Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations

Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations
June 23, 2020
The COVID-19 pandemic has taken a toll on Morocco’s health system and economy, although
the government has won praise for its handling of the crisis. Starting in mid-March 2020, the
Alexis Arieff
government closed its international borders and most commercial air travel; shuttered schools,
Specialist in African Affairs
places of worship, and businesses deemed nonessential; and invoked a national state of

emergency to restrict intercity travel along with nonessential movement by residents. On June 9,
authorities announced a gradual easing of some restrictive measures.

September 30, 2021 Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament and local government officials. King Mohammed VI, who Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament and local government officials. King Mohammed VI, who
inherited the throne in 1999, maintains overarching political authority inherited the throne in 1999, maintains overarching political authority Alexis Arieff but has taken some liberalizing steps. In 2011, amid but has taken some liberalizing steps. In 2011, amid
large protests in Morocco and large protests in Morocco and popular uprisings that overthrewthe popular Specialist in African Affairs overthrow of governments in other North African countries, the king governments in other North African countries, the king
introduced a new introduced a new constitution that strengthened the office of the Prime Minister and expanded individual rights. The monarch constitution that strengthened the office of the Prime Minister and expanded individual rights. The monarch
nonetheless remains the arbiter of national decision-making, the head of the military, and—as remains the arbiter of national decision-making, the head of the military, and—as “Commander of the “Commander of the
Faithful”—the country’s highest religious authority. Faithful”—the country’s highest religious authority. In recent years, officials have struggled to respond to a new wave of
protests over economic challenges, corruption, and police brutality.
Morocco’s stability has taken on greater prominence amid the conflicts in Libya and the Sahel region and political turbulence in Tunisia and Algeria. The country has nonetheless seen recurrent protests over economic challenges, corruption, and police brutality, to which authorities have sometimes responded harshly. The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has brought new economic and governance challenges. As of late September 2021, Morocco had experienced the second-highest cumulative number of confirmed cases in Africa (after South Africa) and also had achieved one of the highest vaccination rates. Cases most recently peaked in July-August 2021. The United States has provided Morocco with COVID-19-related health aid and vaccine donations. Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Morocco as an important regional partner on security, trade, and development. Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Morocco as an important regional partner on security, trade, and development.
Morocco is a designated Major Non-NATO Ally, and Morocco is a designated Major Non-NATO Ally, and bilateral trade and investment expanded after a U.S.-Morocco Free a U.S.-Morocco Free
Trade Agreement was signed in 2004. Trade Agreement was signed in 2004. In 2019, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser
Bourita convened aA high- high-level Bilateral Strategic Dialogue has met periodically since 2012, and Morocco is a member of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State. In July 2021, the United States transferred a Moroccan Guantánamo detainee to Morocco, marking the first prisoner transfer out of Guantánamo since 2016. The Biden Administration has hailed Morocco as “a strategic partner” and lauded its “key role in fostering stability in the region,” while expressing concerns about recent human rights and press freedom trends. In a significant U.S. policy change in late 2020, President Trump announced that the United States would recognize Morocco’s claim over the disputed territory of Western Sahara and redrew U.S. maps accordingly. Previously, the United States had recognized neither Morocco’s claim, nor the self-declared government led by the independence-seeking Polisario Front; U.S. officials had, however, characterized Morocco’s proposal of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as “serious, realistic, and credible.” The U.S. shift in 2020, a top Moroccan priority for decades, coincided with a pledge by Morocco to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel. The Biden Administration initially indicated that it was reviewing the Western Sahara recognition policy, but has not altered it to date. U.S. bilateral aid, totaling $41 million in FY2021, seeks to improve Morocco’s education system, local governance, livelihood opportunities, and military capabilities . In line with its broader budget proposals, the Trump Administration repeatedly proposed to decrease bilateral aid to Morocco; Congress did not enact these proposals. The Biden Administration has proposed a slight decrease to $36 million in bilateral aid for Morocco in FY2022. Morocco also is implementing a $450 million, five-year U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) development aid compact. U.S.-Morocco security cooperation is extensive. Morocco has been a growing recipient of U.S. Defense Department global train and equip programs in recent years. It hosts an annual U.S. multinational military exercise, African Lion, involving thousands of soldiers from the United States and other countries in North and West Africa. Morocco is a significant purchaser of U.S. arms for its income level; the Trump Administration approved, with congressional assent, up to $10 billion in new arms sales to Morocco in 2019 alone, including 25 new F-16 jets, 36 Apache attack helicopters, TOW missiles and missile launchers, and an upgrade of Morocco’s existing 23 F-16s. Morocco’s foreign policy focuses on its Western partners (including the United States along with France, Spain, and the European Union); the Arab Gulf states; and sub-Saharan Africa. Tensions between Morocco and Algeria—a regional rival that hosts and backs the Polisario—have long stymied security and economic cooperation in North Africa. In August 2021, Algeria announced it was severing diplomatic ties with Morocco , in the context of renewed military clashes in Western Sahara in late 2020 and Morocco’s current normalization of relations with Israel. Morocco expressed regret over the decision. level U.S.-Morocco Strategic Dialogue, which had last been held in 2015. While expressing
continued support for the U.S.-Morocco relationship and approving large new arms sales to the country, the Trump
Administration has repeatedly proposed to cut bilateral aid to Morocco, in line with its global foreign aid budget proposals.
For FY2021, the Administration has proposed $13.5 million in bilateral aid appropriations for Morocco, compared to $41.0
million appropriated by Congress in FY2020 under P.L. 116-94; Congress did not adopt similar proposals in previous years.
Separately, Morocco is implementing a five-year $450 million U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact—the
country’s second such program—focused on enhancing workforce development and land productivity.
U.S.-Morocco security cooperation is robust. Morocco has long been a significant purchaser, for its income level, of U.S.
defense materiel (including F-16 jets), and hosts an annual military exercise in which some 1,000 U.S. personnel participate.
(The 2020 iteration of the exercise, due in April, was canceled due to COVID-19.) The Administration approved, with
congressional assent, up to $10 billion in new arms sales to Morocco in 2019, including more F-16s. Morocco is a member of
the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State. In 2017, the United States and Morocco launched an “Initiative to
Address Homegrown Violent Extremists” under the auspices of the multilateral Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF).
With regard to the disputed territory of Western Sahara, which Morocco claims and largely administers, the United States has
recognized neither Morocco’s assertion of sovereignty, nor the self-declared Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), led
by the independence-seeking Polisario Front from exile in Algeria. The United States has repeatedly voted in the U.N.
Security Council to extend a U.N. peacekeeping operation known as MINURSO, which observes a 1991 ceasefire between
Morocco and the Polisario, although U.S. officials threatened to withdraw support for the mission during the tenure of former
National Security Advisor John Bolton (2018-2019). Since 2007, the U.N. Security Council—of which the United States is a
veto-capable permanent member—has called on Morocco and the Polisario to engage in negotiations without preconditions
to reach a “mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western
Sahara.” Successive U.S. Administrations have praised Morocco’s proposal of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as a
“serious, realistic, and credible” option for a final settlement, while continuing to back U.N.-facilitated talks. (See CRS
Report RS20962, Western Sahara, for background.) Congressional interest in the Western Sahara issue and the scope of U.S.
aid has been reflected in recent foreign assistance appropriations measures and other legislation, including H.Res. 223.
Morocco’s foreign policy focuses on its Western partners (including the United States along with France, Spain, and the
European Union); the Arab Gulf states; and friendly countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2018, Morocco cut ties with Iran for In 2018, Morocco cut ties with Iran for
the second time in a decade, accusing it of the second time in a decade, accusing it of providing military supportsupplying arms to the Polisario via Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated to the Polisario via Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated
terrorist network. Tensions between Morocco and neighboring Algeria—a regional rival and the Polisario’s primary backer—
have long stymied regional security and economic cooperation within North Africaterrorist group. In 2016, Morocco joined the African . In 2016, Morocco joined the African
Union (AU), having previously refused to Union (AU), having previously refused to do so due to the organization’s recognition of the do so due to the organization’s recognition of the SADRPolisario’s Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a member state. as a member state.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

---

link to page 4 link to page 7 link to page link to page 4 link to page 7 link to page 78 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 6 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 6 link to page 1112 link to page 14 link to page 16 link to page 14 link to page 16 Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations

Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Foreign Relations ............................................................................................................................ 4
Politics .......................................................................................................................... 5 The Economy ................... 4
The Economy .............................................................................................. 6 Terrorism and Foreign Fighters .................................... 6
Terrorism and Foreign Fighters ..................................................... 7 Western Sahara .................................................. 7
Western Sahara ............................................................. 8 Ceasefire Rupture in 2020................................................................... 8
U.S. Relations ........................ 9 U.S. Relations .............................................................................................................. 10
U.S. Foreign Aid ...................................................................................................................... 11
Western Sahara: U.S. Policy and Foreign Aid Legislation 11 Western Sahara in Foreign Aid Legislation ............................................................. 12

Figures
Figure 1. Morocco at a Glance ........................................................................................................ 3
Figure 2. U.N. Map of the Western Sahara .............................................................................................. 8

9 Tables
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Morocco, State Department +and USAID ............................................ 11

11 Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 13

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

---

link to page 13 Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations

Introduction
Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Morocco as an important regional Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Morocco as an important regional partner on
security, trade, and developmentsecurity, trade, and development. Historically warm ties expanded after the terrorist partner, and successive Congresses have supported U.S.-Morocco cooperation and aid on a bipartisan basis. Historical y warm ties deepened after the attacks of attacks of
September 11, 2001, September 11, 2001, whenas President George W. Bush sought the cooperation of Arab President George W. Bush sought the cooperation of Arab
governments in countering terrorism. His Administration designated Morocco a Major Non-governments in countering terrorism. His Administration designated Morocco a Major Non-
NATO NATO Ally Al y in 2004 and in 2004 and concluded a concluded a bilateralU.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement the same year, which Free Trade Agreement the same year, which
Congress Congress authorizedenacted under under P.L. 108-302. President Obama continued to pursue close ties via a U.S.-Morocco Bilateral Strategic Dialogue and other initiativesP.L. 108-302. The United States has continued to build strong
relations with the kingdom under President Obama and President Trump, notwithstanding , notwithstanding
occasional occasional friction over the issue of Western Sahara, U.S. human rights criticism and some friction over Western Sahara—a disputed territory that Morocco claims and a disputed territory that Morocco claims and
largely administers. High-level meetings regularly occur, including via a U.S.-Morocco Bilateral
Strategic Dialogue (see “U.S. Relations”).
Morocco’s stability has taken on greater prominence over the past decade amid popular uprisings
in Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria, as well as ongoing conflicts in Libya and the Sahel region.
Morocco is the only North African country not to have experienced a major terrorist attack since
2012, although individuals who had reportedly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State killed two
European tourists in 2018. Moroccan authorities regularly report disrupting internal and
transnational terrorist plots. Morocco also was reportedly a top global source of Islamic State
“foreign fighters” in Syria and Iraq at the height of the group’s territorial control.
King Mohammed VI weathered large protests in 2011 during the wave of regional unrest known
as the “Arab Spring.” He responded by devolving some executive powers to elected officials,
with a new constitution that was adopted by referendum. The Party for Justice and Development
(PJD)—generally characterized as a moderate Islamist political party—has won two legislative
elections since then and has led a series of coalition governments, although the palace has
increasingly moved to check its influence over policymaking in recent years.
Protests again erupted in 2016-2018 in the historically marginalized northern Rif region and in
rural and mining communities in the country’s east, reflecting apparent discontent over the
economy, corruption, and police brutality. Perceptions of cronyism and corruption also fueled a
boycott movement in 2018 targeting firms led by individuals seen as close to the palace and
influential in both business and politics.1 Sporadic protests over various issues, including
governance, continued across the country through early 2020.2 The Arab Barometer regional
opinion survey reported in 2019largely controls. At the time, the United States did not recognize Morocco’s claim to the territory, nor did it recognize the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), a self-declared state founded by the independence-seeking Polisario Front from exile in Algeria. In a policy change in late 2020, President Trump announced that the United States would recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and redrew U.S. maps accordingly (Figure 1). The U.S. shift, a top Moroccan priority for decades, coincided with Morocco’s decision to join the “Abraham Accords,” a set of diplomatic normalization agreements between Arab states and Israel.1 The Biden Administration initial y indicated that it was reviewing the recognition policy, but has not altered it to date.2 The Biden Administration has hailed Morocco as “a strategic partner” and lauded its “key role in fostering stability in the region,” while expressing some concerns about recent human rights and press freedom trends.3 Morocco’s stability has taken on greater prominence amid the conflicts in Libya and the Sahel region and political turbulence in Tunisia and Algeria. King Mohammed VI, who ascended to the throne in 1999, responded to protests during the 2011 “Arab Spring” with a new constitution, adopted by referendum, which devolved some executive powers to elected officials and expanded some individual rights protections. Morocco is the only North African country not to have experienced a large terrorist attack since 2012. At the same time, it was reportedly a top source of Islamist “foreign fighters” in Iraq and Syria in 2014-2015, and two European tourists were kil ed in Morocco in 2018 by individuals who had reportedly pledged al egiance to the Islamic State. Some analysts debate whether Moroccan institutions can continue to weather internal and regional strains, including those posed by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.4 Prior to the pandemic, the Arab Barometer regional opinion survey reported that Moroccan respondents’ top concerns were the “the that Moroccan respondents’ top concerns were the “the
economy,” “the quality of public services,” and corruption.economy,” “the quality of public services,” and corruption.35 Nearly half of Moroccan respondents Nearly half of Moroccan respondents
stated that they would consider emigrating, stated that they would consider emigrating, including 70% of those aged 18-29. Sporadic localized protests and strikes occurred from 2019 through early 2020, following a wave of larger demonstrations in 2016-2018 in historical y marginalized rural areas in the northern Rif region and in the east.6 Protesters’ stated grievances 1 See CRS Insight IN11555, Morocco-Israel Normalization and U.S. Policy Change on Western Sahara . 2 State Department press briefing, February 22, 2021. 3 Respectively, Secretary of State Antony Blinken statement via T witter, 10:00 am, May 18, 2021; State Department, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Moroccan Foreign Minister Bourita,” May 18, 2021, and press briefing, July 12, 2021. 4 See, e.g., Intissar Fakir and Isabelle Werenfels, “T he Pandemic and Governance in the Maghreb: A Moment of T ruth,” SWP Comment, February 2021. 5 Arab Barometer V, “Morocco Country Report,” 2019. 6 See Abdelillah Essatte, “Protests of Morocco’s Margins: T he credibility gap,” Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis Congressional Research Service 1 Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations included economic hardships, corruption, lack of access to state services, poor working conditions, and police brutality. Perceptions of cronyism and corruption also fueled a boycott movement in 2018 targeting firms led by individuals seen as influential in both business and politics.7 Morocco’s curtailment of migration to Europe also has sparked domestic controversy.8 In recent years, human rights groups have highlighted what they view as a pattern of political y motivated prosecutions of local activists, artists, social media posters, and journalists probing sensitive issues such as corruption, land tenure abuses, and the recent unrest in the Rif.9 Police al egedly employed excessive force and torture against the Rif protesters in 2016-2017, and protest leaders were sentenced to lengthy prison terms.10 More recently, Moroccan security forces have reportedly violently suppressed pro-independence protests in Western Sahara.11 These trends follow a period in which King Mohammed VI pursued various human rights initiatives, for example ending military trials for civilian suspects, affording legal registration to a handful of critical civil society organizations based in Moroccan-administered Western Sahara, and granting legal residency status to many migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. The 2011 constitution expanded ethnic Amazigh (Berber) cultural rights, women’s rights, political decentralization, and judicial independence, although these initiatives remain works in progress. Early in his reign, the king oversaw a landmark truth and reconciliation process pertaining to state repression under his father, King Hassan II, and a reform of Morocco’s family code that raised the minimum age of marriage and advanced women’s rights in marital and family matters. The push and pull in Morocco over political power, economic opportunity, and freedom of expression have played out in a shifting regional and international context. Western efforts to encourage political reforms in North Africa arguably waned after the 2013 leadership change in Egypt and the rise of the Islamic State (including its Libya offshoot) in 2014. The observation of violence and chaos in Libya and economic hardships in Tunisia may also have tempered domestic appetite for political change. As elsewhere in the region, Moroccans have continued to seek new ways to influence official decision-making, while state actors have toggled between responding to public demands and exercising more hardline approaches.12 Morocco and COVID-19 As of late September, Morocco had administered more COVID-19 vaccine doses per capita (112 per 100 people) than most other African countries.13 Morocco also had reported the second-highest number of cumulative (MIPA), August 2018. 7 Jeune Afrique, “Le boycott des produits alimentaires est dirigé contre des personnes anti-PJD,” May 12, 2018. 8 See, e.g., Samia Errazzouki, “A young woman embodied Morocco’s future. Instead she was shot while trying to emigrate [op-ed],” Washington Post, October 2, 2018. 9 See, e.g., Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), “Morocco’s new tactic to punish journalists: charge them with sex crimes,” March 18, 2021; and Adel Abdel Ghafar, “ T he arrest of Maati Monjib and the continued retreat of human rights in Morocco,” Brookings, March 9, 2021; Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Morocco: Crackdown on Social Media Critics,” February 5, 2020, “ Morocco: T rial Over Private Life Allegations,” September 9, 2019, and “ Morocco: Shocking Verdict Against Activists, A Journalist ,” April 10, 2019. 10 Reuters, “Moroccan court jails Rif protest leader for 20 years,” June 26, 2018 ; HRW, “Morocco: Another Crackdown on Protests,” June 4, 2018, and “Morocco: King Brushes Off Evidence of P olice Abuse,” September 5, 2017. T he king pardoned some jailed Rif protesters, but key protest leaders remain in prison. 11 HRW, “ Western Sahara: Morocco Cracks Down on Activists,” December 18, 2020. 12 Intissar Fakir and Sarah Yerkes, “Governance and the Future of the Arab World,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 16, 2018. 13 CRS calculation based on World Health Organization (WHO) COVID-19 Dashboard data, as of September 28. Congressional Research Service 2 link to page 9 Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations confirmed COVID-19 cases in Africa, behind only South Africa. Morocco experienced its largest wave of confirmed COVID-19 cases to date in July-August 2021, in paral el with similar trends across North Africa. Like many countries in the sub-region, Morocco has imposed, lifted, and re-imposed various COVID-19-related restrictions since early 2020. In March 2020, Morocco closed its borders and suspended international commercial flights, prompting the U.S. State Department to evacuate stranded U.S. citizens. The government also invoked a national state of emergency, imposed nationwide restrictions on internal travel and movements, and closed schools, places of worship, communal steam baths, and nonessential businesses. Many Moroccans reportedly approved of such measures to limit spread of the virus.14 Authorities began lifting some restrictions in June 2020, while maintaining the state of emergency. As of August 2021, a national curfew, internal travel restrictions, some business closures, and a mask mandate were in effect, and the state of emergency had been extended.15 The pandemic has negatively affected Morocco’s economy, fueling a recession in 2020 and a rise in u nemployment (see “The Economy” below). In early 2020, the government established an emergency pandemic fund of about $1 bil ion—financed by the state and voluntary contributions from private firms including 70% of those aged 18-29. Morocco’s role in
enforcing European efforts to curtail migration has sparked domestic controversy.4
The king has pursued several human rights initiatives in recent years, for example ending military
trials for civilian suspects and affording legal registration to a handful of critical civil society
organizations based in Moroccan-administered Western Sahara. The 2011 constitution expanded
Amazigh (Berber) cultural rights, women’s rights, administrative decentralization, and judicial
independence, although these stated objectives remain works in progress. At the same time,
activists and journalists have faced harassment and criminal prosecution while probing sensitive

1 Jeune Afrique, “Le boycott des produits alimentaires est dirigé contre des personnes anti-PJD,” May 12, 2018.
2 Jeune Afrique, “Plusieurs milliers de personnes défilent à Casablanca contre les inégalités,” February 23, 2020.
3 Arab Barometer V, “Morocco Country Report,” 2019.
4 Samia Errazzouki, “A young woman embodied Morocco’s future. Instead she was shot while trying to emigrate [op-
ed],” Washington Post, October 2, 2018.
Congressional Research Service

1

---

Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations

issues including official corruption, security force abuses, and protests in the Rif.5 The police
were accused of excessive use of force and torture of detainees during the crackdown on Rif
protesters, and protest leaders were sentenced to lengthy prison terms.6 The king subsequently
pardoned some, but not all, jailed Rif protesters, but key protest leaders remain in prison.
The push and pull in Morocco over political power, economic opportunity, and freedom of
expression has played out amid a shifting regional and international context in recent years.
Western efforts to encourage political reforms in the region arguably waned after the 2013
leadership change in Egypt and the rise of the Islamic State in 2014. As elsewhere in the region,
Moroccan citizens have continued to seek new ways to influence official decision-making, while
state actors have toggled between a responsiveness to public demands and more hardline
approaches.7 Whether and how the course of the COVID-19 pandemic influences Moroccans’
relationship with the country’s governing institutions remains to be seen.8
Morocco and COVID-19
As of June 23, Morocco’s government had recorded over 10,200 cumulative cases of COVID-19, or roughly 2.8
per 10,000 citizens—a rate roughly equivalent to neighboring Algeria but higher than Tunisia, for example.9
Morocco closed its borders and suspended international commercial flights on March 15, prompting the U.S. State
Department to evacuate stranded U.S. citizens.10 On March 20, the government invoked a national state of
emergency and imposed nationwide restrictions on internal travel and movements, and closed schools, places of
worship, communal steam baths, and nonessential businesses. Many Moroccans reportedly approved of restrictive
measures to limit spread of the virus, and viewed information from the Moroccan Ministry of Health as reliable.11
On June 9, authorities announced the gradual lifting of some restrictions, while maintaining the state of emergency.
Morocco’s health system initially appeared likely to be overwhelmed by the pandemic. Morocco has an estimated
0.7 physicians and 1.1 hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants, compared to global averages of 2.5 and 2.7, respectively.
The country has made substantial progress in control ing major infectious diseases and reducing child and maternal
mortality in recent decades, however, pointing to some health system improvements.12 Since the early 2000s, the
government has also sought to expand access to healthcare, with mixed results.13 Local hospitals reportedly saw a
surge in COVID-19 patients in April-May 2020,14 and the government oversaw construction of temporary medical
facilities in some areas. As of mid-June, daily counts of new confirmed cases were lower than peaks in April-May,
but were also trending upward compared to recent prior weeks.15

5 See Committee to Protect Journalists, “Morocco,” https://cpj.org/mideast/morocco/; Human Rights Watch (HRW),
“Morocco: Trial Over Private Life Allegations,” September 9, 2019.
6 Reuters, “Moroccan court jails Rif protest leader for 20 years,” June 26, 2018; HRW, “Morocco: Another Crackdown
on Protests,” June 4, 2018, and “Morocco: King Brushes Off Evidence of Police Abuse,” September 5, 2017.
7 Intissar Fakir and Sarah Yerkes, “Governance and the Future of the Arab World,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, October 16, 2018.
8 See Intissar Fakir, “COVID-19 may have given North African governments a respite from protests, but this is unlikely
to last long,” Diwan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 23, 2020.
9 Morocco Health Ministry statistics, at http://www.covidmaroc.ma/pages/Accueil.aspx; other country statistics from
the Johns Hopkins University Coronavirus Resource Center, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html.
10 Associated Press (AP), “Stranded Travelers Board Evacuation Flights From Morocco,” March 20, 2020.
11 Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis (MIPA), “COVID-19: How Moroccans View the Government’s Measures,”
March 25, 2020, at https://mipa.institute/7486.
12 World Bank health system data, at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.MED.PHYS.ZS (Morocco statistics as of
2017 and 2014, and global averages as of 2015 and 2011, respectively); and World Health Organization, “Morocco:
Country Cooperation Strategy at a Glance,” May 2018 (latest).
13 Anna Jacobs, “Will COVID19 Lead to Health Care Reform in Morocco?” Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis,
May 14, 2020.
14 AP, “Weary Moroccan Medics Fight Virus, Nightmares and Tears,” May 2, 2020.
15 New York Times, “Coronavirus Map: Tracking the Global Outbreak,” updated as of June 17, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

2

---

Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations

Disruptions in global food supply chains and travel caused by the pandemic have severe implications for Morocco’s
economy. The country is a net importer of agricultural products, and tourism has been the second-largest
contributor to GDP in recent years (at approximately 11% of total GDP as of 2017, per Moroccan government
statistics).16 In late March 2020, the government established an emergency pandemic management fund of about
$1 bil ion—financed by the government and voluntary contributions from private firms and citizens—to boost its and citizens—to boost its
healthcare healthcare capacity and assist economical y vulnerable citizens.16 The state also provided aid for businesses and formal sector workers who lost jobs or working hours, and regulated prices and distribution of facemasks and hand sanitizers. These efforts—and the government’s financial resources more broadly—may not be sufficient to assuage household-level hardships or fiscal and trade imbalances attributable to the pandemic.17 Figure 1. Morocco at a Glance Population: 36.6 mil ion, of which 64% urban Ethnicities: Arab and/or Amazigh (Berber) 99% Languages: capacity and assist economically vulnerable citizens.17 Moroccan foundations have also donated personal
protective equipment (PPE) to health workers.
Figure 1. Morocco at a Glance

Population: 35.6 mil ion
GDP Growth / Per Capita: 2.7% / $3,345 (2019 est.)
Ethnicities: Arab and/or Berber (Amazigh) 99%,
Unemployment: 9.2%; ages 15-24: 26% (2019 est.)
other 1%
Key Exports: clothing and textiles, automobiles, electric
Languages: Arabic (official), Tamazight (official)
components, inorganic chemicals, transistors, crude
and other Berber languages, French
minerals, fertilizers (including phosphates), petroleum
Religions: Muslim 99% (official, virtually all Sunni),
products, citrus fruits, vegetables, fish
otherArabic (official), Tamazight (official) and other Berber languages, French Religions: Muslim 99% (official, virtual y al Sunni), other 1% (including Christian, Jewish, (including Christian, Jewish, Baha’i) Baha’i) 1%
Export Partners: Spain 23%, France 23%, Italy 5%, United
Life Expectancy: 73.: 73.36 years Median Age: 29.1 years (2020) Literacy: 74% (male 83%, female 65%) (2018) Access to electricity: 100% of population (2020) Fertility Rate: 2.3 children born/woman Women aged 20-24 who were married by age 18: 14% (2018) GDP Growth / Per Capita: -7% / $3,158 (2020) Inflation: 0.6% Unemployment: 11.9% (2020); ages 15-24: 22% (2016) Employment in agriculture: 33% of total employment (2019) Key Exports / Partners: cars, insulated wiring, fertilizers, phosphoric acid, clothing and apparel / Spain 23%, France 19% (2019) Key Imports / Partners: refined petroleum, cars and vehicle parts, natural gas, coal, low-voltage protection equipment / Spain 19%, France 11%, China 9%, United States 7%, Germany 5%, Turkey 5%, Italy 5% (2019) Source: CRS graphic. Map from U.S. Department of State and ESRI. Fact information from CIA World Factbook, International Monetary Fund (2021); World Bank Development Indicators; 2021 estimates unless noted. 14 Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis (MIPA), “COVID-19: How Moroccans View the Government’s Measures,” March 25, 2020. 15 U.S. Embassy in Morocco, “COVID-19 Information,” updated as of August 24, 2021. 16 See International Monetary Fund, Policy Responses to COVID-19: Policy T racker, at https://www.imf.org/en/T opics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19. 17 Yasmina Abouzzohour, “Coping with COVID-19’s cost: T he example of Morocco,” Brookings, December 23, 2020. Congressional Research Service 3 link to page 11 Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations Foreign Relations Morocco’s foreign relations focus years
States 4% (2017)
Median Age: 29.1 years
Key Imports: crude oil, textile fabric, telecommunications
Fertility Rate: 2.3 children per woman
equipment, wheat, gas and electricity, transistors, plastics
Literacy: 73.8% (male 83.3%, female 64.6%) (2018)
Import Partners: Spain 17%, France 12%, China 9%, US
Urban Population (% of total): 63.5%
7%, Germany 6%, Italy 6%, Turkey 5% (2017)
Sources: CRS graphic; borders are not necessarily authoritative. Data from CIA World Factbook and
International Monetary Fund (database, as of October 2019); 2020 estimates unless noted.
Note: Morocco considers Western Sahara to be part of its national territory, but U.S. government maps do not
depict it as such.

16 Export.gov, “Morocco – Agricultural Sector,” July 15, 2019; Morocco’s Ministry of Tourism, Air Transport,
Handicrafts, and Social Economy, “Key Figures,” at https://www.tourisme.gov.ma/en/tourism-figures/key-figures.
17 See International Monetary Fund, Policy Responses to COVID-19: Policy Tracker, at
https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19.
Congressional Research Service

3

---

Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations

Foreign Relations
Morocco’s foreign relations have generally focused on its Western partners (namely France, on its Western partners (namely France,
Spain, the European Union, and the United States); the Arab Gulf states; and Spain, the European Union, and the United States); the Arab Gulf states; and friendly countries in
sub-Saharan Africa. After the 2011 “Arab Spring,” Morocco drew closer to the Gulf countries, sub-Saharan Africa. After the 2011 “Arab Spring,” Morocco drew closer to the Gulf countries,
which pledged aid and investment. In 2015, Morocco temporarily redeployed its F-16 jets from
the U.S.-led counter-Islamic State coalition in order to participate in the Saudi-led operation in
Yemen, where one Moroccan F-16 crashed. Morocco subsequently ended its participation in the
Saudi-led operation, and the two countries temporarily exhibited diplomatic tensions in early
2019which pledged aid and investment. Morocco initial y participated in Saudi-led military operations in Yemen in 2015, but soon ended its involvement and has since exhibited periodic diplomatic friction with Saudi leaders.18 In 2018, .18 In 2018, Morocco cut ties with Iran for the second time in a decade, accusing it of Morocco cut ties with Iran for the second time in a decade, accusing it of
providing providing weaponryweapons to to the Polisario Front (which seeks independence for the Western Sahara, a
disputed territory claimed and largely administered by Morocco) the Polisario Front via Hezbollah, a U.S.-via Hezbollah, a U.S.-
designated terrorist organization.19 U.S. officials have not publicly commented on the allegation.
Morocco supports a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and King Mohammed VI
chairs the Al Quds (Jerusalem) Committee of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC),
which seeks to bolster Muslim claims to the city. Morocco closed Israel’s liaison bureau in
Morocco and Morocco’s office in Tel Aviv during the Palestinian intifada (uprising) in 2001.
Some 600,000 Israelis are of Moroccan origin and many travel there regularly, however. The king
criticized the Trump Administration’s 2017 recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and
assailed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s September 2019 pledge to annex the
Jordan Valley and other territories in the West Bank.20 Thousands of Moroccans protested the
U.S. Embassy’s move to Jerusalem in May 2018.
Tensions between Morocco and Algeria—a regional rival and the Polisario’s primary backer—
have long stymied security and economic cooperation in North Africa. Partly in response, and to
cultivate regional support for its claim to the Western Sahara, the king has launched diplomatic,
investment, and trade initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa.21 In 2016, Morocco joined the African
Union (AU), having left the AU’s predecessor organization in 1984 over the latter’s recognition
of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), the Polisario’s self-declared state. Morocco
has since sought to isolate the SADR within AU institutions, with mixed success. In 2017,
Morocco also requested to join the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
although Morocco’s territory is not geographically contiguous with the bloc.22 As of mid-2020,
Morocco had signed, but not ratified, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA).
Politics
The 2011 constitution requires the king to appoint a prime minister/head of government from the
largest party in the directly-elected Chamber of Representatives. The king remains the arbiter of

18 Carnegie Endowment, “What Impact Will Morocco’s Decision to Withdraw From the Anti-Houthi Coalition Have?”
February 14, 2019.
19 Moroccodesignated terrorist organization, and Algeria.19 Tensions between Morocco and Algeria—a regional rival that hosts and backs the Polisario— have long stymied security and economic cooperation in North Africa. In late August 2021, Algeria cut bilateral diplomatic ties, accusing Morocco of supporting an Algerian separatist group, surveil ing Algerian officials, and other “hostile actions.”20 The move came in the context of Morocco’s diplomatic rapprochement with Israel and renewed military clashes in Western Sahara between the Polisario and Moroccan forces since late 2020 (see “Western Sahara”). Morocco expressed regret and rejected the premise of Algeria’s decision; in early August, King Mohammed VI had publicly cal ed for Algerian-Moroccan reconciliation.21 In December 2020, Morocco pledged to normalize its diplomatic relationship with Israel and joined the Abraham Accords, which were backed by the United States. The two countries committed to establish formal diplomatic contacts—initial y via the revival of liaison offices in Rabat and Tel Aviv—along with direct flights and bilateral economic and technical cooperation.22 In August 2021, Israeli Foreign Minister visited Morocco, reportedly the first such visit since 2003, and announced the two countries would upgrade the liaison offices to full embassies.23 At the same time, King Mohammed VI has expressed his continued support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the king chairs the Al Quds (Jerusalem) Committee of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which seeks to bolster Muslim claims to the city.24 Morocco's relationship with Israel dates to the 1960s, and prior to the current normalization process the two countries reportedly engaged in some security and intel igence cooperation.25 Morocco and Israel established diplomatic liaison offices in 1994, but Morocco closed them in 2000 during the second Palestinian intifada (uprising). Israeli tourist visits to Morocco continued; hundreds of thousands of Israeli Jews trace their heritage to Morocco. Full normalization is widely believed to be unpopular in Morocco—for example, thousands of Moroccans protested the U.S. Embassy’s move to Jerusalem in 2018—but the U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara may have helped assuage public opposition. 18 Carnegie Endowment, “What Impact Will Morocco’s Decision to Withdraw From the Anti-Houthi Coalition Have?” February 14, 2019. 19 U.S. officials did not publicly comment on the allegation. Morocco previously severed diplomatic ties with Iran from 2009 to 2016, accusing Iran of fostering Shi’ite proselytization. severed diplomatic ties with Iran from 2009 to 2016, accusing Iran of fostering Shi’ite proselytization.
20 20 Morocco World News, “US Recognition of Jerusalem: King Mohammed VI Expresses ‘Deep Concern’ to Trump,”
December 5, 2017, and “Morocco Condemns Netanyahu’s Annexation Speech, Reiterates Support for Palestine,”
September 13, 2019. Morocco’s Foreign Minister reportedly restated opposition in a June 2020 OIC meeting.
21 See The Economist, “Why Morocco is Cosying Up to Sub-Saharan Africa,” July 19, 2018.
22 West African leaders have expressed support in principle, Morocco’s membership bid has not formally advanced;
friction over trade and immigration policy may be barriers. See Financial Times, “Morocco’s ECOWAS Bid Sparks
African Fear and Suspicion,” January 23, 2019.
Congressional Research Service

4

---

Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations

national political decision-making, the head of the military, and (as “Commander of the Faithful”)
the country’s highest religious authority. In practice, King Mohammed VI has continued to shape
policymaking on occasion, and he has regularly dismissed and reshuffled cabinet ministers. The
king spent several months abroad in 2018 after undergoing heart surgery in France, spurring
concerns about his health.23 He underwent heart surgery again in Rabat in mid-2020.24
Morocco’s main Islamist political party, the Party for Justice and Democracy (PJD, sometimes
known as Al Misbah or “the lamp”), has led a series of fractious coalition governments since
2011. The PJD spent two decades as an opposition party before winning its first electoral victory
(a plurality of seats in the Chamber of Representatives) after the 2011 protests and constitutional
revision. The party again won a plurality in legislative elections held in 2016. In recent years,
however, the palace and its political allies have taken steps to curtail the PJD’s influence over
policymaking.25 Morocco’s political system and electoral districting have arguably further
constrained the party’s influence.
Following the 2016 elections, the RNI party (National Rally of Independents, after its French
acronym), whose leadership is widely seen as close to the palace, effectively blocked then-Prime
Minister and PJD leader Abdelilah Benkirane from forming a government.26 After negotiations
stalled, the king dismissed Benkirane in favor of his then-deputy, former Foreign Minister Saad
Eddine al Othmani—who announced a coalition with parties backed by the RNI, to which
Benkirane had objected. These included the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP after its
French acronym), a secularist opposition party that shares few policy priorities with the PJD and
whose electoral strength has cratered in recent cycles. A trend toward diminished PJD political
influence was also visible in the aftermath of regional and municipal elections in 2015. The PJD
won the most seats and votes, but the pro-palace Party for Authenticity and Modernity (PAM)—
founded by top royal advisor Fouad Ali el Himma—secured control of more regional councils.
The PJD has generallyReuters, “ Algeria cuts diplomatic relations with Morocco,” August 25, 2021. 21 Associated Press, “ Morocco 'regrets' Algeria's decision to cut diplomatic ties,” August 25, 2021. 22 State Department, Joint Declaration among the Kingdom of Morocco, the United States of America, and the State of Israel, January 2021, at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Joint-Declaration-US-Morrocco-Israel.pdf. 23 Reuters, “Israel, Morocco to upgrade relations, open embassies, Israeli FM says,” August 12, 2021. 24 Morocco’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Phone Call Between His Majesty King Mohammed VI and His Excellency Mahmoud Abbas Abu Mazen, President of the Palestinian National Authority,” December 10, 2020. 25 New York Times, “Israel-Morocco Deal Follows History of Cooperation on Arms and Spying,” December 10, 2021. Congressional Research Service 4 Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations In part to cultivate regional support for its claim to the Western Sahara as wel as economic opportunities for Moroccan firms, King Mohammed VI has launched diplomatic, investment, and trade initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa.26 In 2016, Morocco joined the African Union (AU) having left the AU’s predecessor organization in 1984 over the latter’s recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), the Polisario’s self-declared state. Morocco has since sought to isolate the SADR (an AU member state) within AU institutions, with mixed success. Morocco also has requested to join the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), although it is not geographical y contiguous with the bloc. Morocco has signed but has not yet finalized its ratification of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA).27 Politics The 2011 constitution requires the king to appoint a prime minister (“head of government”) from the largest party in the directly-elected Chamber of Representatives, one of two chambers comprising the parliament. The king remains the arbiter of national political decision-making, the head of the military, and (as “Commander of the Faithful”) the country’s highest religious authority. In practice, King Mohammed VI has continued to shape policymaking and has regularly dismissed and reshuffled cabinet ministers. The king has undergone heart surgeries in Morocco and abroad in recent years, spurring concerns about his health among some observers.28 Morocco has dozens of registered political parties, reflecting a range of ideological persuasions. The moderate Islamist Party for Justice and Democracy (PJD) won a plurality in elections for the Chamber of Representatives in 2011 and 2016, and led a series of fractious coalition governments over the past ten years. In elections in September 2021, the PJD lost nearly al of its seats, while the centrist, economical y liberal National Ral y of Independents (RNI, after its French acronym) won a plurality of 102 out of 395 seats. Voter turnout was reported at 50%, up from 43% in 2016. RNI leader Aziz Akhannouch, a former cabinet minister and one of Morocco’s most prominent businessmen, has since announced a coalition with the conservative Istiqlal party (“Independence,” 81 seats) and the secularist liberal Party for Authenticity and Modernity (PAM, 87 seats), which was founded by royal advisor Fouad Ali el Himma. The PJD spent two decades as an opposition party before winning its first electoral victory in 2011, and it has general y refrained from pressing for deep political changes, preferring to reassure refrained from pressing for deep political changes, preferring to reassure
the palace of its ability to function within the established order.27 Several other Moroccan Islamist
movements, such as the Sufi Justice and Charity Organization (Al Adl wal Ihsan)—thought to be
Morocco’s largest grassroots movement—reject the religious authority of the monarchy and have
remained outside the political system.28 The PJD has nonetheless long espoused an anti-
corruption message that can be understood as a critique of the status quo. This message appears to
be popular, but as the large protests of 2011 fade into the past, the palace and its allies appear to
feel more emboldened to intervene directly in politics and check the PJD.29 A perceived shift in
Western donor attention away from democratic reforms and toward counterterrorism cooperation
may also be a factor. The PJD itself may have responded to these trends, replacing Benkirane as
party leader with Al Othmani, who has pursued a less populist and less confrontational tack.

23 Middle East Eye, “Mohammed VI, the absent king of Morocco,” March 30, 2018.
24the palace of its ability to function within the established order.29 The party has nonetheless espoused an anti-corruption message that may be understood as a critique of the status quo. Some observers perceived the PJD’s losses in 2021 as symbolic of a popular backlash against Islamist parties in the Middle East in recent years.30 Perceptions that the PJD had failed to al eviate economic chal enges may also have eroded its popularity, while Morocco’s political system and electoral laws have arguably further constrained the party’s influence.31 Several other Moroccan Islamist groups, such as the Justice and Charity Organization (Al Adl wal Ihsan)—reportedly Morocco's largest grassroots movement—reject the religious authority of the 26 See The Economist, “Why Morocco is Cosying Up to Sub-Saharan Africa,” July 19, 2018. 27 African Union, African T rade Observatory Dashboard, https://ato.africa/en/, data as of August 26, 2021. 28 Middle East Eye, “Mohammed VI, the absent king of Morocco,” March 30, 2018; Associated Press, “Morocco’s King, 56, Undergoes Associated Press, “Morocco’s King, 56, Undergoes Successful Successful Heart Surgery,”Heart Surgery,” June 15, 2020. June 15, 2020.
25 Intissar Fakir29 Anouar Boukhars, , Morocco’s Islamist Party: Redefining Politics Under Pressure, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, December 28, 2017.
26 Morocco World News, “Benkirane Speaks Out Over Akhannouch’s Government Formation ‘Blockage,’” December
22, 2016.
27 Anouar Boukhars, Morocco’s Islamists: Bucking the Trend? FRIDE, June 6, 2014.
28 See Vish Sakthivel, Al-Adl wal-Ihsan: Inside Morocco’s Islamist Challenge, Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 2014.
29 Mohamed Daadaoui, “Morocco’s king just named a new prime minister, in case you forgot who’s in charge,”
Washington Post Monkey Cage blog, March 20, 2017.
Congressional Research Service

5

---

link to page 4 Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations

The Economy
Morocco is a lower-middle income country; poverty and illiteracy remain widespread, despite
's Islamists: Bucking the Trend? FRIDE, June 6, 2014. 30 New York Times, “Islamists See Big Losses in Moroccan Parliamentary Elections,” September 8, 2021. 31 Reuters, “ Looming Moroccan election reveals parliament's dimming sway ,” September 4, 2021. Congressional Research Service 5 link to page 4 Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations monarchy and have remained outside the political system. One Moroccan analyst assessed that the election in 2021 of parties with close ties to the palace would “reinforce the monarchy’s stability and boost its image as the strongest – and smartest – political actor,” while noting that, “With the PJD out of the picture, the palace no longer has a scapegoat if things go wrong.”32 The Economy Morocco is a lower-middle income country with significant internal disparities; poverty and il iteracy rates remain high, despite sophisticated urban centers in Casablanca and Rabat. The economy is diverse, with sophisticated urban centers in Casablanca and Rabat. The economy is diverse, with key sectors
including agriculture, tourism, mining, and textiles and apparelagriculture, tourism, mining, and textiles and apparel comprising key sectors. Remittances from Moroccans . Remittances from Moroccans
living in Europe have long provided a source ofliving abroad provide additional foreign exchange and a social safety net. foreign exchange and a social safety net.
Through internal and Western Sahara mines, Morocco controls nearly 75Morocco holds an estimated 70% of global reserves of % of global reserves of
phosphates, used in phosphates, used in fertilizers.fertilizers, and was the second-largest phosphate producer in 2020.33 State-owned enterprises and State-owned enterprises and public investment play significant public investment play significant
roles in the economyroles in the economy; notably,: the state is the controlling shareholder the state is the controlling shareholder (with 96% of all shares) in in
the Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP), the Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP), by far the country’s largest exporterthe country’s largest exporter.30
As of April 2020, the, and the palace reportedly owns stakes in domestic companies in a range of sectors. The COVID-19 pandemic has affected Morocco’s economy through the global slowdown in trade and tourism, along with domestic restrictions on businesses and travel. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Monetary Fund (IMF) projectedestimates that Morocco’s economy that Morocco’s economy
would contract by 3.shrank by 7% in 2020, the country’s 7% in 2020, the country’s first recession in decades.34 The government has taken steps to cushion the blow, deferring some taxes, making direct payments to furloughed formal sector employees, and establishing an emergency response fund for vulnerable households (see COVID-19 text box in “Introduction”). The government also deferred social security and tax bil s for some firms in 2020first recession in decades, due to the global and
local impact of COVID-19.31 The government established an emergency response fund in March
2020 to support vulnerable households, with an initial $1 billion in financing (see text box under
“Introduction”). In addition, the government deferred social security and tax bills for certain
firms, while the central bank reduced interest rates, suspended loan repayments, and issued a new , while the central bank reduced interest rates, suspended loan repayments, and issued a new
banking credit banking credit line to finance local businesses’ operational expenses.line to finance local businesses’ operational expenses.32
Over the past decade, annual economic growth has ranged from 1% to 5%, per the IMF35 Socioeconomic hardships have driven emigration and periodic unrest. Annual GDP growth ranged from 1.0% to 5.2% between 2010 and 2019—in line —in line
with regional averages, but not with regional averages, but not consistently outpacing population growth.outpacing population growth.3336 The official The official
unemployment rate stood at unemployment rate stood at 9.211.9% in % in 2019, but was reportedly more than twice as high among
youth.34 Socioeconomic hardships have driven emigration and periodic unrest. Anger at high
consumer prices and perceived cronyism among business and political elites spurred the
aforementioned boycott protest movement in 2018 (“Introduction”).35
Heavily 2020, per the IMF, and is reportedly higher among young people. Heavily reliant on fossil fuel imports to meet reliant on fossil fuel imports to meet its domestic electricity needs, Morocco has sought to curtail costly domestic energy subsidies, a World Bank recommendation. This may have helped fuel popular economic frustrations in recent years and voters’ backlash against the PJD in 2021.37 Morocco also has pursued investments in renewable energy, including large-scale solar and wind power infrastructure.38 The American Chamber of Commerce in Morocco lists over 200 members, including local affiliates of firms such as 3M, Citibank, Johnson & Johnson, and Microsoft. The State 32 Mohammed Masbah, “How Morocco’s Islamist Party Fell from Grace,” Chatham House, September 14, 2021. 33 U.S. Geological Survey, “Phosphate Rock” Mineral Commodity Summary, 2021. 34 IMF, World Economic Outlook database, April 2021. 35 See IMF, Policy Responses to COVID-19: Policy T racker. 36 IMF, World Economic Outlook database, April 2021. 37 World Bank, “ Reforming Subsidies in Morocco,” Economic Premise, No. 134, 2014; Le Monde Arabe, “Maroc : après un bilan maussade, les islamistes du PJD sanctionnés dans les urnes,” September 28, 2021. 38 T he World Bank and African Development Bank—in which the United States is a top shareholder—are providing $535 million to support construction of a its domestic electricity needs, Morocco has sought
investments in renewable energy, including large-scale solar and wind power infrastructure.36
Because the domestic cost of fuel and electricity are politically sensitive, Morocco historically
subsidized these and other key commodities, a policy that the World Bank criticized in 2014 as
“costly, inefficient, and… putting the medium-term sustainability of public finances at risk.”37
Leveraging declines in global oil prices at the time, Morocco ended most fuel subsidies in 2015,
with the notable exception of butane gas, used for cooking. The move prompted public scrutiny
over whether politically-connected gas distribution companies benefitted disproportionately, and
may have contributed to popular frustrations over the high cost of living.38

30 World Bank, Governance Reforms of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs): Lessons from four case studies (Egypt, Iraq,
Morocco and Tunisia), August 2015.
31 IMF, World Economic Outlook database, April 2020.
32 See IMF, Policy Responses to COVID-19: Policy Tracker, at https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-
covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#M.
33 Ibid.
34 CIA World Factbook; youth unemployment statistic from 2016 (latest cited).
35 Reuters, “Morocco consumer boycott has big business in its sights,” May 30, 2018.
36 The World Bank in 2014 approved a $519 million loan to support the construction of a major solar power electricity solar power electricity
generation plant in southern Moroccogeneration plant in southern Morocco— that is reportedly the largest facility of its kindreportedly the largest facility of its kind in the world. See also Moroccan
Investment Development Agency, Investment Opportunities, “Solar Energy” and “Wind Energy. Other donors are also supporting the project. See World Bank, “ Morocco: Noor Solar Power Project ,” at https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P131256.,” at
http://www.invest.gov.ma/index.php?Id=22&lang=en.
37 World Bank, “Reforming Subsidies in Morocco,” Economic Premise, No. 134, February 2014.
38 Jeune Afrique, “Maroc: Le Parlement rend public un rapport sur les prix des carburants sur fond de boycott
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

6 6

---

Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations Department’s 2020and U.S. Relations

As of 2020, the American Chamber of Commerce in Morocco listed over 240 members, including
firms such as 3M, Citibank, Johnson & Johnson, and Microsoft. The State Department’s 2019
Investment Climate Statement reported that Morocco reported that Morocco was “actively encouraging and facilitating
“actively encourages and facilitates foreign investment, particularly in export sectors like manufacturingforeign investment, particularly in export sectors like manufacturing, – through through dynamic macro-economic macro-economic
policies, trade liberalization, investment incentives, and structural reforms.” The report identified policies, trade liberalization, investment incentives, and structural reforms.” The report identified
“insufficient skilled labor, weak intellectualinsufficient skil ed labor, along with “weak intel ectual property rights (IPR) protections, inefficient property rights (IPR) protections, inefficient
government bureaucracy, and the slow pace of regulatory reform” as key challenges.
Terrorism and Foreign Fighters
Morocco is the only country in North Africa not to have suffered a major terrorist attack since
2012, although two European tourists were kidnapped and killed in 2018 by individuals who had
reportedly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State.39 Previously, a sophisticated Al Qaeda-linked
bombing attack killed dozens of people in Casablanca in 2003, and a local terrorist cell assaulted
a tourist-friendly café in Marrakesh in 2011, killing 17 people.40 Small Islamist extremist cells
have long posed a domestic security threat, and authorities have repeatedly claimed to disrupt
local cells and plots tied to Al Qaeda or the Islamic State.41 The State Department has praised
Morocco’s “comprehensive counterterrorism strategy,” noting that it includes “vigilant security
measures, regional and international cooperation, and counter-radicalization policies.”42
At the height of the Islamic State’s territorial control in Syria and Iraq (2014-2015), some 1,500
Moroccans reportedly traveled to those countries as “foreign fighters,” placing Morocco among
the top global sources of Islamist foreign combatants.43 Hundredsgovernment bureaucracy, and the slow pace of regulatory reform remain chal enges” as key business environment chal enges. Terrorism and Foreign Fighters The State Department has praised Morocco’s “comprehensive” counterterrorism strategy, which includes “vigilant security measures, regional and international cooperation, and counter-radicalization policies.”39 Moroccan authorities regularly claim to disrupt local terrorist cel s and plots, including some tied to Al Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL).40 U.N. global terrorism sanctions investigators assessed in mid-2021 that Morocco faced “a growing threat” from Al Qaeda and IS supporters and reported that a U.S.-Morocco “joint operation” had recently dismantled a local IS cel .41 Morocco is the only country in North Africa not to have suffered a major terrorist attack since 2012, although two European tourists were kidnapped and kil ed in 2018 by individuals who had reportedly pledged al egiance to the Islamic State.42 Previously, an Al Qaeda-linked bombing attack kil ed dozens of people in Casablanca in 2003, and a local terrorist cel assaulted a tourist-friendly café in Marrakesh in 2011, kil ing 17 people. At the height of the Islamic State’s territorial control in Syria and Iraq (2014-2015), Morocco was among the top known origins of Islamist foreign fighters in those countries.43 Hundreds of Moroccans reportedly joined the Islamic State reportedly joined the Islamic
State organization, while others—including three former , while others—including three former Guantánamo detainees who had been
U.S. Guantánamo detainees repatriated to Morocco repatriated to Morocco underduring the George W. Bush Administration— the George W. Bush Administration—reportedly joined or formed Al Qaeda-joined or formed Al Qaeda-
affiliated groups.44 In addition, various individuals of Moroccan descent have been implicated in
terrorist plots in Europe and the United States; many appear to have been radicalized abroad.45
affiliated groups.44 The head of Morocco’s Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations stated The head of Morocco’s Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations stated as of mid-in 2018 that the 2018 that the
country had prosecuted and convicted more than country had prosecuted and convicted more than 200 returning fighters.45 Moroccan nationals were also reportedly among the thousands of al eged Islamic State fighters detained as of 2019 in Syria by the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).46 Individuals of Moroccan descent have been implicated in terrorist plots in Europe and the United States; many appear to have been radicalized abroad.47 39 State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019, “Morocco.” 40 State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019 (latest), “Morocco,” released June 24, 2020. 41 Twenty-eighth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, U.N. doc. S/2021/655, July 21, 2021. U.S. officials do not appear to have publicly confirmed such an operation. 42 BBC, “Scandinavian Hikers Murder T rial Begins in Morocco,” May 2, 2019. 43 See, e.g., Washington Post, “Foreign Fighters Flow to Syria [Info-Graphic],” October 11, 2014. 44 Wall Street Journal, “After Guantanamo, Freed Detainees Returned to Violence in Syria Battlefields,” June 200 returning fighters.46 He noted that Moroccan
laws allowed police to arrest returnees upon arrival before processing charges against them.

commercial,” May 17, 2018.
39 BBC, “Scandinavian Hikers Murder Trial Begins in Morocco,” May 2, 2019.
40 In Casablanca, simultaneous suicide bombings killed 33 civilians and 12 assailants. The attacks spurred large street
protests against terrorism as well as a state crackdown on domestic Islamist movements seen as supporting extremism.
Moroccan authorities linked the 2011 attack to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Algerian-origin regional
Al Qaeda affiliate; AQIM denied responsibility while calling on Moroccans to overthrow the monarchy. Reuters,
“Qaeda denies involvement in Morocco cafe bomb attack,” May 7, 2011.
41 In 2018 alone, Moroccan authorities reported to have arrested 71 individuals and dismantled more than 20 terrorists
cells planning to attack a range of targets, including public buildings, prominent figures, and tourist sites. State
Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2018, “Morocco,” released November 1, 2019 (latest available).
42 State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2018, “Morocco.”
43 See, e.g., Washington Post, “Foreign Fighters Flow to Syria [Info-Graphic],” October 11, 2014.
44 Wall Street Journal, “After Guantanamo, Freed Detainees Returned to Violence in Syria Battlefields,” June 3, 2014. 3, 2014.
In 2014, another Moroccan ex-Guantánamo detainee, who had reportedly been transferred from U.S. to Spanish In 2014, another Moroccan ex-Guantánamo detainee, who had reportedly been transferred from U.S. to Spanish
custody in 2005, wascustody in 2005, was arrested in Spain on accusations of recruiting fighters for the Islamic State.arrested in Spain on accusations of recruiting fighters for the Islamic State.
45 45 AFP, “Morocco T ackling Jihadist Returnees: Anti-T error Chief,” May 5, 2018. 46 Washington Post, “T housands of Islamic State fighters captured in Syria face uncertain fate,” December 27, 2019. 47 In 2018, over U.S. objections, Germany deported to Morocco Mounir el Motassadeq, a member of the Hamburg-In 2018, over U.S. objections, Germany deported to Morocco Mounir el Motassadeq, a member of the Hamburg-
basedbased terrorist cell that supported the terrorist cell that supported the logistical planning effortsplanning of the 9/11 attacks of the 9/11 attacks. in the United States (State Department, State Department, Country Reports
on Terrorism 2018, “ Germany”). In 2012, U.S. federal law enforcement agencies arrested a Moroccan citizen whom they accused of plotting to attack the Capitol building. In other cases, Moroccan intelligence has reportedly helped foil terrorist plots in Europe; see, e.g., The North Africa Post, “ Counterterrorism: France thanks Morocco for help in dismantling terror cell,” April 9, 2021. Congressional Research Service 7 link to page 12 Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations Western Sahara48 Morocco and the independence-seeking Polisario Front have vied for control of 2018, “Germany.”
46 AFP, “Morocco Tackling Jihadist Returnees: Anti-Terror Chief,” May 5, 2018.
Congressional Research Service

7

---

Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations

Moroccan nationals were also reportedly among the thousands of alleged Islamic State fighters
detained as of late 2019 in Syria by U.S.-backed the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).47
Western Sahara
The decades-long dispute between Morocco and the independence-seeking Polisario Front over
the former Spanish colony known as the Western Sahara the former Spanish colony known as the Western Sahara remains unresolved.48 Morocco and the
Polisario fought a war in the desert over the territory starting in 1975, whensince the 1970s. Morocco refers to the area as the “Moroccan Sahara,” or its southern provinces. In 1975, as Spain prepared to decolonize the territory, Morocco—which had Morocco—which had
obtained independence from obtained independence from colonial power France in 1956—launched a “Green March” of some France in 1956—launched a “Green March” of some
350,000 unarmed civilians to claim 350,000 unarmed civilians to claim the Western Sahara as Spain prepared to decolonize it. The
it. Mauritania also annexed parts of the territory, and the Polisario launched an insurgency to wrest control. Mauritania withdrew from the conflict in 1979, but conflict between Morocco and the Polisario persisted until the U.N. brokered a ceasefire in 1991U.N. brokered a ceasefire in 1991 and the. The U.N. Security Council Security Council then established the U.N. Mission for the established the U.N. Mission for the
Organization of a Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) to Organization of a Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) to monitor the ceasefire and to
offer Sahrawis—the self-described offer Sahrawis—the self-described originalIndigenous inhabitants of Western Sahara—a inhabitants of Western Sahara—a path toreferendum on “self determination” and to monitor the ceasefire. “self
determination.” Successive U.N. efforts to advance a referendum or other resolution options Successive U.N. efforts to advance a referendum or other resolution options
failed, however,failed to obtain the backing of to obtain the backing of either Morocco, the Polisario, or the Security Council.Morocco, the Polisario, or the Security Council.
Figure 2. Map of the Western Sahara

Source: CRS graphic, adopted from U.N. Secretary-General reports to the U.N. Security Council.
Morocco administers some 85% of the territory, which it considers its southern provinces or the
“Moroccan Sahara,” demarcated by a berm Morocco49 In the absence of a final settlement, the Council has continued to extend MINURSO’s mandate (most recently in October 2020) to observe the 1991 ceasefire.50 Morocco administers some 85% of the territory, demarcated by a berm that it constructed as a constructed as a barrier to Polisario barrier to Polisario

47 Washington Post, “Thousands of Islamic State fighters captured in Syria face uncertain fate,” December 27, 2019.
48 For background, see CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara, by Alexis Arieff.
Congressional Research Service

8

---

Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations

incursions (incursions (Figure 2). In 2007, King Mohammed VI submitted to the U.N. a proposal to grant ). In 2007, King Mohammed VI submitted to the U.N. a proposal to grant
Western Saharathe area “autonomy” under Moroccan sovereignty, and he has pursued policies of political “autonomy” under Moroccan sovereignty, and he has pursued policies of political
decentralization that he says are intended to empower decentralization that he says are intended to empower residents of his “Saharan provinces.”49 The
Sahrawis and other residents.51 The area east of the berm, which the Polisario refers to as its “liberated areas,” comprises largely area east of the berm, which the Polisario refers to as its “liberated areas,” comprises largely
uninhabited desert with some uninhabited desert with some small smal settlements. Algeria hosts and backs the Polisario and its self-settlements. Algeria hosts and backs the Polisario and its self-
declared government, the SADR, but contends that it (Algeria) is not a party to the conflict. declared government, the SADR, but contends that it (Algeria) is not a party to the conflict.
Morocco states that it will accept only a solution that guarantees its sovereignty over the territory
and will negotiate only on that basis—while the Polisario states it will accept only an outcome
involving a referendum with the option of independence. Morocco rejected a 2003 peace plan
involving a referendum proposed by James Baker, the former U.S. Secretary of State then serving
as the Personal Envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General, and called for negotiations with Algeria.
Since 2007, the U.N. Security Council has calledSince 2007, the U.N. Security Council has cal ed for Morocco and the Polisario to engage in for Morocco and the Polisario to engage in
“negotiations without preconditions” to “negotiations without preconditions” to pursue a “mutuallyfind a “mutual y acceptable political solution.”52 Morocco states that it wil accept only a solution that guarantees its sovereignty over the whole territory and wil negotiate only on that basis—while the Polisario states it wil accept only an outcome involving a referendum with the option of independence. In 2018-2019, pressure from the Trump Administration acceptable political solution” to the
situation. Neither side has shown an interest in compromise. In the absence of a final settlement,
the Security Council has continued to task MINURSO with observing the ceasefire. MINURSO’s
uniformed component consists almost entirely of unarmed military observers.
In 2018-2019, pressure from the Trump Administration (see “U.S. Relations”) appeared to appeared to
contribute to some momentum toward talkscontribute to some momentum toward talks, albeit with no concrete outcomes.50.53 The U.N. The U.N.
Secretary-General’s then-Personal Envoy on the Western Sahara, former German President Horst Secretary-General’s then-Personal Envoy on the Western Sahara, former German President Horst
Köhler, convened Köhler, convened two sessions of “roundtable” “roundtable” talksdiscussions among Morocco, the Polisario, Algeria, and Mauritania among Morocco, the Polisario, Algeria, and Mauritania in
December 2018—the first time official representatives of Morocco and the Polisario had met —the first time official representatives of Morocco and the Polisario had met
since 2012, and the first time Algeria agreed to join the since 2012, and the first time Algeria agreed to join the talks—and again in March 2019U.N. talks. No . No
breakthrough was announced, breakthrough was announced, and in May 2019, however, and Köhler unexpectedly announced his resignation Köhler unexpectedly announced his resignation in May 2019, ,
citing health reasons. citing health reasons. As of June 2020, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres hadhas not not
announced a replacement.
Military tensions have periodically escalated in the territory over alleged incursions by one side
or the other into a demilitarized “buffer zone” defined in the ceasefire. In the lead-up to the
MINURSO mandate renewal in early 2018, Morocco accused the Polisario of violating the
ceasefire with Algerian backing.51 Soon after, Morocco cut ties with Iran after accusing it of
arming the Polisario via Hezbollah, with Algerian assistance, although it did not publicly release
evidence.52 In 2016, Morocco expelled MINURSO civilian staff in response to remarks by then-
U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon referencing Morocco’s “occupation” of the territory.53
With limited sources of international leverage, the Polisario has sought to challenge Morocco’s
announced a replacement. At Morocco’s encouragement, at least 20 countries—mostly located in Africa—have opened diplomatic consulates in the territory, which may be viewed as a recognition of Moroccan 48 For background, see CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara. 49 T hese included a 2003 peace plan proposed by James Baker, the former U.S. Secretary of State then serving as the Personal Envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General, involving a referendum on independence, which Morocco rejected. 50 U.N. Security Council Resolution 2548 (2020). As of July 2021, MINURSO comprised 222 military observers. 51 King Mohammed VI, speech on the 33rd anniversary of the Green March, November 11, 2008. 52 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1754 (2007) and subsequent resolutions on Western Sahara. 53 During this time, the T rump Administration sought to increase pressure by shortening MINURSO’s mandate from one year to six months. T his approach was closely associated with then-National Security Advisor John Bolton. See U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “ Explanation of Vote for MINURSO Renewal,” April 27, 2018. Congressional Research Service 8 Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations sovereignty.54 President Trump pledged to open a U.S. consulate, but the timeline for doing so is uncertain. For its part, the Polisario has sought to chal enge Morocco’s ability to conclude trade and natural resource extraction agreements pertaining to goods sourced ability to conclude trade and natural resource extraction agreements pertaining to goods sourced
in Western Sahara.54 The Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled in favor of the

49 King Mohammed VI, speech on the 33rd anniversary of the Green March, November 11, 2008.
50 See U.S. Mission to the United Nations, "Explanation of Vote for MINURSO Renewal," April 27, 2018. The
Administration called for progress toward a settlement, while seeking to increase pressure by shortening MINURSO’s
mandate from one year to six months. This approach was closely associated with then-National Security Advisor John
Bolton, who has long expressed skepticism of MINURSO and advocated pressure on Morocco to make concessions.
51 Middle East Eye, “Morocco threatens Algeria with intervention in Western Sahara,” April 10, 2018.
52 Sarah Feuer, “Delicate Diplomacy in Western Sahara,” The Washington Institute, October 18, 2018.
53 Some MINURSO civilian staff returned to Laayoune in 2017, while some positions were consolidated or relocated.
54 In 2002, the U.N. Legal Counsel, in response to a query from the Security Council on the legality of contracts
concluded by Morocco offshore Western Sahara, concluded that such activities are illegal “if conducted in disregard of
in Western Sahara.55 European Union (EU) courts, among others, have occasional y ruled in the Polisario’s favor; the full implications of the latest EU court ruling, pertaining to EU-Morocco tariff and fisheries agreements, remain to be seen.56 Figure 2. U.N. Map of Western Sahara Source/Note: CRS graphic, adapted from U.N. Secretary-General reports. Ceasefire Rupture in 2020 In November 2020, the Polisario announced it was withdrawing from the ceasefire and launched smal -scale attacks on Moroccan military positions, after Moroccan troops entered a demilitarized “buffer zone” to clear Polisario protesters who were disrupting Moroccan construction of a road connecting to Mauritania. Military tensions have periodical y erupted over al eged incursions by 54 Morocco Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Diplomatic Representations in the Southern Provinces of the Kingdom of Morocco,” December 14, 2020; and subsequent news reports. 55 In 2002, the U.N. Legal Counsel, in response to a query from the Security Council, concluded t hat contracts with Morocco concerning Western Sahara are illegal “if conducted in disregard of the needs and interests of the people” of Western Sahara. the needs and interests of the people” of Western Sahara. ThisT his determination is subject to competing interpretations and determination is subject to competing interpretations and
is not readily enforceable, but may is not readily enforceable, but may affect firms’ calculations. Letter Dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. doc. S/2002/161, February 12, 2002. 56 General Court of the European Union, “T he General Court annuls the Council decisions concerning, first, the agreement between the European Union and Morocco amending the tariff preferences granted by the European Union to products of Moroccan origin and, second, the Sustainable Fisheries Part nership Agreement ,” September 29, 2021.affect the calculations of private firms. See U.N. doc. S/2002/161, Letter Dated 29
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

9 9

---

Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations

Polisario’s stance in recent years, finding that goods produced in the Western Sahara should not
benefit from an EU-Morocco tariff agreement, and that an EU-Morocco fisheries agreement
should not apply to the Western Sahara coastline. EU policymakers have effectively bypassed
these findings in practice; for example, EU parliamentarians endorsed a fisheries deal with
Morocco in 2019 that allows European vessels to operate off the coast of Western Sahara.55
U.S. Relations
The United States and Morocco have longstanding, warm relations. Morocco was one of the first
foreign powers to recognize the United States, by opening its ports to American ships by decree
of Sultan Mohammed III in 1777.56 Longstanding U.S. goals in Morocco include promoting
regional stability, countering terrorism, strengthening trade and investment ties, and supporting
Morocco’s development and reform efforts. The Trump Administration has characterized the
U.S.-Morocco relationship as “a strategic partnership as we work together to advance our shared
vision of a secure, stable, and prosperous North Africa and Middle East.”57 In 2019, the two
countries revived a high-level Bilateral Strategic Dialogue that had last convened in 2015.58
Morocco and the United States have built strong military-to-military ties through regular training
engagements, a large annual exercise known as African Lion (hosted by Morocco), and Moroccan
acquisitions of significant U.S.-origin materiel, including F-16 jets and M1A1 tanks. In 2019, the
U.S. government approved up to $10 billion one side or the other into the buffer zone, but international diplomatic pressure succeeded in deescalating previous stand-offs. The clashes in late 2020 were closely followed by the Trump Administration’s change in recognition policy in Morocco’s favor, which the Polisario likely viewed as decreasing the chance of international pressure on Morocco to make concessions. The Polisario has continued to claim attacks, but does not appear to pose a significant threat to Morocco absent greater Algerian military support. Morocco asserts that it remains committed to the ceasefire, although a reported Moroccan military strike kil ed a Polisario security official in April 2021.57 The Biden Administration has not reversed the U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of sovereignty to date, but has cal ed for new talks and appointment of a new U.N. envoy.58 U.S. Relations The United States and Morocco have longstanding, warm relations.59 As noted above (“Introduction”), the Biden Administration has referred to Morocco as a “strategic partner,” while expressing some human rights concerns. The Administration has maintained, to date, the policy instituted by President Trump of recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. In mid-2021, the Biden Administration repatriated Guantánamo detainee Abdul Latif Nasser to Morocco, the first such detainee transfer from Guantánamo since 2016.60 U.S.-Morocco cooperation aims to promote regional stability, counter terrorism, strengthen trade and investment ties, and support Morocco’s development and reform efforts.61 Congress has supported these objectives on a bipartisan basis, enacting the 2004 U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, approving proposed arms sales to Morocco, and appropriating bilateral economic and military aid. Members of Congress have nonetheless expressed divergent views on the Western Sahara issue. Some Members have supported recent foreign aid appropriations measures favoring Morocco’s position (see below), while some Members have cal ed on the Biden Administration to reverse the Trump Administration’s decision to recognize Morocco’s claim to the territory.62 Morocco and the United States have built strong military-to-military ties through regular training engagements, a large annual exercise hosted by Morocco and known as African Lion, and Moroccan acquisitions of significant U.S.-origin defense materiel. Such purchases have grown in recent years: in 2019 alone, the U.S. government approved up to $10 bil ion in new arms sales to Morocco, including in new arms sales to Morocco, including an upgrade
of Morocco’s existing 23 F-16s, 25 new F-16s, 36 Apache attack helicopters, 25 new F-16s, 36 Apache attack helicopters, and TOW missiles TOW missiles
and missile and missile launchers.launchers, and an upgrade of Morocco’s existing 23 F-16s.63 Morocco’s Major Non-NATO Morocco’s Major Non-NATO Ally status alsoAl y status grants it priority in the grants it priority in the
grant-based delivery of U.S. excess defense articles (EDA), and 57 Defense Post, “Has Morocco Carried Out Its First Drone Strike In the Western Sahara?” April 12, 2021. 58 State Department, “ Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with UN Secretary-General Guterres,” March 29, 2021. 59 Morocco was one of the first foreign powers to recognize the United States, by opening its ports to American ships by decree of Sultan Mohammed III in 1777 . Per the State Department, “ delivery of U.S. excess defense articles (EDA) on a grant basis, and Morocco is a significant
global EDA beneficiary.59
The U.S.-Morocco partnership extends into regional initiatives. Morocco is a member of the U.S.-
led Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State. In recent years, African Lion has expanded to
include participants from other militaries in North and West Africa, along with European
countries.60 The U.S. interest in countering Islamist extremist ideology has coincided with
Morocco’s efforts in recent years to train imams (including from other countries in North and
West Africa) in its traditions of religious moderation.61 In 2017, Morocco arrested a U.S.-
designated Hezbollah financier who was apparently en route from Guinea to Lebanon, and later

January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, Addressed to the President of
the Security Council, February 12, 2002.
55 RFI, “EU Skirts Rule of Law to Adopt Moroccan Fish Deal,” February 12, 2019.
56 Per the State Department, “Morocco formally recognized the United States by signingMorocco formally recognized the United States by signing a treaty of peace and a treaty of peace and
friendship in 1786, a document that remains the longest unbroken relationship in U.S. history.” State Department, “friendship in 1786, a document that remains the longest unbroken relationship in U.S. history.” State Department, “U.S.
Relations with Morocco,” October 4, 2019; and State Department, “ A Guide to the United States’ History of A Guide to the United States’ History of
Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: MoroccoRecognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Morocco .” 60 Nasser was never charged by the United States, and his transfer was reportedly approved during the Obama Administration. New York Tim es, “ Biden Administration T ransfers Its First Detainee From Guantánamo Bay ,” July 19, 2021. 61 State Department, “ U.S. Relations With Morocco,” November 5, 2020 (latest). 62 Senator James Inhofe, “ Inhofe, Leahy Lead 25 Colleagues to Urge Biden to Reverse Misguided Western Sahara Decision,” February 17, 2021. 63 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notifications, available at https://www.dsca.mil/. Congressional Research Service 10 Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations Morocco is a significant global EDA beneficiary.64 The Utah National Guard maintains a State Partnership Program with Morocco’s armed forces. The U.S.-Morocco partnership extends into regional initiatives. Morocco is a member of the U.S.- led Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State. In recent years, African Lion has expanded to include troops from other countries in North and West Africa.65 The United States has been supportive of Morocco’s efforts to train imams from other countries in North and West Africa in its traditions of religious moderation. In 2017, Morocco arrested a U.S.-designated Hezbollah financier who was reportedly en route to Lebanon, and .”
57 Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, press statement on Moroccan National Day, July 30, 2018.
58 State Department, “Security Working Group of the U.S.-Morocco Strategic Dialogue,” July 3, 2019. President
Obama and King Mohammed VI launched the Dialogue in 2012.
59 22 U.S. Code §2321j. According to data published by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the United
States delivered $4.8 million worth of equipment to Morocco (acquisition value) through EDA in 2019, and also
authorized delivery of two C-130H aircraft and an F-16 training aircraft.
60 Department of Defense, “Exercise African Lion 2018 Concludes in Morocco,” May 17, 2018.
61 See testimony by Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joan Polaschik,
“Beyond ISIS: Countering Terrorism, Radicalization, and Promoting Stability in North Africa,” Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on the Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism, December 6, 2017.
Congressional Research Service

10

---

Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations

transferred him to U.S. custody to face trial.62transferred him to U.S. custody to face trial.66 Morocco hosted Libyan talks Morocco hosted Libyan talks culminating inthat produced the the
2015 agreement to establish a Libyan 2015 agreement to establish a Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA), which the United Government of National Accord (GNA), which the United
States backed.
U.S. Foreign Aid
U.S. bilateral aid aims to help Morocco improve education, local governance, livelihood
opportunities, and military capabilities. In addition to funds administered by the State Department
and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—see Table 1—Morocco began
implementing a five-year, $450 million U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact
in 2017, the country’s second such program.63 The current compact seeks to address “two
Moroccan Government priorities that have posed binding constraints to economic growth and
investment: youth employability and land productivity.”64 Morocco also has received aid under
U.S. global programs such as the Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF), for which Congress has
appropriated funds to assist countries affected by the Islamic State.
In line with its global foreign assistance proposals, the Trump Administration has States backed. U.S. Foreign Aid U.S. bilateral aid, totaling $41 mil ion in FY2021 appropriations (Table 1), aims to help Morocco improve its education system, local governance, livelihood opportunities, and military capabilities. In line with its broader budget proposals, the Trump Administration proposed large cuts to U.S. bilateral aid for Morocco; Congress did not enact these proposals. The Biden Administration has proposed a slight decrease in aid for Morocco to $36 mil ion in FY2022. proposed
repeatedly to decrease State Department- and USAID-administered bilateral aid to Morocco. This
would not directly affect the MCC compact or programs administered by other U.S. federal
entities. Congress has not adopted such aid budget proposals with regard to Morocco to date.
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Morocco, State Department +and USAID
allocationsal ocations by year of appropriation, current $ by year of appropriation, current $ millions
FY2020
FY2020
FY2021mil ions FY2021 FY2021 FY2022

FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
(requestedFY2020 (request)
(enacted)
(requestedrequest)
DA DA
- -
- -
- -
10.0 -
10.0 10.0
-
ESF ESF/ESDF
20.0 20.0
20.0 20.0
20.0 20.0
10.010.0 10.0 (ESDF)
10.0 10.0
1020.0
INCLE INCLE
5.0 5.0
5.0 5.0
5.0 5.0
3.05.0 1.5
5.0 5.0
1.53.9
FMF FMF
10.0 10.0
10.0 10.0
10.0 10.0
10.0 -
10.0 10.0
-10.0
IMET IMET
2.1 2.1
2.1 2.1
2.0 2.0
2.0 2.0
2.0 2.0
2.0
NADR NADR
1.5 1.5
1.5 1.5
1.5 1.5
0.74.0 -
4.0 4.0
-
TOTAL
38.6
38.6
38.5
15.741.0 13.5
41.0
13.535.9
Source: State Department annual CongressionalState Department annual Congressional Budget Justification (FY2019-FY2021 Budget Justifications (FY2019-FY2022); explanatory statement ); explanatory statement
accompanying P.L. 116-accompanying P.L. 116-94260 , Division , Division G K (FY2021). .
Notes: Does not includeExcludes funds provided via global programs funds provided via global programs, or administered or by other federal entities (e.g.,by other federal entities (e.g., the Mil ennium Chal enge Corporation or Department of Defense). DA = Development the
MCC). DA=Development Assistance; ESFAssistance; ESF= = Economic Support Fund; ESDFEconomic Support Fund; ESDF= = Economic Support & DevelopmentEconomic Support & Development
Fund (a Trump Administration-proposedFund (a Trump Administration-proposed new account); INCLEaccount); INCLE= = International Narcotics Control & Law International Narcotics Control & Law
Enforcement; FMFEnforcement; FMF= = Foreign Military Financing; IMETForeign Military Financing; IMET= = International Military Education & Training; International Military Education & Training;
NADR=NADR = Nonproliferation,Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism,Antiterrorism, Demining,Demining, & Related Programs. In addition to bilateral aid funds administered by the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Morocco began implementing a five-year, $450 mil ion U.S. Mil ennium Chal enge Corporation (MCC) compact in 2017, the country’s second such 64 22 U.S. Code §2321j. Recently EDA-authorized deliveries to Morocco include C-130H and F-16 training aircraft. 65 U.S. Africa Command, “ Plans underway for African Lion, Africa's biggest military exercise,” February 4, 2021. 66 Washington Post, “Lebanese businessman, Hezbollah supporter, charged with evading U.S. terror sanctions,” March 24, 2017. Congressional Research Service 11 Morocco: Background & Related Programs.

62 Washington Post, “Lebanese businessman, Hezbollah supporter, charged with evading U.S. terror sanctions,” March
24, 2017.
63 Morocco’s $697.5 million 2008-2013 MCC compact sought to alleviate poverty through targeted investments in fruit
tree productivity, fisheries, artisan production, financial services, and private enterprises.
64 MCC, “Morocco Employability and Land Compact,” https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/morocco-
employability-and-land-compact.
Congressional Research Service

11

---

Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations

Western Sahara: U.S. Policy and Foreign Aid Legislation
With regard to Western Sahara, the United States has recognized neither Morocco’s claim of
sovereignty, nor the SADR. The Trump Administration has continued a policy of supporting
U.N.-led diplomatic initiatives to achieve a negotiated solution, while praising Morocco’s
autonomy proposal as “serious, realistic, and credible” and a “potential approach that could
satisfy the aspirations of the people in the Western Sahara to run their own affairs in peace and
dignity”—the same terms used by the previous Administration.65 In 2018, then-National Security
Advisor John Bolton threatened to end U.S. support for MINURSO in an effort to increase
pressure on the parties to reach a political settlement.66 Bolton’s approach appeared nested within
his stated skepticism toward U.N. peacekeeping, as well as his assertions earlier in his career that
U.S. policy toward Western Sahara had overly favored Morocco.67 Bolton’s stance did not result
in an evident shift in U.S.-Morocco bilateral relations, however. In 2013 and 2016, diplomatic
crises erupted over perceived Obama Administration pressure on Morocco over and U.S. Relations program.67 The current compact seeks to address “two Moroccan Government priorities that have posed binding constraints to economic growth and investment: youth employability and land productivity.”68 The State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense (DOD) also have al ocated funds for Morocco under global programs established by Congress, such as the Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF) for countries affected by the Islamic State, USAID’s Countering Chinese Influence Fund (CCIF), and DOD’s “Section 333” global train and equip security program (authorized under 10 U.S.C. §333).69 The State Department and USAID have provided at least $11.4 mil ion in COVID-19-related health aid for Morocco since March 2020, in addition to 302,400 Johnson & Johnson COVID-19 vaccine doses donated in July 2021; the State Department also has al ocated funds to refurbish Morocco’s Pasteur Institute.70 Western Sahara in Foreign Aid Legislation Prior to the Trump Administration’s decision to recognize Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over Western Sahara Western Sahara
in the U.N.68
It hasin late 2020, it had been the policy of successive Administrations that funds appropriated for bilateral aid to been the policy of successive Administrations that funds appropriated for bilateral aid to
Morocco Morocco maycould not be implemented in Western Sahara. (The impact, if any, of the recognition policy on this approach has not been publicly articulated.) Starting in 2013, some Members of Congress backed provisions in annual State and Foreign Operations (SFOPS) appropriations measures that sought to overturn this approach and thereby presumably encourage the executive branch to alter its policy in Morocco’s favor. Final enacted bil s contained more flexible provisions that required some aid to be implemented in Western Sahara, while deferring to the executive branch on the source of those funds. In the 113th Congress, the House Appropriations Committee not be implemented in Western Sahara, as such use could be interpreted as a tacit
endorsement of Moroccan sovereignty and therefore as a shift in U.S. diplomatic recognition
policy. To date, the 116th Congress has passed two successive annual foreign aid appropriations
measures providing that an unspecified amount of global bilateral economic assistance funds
“shall be made available for the Western Sahara.” The provision originated in the House
Appropriations Committee during the 113th Congress, which reported an FY2014 appropriations reported an FY2014 appropriations
measure providing that bilateralmeasure providing that bilateral economic assistance appropriations “available for assistance economic assistance appropriations “available for assistance to
Morocco shall shal be made availablebe made available for any region administered by Morocco, including the Western for any region administered by Morocco, including the Western
Sahara” (§7042[g] of H.R. 2855; italics added). The Senate Sahara” (§7042[g] of H.R. 2855; italics added). The Senate bill bil did not contain an equivalent did not contain an equivalent
provision. The final enrolled provision. The final enrolled bill bil contained a provision contained a provision substantially similar to the one reported by similar to the one reported by
the House committee, but with the word “should” substituting for “the House committee, but with the word “should” substituting for “shall” (shal ” (§7041[h] of P.L. 113-76, 7041[h] of P.L. 113-76,
Division K). The following year’s Division K). The following year’s aid appropriations measure provided that funds appropriated appropriations measure provided that funds appropriated
for global for global bilateral economic assistance, bilateral economic assistance, with no specific reference to Morocco, “shall “shal be made be made
available for assistance for the Western Sahara” available for assistance for the Western Sahara” ((§7041[g] of P.L. 113-235, Division J). Subsequent 7041[g] of P.L. 113-235, Division J). Subsequent
enacted appropriations measures have contained substantially similar provisions.


65 State Department, Office of the Spokesperson, “Deputy Secretary Sullivan’s Meeting With Foreign Minister Nasser
Bourita in Morocco,” June 29, 2018; State Department, “Joint Statement of the Second Session of the United States -
Kingdom of Morocco Strategic Dialogue,” April 4, 2014.
66 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Explanation of Vote for MINURSO Renewal,” April 27, 2018.
67 See, e.g., Bolton, Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America at the United Nations (Threshold Editions: 2008);
and remarks at the Heritage Foundation on the Trump Administration’s Africa strategy, December 13, 2018.
68 In 2013, U.S. diplomats in New York temporarily backed a proposal in the U.N. Security Council that would have
added human rights monitoring to MINURSO’s mandate. Morocco responded by expelling U.S. military personnel
participating in the annual joint military exercise African Lion. The proposal ultimately did not advance, and tensions
seemed to fade with the king’s visit to Washington DC later that year. In 2016, Morocco expelled U.N. civilian
officials from Western Sahara after the then-U.N. Secretary-General used the term “occupation” to refer to its
administration of the territory. The king then delivered a speech that observers saw as aimed at U.S. diplomats serving
in the U.N. Secretariat, criticizing what he portrayed as fair-weather friends and calling for the “diversification” of
Morocco’s foreign partnerships. The speech followed an official visit by the king to Russia. (Morocco World News,
“Full Text of King Mohammed VI’s Speech to Morocco-GCC Summit in Riyadh,” April 20, 2016.)
Congressional Research Service

12

---

Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations


Author Information

Alexis Arieff

Specialist in African Affairs
enacted appropriations measures have contained substantial y similar provisions, including, most recently, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (§7041[g] of P.L. 116-260, Division K).71 67 Morocco’s $697.5 million 2008-2013 MCC compact sought to alleviate poverty through targeted investmen ts in fruit tree productivity, fisheries, artisan production, financial services, and private enterprises. 68 MCC, “ Morocco Employability and Land Compact ,” at http://www.mcc.gov. 69 Recently planned Section 333 activities would support Moroccan capabilities related to counterterrorism, maritime security, counter-narcotics, and countering weapons of mass destruction, as notified to Congress by DOD. 70 State Department data on COVID-19 response aid provided to CRS, as of April 25, 2021; “COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution” data via https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/morocco/; and congressional notifications. 71 T he House Appropriations Committee’s accompanying report stated: “Subsection (g) includes similar language from the prior year. T he Committee recognizes the longstanding partnership between the United States and the Kingdom of Morocco based on mutual interests of stabilit y, tolerance and economic prosperity in the Middle East and Africa. T he Committee encourages the Secretary of State to strengthen this partnership to defeat terrorism and violent extremist groups, namely in the Sahel region, as well as to counter Iran's malign influence in the region” (H.Rept. 116-444). Congressional Research Service 12 Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations Author Information Alexis Arieff Specialist in African Affairs


Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should notn ot be relied upon for purposes other be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
R45387 R45387 · VERSION 36 · UPDATED
13 13

---