Updated June 22July 13, 2020
Uyghurs in China
Uyghurs (also spelled “Uighurs”) are an ethnic group living
primarily in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR) in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) far
northwest. Uyghurs speak a Turkic language and practice a
moderate form of Sunni Islam. The XUAR, often referred
to simply as Xinjiang (pronounced “SHIN-jyahng”), is a
provincial-level administrative region which comprises
about one-sixth of China’s total land area and borders eight
countries. The region is rich in minerals, produces over
80% of China’s cotton, and has China’s largest coal and
natural gas reserves and a fifth of its oil reserves. The
XUAR is a strategic region for the PRC’s Belt and Road
Initiative, which includes Chinese-backed infrastructure
projects and energy development in neighboring Central
and South Asia.
Sources: CRS using U.S. Department of State Boundaries; Esri;
Global Administrative Areas; DeLorme; NGA.
All or parts of the area comprising Xinjiang have been
under the political control or influence of Chinese,
Mongols, and Russians for long periods of the region’s
documented history, along with periods of Turkic or
Uyghur rule. Uyghurs played a role in the establishment of
two short-lived East Turkestan Republics in the 1930s and
1940s. The PRC asserted control over Xinjiang in 1949 and
established the XUAR in 1955.
Uyghurs once were the
predominant ethnic group in the
XUAR; they now
constitute roughly 45% of the region’s
population of 24
million, or around 10.5 million, as many
Han Chinese, the
majority ethnic group in China, have
migrated there,
particularly to the provincial capital,
Urumqi. Many
Uyghurs complain that Hans have benefitted
disproportionately from economic development in Xinjiang.
Human Rights Issues
Since an outbreak of demonstrations and ethnic unrest in
2009, and clashes involving Uyghurs and Xinjiang security
personnel that spiked between 2013 and 2015, PRC leaders
have sought to “stabilize” the XUAR through more
intensive security measures aimed at combatting “terrorism,
separatism and religious extremism.” PRC official data
indicates that criminal arrests in Xinjiang increased from
approximately 14,000 in 2013 to 228,000 in 2017.
Two prominent Uyghurs serving life sentences for state
security crimes are Ilham Tohti (convicted in 2014), a
Uyghur economics professor who had maintained a website
related to Uyghur issues, and Gulmira Imin (convicted in
2010), who had managed a Uyghur language website and
participated in the 2009 protests. In September 2017,
former Xinjiang University President Tashpolat Teyip, an
ethnic Uyghur, was convicted of separatism in a secret trial
and received a death sentence with a two-year reprieve. His
status is unknown.
Since 2017, in tandem with a new national policy referred
to as “Sinicization,” XUAR authorities have instituted
measures to assimilate Uyghurs into Han Chinese society
and reduce the influences of Uyghur, Islamic, and Arabic
cultures and languages. The XUAR government enacted a
law in 2017 that prohibits “expressions of extremification,”
and placed restrictions, often imposed arbitrarily, upon face
veils, beards and other
dress and grooming, the practicepractices of traditional
Uyghur Uyghur
customs, and adherence to Islamic dietary laws
(halal).
Thousands of mosques in Xinjiang reportedly have
been demolished as part of what the government calls a
“mosque rectification” campaign; others have been
“Sinicized”—minarets have been taken down, onion domes
have been replaced by traditional Chinese roofs, and
been
demolished or “Sinicized,” whereby Islamic motifs and Arabic writings have been removed.
China’s new religious policies also have placed greater
restrictions on the Hui, another Muslim minority group in
China who number around 11 million, although these have
been less severe than those placed on the Uyghurs. The Hui
are more geographically dispersed and culturally
assimilated than the Uyghurs, are generally physically
indistinguishable from Hans, and do not speak a nonChinese language.
With the apparent strong backing of Communist Party
General Secretary Xi Jinping, beginning in 2016, the new
Communist Party Secretary of the XUAR, former Tibet
Party Secretary Chen Quanguo, stepped up security
measures aimed at the Uyghur population. Such actions
have included the installation of thousands of neighborhood
police kiosks, more intrusive monitoring of Internet use,
and the collection of biometric data for identification
purposes. The central government sent an estimated one
million officials and state workers from outside Xinjiang,
mostly ethnic Han, to live temporarily in the homes of
Uyghurs to assess their loyalty to the Communist Party.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Uyghurs in China
Mass Internment
According to some estimates, since 2017, Xinjiang
authorities have arbitrarily detained approximately 1.5
million Turkic Muslims, mostly ethnic Uyghurs and a
smaller number of Kazakhs, in “reeducation camps.” PRC
officials describe the Xinjiang facilities as “vocational
education and training centers” where “trainees” study
Chinese, learn job skills, undergo “de-extremization” and
be “cured of ideological infection.” Some may have
engaged in religious and ethnic cultural practices that the
government now perceives as extremist, or as manifesting
“strongly religious” views or thoughts that could lead to the
spread of religious extremism or terrorism. Detainees
reportedly are compelled to renounce many of their Islamic
beliefs and customs and to undergo self-criticisms.
According to some former detainees, treatment and
conditions in the camps include crowded and unsanitary
conditions, forced labor, food deprivation, beatings, and
sexual abuse.
In July 2019, Xinjiang officials claimed that most detainees
had been released. Many Uyghurs living abroad, however,
say that they still have not heard from missing relatives in
Xinjiang. Over 400 prominent Uyghur intellectuals
reportedly have been detained or their whereabouts are
unknown. Some detainees have received prison sentences.
Forced and Involuntary Labor
According to some reports, the government has begun to
move large numbers of Uyghurs, including many former
detainees, into textile, apparel, and other labor-intensive
industries in Xinjiang and other PRC provinces. Uyghurs
who refuse to accept such employment may be threatened
with detention. They continue to be heavily monitored
outside of work, and are required to attend political study
classes at night. In March 2020, the CongressionalExecutive Commission on China released a report, “Global
Supply Chains, Forced Labor, and the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region.” A study by the Australian Strategic
Policy Institute identified nearly 120 Chinese and foreign
companies, including global brands, that the institute
alleges directly or indirectly benefit from Uyghur labor in
potentially abusive circumstances.
Selected U.S. Responses
On October 1, 2019, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
announced that it had blocked certain shipments of goods
suspected of having been made with forced labor from five
countries, including China, pursuant to Section 307 of the
Tariff Act of 1930. The Chinese goods, sportswear made
for a U.S. company, were suspected of using forced labor
Arabic writings have been removed. There have been
reports of a government campaign to forcefully reduce birth
rates among Turkic Muslims in the region.
Beginning in 2016, the newly appointed Communist Party
Secretary of the XUAR, former Tibet Party Secretary Chen
Quanguo, stepped up security and surveillance measures
aimed at the Uyghur population. Such actions included the
installation of thousands of neighborhood police kiosks,
more intrusive monitoring of Internet use, and the
collection of biometric data for identification purposes. The
central government sent an estimated one million officials
and state workers from outside Xinjiang, mostly ethnic
Han, to live temporarily in Uyghur homes to assess their
compliance with government policies.
Mass Internment
By some estimates, since 2017, Xinjiang authorities have
arbitrarily detained 1.5 million Turkic Muslims, mostly
Uyghurs and a smaller number of Kazakhs, in “reeducation
camps.” The facilities also have held many prominent
Uyghur intellectuals. PRC officials describe the facilities as
“vocational education and training centers” where
“trainees” study Chinese, learn job skills, undergo “deextremization” and are to be “cured of ideological
infection.” Some may have engaged in religious and ethnic
cultural practices that the government now perceives as
extremist, or as manifesting “strongly religious” views or
thoughts that could lead to the spread of religious
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Uyghurs in China
extremism or terrorism. Detainees reportedly are compelled
to renounce many of their Islamic beliefs and customs.
Forced and Involuntary Labor
In July 2019, Xinjiang officials claimed that most detainees
had been released, although many Uyghurs living abroad
say that they still have not heard from missing relatives in
Xinjiang. According to some reports, the government has
begun to move large numbers of Uyghurs, including many
former detainees, into textile, apparel, and other laborintensive industries in Xinjiang and other PRC provinces.
Uyghurs who refuse to accept such employment may be
threatened with detention. In addition, they continue to be
heavily monitored outside of work, and are required to
attend political study classes at night. In March 2020, the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China released a
report, “Global Supply Chains, Forced Labor, and the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.” A study by the
Australian Strategic Policy Institute identified nearly 120
Chinese and foreign companies, including global brands,
that the institute alleges directly or indirectly benefit from
Uyghur labor in potentially abusive circumstances.
Selected U.S. Responses
In October 2019, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
announced that it had blocked certain shipments of goods
suspected of involving forced labor from five countries,
including China, pursuant to the forced labor import ban in
Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The Chinese goods,
sportswear made for a U.S. company, were suspected of
using forced labor from a Xinjiang reeducation camp.
In October 2019, the U.S. Department of Commerce
announced that it would add 28 PRC entities to the Bureau
of Industry and Security (BIS) “entity list” under the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR), for their connections to
PRC human rights abuses against Uyghur and other Turkic
Muslims in Xinjiang. The action imposes licensing
requirements prior to the sale or transfer of U.S. items to
these entities. In May 2020, the Commerce Department
placed an additional nine PRC entities on the list.
In October 2019, the State Department announced visa
restrictions (under the Immigration and Nationality Act)
against an unspecified number of Chinese
government and
Communist Party officials who are
believed to be
responsible for, or complicit in, the detention
or abuse of
Uyghurs and other Muslims in Xinjiang. The department
subsequently announced restrictions on additional
unspecified Party officials in July 2020.
On June 17, 2020, President Trump signed the Uyghur
Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 into law (P.L. 116-145).
The act aims to impose visa and economic sanctions on
PRC officials determined to be responsible for human rights
abuses against Uyghurs and other Muslim minority groups
in Xinjiang. The act also mandates the Department of State,
the Director of National Intelligence, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, respectively, to submit reports to
relevant Congressional committees on the following:
human rights abuses, including detention and forced labor,
against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in the XUAR;
the security and economic implications posed to the United
States by PRC policies in Xinjiang, including a list of
Chinese companies that are involved in constructing or
operating operating
internment camps or producing mass surveillance
equipment for Xinjiang; and U.S. efforts to protect Uyghur
Americans and ethnic Uyghurs from China legally studying
and working residing
in the United States from harassment or
intimidation by
officials or agents of the PRC government.
Pending legislation includes the Uyghur Forced Labor
Prevention Act (S. 3471 and H.R. 6210), which among
other provisions would create a presumption of denial of
import into the United States of “significant goods, wares,
articles and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured
wholly or in part” in Xinjiang or by certain Xinjiang-related
entities pursuant to the forced labor import ban in Section
307 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
Alleged Terrorism
The PRC government has attributed numerous On July 9, 2020, the Trump Administration designated four
current and former Communist Party officials in Xinjiang,
including XUAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo (a member
of the CCP Politburo), and the Xinjiang Public Security
Bureau, to be sanctioned pursuant to Executive Order
(E.O.) 13818. E.O. 13818 implements the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, which was
enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act
for FY2017 (P.L. 114-328) and authorizes the President to
impose both economic sanctions and visa denials or
revocations against foreign individuals or entities
responsible for human rights abuses or corruption. The
State Department also announced that it was publicly
designating three of the officials for visa restrictions
pursuant to Section 7031(c) of the Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 2020 (Division G of P.L. 116-94) due to their
involvement in gross violations of human rights; these
designations additionally extend visa restrictions to the
officials’ immediate family members.
Pending Uyghur-related legislation includes the Uyghur
Forced Labor Prevention Act (S. 3471 and H.R. 6210),
which among other provisions would create a presumption
of denial of import into the United States of items
produced, wholly or in part, in Xinjiang or by certain
Xinjiang-related entities pursuant to Section 307 of the
Tariff Act of 1930.
Alleged Terrorism
The PRC government has attributed numerous past deadly
incidents in the XUAR to the East Turkestan Islamic
Movement (ETIM), which it portrays as a Uyghur separatist
and terrorist group with ties to global terrorist
organizations. The U.S. government designated ETIM as a
terrorist organization under Executive Order 13224 in 2002
(to block terrorist financing) and placed ETIM on the
Terrorist Exclusion List in 2004 (to prevent the entry of
terrorists into the United States). ETIM is not on the
Department of State’s narrower “Foreign Terrorist
Organization” (FTO) list. Roughly 100 Uyghurs from
China entered Islamic State territory during 2013-2014,
according to the New America Foundation.
At its height, ETIM, whose members reportedly spent time
in Afghanistan and Pakistan from the late-1990s to the mid2000s, was a small, loosely organized and poorly financed
group that lacked weapons and had little if any contact with
global jihadist groups, according to some experts. The U.S.
government “identified sufficient evidence” to consider
three violent incidents in China purportedly involving
Uyghurs as terrorist attacks in 2014. The lack of available
information in most other cases has made it difficult to
verify PRC most other PRC
accounts of alleged terrorist activity. In 2019,
the Department of State reported that in 2018, there was a
lack of independent evidence that ETIM is still active.
Thomas Lum, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Michael A. Weber, Analyst in Foreign Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Uyghurs in China
IF10281
Thomas Lum, Specialist in Asian Affairs
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10281 · VERSION 3638 · UPDATED