Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations

Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations
July 6, 2020May 10, 2022
Occupying almost half of South America, Brazil is the fifth-largest and Occupying almost half of South America, Brazil is the fifth-largest and fifthsixth-most-populous -most-populous
country in the world. Given its size and tremendous natural resources, Brazil has long had the country in the world. Given its size and tremendous natural resources, Brazil has long had the
Peter J. Meyer
potential to become a world power and periodically has been the focal point of U.S. policy in potential to become a world power and periodically has been the focal point of U.S. policy in
Specialist in Latin Specialist in Latin
Latin America. Latin America. Brazil’s rise to prominence has been hindered, however, by uneven economic
American Affairs
performance and political instability. AfterHowever, uneven economic performance and political instability have hindered American and Canadian Brazil’s rise to international prominence. The country experienced a period of strong economic Affairs a period of strong economic growth and increased growth and increased

international influence during the first decade of the 21st century, international influence during the first decade of the 21st century, Brazil has but it has struggled with a struggled with a
series of domestic crises in recent years. Since 2014, the country has experienced a deep

recession, record-high homicide rate, and massive corruption scandal. Those combined crises
series of economic, political, security, and health crises since 2014. This domestic turbulence contributed to the controversial impeachment and removal from office of contributed to the controversial impeachment and removal from office of President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). TheyIt also also
discredited much of Brazil’s political class, paving the way for right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro to win the presidency in discredited much of Brazil’s political class, paving the way for right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro to win the presidency in
October 2018. 2018.
Since taking office in January 2019, President Since taking office in January 2019, President Jair Bolsonaro has Bolsonaro has begun to implementimplemented some economic and regulatory reforms economic and regulatory reforms
favored by international investors and Brazilian businesses and has proposed favored by international investors and Brazilian businesses and has proposed hard -line security policies intended to reduce
crime and violencemeasures to ease firearms regulations and promote development in the Brazilian Amazon. Rather than building a broad-based . Rather than building a broad-based legislative coalition to advance his agenda, coalition to advance his agenda, however, Bolsonaro has governed in a populist manner, using social media to communicate directly with his political base; take Bolsonaro has sought to
keep the electorate polarized and his political base mobilized by taking socially conservative stands on cultural issuessocially conservative stands on cultural issues; and criticize and
verbally attacking perceived enemies, such as the press, perceived enemies, such as the press, nongovernmentalcivil society organizations, and other branches of government. organizations, and other branches of government.
This confrontational approach This confrontational approach to governance has alienated potential allies within the conservative-has alienated potential allies within the conservative-leaning congress and has placed additional stress on the country’s already strained democratic institutions. It also has leaning congress and
hindered Brazil’s ability to address serious challenges, such as the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)hindered Brazil’s ability to address serious challenges, such as the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and
accelerating deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. It also has placed additional stress on the country’s already strained
democratic institutions. With the novel coronavirus spreading rapidly throu ghout the country and the economy projected to
contract 9.1% in 2020, Brazilians have taken to the streets both in opposition to, and in support of, Bolsonaro. According to a
poll conducted in late June 2020, 32% of Brazilians consider Bolsonaro’s performance in office “good” or “great,” 23%
consider it “average,” and 44% consider it “bad” or “terrible.”
In international affairs, the Bolsonaro Administration has pandemic. According to a weighted average of recent polls, as of early May 2022, about 49% of Brazilians rated Bolsonaro’s performance in office as “bad” or “terrible,” 30% rated it “good” or “great,” and 19% rated it “regular.” Likewise, Bolsonaro trailed former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) by about 10 percentage points, 33% to 43%, in the presidential election scheduled for October 2022, with several other potential candidates registering single-digit support. In international affairs, the Bolsonaro administration initially moved away from Brazil’s traditional commitment to autonomy moved away from Brazil’s traditional commitment to autonomy
and toward and toward closer alignment with the United States. Bolsonaro alignment with the United States. Bolsonaro has coordinated closely with the Trump Administration on regional coordinated closely with the Trump Administration on regional
challengeschallenges, such as the crisis in Venezuela, and frequently supported the Trump Administration within multilateral organizations. The Trump Administration welcomed Bolsonaro’s rapprochement and designated Brazil as a major non-NATO ally. The United States and Brazil also forged agreements on several trade and investment matters, including a Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency, concluded in October 2020, intended to foster cooperation on trade facilitation and customs administration, good regulatory practices, and anti-corruption measures. Relations appear to have cooled somewhat under President Biden, potentially suggesting those advances were the result of Bolsonaro’s personal and ideological rapport with President Trump rather than a growing alignment between Brazil and the United States. Nevertheless, bilateral merchandise trade reached a record high of $78.2 billion in 2021, and the U.S. and Brazilian governments have maintained frequent, high-level engagement. Among other objectives, the Biden Administration has sought to work with Brazil to enhance bilateral security ties, coordinate approaches to regional and international policy challenges, and strengthen efforts to combat Amazon deforestation and mitigate climate change. The 117th Congress has maintained such as the crisis in Venezuela. On other matters, such as commercial ties with China, Bolsonaro has adopted a
pragmatic approach intended to ensure continued access to Brazil’s major export markets. The Trump Administration has
welcomed Bolsonaro’s rapprochement and sought to strengthen U.S.-Brazilian relations. In 2019, the Trump Administration
took steps to bolster bilateral cooperation on counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts and designated Brazil as a major
non-NATO ally. The United States and Brazil also agreed to several measures intended to facilitate trade and investment.
Nevertheless, some Brazilian analysts and former officials have questioned whether alignment with the United States is the
most effective way to advance Brazil’s national interests.
The 116th Congress has expressed renewed interest in Brazil and U.S.-Brazilian relations. Environmental conservation has interest in Brazil and U.S.-Brazilian relations. Environmental conservation has
been been a one major focus, with Congress appropriating $major focus, with Congress appropriating $1525 million million for foreign assistance programs in the Brazilian Amazonfor foreign assistance programs in the Brazilian Amazon,
including $5 million to address fires in the region, in the Further in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 20202022 (P.L. 117-103), up from $17 million in FY2021. Several other introduced bills that focus on U.S. environmental policies globally could affect bilateral relations. For example, S. 1201 would direct the Secretary of State to engage with Brazil on environmental enforcement, sustainable development, and emissions reduction efforts. H.R. 5508 and S. 2950 would prohibit the importation of certain commodities produced on illegally deforested land and would establish a fund to combat deforestation. Some Members also have (P.L. 116-94).
Likewise, Members introduced legislative proposals that would express support for Amazon conservation efforts (S.Res.
337) and restrict U.S. defense and trade relations with Brazil in response to deforestation (H.R. 4263). Congress also has
expressed concerns about the state of democracy and human rights in Brazil. expressed concerns about the state of democracy and human rights in Brazil. A provision ofThe explanatory statement accompanying the National Defense the National Defense
Authorization Act for Authorization Act for FY2020 (P.L. 116-92) directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to
submit a report to Congress regarding Brazil’s human rights climate and U.S.-Brazilian security cooperation. Another
resolution (H.Res. 594) would express concerns about threats to human rights, the rule of law, democracy , and the
environment in Brazil.
FY2022 (P.L. 117-81) called on the Secretary of Defense to ensure any security assistance provided to Brazil complies with U.S. laws and Department of Defense policies regarding adherence to human rights and international law. These and other issues may factor into the Senate’s consideration of Elizabeth Frawley Bagley, whom President Biden nominated to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Brazil (PN1691) in January 2022. For additional information, see CRS Report R46619, U.S.-Brazil Economic Relations, coordinated by M. Angeles Villarreal; and CRS In Focus IF11306, Fire and Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, by Pervaze A. Sheikh et al. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Brazil’s Political and Economic Environment ................................................................................ 3 Background ........ 3
Background .............................................................................................................. 3
Recession, Insecurity, and Corruption (2014-2018......... 3 Bolsonaro Administration (2019-Present) ......................................................... 4
Bolsonaro Administration (2019-Present) ........................ 5 Pandemic Response .............................................. 6
Pandemic Response .............................................................. 6 Economic and Social Policies ................................ 7
Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law............................................................. 8
Economic Policy 7 Security Policy ............................................................................................................. 10
Security Policy....... 8 October 2022 Elections .......................................................................................................... 10... 9
Amazon Conservation and Climate Change ......................................................................... 11
Brazilian Policies and Deforestation Trends ......... 10 Environmental Policies ................................................................. 12
Paris Agreement ........................................... 11 Paris Agreement Commitments ............................................................ 14
U.S.-Brazilian Relations..................................... 13 U.S.-Brazilian Relations ................................................................. 15
Commercial Relations ............................................... 14 Environmental Cooperation ............................................... 17
Recent Trade Negotiations ..................................................... 15 Defense Cooperation .............................. 17
Trade and Investment Flows................................................................................. 19
Security Cooperation17 Geopolitical Issues ............................................................................................................ 20
Counternarcotics18 Human Rights Concerns ................................................................................................ 21
Counterterrorism ... 20 Commercial Relations ......................................................................................................... 21
Defense Cooperation.... 20 Recent Trade Negotiations ................................................................................................ 22
U.S. Support for Amazon Conservation21 Trade and Investment Flows ........................................................................................... 24.. 22
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 24 25

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Brazil ................................................................................................................... 2 Figure 2. Deforestation in Brazil’s Legal Amazon: 2004-2021 2
Figure 2. Confirmed Cases of COVID-19 ........................................................................... 8
Figure 3. Deforestation in Brazil’s Legal Amazon: 2004-2019 12 Figure 3. U.S. Trade with Brazil: 2012-2021 ................................................................................ 13
Figure 4. U.S. Trade with Brazil: 2008-201923 Tables Table 1. Evolution of Brazil’s Paris Agreement Commitments .................................................... 13 Contacts Author Information .................................. 20

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 2624

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Introduction
As the As the fifth-largest6th-most populous country and the country and the ninth-
Brazil at a Glance
12th-largest economy in the world, Brazil largest economy in the world, Brazil plays
Population: 211.6 mil ion (2020 est.)
an important role in global governance (see
Race/Ethnicity: Leadership: President Jair Bolsonaro, Vice President plays an important role in global Hamilton Mourão, Senate President Rodrigo Pacheco, governance (see Figure 1 for a map of Chamber of Deputies President Arthur Lira Brazil). Over the past 20 years, Brazil has Population: 214.5 mil ion (2022 est.) forged coalitions with other large, Race/Ethnicity: White—47.7%, Mixed Race—43.1%, developing countries to push for changes to Black—7.6%, Asian—1.1%, Indigenous—0.4% (Self- multilateral institutions and to ensure that identification, 2010) global agreements on issues ranging from Religion: Catholic—54.2%, Evangelical Christian—24.5%, trade to climate change adequately protect None—13.0%, Other—7.2% (2020) their interests. Brazil also has taken on a Official Language: Portuguese greater role in promoting peace and Land Area: 3.3 mil ion square miles (slightly larger than stability, contributing to U.N. peacekeeping the 48 contiguous U.S. states and the District of Columbia) missions and mediating conflicts in South Gross Domestic Product (GDP)/GDP per Capita: America and further afield. Although recent $1.61 tril ion/$7,563 (2021 est.) domestic challenges have led Brazil to turn Top Exports/Export Markets: iron ore, soybeans, oil, inward and weakened its appeal globally, meat, and iron and steel/China (31%), European Union (13%), United States (11%), and Argentina (4%) (2021) the country continues to exert considerable Life Expectancy at Birth: 76.8 years (2020) influence on international policy issues that Poverty Rate: 18.4% (2020 est.) affect the United States. Sources: Population, race/ethnicity, land area, and lifeWhite—47.7%, Mixed Race—43.1%,
Figure 1 for a map of Brazil). Over the past
Black—7.6%, Asian—1.1%, Indigenous—0.4% (Self-
20 years, Brazil has forged coalitions with
identification, 2010)
other large, developing countries to push
Religion: Catholic—65%, Evangelical Christian—22%,
for changes to multilateral institutions and
None—8%, Other—4% (2010)
to ensure that global agreements on issues
Official Language: Portuguese
ranging from trade to climate change
Land Area: 3.3 mil ion square miles (slightly smal er than
adequately protect their interests. Brazil
the United States)
also has taken on a greater role in
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)/GDP per Capita:
promoting peace and stability, contributing
$1.85 tril ion/$8,797 (2019 est.)
to U.N. peacekeeping missions and
Top Exports: oil, soybeans, iron ore, meat, and
mediating conflicts in South America and
machinery (2019)
further afield. Although recent domestic
Life Expectancy at Birth: 76 years (2018)
chal enges have led Brazil to turn inward
Poverty Rate: 11.0% (2018 est.)
and weakened its appeal global y, the
Leadership: President Jair Bolsonaro, Vice President
country continues to exert considerable
Hamilton Mourão, Senate President Davi Alcolumbre,
influence on international policy issues that
Chamber of Deputies President Rodrigo Maia
affect the United States.
Sources: Population, race/ethnicity, religion, land
area, and life expectancy statistics from the Instituto
U.S. policymakers have often viewed
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística; GDP estimates
Brazil U.S. policymakers have often viewed expectancy statistics from the Instituto Brasileiro de Brazil as a natural partner in regional and Geografia e Estatística; Religion pol ing data from global affairs, given its status as a fellow Latinobarómetro, GDP estimates from the International multicultural democracy. Repeated efforts Monetary Fund; export data from Trade Data Monitor; and poverty estimate from the U.N. Economic to forge a close partnership have left both Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. countries frustrated, however, as their occasionallyas a natural partner in regional and
from the International Monetary Fund; export data
from Global Trade Atlas; and poverty data from
global affairs, given its status as a fel ow
Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Centro de Políticas Sociais.
multicultural democracy. Repeated efforts
to forge a close partnership have left both
countries frustrated, however, as their occasional y divergent interests and policy approaches have divergent interests and policy approaches have
inhibited cooperation.inhibited cooperation. The Trump Administration The Trump Administration has viewed the viewed the 2018 election of election of Brazilian
President Jair Bolsonaro as a fresh opportunity to deepen the bilateral relationship. Bolsonaro President Jair Bolsonaro as a fresh opportunity to deepen the bilateral relationship. Bolsonaro has
begun to shiftshifted Brazil’s foreign policy to bring the country into closer alignment with the United Brazil’s foreign policy to bring the country into closer alignment with the United
States, and President Trump States, and President Trump has designated Brazil a designated Brazil a major non-NATO ally. The United States and Brazil also concluded a Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency intended to bolster commercial ties. Nevertheless, relations appear to have cooled somewhat since President Biden took office, suggesting those advances were largely the result of Bolsonaro’s personal and ideological rapport with President Trump. Congress has expressed considerable interest in Brazil in recent yearsNATO ally. Nevertheless, ongoing
differences over trade protections and relations with China threaten to leave both the United
States and Brazil with unmet expectations once again.
The 116th Congress has expressed renewed interest in Brazil, recognizing Brazil’s potential to , recognizing Brazil’s potential to
affect U.S. affect U.S. foreign policy initiatives and interests. Some Members view Brazil as a strategic partner for initiatives and interests. Some Members view Brazil as a strategic partner for
addressing regional and globaladdressing regional and global chal enges. They have urged the Trump Administration to forge
stronger economic, security, and military ties with Brazil challenges. They have called for stronger U.S. economic and security ties with Brazil to bolster the bilateralto bolster the bilateral relationship and relationship and
counter the influence of extra-hemispheric powers, such as Chinacounter the influence of extra-hemispheric powers, such as China and Russia.1 Other Members .1 Other Members
have expressed reservations about a close partnership with the Bolsonaro have expressed reservations about a close partnership with the Bolsonaro Administrationadministration. They . They
are concerned that Bolsonaro is presiding over an erosion of democracy and human rights in
Brazil and that his environmental policies threaten the Amazon and global efforts to mitigate

1 See, are concerned that 1 See, for example, Letter from for example, Letter from Senator Marco Rubio to President Donald J. T rump, December 20, 2019, at
Marco Rubio, U.S. Senator, to Lloyd Austin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense, January 7, 2022, at https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/e6199a08-c4d2-424b-9e48-676585575e34/
035E152B8835E8734AA978266554751D.20191220 -letter-to-potus-re-brazil-7a6d5f3d-b7aa-40b7-a528-2c10a658fdf4/42C29B167B0F43821E5FC296C4FF972A.01.07.22-rubio-letter-to-austin-re-brazil.pdf. .pdf.
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Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations

Bolsonaro is presiding over an erosion of democracy and human rights in Brazil and that his environmental policies threaten the Amazon forest and global efforts to mitigate climate change.2 Congress may continue to assess these differing approaches to U.S.-Brazilian climate change.2 Congress may continue to assess these differing approaches to U.S.-Brazilian
relations as it carries out its oversight responsibilities and considers FY2021 appropriations and
other legislative initiatives.
relations as it considers foreign assistance appropriations and other legislative initiatives and engages in oversight of U.S. policy. Figure 1. Map of Brazil

Source: Map Resources.Map Resources. Adapted by CRS Graphics. Note: The Legal Amazon is a region designated under Brazilian law, which includes nine states that fall within the Amazon Basin. 2 See, for example, Letter from Senator Patrick Leahy et al. to President Joseph Biden, April 16, 2021, at https://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Letter%20to%20Biden%20re%20Amazon%204-15-21.pdf; and Letter from Henry C. “Hank” Johnson Jr., Member of Congress et al. to President Joseph R. Biden, October 14, 2021, at https://hankjohnson.house.gov/sites/hankjohnson.house.gov/files/documents/Letter%20Urging%20Democracy%20%26%20Human%20Rights%20inAdapted by CRS Graphics.

2 See, for example, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, “Climate Change,” Remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record,
vol. 165, part 148 (September 16, 2019), p. S5496; and Letter f rom Honorable Richard E. Neal, Chairman, House
Committee on Ways and Means, et al. to Honorable Robert Lighthizer, U.S. T rade Representative, June 3, 2020, at
https://waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/
20200603_WM%20Dem%20Ltr%20to%20Amb%20Lighthizer%20re%20Brazil.pdf. %20Brazil.pdf.
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Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations

Brazil’s Political and Economic Environment
Background
BrazilBrazil declared independence from Portugal in 1822, declared independence from Portugal in 1822, initial y initially establishing a constitutional establishing a constitutional
monarchy and retaining a slave-based, plantation economy. Although the country abolished monarchy and retaining a slave-based, plantation economy. Although the country abolished
slavery in 1888 and became a republic in 1889, economic and political power remained slavery in 1888 and became a republic in 1889, economic and political power remained
concentrated in the hands of large rural landowners and the vast majority of Braziliansconcentrated in the hands of large rural landowners and the vast majority of Brazilians remained remained
outside the politicaloutside the political system. The authoritarian government of Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945) began system. The authoritarian government of Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945) began
the incorporation of the working classes but exerted strict control over labor as part of its broader the incorporation of the working classes but exerted strict control over labor as part of its broader
push to centralize power in the federal government. Vargas also began to implement a state-led push to centralize power in the federal government. Vargas also began to implement a state-led
development model, which endured for much of the 20th century as successive governments development model, which endured for much of the 20th century as successive governments
supported the expansion of Braziliansupported the expansion of Brazilian industry. industry.
Brazil Brazil experienced two decades of multiparty democracy from 1945 to 1964 but struggled with experienced two decades of multiparty democracy from 1945 to 1964 but struggled with
political and economic instabilitypolitical and economic instability, which that ultimately led the military to seize power. A 1964 ultimately led the military to seize power. A 1964
military military coup, encouraged and welcomed by the United States, ushered in two decades of coup, encouraged and welcomed by the United States, ushered in two decades of
authoritarian rule.3 Although repressive, the military government was not as brutal as the authoritarian rule.3 Although repressive, the military government was not as brutal as the
dictatorships established in several other South American nations. It dictatorships established in several other South American nations. It nominal y al owednominally allowed the the
judiciary and congress to function during its tenure but stifled representative democracy and civic judiciary and congress to function during its tenure but stifled representative democracy and civic
action, carefully preserving its influence during one of the most protracted transitions to action, carefully preserving its influence during one of the most protracted transitions to
democracy to occur in Latin America. Braziliandemocracy to occur in Latin America. Brazilian security forces security forces kil edkilled at least 434 dissidents at least 434 dissidents
during the dictatorship and they detained and tortured an estimated 30,000-50,000 others.4 during the dictatorship and they detained and tortured an estimated 30,000-50,000 others.4
Brazil Brazil restored civilian rule in 1985, and a national constituent assembly, elected in 1986, restored civilian rule in 1985, and a national constituent assembly, elected in 1986,
promulgated a new constitution in 1988. The constitution established a liberal democracy with a promulgated a new constitution in 1988. The constitution established a liberal democracy with a
strong president, a bicameral congress consisting of the 513-member strong president, a bicameral congress consisting of the 513-member chamber of deputiesChamber of Deputies and the and the
81-member 81-member senateSenate, and an independent judiciary. , and an independent judiciary. Power is somewhat decentralized under the
country’s federal structure, which includesUnder Brazil’s federal structure, the national government shares power with 26 states, a federal district, and some 5,570 26 states, a federal district, and some 5,570
municipalities. municipalities.
Brazil Brazil experienced economic recession and political uncertainty during the first decade after its experienced economic recession and political uncertainty during the first decade after its
political transition. Numerous efforts to control runaway inflation failed, and two elected political transition. Numerous efforts to control runaway inflation failed, and two elected
presidents did not complete their terms; one died before taking office, and the other was presidents did not complete their terms; one died before taking office, and the other was
impeached on corruption charges and resigned. impeached on corruption charges and resigned.
The situation began to stabilize The situation began to stabilize under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) of the under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) of the
center-right Brazilian Social Democracy Party (center-right Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, or , or
PSDB). PSDB). Initial y Initially elected on the success of the anti-inflation elected on the success of the anti-inflation Real Plan that he implemented as Plan that he implemented as
finance minister under President Itamar Franco (1992-1994), Cardoso ushered in a series of finance minister under President Itamar Franco (1992-1994), Cardoso ushered in a series of
market-oriented economic reforms. His administration privatized some state-owned enterprises, market-oriented economic reforms. His administration privatized some state-owned enterprises,
gradual ygradually opened the economy to foreign trade and investment, and adopted the three main opened the economy to foreign trade and investment, and adopted the three main pil arspillars
of Brazil’s macroeconomic policy: a floating exchange rate, a primary budget surplus, and an of Brazil’s macroeconomic policy: a floating exchange rate, a primary budget surplus, and an

3 For information on U.S. policy prior to and following3 For information on U.S. policy prior to and following the coup, see the coup, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–, 1964–
1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, eds. David1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, eds. David C. Geyer and David H. Herschler (Washington: C. Geyer and David H. Herschler (Washington:
GPO, 2004), Documents 181-244, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/ch5. GPO, 2004), Documents 181-244, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/ch5.
4 At least 8,350 4 At least 8,350 indigenous Brazilians also were Indigenous people in Brazil also were killed duringkilled during the dictatorship, either directly by government agents or the dictatorship, either directly by government agents or
indirectly indirectly as a result ofdue to government policies. Ministério Público Federal, Procuradoria Federal government policies. Ministério Público Federal, Procuradoria Federal dos Direitos do Cidadão, dos Direitos do Cidadão,
“PFDC Contesta Recomendação de Festejos ao Golpe“PFDC Contesta Recomendação de Festejos ao Golpe de 64,” press release, March 26, de 64,” press release, March 26, 201 92019; and ; and Relatório da
Com issãoda Comissão Nacional da Verdade, December 10, 2014, at http://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/. , December 10, 2014, at http://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/.
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inflation-targeting monetary policy. Nevertheless, the Brazilian inflation-targeting monetary policy. Nevertheless, the Brazilian state maintained an influential state maintained an influential
role in the economy. role in the economy.
The Cardoso Administration’s economicBrazil’s domestic reforms and a surge in international demand reforms and a surge in international demand
(particularly from China) for (particularly from China) for Brazilian Brazilian commodities—such as oil, iron, and soybeans—fostered a commodities—such as oil, iron, and soybeans—fostered a
period of strong economic growth in Brazil during the first decade of the 21st century. The center-period of strong economic growth in Brazil during the first decade of the 21st century. The center-
left Workers’ Party (left Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT) administration of President Luiz Inácio , or PT) administration of President Luiz Inácio
Lula da Silva (Lula, 2003-2010) Lula da Silva (Lula, 2003-2010) used increased export revenuessought to harness that growth to improve social inclusion and to improve social inclusion and
reduce inequality. Among other measures, the PT-led government expanded social welfare reduce inequality. Among other measures, the PT-led government expanded social welfare
programs and raised the minimum wage by 64% above inflation.5 programs and raised the minimum wage by 64% above inflation.5 Between 2003 and 2010, the
Brazilian economy expanded by an average of 4.1% per year and the poverty rate fel from 28.2%
to 13.6%.6 The growth of theOver the course of Lula’s two terms in office, Brazil’s poverty rate fell from 38.8% to 21.0%.6 Economic growth averaged 4.1% per year during the same period, as Brazil’s emerging middle class fueled a domestic consumption boom that reinforced middle class fueled a domestic consumption boom that reinforced
Brazilthe country’s economic expansion.’s economic expansion. Although the poverty rate initial y continued to decline7 Although living conditions initially continued to improve under the under the
PT-led administration of PT-led administration of President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), Brazil has struggled with significant economic and political turmoil over the past decade. The country fell into a deep recession in President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016)—reaching a low of 8.4% in
2014—socioeconomic conditions deteriorated during Rousseff’s final two years in office.7
Recession, Insecurity, and Corruption (2014-2018)
After nearly two decades of relative stability, Brazil has struggled with a series of crises since
2014. The country fel into a deep recession in late 2014, due to a decline in global commodity 2014, due to a decline in global commodity
prices and the prices and the Rousseff AdministrationBrazilian government’s economic mismanagement.8 ’s economic mismanagement.8 Unemployment spiked as Brazil’s real gross domestic Brazil’s real gross domestic
product (GDP) contracted by 8.2% over the product (GDP) contracted by 8.2% over the course of 2015 and 2016.9 During the same period, a far-reaching investigation reported that it found evidence of systemic corruption dating back to the Lula administration that implicated prominent Brazilian business executives and politicians from across the political spectrum. The scandals further eroded President Rousseff’s political support, contributing to her controversial impeachment and removal from office in 2016.10 Rousseff’s vice president, Michael Temer of the patronage-based Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement, served out the remainder of her term (2016-2018). His center-right administration enacted a series of investor-backed reforms, including measures to cap government expenditures and weaken worker protections. Those policies had little popular support, however, and they failed to revive the Brazilian economy. At the same time, a decade-long deterioration in security conditions accelerated, with a record-high 64,000 Brazilians (30.9 per 100,000 people) killed in 2017.11 Temer also faced several corruption charges but his congressional allies shielded him from trial.12 In mid-2018, 9% of Brazilians expressed 5 Cristiano Romero, “O Legado de Lula na Economia,” Valor Online, December 29, 2010. 6 The poverty line is defined as the minimum amount necessary to satisfy nutritional requirement and meet other basic needs. U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), CEPALSTAT database, March 2022. 7 International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook Database, April 2022,” April 19, 2022. (Hereafter: IMF, April 2022). 8 Alfredo Cuevas et al., “An Eventful Two Decades of Reforms, Economic Boom, and a Historic Crisis,” in Brazil: Boom, Bust, and the Road to Recovery, IMF, 2018; and Pedro Mendes Loureiro and Alfredo Saad-Filho, “The Limits of Pragmatism: Thecourse of 2015 and 2016.9 Although Brazil emerged
from recession in mid-2017, recovery has been slow. The economy expanded by just over 1% in
2017 and 2018, and unemployment, which peaked at 13.7% in the first quarter of 2017, has
remained above 11% for four years.10 Largely due to the weak labor market, the real incomes of
the bottom half of Brazilian workers declined by 17% between the onset of the recession and
mid-2019, pushing an estimated 6 mil ion people into poverty.11 The downturn disproportionately
affected Afro-Brazilians, who comprised an estimated 56% of the Brazilian population but 64%
of the unemployed in 2018.12 Large fiscal deficits at al levels of government exacerbated the
situation, limiting the resources available to provide social services.
The deep recession also hindered federal, state, and local government efforts to address serious
chal enges such as crime and violence. A record-high 64,000 Brazilians were kil ed in 2017, and

5 Cristiano Romero, “O Legado de Lula na Economia,” Valor Online, December 29, 2010.
6 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database October 2019, October 11, 2019. T he
poverty line is defined as the income necessary to cover basic expenses, such as food, clothing, housing, and transit.
Marcelo Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Centro de Políticas Sociais, August 2019, p. 15.
Hereinafter, Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade.
7 Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade.
8 Alfredo Cuevas et al., “An Eventful T wo Decades of Reforms, Economic Boom, and a Historic Crisis,” in Brazil:
Boom , Bust, and the Road to Recovery, IMF, 2018; and Pedro Mendes Loureiro and Alfredo Saad-Filho, “ T he Limits
of Pragmatism: T he Rise and Fall of the Brazilian Workers’ Party (2002-2016),” Latin American Perspectives, vol. 46,
no. 1 (2019).
9 IMF, Staff Report for the 2018 Article IV Consultation, June 20, 2018.
10 IMF, “World Economic Outlook Database: October 2019,” October 11, 2019; and Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e
Estatística (IBGE), “ PNAD Contínua: T axa de Desocupação é de 12,6% e T axa de Subutilização é de 25,6% no
T rimestre Encerrado em Abril de 2020,” press release, May 28, 2020.
11 Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade, pp. 5, 15.
12 In 2018, 46.5% of Brazilians self-identified as mixed race and 9.3% self-identified as black. IBGE, Desigualdades
Sociais por Cor ou Raça no Brasil, 2019, p. 2.
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the country’s homicide rate of 30.9 per 100,000 residents was more than five times the global
average. Although homicides declined by nearly 11% in 2018, feminicide (gender-motivated
murders of women) and reports of sexual violence increased.13 The deterioration in the security
situation, like the economic crisis, disproportionately affected Afro-Brazilians, who were the
victims of more than 75% of homicides and 61% of feminicides in 2017 and 2018.14
A series of corruption scandals further discredited the country’s political establishment. The so-
cal ed Car Wash (Lava Jato) investigation, launched in 2014, implicated politicians from across
the political spectrum and many prominent business executives. The initial investigation revealed
that political appointees at the state-controlled oil company, Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras),
colluded with construction firms to fix contract bidding processes. The firms then provided
kickbacks to Petrobras officials and politicians in the ruling coalition. Paral el investigations
discovered similar practices throughout the public sector, with businesses providing bribes and
il egal campaign donations in exchange for contracts or other favorable government treatment.
The scandals sapped President Rousseff’s political support, contributing to her controversial
impeachment and removal from office in August 2016.15 Michael Temer, who presided over a
center-right government for the remainder of Rousseff’s term (2016-2018), was entangled in
several corruption scandals but managed to hold on to power. Several other high-level politicians,
including former President Lula, have been convicted for corruption and face potential y lengthy
prison sentences (see the text box, below).
Lula’s Imprisonment and Release
Brazilian prosecutors have brought charges against former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula; 2003-2010) in
at least eight corruption cases, including two cases for which he has already been convicted. The first conviction
was upheld by a circuit court panel and Brazil’s Superior Court of Justice, which resulted in Lula being imprisoned
and barred from running for a third presidential term in 2018. Press reports have raised concerns, however, that
Judge Sérgio Moro and the prosecutors initial y involved in Lula’s case may have been political y biased and
engaged in improper coordination; Moro served as President Jair Bolsonaro’s minister of justice and public
security from January 2019-April 2020. Lula was released from prison in November 2019 after Brazil’s supreme
court ruled that most individuals convicted of nonviolent crimes should remain free until they have exhausted the
appeals process. Nevertheless, Lula remains ineligible for elective office unless the convictions are overturned and
ultimately may have to serve out the remainder of his sentences.
Sources: Letter from Adriano Augusto Silvestrin Guedes, Brazilian Circuit Court Federal Prosecutor, et al.
to a Group of International Jurists, published by the Global Anticorruption Blog, September 12, 2019; Glenn
Greenwald and Victor Pougy, “Hidden Plot: Brazil’s Top Prosecutors Who Indicted Lula Schemed in Secret
Messages to Prevent His Party from Winning 2018 Election,” Intercept, June 9, 2019; and Ernesto Londoño
and Letícia Casado, “Ex-President of Brazil Is Freed from Prison After Ruling by Supreme Court,” New York
Times, November 9, 2019.
The inability of Brazil’s political leadership to overcome these crises undermined Brazilians’
confidence in their democratic institutions. As of mid-2018, 33% of Brazilians expressed trust in
the judiciary, 26% expressed trust in the election system, 12% expressed trust in congress, 7%
expressed trust in the federal government, and 6% expressed trust in political parties. Moreover,

13 Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, 2019; and United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime, Global Study on Hom icide, 2019.
14 Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, “Violence Against Black People in Brazil,” infographic, 2019, at
http://www.forumseguranca.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/infografico-consicencia-negra-2019-
FINAL_ingl%C3%AAs_site.pdf.
15 Felipe Nunes and Carlos Ranulfo Melo, “Impeachment, Political Crisis and Democracy in Brazil,” Revista de
Ciencia Política, vol. 37, no. 2 (2017).
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only 9% of Brazilians expressed Rise and Fall of the Brazilian Workers’ Party (2002-2016),” Latin American Perspectives, vol. 46, no. 1 (2019). 9 IMF, Staff Report for the 2018 Article IV Consultation, June 20, 2018. 10 Felipe Nunes and Carlos Ranulfo Melo, “Impeachment, Political Crisis and Democracy in Brazil,” Revista de Ciencia Política, vol. 37, no. 2 (2017). 11 Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, October 2021, p 20 (Hereafter: FBSP, 2021). 12 Anna Jean Kaiser, “Brazil’s President Temer Avoids a New Corruption Trial,” Washington Post, October 25, 2017. Congressional Research Service 4 link to page 10 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 14 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations satisfaction with the way democracy was working in their satisfaction with the way democracy was working in their
country—the lowest percentage in country—the lowest percentage in al all of Latin America.of Latin America.1613
Bolsonaro Administration (2019-Present)
BrazilianBrazilian voters registered their intense dissatisfaction with the situation in the country in the voters registered their intense dissatisfaction with the situation in the country in the
2018 elections. In addition to ousting 75% of incumbents running for reelection to the 2018 elections. In addition to ousting 75% of incumbents running for reelection to the senateSenate and and
43% of incumbents running for reelection to the 43% of incumbents running for reelection to the chamber of deputiesChamber of Deputies, they elected as president, , they elected as president,
Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right congressmanlegislator and retired army captain. and retired army captain.1714 Prior to the election, Prior to the election, most
many observers considered Bolsonaro to be a fringe figure in observers considered Bolsonaro to be a fringe figure in the Brazilian congress. He exercised little congress. He exercised little
influence over policy and was best known for his controversial remarks defending the country’s influence over policy and was best known for his controversial remarks defending the country’s
military dictatorship (1964-1985) and expressing prejudice toward marginalized sectors of military dictatorship (1964-1985) and expressing prejudice toward marginalized sectors of
Brazilian Brazilian society.society.1815 Backed by the Backed by the smal small Social Liberal PartySocial Liberal Party (PSL), Bolsonaro also lacked the , Bolsonaro also lacked the
finances and party machinery of his principal competitors. Nevertheless, his social media-driven finances and party machinery of his principal competitors. Nevertheless, his social media-driven
campaign and campaign and populist, tough-on-crime message attracted a strong base of support. He outflanked tough-on-crime message attracted a strong base of support. He outflanked
his opponents by exploiting anti-PT and antiestablishment sentiment and aligninghis opponents by exploiting anti-PT and antiestablishment sentiment and aligning himself with himself with
the few institutions that Braziliansthe few institutions that Brazilians stil general y trust still generally trusted: the military and the churches.: the military and the churches.1916 Bolsonaro Bolsonaro
largely remained off the campaign trail largely remained off the campaign trail in the weeks leading up to the election after being stabbed
in an assassination attemptafter being stabbed a month before the election, but he easily defeated the PT’s Fernando Haddad 55%-45% in a , but he easily defeated the PT’s Fernando Haddad 55%-45% in a
second-round runoff. Bolsonaro’s PSL also won the second-most seats in the lower house.
Since Bolsonaro began his four-year term on January 1, 2019second-round runoff. Bolsonaro campaigned on a platform pledging to combat corruption, take a hardline approach to crime, enact market-oriented economic reforms, repeal environmental and firearms regulations, and advance conservative social values. Since taking office in January 2019, however, he has struggled to advance , he has struggled to advance
portions of his agenda portions of his agenda due to cabinet infighting and the lack of a working majority inthrough Brazil’s Brazil’s
fragmented congress, which includes fragmented congress, which includes 2423 political parties. political parties.20 Whereas previous Brazilian Whereas previous Brazilian presidents presidents
stitchedforged governing coalitions governing coalitions together by distributing control of by distributing control of government jobs andcabinet positions and other government resources to resources to
parties in exchange for parties in exchange for theircongressional support, Bolsonaro support, Bolsonaro initial y was unwil ing to enter intoinitially resisted such such
arrangements. arrangements. Moreover, he general y has avoided negotiating the details of his policy proposals
with legislators. Instead, Bolsonaro has sought to keep his political base mobilized by taking
social y conservative stands on cultural issues and verbal y attacking perceived enemies, such as
the press, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other branches of government.21
Bolsonaro’s attacks have grown more strident since March 2020, as he has faced widespread
scrutiny over his erratic response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and his
al eged attempts to interfere in law enforcement investigations to protect his family and al ies (see
“Pandemic Response” and “Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law,” below).
Bolsonaro’s confrontational approach to governance and recent scandals have alienated many of
his potential al ies within the conservative-leaning congress, as wel as some former supporters.
In November 2019, for example, Bolsonaro abandoned the PSL after a series of disagreements

16 Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe 2018, November 2018.
17 Sylvio Costa and Edson Sardinha, “O que Você Precisa Saber para Entender o Novo Congresso Brasileiro,”
Congresso em Foco, October 9, 2018.
18 See, Instead, he adopted a populist approach to governance, using social media to communicate directly with his political base, criticize opponents, and generate pressure for his agenda. Although Bolsonaro ultimately incorporated several large patronage-based parties into his administration to ward off the threat of impeachment, many of his preferred policies remain stalled in congress (see “Economic and Social Policies”, “Security Policy”, and “Environmental Policies”).17 By most accounts, President Bolsonaro’s approach to governance has placed additional stress on Brazil’s already-strained democratic institutions. He repeatedly has escalated policy disputes with the congress, supreme court, and state and local governments, using what is often viewed as confrontational rhetoric and suggesting he could call upon the military for support.18 The 13 Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe 2018, November 2018. 14 Sylvio Costa and Edson Sardinha, “O que Você Precisa Saber para Entender o Novo Congresso Brasileiro,” Congresso em Foco, October 9, 2018. 15 See, for example, Brian Winter, “System Failure: Behind the Rise of Jair Bolsonaro,” for example, Brian Winter, “System Failure: Behind the Rise of Jair Bolsonaro,” Americas Quarterly, vol. 11, , vol. 11,
no. 1, (January 2018). no. 1, (January 2018).
19 16 Matias Spektor, “It’s Not Just the Right Matias Spektor, “It’s Not Just the Right T hatThat’s Voting for Bolsonaro. It’s Voting for Bolsonaro. It ’s Everyone.” ’s Everyone.” Foreign Policy, October 26, , October 26,
2018. As of mid-2018, 58% of Brazilians expressed trust in the military and 73% expressed trust in the churches, 2018. As of mid-2018, 58% of Brazilians expressed trust in the military and 73% expressed trust in the churches,
according to Corporación Latinobarómetro. according to Corporación Latinobarómetro.
20 Câmara dos Deputados, “Bancada Atual,” accessed in June 2020.
21 See, for example, Andres Schipani, “Brazil: Jair Bolsonaro Pushes Cult ure War over Economic Reform,” Financial
Tim es, August 24, 2019; and Paulo T revisani, “ Brazil’s President Hits the Street, Railing Against the Media,” Wall
Street Journal, February 11, 2020.
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with the party’s leadership; he intends to create a new Al iance for Brazil party to contest future
elections. In May 2020, Bolsonaro reportedly began distributing government positions to several
large patronage-based parties in an attempt to ward off impeachment.22 Although Bolsonaro
appears to have sufficient congressional support to hold onto the presidency for the time being, he
stil lacks a working majority to advance his policy agenda (see “Economic Policy” and “Security
Policy,” below). Public opinion remains polarized, with Brazilians taking to the streets both in
opposition to, and in support of, Bolsonaro. According to a poll conducted in late June 2020, 32%
of Brazilians consider Bolsonaro’s performance in office “good” or “great,” 23% consider it
“average,” and 44% consider it “bad” or “terrible.”23
Pandemic Response
Brazil’s federal health ministry recognized the COVID-19 pandemic as a public health
emergency of national importance on February 3, 2020—nearly a month before Brazil confirmed
its first coronavirus infection. By mid-March, the Bolsonaro Administration had begun to close
Brazil’s international borders and had cal ed on the Brazilian Congress to declare a state of public
calamity in order to free up resources to address the pandemic’s health and economic effects.
Since then, however, President Bolsonaro has consistently downplayed the threat posed by
COVID-19. He has criticized Brazilian states and municipalities for imposing containment
measures and has argued that restrictions on economic activity are17 “Brazil: The ‘Old Politics’ is Back in Fashion,” Latin American Weekly Report, February 4, 2021. 18 Ricardo Brito, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro Says Military Will Not Remove Elected President,” Reuters, June 15, 2020; Marcelo Silva de Sousa, “Brazil Leader Says Army Could be Called if Lockdown Chaos,” Associated Press, April 24, 2021; and “Brazil Pres. Oversees Military Display Viewed as Bid to Intimidate Congress,” EFE News Service, August 10, 2021. Congressional Research Service 5 link to page 10 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations Brazilian armed forces are now more involved in governance than they have been at any time since the end of the dictatorship in 1985; Bolsonaro has appointed retired and active-duty military officers to lead nearly half of his cabinet ministries and has more than doubled the number of such officers serving in other high-level appointed positions.19 Bolsonaro also reportedly has sought to exert influence over law enforcement agencies to protect his family from corruption charges and to advance his political interests.20 In addition to such efforts to intimidate or control government institutions, Bolsonaro has engaged in frequent verbal attacks against journalists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), reportedly fueling an increase in threats and violence against such groups.21 Pandemic Response The Bolsonaro administration’s response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has faced widespread criticism, both at home and abroad. Although the Brazilian government enacted significant economic support measures to help households, businesses, and state governments through the pandemic (see “Economic and Social Policies”), Bolsonaro has actively opposed most of the country’s public health measures. Throughout the pandemic, he has downplayed the threat posed by COVID-19, flouted public health guidelines, promoted unproven treatments, and spread scientifically baseless information linking COVID-19 vaccines to HIV.22 He also has sought to overturn restrictions imposed by state and local governments, arguing the economic impact is more damaging than the virus more damaging than the virus
itself. He has issued several decrees to overturn local restrictions, but these decrees have been
blocked in court. Bolsonaro has repeatedly flouted public health guidelines, wading into crowds
of supporters without a mask, even as nearly two dozen top officials in his government have
tested positive for the virus.24 Bolsonaro also has clashed with members of his own
administration, dismissing one health minister and provoking the resignation of another, due to
his opposition to social distancing measures and his promotion of chloroquine and
hydroxychloroquine—two antimalarial drugs that have yet to be proven effective for treating
COVID-19.25
To date, Brazil’s efforts to contain the virus have been unsuccessful. As of July 5, 2020, Brazil
had recorded more than 1.6 mil ion cases and nearly 65,000 deaths from COVID-19 (see Figure
2).26 An epidemiological study based on antibody tests suggests the total number of Brazilians
who have been infected by the virus may be six times higher than the number of official y
confirmed cases. The study also found significant regional, socioeconomic, and ethnic/racial
disparities in infection rates. For example, 1.1% of self-identified white Brazilians tested positive
for antibodies, compared to 2.1% of Brazilians of Asian descent, 2.5% of black Brazilians, 3.1%
of mixed-race Brazilians, and 5.4% of indigenous Brazilians.27 Although Brazil has one of the
strongest public health systems in Latin America, hospitals have been overwhelmed in some

22 André Shalders, “Bolsonaro terá ‘Centrão’, mas Impeachment pode Avançar se houver Apoio Popular, Dizem
Autores de Pedido,” BBC News Brasil, May 7, 2020.
23 Datafolha, “Bolsonaro é Reprovado por 44%,” June 26, 2020.
24 “Unsealed Exams Confirm Bolsonaro Did Not Catch COVID-19,” Valor International, May 13, 2020; and
“Bolsonaro Rallies with Supporters Amid Virus Surge,” Agence France Presse, May 24, 2020.
25 Mauricio Savarese, “Brazil’s Health Minister Resigns After One Month on the Job,” Associated Press, May 15,
2020; and Ernesto Londoño and Mariana Simões, “Defying Science, Brazil’s Leader T rumpets Unproven ‘Cure’,” New
York Tim es, June 14, 2020.
26 Ministério da Saúde do Brasil, “Painel Coronavirus,” July 6, 2020, at https://covid.saude.gov.br/.
27 Universidade Federal de Pelotas, Centro de Pesquisas Epidemiológicas, “EPICOVID19-BR Divulga Novas
Resultados Sobre o Coronavírus no Brasil,” July 2, 2020.
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cities, and the virus is now spreading rapidly throughout the interior of the country.28 The
politicization of the pandemic and the lack of coordination among different levels of government
may have contributed to the country’s ineffective response.
Figure 2. Confirmed Cases of COVID-19
(new cases by date reported [February 26, 2020 – July 5, 2020])

Source: CRS presentation of data from the Brazilian government’s Ministério da Saúde, “Painel Coronavirus,”
July 6, 2020, at https://covid.saude.gov.br/.
Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law
Many analysts argue there has been an erosion of democracy in Brazil under Bolsonaro.29 Since
taking office, the president has continued to celebrate Brazil’s military dictatorship, and his
sons—who play an influential role in his government—have questioned democracy and
suggested authoritarian measures may be necessary in certain circumstances.30 Bolsonaro also has
attended ral ies in which some of his supporters have cal ed on the military to close congress and
the supreme court.31

28 Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, Nuclear T hreat Initiative, and Economist Intelligence Unit, Global Health
Security Index, 2019; and “ Cidades do Interior já Respondem por quase 60% dos Casos de Covid no País,” Folha de
São Paulo, June 22, 2020.
29 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, Autocratization Surges – Resistance Grows: Democracy Report 2020,
March 20, 2020; and “ Brasil está em Processo de Erosão, Dizem Brasilianistas,” Valor, June 12, 2020.
30 Rodrigo Borges Delfim and T hais Arbex, “Carlos Bolsonaro Diz que País Não T erá T ransformação Rápida por Vias
Democráticas,” Folha de São Paulo, September 9, 2019; and “ Eduardo Bolsonaro Fala em Novo AI-5 ‘se Esquerda
Radicalizar’,” UOL, October 31, 2019
31 T errence McCoy and Heloísa T raiano, “As Brazil’s Challenges Multiply, Bolsonaro’s Fans Call for a Military
T akeover,” Washington Post, May 11, 2020.
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Civil-military relations have shifted as Bolsonaro has appointed retired and active-duty military
officers to lead more than a third of his cabinet ministries and to approximately 3,000 other
positions throughout the government.32 The Brazilian armed forces are now more involved in
governance than they have been at any time since the end of the dictatorship. Although some
analysts maintain that the officers have had a moderating influence on Bolsonaro, others are
concerned about politicization of the armed forces. On several occasions, Bolsonaro and members
of his administration have appeared to suggest that the armed forces would back the president if
the Brazilian congress or judiciary sought to remove him from office.33
Bolsonaro also has exerted political influence over law enforcement agencies, potential y
hindering investigations and cal ing into question the independence of Brazilian institutions.
Minister of Justice and Public Security Sérgio Moro resigned in April 2020 after Bolsonaro
dismissed the director-general of the Brazilian federal police, al egedly to push for certain
appointments within the force and gain access to confidential information regarding ongoing
investigations. Bolsonaro denied the al egations, but his newly appointed director-general
immediately replaced the head of the federal police office in Rio de Janeiro, which reportedly is
investigating potential corruption and money laundering by two of Bolsonaro’s sons. The federal
police also are investigating dozens of Bolsonaro’s political al ies—and reportedly at least one of
his sons—for their al eged involvement in an il egal digital disinformation campaign.34 In
addition to his federal police appointments, observers have questioned changes Bolsonaro has
made to Brazil’s tax collection agency, financial intel igence unit, and antitrust regulator, as wel
as his decision to disregard a norm in place since 2003 of selecting an attorney general from a
shortlist approved by the public prosecutors’ association.35
Observers have raised serious concerns about human rights in Brazil as Bolsonaro has taken steps
to weaken the press, exert control over NGOs, and roll back rights previously granted to
marginalized groups.36 Brazil’s civil society has pushed back against such measures, many of
which have been blocked by the Brazilian congress and judiciary. Nevertheless, human rights
advocates argue the president’s statements and actions have fueled attacks against journalists,
activists, and indigenous and quilombola communities.37

32 Anthony Boadle, “ Analysis – T hreat of Brazil Military Coup Unfounded, Retired Generals Say,” Reuters, June 22,
2020.
33 “Bolsonaro: Forças Armadas Defendem a Pátria e ‘Não Cumprem Ordens Absurdas’,” UOL, June 12, 2020; and
Ricardo Brito, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro Says Military Will Not Remove Elected President,” Reuters, June 15, 2020.
34 “Moro Plunges Knife into Bolsonaro as COVID-19 Swamps Brazil,” Latin American Weekly Report, April 30, 2020;
“Brazil: Police Investigate Bolsonaro’s Allies, T ensions Rise,” Latin News Daily, May 28, 2020; and “De ‘Rachadinha’
a Fantasmas, Conheça Investigações que Envolvem o Entorno de Jair Bolsonaro,” Folha de São Paulo, June 18, 2020.
35 Ryan C. Berg, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro Continues to Be His Own Worst Enemy,” American Enterprise Institute,
September 24, 2019; and Guilherme France, Brazil: Setbacks in the Legal and Institutional Anti-Corruption
Fram eworks, T ransparency International, 2019.
36 “Brazil: Print Media T hreatened by Presidential Decree,” Latin News Daily, August 8, 2019; Mauricio Savarese,
“Brazil’s Bolsonaro T argets Minorities on 1st Day in Office,” Associated Press, January 3, 2019; and Gabriel
Stargardter, “Bolsonaro Presidential Decree Grants Sweeping Powers over NGOs in Brazil,” Reuters, January 2, 2019.
37 Quilombolas are a self-declared ethno-racial group, some of whom are the descendants of freed or escaped slaves.
For more information, see Mariana Nozela Prado, “Quilombola Communities of Brazil,” Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, Brazil Institute, infographic, August 13, 2018, at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
article/quilombola-communities-brazil. “ Brazil: Journalists Denounce Increased Attacks,” Latin News Daily, January
17, 2020; Maria Elena Bucheli, “ Bolsonaro ‘T urned Me into a Pariah,’ Says Gay Lawmaker Who Fled Brazil,” Agence
France Presse, March 20, 2019; and “Brazil: Indigenous Violence on the Rise,” Latin American Security & Strategic
Review, January 2020.
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Economic Policy
During its first year in office, the Bolsonaro Administration began implementing key aspects of
its market-oriented economic agenda. As part of a far-reaching privatization program, the
Brazilian government began sel ing off assets, including subsidiaries of state-owned enterprises,
stakes in private companies, and infrastructure and energy concessions, yielding revenues of
approximately $66 bil ion in 2019.38 The Brazilian congress also enacted a major pension reform
expected to reduce government expenditures by at least $194 bil ion over the next decade.39
Those policies built on a 2016 constitutional amendment that froze inflation-adjusted government
spending for 20 years. Other Bolsonaro Administration proposals to simplify the tax system, cut
and decentralize government expenditures, and decrease compensation and job security for
government employees had yet to move forward in congress when legislators shifted their focus
to addressing the COVID-19 pandemic.
Although the International Monetary Fund had expected Brazil’s economic growth to accelerate
from 1.1% in 2019 to 2.2% in 2020, it now forecasts a 9.1% contraction.40 According to one
projection, the unemployment rate, which was already above 12% before the onset of the
pandemic, wil average nearly 19% over the course of the year.41 The Brazilian congress has
enacted a series of emergency measures to mitigate the economic and social impacts of the
recession, including an expansion of a conditional cash transfer program for low-income
Brazilians, new monthly cash transfers for informal and unemployed workers, credit and payroll
assistance for smal - and medium-sized businesses, and aid for state and municipal governments.
Altogether, the government’s fiscal response is equivalent to more than 6% of GDP.42 The
Brazilian Central Bank has provided additional support for the economy by cutting the
benchmark interest rate to a historic low and implementing measures to increase the liquidity of
the financial system.
Bolsonaro Administration officials and some economists assert that Brazil should quickly
withdraw the emergency measures and enact pending structural reforms once the economy begins
to recover.43 They argue that reducing Brazil’s fiscal deficit and stabilizing public debt are
necessary to attract private investment and foster economic growth. Other economists argue that
the pandemic and recession demonstrate the need for a stronger public health system, more
comprehensive social safety net, and increased public investment in education, infrastructure, and
research and development.44
Security Policy
Bolsonaro has had difficulty advancing the hard-line security platform that was the centerpiece of
his campaign. The Brazilian congress blocked Bolsonaro’s proposal to shield from prosecution

38 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Brazil-U.S. Business Council, “What Can Brazil Expect from Concessions and
Privatizations in 2020?,” Brazil Investment Monitor, February 14, 2020.
39 Andres Schipani and Bryan Harris, “Can Brazil’s Pension Reform Kick -Start the Economy?,” Financial Times,
October 22, 2019.
40 IMF, Tentative Stabilization, Sluggish Recovery?, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2020; and IMF, A
Crisis Like No Other, An Uncertain Recovery, World Economic Outlook, June 2020.
41 Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Insitituto Brasileiro de Economia, Boletim Macro, June 2020.
42 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD Economic Outlook, June 2020.
43 “A Window of Opportunity for the Reforms,” Valor International, June 17, 2020; and OECD, OECD Economic
Outlook, June 2020.
44 Laura Carvalho, “As Funçöes do Estado Reveladas pela Pandemia,” Nexo Jornal, April 30, 2020.
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police who kil suspected criminals and pushed back against Bolsonaro’s decrees loosening gun
controls. Other Bolsonaro Administration proposals, including measures to modernize police
investigations and impose stricter criminal sentences, were enacted in December 2019.
Preliminary data suggest that security conditions in Brazil improved in 2019, as the country
registered a 19% decline in homicides. The number of individuals kil ed by police increased,
however, including an 18% spike in the state of Rio de Janeiro.45 In recent years, more than 75%
of those kil ed by police have been Afro-Brazilian.46 The Bolsonaro Administration has claimed
credit for fal ing crime rates, but some security analysts argue the situation has been improving
since late 2017 due to state and municipal initiatives and reduced conflict between the country’s
largest criminal groups.47 (See the “Counternarcotics” section for more information.)
Amazon Conservation and Climate Change
A 30% increase in fires in the Brazilian Amazon in 2019 compared to the previous year led many
Brazilians and international itself.23 A Brazilian Senate investigation found that such actions “deliberately exposed the population to a concrete risk of mass infection,” and recommended criminal charges against President Bolsonaro for nine different offenses, including crimes against humanity.24 As of May 10, 2022, Brazil had reported more than 30.5 million cases and 664,000 deaths from COVID-19 since the start of the pandemic, giving the country one of the highest COVID-19 mortality rates (312.6 deaths per 100,000 people) in the world.25 Even as it has struggled to control the spread of the virus, Brazil has played an important role in the development and production of COVID-19 vaccines. In 2020, the country hosted clinical trials for COVID-19 vaccines developed by AstraZeneca/Oxford, Sinovac, and Pfizer/BioNTech. Brazilian institutions (the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), the Butantan Institute, and Eurofarma Laboratórios, respectively) have entered into agreements with those companies to produce hundreds of millions of vaccine doses annually for domestic use in Brazil and for export 19 Wendy Hunter and Diego Vega, “Populism and the Military: Symbiosis and Tension in Bolsonaro’s Brazil,” Democratization, vol. 29, no. 2 (2022), pp. 337-359. 20 Guilherme France, Brazil: Setbacks in the Legal and Institutional Anti-Corruption Frameworks, Transparency International, November 20, 2019; Ricardo Brito, “Brazil Justice Minister Quits, Accuses Bolsonaro of Meddling in Police,” Reuters, April 24, 2020; and Ricardo Brito, “On Tape, Boslonaro Cites Protecting His Family in Push to Swap Top Rio Cop – Source,” Reuters, May 12, 2020. 21 Igarapé Institute, The ‘Agora’ is Under Attack: Assessing the Closure of Civic Space in Brazil and Around the World, Strategic Paper 49, October 2020, p. 14. 22 See, for examples, “Brazil: Bolsonaro Pandemic as Death Toll Reaches New Milestone,” Latin News Daily, October 12, 2020; “Bolsonaro Rallies with Supporters Amid Virus Surge,” Agence France Presse, May 24, 2020; Ernesto Londoño and Mariana Simões, “Defying Science, Brazil’s Leader Trumpets Unproven ‘Cure’,” New York Times, June 14, 2020; and “Brazilian President Says COVID-19 Vax and HIV Go Hand in Hand,” MercoPress, October 26, 2021. 23 “Brazil’s Sao Paulo to Get Two-Week Coronavirus Shutdown, Bolsonaro Blasts ‘Hysteria’,” Reuters, March 21, 2020; and “Brazil: Bolsonaro Expands Essential Businesses, Crosses Governors,” Latin News Daily, May 12, 2020. 24 Senado Federal, Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito da Pandemia, Relatório Final, October 26, 2021, p. 1271. 25 Johns Hopkins, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,” at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality. Congressional Research Service 6 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations to countries throughout Latin America and Africa.26 Fiocruz and the Butantan Institute are also developing additional COVID-19 vaccines, and the Pan American Health Organization selected Fiocruz to serve as a regional hub for the development of mRNA-based vaccines in Latin America. Although global supply chain disruptions and delays in government planning and procurement initially slowed Brazil’s domestic vaccination campaign, more than 77% of Brazilians were fully vaccinated as of May 10, 2022.27 Brazil plans to donate at least 30 million vaccine doses to low-income countries, delivering an initial 500,000 doses to Paraguay in December 2021.28 Economic and Social Policies President Bolsonaro has had mixed success in advancing the market-oriented economic reforms that he campaigned on and that some economists maintain are necessary to boost Brazil’s long-term growth potential. In 2019, the Brazilian government enacted a far-reaching pension reform to reduce government expenditures. It also began implementing an infrastructure and natural resource concession program that generated more than $145 billion in investments and $26 billion in government fees between 2019 and 2021.29 Those measures built on a 2016 constitutional amendment that froze inflation-adjusted government spending for 20 years in an attempt to reduce the national debt (estimated at 93% of GDP in 2021).30 Other structural reforms have stalled in the Brazilian congress, including measures to simplify the tax system and decrease compensation and job security for government employees. Over the past two years, Brazilian policymakers have focused on mitigating the economic and social impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020, they suspended the budget cap and enacted a series of emergency support measures that included an expansion of a conditional cash transfer program for low-income Brazilians, new monthly cash transfers for informal and unemployed workers, credit and payroll assistance for small- and medium-sized businesses, and aid for state and municipal governments. Brazil’s fiscal response, which amounted to 12% of GDP in 2020, limited the country’s economic contraction to 3.9%.31 It also resulted in Brazil being the only country in Latin America in which the estimated poverty rate declined between 2019 and 2020, falling by nearly two percentage points to 18.4%.32 Brazil began to withdraw those emergency support measures in 2021, as the economy rebounded with 4.6% growth.33 Approximately 12 million Brazilians (11.1% of the population) remained unemployed in the fourth quarter of 2021, 26 Fiocruz News Agency, “Fiocruz and AstraZeneca Make a Commitment for API Acquisition in 2022,” press release, November 3, 2021; Instituto Butantan, “Butantan Vai Fornecer CoronaVac para Países da América do Sul e da África, Afirma Dimas Covas,” press release, September 29, 2021; and Pfizer, “Pfizer and BioNTech Announce Collaboration with Brazil’s Eurofarma to Manufacture COVID-19 Vaccine Doses for Latin America,” press release, August 26, 2021. 27 “Brazil Economy: Country Struggles with Slow Start to COVID-19 Vaccinations,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 29, 2021; Diane Jeantet and Débora Álvares, “Sidelining Experts, Brazil Bungled Its Immunization Plans,” Associated Press, January 16, 2021; and Johns Hopkins, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Brazil,” at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/brazil. 28 Alex Rodrigues, “Brazil to Donate 10 Mi COVID-19 Shots to Low-Income Nations,” Agência Brasil, December 12, 2021; and Ministério das Relações Exteriores, “Joint Press Release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Health on the Donation of COVID-19 Vaccines to Paraguay,” press release Nº 182, December 27, 2021. 29 Bryan Harris, “Brazil’s Economic Outlook Buoyed by Big-ticket Investments,” Financial Times, January 4, 2022. 30 IMF, April 2022. 31 IMF, “Policy Responses to COVID-19,” July 2, 2021; and IMF, April 2022. 32 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Social Panorama of Latin America, 2021, January 2022. 33 IMF, April 2022. Congressional Research Service 7 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations however, and rising energy prices and global supply bottlenecks drove Brazil’s annual inflation rate above 10%.34 The International Monetary Fund forecasts that Brazil’s economic growth rate will slow to 0.8% in 2022, due, in part, to high inflation and rising interest rates.35 In an attempt to offset the higher cost of living, the Bolsonaro administration has reduced fuel taxes, increased cash transfers to low-income Brazilians, and launched a stimulus program to inject about $34 billion (2.1% of GDP) into the economy by advancing pension payments, expanding access to credit, and allowing workers to access some mandatory savings.36 The additional expenditures may require the Brazilian government to make cuts to other areas of the budget or readjust the country’s spending cap. Security Policy President Bolsonaro has had some difficulty advancing the hardline security platform that was a centerpiece of his 2018 electoral campaign. The Brazilian congress enacted measures to modernize police investigations and impose more severe criminal sentences in 2019, but it has yet to approve Bolsonaro’s proposals to shield from prosecution police who kill suspected criminals or to roll back the country’s strict firearms regulations. With legislation stalled, Bolsonaro issued more than 30 decrees to ease gun ownership during his first three years in office.37 Although the Brazilian supreme court overturned some of those decrees, the number of newly registered firearms in Brazil reportedly quadrupled from 2018 to 2021.38 In general, violence in Brazil has been trending downward in recent years. The number of Brazilians killed annually declined nearly 22% between 2017 and 2020 to just over 50,000 (23.6 per 100,000 residents).39 During the same period, however, femicides (gender-motivated murders of women and girls) increased by 26% and the number of individuals killed by police increased by 24%.40 This violence disproportionately affects Afro-Brazilians, who comprised approximately 56% of Brazil’s total population in 2020 but were the victims of 62% of femicides, 76% of homicides, and 79% of police killings.41 Preliminary data suggests homicides continued to decline in 2021, reaching a 15-year low, but there was a slight increase in sexual violence.42 The Bolsonaro administration has claimed credit for the falling homicide rate, but security analysts have identified a variety of other factors that have contributed to the decline, including shifting dynamics among the country’s criminal organizations.43 Over the past decade, several 34 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE), “Continuous PNAD: Unemployment Rate is 11.1%, Underutilization Rate is 24.3% in Quarter Ending in December,” press release, February 24, 2022; and Letter from Roberto Oliveira Campos Neto, Presidente, Banco Central do Brasil, to Paulo Roberto Nunes Guedes, Ministro de Estado da Economia, January 11, 2022. 35 IMF, April 2022. 36 “Bolsonaro’s Social Spending Package Targets October Election,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 24, 2022. 37 Lais Martins, “Bolsonaro’s Pro-Gun Agenda May Become Law,” Foreign Policy, February 8, 2022. 38 “Registro de Novas Armas de Fogo por Civis Bate Recorde,” O Globo, February 22, 2022. 39 FBSP, 2021, p. 20. 40 FBSP, 2021, pp. 59 and 91. 41 FBSP, 2021, pp. 40, 67, and 98. 42 G1, Monitor da Violência, “Número de Assassinatos Cai 7% No Brasil em 2021 e é o Menor da Série Histórica,” February 21, 2022; and FBSP, “Violência Contra Mulheres em 2021,” March 7, 2022, p. 9. 43 Samira Bueno and Renato Sérgio de Lima, “Queda de Assassinatos Mostra que Estados Regiram e Colocaram em Prática Programas de Enfrentamento à Violência,” G1, Monitor da Violência, February 21, 2022. Congressional Research Service 8 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations large, well-organized, and heavily armed criminal groups in Brazil—such as the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital, or PCC) and the Red Command (Comando Vermelho, or CV)—have increased their transnational operations. The PCC is now among the world’s most powerful organized crime groups, according to the U.S. Treasury Department, which imposed sanctions on the group in December 2021.44 Violence in Brazil spiked in 2016 and 2017 as a long-standing truce between the PCC, CV, and their local affiliates broke down and the organizations battled for control of strategic trafficking corridors. Violence has since declined in areas where a single group has consolidated territorial control.45 October 2022 Elections Brazil is scheduled to hold presidential, legislative, and state elections on October 2, 2022. President Bolsonaro has joined the center-right Liberal Party in advance of the election in an attempt to expand his base and forge alliances with several of the county’s large patronage-based parties. He abandoned his previous Social Liberal Party in 2019 due to disagreements with the party’s leadership, and his efforts to establish a new Alliance for Brazil party were unsuccessful. At this juncture, Bolsonaro appears to face a difficult path to reelection. According to a weighted average of polls, as of May 9, 2022, 49.3% of Brazilians rated Bolsonaro’s performance in office as “bad” or “terrible,” 30.0% rated it “good” or “great,” and 19.3% rated it “regular.”46 As his popular support has declined, Bolsonaro has repeatedly questioned the legitimacy of Brazil’s electoral system, raising concerns that he may seek to discredit or overturn the results of the October elections.47 The political opposition, which has been fragmented for the past three years, has begun to coalesce behind former President Lula (2003-2010) of the center-left PT. Lula was convicted on corruption charges in 2017 and imprisoned for nearly two years, but the Brazilian supreme court annulled those convictions on procedural grounds in 2021, making him once again eligible for public office. The supreme court subsequently ruled that the judge presiding over the case for which Lula was imprisoned had acted with bias.48 The 76-year old former president remains popular among many Brazilians due to the significant improvements in living standards that 44 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Uses New Sanctions Authority to Combat Global Illicit Drug Trade,” press release, December 15, 2021. 45 G1, Monitor da Violência, “Número de Assassinatos Cai 7% No Brasil em 2021 e é o Menor da Série Histórica,” February 21, 2022. 46 UOL, “Agregador de Pesquisas UOL,” at https://noticias.uol.com.br/reportagens-especiais/pesquisa-eleitoral-eleicoes-2022-agregador/#page3. 47 Flávia Milhorance and Ernesto Londoño, “Brazil’s Leader Attacks Electronic Ballots and Threatens to Suspend Vote,” New York Times, August 11, 2021; “Bolsonaro Interrompe Trégua e Retoma Ataques ao Sistema Eleitoral,” Folha de São Paulo, February 12, 2022; and Mauricio Savarese, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro Says He Will Seek Audit of Voting System,” Associated Press, May 5, 2022. 48 Lula faced numerous corruption charges, was convicted in two cases, and was sentenced to more than 25 years in prison. The first conviction was upheld by a circuit court panel and Brazil’s superior court of justice, which resulted in Lula being imprisoned in April 2018 and barred from running for a third presidential term. Lula was released from prison in November 2019, however, after Brazil’s supreme court ruled that most individuals convicted of nonviolent crimes should remain free until they have exhausted the appeals process. In April 2021, the supreme court annulled Lula’s convictions on procedural grounds, and, in June 2021, the supreme court ruled that Judge Sergio Moro, who presided over Lula’s initial conviction and went on to serve as minister of justice and public security in the Bolsonaro administration, had acted with bias. As of March 2022, Brazilian courts had acquitted Lula in three cases and dismissed or suspended the remaining charges against him. Ernesto Londoño and Letícia Casado, “Ex-President of Brazil Is Freed from Prison After Ruling by Supreme Court,” New York Times, November 9, 2019; and Paulo Roberto Netto, “Lula Se Livra de Processos, Mas Teve Só 3 Absolvições,” Poder360, March 15, 2022. Congressional Research Service 9 link to page 5 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations occurred during his eight years in office. Although there continues to be a strong current of anti-PT sentiment among some sectors of the population, Lula has taken steps to broaden his coalition. In April 2022, for example, Lula selected Geraldo Alckmin—one of the founders of the center-right PSDB and Lula’s 2006 presidential opponent—to serve as his running mate.49 According to one poll aggregator, as of May 4, 2022, Lula was leading Bolsonaro 43.3% to 32.8%, with several other potential candidates trailing with single digit support.50 Additional challengers could emerge before the August 15 registration deadline. If no candidate wins more than 50% of the valid votes, a runoff between the top two candidates is scheduled for October 30. Amazon Conservation and Climate Change Significant increases in fires and deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon over the past three years have led many Brazilians and international observers to express concern about the rainforest and the extent to observers to express concern about the rainforest and the extent to
which its destruction is contributing to regional and global climate change.which its destruction is contributing to regional and global climate change.48 51 Covering nearly 2.7 Covering nearly 2.7
mil ion million square miles across seven countries, the Amazon Basin is home to the largest and most square miles across seven countries, the Amazon Basin is home to the largest and most
biodiverse tropical forest in the world.biodiverse tropical forest in the world.4952 Scientific studies have found that the Amazon plays an Scientific studies have found that the Amazon plays an
important role in the global carbon cycle by absorbing and sequestering important role in the global carbon cycle by absorbing and sequestering carbon. Although
findings vary, one recent study estimated the forest absorbs 560 mil ion tons of carbon dioxide
per year and its biomass holds 76 bil ion carbon. Some estimates suggest it may hold 123 billion tons of carbon—an amount equivalent to tons of carbon—an amount equivalent to sevenabout 12 years of years of
global carbon emissions.global carbon emissions.5053 The Amazon also pumps water into the atmosphere, affecting regional The Amazon also pumps water into the atmosphere, affecting regional
rainfal rainfall patterns throughout South America.patterns throughout South America.5154 An estimated 17% of the Amazon An estimated 17% of the Amazon basinBasin has been has been
deforested, however, and some scientists have warned that the forest may be nearing a tipping deforested, however, and some scientists have warned that the forest may be nearing a tipping
point at which it is no longer able to sustain itself and transitions to a drier, point at which it is no longer able to sustain itself and transitions to a drier, savanna-like ecosystem.55 This cycle of deforestation and warming may reduce the forest’s capacity to store carbon and could result in the Amazon becoming a net carbon source.56 Efforts to conserve the forest often focus on Brazil, since the country encompasses about 69% of the Amazon Basin.57 Within Brazil, the government has established an administrative zone known as the Legal Amazon, which is comprised of nine states that fall within the Amazon Basin (see Figure 1). Although rainforest covers most of the Legal Amazon, savanna (Cerrado) and 49 Alckmin left the PSDB in December 2021 and joined the center-left Brazilian Socialist Party in March 2022 in anticipation of the alliance with Lula. 50 UOL, “Agregador de Pesquisas UOL,” at https://noticias.uol.com.br/reportagens-especiais/pesquisa-eleitoral-eleicoes-2022-agregador/#page2. 51 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11306, Fire and Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazonsavanna-like
ecosystem.52

45 “Número de Pessoas Mortas pela Polícia Cresce no Brasil em 2019; Assassinatos de Policiais Caem pela Met ade,”
G1, Monitor da Violência, April 16, 2020; and Karina Nascimento, “ Principais Crimes Registraram Queda no Estado
em 2019,” Governo do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Segurança Pública, January 21, 2020.
46 Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, “Violence Against Black People in Brazil,” infographic, 2019.
47 André Cabette Fábio, “A Queda da Criminalidade no Brasil. e o Discurso de Moro,” Nexo Jornal, January 6, 2020.
48 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE), “Monitoramento dos Focos Ativos por Bioma,” at
http://queimadas.dgi.inpe.br/queimadas/portal-static/estatisticas_estados/. For more information on the fires, see CRS
In Focus IF11306, Fire and Deforestation in the Brazilian Am azon , by Pervaze A. Sheikh et al. , by Pervaze A. Sheikh et al.
4952 Portions of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Portions of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and VenezuelaPeru, and Venezuela are located in the Amazon Basin. are located in the Amazon Basin. T heThe
rainforest extends beyond the Amazon Basin into Suriname and French Guiana.rainforest extends beyond the Amazon Basin into Suriname and French Guiana. United Nations Environment United Nations Environment
ProgrammeProgramme (UNEP), G, Global International Waters Assessm ent: Am azon Assessment: Amazon Basin, GIWA Regional, GIWA Regional Assessment 40b, Assessment 40b,
Kalmar, Sweden,Kalmar, Sweden, 2004, p. 15 (Hereafter: UNEP 2004). 53 Luciana V. Gatti et al., “Amazonia as a Carbon Source Linked to Deforestation and Climate Change,” Nature, vol. 595 (July 15, 2021), p. 3882004, p. 15.
50 Edna Rödig et al., “T he Importance of Forest Structure for Carbon Fluxes of the Amazon Rainforest,” Environmental
Research Letters, vol. 13, no. 5 (2018), p. 9; Hemholtz Centre for Environmental Research, “ The Forests of the
Amazon Are an Important Carbon Sink,” press release, November 8, 2019; and Pierre Friedlingstein et al., “Global ; and Pierre Friedlingstein et al., “Global
Carbon BudgetCarbon Budget 2019 2021,” ,” Earth System Science Data, , vol. 11, no. 4 (2019), p. 1803.
51Preprint (November 4, 2021), p. 26. 54 D. C. Zemp et al., “Deforestation Effects on Amazon Forest Resilience,” D. C. Zemp et al., “Deforestation Effects on Amazon Forest Resilience,” Geophysical Research Letters,, vol. 44, no. vol. 44, no.
12 (2017). 12 (2017).
52 T homas55 Thomas Lovejoy and Carlos Nobre, “Amazon Lovejoy and Carlos Nobre, “Amazon T ippingTipping Point: Last Chance for Action,” Point: Last Chance for Action,” Science Advances, vol. 5, no. , vol. 5, no.
12 (2019). 12 (2019).
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link to page 5 link to page 16 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations

Efforts to conserve the forest often focus on Brazil, since the country encompasses about 69% of
the Amazon Basin.53 Within Brazil, the government has established an administrative zone known
as the Legal Amazon, which includes nine states: Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Mato Grosso, Pará,
Rondônia, Roraima, Tocantins, and most of Maranhão (see Figure 1). Although rainforest covers
most of the Legal Amazon, savanna (Cerrado) and wetlands (Pantanal) are 56 Luciana V. Gatti et al., “Amazonia as a Carbon Source Linked to Deforestation and Climate Change,” Nature, vol. 595 (July 15, 2021), pp. 388-393. 57 UNEP, 2004, p. 16. Congressional Research Service 10 link to page 15 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations wetlands (Pantanal) are also present in portions of present in portions of
the region. The Legal Amazon was largely undeveloped until the 1960s, when the military-led the region. The Legal Amazon was largely undeveloped until the 1960s, when the military-led
government began subsidizing the settlement and development of the region as a matter of government began subsidizing the settlement and development of the region as a matter of
national security. national security. Partial yPartially due to those incentives, due to those incentives, the human population in the Legal Amazon
grew from 6 mil ion in 1960 to 25 mil ion in 2010. Forest cover in the Legal Amazon has
declined by approximately 20% as settlements, roads, logging, ranching, farming, and other
activities have proliferated in the region.54
Brazilian Policies and Deforestation Trends
In 2004, the Brazilian roads, logging, mining, agriculture, and other activities proliferated in the region, and the Legal Amazon’s human population grew from 7.1 million in 1970 to 28.1 million in 2020.58 About 19.5% of the Amazon forest located within Brazil had been lost as of 2020.59 Environmental Policies In 2004, the Brazilian government adopted an action plan to prevent and control deforestation in government adopted an action plan to prevent and control deforestation in
the Legal Amazon.the Legal Amazon.5560 It increased It increased surveil ancesurveillance in the Amazon region, began to enforce in the Amazon region, began to enforce
environmental laws and regulations more rigorously, and took steps to consolidate and expand environmental laws and regulations more rigorously, and took steps to consolidate and expand
protected lands. protected lands. Nearly 20More than 22% of the % of the BrazilianLegal Amazon now has some sort of federal or state Amazon now has some sort of federal or state
protected status, and the Brazilian government has recognized protected status, and the Brazilian government has recognized an additional 22more than 23% of the region as Indigenous or Quilombola territories.61% of the Brazilian
Amazon as indigenous territories.56 Brazil’s forest code also requires private landowners in Brazil’s forest code also requires private landowners in the Amazon biomethe
Legal Amazon to maintain native vegetation on 80% of their properties. to maintain native vegetation on 80% of their properties.
Other Brazilian Other Brazilian initiatives have sought to support sustainable development in the Amazon while initiatives have sought to support sustainable development in the Amazon while
limitinglimiting the extent to which the country’s agricultural sector drives deforestation. In 2008, the the extent to which the country’s agricultural sector drives deforestation. In 2008, the
Brazilian Brazilian government began conditioning credit on farmers’ compliance with environmental government began conditioning credit on farmers’ compliance with environmental
laws; in 2009, the government banned new sugarcane plantations in the Legal Amazon. The laws; in 2009, the government banned new sugarcane plantations in the Legal Amazon. The
BrazilianBrazilian government also supported private sector conservation initiatives. Those included a government also supported private sector conservation initiatives. Those included a
2006 voluntary agreement among most major soybean traders not to purchase soybeans grown on 2006 voluntary agreement among most major soybean traders not to purchase soybeans grown on
lands deforested after 2006 (later revised to 2008) and a 2009 voluntary agreement among lands deforested after 2006 (later revised to 2008) and a 2009 voluntary agreement among
meatpackers not to purchase cattle raised on lands deforested in the Amazon after 2008.meatpackers not to purchase cattle raised on lands deforested in the Amazon after 2008.
Brazil’s public and private conservation efforts, combined with economic factors that made Brazil’s public and private conservation efforts, combined with economic factors that made
agricultural commodity exports less profitable,agricultural commodity exports less profitable,57 led to an 83% decline in deforestation in the led to an 83% decline in deforestation in the
Legal Amazon between 2004 and 2012.Legal Amazon between 2004 and 2012.62 Deforestation has Deforestation has been trending upwardincreased significantly in recent years, in recent years,
however, rising from a low of 1,765 square miles in 2012 to however, rising from a low of 1,765 square miles in 2012 to 3,9115,110 square miles in the 12-month square miles in the 12-month
monitoring period that ended in July monitoring period that ended in July 2019 (see2021 (see Figure 32). Analysts have linked the increase in . Analysts have linked the increase in
deforestation to a series of deforestation to a series of government policy reversals that have cut funding for environmental enforcement, policy reversals that have cut funding for environmental enforcement,
reduced the size of protected areas, and relaxed conservation requirements.reduced the size of protected areas, and relaxed conservation requirements.58 63 Market incentives, such as the growth in Chinese imports of Brazilian beef and soybeans and record-high gold prices, also have contributed to recent deforestation trends.64 58 Daniel Santos, Rodney Salomão, and Adalberto Veríssimo, Fatos da Amazônia 2021, Amazônia 2030, March 2021, p. 10 (Hereafter: Amazônia 2030, March 2021). 59 Amazônia 2030, March 2021, p. 16. 60 Presidência da República, Casa Market incentives,

53 UNEP, Global International Waters Assessment: Amazon Basin, GIWA Regional Assessment 40b, Kalmar, Sweden,
2004, p. 16.
54 Eric A. Davidson et al., “ T he Amazon Basin in T ransition,” Nature, vol. 481 (2012), p. 321.
55 Presidência da República, Casa Civil, Civil, Plano de Ação para a Prevenção e Controle do Desmatamento na Amazônia
Legal, March 2004. , March 2004.
56 Amazon Network of Georeferenced Socio-Environmental Information, “Amazonia 2019 – Protected Areas and
Indigenous T erritories,” map, 2019.
57 Philip Fearnside, “Business as Usual: A Resurgence 61 Quilombolas are inhabitants of communities founded by individuals who escaped or were freed from slavery. Amazônia 2030, March 2021, p. 21. 62 Philip Fearnside, “Business as Usual: A Resurgence of Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon,” of Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon,” Yale Environment
360, April 18, 2017, April 18, 2017. Hereinafter, (Hereafter: Fearnside, “ Fearnside, “ Business as Usual.”
58 Fearnside, “Business as Usual”; Business as Usual.”); and Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, “Taxa PRODES Amazônia – 2004 a 2021 (km²),” November 19, 2021. 63 Fearnside, “Business as Usual”; and William D. Carvalho et al., “Deforestation Control in the Brazilian Amazon: A and William D. Carvalho et al., “Deforestation Control in the Brazilian Amazon: A
Conservation StruggleConservation Struggle Being Lost as Agreements and Regulations Are SubvertedBeing Lost as Agreements and Regulations Are Subverted and Bypassed,”and Bypassed,” Perspectives in Ecology and Conservation, vol. 17, no. 3 (2019). 64 Gustavo Faleiros, “China’s Brazilian Beef Demand Linked to Amazon Deforestation Risk,” Diálogo Chino, October 23, 2019; André Vasconcelos, “Uncovering the Deforestation and Climate Risks of Chinese and EU Soy and Beef Congressional Research Service 11 link to page 15 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations in
Ecology and Conservation, vol. 17, no. 3 (2019).
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Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations

such as the growth in Chinese imports of Brazilian beef and soybeans, also have contributed to
recent deforestation trends.59 For example, China purchased nearly 76% of its soybean imports
from Brazil in 2018, up from roughly 50% in prior years, after imposing a retaliatory tariff on
U.S. soybeans.60
Figure 3. Deforestation in Brazil’s Legal Amazon: 2004-2019

Source: CRS presentation of data from the Brazilian government’s Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, “A
Taxa Consolidada de Desmatamento por Corte Raso para os Nove Estados da Amazônia Legal (AC, AM, AP,
MA, MT, PA, RO, RR e TO) em 2019 é de 10.129 km2,” press release, June 9, 2020.
Notes: Annual monitoring periods run from August to July (e.g., 2019 data include deforestation from August
2018 to July 2019).
Although changes that weakened Brazil’s environmental policies began under President Rousseff Although changes that weakened Brazil’s environmental policies began under President Rousseff
and continued under President Temer, some analysts argue that the Bolsonaro and continued under President Temer, some analysts argue that the Bolsonaro Administrationadministration’s ’s
approach to the Amazon has approach to the Amazon has led to further increases in deforestation.61emboldened individuals engaged in illegal logging, mining, and land grabbing.65 Bolsonaro has fiercely Bolsonaro has fiercely
defended Brazil’s sovereignty over the Legal Amazon and its right to develop the region. Since defended Brazil’s sovereignty over the Legal Amazon and its right to develop the region. Since
taking office, his administration has lifted the ban on new sugarcane plantations in the Legal taking office, his administration has lifted the ban on new sugarcane plantations in the Legal
Amazon and Amazon and cal edcalled for an end to the soy moratorium. It also has proposed measures for an end to the soy moratorium. It also has proposed measures —to date, not enacted by the Brazilian congress—to provide to provide
property titles to individualsproperty titles to individuals il egal y illegally occupying public lands and to occupying public lands and to al owallow commercial commercial
agriculture, mining, and hydroelectric projects in agriculture, mining, and hydroelectric projects in indigenousIndigenous territories. The Bolsonaro administration argues that such economic activities would benefit those living in the region and reduce incentives for illegal deforestation. Figure 2. Deforestation in Brazil’s Legal Amazon: 2004-2021 Source: CRS presentation of data from the Brazilian government’s Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, “Taxa PRODES Amazônia – 2004 a 2021 (km²),” November 19, 2021, at http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes. Note: Annual monitoring periods run from August to July (e.g., 2021 data include deforestation from August 2020 to July 2021). At the same time, Bolsonaro has questioned the Brazilian government’s deforestation data and scaled back environmental enforcement. Between 2018 and 2021, Amazon deforestation increased by nearly 76% (see Figure 2), while territories. The Bolsonaro

59 Gustavo Faleiros, “China’s Brazilian Beef Demand Linked to Amazon Deforestation Risk,” Diálogo Chino, October
23, 2019; and Richard Fuchs et al., “U.S.-China T rade War Imperils Amazon Rainforest,” Nature, vol. 567 (March 28,
2019).
60 Marcos Caramuru de Paiva, “Brazil and China: A Brief Analysis of the State of Bilateral Relations,” in Brazil-China:
The State of the Relationship, Belt and Road, and Lessons for the Future (Rio de Janeiro: Centro Brasileiro de Relações
Internacionais, 2019), p. 122. Also see Fred Gale, Constanza Valdes, and Mark Ash, Interdependence of China, United
States, and Brazil in Soybean Trade, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, June 2019.
61 Kathryn Hochstetler, “This Isn’t the First T ime Fires Have Ravaged the Amazon,” Foreign Policy, August 29, 2019;
and Rubens Ricupero et al., Com unicado dos Ex-Ministros de Estado do Meio Am biente, May 8, 2019.
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Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations

Administration argues that such economic activities wil benefit those living in the region and
reduce incentives for il egal deforestation.
At the same time, Bolsonaro has questioned the Brazilian government’s deforestation data and
scaled back environmental enforcement. He has removed several high-level officials from
Brazil’s environmental monitoring and enforcement agencies, replacing them with appointees
who al egedly have hampered enforcement efforts.62 In 2019, Brazil’s primary environmental Brazil’s primary environmental
enforcement agency reportedly issued enforcement agency reportedly issued 34% fewer environmental fines, reported 51% fewer
environmental crimes, and seized 61% less il egal y logged timber than it had in 2018.63
Those actions reportedly have emboldened some loggers, miners, and ranchers, contributing to
the surge in fires in 2019 and a 34% increase in deforestation in the annual monitoring period that
included the first seven months of Bolsonaro’s term.64 Bolsonaro initial y dismissed
environmental concerns about the Amazon, asserting that deforestation and burning are cultural
practices that wil never end.65 In January 2020, however, he announced the creation of a new
security force to protect the environment and a new Amazon Council, headed by Vice President
Hamilton Mourão, to coordinate conservation and sustainable development efforts. About 4,000
troops, police officers, and environmental agents have been deployed in the Amazon region as
part of an inter-agency enforcement operation since May 2020.66 The Bolsonaro Administration is
also reportedly drafting a new plan for combatting il egal deforestation.
Paris Agreement
The rising levels of Amazon deforestation cal into question whether Brazil wil meet its Paris
Agreement commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 37% below 2005 levels (to 1.3
gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO₂e) by 2025.67 According to a 2018 assessment by
the U.N. Environment Program, Brazil’s greenhouse40% fewer fines for crimes against flora, imposed 70% fewer embargos on rural properties for illegal deforestation, and conducted 81% fewer seizures in 2021 than it had Imports from South America,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, January 2022; and Joshua Howat Berger and Valeria Pacheco, “New Gold Rush Fuels Amazon Destruction,” Agence France Presse, November 9, 2021. 65 Philip M. Fearnside, “Brazil’s Amazon Gold Mining to be ‘Stimulated’ by Bolsonaro’s Decree,” Mongabay, February 22, 2022; and Gil Alessi, “The Amazon Rainforest Under Bolsonaro: A Story of Fire and Violence in Brazil,” El País, September 16, 2021. Congressional Research Service 12 link to page 16 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations in 2018.66 Although the Bolsonaro administration deployed the armed forces to the Amazon in a series of operations, critics contend the military presence was ineffective and even hindered some enforcement efforts due to the armed forces’ lack of experience in detecting and responding to environmental crimes.67 Paris Agreement Commitments The rising levels of Amazon deforestation may call into question whether Brazil will meet its commitments under the Paris Agreement on climate change. In 2016, Brazil committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 37% below 2005 levels by 2025 and by 43% below 2005 levels by 2030.68 As of 2016, Brazil was on track to meet those commitments. Greenhouse gas emissions declined by 12% per year gas emissions declined by 12% per year
from 2006 to 2016, as significant from 2006 to 2016, as significant declinesreductions in deforestation offset slight increases in emissions in deforestation offset slight increases in emissions
from other sources.68 Those reductions had put Brazil on track to meet its Paris Agreement
commitment, but emissions have begun to rise again due to increased deforestation. In 2018,

62 Jack Spring and Stephen Eisenhammer, “Exclusive: As Fires Race through Amazon, Brazil’s Bolsonaro Weakens
Environment Agency,” Reuters, August 28, 2019.
63 Danielle Brant and Phillippe Watanabe, “Sob Bolsonaro, Multas Ambientais Caem 34% para Menor Nível em 24
Anos,” Folha de São Paulo, March 9, 2020; and Ernesto Londoño, Manuela Andreoni, and Letícia Casado, “Amazon
Deforestation Soars as Pandemic Hobbles Enforcement,” International New York Times, June 12, 2020.
64 Fabiano Maisonnave, “Declarações Antiambientalistas de Políticos Aceleram Desmatamento, Diz Estudo,” Folha de
São Paulo, December 16, 2019; Stephen Eisenhammer, “ ‘Day of Fire’: Blazes Ignite Suspicion in Amazon T own,”
Reuters, September 11, 2019; Marina Lopes, “ Illegal Miners, Feeling Betrayed, Call on Bolsonaro to End
Environmental Crackdown in Amazon,” Washington Post, September 10, 2019; and INPE, “A T axa Consolidada de
Desmatamento por Corte Raso para os Nove Estados da Amazônia Legal (AC, AM , AP, MA, MT , PA, RO, RR e T O)
em 2019 é de 10.129 km2,” press release, June 9, 2020.
65 “Bolsonaro Diz que Desmatamento é Cultural no Brasil e Não Acabará,” Folha de São Paulo, November 20, 2019.
66 Claudia Safatle, Fernando Exman, and Malu Delgado, “Society Reacts to Crisis and Mourão Rules Out Coup,” Valor
International, May 31, 2020.
67 Federative Republic of Brazil, Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, September 21, 2016. “CO₂e” is a
metric used to express the impact of emissions from differing greenhouse gasses in a common unit by converting each
gas to the equivalent amount of CO₂ that would have the same effect on increasing global average temperature.
68 UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2018, November 2018, p. 9.
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Brazil’s greenhouse gas emissions increased by an estimated 0.3% (to 1.9 GtCO₂e), even as
emissions from the energy sector declined by nearly 5%.69
President Bolsonaro had pledged to withdraw from the Paris Agreement during his 2018 election
campaign, but he reversed course following his inauguration, stating that Brazil would remain in
the agreement “for now.”70 At the 25th Conference of Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention
on Climate Change (COP 25), Brazil pushed developed countries to meet their 2009 goal to
mobilize $100 bil ion from public and private sources, annual y, by 2020, to help developing
countries mitigate and adapt to climate change. Brazil’s environmental minister has asserted that
Brazil should receive at least 10% of those funds.71 Brazil also insisted that carbon credits
developed under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol should carry over into the Paris Agreement’s new
international carbon markets and that countries that host emissions-cutting projects should not
have to report the transfers of those credits to other countries. Many other negotiators expressed
concern that Brazil’s proposals could al ow poorly validated credits from the Kyoto mechanisms
to undermine the new Paris Agreement markets, as wel as risk double-counting the credits both
international y and toward the host countries’ domestic mitigation goals. Those disagreements
reportedly impeded efforts to finalize rules for new carbon markets under the Paris Agreement.72
Even as the Brazilian government has cal ed for greater international financial support, it has
deprioritized domestic efforts to combat climate change. In 2019, the Bolsonaro Administration
closed the climate change departments within the environment and foreign ministries and reduced
spending on climate change initiatives by about 10% compared to 2018. Brazil’s 2020 federal
budget authorizes 37% less funding for climate change initiatives than was expended in 2019.73
Moreover, the Bolsonaro Administration lost one of Brazil’s primary sources of international
assistance when it unilateral y restructured the governance of the Amazon Fund—a mechanism
launched in 2008 to attract funding for conservation and sustainable development efforts. In
response, the governments of Norway and Germany, which have donated nearly $1.3 bil ion to
the fund since 2009, suspended their contributions in August 2019.74 Vice President Hamilton
Mourão and state governments in the Legal Amazon are negotiating with Norway and Germany
to restore the funding.
U.S.-Brazilian Relations
The United States and Brazil historical y have enjoyed robust political and economic relations,
but from other sources.69 Although President Bolsonaro pledged to withdraw from the Paris Agreement during his 2018 election campaign, he reversed course following his inauguration, reportedly stating that Brazil would remain in the agreement “for now.”70 In 2020, Brazil submitted an updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) that reaffirmed its previous Paris Agreement commitments but recalculated the 2005 baseline, allowing higher absolute emissions in each of the target years (see Table 1). Many observers criticized Brazil’s updated NDC as contrary to the spirit of the Paris Agreement, which calls for countries to adopt increasingly more ambitious goals.71 Table 1. Evolution of Brazil’s Paris Agreement Commitments NDC 2025 Target 2030 Target Net Zero Emissions Date Target Date Compared to GtCO2e Compared to GtCO2e 2005 2005 2016 -37% 1.30 -43% 1.20 none 2020 -37% 1.79 -43% 1.62 2060 2022 -37% 1.61 -50% 1.28 2050 Source: CRS presentation of data from “Natalie Unterstel and Nathália Martins, NDC: Analysis of the 2022 Update Submitted by the Government of Brazil, Instituto Talanoa, 2022, p. 5. Notes: NDC = Nationally Determined Contribution; GtCO2e = gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent. Brazil’s calculation of its 2005 baseline emissions changed from 2.10 GtCO2e in 2016 to 2.84 GtCO2e in 2020 to 2.56 GtCO2e in 2022. 66 Observatório Do Clima, The Bill Has Come Due: The Third Year of Environmental Havoc Under Jair Bolsonaro, February 2022, pp. 12-13. 67 Terrence McCoy and Heloísa Traiano, “Bolsonaro Sent Soldiers to the Amazon to Curb Deforestation. Here’s How the Effort Failed,” Washington Post, January 3, 2021; and Jake Spring, “Special Report-Brazil’s Military Fails in Key Mission: Halting Amazon Deforestation,” Reuters, March 24, 2021. 68 Federative Republic of Brazil, Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, September 21, 2016. 69 UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2018, November 27, 2018, p. 9. 70 “Brazil to Remain in Paris Agreement ‘for Now,’ Bolsonaro Says,” Valor International, January 22, 2019. 71 Observatório Do Clima, NDC and the Carbon Trick Maneuver: How Brazil Reduced the Ambition of Its Goals under the Paris Agreement, December 10, 2020; and WWF-Brazil, “New Brazilian NDC Reduces the Country’s Climate Ambition, Against the Spirit of the Paris Agreement,” December 11, 2021. Congressional Research Service 13 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations In the face of growing international scrutiny over its environmental policies, the Bolsonaro administration pledged to strengthen its Paris Agreement commitments at the November 2021 U.N. climate change conference. In March 2022, Brazil submitted an updated NDC that reaffirms Brazil’s 2025 target, commits to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 50% below 2005 levels by 2030, and sets a goal of net zero emissions by 2050.72 Due to another recalculation of the 2005 baseline, however, Brazil’s absolute emissions targets for 2025 and 2030 remain 0.31 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO₂e) and 0.08 GtCO₂e higher, respectively, than the levels assumed in the country’s 2016 NDC.73 A 2021 U.N. Environment Program report assessed that Brazil was unlikely to achieve its original 2016 NDC targets under current policies.74 In 2020, the most recent year for which comprehensive data are available, Brazil’s annual greenhouse gas emissions increased by an estimated 9.5% (to 2.16 GtCO₂e). The increase was driven by a 23.7% increase in emissions from the forestry and other land use sector, which accounted for 46% of Brazil’s total emissions.75 Conversely, emissions from the energy sector declined by 4.5% in 2020, as renewable energy sources accounted for 40% of Brazil’s primary energy production and 83% of the country’s installed electricity generation capacity.76 Brazil has adopted some new emission mitigation measures over the past two years. In 2021, it enacted a national policy on payments for environmental services to regulate voluntary agreements that compensate individuals and communities for protecting forests and other natural resources. Brazil also launched an “Adopt a Park” program to attract private funding for conservation efforts. A bill to establish a voluntary carbon market in line with the international carbon markets established by the Paris Agreement is under consideration in the Brazilian congress. Although Brazil has reiterated its call for higher income countries to fund these types of conservation and sustainable development projects, the Bolsonaro administration has yet to reach agreements with the governments of Norway and Germany to release more than $580 million donated through Brazil’s Amazon Fund for such efforts.77 The funding has been frozen since 2019, when the Bolsonaro administration unilaterally restructured the governance of the fund and Amazon deforestation began to accelerate. U.S.-Brazilian Relations The United States and Brazil historically have enjoyed robust political and economic relations but the countries’ divergent perceptions of their national interests have inhibited the development the countries’ divergent perceptions of their national interests have inhibited the development
of a close partnership. of a close partnership. Those perceptions have changed somewhat over the past year and a half.
Whereas the past several Brazilian administrationsThat began to change, to a certain extent, after President Bolsonaro took office. Whereas previous Brazilian governments generally sought to maintain autonomy in foreign sought to maintain autonomy in foreign
affairs, Bolsonaro affairs, Bolsonaro has cal ed for close called for alignment with the United States. He coordinated closely with the 72 Federative Republic of Brazil, Nationally Determined Contribution, March 21, 2022. 73 “CO₂e” is a metric used to express the impact of emissions from differing greenhouse gasses in a common unit by converting each gas to the equivalent amount of CO₂ that would have the same effect on increasing global average temperature. Natalie Unterstell and Nathália Martins, NDC: Analysis of the 2022 Update Submitted by the Government of Brazil, Instituto Talanoa, 2022. 74 UNEP, The Heat Is On, A World of Climate Promises Not Yet Delivered: Emissions Gap Report 2021, October 26, 2021, pp. 13-14. 75 Observatório do Clima, “Análise das Emissões Brasileiras de Gases de Efeito Estufa do Brasil e Suas Implicações para as Metas de Clima do Brasil 1970-2020,” 2021, pp. 3-4. 76 Ibid; Ministério de Minas e Energia, Brazilian Energy Balance: Year 2020, 2021, pp. 20, 23. 77 “COP26: Brazil’s Climate Vows ‘Not Enough’ to ‘Unblock Resources’ for Amazon Fund,” BBC Monitoring, November 17, 2021; and Amazon Fund, “Portfolio Report,” February 28, 2022. Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 20 link to page 23 link to page 18 link to page 25 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations Trump Administration on regional challenges, such as the crisis in Venezuela, and frequently supported the Trump Administration within multilateral organizations. The Trump Administration welcomed Bolsonaro’s rapprochement and sought to strengthen bilateral ties. In 2019, for example, the Trump Administration designated Brazil as a major non-NATO ally (see “Defense Cooperation”). The Trump Administration also pursued trade negotiations with Brazil, concluding a Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency in 2020, which aims to foster cooperation on trade facilitation and customs administration, good regulatory practices, and anti-corruption measures (see “Commercial Relations”). Relations appear to have cooled somewhat under President Biden, suggesting those advances in bilateral ties reflected Bolsonaro’s personal and ideological rapport with President Trump rather than a growing alignment between Brazil and the United States. Bolsonaro was among the last world leaders to recognize President Biden’s election, and, as of April 2022, the two leaders had yet to speak directly.78 Although some Members of Congress have called on the Biden Administration to condition U.S. relations with Brazil on Bolsonaro’s environmental policies and respect for democracy and human rights, the Biden Administration generally has avoided direct confrontations with the Brazilian president.79 Instead, the Administration has sought to foster positive engagement on such issues. The Administration invited Bolsonaro to participate in the April 2021 Leaders Summit on Climate (see “Environmental Cooperation”) and the December 2021 Summit for Democracy, and relaunched the U.S.-Brazil Human Rights Working Group. The Administration also has continued to support Brazil’s COVID-19 response, with total assistance to Brazil since the start of the pandemic amounting to more than $58 million and 5 million vaccine doses.80 Moreover, U.S.-Brazil commercial ties have continued to expand, with bilateral merchandise trade reaching a record high in 2021 (see “Trade and Investment Flows”). Environmental Cooperation President Biden has placed conservation of the Amazon forest and other efforts to mitigate global climate change at the center of his policy toward Brazil. During his presidential campaign, Biden proposed a $20 billion international fund to support conservation in the Amazon, and asserted that Brazil would face “significant economic consequences” if it did not curb deforestation.81 President Bolsonaro rejected that idea, reportedly stating that he “does not accept bribes ... or coward threats toward [Brazil’s] territorial and economic integrity.”82 Since President Biden’s inauguration, however, Bolsonaro has expressed a willingness to work with the United States to combat deforestation and climate change.83 78 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki,” April 25, 2022. 79 Letter from Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator et al. to President Joseph Biden, April 16, 2021; Letter from Henry C. “Hank” Johnson Jr., Member of Congress et al. to President Joseph Biden, October 14, 2021; Brian Winter, “The Silent Partner,” Revista Piauí, September 2021. 80 U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Brazil, “U.S.-Brazil High Level Dialogue 2022: Economic Growth & Prosperity,” April 25, 2022. 81 “CNN and Univision Host Democratic Presidential Candidates Debate in Washington, D.C.,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts, March 15, 2020; and “Case Western Reserve University and the Cleveland Clinic Hold the First 2020 Presidential Debate in Cleveland,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts, September 29, 2020. 82 Mauricio Savarese, “Brazil President Calls Biden’s Amazon Comments ‘Disastrous,” Associated Press, September 30, 2020. 83 Letter from Jair Bolsonaro, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, to Joseph Biden, President of the United States of America, April 14, 2021. Congressional Research Service 15 link to page 16 link to page 15 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations Biden Administration officials, led by Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry, have engaged extensively with Brazil to encourage the country to strengthen its environmental policies and to explore potential areas for cooperation. During the April 2021 Leaders Summit on Climate, Bolsonaro pledged to double funding for environmental enforcement efforts, reiterated Brazil’s commitment to end illegal deforestation by 2030, and stated that Brazil would reduce its net greenhouse gas emissions to zero by 2050—10 years earlier than the country’s previous goal.84 The Brazilian government announced more ambitious targets at the November 2021 U.N. climate change conference, pledging to eliminate illegal deforestation by 2028 and reduce greenhouse-gas emissions by 50% compared with 2005 levels by 2030.85 Brazil has incorporated those emission cuts into its updated NDC (see “Paris Agreement Commitments”). In November 2021, the Biden Administration released a Plan to Conserve Global Forests: Critical Carbon Sinks, which calls for the United States to dedicate $9 billion by 2030 to efforts to halt forest loss, restore critical carbon sinks, and improve land management worldwide.86 The plan was issued pursuant to Executive Order 14008, “Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad,” which directed the Secretaries of State and the Treasury—in coordination with other agencies—to develop a plan for promoting the protection of the Amazon and other critical ecosystems.87 Nevertheless, the Administration’s foreign assistance funding requests for Brazil have remained relatively limited. For FY2023, the Administration is requesting $35 million to support conservation and natural resource management in the Brazilian Amazon, which is $10 million more than Congress appropriated for such programs for FY2022 (P.L. 117-103) and $18 million more than Congress appropriated for FY2021 (P.L. 116-260).88 Administration officials have indicated that more extensive U.S. financial support would be contingent on Brazil achieving concrete results in reducing illegal deforestation.89 As noted previously, deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon reached a 15-year high between August 2020 and July 2021 (see Figure 2). The Biden Administration’s FY2023 funding request would build on decades of U.S. support for conservation efforts in Brazil. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead U.S. agency responsible for implementing environmental assistance activities in Brazil. USAID coordinates activities under the U.S.-Brazil Partnership for the Conservation of Amazon Biodiversity (PCAB), launched in 2014 to bring together the U.S. and Brazilian governments, private sector companies, and NGOs to strengthen protected area management and promote sustainable development in the Amazon. In addition to providing assistance for federally and state-managed protected areas, USAID works with Indigenous and Quilombola communities to strengthen their capacities to manage natural resources and improve their livelihoods. USAID also supports the private sector-led Partnership Platform for the Amazon, which facilitates private investment in innovative conservation and sustainable development activities.90 In FY2020, as 84 “Confira Discurso do Presidente Bolsonaro na Cúpula do Clima,” Agência Brasil, April 22, 2021. 85 Embassy of Brazil, “Brazil Announces New, Ambitious Climate Goals at COP26,” November 1, 2021. 86 White House, Plan to Conserve Global Forests: Critical Carbon Sinks, November 2021, p. 4. 87 Executive Order 14008, “Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad,” 86 Federal Register 7619-7633, February 1, 2021. 88 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2023, March 2022, pp. 90, 158. 89 Ned Price, Department Spokesperson, “Department Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of State, April 20, 2021; and Jake Spring, “Brazil Demand for U.S. to Pay Upfront Stalls Deal to Save Amazon Forest,” Reuters, April 15, 2021. 90 USAID, “Brazil: Bilateral Biodiversity Conservation,” January 19, 2022, at https://www.usaid.gov/brazil/our-work/environmental-partnerships. Congressional Research Service 16 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations deforestation increased overall in Brazil, it decreased by 29% in protected areas and by 49% in protected areas receiving USAID support.91 Several other U.S. agencies are engaged in Brazil, often in collaboration with USAID. The U.S. Forest Service, for example, provides technical assistance to the Brazilian government, NGOs, and cooperatives intended to improve protected area management, reduce the threat of fire, conserve migratory bird habitat, and facilitate the establishment of sustainable value chains for forest products. NASA has provided data and technical support to Brazil to help the country better monitor Amazon deforestation. Other agencies, such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, have provided law enforcement support to Brazil to help the country combat wildlife trafficking, illegal logging, and other conservation crimes. Some Members of Congress have called on the Brazilian and U.S. governments to do more to conserve the Amazon. The United States Climate Leadership in International Mitigation, Adaptation, and Technology Enhancement (CLIMATE) Act of 2021 (S. 1201), introduced in April 2021, includes a provision that would direct the Secretary of State to engage with Brazil on environmental enforcement, sustainable development, and emissions reduction efforts. It also would express the sense of Congress that the President should consider Brazil’s land use policies in the Amazon when negotiating bilateral agreements with Brazil or engaging with Brazil in international forums.92 The Fostering Overseas Rule of law and Environmentally Sound Trade (FOREST) Act of 2021 (H.R. 5508/S. 2950), introduced in October 2021, could also affect U.S. relations with Brazil. Among other provisions, the measure would prohibit the importation of certain commodities produced on illegally deforested land—including cattle and soybeans—and establish a fund to assist foreign governments and civil societies in combatting deforestation. Defense Cooperation Although the United States and Brazil are both parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, a collective security pact signed in 1947, the countries’ independent foreign and defense policies historically have limited bilateral security cooperation.93 During the 1970s, for example, Brazil withdrew from a series of military agreements with the United States in response to U.S. criticism on human rights issues and U.S. opposition to a Brazilian nuclear agreement with West Germany. The countries did not conclude a new umbrella Defense Cooperation Agreement until 2010. That same year, Brazil and the United States signed a General Security of Military Information Agreement intended to facilitate the sharing of classified information. The Brazilian congress did not approve either of those agreements until 2015, however, due to a cooling of relations after press reports revealed that the U.S. National Security Agency had engaged in extensive surveillance in Brazil.94 In 2019, President Bolsonaro took office pledging to pursue closer ties with the United States and the Trump Administration designated Brazil as a major non-NATO ally for the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. §2321k), and the Arms Export Control 91 USAID, Report to Congress on Programs in Forestry and the Conservation of Biodiversity during Fiscal Year 2020: Results and Funding, February 2, 2022, p. 3. 92 S. 1201, §507. 93 Cooperation was closer during the first half of the 20th century, when Brazil was the only Latin American country to deploy forces to Europe during World War II. The 25,000-strong Brazilian Expeditionary Force fought as a division within the United States Fifth Army in Italy. 94 “Brazil President Postpones US Visit over Spying,” Voice of America, September 17, 2013. Congressional Research Service 17 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations Act (22 U.S.C. §§2751 et seq.).95 The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, had previously designated Brazil as major non-NATO ally for the purposes of 10 U.S.C. 2350a. Among other benefits, those designations grant Brazil privileged access to U.S. military training and equipment, and eligibility for cooperative research and development projects.96 The Biden Administration has sought to continue strengthening U.S.-Brazilian defense ties. To enhance interoperability among U.S., Brazilian, and partner forces, the Administration has invited Brazil to host the 2022 UNITAS multinational maritime exercise conducted annually in Latin America and the Caribbean and has expressed support for Brazil’s participation as a NATO global partner.97 U.S. and Brazilian officials are also exploring potential collaboration to train troops contributed by other countries to U.N. peacekeeping operations. During the Fourth Annual U.S.-Brazil Strategic Defense Talks, held in December 2021, U.S. and Brazilian officials identified steps to deepen cooperation in the areas of space, cyber, and research and development.98 In FY2021, the U.S. government provided Brazil $650,000 of International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance to strengthen military-to-military relationships, increase the professionalization of Brazilian forces, and enhance the Brazilian military’s capabilities. The Biden Administration is requesting $800,000 of IMET for Brazil in FY2023 (FY2022 allocations are not yet available).99 Geopolitical Issues Although recent bilateral defense agreements and the U.S. designation of Brazil as a major non-NATO ally have laid a foundation for closer U.S.-Brazilian military ties, the long-term trajectory of the defense relationship may depend on broader geopolitical considerations. In recent years, the U.S. Southern Command has expressed increasing concern about the presence of China and Russia in the Western Hemisphere and has called for enhanced security cooperation with Brazil and other Latin American countries to counter such “malign actors.”100 Many within Brazil’s military and foreign policy establishments are wary of becoming embroiled in global power rivalries, however, and view diversified diplomatic, economic, and military ties as the best way to advance the country’s interests and national development.101 These differing perceptions of their national interests have led the United States and Brazil to diverge on certain international security issues. For example, the Trump and Biden Administrations urged Brazil to exclude equipment from Chinese companies like Huawei from 95 White House, “Designation of the Federative Republic of Brazil as a Major Non-NATO Ally,” Presidential Determination No. 2019-21 of July 31, 2019, 84 Federal Register 43035, August 19, 2019. 96 For more information, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, “Major Non-NATO Ally Status,” fact sheet, January 20, 2021, at https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/. 97 NATO global partners are not formal members of the alliance, but work with NATO on common security challenges. 98 U.S. Department of Defense, “Readout of the 4th Annual U.S.-Brazil Strategic Defense Talks,” press release, December 16, 2021. 99 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2023, March 28, 2022, p. 176. 100 General Laura J. Richardson, Commander, United States Southern Command, “Statement Before the 117th Congress, House Armed Services Committee,” March 8, 2022. 101 “Bolsonaro Wants Closer Security Ties with Washington. Does Brazil’s Military?” World Politics Review, April 5, 2019; Benoni Belli and Filipe Nasser, “Brazil: Coupling Multipolarity with Multilateralism,” in The Road Ahead: The 21st Century World Order in the Eyes of Policy Planners (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2018); and Adriana Erthal Abdenur, “Brazil as a Rising Power: Coexistence through Universalism,” in The BRICS and Coexistence: An Alternative Vision of World Order (Routledge, 2015), pp. 49-74. Congressional Research Service 18 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations Brazil’s fifth-generation (5G) telecommunications infrastructure. U.S. officials warned their Brazilian counterparts that such equipment could compromise Brazil’s national security and intellectual property and potentially jeopardize military and intelligence cooperation with the United States.102 U.S. officials also offered financing to assist Brazilian telecommunications companies in purchasing 5G equipment from other providers.103 Many Brazilian officials and businesses, however, were concerned that excluding Huawei could increase costs, delay the rollout of 5G technology, and damage relations with China—Brazil’s top trade partner.104 The Bolsonaro administration ultimately decided to allow Huawei equipment in the country’s commercial 5G infrastructure but to exclude it from a separate network for government communications.105 The United States and Brazil also have differed in their responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Biden Administration criticized President Bolsonaro’s February 2022 trip to Moscow, where he met with President Vladimir Putin and expressed solidarity with Russia as it amassed troops along the Ukrainian border.106 Among other objectives, Bolsonaro reportedly hoped to obtain Russian technical support for Brazil’s efforts to build a nuclear-powered submarine.107 Since the invasion, Brazil, which is serving on the U.N. Security Council for the 2022-2023 term, has voted in favor of U.N. resolutions demanding Russia’s unconditional withdrawal from Ukraine while criticizing other countries’ “indiscriminate application of sanctions and the deployment of arms” to Ukraine.108 Brazil also opposed or abstained from voting on several U.S.-backed measures to expel Russia from international organizations, asserting that such measures impede the dialogue needed to resolve the situation.109 Beyond their impact on the conflict itself, the Bolsonaro administration has expressed concerns that sanctions could negatively affect Brazil’s agribusiness sector, which is dependent on Russia for about 20% of its fertilizer supply.110 102 U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Brazil, “Under Secretary Keith Krach’s Remarks on Economic Security,” November 11, 2020; and “Brazil Report: US Insists on Keeping China’s Huawei Out of Brazilian 5G Market,” BBC Monitoring, July 14, 2021. 103 “U.S. Offers Brazil Funding to Buy 5G Gear from Huawei Rivals-Diplomat,” Reuters, June 23, 2020; and Export-Import Bank of the United States, “EXIM Signs $1 Billion Memorandum of Understanding with Brazil Ministry of Economy in Ceremony with President Bolsonaro of Brazil and U.S. National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien,” press release, October 20, 2020. 104 “Maia in Favor of Chinese Suitors for 5G Technology,” Valor International, June 16, 2020; and “Teles Defendem Huawei no 5G para Evitar Repasses de Custos ao Consumidor,” Folha de São Paulo, December 8, 2020. 105 Anne Warth, “Huawei Está Descartada de Rede do Governo, Diz Ministro,” Estado de São Paulo, March 10, 2021. 106 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technology Anne Neuberger, and Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics and Deputy NEC Director Daleep Singh,” February 18, 2022. 107 Anthony Boadle and Vladimir Soldatkin, “Boslonaro Says Brazil Keen on Russian Nuclear Reactors, No Mention of Ukraine,” Reuters, February 16, 2022; and “US Refusal Made Bolsonaro Ask Putin for Help with Nuclear Submarine,” Folha de São Paulo, March 17, 2022. 108 Ministério das Relações Exteriores, “Explanation of Vote by the Permanent Representative Ambassador Ronaldo Costa Rilho in the General Assembly Debate on Ukraine,” Press Release N. 36, March 2, 2022. 109 Ministério das Relações Exteriores, “Resolução da Assembleia Geral da ONU sobre a Suspensão do ‘Status’ da Rússia como Membro do Conselho de Direitos Humanos,” Press Release N. 60, April 7, 2022; and Mariana Sanches, “Nos EUA, Guedes Diz que ‘Brasil é Contra Guerra e Contra Sanções’ e que País ‘Pertence aos BRICS, Não à OCDE’,” BBC News Brasil, April 19, 2022. 110 Gabriel Stargardter, “Bolsonaro Won’t Condemn Putin, Says Brazil Will Remain Neutral Over Invasion,” Reuters, February 27, 2022; and “Fertiliser Shortage Jeopardizes Agricultural Output in 2023,” Economist Intelligence Unit, April 4, 2022. Congressional Research Service 19 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations Human Rights Concerns Some Members of Congress have sought to ensure that U.S. military engagement with Brazil does not contribute to human rights abuses. They have expressed particular concern that a 2019 technology safeguards agreement, which enables the launch of spacecraft and satellites that use U.S. technology from Brazil’s Alcântara Space Center, could result in the expansion of the center and the forced relocation of hundreds of Quilombola families.111 The House-passed version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2022 (NDAA, H.R. 4350) would have prohibited the use of any Department of Defense-managed security assistance to support Brazilian security forces in the involuntary relocation of Indigenous or Quilombola communities in Brazil. That provision was not included in the final FY2022 NDAA legislation (P.L. 117-81), but the accompanying explanatory statement called on the Secretary of Defense to ensure any security assistance provided to Brazil is in compliance with U.S. laws and DOD policies regarding adherence to human rights and international law.112 The draft explanatory statement accompanying the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (S. 3075) included a similar provision for State Department-managed security assistance, although it was not included in the final foreign operations appropriations legislation (P.L. 117-103, Division K).113 Commercial Relations114 Trade policy often has been a contentious issue in U.S.-Brazilian relations. Since the early 1990s, Brazil’s trade policy has prioritized integration with its South American neighbors through the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO).115 Brazil is the industrial hub of Mercosur, which it established in 1991 with Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Although the bloc was intended to advance incrementally toward full economic integration, only a limited customs union has been achieved thus far. Mercosur also has evolved into a somewhat protectionist arrangement, shielding its members from external competition rather than serving as a platform for insertion into the global economy, as originally envisioned. Within the WTO, Brazil traditionally has joined with other developing nations to push the United States and other developed countries to reduce their agricultural tariffs and subsidies while resisting developed countries’ calls for increased access to developing countries’ industrial and services sectors. Those differences blocked conclusion of the most recent 111 See, for example, Representative Deb Haaland, “Haaland, Sanders, Castro, Johnson Call for Protection of Afro-Brazilian Communities,” press release, October 7, 2020. 112 For example, U.S. security assistance is subject to legal provisions (codified at 22 U.S.C. §2378d and 10 U.S.C. §362) that require the State Department and the Department of Defense to vet foreign security forces and prohibit funding for any military or other security unit if there is credible evidence that it has committed “a gross violation of human rights.” “Explanatory Material Statement Submitted by Mr. Smith of Washington, Chair of the House Committee on Armed Services, on House Amendment to S. 1605,” Congressional Record, vol. 167, no. 211—Book II (December 7, 2021), p. H7335. 113 The draft explanatory statement is available at https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SFOPSREPT_FINAL.PDF. 114 For more information, see CRS Report R46619, U.S.-Brazil Economic Relations, coordinated by M. Angeles Villarreal. 115 João Augusto de Castro Neves, Brazil’s Slow and Uncertain Shift from Protectionism to Free Trade, Inter-American Dialogue, working paper, January 2014. Congressional Research Service 20 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations round of multilateral trade negotiations (the WTO’s Doha Round), as well as U.S. efforts in the 1990s and 2000s to establish a hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas.116 Recent Trade Negotiations The Bolsonaro and Trump Administrations negotiated several agreements intended to strengthen the bilateral commercial relationship. During Bolsonaro’s March 2019 official visit to Washington, the United States endorsed Brazil’s accession to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in exchange for Brazil agreeing to gradually give up its “special and differential treatment” status, which grants special rights to developing nations at the WTO. The United States and Brazil also agreed to take steps toward lowering trade barriers for certain agricultural products. Brazil agreed to adopt a tariff rate quota—implemented in November 2019—to allow the importation of 750,000 tons of U.S. wheat annually without tariffs. Brazil also agreed to adopt “science-based conditions” that could enable U.S. pork producers to export to Brazil, though preliminary discussions have not resulted in U.S. access to the Brazilian market.117 In exchange, the United States agreed to send a U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) team to Brazil to audit the country’s raw beef inspection system.118 In February 2020, FSIS determined that “Brazil’s food safety inspection system governing raw intact beef is equivalent to that of the [United States],” and lifted a suspension on U.S. imports.119 A bill introduced in the Senate in August 2021 (S. 3230) would suspend all beef imports from Brazil while a working group evaluates the extent to which those imports pose a threat to U.S. food safety. In March 2020, Presidents Trump and Bolsonaro agreed to accelerate bilateral trade negotiations under a 2011 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation (ATEC). Although a majority of Members on the House Committee on Ways and Means expressed strong opposition to “pursuing any type of trade agreement with the Bolsonaro government” due to human rights, labor, and environmental concerns, the Trump and Bolsonaro Administrations ultimately concluded a Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency in October 2020.120 The protocol adds three annexes to the ATEC intended to foster cooperation on trade facilitation and customs administration, good regulatory practices, and anti-corruption measures.121 Brazil’s congress ratified the protocol in November 2021 and it entered into force in February 2022; the protocol did not require U.S. congressional approval. The Biden Administration has expressed interest in further strengthening economic ties with Brazil, but it appears unlikely to pursue negotiations toward a comprehensive free trade 116 For background on the stalled negotiations, see CRS In Focus IF10002, The World Trade Organization, by Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Rachel F. Fefer, and Ian F. Fergusson; and CRS Report RL33162, Trade Integration in the Americas, by M. Angeles Villarreal. 117 Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), 2022 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, March 31, 2022, p. 61. 118 White House, “Joint Statement from President Donald J. Trump and President Jair Bolsonaro,” March 19, 2019. 119 The United States had suspended imports of raw beef from Brazil in June 2017, after Brazilian investigators discovered that some of the country’s top meat processing companies, including JBS and BRF, had bribed food inspectors to approve the sale of tainted products. USDA, Food Safety and Inspection Service, “Eligibility of Brazil to Export Raw Intact Beef to the United States,” FSIS Notice 09-20, February 24, 2020. 120 Letter from Honorable Richard E. Neal, Chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means et al. to Honorable Robert Lighthizer, U.S. Trade Representative, June 3, 2020. 121 The text of the protocol is available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/ATECProtocolUSBREnglish.pdf. Congressional Research Service 21 link to page 26 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations agreement. In addition to overcoming U.S. congressional opposition, a potential free trade agreement would need to be negotiated with the broader Mercosur bloc. In February 2022, the U.S.-Brazil CEO Forum issued a series of recommendations to strengthen bilateral commercial ties, which ranged from collaborating on supply chain resiliency to promoting the regulation of carbon markets.122 Trade and Investment Flows U.S.-Brazilian trade has suffered from economic volatility over the past decade, including Brazil’s 2014-2017 recession and the 2020 pandemic-driven downturn (see Figure 3). Total bilateral merchandise trade bounced back in 2021, however, growing nearly 35% compared with 2020 to reach an all-time high of $78.2 billion. U.S. goods exports to Brazil totaled $46.9 billion, and U.S. goods imports from Brazil totaled $31.3 billion, giving the United States $15.6 billion trade surplus. The top U.S. exports to Brazil were mineral fuels (primarily refined petroleum), civilian aircraft and parts, machinery, pharmaceutical products, and plastics. The top U.S. imports from Brazil included mineral fuels (primarily crude oil), iron and steel, machinery, wood, and aircraft. In 2021, Brazil was the ninth-largest export market for U.S. goods, accounting for 2.7% of total U.S. goods exports.123 The United States was Brazil’s second-largest export market, accounting for 11.1% of Brazil’s total goods exports, compared to 31.3% for China.124 Brazil benefits from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program, which provides nonreciprocal, duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from designated developing countries.125 Brazil was the third-largest beneficiary of the program in 2020, with duty-free imports to the United States valued at $2.2 billion—equivalent to 9.4% of all U.S. goods imports from Brazil.126 The GSP program expired on December 31, 2020. Several bills to reauthorize the program have been introduced in the 117th Congress. For example, the United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021 (S. 1260), which passed the Senate in June 2021, and the America COMPETES Act of 2022 (H.R. 4521), as passed by the House in February 2022, would reauthorize GSP until January 1, 2027 while tying eligibility to certain environmental and human rights standards, among other criteria.127 U.S.-Brazilian services trade is also significant, though it decreased significantly during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020 (the most recent year for which data are available), total bilateral services trade amounted to $19.7 billion—a 36% decline compared with 2019. U.S. services exports to Brazil totaled $14.9 billion, and U.S. services imports from Brazil totaled $4.7 billion, giving the United States a $10.2 billion surplus. Telecommunications, computer, and information services was the top category of U.S. services exports to Brazil; professional and management consulting services was the top category of U.S. services imports from Brazil. Travel, which had been the top U.S. services export to Brazil in 2019, declined by 74% in 122 For the full set of recommendations, see International Trade Administration, “U.S.-Brazil CEO Forum Recommendations Report,” February 7, 2022, at https://www.trade.gov/us-brazil-ceo-forum-2022-joint-recommendations. 123 U.S. Census Bureau data, as made available by Trade Data Monitor, April 2022. 124 Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade data, as made available by Trade Data Monitor, April 2022. 125 For more information on GSP, see CRS In Focus IF11232, Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), by Liana Wong. 126 U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau data, as made available by the U.S. International Trade Commission, “Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb,” accessed in April 2022. 127 S. 1260, Title IV, Subtitle A; and H.R. 4521, Title IV, Subtitle A. Congressional Research Service 22 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations 2020.128 Due to widespread transmission of COVID-19 and the emergence of new variants in Brazil, the United States denied entry to most Brazilians from May 2020 until November 2021.129 Figure 3. U.S. Trade with Brazil: 2012-2021 (billions of U.S. dollars) Source: CRS presentation of U.S. Department of Commerce data, as made available through Trade Data Monitor and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, accessed April 2022. Note: Services trade data are not yet available for 2021. According to the U.S. Department of State, the Brazilian government actively encourages foreign direct investment (FDI) in certain sectors, such as automobiles, renewable energy, and oil and gas, but imposes restrictions on FDI in others, such as telecommunications, aerospace, and rural property.130 As of 2020 (the most recent year for which data are available), the accumulated stock of U.S. FDI in Brazil was $70.7 billion, with significant investments in manufacturing, finance, and mining, among other sectors. The same year, the stock of Brazilian FDI in the United States totaled $6.9 billion.131 128 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. Trade in Services, by Country or Affiliation and by Type of Service,” July 2, 2021. 129 Executive Office of the President, Proclamation 10041 of May 24, 2020, “Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Certain Additional Persons Who Pose a Risk of Transmitting 2019 Novel Coronavirus,” 85 Federal Register 31933-31936, May 28, 2020; Executive Office of the President, Proclamation 10143 of January 25, 2021, “Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Certain Additional Persons Who Pose a Risk of Transmitting Coronavirus Disease 2019,” 86 Federal Register 7467-7470, January 28, 2021; and The President, Proclamation 10294 of October 25, 2021, “Advancing the Safe Resumption of Global Travel During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 86 Federal Register 59603-59608, October 28, 2021. 130 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Investment Climate Statements: Brazil, July 21, 2021. 131 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position Data,” accessed in April 2022. Congressional Research Service 23 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations Outlook Nearly eight years after the country fell into a deep recession, Brazil remains mired in difficult alignment with the United States. Within Latin America,
for example, the Bolsonaro Administration has adopted a more confrontational approach toward

69 Observatório do Clima, “Estimativas de Emissões de Gases de Efeito Estufa do Brasil 1970-2018,” November 5,
2019.
70 “Brazil to Remain in Paris Agreement ‘for Now,’ Bolsonaro Says,” Valor International, January 22, 2019.
71 Luciana Amaral and Gustavo Uribe, “Ricardo Salles: Brasil Cobrará no Mínimo US$10 bi ao Ano dos Países Ricos,”
UOL, November 29, 2019.
72 Simon Evans and Josh Gabbatiss, “COP25: Key Outcomes Agreed at the U.N. Climate T alks in Madrid,” Carbon
Brief, December 15, 2019; and Jean Chemnick, “ U.N. T alks Limp to a Close with No D eal on Carbon T rading,” E&E
News, December 16, 2019.
73 Senado Federal, “SIGA Brasil,” accessed in June 2020.
74 Amazon Fund, “Donations,” at http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/en/donations/.
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Cuba and has closely coordinated with the Trump Administration on measures to address the
crisis in Venezuela. The Trump Administration has welcomed Bolsonaro’s rapprochement,
designating Brazil as a major non-NATO al y and concluding several smal -scale bilateral
commercial agreements in 2019. The Trump Administration also has sought to support Brazil’s
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, providing the country with more than $12.5 mil ion of
health and humanitarian assistance and—more controversial y—2 mil ion doses of
hydroxychloroquine.75
Bolsonaro’s realignment of Brazilian foreign policy has been contentious domestical y. Some
analysts argue that it has not resulted in many concrete benefits for Brazil.76 They note, for
example, that the Trump Administration has maintained, and threatened to impose, trade barriers
on key Brazilian exports despite recent bilateral agreements (see “Recent Trade Negotiations”).
Likewise, U.S. officials reportedly have warned Brazil that closer bilateral defense ties could be
in jeopardy if Brazil al ows Chinese telecommunications company Huawei to participate in
Brazil’s 5G cel ular network (see the “Defense Cooperation” section). Some Brazilian analysts
also argue that abandoning the country’s commitment to autonomy in foreign affairs has
weakened Brazil’s international standing and caused tensions in its relations with other important
partners, such as fel ow members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)
group.77 There does not appear to be public support for the Trump Administration’s foreign policy
within Brazil; in 2019, 60% of Brazilians expressed no confidence in President Trump to “do the
right thing regarding world affairs.”78
In some cases, domestic opposition has prevented Bolsonaro from aligning Brazilian foreign
policy more closely with the United States. For example, during his 2018 presidential campaign,
Bolsonaro indicated he would follow President Trump’s lead in withdrawing from the Paris
Agreement on climate change and taking a more confrontational approach toward Chinese trade
and investment. He has backed away from those positions since taking office, reportedly due to
concerns about losing access to foreign markets, particularly within the powerful agribusiness
sector, which accounts for 21% of Brazil’s GDP and is a major component of Bolsonaro’s
political base.79
Although some Members of the 116th Congress have urged the Trump Administration to seize on
Bolsonaro’s goodwil to develop a strategic partnership with Brazil, others have expressed
reservations about the current Brazilian administration. They are concerned about Bolsonaro’s
commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, as wel as about changes to Brazil’s
environmental policies that appear to have contributed to fires and deforestation in the Brazilian
Amazon (see “U.S. Support for Amazon Conservation”).

75 U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Brazil, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Brazil to Combat COVID-19,” May 31, 2020;
and White House, “Joint Statement from the United States of America and the Federative Republic of Brazil Regarding
Health Cooperation,” May 31, 2020.
76 T errence McCoy, “In Brazil, T rump T ariffs Show Bolsonaro’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy Has Backfired,”
Washington Post, December 2, 2019; and Oliver Stuenkel, “ Bolsonaro Placed a Losing Bet on T rump,” Foreign Policy,
December 6, 2019.
77 Maria Herminia T avares, “Rumo a Lugar a Nenhum,” Folha de São Paulo, January 23, 2020; and “Alinhamento
Automático do Brasil com EUA Causa Atritos na Cúpula dos BRICS,” Folha de São Paulo, November 13, 2019.
78 Richard Wike, “T rump Ratings Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay Mostly Favorable,” Pew
Research Center, January 8, 2020.
79 Centro de Estudos Avançados em Economia Aplicada, PIB do Agronegócio Brasil, 2020; Oliver Stuenkel,
“Bolsonaro Fans the Flames,” Foreign Affairs, August 30, 2019; and “No 1º Ano de Bolsonaro, China Vai de Ameaça
Comunista a Aliada Estratégica,” Folha de São Paulo, January 1, 2020.
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Commercial Relations
Trade policy often has been a contentious issue in U.S.-Brazilian relations. Since the early 1990s,
Brazil’s trade policy has prioritized integration with its South American neighbors through the
Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and multilateral negotiations at the World Trade
Organization (WTO).80 Brazil is the industrial hub of Mercosur, which it established in 1991 with
Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Although the bloc was intended to advance incremental y
toward full economic integration, only a limited customs union has been achieved thus far.
Mercosur also has evolved into a somewhat protectionist arrangement, shielding its members
from external competition rather than serving as a platform for insertion into the global economy,
as original y envisioned. Within the WTO, Brazil traditional y has joined with other developing
nations to push the United States and other developed countries to reduce their agricultural tariffs
and subsidies while resisting developed countries’ cal s for increased access to developing
countries’ industrial and services sectors. Those differences blocked conclusion of the most recent
round of multilateral trade negotiations (the WTO’s Doha Round), as wel as U.S. efforts in the
1990s and 2000s to establish a hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas.81
Recent Trade Negotiations
The Bolsonaro and Trump Administrations have negotiated several agreements intended to
strengthen the bilateral commercial relationship. During Bolsonaro’s March 2019 official visit to
Washington, the United States and Brazil agreed to take steps toward lowering trade barriers for
certain agricultural products. Brazil agreed to adopt a tariff rate quota—implemented in
November 2019—to al ow the importation of 750,000 tons of U.S. wheat annual y without tariffs.
Brazil also agreed to adopt “science-based conditions” that could enable imports of U.S. pork. In
exchange, the United States agreed to send a U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) team to Brazil to audit the country’s raw beef inspection system.82
The United States had suspended imports of raw beef from Brazil in June 2017, after Brazilian
investigators discovered that some of the country’s top meat processing companies, including
JBS and BRF, had bribed food inspectors to approve the sale of tainted products. FSIS began
inspecting al meat products arriving from Brazil and refused entry to 11% of Brazilian fresh beef
products in the months leading up to the suspension.83 The Bolsonaro Administration had hoped
an FSIS audit would quickly reopen the U.S. market to Brazilian beef and expressed frustration
that U.S. import restrictions remained in place through the end of 2019. On February 21, 2020,
however, the Trump Administration lifted the suspension after determining that “Brazil’s food
safety inspection system governing raw intact beef is equivalent to that of the [United States].”84
Nevertheless, some consumer advocates, industry groups, and Members of Congress remain
concerned about Brazilian meat. A bil introduced in April 2019 (S. 1124, Tester) would suspend

80 João Augusto de Castro Neves, Brazil’s Slow and Uncertain Shift from Protectionism to Free Trade, Inter-American
Dialogue, working paper, January 2014.
81 For background on the stalled negotiations, see CRS In Focus IF10002, The World Trade Organization, by Cathleen
D. Cimino-Isaacs, Rachel F. Fefer, and Ian F. Fergusson; and CRS Report RL33162, Trade Integration in the
Am ericas, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
82 White House, “Joint Statement from President Donald J. T rump and President Jair Bolsonaro,” March 19, 2019.
83 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), “Perdue: USDA Halting Import of Fresh Brazilian Beef,” press release,
June 22, 2017; and “Scandal Could Spoil Brazil’s Meat Industry,” Latin News Daily, March 20, 2017.
84 David Pitt, “US Lifts Brazilian Beef Import Ban Amid Quality Concerns,” Associated Press, February 21, 2020; and
USDA, Food Safety and Inspection Service, “Eligibility of Brazil to Export Raw Intact Beef to the United States,”
FSIS Notice 09-20, February 24, 2020.
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al beef and poultry imports from Brazil while a working group evaluates the extent to which
those imports pose a threat to food safety.
The United States and Brazil announced several other agreements during Bolsonaro’s March
2019 official visit. A technology safeguards agreement, which the Brazilian congress ratified in
November 2019, wil enable the launch of U.S.-licensed satel ites from Alcântara space center in
Brazil’s northeastern state of Maranhão. The United States also endorsed Brazil’s accession to the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in exchange for Brazil agreeing to
gradual y give up its “special and differential treatment” status, which grants special rights to
developing nations at the WTO.
In 2020, U.S. and Brazilian officials reportedly hope to conclude agreements on customs
administration, e-commerce rules, regulatory practices, and anti-corruption measures while
consulting with domestic stakeholders regarding “how best to expand trade and develop the
bilateral economic relationship.”85 U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer asserts that the
Trump Administration does not have any plans to pursue a comprehensive free-trade agreement
with Brazil at this time but is negotiating smal -scale accords to address chal enges faced by U.S.
businesses.86 A majority of Members on the House Committee on Ways and Means signed a letter
in June 2020 expressing strong opposition to “pursuing any type of trade agreement with the
Bolsonaro government” due to human rights, labor, and environmental concerns.87
Potential U.S. Tariffs on Brazilian Steel
In December 2019, President Trump announced his intention to impose tariffs on steel imports from Brazil. The
Trump Administration had imposed a 25% tariff on selected steel imports from most countries in March 2018,
using the authority granted in Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to take action to adjust imports
that threaten to impair U.S. national security (19 U.S.C. §1862). The Administration ended up excluding Brazil
from those additional duties after the Brazilian government agreed to a quota al otment that restricts the total
amount of steel Brazil can export to the United States. In his December 2019 tweet announcing the tariffs,
President Trump asserted that Brazil had presided over “a massive devaluation” of its currency, “which is not
good for [U.S.] farmers.” Economists maintain that the Brazilian real has lost value compared to the U.S. dol ar due
to the comparative weakness of the Brazilian economy, not manipulation by Brazil’s central bank. The Trump
Administration’s trade dispute with China also has led to increased Chinese purchases of Brazilian soy and other
agricultural commodities. The Trump Administration has yet to impose tariffs on Brazilian steel, but President
Trump has refused to rule out doing so in the future.
For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10667, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, by Rachel F. Fefer
and Vivian C. Jones.
Sources: White House, “Presidential Proclamation in Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States,”
March 8, 2018; White House, “Presidential Proclamation in Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United
States,” May 31, 2018; Ana Swanson, “Trump Says U.S. Wil Impose Metal Tariffs on Brazil and Argentina,”
New York Times, December 2, 2019; and “Trump: No Promises Regarding Steel and Aluminum Tariffs on
Brazil,” Reuters, March 7, 2020.
In addition to congressional opposition, a potential free-trade agreement would need to overcome
a series of other chal enges. Barring changes to Mercosur’s rules, any agreement to reduce tariffs
would need to be negotiated with the broader bloc. In 2019, Mercosur signed free-trade

85 Embassy of Brazil in Washington, D.C., “Brazil-U.S. Joint Statement on Enhancement of Bilateral Economic and
T rade Partnership,” April 20, 2020; and Daniel Rittner, “Brazil and US Close to Reaching Customs Deal,” Valor
International, June 9, 2020.
86 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, 2020 Trade Policy Agenda, testimony of Ambassador Robert
E. Lighthizer, U.S. T rade Representative, 116 th Cong., 2nd sess., June 17, 2020.
87 Letter from Honorable Richard E. Neal, Chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means, et al. to Honorable
Robert Lighthizer, U.S. T rade Representative, June 3, 2020.
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agreements with the European Union and the European Free Trade Association. Those
agreements have yet to be ratified, however, and the recent political shift in Argentina could make
the negotiation of new agreements more difficult.88 A free-trade agreement also could provoke
opposition from domestic producers threatened by foreign competition. Industry associations in
Brazil reportedly have been lobbying the Bolsonaro Administration to focus on reducing costs for
domestic business before pursuing trade liberalization.89 U.S. businesses also have sought
protections, and President Trump has occasional y threatened to impose tariffs on Brazilian
products (see the text box, above).
Trade and Investment Flows
U.S.-Brazilian trade has increased significantly over the past two decades but has suffered from
economic volatility, such as the 2007-2008 global financial crisis and Brazil’s 2014-2017
recession (see Figure 4). In 2019, total bilateral merchandise trade amounted to $73.9 bil ion.
U.S. goods exports to Brazil totaled $43.1 bil ion, and U.S. goods imports from Brazil totaled
$30.9 bil ion, giving the United States a $12.2 bil ion trade surplus. The top U.S. exports to Brazil
were mineral fuels, aircraft, machinery, and organic chemicals. The top U.S. imports from Brazil
included mineral fuels, iron and steel, aircraft, machinery, and wood and wood pulp. In 2019,
Brazil was the 14th-largest trading partner of the United States.90 The United States was Brazil’s
second-largest trading partner, accounting for 14.8% of Brazil’s total merchandise trade,
compared to 24.4% for China.91
Brazil benefits from the Generalized System of Preferences program, which provides
nonreciprocal, duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from designated developing
countries. Brazil was the fourth-largest beneficiary of the program in 2019, with duty-free
imports to the United States valued at $2.3 bil ion—equivalent to 7.4% of al U.S. merchandise
imports from Brazil.92
U.S.-Brazilian services trade is also significant. In 2018 (the most recent year for which data are
available), total bilateral services trade amounted to $34.4 bil ion. U.S. services exports to Brazil
totaled $28.2 bil ion, and U.S. services imports from Brazil totaled $6.1 bil ion, giving the United
States a $22.1 bil ion surplus. Travel, transport, and telecommunications were the top categories
of U.S. services exports to Brazil, and business services was the top category of U.S. imports
from Brazil.93 Brazil began exempting U.S. citizens from the country’s tourist and business visa
requirements in June 2019, which could increase U.S. travel to Brazil in the coming years. In
2019, more than 2.1 mil ion Brazilians visited the United States, spending $11.3 bil ion on travel
and tourism.94 Due to widespread person-to-person transmission of the novel coronavirus in

88 For more information on Argentina, see CRS In Focus IF10932, Argentina: An Overview, by Mark P. Sullivan.
89 “Brazil Economy: T rade Liberalisation Advances, but Slower T han Guedes Wants,” Economist Intelligence Unit,
November 25, 2019.
90 U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau data, as made available by Global Trade Atlas, February 2020.
91 Brazilian Foreign T rade Secretariat (SECEX) data, as made available by Global Trade Atlas, February 2020.
92 U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau data, as made available by the U.S. International T rade Commission,
“Interactive T ariff and T rade DataWeb,” accessed in February 2020.
93 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. T rade in Services, by Country or Affiliation
and by T ype of Service,” October 15, 2019.
94 U.S. Department of Commerce, International T rade Administration, National T ravel and T ourism Office, Market
Profile: Brazil, March 2020.
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Brazil, however, the United States has denied entry to most Brazilian citizens and other foreign
nationals who have been present in Brazil in the previous 14 days since May 28, 2020.95
Figure 4. U.S. Trade with Brazil: 2008-2019

Source: CRS presentation of U.S. Department of Commerce data, as made available through Global Trade Atlas
and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, accessed February 2020.
Note: Services data are not yet available for 2019.
U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Brazil has increased by more than 60% since 2008. As of
2018 (the most recent year for which data are available), the accumulated stock of U.S. FDI in
Brazil was $70.9 bil ion, with significant investments in manufacturing, finance, and mining,
among other sectors.96
Security Cooperation
Although U.S.-Brazilian cooperation on security issues traditional y has been limited, law
enforcement and military ties have grown closer in recent years. In 2018, the countries launched a
new Permanent Forum on Security that aims to foster “strategic, intense, on-going bilateral
cooperation” on a range of security chal enges, including arms and drug trafficking, cybercrime,
financial crimes, and terrorism.97 The United States and Brazil also engage in high-level security
discussions under the long-standing Political-Military Dialogue and a new Strategic Partnership
Dialogue, which met for the first time in September 2019.

95 White House, “Proclamation on Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Certain Additional
Persons Who Pose a Risk of T ransmitting Novel Coronavirus,” May 24, 2020.
96 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position
Data,” accessed in January 2020.
97 U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Brazil, “U.S.-Brazil Permanent Security Forum,” March 19, 2019.
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Counternarcotics
Brazil is not a major drug-producing country, but it is the world’s second-largest consumer of
cocaine hydrochloride and likely the world’s largest consumer of cocaine-derivative products. It
is also a major transit country for cocaine bound for Europe.98 Organized crime in Brazil has
increased in scope and scale over the past decade, as some of the country’s large, wel -organized,
and heavily armed criminal groups—such as the Red Command (Comando Vermelho, or CV) and
the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital, or PCC)—have increased their
transnational operations. Security analysts have attributed much of the recent violence in Brazil,
particularly in the northern portion of the country, to clashes among the CV, PCC, and their local
affiliates over control of strategic trafficking corridors.99
The Brazilian government has responded to the chal enges posed by organized crime by
bolstering security along the 9,767-mile border it shares with 10 nations, including the region’s
cocaine producers—Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Under its Strategic Border Plan, introduced in
2011, the Brazilian government has deployed interagency resources, including unmanned aerial
vehicles, to monitor il icit activity in high-risk locations along its borders and in the remote
Amazon region. It also has carried out joint operations with neighboring countries. More recently,
the Brazilian government has begun acquiring low-altitude mobile radars and other equipment to
support its Integrated Border Monitoring System. That system was initial y scheduled to be
operational along the entire Brazilian border in 2022, but the Brazilian government now estimates
that the system may not be completely in place until 2035 due to budget constraints.100
The United States supports counternarcotics capacity-building efforts in Brazil under a 2008
U.S.-Brazil Memorandum of Understanding on Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement. In
2019, the United States trained nearly 1,000 Brazilian police officers on combatting money
laundering and community policing, among other topics.101
Counterterrorism
Despite having little history of terrorism, Brazil began working closely with the United States and
other international partners to assess and mitigate potential terrorist threats in the lead-up to
hosting the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. Among other support, U.S.
authorities trained Brazilian law enforcement on topics such as countering international terrorism,
preventing attacks on soft targets, and identifying fraudulent documents. The Brazilian
government also enacted legislation that criminalized terrorism and terrorist financing in 2016,
closing a long-standing legal gap that reportedly had hindered counterterrorism investigations and
prosecutions.102 Brazil further strengthened its legal framework for identifying and freezing
terrorist assets in 2019 to address deficiencies identified by the intergovernmental Financial
Action Task Force.103

98 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report, Volum e I: Drug and Chem ical Control, March 2, 2020, p. 109. Hereinafter: INCSR, 2020.
99 See, for example, Bruno Paes Manso, “A Cena Criminal Brasileira Mudou; Compreendê-la Ajuda Entender as Novas
Dinâmicas do Homicídio,” in Anuário Brazileiro de Segurança Pública 2019 (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública,
2019); and Carolina Sampó, De la Reclusión en las Prisiones al Control del Tráfico de Cocaína: la Evolución de las
Organizaciones Crim inales Brasileñas, Real Instituto Elcano, working paper, June 10, 2019.
100 Nelza Oliveira, “Brazil Invests in Border Surveillance Radars,” Diálogo, January 3, 2019.
101 INCSR, 2020, p. 111.
102 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, July 2017.
103 Financial Action T ask Force (FAT F), “Outcomes FAT F Plenary, 16 -18 October 2019,” press release, October 18,
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Brazilian officials have used the new legal framework several times in recent years. In the weeks
leading up to the 2016 Olympics, they dismantled a loose, online network of Islamic State
sympathizers; 12 individuals were detained, and 8 ultimately were convicted and sentenced to
between 5 and 15 years in prison for promoting the Islamic State and terrorist attacks through
social media.104 In 2018, Brazilian prosecutors charged 11 individuals with planning to establish
an Islamic State cel in Brazil and attempting to recruit fighters to send to Syria.105 Although some
observers have applauded such efforts, others argue that Brazilian authorities are improperly
surveil ing, and stoking prejudice toward, the country’s smal Muslim population.106
Brazil historical y had been reluctant to adopt specific antiterrorism legislation due to concerns
about criminalizing the activities of social movements and other groups that engage in actions of
political dissent. President Bolsonaro has reinvigorated those concerns by labeling protestors and
Brazil’s Landless Workers’ Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra, or MST) as
terrorists.107 In December 2019, the Brazilian congress restricted the ability of the country’s
financial intel igence unit to report on terrorist financing, reportedly to prevent Bolsonaro from
targeting political and social activists. That restriction could jeopardize Brazil’s compliance with
global anti-money laundering and antiterrorism financing standards.108
In December 2019, the U.S. Department of State al ocated $700,000 of FY2019 Nonproliferation,
Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs aid to Brazil to improve Brazilian law
enforcement’s capability to deter, detect, and respond to terrorism-related activities.109 The
assistance wil fund border security training and other initiatives, with a particular focus on
preventing suspected terrorists and terrorist facilitators from transiting the so-cal ed Tri-Border
Area of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, which has long been a haven for il icit activities.110 U.S.
Customs and Border Protection officers also are working with Brazilian authorities at Guarulhos
International Airport in São Paulo to identify high-risk travelers and contraband moving through
Brazil.111
Defense Cooperation
U.S.-Brazilian military ties have grown considerably over the past decade but have faced
occasional setbacks. In the aftermath of a massive January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, U.S. and

2019. For more on the FAT F, see CRS Report RS21904, The Financial Action Task Force: An Overview, by James K.
Jackson.
104 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2017, September 2018.
105 “Brazil Charges 11 People with T rying to Set Up Islamic State Cell,” Reuters, May 17, 2018.
106 T ulio Kruse, “Brazilian Muslims Face a Wave of Persecution and Prejudice Stoked by New Government,”
Intercept, October 4, 2016.
107 “A Empresários, Bolsonaro Defende Ação Armada contra Movimentos Sociais,” Agência Estado, May 22, 2018;
“Bolsonaro Says Brazil Is Prepared in Case of Protests, But Not Worried,” Reuters, November 23, 2019; and “Brazil:
Gov’t Dismisses Critics as ‘T errorists’,” Latin News Daily, June 4, 2020.
108 Isabela Cruz, “Como o Novo COAF vai Impactar o Combate ao T errorismo,” Nexo Jornal, December 18, 2019; and
Bryan Harris, “Brazil Criticised for Backtracking on T error Funding Fight,” Financial Times, February 3, 2020.
109 U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Notification 19-324,” December 5, 2019.
110 In September 2018, for example, Brazilian police arrested an alleged Hezbollah financier in the T ri-Border Area
who the U.S. Department of the T reasury had previously sanctioned as a Specially Designated Globa l T errorist
pursuant to Executive Order 13224. Brazil does not consider Hezbollah a terrorist organization, but the Bolsonaro
Administration reportedly is considering measures to designate it as such.
111 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019, June 2020, at
https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/brazil/.
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Brazilian military forces providing humanitarian assistance engaged in their largest combined
operations since World War II.112 Later in 2010, the countries signed a Defense Cooperation
Agreement and a General Security of Military Information Agreement intended to facilitate the
sharing of classified information. The Brazilian congress did not approve those agreements until
2015, however, due to a cooling of relations after press reports revealed that the U.S. National
Security Agency had engaged in extensive espionage in Brazil. A Master Information Exchange
Agreement, signed in 2017, implemented the two previous agreements and enabled the countries
to pursue bilateral defense-related technology projects.
In July 2019, President Trump designated Brazil as a major non-NATO al y for the purposes of
the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).113 Among other benefits, that designation
offers Brazil privileged access to the U.S. defense industry and increased joint military
exchanges, exercises, and training.114 In FY2019, the U.S. government provided $666,000 in
International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance to Brazil to strengthen military-
to-military relationships, increase the professionalization of Brazilian forces, and enhance the
Brazilian military’s capabilities. The U.S. government also delivered to Brazil $11.2 mil ion of
equipment under the Excess Defense Articles program and $96.7 mil ion of equipment and
services under the Foreign Military Sales program.115 The U.S. government is providing an
estimated $800,000 of IMET to Brazil in FY2020, and the Trump Administration has requested
$625,000 of IMET for Brazil in FY2021.116
Although recent bilateral agreements and the U.S. designation of Brazil as a major non-NATO
ally have laid a foundation for closer military ties, the long-term trajectory of the defense
relationship may depend on broader geopolitical considerations. For example, U.S. officials
reportedly have warned that bilateral military and intel igence cooperation could be in jeopardy if
Brazil al ows the Chinese company Huawei to participate in Brazil’s 5G cel ular network.117 The
U.S. government reportedly is offering financing through the U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation for Brazilian telecommunications companies to purchase 5G equipment
from other providers, such as Sweden’s Ericsson or Finland’s Nokia. Some Brazilian officials are
concerned, however, that excluding Huawei could delay the technology’s rollout and make it
more expensive for consumers.118 More broadly, the Bolsonaro Administration general y has
sought to avoid confrontations with China—Brazil’s top trade partner and an important source of
foreign investment—and influential sectors of Brazil’s military and foreign policy establishments
are wary of becoming embroiled in global power rivalries.119

112 Brazil was the only Latin American nation to deploy forces to Europe during World War II. T he 25,000 -strong
Brazilian Expeditionary Force fought as a division within the United States Fifth Army in Italy.
113 White House, “Designation of the Federative Republic of Brazil as a Major Non -NAT O Ally,” Presidential
Determination No. 2019-21 of July 31, 2019, 84 Federal Register 43035, August 19, 2019.
114 U.S. Embassy Brazil, “Major Non-NAT O Ally,” press release, March 19, 2019.
115 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Fiscal Year 2019 Military Assistance Report,
February 10, 2020.
116 U.S. Department of State, FY2020 estimate data provided to CRS, June 15, 2020; and Congressional Budget
Justification for the Departm ent of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Program s, Fiscal Year 2021, February 10,
2020, p. 132.
117 “EUA Pressionam Brasil Contra Entrada da Chinesa Huawei no Mercado de 5G,” Folha de São Paulo, November
19, 2019.
118 “U.S. Offers Brazil Funding to Buy 5G Gear from Huawei Rivals – Diplomat,” Reuters, June 23, 2020; and “Maia
in Favor of Chinese Suitors for 5G T echnology,” Valor International, June 16, 2020.
119 Benoni Belli and Filipe Nasser, “Brazil: Coupling Multipolarity with Multilateralism,” in The Road Ahead: The 21st-
Century World Order in the Eyes of Policy Plann ers (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2018), p. 108; and
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Congress has expressed interest in ensuring that U.S. military engagement with Brazil does not
contribute to human rights abuses. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020
(P.L. 116-92) directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to
submit a report to Congress regarding U.S.-Brazilian security cooperation. The report is to assess
the capabilities of Brazil’s military forces and describe the U.S. security cooperation relationship
with Brazil, including U.S. objectives, ongoing or planned activities, and the Brazilian military
capabilities that U.S. cooperation could enhance. The report is also to assess the human rights
climate in Brazil, including the Brazilian military’s adherence to human rights and an
identification of any Brazilian military or security forces credibly al eged to have engaged in
human rights violations that have received or purchased U.S. equipment or training. Moreover,
the report is to describe ongoing or planned U.S. cooperation activities with Brazil focused on
human rights and the extent to which U.S. security cooperation with Brazil could encourage
accountability and promote reform through training on human rights, rule of law, and rules of
engagement.
Some Members of Congress also have cal ed for changes to U.S. security cooperation with
Brazil. A resolution introduced in September 2019 expressing concerns about threats to human
rights, the rule of law, democracy, and the environment in Brazil (H.Res. 594, Grijalva) would
cal for the United States to rescind Brazil’s designation as a major non-NATO al y and suspend
assistance to Brazilian security forces, among other actions. In contrast, other Members have
cal ed for closer U.S. security ties with Brazil, including its inclusion in NATO partnership
programs.120
U.S. Support for Amazon Conservation
The U.S. government has supported conservation efforts in Brazil since the 1980s. Current U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) activities are coordinated through the U.S.-
Brazil Partnership for the Conservation of Amazon Biodiversity (PCAB). Launched in 2014, the
PCAB brings together the U.S. and Brazilian governments, private sector companies, and NGOs
to strengthen protected area management and promote sustainable development in the Amazon. In
addition to providing assistance for federal y and state-managed protected areas, USAID works
with indigenous and quilombola communities to strengthen their capacities to manage their
resources and improve their livelihoods. USAID also supports the private sector-led Partnership
Platform for the Amazon, which facilitates private investment in innovative conservation and
sustainable development activities.121 In November 2019, USAID helped establish the Athelia
Biodiversity Fund, a Brazilian equity fund that aims to raise $100 mil ion of mostly private
capital to invest in similar efforts. In addition to those long-term development programs,
USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance deployed a team of wildfire experts to assist
Brazilian fire investigators in 2019.
Several other U.S. agencies are engaged in Brazil, often in collaboration with or with funding
transferred from USAID. The U.S. Forest Service, for example, provides technical assistance to
the Brazilian government, NGOs, and cooperatives intended to improve protected area
management, reduce the threat of fire, conserve migratory bird habitat, and facilitate the

“Bolsonaro Wants Closer Security T ies with Washington. Does Brazil’s Military?” World Politics Review, April 5,
2019.
120 Letter from Senator Marco Rubio to President Donald J. T rump, December 2 0, 2019.
121 U.S. Agency for International Development, “Brazil: Bilateral Biodiversity Conservation,” September 6, 2019, at
https://www.usaid.gov/brazil/our-work/environment al-partnerships.
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establishment of sustainable value chains for forest products. NASA also has provided data and
technical support to Brazil to help the country better monitor Amazon deforestation.
President Trump has not requested funding for environmental programs in Brazil in any of his
budget proposals. Nevertheless, Congress has continued to fund conservation activities in the
country. In the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), Congress
appropriated $15 mil ion for the Brazilian Amazon, including $5 mil ion to address fires in the
region.
Some Members of Congress have cal ed on the Brazilian and U.S. governments to do more to
conserve the Amazon. For example, a resolution introduced in the Senate in September 2019
(S.Res. 337, Schatz) would express bipartisan concern about fires and il egal deforestation in the
Amazon, cal on the Brazilian government to strengthen environmental enforcement and reinstate
protections for indigenous communities, and back continued U.S. assistance to the Brazilian
government and NGOs. The Act for the Amazon Act (H.R. 4263, DeFazio), introduced in
September 2019, would take a more punitive approach. It would ban the importation of certain
fossil fuels and agricultural products from Brazil, prohibit certain types of military-to-military
engagement and security assistance to Brazil, and forbid U.S. agencies from entering into free
trade negotiations with Brazil.
Outlook
More than five years after the country fel into recession and more than three years after the
controversial impeachment and removal from office of President Rousseff, Brazil remains mired
in difficult domestic circumstances. The COVID-19 pandemic abruptly halted the country’s slow domestic circumstances. The COVID-19 pandemic abruptly halted the country’s slow
economic economic recovery and Brazil’s per capita income and employment rates remain below pre-recession levels. Although widespread vaccination has allowed Brazil to rollback public health restrictions, rising international fuel and food prices have weakened the country’s economic growth prospects. Political polarization is likely to increase in advance of Brazil’s October 2022 elections as President Bolsonaro seeks to rally his base for reelection and former President Lula attempts to mount a political comeback. Such polarization could weaken the credibility of the election results among some sectors of the electorate, particularly if candidates—such as Bolsonaro—continue to question the legitimacy of the electoral system. Whoever wins is likely to remain focused on the country’s internal challengesrecovery and now threatens to wipe out the modest employment gains achieved since
the last downturn. Repeated budget cuts have reduced social services for the most vulnerable and
have weakened the Brazilian government’s capacity to respond to the pandemic and other
chal enges, such as high levels of crime and increasing deforestation. President Bolsonaro was
elected, in part, on his pledge to clean up the political system, but his interference in justice sector
agencies and frequent attacks on the press, civil society groups, and other branches of government
have placed additional stress on the country’s already-strained democratic institutions. Brazilian
policymakers are likely to remain focused on these internal chal enges for the next several years,
limiting for the next several years, limiting Brazil’s abilityBrazil’s ability to take on regional responsibilities or exert its influence to take on regional responsibilities or exert its influence international y.
U.S.-Brazilian relations have grown closer since 2019, as President Bolsonaro’s foreign policy
has prioritized alignment with the Trump Administration. In addition to coordinating on
international affairs, the U.S. and Brazilian governments have taken steps tointernationally. U.S.-Brazilian relations initially improved following President Bolsonaro’s inauguration but now threaten to return to their historic pattern, in which heightened expectations give way to mutual disappointment and mistrust. Both countries took steps to enhance bilateral security cooperation and bolster commercial bolster commercial
ties and enhance security cooperation. Nonetheless, policy differences have emerged over
sensitive issues, such as bilateral trade barriers and relations with China, which affect the
economic and geopolitical interests of both countries. Those disagreements suggest the Trump
and Bolsonaro Administrations may need to engage in more extensive consultations and
confidence-building measures if they intend to avoid the historic pattern of U.S.-Brazilian
relations, in which heightened expectations give way to mutual disappointment and mistrust.
The 116thties during 2019 and 2020, based, in part, on the personal and ideological rapport between President Bolsonaro and President Trump. Relations appear to have cooled since President Biden took office in 2021, however, as the countries have struggled to bridge policy differences over sensitive issues, such as natural resource management and relations with China. The future of the bilateral relationship may depend on the extent to which the United States and Brazil are able to reconcile their sometimes-divergent economic and geopolitical interests and identify shared priorities. The 117th Congress may continue to shape U.S.-Brazilian relations using its legislative Congress may continue to shape U.S.-Brazilian relations using its legislative and and
oversight powers. Although there appears to be considerable support in Congress for forging a oversight powers. Although there appears to be considerable support in Congress for forging a
long-term strategic partnership with Brazil, many Members may be reluctant to advance major long-term strategic partnership with Brazil, many Members may be reluctant to advance major
bilateral commercial or security cooperation initiatives in the near term, given their concerns bilateral commercial or security cooperation initiatives in the near term, given their concerns
about the erosion of democracy, human rights, and environmental protections under Bolsonaro. about the erosion of democracy, human rights, and environmental protections under Bolsonaro.
For the time being, Congress may continue appropriating funding for programs with broad For the time being, Congress may continue appropriating funding for programs with broad
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support, such as Amazon conservation efforts, while Members continue to advocate for divergent support, such as Amazon conservation efforts, while Members continue to advocate for divergent
policy approaches toward the Bolsonaro policy approaches toward the Bolsonaro Administrationadministration. .

Author Information

Peter J. Meyer Peter J. Meyer

Specialist in Latin American Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs Congressional Research Service 24 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations Affairs



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