The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

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The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting
July July 813, 2020 , 2020
Vehicle (OMFV) Program: Background and
Andrew Feickert
Issues for Congress
Specialist in Military Specialist in Military
Ground Forces Ground Forces
In June 2018, in part due to congressional concerns, the Army announced a new modernization In June 2018, in part due to congressional concerns, the Army announced a new modernization

strategy and designated the Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) as the program to replace strategy and designated the Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) as the program to replace
the M-2 Bradley. In October 2018, Army leadership decided to redesignate the NGCV as the the M-2 Bradley. In October 2018, Army leadership decided to redesignate the NGCV as the

Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) and to add additional vehicle programs to what Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) and to add additional vehicle programs to what
would be called the NGCV Program. would be called the NGCV Program.
The M-2 Bradley, which has been in service since 1981, is an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) used to transport infantry on The M-2 Bradley, which has been in service since 1981, is an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) used to transport infantry on
the battlefield and provide fire support to dismounted troops and suppress or destroy enemy fighting vehicles. Updated the battlefield and provide fire support to dismounted troops and suppress or destroy enemy fighting vehicles. Updated
numerous times since its introduction, the M-2 Bradley is widely considered to have reached the technological limits of its numerous times since its introduction, the M-2 Bradley is widely considered to have reached the technological limits of its
capacity to accommodate new electronics, armor, and defense systems. Two past efforts to replace the M-2 Bradley—the capacity to accommodate new electronics, armor, and defense systems. Two past efforts to replace the M-2 Bradley—the
Future Combat System (FCS) Program and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program—were cancelled for programmatic Future Combat System (FCS) Program and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program—were cancelled for programmatic
and cost-associated reasons. and cost-associated reasons.
In late 2018, the Army established Army Futures Command (AFC), intended to establish unity of command and effort while In late 2018, the Army established Army Futures Command (AFC), intended to establish unity of command and effort while
consolidating the Army’s modernization process under one roof. AFC is intended to play a significant role in OMFV consolidating the Army’s modernization process under one roof. AFC is intended to play a significant role in OMFV
development and acquisition. development and acquisition.
On March 29, 2019, the Army issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) to industry for the OMFV. The Army characterized its On March 29, 2019, the Army issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) to industry for the OMFV. The Army characterized its
requirements as “aggressive” and noted industry might not be able to meet all requirements. requirements as “aggressive” and noted industry might not be able to meet all requirements.
On January 16, 2020, the Army canceled the current OMFV program, intending to restart the program following an analysis On January 16, 2020, the Army canceled the current OMFV program, intending to restart the program following an analysis
and revision of program requirements. According to Army officials, “a combination of requirements and schedule and revision of program requirements. According to Army officials, “a combination of requirements and schedule
overwhelmed industry’s ability to respond within the Army’s timeline.” overwhelmed industry’s ability to respond within the Army’s timeline.”
On February 7, 2020, the Army reopened the OMFV competition by releasing a new market survey with a minimally On February 7, 2020, the Army reopened the OMFV competition by releasing a new market survey with a minimally
prescriptive wish list and an acquisition strategy that shifted most of the initial cost burden to the Army. prescriptive wish list and an acquisition strategy that shifted most of the initial cost burden to the Army.
On April 9, 2020, the Army provided new OMFV program guidance to industry featuring a five-phased approach to On April 9, 2020, the Army provided new OMFV program guidance to industry featuring a five-phased approach to
acquisition as well as a pledge to “reduce foreign barriers to competition,” and “identify a pathway to integrate relevant but acquisition as well as a pledge to “reduce foreign barriers to competition,” and “identify a pathway to integrate relevant but
immature technologies” into the program. immature technologies” into the program.
The Army requested $327.732 million in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding for the OMFV The Army requested $327.732 million in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding for the OMFV
program in its FY2021 budget request. program in its FY2021 budget request.
At present, the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) recommends decreases to the OMFV budget request as At present, the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) recommends decreases to the OMFV budget request as
follows: follows:
 S. 4049 recommends decreasing the Army’s OMFV FY2021 budget request by $80 million to $247.732  S. 4049 recommends decreasing the Army’s OMFV FY2021 budget request by $80 million to $247.732
million for program reset, attributed to the program’s cancellation and restart. million for program reset, attributed to the program’s cancellation and restart.
 H.R. 6395  H.R. 6395~~. The Chairman’s Mark of H.R. 6395~~ recommends decreasing the Army’s OMFV FY2021 recommends decreasing the Army’s OMFV FY2021
budget request by $83 million to $244.732 budget request by $83 million to $244.732 million for Army-identified funds excess to need, also attributed million for Army-identified funds excess to need, also attributed
to the OMFV program cancellation and to the OMFV program cancellation and restart. The FY2021 Defense appropriations bill recommends decreasing the Army’s OMFV FY2021 budget request by $98.232 million due to Army-identified excess and overestimation of need. ~~restart.~~
Potential issues for Congress include the Army’s new OMFV Acquisition Strategy and OMFV program decisionmaking Potential issues for Congress include the Army’s new OMFV Acquisition Strategy and OMFV program decisionmaking
authority. authority.

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The Army’s OMFV Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Why Is This Issue Important to Congress?
The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) is the Army’s third attempt to replace The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) is the Army’s third attempt to replace
the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) which has been in service since the early 1980s. the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) which has been in service since the early 1980s.
Despite numerous upgrades since its introduction, the Army contends the M-2 is near the end of Despite numerous upgrades since its introduction, the Army contends the M-2 is near the end of
its useful life and can no longer accommodate the types of upgrades needed for it to be effective its useful life and can no longer accommodate the types of upgrades needed for it to be effective
on the modern battlefield. on the modern battlefield.
Because the OMFV would be an important weapon system in the Army’s Armored Brigade Because the OMFV would be an important weapon system in the Army’s Armored Brigade
Combat Teams (ABCTs), Congress may be concerned with how the OMFV would impact the Combat Teams (ABCTs), Congress may be concerned with how the OMFV would impact the
effectiveness of ground forces over the full spectrum of military operations. Moreover, Congress effectiveness of ground forces over the full spectrum of military operations. Moreover, Congress
might also be concerned with how much more capable the OMFV is projected to be over the M-2 might also be concerned with how much more capable the OMFV is projected to be over the M-2
Bradley to ensure that it is not just a costly marginal improvement over the current system. A Bradley to ensure that it is not just a costly marginal improvement over the current system. A
number of past unsuccessful Army acquisition programs have served to heighten congressional number of past unsuccessful Army acquisition programs have served to heighten congressional
oversight of Army programs, and the OMFV may be subject to a high degree of congressional oversight of Army programs, and the OMFV may be subject to a high degree of congressional
interest. interest.
The Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV)
Becomes the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle
(OMFV)
In June 2018, the Army established the Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) program to In June 2018, the Army established the Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) program to
replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), which has been in service since the replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), which has been in service since the
early 1980s. In October 2018, Army leadership reportedly decided to redesignate the NGCV as early 1980s. In October 2018, Army leadership reportedly decided to redesignate the NGCV as
the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) and add additional vehicle programs to what the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) and add additional vehicle programs to what
would be called the NGCV Program.1 Under the new NGCV Program, the following systems are would be called the NGCV Program.1 Under the new NGCV Program, the following systems are
planned for development: planned for development:
 The  The Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV): the M-2 Bradley IFV the M-2 Bradley IFV
replacement. replacement.
 The  The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV):2 the M-113 vehicle 2 the M-113 vehicle
replacement. replacement.
  Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF):3 a light tank for Infantry Brigade Combat 3 a light tank for Infantry Brigade Combat
Teams (IBCTs). Teams (IBCTs).
  Robotic Combat Vehicles (RCVs): three versions, Light, Medium, and Heavy. three versions, Light, Medium, and Heavy.
  The Decisive Lethality Platform (DLP): the M-1 Abrams tank replacement. the M-1 Abrams tank replacement.
Report Focus on OMFV
Because AMPV and MPF are discussed in earlier CRS reports and the OMFV is in the early Because AMPV and MPF are discussed in earlier CRS reports and the OMFV is in the early
stages of development, the remainder of this report focuses on the OMFV. Because the DLP is stages of development, the remainder of this report focuses on the OMFV. Because the DLP is

1 Ashley Tressel, “MPF, AMPV Now Part of NGCV Family of Vehicles,” 1 Ashley Tressel, “MPF, AMPV Now Part of NGCV Family of Vehicles,” InsideDefense.com, October 12, 2018. October 12, 2018.
2 For additional information on the AMPV, see CRS Report R43240, 2 For additional information on the AMPV, see CRS Report R43240, The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
(AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert. , by Andrew Feickert.
3 For additional information on MPF, see CRS Report R44968, 3 For additional information on MPF, see CRS Report R44968, Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Mobility,
Reconnaissance, and Firepower Programs, by Andrew Feickert. , by Andrew Feickert.
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intended to replace the Army’s second major ground combat system—the M-1 Abrams Tank—it intended to replace the Army’s second major ground combat system—the M-1 Abrams Tank—it
will be addressed in a separate CRS report in the future. will be addressed in a separate CRS report in the future.
Preliminary OMFV Requirements4
The Army’s preliminary basic operational requirements for the OMFV included the following: The Army’s preliminary basic operational requirements for the OMFV included the following:
  Optionally manned. It must have the ability to conduct remotely controlled It must have the ability to conduct remotely controlled
operations while the crew is off-platform.5 operations while the crew is off-platform.5
  Capacity. It should eventually operate with no more than two crewmen and It should eventually operate with no more than two crewmen and
possess sufficient volume under armor to carry at least six soldiers. possess sufficient volume under armor to carry at least six soldiers.
  Transportability. Two OMFVs should be transportable by one C-17 and be Two OMFVs should be transportable by one C-17 and be
ready for combat within 15 minutes. ready for combat within 15 minutes.
  Dense urban terrain operations and mobility. Platforms should include the Platforms should include the
ability to super elevate weapons and simultaneously engage threats using main ability to super elevate weapons and simultaneously engage threats using main
gun and an independent weapons system. gun and an independent weapons system.
  Protection. It must possess requisite protection to survive on the contemporary It must possess requisite protection to survive on the contemporary
and future battlefield. and future battlefield.
  Growth. It should possess sufficient size, weight, architecture, power, and It should possess sufficient size, weight, architecture, power, and
cooling for automotive and electrical purposes to meet all platform needs and cooling for automotive and electrical purposes to meet all platform needs and
allow for preplanned product improvements. allow for preplanned product improvements.
  Lethality. It should apply immediate, precise, and decisively lethal extended It should apply immediate, precise, and decisively lethal extended
range medium-caliber, directed energy, and missile fires in day/night/all-weather range medium-caliber, directed energy, and missile fires in day/night/all-weather
conditions, while moving and/or stationary against moving and/or stationary conditions, while moving and/or stationary against moving and/or stationary
targets. The platform should allow for mounted, dismounted, and unmanned targets. The platform should allow for mounted, dismounted, and unmanned
system target handover. system target handover.
  Embedded platform training. It should have embedded training systems that It should have embedded training systems that
have interoperability with the Synthetic Training Environment. have interoperability with the Synthetic Training Environment.
  Sustainability. Industry should demonstrate innovations that achieve Industry should demonstrate innovations that achieve
breakthroughs in power generation and management to obtain increased breakthroughs in power generation and management to obtain increased
operational range and fuel efficiency, increased silent watch, part and component operational range and fuel efficiency, increased silent watch, part and component
reliability, and significantly reduced sustainment burden. reliability, and significantly reduced sustainment burden.
Additional requirements included the capacity to accommodate6 Additional requirements included the capacity to accommodate6
 reactive armor,  reactive armor,
 an Active Protection System (APS),  an Active Protection System (APS),

4 Bob Purtiman, “Preparing for Future Battlefield: The Next Generation Combat Vehicle,” 4 Bob Purtiman, “Preparing for Future Battlefield: The Next Generation Combat Vehicle,” Army News, September 17, September 17,
2018. 2018.
5 For additional information on autonomous systems, see CRS Report R45392, 5 For additional information on autonomous systems, see CRS Report R45392, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and
Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress, coordinated by Andrew , coordinated by Andrew
Feickert. Feickert.
6 Project Manager NGCV, NGCV OMFV Industry Day Briefing, August 6, 2018, and David Vergun, “Next Generation 6 Project Manager NGCV, NGCV OMFV Industry Day Briefing, August 6, 2018, and David Vergun, “Next Generation
Combat Vehicle Must be Effective in Mega Cities, FORSCOM Commander Says,” Combat Vehicle Must be Effective in Mega Cities, FORSCOM Commander Says,” Army News, November 30, 2017. , November 30, 2017.
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 artificial intelligence,7 and  artificial intelligence,7 and
 directed-energy weapons8 and advanced target sensors.  directed-energy weapons8 and advanced target sensors.
Background
The Army’s Current Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)
The M-2 Bradley is an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) used to transport infantry on the The M-2 Bradley is an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) used to transport infantry on the
battlefield and provide fire support to dismounted troops and suppress or destroy enemy fighting battlefield and provide fire support to dismounted troops and suppress or destroy enemy fighting
vehicles. The M-2 has a crew of three—commander, gunner, and driver—and carries seven fully vehicles. The M-2 has a crew of three—commander, gunner, and driver—and carries seven fully
equipped infantry soldiers. M-2 Bradley IFVs are primarily found in the Army’s Armored equipped infantry soldiers. M-2 Bradley IFVs are primarily found in the Army’s Armored
Brigade Combat Teams (ABCT). The first M-2 prototypes were delivered to the Army in Brigade Combat Teams (ABCT). The first M-2 prototypes were delivered to the Army in
December 1978, and the first delivery of M-2s to units started in May 1981. The M-2 Bradley has December 1978, and the first delivery of M-2s to units started in May 1981. The M-2 Bradley has
been upgraded often since 1981.9 been upgraded often since 1981.9
M-2 Limitations and the Need for a Replacement
Despite numerous upgrades over its lifetime, the M-2 Bradley has what some consider a notable Despite numerous upgrades over its lifetime, the M-2 Bradley has what some consider a notable
limitation. Although the M-2 Bradley can accommodate seven fully equipped infantry soldiers, limitation. Although the M-2 Bradley can accommodate seven fully equipped infantry soldiers,
infantry squads consist of nine soldiers. As a result, “each mechanized [ABCT] infantry platoon infantry squads consist of nine soldiers. As a result, “each mechanized [ABCT] infantry platoon
has to divide three squads between four Bradleys, meaning that all the members of a squad are has to divide three squads between four Bradleys, meaning that all the members of a squad are
not able to ride in the same vehicle.”10 This limitation raises both command and control and not able to ride in the same vehicle.”10 This limitation raises both command and control and
employment challenges for Bradley-mounted infantry squads and platoons. employment challenges for Bradley-mounted infantry squads and platoons.
The M-2 Bradley first saw combat in 1991 in Operation Desert Storm, where its crews were The M-2 Bradley first saw combat in 1991 in Operation Desert Storm, where its crews were
generally satisfied with its performance.11 The M-2’s service in 2003’s Operation Iraqi Freedom generally satisfied with its performance.11 The M-2’s service in 2003’s Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) was also considered satisfactory. However, reports of vehicle and crew losses attributed to (OIF) was also considered satisfactory. However, reports of vehicle and crew losses attributed to
mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and anti-tank rockets—despite the addition of mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and anti-tank rockets—despite the addition of
reactive armor12 to the M-2—raised concerns about the survivability of the Bradley.13 reactive armor12 to the M-2—raised concerns about the survivability of the Bradley.13
Furthermore, the M-2 Bradley is reportedly reaching the technological limits of its capacity to Furthermore, the M-2 Bradley is reportedly reaching the technological limits of its capacity to
accommodate new electronics, armor, and defense systems.14 By some accounts, M-2 Bradleys accommodate new electronics, armor, and defense systems.14 By some accounts, M-2 Bradleys

7 For additional information on Army artificial intelligence efforts, see CRS Report R45392, 7 For additional information on Army artificial intelligence efforts, see CRS Report R45392, U.S. Ground Forces
Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress, coordinated by , coordinated by
Andrew Feickert. Andrew Feickert.
8 For information on Army directed energy efforts, see CRS Report R45098, 8 For information on Army directed energy efforts, see CRS Report R45098, U.S. Army Weapons-Related Directed
Energy (DE) Programs: Background and Potential Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert. , by Andrew Feickert.
9 Sebastien Roblin, “The Army’s Plan for a Super Bradley Fighting Vehicle are Dead,” 9 Sebastien Roblin, “The Army’s Plan for a Super Bradley Fighting Vehicle are Dead,” The National Interest,, February February
10, 2019. 10, 2019.
10 Ibid. 10 Ibid.
11 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Operation Desert Storm: Early Performance Assessment 11 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Operation Desert Storm: Early Performance Assessment
of Bradley and Abrams,” GAO/NSIAD-92-94, January 1992. of Bradley and Abrams,” GAO/NSIAD-92-94, January 1992.
12 Reactive armor typically consists of a layer of high explosive between two metallic armor plates. When a penetrating 12 Reactive armor typically consists of a layer of high explosive between two metallic armor plates. When a penetrating
weapon strikes the armor, the explosive detonates, thereby damaging the penetrator or disrupting the resulting plasma weapon strikes the armor, the explosive detonates, thereby damaging the penetrator or disrupting the resulting plasma
jet generated by the penetrator. jet generated by the penetrator.
13 Sebastien Roblin, “The Army’s M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle is Old. What Replaces it Could be Revolutionary,” 13 Sebastien Roblin, “The Army’s M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle is Old. What Replaces it Could be Revolutionary,”
The National Interest, October 27, 2018. , October 27, 2018.
14 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Pushes Bradley Replacement; Cautious on Armed Robots,” 14 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Pushes Bradley Replacement; Cautious on Armed Robots,” Breaking Defense, June June
27, 2018. 27, 2018.
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during OIF routinely had to turn off certain electronic systems to gain enough power for anti- during OIF routinely had to turn off certain electronic systems to gain enough power for anti-
roadside-bomb jammers. Moreover, current efforts to mount Active Protection Systems (APS)15 roadside-bomb jammers. Moreover, current efforts to mount Active Protection Systems (APS)15
on M-2 Bradleys to destroy incoming anti-tank rockets and missiles are proving difficult.16 Given on M-2 Bradleys to destroy incoming anti-tank rockets and missiles are proving difficult.16 Given
its almost four decades of service, operational limitations, demonstrated combat vulnerabilities, its almost four decades of service, operational limitations, demonstrated combat vulnerabilities,
and difficulties in upgrading current models, many argue the M-2 Bradley is a candidate for and difficulties in upgrading current models, many argue the M-2 Bradley is a candidate for
replacement. replacement.
Past Attempts to Replace the M-2 Bradley IFV
The Army has twice attempted to replace the M-2 Bradley IFV—first as part of the Future The Army has twice attempted to replace the M-2 Bradley IFV—first as part of the Future
Combat System (FCS) Program,17 which was cancelled by the Secretary of Defense in 2009, and Combat System (FCS) Program,17 which was cancelled by the Secretary of Defense in 2009, and
second with the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program,18 cancelled by the Secretary of Defense second with the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program,18 cancelled by the Secretary of Defense
in 2014. These cancellations, along with a series of high-profile studies, such as the 2011 Decker-in 2014. These cancellations, along with a series of high-profile studies, such as the 2011 Decker-
Wagner Army Acquisition Review, have led many to call into question the Army’s ability to Wagner Army Acquisition Review, have led many to call into question the Army’s ability to
develop and field ground combat systems. develop and field ground combat systems.
Why the FCS and GCV Programs Were Cancelled
FCS
Introduced in 1999 by Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, FCS was envisioned as a Introduced in 1999 by Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, FCS was envisioned as a
family of networked manned and unmanned vehicles and aircraft for the future battlefield. The family of networked manned and unmanned vehicles and aircraft for the future battlefield. The
Army believed that advanced sensor technology would result in total battlefield awareness, Army believed that advanced sensor technology would result in total battlefield awareness,
permitting the development of lesser-armored combat vehicles and the ability to engage and permitting the development of lesser-armored combat vehicles and the ability to engage and
destroy targets beyond the line-of-sight. However, a variety of factors led to the program’s destroy targets beyond the line-of-sight. However, a variety of factors led to the program’s
cancellation, including a complicated, industry-led management approach; the failure of a number cancellation, including a complicated, industry-led management approach; the failure of a number
of critical technologies to perform as envisioned; and frequently changing requirements from of critical technologies to perform as envisioned; and frequently changing requirements from
Army leadership—all of which resulted in program costs increasing by 25%.19 After $21.4 billion Army leadership—all of which resulted in program costs increasing by 25%.19 After $21.4 billion
already spent20 and the program only in the preproduction phase, then Secretary Gates already spent20 and the program only in the preproduction phase, then Secretary Gates
restructured the program in 2009, effectively cancelling it.21 restructured the program in 2009, effectively cancelling it.21
GCV22
Recognizing the need to replace the M-2 Bradley, as part of the FCS “restructuring,” the Army Recognizing the need to replace the M-2 Bradley, as part of the FCS “restructuring,” the Army
was directed by the Secretary of Defense in 2009 to develop a ground combat vehicle (GCV) that was directed by the Secretary of Defense in 2009 to develop a ground combat vehicle (GCV) that

15 For additional information on active protection systems, see CRS Report R44598, 15 For additional information on active protection systems, see CRS Report R44598, Army and Marine Corps Active
Protection System (APS) Efforts, by Andrew Feickert. , by Andrew Feickert.
16 Ibid. 16 Ibid.
17 For additional historical information on the Future Combat System, see CRS Report RL32888, 17 For additional historical information on the Future Combat System, see CRS Report RL32888, Army Future Combat
System (FCS) “Spin-Outs” and Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew , by Andrew
Feickert and Nathan J. Lucas. Feickert and Nathan J. Lucas.
18 For additional historical information on the Ground Combat Vehicle, see CRS Report R41597, 18 For additional historical information on the Ground Combat Vehicle, see CRS Report R41597, The Army’s Ground
Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert. , by Andrew Feickert.
19 Stephen Rodriguez, “Top Ten Failed Defense Programs of the RMA Era,” 19 Stephen Rodriguez, “Top Ten Failed Defense Programs of the RMA Era,” War on the Rocks, December 2, 2014. December 2, 2014.
20 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army 20 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army
Futures Command Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132, January 2019, p. 3. Futures Command Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132, January 2019, p. 3.
21 Stephen Rodriguez, “Top Ten Failed Defense Programs of the RMA Era,” 21 Stephen Rodriguez, “Top Ten Failed Defense Programs of the RMA Era,” War on the Rocks, December 2, 2014. , December 2, 2014.
22 Information in this section is taken directly from CRS Report R41597, 22 Information in this section is taken directly from CRS Report R41597, The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert. , by Andrew Feickert.
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would be relevant across the entire spectrum of Army operations, incorporating combat lessons would be relevant across the entire spectrum of Army operations, incorporating combat lessons
learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2010, the Army, in conjunction with the Pentagon’s learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2010, the Army, in conjunction with the Pentagon’s
acquisition office, conducted a review of the GCV program to “review GCV core elements acquisition office, conducted a review of the GCV program to “review GCV core elements
including acquisition strategy, vehicle capabilities, operational needs, program schedule, cost including acquisition strategy, vehicle capabilities, operational needs, program schedule, cost
performance, and technological specifications.” This review found that the GCV relied on too performance, and technological specifications.” This review found that the GCV relied on too
many immature technologies, had too many performance requirements, and was required by many immature technologies, had too many performance requirements, and was required by
Army leadership to have too many capabilities to make it affordable. In February 2014, the Army Army leadership to have too many capabilities to make it affordable. In February 2014, the Army
recommended terminating the GCV program and redirecting the funds toward developing a next-recommended terminating the GCV program and redirecting the funds toward developing a next-
generation platform.23 The cost of GCV cancellation was estimated at $1.5 billion.24 generation platform.23 The cost of GCV cancellation was estimated at $1.5 billion.24
After the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV): The Next
Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) Program
In the aftermath of the GCV program, the Army embarked on a Future Fighting Vehicle (FFV) In the aftermath of the GCV program, the Army embarked on a Future Fighting Vehicle (FFV)
effort in 2015. Army officials—described as “cautious” and “in no hurry to initiate an infantry effort in 2015. Army officials—described as “cautious” and “in no hurry to initiate an infantry
fighting vehicle program”—instead initiated industry studies to “understand the trade space fighting vehicle program”—instead initiated industry studies to “understand the trade space
before leaping into a new program.”25 In general, Army combat vehicle modernization efforts before leaping into a new program.”25 In general, Army combat vehicle modernization efforts
post-FCS were characterized as upgrading existing platforms as opposed to developing new post-FCS were characterized as upgrading existing platforms as opposed to developing new
systems. This was due in part to reluctance of senior Army leadership, but also to significant systems. This was due in part to reluctance of senior Army leadership, but also to significant
budgetary restrictions imposed on the Army during this period. Some in Congress, however, were budgetary restrictions imposed on the Army during this period. Some in Congress, however, were
not pleased with the pace of Army modernization, reportedly noting the Army was “woefully not pleased with the pace of Army modernization, reportedly noting the Army was “woefully
behind on modernization” and was “essentially organized and equipped as it was in the 1980s.”26 behind on modernization” and was “essentially organized and equipped as it was in the 1980s.”26
In June 2018, in part due to congressional concerns, the Army announced a new modernization In June 2018, in part due to congressional concerns, the Army announced a new modernization
strategy and designated the NGCV as the second of its six modernization priorities.27 Originally, strategy and designated the NGCV as the second of its six modernization priorities.27 Originally,
the NGCV was considered the program to replace the M-2 Bradley. Development of the NGCV the NGCV was considered the program to replace the M-2 Bradley. Development of the NGCV
would be managed by the Program Executive Officer (PEO) Ground Combat Systems, under the would be managed by the Program Executive Officer (PEO) Ground Combat Systems, under the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (ASA), Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ALT). Assistant Secretary of the Army (ASA), Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ALT).
Army Futures Command (AFC) and
Cross-Functional Teams (CFTs)
Army Futures Command28
In November 2017, the Army established a Modernization Task Force to examine the options for In November 2017, the Army established a Modernization Task Force to examine the options for
establishing an Army Futures Command (AFC) that would establish unity of command and effort establishing an Army Futures Command (AFC) that would establish unity of command and effort
as the Army consolidated its modernization process under one roof. Formerly, Army as the Army consolidated its modernization process under one roof. Formerly, Army

23 Remarks by then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel FY2015 Budget Preview, Pentagon Press Briefing Room, 23 Remarks by then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel FY2015 Budget Preview, Pentagon Press Briefing Room,
Monday, February 24, 2014. Monday, February 24, 2014.
24 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army 24 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army
Futures Command Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132, January 2019, p. 3. Futures Command Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132, January 2019, p. 3.
25 Sebastian Sprenger, “Army Bides its Time in Next Steps Toward Infantry Fighting Vehicle,” 25 Sebastian Sprenger, “Army Bides its Time in Next Steps Toward Infantry Fighting Vehicle,” InsideDefense.com,
June 10, 2015. June 10, 2015.
26 Association of the U.S. Army, “Milley: Readiness, with Needed Modernization, is a Top Priority,” March 1, 2016. 26 Association of the U.S. Army, “Milley: Readiness, with Needed Modernization, is a Top Priority,” March 1, 2016.
27 U.S. Army Modernization Strategy, June 6, 2018, https://www.army.mil/standto/2018-06-06. 27 U.S. Army Modernization Strategy, June 6, 2018, https://www.army.mil/standto/2018-06-06.
28 Information in this section is taken directly from CRS Insight IN10889, 28 Information in this section is taken directly from CRS Insight IN10889, Army Futures Command (AFC), by Andrew , by Andrew
Feickert. Feickert.
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modernization activities were primarily spread among Forces Command (FORSCOM), Training modernization activities were primarily spread among Forces Command (FORSCOM), Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Army Materiel Command (AMC), Army Test and and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Army Materiel Command (AMC), Army Test and
Evaluation Command (ATEC), and the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-8.29 Intended to be a 4-star Evaluation Command (ATEC), and the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-8.29 Intended to be a 4-star
headquarters largely drawn from existing Army commands, AFC was planned to be established in headquarters largely drawn from existing Army commands, AFC was planned to be established in
an urban environment with ready access to academic, technological, and industrial expertise. On an urban environment with ready access to academic, technological, and industrial expertise. On
July 13, 2018, the Army announced that AFC would be headquartered in Austin, TX, and that it July 13, 2018, the Army announced that AFC would be headquartered in Austin, TX, and that it
had achieved initial operating capability on July 1, 2018. AFC reached full operational capability had achieved initial operating capability on July 1, 2018. AFC reached full operational capability
on July 31, 2019.30 Sub-organizations, many of which resided within FORSCOM, TRADOC, and on July 31, 2019.30 Sub-organizations, many of which resided within FORSCOM, TRADOC, and
AMC, were transitioned to AFC. AMC, were transitioned to AFC.
Cross-Functional Teams (CFTs)
Army Futures Command intends to use what it calls Cross-Functional Teams (CFT) as part of its Army Futures Command intends to use what it calls Cross-Functional Teams (CFT) as part of its
mission, which includes the development of NGCV. As a means to “increase the efficiency of its mission, which includes the development of NGCV. As a means to “increase the efficiency of its
requirements and technology development efforts, the Army established cross-functional team requirements and technology development efforts, the Army established cross-functional team
pilots for modernization” in October 2017.31 These CFTs are intended to pilots for modernization” in October 2017.31 These CFTs are intended to
 leverage expertise from industry and academia;  leverage expertise from industry and academia;
 identify ways to use experimentation, prototyping, and demonstrations; and  identify ways to use experimentation, prototyping, and demonstrations; and
 identify opportunities to improve the efficiency of requirements development and  identify opportunities to improve the efficiency of requirements development and
the overall defense systems acquisition process.32 the overall defense systems acquisition process.32
The eight CFTs are The eight CFTs are
 Long Range Precision Fires at Ft. Sill, OK;  Long Range Precision Fires at Ft. Sill, OK;
 Next Generation Combat Vehicle at Detroit Arsenal, MI;  Next Generation Combat Vehicle at Detroit Arsenal, MI;
 Future Vertical Lift at Redstone Arsenal, AL;  Future Vertical Lift at Redstone Arsenal, AL;
 Network Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence at Aberdeen  Network Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence at Aberdeen
Proving Ground, MD; Proving Ground, MD;
 Assured Positioning, Navigation and Timing at Redstone Arsenal, AL;  Assured Positioning, Navigation and Timing at Redstone Arsenal, AL;
 Air and Missile Defense at Ft. Sill, OK;  Air and Missile Defense at Ft. Sill, OK;
 Soldier Lethality at Ft. Benning, GA; and  Soldier Lethality at Ft. Benning, GA; and
 Synthetic Training Environment in Orlando, FL.33  Synthetic Training Environment in Orlando, FL.33
CFTs are to be a part of AFC. Regarding the NGCV, program acquisition authority is derived CFTs are to be a part of AFC. Regarding the NGCV, program acquisition authority is derived
from Assistant Secretary of the Army (ASA) for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ALT), from Assistant Secretary of the Army (ASA) for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ALT),
who is also the senior Army Acquisition Executive (AAE), to whom the Program Executive who is also the senior Army Acquisition Executive (AAE), to whom the Program Executive
Officers (PEOs) report. AFC is to be responsible for requirements and to support PEOs. The Officers (PEOs) report. AFC is to be responsible for requirements and to support PEOs. The

29 The Army G-8 is the Army’s lead for matching available resources to the defense strategy and the Army plan. They 29 The Army G-8 is the Army’s lead for matching available resources to the defense strategy and the Army plan. They
accomplish this through participation in Office of the Secretary of Defense–led defense reviews and assessments, the accomplish this through participation in Office of the Secretary of Defense–led defense reviews and assessments, the
programming of resources, material integration, analytical and modeling capabilities, and the management of the programming of resources, material integration, analytical and modeling capabilities, and the management of the
Department of the Army studies and analysis. http://www.g8.army.mil/, accessed February 21, 2019. Department of the Army studies and analysis. http://www.g8.army.mil/, accessed February 21, 2019.
30 Sean Kimmons, “In First Year, Futures Command Grows from 12 to 24,000 Personnel,” 30 Sean Kimmons, “In First Year, Futures Command Grows from 12 to 24,000 Personnel,” Army News Service, July 19, July 19,
2019. 2019.
31 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army 31 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army
Futures Command Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132, January 2019, p. 7. Futures Command Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132, January 2019, p. 7.
32 Ibid., p. 8. 32 Ibid., p. 8.
33 Ibid. 33 Ibid.
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NGCV Program Manager (PM), who is subordinate to PEO Ground Combat Systems, is to NGCV Program Manager (PM), who is subordinate to PEO Ground Combat Systems, is to
remain under the control of ASA (ALT) but are to be teamed with CFTs under control of the remain under the control of ASA (ALT) but are to be teamed with CFTs under control of the
AFC.34 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes, however AFC.34 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes, however
Army Futures Command has not yet established policies and procedures detailing how it Army Futures Command has not yet established policies and procedures detailing how it
will execute its assigned mission, roles, and responsibilities. For example, we found that it will execute its assigned mission, roles, and responsibilities. For example, we found that it
is not yet clear how Army Futures Command will coordinate its responsibilities with is not yet clear how Army Futures Command will coordinate its responsibilities with
existing acquisition organizations within the Army that do not directly report to it. One existing acquisition organizations within the Army that do not directly report to it. One
such organization is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, such organization is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics and Technology [ASA (ALT)]—the civilian authority responsible for the overall Logistics and Technology [ASA (ALT)]—the civilian authority responsible for the overall
supervision of acquisition matters for the Army—and the acquisition offices it oversees.35 supervision of acquisition matters for the Army—and the acquisition offices it oversees.35
The Army’s explanation of how the NGCV program is to be administered and managed, along The Army’s explanation of how the NGCV program is to be administered and managed, along
with GAO’s findings regarding AFC not yet having established policies and procedures, suggests with GAO’s findings regarding AFC not yet having established policies and procedures, suggests
a degree of uncertainty as to how the NGCV program was to be managed. a degree of uncertainty as to how the NGCV program was to be managed.
Army’s Original OMFV Acquisition Approach36
Figure 1 depicts the Department of Defense (DOD) Systems Acquisition Framework, which depicts the Department of Defense (DOD) Systems Acquisition Framework, which
illustrates the various phases of systems development and acquisitions and is applicable to the illustrates the various phases of systems development and acquisitions and is applicable to the
procurement of Army ground combat systems. procurement of Army ground combat systems.
Figure 1. DOD Systems Acquisition Framework

Source: http://acqnotes.com/acqnote/acquisitions/acquisition-process-overview, accessed February 13, 2019. http://acqnotes.com/acqnote/acquisitions/acquisition-process-overview, accessed February 13, 2019.
Notes: Each phase of the acquisition process has specific DOD regulations and federal statutes that must be Each phase of the acquisition process has specific DOD regulations and federal statutes that must be
met. At the end of each phase, there is a Milestone Review (A, B, C) to determine if the acquisition program has met. At the end of each phase, there is a Milestone Review (A, B, C) to determine if the acquisition program has
met these required regulations and statues to continue on into the next phase. met these required regulations and statues to continue on into the next phase.
Critical Development Document (CDD): The CDD specifies the operational requirements for the system The CDD specifies the operational requirements for the system
that wil deliver the capability that meets operational performance criteria specified in the Initial Capabilities that wil deliver the capability that meets operational performance criteria specified in the Initial Capabilities
Document (ICD). Document (ICD).
Preliminary Design Review (PDR): The PDR is a technical assessment that establishes the Allocated Baseline The PDR is a technical assessment that establishes the Allocated Baseline
of a system to ensure a system is operationally effective. of a system to ensure a system is operationally effective.
Request for Proposal (RFP): A RFP is a document that solicits proposal, often made through a bidding A RFP is a document that solicits proposal, often made through a bidding
process, by an agency or company interested in procurement of a commodity, service, or valuable asset, to process, by an agency or company interested in procurement of a commodity, service, or valuable asset, to
potential suppliers to submit business proposals. potential suppliers to submit business proposals.

34 U.S. Army Stand-To, Army Futures Command, March 28, 2018. 34 U.S. Army Stand-To, Army Futures Command, March 28, 2018.
35 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army 35 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army
Futures Command Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132, January 2019, p. 14. Futures Command Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132, January 2019, p. 14.
36 For additional information on defense acquisition, see CRS Report R44010, 36 For additional information on defense acquisition, see CRS Report R44010, Defense Acquisitions: How and Where
DOD Spends Its Contracting Dollars, by Moshe Schwartz, John F. Sargent Jr., and Christopher T. Mann. , by Moshe Schwartz, John F. Sargent Jr., and Christopher T. Mann.
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Critical Design Review (CDR): A CDR is a multi-disciplined technical review to ensure that a system can A CDR is a multi-disciplined technical review to ensure that a system can
proceed into fabrication, demonstration, and test and can meet stated performance requirements within cost, proceed into fabrication, demonstration, and test and can meet stated performance requirements within cost,
schedule, and risk. schedule, and risk.
Production Readiness Review (PRR): The PRR assesses a program to determine if the design is ready for The PRR assesses a program to determine if the design is ready for
production. production.
Original OMFV Acquisition Plan
Reportedly, the original OMFV plan called for five years of Technology Development, starting in Reportedly, the original OMFV plan called for five years of Technology Development, starting in
FY2019, and leading up to a FY2024 Milestone B decision to move the program into the FY2019, and leading up to a FY2024 Milestone B decision to move the program into the
Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase.37 If the Engineering and Manufacturing Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase.37 If the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development phase proved successful, the Army planned for a Milestone C decision to move the Development phase proved successful, the Army planned for a Milestone C decision to move the
program into the Production and Deployment phase in FY2028, with the intent of equipping the program into the Production and Deployment phase in FY2028, with the intent of equipping the
first unit by FY2032.38 first unit by FY2032.38
Secretary of the Army Accelerates the Program
In April 2018, then-Secretary of the Army Mark Esper, noting that industry could deliver OMFV In April 2018, then-Secretary of the Army Mark Esper, noting that industry could deliver OMFV
prototypes by FY2021, reportedly stated he wanted to accelerate the OMFV timeline.39 After prototypes by FY2021, reportedly stated he wanted to accelerate the OMFV timeline.39 After
examining a number of possible courses of action, the Army reportedly settled on a timeline that examining a number of possible courses of action, the Army reportedly settled on a timeline that
would result in an FY2026 fielding of the OMFV.40 This being the case, the Army reportedly would result in an FY2026 fielding of the OMFV.40 This being the case, the Army reportedly
would pursue a “heavily modified off-the-shelf model meaning a mature chassis and turret would pursue a “heavily modified off-the-shelf model meaning a mature chassis and turret
integrated with new sensors.”41 Reportedly, some Army officials suggested they would have liked integrated with new sensors.”41 Reportedly, some Army officials suggested they would have liked
to see a 50 mm cannon on industry-proposed vehicles.42 Under this new acquisition approach, the to see a 50 mm cannon on industry-proposed vehicles.42 Under this new acquisition approach, the
Army planned to Army planned to
 award up to two vendors three-year Engineering and Manufacturing  award up to two vendors three-year Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD) contracts in the first quarter of FY2020; Development (EMD) contracts in the first quarter of FY2020;
 if EMD is successful, make a Milestone C decision to move the program into the  if EMD is successful, make a Milestone C decision to move the program into the
Production and Development phase in the third quarter of FY2023; and Production and Development phase in the third quarter of FY2023; and
 equip first units in the first quarter of FY2026.43  equip first units in the first quarter of FY2026.43

37 Ashley Tressel, “How the Army Secretary Accelerated Service’s New Combat Vehicle Program,” 37 Ashley Tressel, “How the Army Secretary Accelerated Service’s New Combat Vehicle Program,”
InsideDefense.com, November 20, 2018. November 20, 2018.
38 Ibid. 38 Ibid.
39 Ibid. 39 Ibid.
40 Ibid. 40 Ibid.
41 Ibid. 41 Ibid.
42 Ibid. 42 Ibid.
43 Project Manager NGCV, NGCV OMFV Industry Day Briefing, August 6, 2018, p. 9. 43 Project Manager NGCV, NGCV OMFV Industry Day Briefing, August 6, 2018, p. 9.
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Army Issues OMFV Request for Proposal (RFP)44
On March 29, 2019, the Army issued a Request for Proposal (RFP)45 to industry for the OMFV. On March 29, 2019, the Army issued a Request for Proposal (RFP)45 to industry for the OMFV.
The Army has characterized its requirements as “aggressive” and noted industry might not be able The Army has characterized its requirements as “aggressive” and noted industry might not be able
to meet all requirements. Major requirements included the ability to transport two OMFVs in a C-to meet all requirements. Major requirements included the ability to transport two OMFVs in a C-
17 aircraft which will likely require the vehicle to have the ability to accommodate add-on armor; 17 aircraft which will likely require the vehicle to have the ability to accommodate add-on armor;
a threshold (minimum) requirement for a 30 mm cannon and a second generation forward-a threshold (minimum) requirement for a 30 mm cannon and a second generation forward-
looking infra-red radar (FLIR); and objective (desired) requirements for a 50 mm cannon and a looking infra-red radar (FLIR); and objective (desired) requirements for a 50 mm cannon and a
third generation FLIR. By October 1, 2019, industry was required to submit prototype vehicles to third generation FLIR. By October 1, 2019, industry was required to submit prototype vehicles to
the Army for consideration and in the second quarter of FY2020, the Army planned to select two the Army for consideration and in the second quarter of FY2020, the Army planned to select two
vendors to build 14 prototypes for further evaluation. vendors to build 14 prototypes for further evaluation.
Potential OMFV Candidates
Reportedly, the Army originally planned to award a production contract for up to 3,590 OMFVs Reportedly, the Army originally planned to award a production contract for up to 3,590 OMFVs
to a single vendor.46 Although the Army reportedly expected five to seven vendors to compete for to a single vendor.46 Although the Army reportedly expected five to seven vendors to compete for
the OMFV EMD contract, three vendors showcased prospective platforms in the fall of 2018.47 the OMFV EMD contract, three vendors showcased prospective platforms in the fall of 2018.47
BAE Systems
BAE Systems had proposed its fifth-generation CV-90. The CV-90 was first fielded in Europe in BAE Systems had proposed its fifth-generation CV-90. The CV-90 was first fielded in Europe in
the 1990s. The latest version mounted a 35 mm cannon provided by Northrop Grumman that can the 1990s. The latest version mounted a 35 mm cannon provided by Northrop Grumman that can
accommodate 50 mm munitions. The CV-90 featured the Israeli IMI Systems Iron Fist Active accommodate 50 mm munitions. The CV-90 featured the Israeli IMI Systems Iron Fist Active
Protection System (APS). The CV-90 could accommodate a three-person crew and five infantry Protection System (APS). The CV-90 could accommodate a three-person crew and five infantry
soldiers. soldiers.

44 Information in this section is taken from Devon L. Suits, “Army Looking for Optionally-Manned Fighting Vehicle,” 44 Information in this section is taken from Devon L. Suits, “Army Looking for Optionally-Manned Fighting Vehicle,”
Army News Service, March 28, 2019; Connie Lee, “Breaking: Army to Release Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle March 28, 2019; Connie Lee, “Breaking: Army to Release Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle
RFP,” RFP,” National Defense, March 27, 2019; Jen Judson, “Army Drops Request for Proposals to Build Next-Gen Combat March 27, 2019; Jen Judson, “Army Drops Request for Proposals to Build Next-Gen Combat
Vehicle Prototypes,” Vehicle Prototypes,” Defense News.com, March 26, 2019: and Ashley Roque, “U.S. Army Releases OMFV RFP, March 26, 2019: and Ashley Roque, “U.S. Army Releases OMFV RFP,
Focusing on What is Deemed Realistically Obtainable,” Focusing on What is Deemed Realistically Obtainable,” Janes, Defemse Weekly, April 10, 2019, p. 11. April 10, 2019, p. 11.
45 A Request for Proposal (RFP) is a solicitation used in negotiated acquisition to communicate government 45 A Request for Proposal (RFP) is a solicitation used in negotiated acquisition to communicate government
requirements to prospective contractor and to solicit proposals. At a minimum, solicitations shall describe the requirements to prospective contractor and to solicit proposals. At a minimum, solicitations shall describe the
Government’s requirement, anticipated terms and conditions that will apply to the contract, information required in the Government’s requirement, anticipated terms and conditions that will apply to the contract, information required in the
offeror’s proposal, and (for competitive acquisitions) the criteria that will be used to evaluate the proposal and their offeror’s proposal, and (for competitive acquisitions) the criteria that will be used to evaluate the proposal and their
relative importance. See DOD Acquisition Notes: http://acqnotes.com/acqnote/tasks/request-for-proposalproposal-relative importance. See DOD Acquisition Notes: http://acqnotes.com/acqnote/tasks/request-for-proposalproposal-
development, accessed June 13, 2019. development, accessed June 13, 2019.
46 Jason Sherman, “Army Tweaking NGCV Requirements, Requests for Proposals Following Recent Industry Parlay,” 46 Jason Sherman, “Army Tweaking NGCV Requirements, Requests for Proposals Following Recent Industry Parlay,”
InsideDefense.com, October 5, 2018. , October 5, 2018.
47 Information in this section is taken from Ashley Tressel, “Contractors Debut Possible Bradley Replacement 47 Information in this section is taken from Ashley Tressel, “Contractors Debut Possible Bradley Replacement
Vehicles,” Vehicles,” InsideDefense.com, October 19, 2018. , October 19, 2018.
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Figure 2. BAE Prototype CV-90

Source: https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/product/cv90, accessed January 31, 2019. https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/product/cv90, accessed January 31, 2019.
BAE Decides Not to Compete for the OMFV Contract48
On June 10, 2019, BAE reportedly announced it would not compete for the OMFV contract On June 10, 2019, BAE reportedly announced it would not compete for the OMFV contract
suggesting the requirements and acquisition schedule “did not align with our current focus or suggesting the requirements and acquisition schedule “did not align with our current focus or
developmental; priorities.”49 developmental; priorities.”49
General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS)
GDLS proposed its Griffin III technology demonstrator, which used the British Ajax scout vehicle GDLS proposed its Griffin III technology demonstrator, which used the British Ajax scout vehicle
chassis. The Griffin III mounted a 50 mm cannon and could accommodate an APS and host chassis. The Griffin III mounted a 50 mm cannon and could accommodate an APS and host
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Griffin II could accommodate a two-person crew and six unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Griffin II could accommodate a two-person crew and six
infantry soldiers. infantry soldiers.

48 Ashley Tressel, “BAE Ducks Out of OMFV Competition,” 48 Ashley Tressel, “BAE Ducks Out of OMFV Competition,” InsideDefense.com, June 10, 2019. June 10, 2019.
49 Ibid. 49 Ibid.
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Figure 3. GDLS Griffin III Prototype

Source: Sydney J. Freedberg, “General Dynamics Land Systems Griffin III for U.S. Army’s Next Generation Sydney J. Freedberg, “General Dynamics Land Systems Griffin III for U.S. Army’s Next Generation
Combat Vehicle (NGCV),” October 8, 2018. Combat Vehicle (NGCV),” October 8, 2018.
Raytheon/Rheinmetall
Raytheon/Rheinmetall proposed its Lynx vehicle. It could mount a 50 mm cannon and thermal Raytheon/Rheinmetall proposed its Lynx vehicle. It could mount a 50 mm cannon and thermal
sights, and could accommodate both APS and UAVs. Raytheon states that the Lynx can sights, and could accommodate both APS and UAVs. Raytheon states that the Lynx can
accommodate a nine-soldier infantry squad.50 accommodate a nine-soldier infantry squad.50
Army Disqualifies Raytheon/Rheinmetall Lynx Prototype51
Reportedly, the Army disqualified the Raytheon/Rheinmetall bid because it failed to deliver a Reportedly, the Army disqualified the Raytheon/Rheinmetall bid because it failed to deliver a
single OMFV prototype by October 1, 2019, as stipulated in the RFP, meaning only a single single OMFV prototype by October 1, 2019, as stipulated in the RFP, meaning only a single
vendor—General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS)—was left to compete for the EMD contract. vendor—General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS)—was left to compete for the EMD contract.
Supposedly, Rheinmetall was unable to ship its Lynx prototype from Germany (although Supposedly, Rheinmetall was unable to ship its Lynx prototype from Germany (although
Rheinmetall shipped it to the United States in 2018) and asked the Army for a four-week Rheinmetall shipped it to the United States in 2018) and asked the Army for a four-week
extension so it could ship the vehicle to Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland or, if that was extension so it could ship the vehicle to Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland or, if that was
not acceptable, arrange for the Army to take possession of the vehicle in Germany instead. Both not acceptable, arrange for the Army to take possession of the vehicle in Germany instead. Both
requests by Rheinmetall were reportedly denied by the Army. Reportedly, the Army Acquisition requests by Rheinmetall were reportedly denied by the Army. Reportedly, the Army Acquisition
Authority—the ASA (ALT)—was willing to grant a four-week extension, but Army Futures Authority—the ASA (ALT)—was willing to grant a four-week extension, but Army Futures
Command (AFC) insisted the Army adhere to the October 1, 2019, deadline.52 Command (AFC) insisted the Army adhere to the October 1, 2019, deadline.52

50 https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/lynx-infantry-fighting-vehicle, accessed January 31, 2019. 50 https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/lynx-infantry-fighting-vehicle, accessed January 31, 2019.
51 Information in this section is taken from Jen Judson, “Lynx 41 Disqualified from Bradley Replacement 51 Information in this section is taken from Jen Judson, “Lynx 41 Disqualified from Bradley Replacement
Competition,” Competition,” DefenseNews.com, October 4, 2019, and Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Bradley Replacement: Army Risks October 4, 2019, and Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Bradley Replacement: Army Risks
Third Failure in a Row,” Third Failure in a Row,” Breaking Defense, October 7, 2019. October 7, 2019.
52 Judson, “Lynx 41 Disqualified from Bradley Replacement Competition.” 52 Judson, “Lynx 41 Disqualified from Bradley Replacement Competition.”
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Reportedly, a number of companies were interested in competing and submitting bids for the Reportedly, a number of companies were interested in competing and submitting bids for the
OMFV EMD contract but expressed concerns to the Army that meeting its requirements and OMFV EMD contract but expressed concerns to the Army that meeting its requirements and
timelines would not be possible and asked for extensions so they could submit bids. Some in timelines would not be possible and asked for extensions so they could submit bids. Some in
industry reportedly had expressed their concerns to Army leadership that it would be difficult to industry reportedly had expressed their concerns to Army leadership that it would be difficult to
meet approximately 100 mandatory vehicle requirements with a nondevelopmental vehicle meet approximately 100 mandatory vehicle requirements with a nondevelopmental vehicle
prototype in the 15 months allotted.53 prototype in the 15 months allotted.53
Figure 4. Raytheon/Rheinmetall Lynx Prototype

Source: https://www.rheinmetall-defence.com/en/rheinmetall_defence/systems_and_products/vehicle_systems/https://www.rheinmetall-defence.com/en/rheinmetall_defence/systems_and_products/vehicle_systems/
armoured_tracked_vehicles/lynx/index.php, accessed January 31, 2019. armoured_tracked_vehicles/lynx/index.php, accessed January 31, 2019.
Recent Program Activities
Army Cancels OMFV Program54
Reportedly, on January 16, 2020, the Army canceled the current OMFV program, with the intent Reportedly, on January 16, 2020, the Army canceled the current OMFV program, with the intent
to restart the program following an analysis and revision of program requirements. According to to restart the program following an analysis and revision of program requirements. According to
Army officials, “a combination of requirements and schedule overwhelmed industry’s ability to Army officials, “a combination of requirements and schedule overwhelmed industry’s ability to
respond within the Army’s timeline.”55 Others suggest that after the Army released its final RFP, respond within the Army’s timeline.”55 Others suggest that after the Army released its final RFP,
several companies raised concerns with the Army about the requirement for vendors to produce a several companies raised concerns with the Army about the requirement for vendors to produce a
nondevelopmental prototype within 15 months, as previously noted, as well as the requirement to nondevelopmental prototype within 15 months, as previously noted, as well as the requirement to
fit two OMFVs inside a C-17 aircraft.56 At the time of the cancellation, Army officials reportedly fit two OMFVs inside a C-17 aircraft.56 At the time of the cancellation, Army officials reportedly

53 Ibid. 53 Ibid.
54 Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from Ashley Tressel, “Army Scraps OMFV Program to 54 Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from Ashley Tressel, “Army Scraps OMFV Program to
Start Competition Over,” Start Competition Over,” InsideDefense.com, January 16, 2020. , January 16, 2020.
55 Ibid. 55 Ibid.
56 Ashley Roque and Robin Hughes, “No Contest: Briefing: The U.S. Army’s OMFV Competition,” Jane’s Defence 56 Ashley Roque and Robin Hughes, “No Contest: Briefing: The U.S. Army’s OMFV Competition,” Jane’s Defence
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would not commit to a timeline for a revised program or if it would affect the original fielding would not commit to a timeline for a revised program or if it would affect the original fielding
date of FY2026. Army officials characterized the program cancellation as positive, noting it date of FY2026. Army officials characterized the program cancellation as positive, noting it
would save $9 billion by cancelling the program early and that the decision to cancel would save $9 billion by cancelling the program early and that the decision to cancel
demonstrated the value of AFC.57 demonstrated the value of AFC.57
Army Restarts OMFV Program58
Reportedly, on February 7, 2020, the Army reopened the OMFV competition by releasing a new Reportedly, on February 7, 2020, the Army reopened the OMFV competition by releasing a new
market survey with a minimally prescriptive wish list and an acquisition strategy that shifted most market survey with a minimally prescriptive wish list and an acquisition strategy that shifted most
of the initial cost burden to the Army, in what was described as “a bid to regain industry’s trust of the initial cost burden to the Army, in what was described as “a bid to regain industry’s trust
after a faulty start.”59 As part of the new acquisition strategy, the Army asked potential vendors to after a faulty start.”59 As part of the new acquisition strategy, the Army asked potential vendors to
first submit a “rough digital prototype” and stated that the Army would not initially seek a target first submit a “rough digital prototype” and stated that the Army would not initially seek a target
fielding date of FY2026. Also, the Army suggested the requirement to fit two OMFVs on a C-17 fielding date of FY2026. Also, the Army suggested the requirement to fit two OMFVs on a C-17
aircraft was not part of this new “wish list.” Reportedly, it is hoped this new acquisition approach aircraft was not part of this new “wish list.” Reportedly, it is hoped this new acquisition approach
will bring companies who initially bowed out of the previous competition back into the new will bring companies who initially bowed out of the previous competition back into the new
competition. competition.
New OMFV Program Guidance60
On April 9, 2020, the Army released new OMFV program guidance to industry. Of note, the On April 9, 2020, the Army released new OMFV program guidance to industry. Of note, the
Army stated it now plans to “reduce foreign barriers to competition,” and “identify a pathway to Army stated it now plans to “reduce foreign barriers to competition,” and “identify a pathway to
integrate relevant but immature technologies” for the OMFV program. The Army currently plans integrate relevant but immature technologies” for the OMFV program. The Army currently plans
for a five-phased approach to OMFV acquisition: for a five-phased approach to OMFV acquisition:
 development and refinement OMFV acquisition and contracting strategies;  development and refinement OMFV acquisition and contracting strategies;
 preliminary design;  preliminary design;
 detailed design;  detailed design;
 prototype building and testing; and  prototype building and testing; and
 production and fielding.  production and fielding.
The Army now plans to award the first contract in the fourth quarter of FY2021, with a second The Army now plans to award the first contract in the fourth quarter of FY2021, with a second
award planned for the second quarter of FY2023 and down-select to a single vendor in the second award planned for the second quarter of FY2023 and down-select to a single vendor in the second
quarter of FY2027. The new program guidance also calls for a full-rate production decision in the quarter of FY2027. The new program guidance also calls for a full-rate production decision in the
third quarter of FY2029. The Army now plans for the first unit to be equipped in the fourth third quarter of FY2029. The Army now plans for the first unit to be equipped in the fourth
quarter of FY2028. quarter of FY2028.

Weekly, November 13, 2019, p. 27. Weekly, November 13, 2019, p. 27.
57 Ashley Tressel, “Army Scraps OMFV Program to Start Competition Over,” 57 Ashley Tressel, “Army Scraps OMFV Program to Start Competition Over,” InsideDefense.com, January 16, 2020. , January 16, 2020.
58 Information in this section, unless otherwise noted, is taken from Ashley Tressel, “Army Reopens Competition for 58 Information in this section, unless otherwise noted, is taken from Ashley Tressel, “Army Reopens Competition for
Bradley Replacement,” Bradley Replacement,” InsideDefense.com, February 7, 2020. February 7, 2020.
59 Ibid. 59 Ibid.
60 Information in this section is taken from U.S. Army Document “Industry Day Narrative for Optionally Manned 60 Information in this section is taken from U.S. Army Document “Industry Day Narrative for Optionally Manned
Fighting Vehicle (OMFV),” dated April 9, 2020, and Ashley Tressel, “Army Releases New Details on OMFV Fighting Vehicle (OMFV),” dated April 9, 2020, and Ashley Tressel, “Army Releases New Details on OMFV
Competition,” Competition,” InsideDefense.com,, April 10, 2020. April 10, 2020.
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FY2021 OMFV Budget Request61
The Army requested $327.732 million in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) The Army requested $327.732 million in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
funding for the OMFV program in its FY2021 budget request. Funding is planned to be used for, funding for the OMFV program in its FY2021 budget request. Funding is planned to be used for,
among other things, funding up to five vendors so they can prepare for their digital design among other things, funding up to five vendors so they can prepare for their digital design
submissions. submissions.
FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
S. 4049
S. 4049 S. 4049 ~~decreased~~recommends decreasing the Army’s OMFV FY2021 the Army’s OMFV FY2021 RDT&E budget request by $80 million to $247.732 million budget request by $80 million to $247.732 million
for program reset.62 This is attributed to the program’s cancellation and restart. for program reset.62 This is attributed to the program’s cancellation and restart.
H.R. 6395
~~The Chairman’s Mark of H.R. 6395 decreased~~H.R. 6395 recommends decreasing the Army’s OMFV FY2021 the Army’s OMFV FY2021 RDT&E budget request by $83 budget request by $83
million to $244.732 million for Army-identified funds excess to need, also attributed to the million to $244.732 million for Army-identified funds excess to need, also attributed to the
OMFV program cancellation and restart.63 OMFV program cancellation and restart.63
~~Potential Issues for Congress~~
~~The Army’s New OMFV Acquisition Strategy~~
~~While there is not a great deal of public detail regarding the Army’s new OMFV acquisition~~
~~strategy, in an interview the ASA (ALT) Dr. Bruce Jette briefly outlined the Army’s current plans~~
~~as follows:64~~
~~ The Army’s current plan is to choose up to five vendors for the original~~
~~equipment manufacturer position, while also choosing up to five separate~~
~~contractors interested in developing subcomponents.~~
~~ Three of the five vendors would then move on to produce a “Detailed Digital~~
~~Design” similar to a Critical Design Review (CDR), “where we prove out [that]~~
~~all of the technologies that are being offered can be accomplished, that they can~~
~~be fitted together, that they have open architectures, that there’s flexibility in the~~
~~design.”65~~
~~ Two of the vendors will then be funded to build physical prototypes, and “we’ll~~
~~do all the standard things you do with physical prototypes—we will validate and~~FY2021 Defense Appropriations Bill House Report XX-116, Defense appropriations bill, FY2021, recommends decreasing the Army’s OMFV FY2021 RDT&E budget request by $83.232 million due to Army identified excess and an additional $15 million due to overestimation of need—a total reduction of $98.232 million.64 Potential Issues for Congress The Army’s New OMFV Acquisition Strategy While there is not a great deal of public detail regarding the Army’s new OMFV acquisition strategy, in an interview the ASA (ALT) Dr. Bruce Jette briefly outlined the Army’s current plans as follows:65

61 Information in this section is taken from Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army, 61 Information in this section is taken from Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army,
Justification Book of Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army RDT&E – Volume II, Budget Activity 5, Justification Book of Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army RDT&E – Volume II, Budget Activity 5,
February 2020, pp. 497-506 and Ashley Tressel, “Army Projects $1B for OMFV Development over FYDP,” February 2020, pp. 497-506 and Ashley Tressel, “Army Projects $1B for OMFV Development over FYDP,”
InsideDefense.com,, March 19, 2019. March 19, 2019.
62 S. 62 S. ~~___ Rpt. ____~~Rept. 116-236, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, June 24, 2020, p., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, June 24, 2020, p. 70. 70.
63 H.63 H.~~R. 6395—FY21 National Defense Authorization Bill Chairman’s Mark, June 25, 2020, p. 24.~~
64 Rept. XX-116, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. Report of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives on H.R. 6395, July XX, 2020, p. 412. 64 H.Rept. XX-116, Defense Appropriations Bill, FY2021, July XX, 2020, p. 252. 65 Ashley Tressel, “Army Reopens Competition for Bradley Replacement,” Ashley Tressel, “Army Reopens Competition for Bradley Replacement,” InsideDefense.com, February 7, 2020. , February 7, 2020.
~~65 Ibid.~~
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 The Army’s current plan is to choose up to five vendors for the original equipment manufacturer position, while also choosing up to five separate contractors interested in developing subcomponents.  Three of the five vendors would then move on to produce a “Detailed Digital Design” similar to a Critical Design Review (CDR), “where we prove out [that] all of the technologies that are being offered can be accomplished, that they can be fitted together, that they have open architectures, that there’s flexibility in the design.”66  Two of the vendors will then be funded to build physical prototypes, and “we’ll do all the standard things you do with physical prototypes—we will validate and verify what we learned in the modeling and simulation, and in the soldier verify what we learned in the modeling and simulation, and in the soldier
touchpoint, we’ll confirm that the things we found were feasible were in fact touchpoint, we’ll confirm that the things we found were feasible were in fact
feasible.”feasible.”6667
 After that, the Army will choose a single prime contractor and move the  After that, the Army will choose a single prime contractor and move the
“characteristics” into a requirements document. “characteristics” into a requirements document.
 The Army would then, at that point, decide whether to move the program from a  The Army would then, at that point, decide whether to move the program from a
Middle-Tier Acquisition Middle-Tier Acquisition ~~Authority67~~Authority68 to a Federal Acquisition Regulation-based to a Federal Acquisition Regulation-based
contract and solidify a timeline. contract and solidify a timeline.
While this tentative plan is useful, it can be argued that for a potentially $45 billion program, While this tentative plan is useful, it can be argued that for a potentially $45 billion program,6869 a a
more detailed plan is necessary for oversight—particularly in light of this initial program misstep more detailed plan is necessary for oversight—particularly in light of this initial program misstep
by the Army. While the Army’s April 9, 2020, revised program guidance to industry does provide by the Army. While the Army’s April 9, 2020, revised program guidance to industry does provide
some additional context and tentative dates, the guidance’s new proposed five program phases some additional context and tentative dates, the guidance’s new proposed five program phases
arguably lack the level detail needed for program oversight. In this regard, Congress might decide arguably lack the level detail needed for program oversight. In this regard, Congress might decide
to require the Army to submit a more detailed plan. to require the Army to submit a more detailed plan.
OMFV Program Decisionmaking Authority
As part of the Army’s detailed new OMFV acquisition strategy, given previously discussed As part of the Army’s detailed new OMFV acquisition strategy, given previously discussed
concerns over AFC’s programmatic role and decisionmaking authorities, it could be useful if the concerns over AFC’s programmatic role and decisionmaking authorities, it could be useful if the
Army designates who—the ASA (ALT) or Commander, AFC—will make programmatic Army designates who—the ASA (ALT) or Commander, AFC—will make programmatic
decisions by acquisition phase or activity. Given the alleged disagreement between the ASA decisions by acquisition phase or activity. Given the alleged disagreement between the ASA
(ALT) and Commander, AFC, over disqualifying Raytheon/Rheinmetall in the previous OMFV (ALT) and Commander, AFC, over disqualifying Raytheon/Rheinmetall in the previous OMFV
program, a clear delineation of program decisionmaking authority by acquisition phase or activity program, a clear delineation of program decisionmaking authority by acquisition phase or activity
could assist policymakers in their oversight of the program. In addition, it might also be could assist policymakers in their oversight of the program. In addition, it might also be
beneficial to designate who will make the final decision over modifying, adding, or eliminating beneficial to designate who will make the final decision over modifying, adding, or eliminating
OMFV operational requirements. OMFV operational requirements.

~~Author Information~~

~~Andrew Feickert~~

~~Specialist in Military Ground Forces~~

66 Ibid. 66 Ibid.
67 67 Ibid. 68 Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) is a rapid acquisition interim approach that focuses on delivering capability in a Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) is a rapid acquisition interim approach that focuses on delivering capability in a
period of two to five years. The interim approach was granted by Congress in the FY2016 National Defense period of two to five years. The interim approach was granted by Congress in the FY2016 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 804 and is not be subject to the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 804 and is not be subject to the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System
(JCIDS) and DOD Directive 5000.01 “Defense Acquisition System.” The approach consists of utilizing two acquisition (JCIDS) and DOD Directive 5000.01 “Defense Acquisition System.” The approach consists of utilizing two acquisition
pathways: (1) Rapid Prototyping and (2) Rapid Fielding. It does this by streamlining the testing and deployment of pathways: (1) Rapid Prototyping and (2) Rapid Fielding. It does this by streamlining the testing and deployment of
prototypes or upgrading existing systems with already proven technology. See AcqNotes, http://acqnotes.com/acqnote/prototypes or upgrading existing systems with already proven technology. See AcqNotes, http://acqnotes.com/acqnote/
acquisitions/middle-tier-acquisitions, accessed February 14, 2020. acquisitions/middle-tier-acquisitions, accessed February 14, 2020.
6869 Jason Sherman, “Army Estimates $45 Billion Total Price Tag – or $11 Million per Vehicle – for OMFV,” Jason Sherman, “Army Estimates $45 Billion Total Price Tag – or $11 Million per Vehicle – for OMFV,”
InsideDefense.com, October 11, 2019. October 11, 2019.
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Author Information Andrew Feickert Specialist in Military Ground Forces
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