and Redstone Arsenal, On September 3, 2013, the Army began JLTV testing at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; Yuma, AZ; and Redstone Arsenal,
AL. The Army planned to select a single vendor by 2015, with the first Army brigade being equipped with JLTVs by 2018. AL. The Army planned to select a single vendor by 2015, with the first Army brigade being equipped with JLTVs by 2018.
On August 25, 2015, it was announced the Army had awarded Oshkosh a $6.7 billion low rate initial production (LRIP) On August 25, 2015, it was announced the Army had awarded Oshkosh a $6.7 billion low rate initial production (LRIP)
contract with eight options to procure the initial 16,901 vehicles for the Army and Marines. The JLTV is being produced in contract with eight options to procure the initial 16,901 vehicles for the Army and Marines. The JLTV is being produced in
Oshkosh, WI. Oshkosh, WI.
The British Army is reportedly trying to acquire 2,747 JLTVs through Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The Marines have also The British Army is reportedly trying to acquire 2,747 JLTVs through Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The Marines have also
reportedly increased their JLTV requirement for a total of 9,091 JLTVs. The Air Force and Navy are also procuring a limited reportedly increased their JLTV requirement for a total of 9,091 JLTVs. The Air Force and Navy are also procuring a limited
number of JLTVs for use. number of JLTVs for use.
A redacted May 2, 2018, DOD Inspector General (IG) report noted the services had not demonstrated effective test results to A redacted May 2, 2018, DOD Inspector General (IG) report noted the services had not demonstrated effective test results to
prepare the JLTV program for full rate production, but the JLTV Program Office planned to address this concern. The prepare the JLTV program for full rate production, but the JLTV Program Office planned to address this concern. The
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) FY2018 Annual Report noted among other findings that JLTVs were Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) FY2018 Annual Report noted among other findings that JLTVs were
not operationally suitable because of deficiencies in reliability, maintainability, training, manuals, crew situational awareness, not operationally suitable because of deficiencies in reliability, maintainability, training, manuals, crew situational awareness,
and safety. On June 20, 2019, the Army authorized JLTV full-rate production. and safety. On June 20, 2019, the Army authorized JLTV full-rate production.
In order to free up funds for other Army modernization priorities, the Army plans a program reduction in FY2021 of $201.6 In order to free up funds for other Army modernization priorities, the Army plans a program reduction in FY2021 of $201.6
million and will also extend the JLTV procurement by three years until 2042. The Army also has indicated it plans compete a million and will also extend the JLTV procurement by three years until 2042. The Army also has indicated it plans compete a
follow-on contract to be awarded in FY2022 intended to split the procurement between Oshkosh and a new competitor in follow-on contract to be awarded in FY2022 intended to split the procurement between Oshkosh and a new competitor in
order to drive down costs. order to drive down costs.
Potential questions for Congress include Potential questions for Congress include
1. Will the JLTV become the major bill payer for Army modernization? and 1. Will the JLTV become the major bill payer for Army modernization? and
2. What is the future of JLTV procurement? 2. What is the future of JLTV procurement?

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Tables
Table 1. FY2021 DOD Budget Request—JLTV ........................................................................... 10

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 1213

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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress

Background1
The JLTV is an Army-led, multiservice initiative to develop a family of future light tactical The JLTV is an Army-led, multiservice initiative to develop a family of future light tactical
vehicles to replace many of the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) used by the vehicles to replace many of the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) used by the
armed services today. HMMWVs, which first entered service in 1985, were developed during the armed services today. HMMWVs, which first entered service in 1985, were developed during the
Cold War when improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other antivehicle explosive devices Cold War when improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other antivehicle explosive devices
were not a major factor in military planning. The HMMWVs’ demonstrated vulnerability to IEDs were not a major factor in military planning. The HMMWVs’ demonstrated vulnerability to IEDs
and the difficulties and costs experienced in “up-armoring” HMMWVs already in the inventory and the difficulties and costs experienced in “up-armoring” HMMWVs already in the inventory
led to renewed emphasis on vehicle survivability. DOD officials have emphasized that JLTVs are led to renewed emphasis on vehicle survivability. DOD officials have emphasized that JLTVs are
not intended to replace HMMWVs “one for one.”2 not intended to replace HMMWVs “one for one.”2
The JLTV Program
What Is the JLTV?3
The JLTV program is a joint Army/Marine Corps effort to develop and produce both vehicles and The JLTV program is a joint Army/Marine Corps effort to develop and produce both vehicles and
associated trailers. The JLTV family of vehicles consists of two variants: the two seat Utility associated trailers. The JLTV family of vehicles consists of two variants: the two seat Utility
variant and a four seat variant with three models: variant and a four seat variant with three models:
 General Purpose (GP) variant;  General Purpose (GP) variant;
 Heavy Guns Carrier (HGC) variant; and  Heavy Guns Carrier (HGC) variant; and
 Close Combat Weapon carrier (CCWC) variant.4  Close Combat Weapon carrier (CCWC) variant.4
Program Structure
The JLTV is an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program.5 The Army bears the overall The JLTV is an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program.5 The Army bears the overall
responsibility for developing the JLTV through its Joint Program Office, which reports to the responsibility for developing the JLTV through its Joint Program Office, which reports to the
Program Executive Office (PEO) for Combat Support & Combat Service Support (PEO Program Executive Office (PEO) for Combat Support & Combat Service Support (PEO
CS&CSS) in Warren, MI, which reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, CS&CSS) in Warren, MI, which reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology (ASA [AL&T]). Marine participation is centered on a program office Logistics, and Technology (ASA [AL&T]). Marine participation is centered on a program office
under the supervision of the Program Executive Officer Land Systems (PEO LS) Marine Corps at under the supervision of the Program Executive Officer Land Systems (PEO LS) Marine Corps at
Quantico, VA. Quantico, VA.

1 Alan L. Gropman, “Combat Vehicle Sector Could be Headed for Turbulent Times,” 1 Alan L. Gropman, “Combat Vehicle Sector Could be Headed for Turbulent Times,” National Defense, April 25, , April 25,
2008, and James P. Miller, “Race is On to Replace Humvee,”2008, and James P. Miller, “Race is On to Replace Humvee,” Chicago Tribune, June 21, 2008. , June 21, 2008.
2 Kris Osborn, “DOD’s JLTV Becoming an International Effort,” 2 Kris Osborn, “DOD’s JLTV Becoming an International Effort,” Defense News, August 4, 2008. Headquarters, , August 4, 2008. Headquarters,
Department of the Army, “Army Truck Program (Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Acquisition Strategy) Report to the Department of the Army, “Army Truck Program (Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Acquisition Strategy) Report to the
Congress,” June 2010, p. 5. Congress,” June 2010, p. 5.
3 Information in this section is taken from the Army Product Manager, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle website, 3 Information in this section is taken from the Army Product Manager, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle website,
https://www.peocscss.army.mil/pmjltv.html, visited February 18, 2020, and Tony Bertuca, “PMs: JLTV Still Too https://www.peocscss.army.mil/pmjltv.html, visited February 18, 2020, and Tony Bertuca, “PMs: JLTV Still Too
Heavy, Changing Schedule and Losing Six-Man Variant,” Heavy, Changing Schedule and Losing Six-Man Variant,” InsideDefense.com, February 11, 2011. February 11, 2011.
4 Ibid. 4 Ibid.
5 The 12th Edition of the 5 The 12th Edition of the Defense Acquisition University Glossary, July 2005, defines an ACAT 1D program as “a , July 2005, defines an ACAT 1D program as “a
Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) which is estimated by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) which is estimated by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics) (USD (AT&L)) to require the eventual expenditure for Research, Development, Test, and Technology, and Logistics) (USD (AT&L)) to require the eventual expenditure for Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation (RDT&E) of more than $365 million (FY2000 constant dollars) or the procurement of more than $2.19 Evaluation (RDT&E) of more than $365 million (FY2000 constant dollars) or the procurement of more than $2.19
billion (FY2000 constant dollars).” billion (FY2000 constant dollars).”
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Past Program History
In November 2006 the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) In November 2006 the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC)
approved the JLTV program. On December 22, 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for approved the JLTV program. On December 22, 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD (AT&L) signed an Acquisition Decision Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD (AT&L) signed an Acquisition Decision
Memorandum (ADM) directing the JLTV Program to move from the Concept Refinement Phase Memorandum (ADM) directing the JLTV Program to move from the Concept Refinement Phase
into the Technology Development (TD) Phase of the DOD System Acquisition Process. The into the Technology Development (TD) Phase of the DOD System Acquisition Process. The
Army and Marines had intended to issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) for Technology Army and Marines had intended to issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) for Technology
Development Phase as early as October 2007. Concerned with funding adequacy, technical Development Phase as early as October 2007. Concerned with funding adequacy, technical
maturity, and shifting requirements, the Pentagon’s acquisition executive disapproved the maturity, and shifting requirements, the Pentagon’s acquisition executive disapproved the
issuance of the RFP and directed the Army and Marines to “go back to the drawing board and issuance of the RFP and directed the Army and Marines to “go back to the drawing board and
develop a robust technology development phase.”6 On February 5, 2008, an RFP for Technology develop a robust technology development phase.”6 On February 5, 2008, an RFP for Technology
Development Phase was issued to industry.7 The RFP stated the government desired to award Development Phase was issued to industry.7 The RFP stated the government desired to award
three contracts for the JLTV Technology Development Phase. The RFP stipulated that proposals three contracts for the JLTV Technology Development Phase. The RFP stipulated that proposals
would be due April 7, 2008, and the TD Phase would last 27 months. Contractors would build would be due April 7, 2008, and the TD Phase would last 27 months. Contractors would build
four test subconfigurations during the first 15 months, followed by 12 months of testing. four test subconfigurations during the first 15 months, followed by 12 months of testing.
Technology Development Contracts Awarded8
On October 28, 2008, three awards were made for the JLTV TD Phase for a total of $166 million. On October 28, 2008, three awards were made for the JLTV TD Phase for a total of $166 million.
The three industry teams were (1) BAE Systems Land and Armaments, Ground Systems The three industry teams were (1) BAE Systems Land and Armaments, Ground Systems
Division, Santa Clara, CA, and NAVISTAR Defense, Warrenville, IL; (2) General Tactical Division, Santa Clara, CA, and NAVISTAR Defense, Warrenville, IL; (2) General Tactical
Vehicles, Sterling Heights, MI—a joint venture between General Dynamics Land Systems and Vehicles, Sterling Heights, MI—a joint venture between General Dynamics Land Systems and
AM General; and (3) Lockheed Martin Systems Integration, Oswego, NY, BAE Systems, Alcoa AM General; and (3) Lockheed Martin Systems Integration, Oswego, NY, BAE Systems, Alcoa
Defense, Pittsburgh, PA, and JWF Defense Systems, Johnstown, PA. Defense, Pittsburgh, PA, and JWF Defense Systems, Johnstown, PA.
JLTV Contracts Protested
On November 7 and November 12, 2008, protests were filed with the Government Accountability On November 7 and November 12, 2008, protests were filed with the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) against the TD contract awards by the Northrop Grumman-Oshkosh team and the Office (GAO) against the TD contract awards by the Northrop Grumman-Oshkosh team and the
Textron-Boeing-SAIC team alleging there were “unintended discrepancies” in how the Textron-Boeing-SAIC team alleging there were “unintended discrepancies” in how the
government rated bids in terms of the criteria of systems maturity, logistics, and costs.9 As a result government rated bids in terms of the criteria of systems maturity, logistics, and costs.9 As a result
of that protest, work on the JLTV program by the three winning teams was suspended. On of that protest, work on the JLTV program by the three winning teams was suspended. On
February 17, 2009, GAO rejected the JLTV protests and the stop-work orders were lifted. February 17, 2009, GAO rejected the JLTV protests and the stop-work orders were lifted.

6 Jason Sherman, “Pentagon Halts JLTV Competition, Directs Revised Strategy,” 6 Jason Sherman, “Pentagon Halts JLTV Competition, Directs Revised Strategy,” InsideDefense.com, September 24, , September 24,
2007. 2007.
7 JLTV Request for Proposal, W56HZV-08-R-0210, February 5, 2008, and Marjorie Censer, “JLTV Solicitation Calls 7 JLTV Request for Proposal, W56HZV-08-R-0210, February 5, 2008, and Marjorie Censer, “JLTV Solicitation Calls
for Three Contractors: Officials Say More are Possible,” for Three Contractors: Officials Say More are Possible,” InsideDefense.com, February 5, 2008. , February 5, 2008.
8 Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from TACOM’s JLTV Program website, 8 Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from TACOM’s JLTV Program website,
http://contracting.tacom.army.mil/MAJORSYS/JLTV/jltv.htm, accessed March 2, 2011, and the Marine Corps PEO http://contracting.tacom.army.mil/MAJORSYS/JLTV/jltv.htm, accessed March 2, 2011, and the Marine Corps PEO
Land Systems JLTV website, https://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/peolandsystems/jltv.aspx, accessed March 2, 2011. Land Systems JLTV website, https://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/peolandsystems/jltv.aspx, accessed March 2, 2011.
9 Marjorie Censer, “Following Northrop’s Lead, Boeing-Textron Team Files JLTV Protest,” 9 Marjorie Censer, “Following Northrop’s Lead, Boeing-Textron Team Files JLTV Protest,” InsideDefense.com,
November 12, 2008, and Ann Roosevelt, “Textron-Team Protests Army JLTV Awards,” November 12, 2008, and Ann Roosevelt, “Textron-Team Protests Army JLTV Awards,” Defense Daily, November 13, November 13,
2008; and Daniel Wasserbly, “U.S. GAO Rejects JLTV Protests,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 25, 2009, p. 12. 2008; and Daniel Wasserbly, “U.S. GAO Rejects JLTV Protests,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 25, 2009, p. 12.
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Change in Requirements, Program Schedule, and Variants10
In February 2011 the JLTV Program Office announced the award of the EMD contract would be In February 2011 the JLTV Program Office announced the award of the EMD contract would be
delayed until January or February 2012 because the Army changed requirements for the JLTV to delayed until January or February 2012 because the Army changed requirements for the JLTV to
have the same level of under-body protection as the Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected All-have the same level of under-body protection as the Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected All-
Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV). DOD had planned to award two contracts for the EMD phase, which Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV). DOD had planned to award two contracts for the EMD phase, which
was scheduled to last 24 months,11 but instead opted for a 48-month-long EMD phase before was scheduled to last 24 months,11 but instead opted for a 48-month-long EMD phase before
awarding Production and Deployment contracts in the second quarter of FY2016. It was decided awarding Production and Deployment contracts in the second quarter of FY2016. It was decided
that there would be two variants—a Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV), which can transport four that there would be two variants—a Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV), which can transport four
passengers and carry 3,500 pounds, and a Combat Support Vehicle (CSV), which can transport passengers and carry 3,500 pounds, and a Combat Support Vehicle (CSV), which can transport
two passengers and carry 5,100 pounds. two passengers and carry 5,100 pounds.
Army Issues RFP for EMD Phase12
On January 26, 2012, the Army issued the RFP for the JLTV’s EMD Phase. Industry proposals On January 26, 2012, the Army issued the RFP for the JLTV’s EMD Phase. Industry proposals
for the EMD contract were to have been filed with the Army by March 13, 2012. The RFP for the EMD contract were to have been filed with the Army by March 13, 2012. The RFP
stipulated that up to three EMD contracts could be awarded, and contract award occurred in June stipulated that up to three EMD contracts could be awarded, and contract award occurred in June
2012. These contracts would be capped at $65 million per contract. The duration of the EMD 2012. These contracts would be capped at $65 million per contract. The duration of the EMD
performance period would be 27 months starting with contract award. Vendors would be required performance period would be 27 months starting with contract award. Vendors would be required
to provide 22 prototypes for testing 12 months after contract award, and the target cost for the to provide 22 prototypes for testing 12 months after contract award, and the target cost for the
base vehicle configuration was $250,000 (FY2011 constant dollars), excluding add-on armor kits base vehicle configuration was $250,000 (FY2011 constant dollars), excluding add-on armor kits
and other kits identified in the RFP. and other kits identified in the RFP.
JLTV EMD Contracts Awarded
On August 22, 2012, the Army announced the award of three firm-fixed price JLTV EMD On August 22, 2012, the Army announced the award of three firm-fixed price JLTV EMD
contracts totaling approximately $185 million.13 The three companies awarded the EMD contracts contracts totaling approximately $185 million.13 The three companies awarded the EMD contracts
were AM General, LLC (South Bend, IN); Lockheed Martin Corporation (Grand Prairie, TX); were AM General, LLC (South Bend, IN); Lockheed Martin Corporation (Grand Prairie, TX);
and Oshkosh Corporation (Oshkosh, WI). The period of performance was for 27 months, with and Oshkosh Corporation (Oshkosh, WI). The period of performance was for 27 months, with
each contractor receiving initial funding between $28 million and $36 million per contractor, with each contractor receiving initial funding between $28 million and $36 million per contractor, with
the balance of funding up to the full contract amount being provided in FY2013 and FY2014. In the balance of funding up to the full contract amount being provided in FY2013 and FY2014. In
12 months, each team was required to deliver 22 prototypes and contractor support for a 14-12 months, each team was required to deliver 22 prototypes and contractor support for a 14-
month comprehensive government testing program, which included blast, automotive, and user month comprehensive government testing program, which included blast, automotive, and user
evaluation testing. The overall EMD Phase was scheduled to last 33 months. According to the evaluation testing. The overall EMD Phase was scheduled to last 33 months. According to the
Army, “the EMD Phase is designed to test and prepare the next-generation vehicles for a Limited Army, “the EMD Phase is designed to test and prepare the next-generation vehicles for a Limited
User Test, Capabilities Production Document and Milestone C procurement decision in FY User Test, Capabilities Production Document and Milestone C procurement decision in FY
2015.”14 2015.”14
Unsuccessful bidders Navistar Defense, BAE Systems, and General Tactical Vehicles Unsuccessful bidders Navistar Defense, BAE Systems, and General Tactical Vehicles (a team of (a team of
General Dynamics and AM General) were permitted to continue developing JLTV candidate General Dynamics and AM General) were permitted to continue developing JLTV candidate

10 Information in this section, unless otherwise noted is taken from a briefing from the Project Manager Joint Combat 10 Information in this section, unless otherwise noted is taken from a briefing from the Project Manager Joint Combat
Support Systems on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle given on February 7 and 8, 2011, and Tony Bertuca, “PMs: JLTV Support Systems on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle given on February 7 and 8, 2011, and Tony Bertuca, “PMs: JLTV
Still Too Heavy, Changing Schedule and Losing Six-Man Variant,” Still Too Heavy, Changing Schedule and Losing Six-Man Variant,” InsideDefense.com, February 11, 2011. February 11, 2011.
11 DOD Briefing: “JLTV EMD Industry Day,” April 26, 2010. 11 DOD Briefing: “JLTV EMD Industry Day,” April 26, 2010.
12 Solicitation, Offer, and Award, Number W56HZV-11-R-0329, U.S. Army Contracting Command, January 26, 2012. 12 Solicitation, Offer, and Award, Number W56HZV-11-R-0329, U.S. Army Contracting Command, January 26, 2012.
13 Information in this section is from U.S. Army Message, “Army Awards Three Joint Light Tactical Vehicle 13 Information in this section is from U.S. Army Message, “Army Awards Three Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
Engineering & Manufacturing Development Phase Contracts,” Warren, Michigan, August 22, 2012. Engineering & Manufacturing Development Phase Contracts,” Warren, Michigan, August 22, 2012.
14 Kris Osborn, Office of the Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, “JLTV Program 14 Kris Osborn, Office of the Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, “JLTV Program
Moves into EMD Phase,” Moves into EMD Phase,” Army News Service, October 18, 2012. October 18, 2012.
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vehicles at their own risk and expense, if they notified the government within 30 days of the vehicles at their own risk and expense, if they notified the government within 30 days of the
EMD contract award.15 Reports suggested some bidders considered continuing development of EMD contract award.15 Reports suggested some bidders considered continuing development of
JLTV candidates for submission for production source selection.16 JLTV candidates for submission for production source selection.16
Army Releases Final RFP for JLTV Full-Rate Production17
On December 12, 2014, the Army reportedly released the final RFP for JLTV low-rate initial On December 12, 2014, the Army reportedly released the final RFP for JLTV low-rate initial
production and full-rate production and gave competitors until February 10, 2016, to refine and production and full-rate production and gave competitors until February 10, 2016, to refine and
submit their bids. The Army—on behalf of itself and the Marines—planned to select a winner and submit their bids. The Army—on behalf of itself and the Marines—planned to select a winner and
issue a single contract award in late summer 2016. issue a single contract award in late summer 2016.
The winning contractor would build approximately 17,000 JLTVs for the Army and Marines The winning contractor would build approximately 17,000 JLTVs for the Army and Marines
during three years of low-rate initial production, followed by five years of full-rate production. during three years of low-rate initial production, followed by five years of full-rate production.
The first Army unit would be equipped with JLTVs in FY2018, and the Army’s complete The first Army unit would be equipped with JLTVs in FY2018, and the Army’s complete
acquisition of JLTVs would be completed in 2040. The Marines would begin acquiring their acquisition of JLTVs would be completed in 2040. The Marines would begin acquiring their
5,500 JLTVs at the beginning of production and would be completed by FY2022. 5,500 JLTVs at the beginning of production and would be completed by FY2022.
Bids Submitted for JLTV Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP)18
It was reported that the three companies who were picked in 2012 to build prototypes—Oshkosh, It was reported that the three companies who were picked in 2012 to build prototypes—Oshkosh,
Lockheed Martin, and AM General—submitted their bids for the LRIP contract by the February Lockheed Martin, and AM General—submitted their bids for the LRIP contract by the February
10, 2015, deadline. It was also reported that none of the three competitors had said publicly if 10, 2015, deadline. It was also reported that none of the three competitors had said publicly if
they included in their proposals an option for the Army to purchase a technical data package for they included in their proposals an option for the Army to purchase a technical data package for
their vehicles. If the Army acquired the technical data package, theoretically the Army could use their vehicles. If the Army acquired the technical data package, theoretically the Army could use
that data for future production runs, which could enhance competition and possibly result in that data for future production runs, which could enhance competition and possibly result in
better prices for the government. better prices for the government.
Army Awards JLTV Contract19
On August 25, 2015, the Army awarded Oshkosh a $6.7 billion low rate initial production (LRIP) On August 25, 2015, the Army awarded Oshkosh a $6.7 billion low rate initial production (LRIP)
contract with eight options to procure the initial 16,901 vehicles for the Army and Marines. The contract with eight options to procure the initial 16,901 vehicles for the Army and Marines. The
JLTV is to be produced in Oshkosh, WI.20 A full rate production decision was planned for JLTV is to be produced in Oshkosh, WI.20 A full rate production decision was planned for
FY2018 and called for the production of 49,100 JLTVs for the Army and 5,500 for the Marine FY2018 and called for the production of 49,100 JLTVs for the Army and 5,500 for the Marine
Corps. Corps.

15 Tony Bertuca, “Three JLTV Winners Announced; Losing Companies Still May Have a Shot,” 15 Tony Bertuca, “Three JLTV Winners Announced; Losing Companies Still May Have a Shot,” InsideDefense.com,
August 23, 2012. August 23, 2012.
16 Ibid. 16 Ibid.
17 Information in this section is taken from Megan Eckstein, “Army Releases Final RFP for JLTV; Bids Due Feb. 10,” 17 Information in this section is taken from Megan Eckstein, “Army Releases Final RFP for JLTV; Bids Due Feb. 10,”
Defense Daily, December 15, 2014. December 15, 2014.
18 Information in this section is taken from Sebastian Sprenger, “Companies Submit Bids for Joint Light Tactical 18 Information in this section is taken from Sebastian Sprenger, “Companies Submit Bids for Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle,” Vehicle,” InsideDefense.com, February 10, 2015. February 10, 2015.
19 Joe Gould, “Oshkosh Wins JLTV Award,” 19 Joe Gould, “Oshkosh Wins JLTV Award,” Defense News, August 25, 2015. August 25, 2015.
20 Courtney McBride, “Oshkosh Receives JLTV Order,” 20 Courtney McBride, “Oshkosh Receives JLTV Order,” InsideDefense.com, March 23, 2016. , March 23, 2016.
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Lockheed Martin’s JLTV Protest
Lockheed Martin Files Protest with the Government Accountability Office
(GAO)21
On September 8, 2015, Lockheed Martin reportedly planned a protest with GAO, with a program On September 8, 2015, Lockheed Martin reportedly planned a protest with GAO, with a program
spokesman stating the following: spokesman stating the following:
After evaluating the data provided at our debrief, Lockheed Martin has filed a protest of After evaluating the data provided at our debrief, Lockheed Martin has filed a protest of
the award decision on the JLTV program. We firmly believe we offered the most capable the award decision on the JLTV program. We firmly believe we offered the most capable
and affordable solution for the program. Lockheed Martin does not take protests lightly, and affordable solution for the program. Lockheed Martin does not take protests lightly,
but we are protesting to address our concerns regarding the evaluation of Lockheed but we are protesting to address our concerns regarding the evaluation of Lockheed
Martin’s offer.22 Martin’s offer.22
Army Stops Work on the JLTV Contract23
On September 10, 2015, the Army reportedly issued a stop-work order to Oshkosh, with a GAO On September 10, 2015, the Army reportedly issued a stop-work order to Oshkosh, with a GAO
spokesman noting, “The Federal Acquisition Regulation requires contracting officers to spokesman noting, “The Federal Acquisition Regulation requires contracting officers to
automatically suspend performance on an awarded contract, following appropriate notification of automatically suspend performance on an awarded contract, following appropriate notification of
a protest from GAO.”24 On December 11, 2015, Lockheed Martin informed GAO that it would a protest from GAO.”24 On December 11, 2015, Lockheed Martin informed GAO that it would
file its JLTV protest instead with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. On December 15, 2015, GAO file its JLTV protest instead with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. On December 15, 2015, GAO
closed Lockheed Martin’s protest “without further action.” With the GAO protest dismissed, the closed Lockheed Martin’s protest “without further action.” With the GAO protest dismissed, the
Army lifted its stop-work order to Oshkosh on December 15, 2015.25 The U.S. Court of Federal Army lifted its stop-work order to Oshkosh on December 15, 2015.25 The U.S. Court of Federal
Claims denied Lockheed Martin’s stop-work request on February 11, 2016, meaning Oshkosh Claims denied Lockheed Martin’s stop-work request on February 11, 2016, meaning Oshkosh
could continue work associated with the JLTV contract until the court resolved the contract award could continue work associated with the JLTV contract until the court resolved the contract award
dispute.26 dispute.26
Lockheed Martin Withdraws JLTV Protest from United States Court of
Federal Claims27
On February 17, 2016, Lockheed Martin reportedly withdrew its JLTV protest in the U.S. Court On February 17, 2016, Lockheed Martin reportedly withdrew its JLTV protest in the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims. of Federal Claims.

21 Lee Hudson and Justin Doubleday, “Lockheed To File GAO Bid Protest After Losing JLTV Contract,” 21 Lee Hudson and Justin Doubleday, “Lockheed To File GAO Bid Protest After Losing JLTV Contract,”
InsideDefense.com, September 9, 2015. September 9, 2015.
22 Ibid. 22 Ibid.
23 Sebastian Sprenger, “Newly Awarded JLTV Work Comes To A Halt Amid Auditors’ Review,” 23 Sebastian Sprenger, “Newly Awarded JLTV Work Comes To A Halt Amid Auditors’ Review,” InsideDefense.com,
September 10, 2015. September 10, 2015.
24 Ibid. 24 Ibid.
25 Sebastian Sprenger, “New Lockheed Suit Means JLTV Protest remains Undecided for Now,” 25 Sebastian Sprenger, “New Lockheed Suit Means JLTV Protest remains Undecided for Now,” InsideDefense.com, ,
December 16, 2015, and United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Decision on the Matter of Lockheed December 16, 2015, and United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Decision on the Matter of Lockheed
Martin Corporation, December 15, 2015. Martin Corporation, December 15, 2015.
26 Sebastian Sprenger, “Lockheed Martin Loses JLTV Stop-Work Request,” 26 Sebastian Sprenger, “Lockheed Martin Loses JLTV Stop-Work Request,” InsideDefense.com, February 12, 2016. , February 12, 2016.
27 Jen Judson, “Lockheed Withdraws JLTV Complaint with U.S. Federal Court,” 27 Jen Judson, “Lockheed Withdraws JLTV Complaint with U.S. Federal Court,” Defense News, February 17, 2016. February 17, 2016.
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JLTV LRIP Production Begins28
On March 22, 2016, the Army reportedly placed a $243 million order with Oshkosh Defense to On March 22, 2016, the Army reportedly placed a $243 million order with Oshkosh Defense to
build 657 JLTVs, as well as 2,977 installation kits and related vehicle support LRIP items. The build 657 JLTVs, as well as 2,977 installation kits and related vehicle support LRIP items. The
first JLTVs were delivered in September 2016.29 first JLTVs were delivered in September 2016.29
Delay in JLTV Initial Operating Capability (IOC)30
Primarily due to program disruption resulting from the Lockheed Martin protest, the JLTV will Primarily due to program disruption resulting from the Lockheed Martin protest, the JLTV will
not reach IOC in mid-2019 as originally planned. Instead, the Army anticipates a six-month delay not reach IOC in mid-2019 as originally planned. Instead, the Army anticipates a six-month delay
in IOC until the end of 2019, and the Marine Corps IOC, originally expected for the fourth in IOC until the end of 2019, and the Marine Corps IOC, originally expected for the fourth
quarter of FY2018, will now be a year later in the first quarter of FY2020. Although these delays quarter of FY2018, will now be a year later in the first quarter of FY2020. Although these delays
are significantly longer than the protest period, officials from both services noted their respective are significantly longer than the protest period, officials from both services noted their respective
IOCs were adjusted to reflect delays in scheduled testing. IOCs were adjusted to reflect delays in scheduled testing.
Army Places $100 Million Order for JLTVs31
The Army reportedly ordered 258 JLTVs and 1,727 associated components in December 2017 for The Army reportedly ordered 258 JLTVs and 1,727 associated components in December 2017 for
a total of $100.1 million, with the estimated contract completion date May 31, 2019. According to a total of $100.1 million, with the estimated contract completion date May 31, 2019. According to
Oshkosh Defense, it had delivered more than 1,000 vehicles since October 2016, and soldiers and Oshkosh Defense, it had delivered more than 1,000 vehicles since October 2016, and soldiers and
Marines were expected to start receiving JLTVs for operational use in FY2019. Also in FY2019, a Marines were expected to start receiving JLTVs for operational use in FY2019. Also in FY2019, a
full-rate production decision is expected, with an Army and Marine Initial Operating Capability full-rate production decision is expected, with an Army and Marine Initial Operating Capability
(IOC) expected in early FY2020. (IOC) expected in early FY2020.
Other JLTV Program-Related Developments
Air Force JLTV Acquisition32
In the near term, the Air Force plans to replace HMMWVs with JLTVs in its security forces, In the near term, the Air Force plans to replace HMMWVs with JLTVs in its security forces,
explosive ordnance disposal, pararescue, tactical air control, and special tactics units. Reportedly, explosive ordnance disposal, pararescue, tactical air control, and special tactics units. Reportedly,
the Air Force eventually would like to replace its entire 3,270 HMMWV fleet with JLTVs, but Air the Air Force eventually would like to replace its entire 3,270 HMMWV fleet with JLTVs, but Air
Force budget documents detail JLTV procurement only from FY2019 through FY2022. Force budget documents detail JLTV procurement only from FY2019 through FY2022.
Marines Increase JLTV Requirement to 9,091 Vehicles33
The Marines reportedly plan to increase their JLTV requirement from 5,500 vehicles to 9,091 The Marines reportedly plan to increase their JLTV requirement from 5,500 vehicles to 9,091
vehicles—about a 65% increase over the Marines’ original approved acquisition objective. vehicles—about a 65% increase over the Marines’ original approved acquisition objective.

28 Information in this section is taken from Dan Parsons, “Army Cuts Oshkosh $243 Million Check for First JLTV 28 Information in this section is taken from Dan Parsons, “Army Cuts Oshkosh $243 Million Check for First JLTV
Production Lot,” Production Lot,” Defense Daily, March 24, 2016, and Courtney McBride, “Oshkosh Receives JLTV Order,” March 24, 2016, and Courtney McBride, “Oshkosh Receives JLTV Order,”
InsideDefense.com, March 23, 2016. March 23, 2016.
29 Connie Lee, “Oshkosh Receives JLTV Order; Schedules First Delivery,” 29 Connie Lee, “Oshkosh Receives JLTV Order; Schedules First Delivery,” InsideDefense.com, September 27, 2016. September 27, 2016.
30 Information in this section is from Jen Judson, “Humvee Replacement Delayed for Army and Marine Corps,” 30 Information in this section is from Jen Judson, “Humvee Replacement Delayed for Army and Marine Corps,”
Defense News, April 13, 2016. April 13, 2016.
31 Ashley Tressel, “Army Places $100 Million Order for JLTVs,” 31 Ashley Tressel, “Army Places $100 Million Order for JLTVs,” InsideDefense.com, December 21, 2017. December 21, 2017.
32 Rachael Karas, “Air Force to Begin JLTV Buy in FY-17 to Replace HMMWVs,” 32 Rachael Karas, “Air Force to Begin JLTV Buy in FY-17 to Replace HMMWVs,” InsideDefense.com, June 22, 2017, June 22, 2017,
and Valerie Insinna, “Air Force’s Surprise JLTV Buy in FY 18 Could be Start of Larger Procurement Effort,” and Valerie Insinna, “Air Force’s Surprise JLTV Buy in FY 18 Could be Start of Larger Procurement Effort,”
DefenseNews.com, August 4, 2017. August 4, 2017.
33 Lee Hudson, “Marine Corps Official Says Commandant Seeks More Than 9,000 JLTVs,” 33 Lee Hudson, “Marine Corps Official Says Commandant Seeks More Than 9,000 JLTVs,” InsideDefense.com, May May
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Marine leadership reportedly wanted to acquire these additional vehicles as quickly as possible, Marine leadership reportedly wanted to acquire these additional vehicles as quickly as possible,
budget permitting. In June 2017 Marine Corps officials reportedly noted it would take “a couple budget permitting. In June 2017 Marine Corps officials reportedly noted it would take “a couple
of years” to formally adjust their approved acquisition objective (AAO), meaning that eventually, of years” to formally adjust their approved acquisition objective (AAO), meaning that eventually,
JLTVs would account for approximately half of the Marines’ light tactical vehicle fleet. JLTVs would account for approximately half of the Marines’ light tactical vehicle fleet.
British Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Purchase of JLTV34
The British Army will reportedly acquire 2,747 JLTVs, valued at more than $1 billion, through The British Army will reportedly acquire 2,747 JLTVs, valued at more than $1 billion, through
the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process.35 The sale also includes an armor kit, spare tires, and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process.35 The sale also includes an armor kit, spare tires, and
fording gear, as well as training for vehicle operators and maintainers. fording gear, as well as training for vehicle operators and maintainers.
JLTV Procurement Extended One Year and Increased Total Program
Cost36
DOD reports both the Army and Marines have extended their procurement profiles due to DOD reports both the Army and Marines have extended their procurement profiles due to
program strategy changes, primarily due to updating the mix of vehicle variants and kits. The program strategy changes, primarily due to updating the mix of vehicle variants and kits. The
Army now plans to conclude its procurement in FY2036 and the Marines in FY2023. Total Army now plans to conclude its procurement in FY2036 and the Marines in FY2023. Total
program costs have also increased to $28.03 billion (a 10.9% increase), primarily due to the program costs have also increased to $28.03 billion (a 10.9% increase), primarily due to the
increase in procurement profiles, increase in Marine Corps quantities to 9,091 vehicles, updates in increase in procurement profiles, increase in Marine Corps quantities to 9,091 vehicles, updates in
vehicle configuration and kit mix for the Army, updates in vehicles and kits based on the vehicle vehicle configuration and kit mix for the Army, updates in vehicles and kits based on the vehicle
configuration mix for the Marines, and an increase in other support and initial spares for the configuration mix for the Marines, and an increase in other support and initial spares for the
Army and Marines. Army and Marines.
DOD Inspector General (IG) Report and JLTV Production37
A redacted May 2, 2018, DOD IG report notes that, while the Army and Marine Corps developed A redacted May 2, 2018, DOD IG report notes that, while the Army and Marine Corps developed
adequate test plans, the services had not demonstrated effective test results to prepare the JLTV adequate test plans, the services had not demonstrated effective test results to prepare the JLTV
program for full rate production. The IG’s review of test results in August and September of 2017 program for full rate production. The IG’s review of test results in August and September of 2017
determined the JLTV failed to meet all maintenance-related performance requirements. The IG determined the JLTV failed to meet all maintenance-related performance requirements. The IG
suggested certain capabilities be developed to address the shortfall, but specifics were redacted in suggested certain capabilities be developed to address the shortfall, but specifics were redacted in
the public version of the report. The JLTV Program Executive Office (PEO) noted in response the public version of the report. The JLTV Program Executive Office (PEO) noted in response
that the program would equip all JLTVs with the unspecified capability cited in the IG’s report. that the program would equip all JLTVs with the unspecified capability cited in the IG’s report.
First Units Receive JLTV38
On January 28, 2019, the first JLTVs were delivered to the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team On January 28, 2019, the first JLTVs were delivered to the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team
(ABCT), 3rd Infantry Division at Ft. Stewart, GA. Plans call for the 1st ABCT to be equipped with (ABCT), 3rd Infantry Division at Ft. Stewart, GA. Plans call for the 1st ABCT to be equipped with

17, 2017, and “Marines Will Adjust JLTV Quantity Requirement in a Couple of Years,” 17, 2017, and “Marines Will Adjust JLTV Quantity Requirement in a Couple of Years,” InsideDefense.com, June 19, June 19,
2017. 2017.
34 Matthew Cox, “UK Plans to Buy $1 Billion Worth of JLTVs,” 34 Matthew Cox, “UK Plans to Buy $1 Billion Worth of JLTVs,” Military.com, July 10, 2017. July 10, 2017.
35 For additional information on FMS, see CRS In Focus IF10392, 35 For additional information on FMS, see CRS In Focus IF10392, Foreign Military Sales Congressional Review
Process, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
36 Department of Defense Comprehensive Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) for the December 31, 2017, Reporting 36 Department of Defense Comprehensive Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) for the December 31, 2017, Reporting
Requirement as Updated by the President’s FY2019 Budget, p. 4 and Ashley Tressel, “JLTV Procurement Stretched by Requirement as Updated by the President’s FY2019 Budget, p. 4 and Ashley Tressel, “JLTV Procurement Stretched by
One Year,” One Year,” InsideDefense.com, April 5, 2018. April 5, 2018.
37 Department of Defense Inspector General, Army and Marine Corps Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, May 2, 2018, and 37 Department of Defense Inspector General, Army and Marine Corps Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, May 2, 2018, and
Ashley Tressel, “DOD IG Concerned with JLTV Preparedness,” Ashley Tressel, “DOD IG Concerned with JLTV Preparedness,” InsideDefense.com, May 8, 2018. May 8, 2018.
38 Information in this section is taken from “Army’s Newest Vehicle Delivered to Soldiers at Ft. Stewart,” Army News 38 Information in this section is taken from “Army’s Newest Vehicle Delivered to Soldiers at Ft. Stewart,” Army News
Service, January 28, 2019, “Marine Corps is Rolling Forward with Fielding New JLTV,” Marine Corps Systems Service, January 28, 2019, “Marine Corps is Rolling Forward with Fielding New JLTV,” Marine Corps Systems
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about 500 JLTVs by the end of March 2019. It is not known if the 500 JLTVs have been fielded about 500 JLTVs by the end of March 2019. It is not known if the 500 JLTVs have been fielded
as of the date of this report. The Marines started fielding JLTVs at Camp Pendleton, CA, in as of the date of this report. The Marines started fielding JLTVs at Camp Pendleton, CA, in
February 2019, with initial operational capability planned for late summer 2019. February 2019, with initial operational capability planned for late summer 2019.
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)39 FY2018
Annual Report
Among other things, DOT&E’s FY2018 Annual Report contended the following: Among other things, DOT&E’s FY2018 Annual Report contended the following:
 The JLTV General Purpose (GP), Heavy Guns Carrier (HGC), and Utility (UTL)  The JLTV General Purpose (GP), Heavy Guns Carrier (HGC), and Utility (UTL)
variants are operationally effective for employment in combat and tactical variants are operationally effective for employment in combat and tactical
missions. missions.
 The JLTV Close Combat Weapons Carrier (CCWC) is not operationally effective  The JLTV Close Combat Weapons Carrier (CCWC) is not operationally effective
for use in combat and tactical missions. The CCWC provides less capability to for use in combat and tactical missions. The CCWC provides less capability to
engage threats with the Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) engage threats with the Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW)
missiles over the fielded High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle missiles over the fielded High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV). The missile reload process is slow and difficult for crews. (HMMWV). The missile reload process is slow and difficult for crews.
 All JLTVs are not operationally suitable because of deficiencies in reliability,  All JLTVs are not operationally suitable because of deficiencies in reliability,
maintainability, training, manuals, crew situational awareness, and safety.40 maintainability, training, manuals, crew situational awareness, and safety.40
JLTV Full-Rate Decision Delayed41
Reportedly, the Army decided to delay JLTV full-rate production, previously scheduled for Reportedly, the Army decided to delay JLTV full-rate production, previously scheduled for
December 2018, until the early summer of 2019, in order to assess options for vehicle design December 2018, until the early summer of 2019, in order to assess options for vehicle design
changes suggested by soldiers and marines during testing, potentially resulting in a program changes suggested by soldiers and marines during testing, potentially resulting in a program
schedule breach. Reportedly, the full-rate production decision could have been delayed until June schedule breach. Reportedly, the full-rate production decision could have been delayed until June
2019, but beyond that, it could trigger a Nunn-McCurdy42 breach, requiring, among other things, 2019, but beyond that, it could trigger a Nunn-McCurdy42 breach, requiring, among other things,
a report to Congress and a new program schedule. a report to Congress and a new program schedule.

Command, December 20, 2018, and “First Joint Light Tactical Vehicles Rolling to the Field,” Army News Service, Command, December 20, 2018, and “First Joint Light Tactical Vehicles Rolling to the Field,” Army News Service,
December 20, 2018. December 20, 2018.
39 The Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) is the principal staff assistant and senior advisor to the 39 The Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) is the principal staff assistant and senior advisor to the
Secretary of Defense on operational test and evaluation (OT&E) in DOD. DOT&E is responsible for issuing DOD Secretary of Defense on operational test and evaluation (OT&E) in DOD. DOT&E is responsible for issuing DOD
OT&E policy and procedures; reviewing and analyzing the results of OT&E conducted for each major DOD OT&E policy and procedures; reviewing and analyzing the results of OT&E conducted for each major DOD
acquisition program; providing independent assessments to Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for acquisition program; providing independent assessments to Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD [AT&L]), and Congress; making budgetary and financial Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD [AT&L]), and Congress; making budgetary and financial
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding OT&E; and overseeing major DOD acquisition programs to recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding OT&E; and overseeing major DOD acquisition programs to
ensure OT&E is adequate to confirm operational effectiveness and suitability of the defense system in combat use. ensure OT&E is adequate to confirm operational effectiveness and suitability of the defense system in combat use.
http://www.dote.osd.mil/about/mission.html, accessed February 14, 2019. http://www.dote.osd.mil/about/mission.html, accessed February 14, 2019.
40 Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E), FY2018 Annual Report, December 2018, p. 87. 40 Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E), FY2018 Annual Report, December 2018, p. 87.
41 Information in this section is taken from Jason Sherman, “Army Delays JLTV Full-Rate Production to Consider 41 Information in this section is taken from Jason Sherman, “Army Delays JLTV Full-Rate Production to Consider
Potential Design Changes,” Potential Design Changes,” InsideDefense.com, February 8, 2019. February 8, 2019.
42 The Nunn-McCurdy Act (10 U.S.C. §2433) requires the DOD to report to Congress whenever a Major Defense 42 The Nunn-McCurdy Act (10 U.S.C. §2433) requires the DOD to report to Congress whenever a Major Defense
Acquisition Program (MDAP) experiences cost overruns that exceed certain thresholds. The purpose of the act is to Acquisition Program (MDAP) experiences cost overruns that exceed certain thresholds. The purpose of the act is to
help control cost growth in major defense systems by holding the appropriate Pentagon officials and defense help control cost growth in major defense systems by holding the appropriate Pentagon officials and defense
contractors publicly accountable and responsible for managing costs. When MDAPs experience cost growth of 15% contractors publicly accountable and responsible for managing costs. When MDAPs experience cost growth of 15%
from their current baseline or 30% from their original baseline, they are in a “significant” Nunn-McCurdy Unit Cost from their current baseline or 30% from their original baseline, they are in a “significant” Nunn-McCurdy Unit Cost
Breach. Sponsors must notify Congress within 45 calendar days after the report upon which the determination is based. Breach. Sponsors must notify Congress within 45 calendar days after the report upon which the determination is based.
When MDAPs experience cost growth of 25% from their current baseline or 50% from their original baseline, they are When MDAPs experience cost growth of 25% from their current baseline or 50% from their original baseline, they are
in a “critical” Nunn-McCurdy Unit Cost Breach. Programs in “critical” breach status are subject to detailed review for in a “critical” Nunn-McCurdy Unit Cost Breach. Programs in “critical” breach status are subject to detailed review for
potential termination; http://acqnotes.com/acqnote/careerfields/nunn-mccurdy-act, accessed February 15, 2019. For potential termination; http://acqnotes.com/acqnote/careerfields/nunn-mccurdy-act, accessed February 15, 2019. For
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Army Approves JLTV Full-Rate Production43
On June 20, 2019, the ASA (ALT) approved Army JLTV full-rate production. The Army also On June 20, 2019, the ASA (ALT) approved Army JLTV full-rate production. The Army also
noted that in addition to the Fort Stewart, GA 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, JLTVs had been noted that in addition to the Fort Stewart, GA 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, JLTVs had been
successfully fielded to the Ordnance School at Ft. Lee, VA, the Reserves 84th Training Command successfully fielded to the Ordnance School at Ft. Lee, VA, the Reserves 84th Training Command
at Ft. McCoy, WI, the Marine School of Infantry – West at Camp Pendleton, CA, and the Marine at Ft. McCoy, WI, the Marine School of Infantry – West at Camp Pendleton, CA, and the Marine
School of Infantry – East at Camp Lejeune, NC. School of Infantry – East at Camp Lejeune, NC.
Marine Corps Addresses DOT&E Concerns and JLTV Fielding
Plans44
Marine Corps program officials reportedly worked through a number of the problems addressed Marine Corps program officials reportedly worked through a number of the problems addressed
in DOT&E’s FY2018 Annual Report. They suggest that many of the problems identified in the in DOT&E’s FY2018 Annual Report. They suggest that many of the problems identified in the
report can be addressed through improved tactics, techniques, and procedures and that some of report can be addressed through improved tactics, techniques, and procedures and that some of
the issues identified, such as insufficient training manuals, were a result of program decisions the issues identified, such as insufficient training manuals, were a result of program decisions
resulting from budget restrictions placed on the service. Marine officials also noted that legacy resulting from budget restrictions placed on the service. Marine officials also noted that legacy
HMMWVs had similar challenges identified during testing in 1986, but these issues were HMMWVs had similar challenges identified during testing in 1986, but these issues were
resolved after fielding. In terms of reliability and maintainability, Marine officials noted resolved after fielding. In terms of reliability and maintainability, Marine officials noted
HMMWVs go between 500 to 600 miles between operational mission failures, compared to the HMMWVs go between 500 to 600 miles between operational mission failures, compared to the
JLTV’s requirement of 2,400 miles before operational mission failure, which the JLTV has JLTV’s requirement of 2,400 miles before operational mission failure, which the JLTV has
surpassed during its developmental testing. Compared to HMMWVs, the JLTV is said to be less surpassed during its developmental testing. Compared to HMMWVs, the JLTV is said to be less
burdensome in terms of maintenance, although JLTV maintenance may take a little longer due to burdensome in terms of maintenance, although JLTV maintenance may take a little longer due to
a need to remove armored panels and a more complex engine. a need to remove armored panels and a more complex engine.
The Marines reportedly planned to field its first 55 JLTVs to support units at training locations, The Marines reportedly planned to field its first 55 JLTVs to support units at training locations,
including the School of Infantry West, School of Infantry East, and the Motor Transport including the School of Infantry West, School of Infantry East, and the Motor Transport
Maintenance Instructional Company, by the end of May 2019. Beginning in July 2019, Maintenance Instructional Company, by the end of May 2019. Beginning in July 2019,
operational units are planned to receive their first vehicles (3rd Battalion, 8th Marines at Camp operational units are planned to receive their first vehicles (3rd Battalion, 8th Marines at Camp
Lejeune, NC), which will also signify the Marines Initial Operational capability (IOC). By the Lejeune, NC), which will also signify the Marines Initial Operational capability (IOC). By the
end of FY2019, all three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs)—1st MEF in Camp Pendleton, end of FY2019, all three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs)—1st MEF in Camp Pendleton,
CA; 2nd MEF in Camp Lejeune, NC; and 3rd MEF in Okinawa, Japan—will have received some CA; 2nd MEF in Camp Lejeune, NC; and 3rd MEF in Okinawa, Japan—will have received some
combination of all variants. combination of all variants.
Army Considers Reducing Overall JLTV Acquisition45
On March 13, 2019, Army leadership reportedly announced the Army was considering lowering On March 13, 2019, Army leadership reportedly announced the Army was considering lowering
its overall requirement for JLTVs. In order to free up funding for modernization, the Army its overall requirement for JLTVs. In order to free up funding for modernization, the Army
decided to cut funding over the next five years for 93 programs—including the JLTV. Army decided to cut funding over the next five years for 93 programs—including the JLTV. Army
officials noted the service already has 55,000 HMMWVs and 800 Infantry Squad Vehicles officials noted the service already has 55,000 HMMWVs and 800 Infantry Squad Vehicles

additional information, see CRS Report R41293, additional information, see CRS Report R41293, The Nunn-McCurdy Act: Background, Analysis, and Issues for
Congress, by Moshe Schwartz and Charles V. O'Connor. , by Moshe Schwartz and Charles V. O'Connor.
43 Program Executive Office for Combat Support & Combat Service Support, “Amy Approves JLTV Full-Rate 43 Program Executive Office for Combat Support & Combat Service Support, “Amy Approves JLTV Full-Rate
Production” June 21, 2019. Production” June 21, 2019.
44 Information in this section is taken from Mallory Shelbourne, “Marine Corps to Field First JLTV, is Addressing 44 Information in this section is taken from Mallory Shelbourne, “Marine Corps to Field First JLTV, is Addressing
DOT&E Concerns,” DOT&E Concerns,” InsideDefense.com, February 27, 2019, and Megan Eckstein, “Marine Corps Fields First JLTV , February 27, 2019, and Megan Eckstein, “Marine Corps Fields First JLTV
this Week; IOC Planned for July,” U.S. Naval Institute, February 27, 2019. this Week; IOC Planned for July,” U.S. Naval Institute, February 27, 2019.
45 Information in this section is taken from Jen Judson, “U.S. Army Cuts Current Vehicle Fleet to make way for Next-45 Information in this section is taken from Jen Judson, “U.S. Army Cuts Current Vehicle Fleet to make way for Next-
Gen Tech,” Gen Tech,” InsideDefense.com, March 13, 2019, and Matthew Cox, “Army to Cut JLTV Buy to Pay for Future March 13, 2019, and Matthew Cox, “Army to Cut JLTV Buy to Pay for Future
Systems,” Systems,” Militray.com,, March 13, 2019. March 13, 2019.
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(ISVs), contending the Army “has more capability than we need.”46 Army officials reportedly (ISVs), contending the Army “has more capability than we need.”46 Army officials reportedly
were looking to lower the overall requirement for JLTVs and would determine “a new top line were looking to lower the overall requirement for JLTVs and would determine “a new top line
requirement soon.”47 On March 14, 2019, it was reported the Army planned to buy 1,900 fewer requirement soon.”47 On March 14, 2019, it was reported the Army planned to buy 1,900 fewer
JLTVs than originally planned, reducing program funding by nearly $800 million over the Future JLTVs than originally planned, reducing program funding by nearly $800 million over the Future
Years Defense Plan (FYDP).48 Years Defense Plan (FYDP).48
FY2021 JLTV Program Reduction and Extended Procurement49
In order to free up funds for other Army modernization priorities, the Army plans a program In order to free up funds for other Army modernization priorities, the Army plans a program
reduction in FY2021 of $201.6 million and will now extend the JLTV procurement by three years reduction in FY2021 of $201.6 million and will now extend the JLTV procurement by three years
until 2042. The Army’s approved Army Procurement Objective (APO) continues to be 49,909 until 2042. The Army’s approved Army Procurement Objective (APO) continues to be 49,909
vehicles. It is not known how this extended procurement will affect the Army’s overall fielding vehicles. It is not known how this extended procurement will affect the Army’s overall fielding
plan or if future efforts to free up modernization funds will result in a lowered APO. plan or if future efforts to free up modernization funds will result in a lowered APO.
Army Plans to Recompete JLTV Follow-On Contract50
The Army also has indicated it plans compete a follow-on contract to be awarded in FY2022 The Army also has indicated it plans compete a follow-on contract to be awarded in FY2022
intended to split the procurement between Oshkosh and a new competitor in order to drive down intended to split the procurement between Oshkosh and a new competitor in order to drive down
costs. Depending on the outcome of this competition, the Army’s procurement strategy and costs. Depending on the outcome of this competition, the Army’s procurement strategy and
timeline might change again. timeline might change again.
Department of Defense (DOD) FY2021 Budget
Request51
The FY2021 presidential budget request includes RDT&E and procurement funding requests, as The FY2021 presidential budget request includes RDT&E and procurement funding requests, as
well as FY2021-requested quantities in the base budget and Overseas Contingency Operations well as FY2021-requested quantities in the base budget and Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO) budget request. (OCO) budget request.
Table 1. FY2021 DOD Budget Request—JLTV
Funding
Base
OCO
OCO
Total
Total
Category
Budget
Base Budget
Budget
Budget
Request
Request

$M
Qty
$M
Qty
$M
Qty
RDT&E USA
1.7 1.7
— —
— —
— —
1.7 1.7
— —
RDT&E USMC
2.5 2.5
— —
— —
— —
2.5 2.5
— —
Procurement
USA
894.4 894.4
3,254 3,254
— —
— —
894.4 894.4
3,254 3,254

46 Matthew Cox, March 13, 2019. 46 Matthew Cox, March 13, 2019.
47 Jen Judson, March 13, 2019. 47 Jen Judson, March 13, 2019.
48 Ashley Tressel, “Army Vehicles Pay the Bill for Modernization in First Round of Cuts,” 48 Ashley Tressel, “Army Vehicles Pay the Bill for Modernization in First Round of Cuts,” InsideDefense.com,, March March
14, 2019. 14, 2019.
49 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, February 2020, Army Justification Book of Other 49 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, February 2020, Army Justification Book of Other
Procurement, Army Other Procurement, Army, Tactical and Support Vehicles, Budget Activity 1, pp. 99-109; Ashley Procurement, Army Other Procurement, Army, Tactical and Support Vehicles, Budget Activity 1, pp. 99-109; Ashley
Tressel, “Army Stretching JLTV Buy to 2042,” Tressel, “Army Stretching JLTV Buy to 2042,” InsideDefense.com, February 11, 2020; and “Mobile Medium Range February 11, 2020; and “Mobile Medium Range
Missile Among Programs Army Wants to Cancel,” Missile Among Programs Army Wants to Cancel,” InsideDefense.com, February 13, 2020. February 13, 2020.
50 Ibid. 50 Ibid.
51 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition Cost by 51 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition Cost by
Weapon System: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request, February 2020, p. 3-2. Weapon System: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request, February 2020, p. 3-2.
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress

Funding
Base
OCO
OCO
Total
Total
Category
Budget
Base Budget
Budget
Budget
Request
Request
Procurement
USAF
72.6 72.6
201 201
8.0 8.0
15 15
80.6 80.6
216 216
Procurement
USN
11.1 11.1
25 25
— —
— —
11.1 11.1
25 25
Procurement
USMC
381.7 381.7
752 752
— —
— —
381.7 381.7
752 752
TOTAL
1,364.0
4,232
8.0
15
1,372.0
4,247
Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptrol er)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptrol er)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition
Cost by Weapon System: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request, February Cost by Weapon System: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request, February
2020, p. 3-2. 2020, p. 3-2.
Notes: $M = U.S. Dol ars in Mil ions; = U.S. Dol ars in Mil ions; Qty = FY2021 Procurement Quantities. = FY2021 Procurement Quantities.

FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
S.4049
S. 4049 recommends fully funding the Service’s JLTV RDT&E and Procurement budget S. 4049 recommends fully funding the Service’s JLTV RDT&E and Procurement budget
requests.52 requests.52
H.R. 6395
~~The Chairman’s Mark of~~ H.R. 6395 recommends fully funding the Service’s JLTV RDT&E and H.R. 6395 recommends fully funding the Service’s JLTV RDT&E and
Procurement budget Procurement budget requests.53 FY2021 Defense Appropriations Bill House Report XX -116, Department of Defense appropriations bill, FY2021, recommends that the FY2021 Army JLTV Procurement request be reduced by $10 million to $884.4 million due to excess support costs.54 In addition, the bill also recommends reducing the FY2021 Marine Corps JLTV Procurement request by $31.3 million to $350.3 million due to vehicles previously funded.55 52 S.Rept. 116-236, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, June 24, 2020, pp 8-80. 53 H.Rept. XX-116, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 Report of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives on H.R. 6395, July X, 2020, pp. 357-423. 54 H.Rept. XX-116, Department of Defense appropriations bill, FY2021, July X, 2020, p. 163. 55 Ibid., p. 204. Congressional Research Service 11 Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress ~~requests.53~~
Potential Issues for Congress
Will the JLTV Become the Major Bill Payer for Army
Modernization?
With the Army’s decision to reduce JLTV funding by $201.6 million in FY2021 and previous With the Army’s decision to reduce JLTV funding by $201.6 million in FY2021 and previous
statements about having “more capability than we need,”statements about having “more capability than we need,”5456 some may question if the JLTV will some may question if the JLTV will
become the major bill payer for Army modernization, by reducing in its procurement objective become the major bill payer for Army modernization, by reducing in its procurement objective
and/or by extending the overall procurement timeline, thereby pushing costs further into the and/or by extending the overall procurement timeline, thereby pushing costs further into the
future. As it stands at present, there appears to be a degree of program uncertainty as well as future. As it stands at present, there appears to be a degree of program uncertainty as well as
questions concerning the validity of the Army’s original requirements and plans for the JLTV. questions concerning the validity of the Army’s original requirements and plans for the JLTV.
Compounding this, some defense experts have speculated the Marine Corps might cut their JLTV Compounding this, some defense experts have speculated the Marine Corps might cut their JLTV
buy as the JLTV might prove to be too heavy for the Marine’s planned pivot to a more buy as the JLTV might prove to be too heavy for the Marine’s planned pivot to a more
expeditionary form of warfare.expeditionary form of warfare.5557 If this becomes the case and the Army reduces its JLTV buy to ~~If this becomes the case and the Army reduces its JLTV buy to~~

~~52 S. ___ Rpt. ____, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, June 24, 2020, pp 8-80.~~
~~53 H.R. 6395—FY21 National Defense Authorization Bill Chairman’s Mark, June 25, 2020, pp. 4-28.~~
~~54 Matthew Cox, March 13, 2019.~~
~~55 Charlie Gao, “Is the U.S. Army’s Joint Light Tactical Vehicle in Trouble?” The National Interest, February 15, 2020.~~
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~~Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress~~

fund modernization, there could be appreciable programmatic impacts of interest to fund modernization, there could be appreciable programmatic impacts of interest to
policymakers. policymakers.
What isIs the Future of JLTV Procurement?5658
The Army’s current The Army’s current ~~modernization57~~modernization59 strategy is primarily focused on its six modernization strategy is primarily focused on its six modernization
priorities which does not include the JLTV. The possibility of the Marine Corps adopting a more priorities which does not include the JLTV. The possibility of the Marine Corps adopting a more
expeditionary expeditionary ~~posture58~~posture60 and requiring fewer JLTVs than originally planned suggests original and requiring fewer JLTVs than originally planned suggests original
JLTV procurement plans for the two major service customers might no longer be relevant. JLTV procurement plans for the two major service customers might no longer be relevant.
Despite the Army’s intent to lower costs by competing a follow on contract with another vendor Despite the Army’s intent to lower costs by competing a follow on contract with another vendor
by FY2022, some experts note slowing production rates and extended procurement timelines can by FY2022, some experts note slowing production rates and extended procurement timelines can
act to increase costs. In addition, different versions of the JLTV produced by another vendor act to increase costs. In addition, different versions of the JLTV produced by another vendor
could result in additional operations and maintenance costs which can result from a mixed fleet of could result in additional operations and maintenance costs which can result from a mixed fleet of
vehicles. Taken collectively, these issues might merit DOD and policymakers examining the vehicles. Taken collectively, these issues might merit DOD and policymakers examining the
future of JLTV procurement to help determine the current requirement for JLTVs as well as if future of JLTV procurement to help determine the current requirement for JLTVs as well as if
decisions to extend procurement and re-compete future production will result in increased decisions to extend procurement and re-compete future production will result in increased
programmatic costs. programmatic costs.

~~Author Information~~

~~Andrew Feickert~~

~~Specialist in Military Ground Forces~~

56 56 Matthew Cox, March 13, 2019. 57 Charlie Gao, “Is the U.S. Army’s Joint Light Tactical Vehicle in Trouble?” The National Interest, February 15, 2020. 58 Information in this section is taken from Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Bumps in the Road May Lie Ahead for JLTV Information in this section is taken from Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Bumps in the Road May Lie Ahead for JLTV
Procurement,” Procurement,” National Defense, January 30, 2020, and Charlie Gao, “Is the U.S. Army’s Joint Light Tactical Vehicle January 30, 2020, and Charlie Gao, “Is the U.S. Army’s Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
in Trouble?” The National Interest, February 15, 2020. in Trouble?” The National Interest, February 15, 2020.
5759 For additional information on Army modernization, see CRS Report R46216, For additional information on Army modernization, see CRS Report R46216, The Army’s Modernization Strategy:
Congressional Oversight Considerations, by Andrew Feickert and Brendan W. McGarry. , by Andrew Feickert and Brendan W. McGarry.
5860 For additional information on proposed Marine Corps force structure changes, see CRS Insight IN11281, For additional information on proposed Marine Corps force structure changes, see CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S.
Marine Corps Force Design Initiatives, by Andrew Feickert. , by Andrew Feickert.
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress

Author Information Andrew Feickert Specialist in Military Ground Forces
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