Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
June 18, 2020July 15, 2021
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a key U.S. partner in the Middle The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a key U.S. partner in the Middle East. Although the United
States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, East, and the two countries have cooperated the two countries have cooperated
Jeremy M. Sharp
on a number of regional and international issueson a number of regional and international issues over the years. Jordan remains at peace with
Specialist in Middle
. Jordan Jeremy M. Sharp remains at peace with Israel and is a key interlocutor with the Palestinians. Jordan’s Israel and is a key interlocutor with the Palestinians. Jordan’s Specialist in Middle strategic importance to the United strategic importance to the United
Eastern Affairs
States is evident given ongoing instability in States is evident given ongoing instability in Eastern Affairs neighboring Syria and Iraq. Jordan also is a neighboring Syria and Iraq. Jordan also is a

longtime U.S. partner in global longtime U.S. partner in global counterterrorism operations. U.S.-Jordanian military, counterterrorism operations. U.S.-Jordanian military, intelligence,
intel igence, and diplomatic and diplomatic cooperation seeks to empower political moderates, reduce sectarian conflict, and cooperation seeks to empower political moderates, reduce sectarian conflict, and

eliminate eliminate terrorist threats. terrorist threats.
U.S. officials frequently express their support for Jordan. U.S. support has helped Jordan address serious U.S. officials frequently express their support for Jordan. U.S. support has helped Jordan address serious vulnerabilities,vulnerabilities, both both
internal and external. Jordan’s internal and external. Jordan’s small smal size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western
and various Arab sources. and various Arab sources. President Trump The Biden Administration has acknowledged Jordan’s role as a key U.S. partner in has acknowledged Jordan’s role as a key U.S. partner in countering the Islamic
Statepromoting Middle East peace, as many U.S. policymakers advocate for continued robust U.S. assistance to the kingdom. , as many U.S. policymakers advocate for continued robust U.S. assistance to the kingdom.
Annual Annual U.S. aid to Jordan has nearly quadrupled in historical terms over the last 15 years. The United States has U.S. aid to Jordan has nearly quadrupled in historical terms over the last 15 years. The United States has provided provided
economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total bilateral U.S. aid (overseen by the Departments economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total bilateral U.S. aid (overseen by the Departments
of State and Defense) to Jordan through FY2018 amounted to approximately $22 of State and Defense) to Jordan through FY2018 amounted to approximately $22 billion. bil ion. Jordan also hosts Jordan also hosts overnearly 3,000 U.S. 3,000 U.S.
troops.
To date, Jordan has withstood the impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) with minimal loss of life (a reported nine
deaths), but at a steep cost to its economy. Jordan’s small size and strong public health system arguably contributed to the
country’s ability to manage the pandemic effectively. Jordan is one of the first Arab countries to reopen; as of June 2020 the
state had lifted most restrictions on economic activity and certain public gatherings, such as religious worship. Analysts
anticipate that Jordan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will contract in 2020 by 3.5% after growing 2% last yeartroops. On June 18, 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) announced that several missile defense assets would be withdrawn from the Central Command (CENTCOM) region. Presumably, that may include the Patriot Missile Battery that has been stationed at Jordan’s Shaheed Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base since the height of the Syrian Civil War. To date, the impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) on Jordan has been significant in terms of human and economic costs. As of early July 2021, Jordan has had over 750,000 cases and nearly 10,000 deaths according to the World Health Organization. Real GDP contracted by -1.5% in 2020 and is expected to grow by only 1% in 2021. Losses in . Losses in
government revenue caused by fewer remittances and a weakened market for tourism are government revenue caused by fewer remittances and a weakened market for tourism are expected to widen the budget expected to widen the budget
deficit in the years ahead.
As the Trump Administration has enacted changes to long-standing U.S. policies on Israel and the Palestinians, which the
Palestinians have criticized as unfairly punitive to them and biased toward Israel, Jordan has found itself in a difficult
position. While King Abdullah II seeks to maintain strong relations with the United States, he rules over a country where the
issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population; more than half of all Jordanian citizens originate from
either the West Bank or the area now comprising the state of Israel. In trying to balance U.S.-Jordanian relations with
Palestinian concerns, King Abdullah II has refrained from directly criticizing the Trump Administration on its moves, while
urging the international community to return to the goal of a two-state solution that would ultimately lead to an independent
Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.
Jordanian leaders have expressed strong opposition to a possible Israeli cabinet and Knesset vote on annexing West Bank
territory—in coordination with the United States—after July 1, 2020. King Abdullah II has signaled that should Israel go
ahead with annexation, Jordan is prepared to escalate its confrontation with Israel. As Jordan considers whether to revisit its
ties to Israel, the range of possible options Jordan may be considering include withdrawing its ambassador from Israel,
reducing security cooperation, cancelling its natural gas deal with Israel, and either partially or fully suspending the 1994
peace treatydeficit in the years ahead. As of July 12, 2021, just over 26% of Jordanians had received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine. The President’s FY2022 budget request includes $1.275 bil ion for Jordan, which is in line with the current five-year U.S.-Jordanian Memorandum of Understanding on Assistance. FY2022 marks the final year of the MOU, and the Administration is expected to negotiate a new deal with the Jordanian government over the upcoming months. Congress may consider legislation pertaining to U.S. relations with Jordan. In the 117th Congress, the draft House Foreign Operations appropriations bil would provide “not less than” $1.65 bil ion for assistance to Jordan, including not less than $845.1 mil ion for budget support for the Government of Jordan, $425 mil ion in military aid, and $1.2 bil ion in economic assistance. The act also includes authority for loan guarantees for Jordan and authorizes Foreign Military Financing (FMF) direct loans for Jordan, not to exceed $4 bil ion. The draft House Defense Appropriations bil would provide “not less than” $150 mil ion for border security in Jordan. S.Res. 154 and H.Res. 305 would congratulate the people of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the centennial of the founding of the Jordanian state. Congressional Research Service link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 5 link to page 7 link to page 7 link to page 9 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 20 link to page 21 link to page 6 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 16 link to page 21 link to page 21 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Contents Overview ....................................................................................................................... 1 COVID-19 and the Economic Crisis in Jordan ..................................................................... 2 Country Background ....................................................................................................... 2 The Hashemite Royal Family ...................................................................................... 4 Dispute Within the Royal Family ............................................................................ 4 Political System and Key Institutions............................................................................ 6 2020 Parliamentary Elections ................................................................................. 8 Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians ..................................................................................... 8 Water Scarcity and the Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian Water Deal ..................................... 10 Syria ........................................................................................................................... 11 U.S. Relations .............................................................................................................. 12 The Case of Ahlam al Tamimi ................................................................................... 12 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan .................................................................................... 13 U.S.-Jordanian Agreement on Foreign Assistance ......................................................... 13 Economic Assistance................................................................................................ 14 Humanitarian Assistance for Syrian Refugees in Jordan................................................. 16 Military Assistance .................................................................................................. 17 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and DOD Security Assistance .............................. 17 Excess Defense Articles ...................................................................................... 18 Figures Figure 1. Jordan at a Glance.............................................................................................. 3 Figure 2. State Department and USAID Assistance to Jordan, FY2011-FY2021 ...................... 14 Figure 3. U.S. Cash Transfers to Jordan ............................................................................ 15 Figure 4.U.S., Jordan Sign Aid Agreement ........................................................................ 16 Figure 5. U.S.-Supplied Black Hawk Helicopters for Jordan ................................................ 17 Tables Table 1. Bilateral Aid to Jordan ....................................................................................... 13 Table 2. U.S. Foreign Aid Obligations to Jordan: 1946-2018 ................................................ 18 Contacts Author Information ....................................................................................................... 18 Congressional Research Service Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Overview In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (hereinafter referred to as “Jordan”), economic hardship exacerbated by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is further straining the political system. In recent months, the reign of 59-year-old monarch King Abdullah II bin Al .
Congress may consider legislation pertaining to U.S. relations with Jordan. On February 18, 2016, President Obama signed
the United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-123), which authorizes expedited review and an
increased value threshold for proposed arms sales to Jordan for a period of three years. It amended the Arms Export Control
Act to give Jordan temporarily the same preferential treatment U.S. law bestows upon NATO members and Australia, Israel,
Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. S. 28, the United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Extension Act, would
reauthorize the United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act (22 U.S.C. §275) through December 31, 2022. In the House,
H.R. 4862 also would reauthorize the 2015 Act while also calling on the United States International Development Finance
Corporation to issue a call for “proposals pursuing investment funds with a focus on Jordan.”

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link to page 4 link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 5 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 9 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 15 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 18 link to page 7 link to page 12 link to page 16 link to page 15 link to page 18 link to page 18 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

Contents
Overview: COVID-19 and the Jordanian Economy .............................................................. 1
Country Background ....................................................................................................... 1
The Hashemite Royal Family ...................................................................................... 2
Political System and Key Institutions............................................................................ 2
Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians ..................................................................................... 4
Jordan and Trump Administration Peace Plans ............................................................... 5
Possible Israeli Annexation of the West Bank ................................................................. 6
Possible Jordanian Reactions to Annexation ............................................................. 6
Jordan Ends Israeli Access to Two Territories................................................................. 9
Syria ............................................................................................................................. 9
U.S. Relations .............................................................................................................. 10
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan .................................................................................... 11
U.S.-Jordanian Agreement on Foreign Assistance ......................................................... 12
Economic Assistance................................................................................................ 12
Humanitarian Assistance for Syrian Refugees in Jordan................................................. 14
Military Assistance .................................................................................................. 14
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and DOD Security Assistance .............................. 15
Excess Defense Articles ...................................................................................... 15

Figures
Figure 1. Jordan at a Glance.............................................................................................. 4
Figure 2. Jordanian Officials Pray at Area Recently Reclaimed from Israel .............................. 9
Figure 3. Cash Transfers to Jordan ................................................................................... 13

Tables
Table 1. Bilateral Aid to Jordan ....................................................................................... 12
Table 2. U.S. Foreign Aid Obligations to Jordan: 1946-2018 ................................................ 15

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 15

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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

Overview: COVID-19 and the Jordanian Economy
As of June 2020, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (hereinafter referred to as “Jordan”), led by
58-year-old monarch King Abdullah II bin Al Hussein (hereinafter King Abdullah II), has
managed to navigate the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) with minimal loss of life (a
reported nine deaths), but at a steep cost to its economy.1 Jordan’s smal size and strong public
health system arguably contributed to the country’s ability to manage the pandemic effectively.
Jordan is one of the first Arab countries to reopen; the state has lifted most restrictions on
economic activity and certain public gatherings, such as religious worship.2 Analysts anticipate
that Jordan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) wil contract in 2020 by 3.5% after growing 2% last
year. Losses in government revenue caused by fewer remittances and a weakened market for
tourism are expected to widen the budget deficit in the years ahead; the Economist Intelligence
Unit predicts that public debt wil peak at 124% of GDP in 2022-23.3 It is currently 97% of GDP.
To cope with the economic fal out from the pandemic, the government has delayed public sector
salary increases that were promised as part of the 2020 budget.4 Jordan has experienced
widespread social unrest in recent years stemming largely from its lackluster economy and cuts in
domestic spending.5 In fal 2019, 100,000 public school teachers organized a nationwide strike,
demanding that the government raise teacher salaries. After the strike shut down schools for a
month, the government partial y acceded to teachers’ demands, despite budgetary strains. The
teachers’ strike marked the second major instance of unrest in the last two years over economic
conditions. In 2018, when the government tried to raise income taxes, mass protests ensued; the
government ultimately revised its tax plan and turned to the Arab Gulf monarchies for additional
funds.
Jordan relies heavily on international financial support to cover chronic balance of payment
shortfal s. In May 2020, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) lent Jordan $396 mil ion to “help
address the country’s balance of payments needs and al ow for higher spending on healthcare,
containment, and assistance to households and companies most affected by [the] COVID-19
crisis.”6 The IMF had already provided another multi-year $1.3 bil ion loan package to Jordan in
March 2020 (after an earlier three-year $723 mil ion Extended Fund Facility reform program),
but due to the pandemic, the government is now facing a $1.5 bil ion shortfal in its balance of
payments.
Country Background
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have
cooperated on a number of regional and international issues for decades. Jordan’s smal size and
lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab

1 Osama al Sharif, “Jordan Left with Struggling Economy Following Lockdown,” Al Monitor, May 6, 2020.
2 For details on how Jordan responded to the pandemic, see Jordan: “Government T akes Steps Aimed at Curbing
COVID-19 Outbreak,” Global Legal Monitor, Law Library, Library of Congress, April 28, 2020.
3 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Jordan, Generated on June 4th 2020.
4 “Jordan Postpones Public Sector Wage Hikes to Ease Financial P ressure,” Reuters, April 19, 2020.
5 T uqa Nusairat, “T eachers’ Protest Challenges Jordanian Status Quo,” MENA Source, Atlantic Council, September 27,
2019.
6 IMF Executive Board Approves US$ 396 Million in Emergency Assistance to Jordan to Address the COVID-19
Pandemic, May 21, 2020.
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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both
internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, Hussein (hereinafter King Abdullah II), has been chal enged both from within the royal family and by tribal elites that have formed the bedrock of the kingdom since its establishment a century ago (see below). While as of July 2021 there is no imminent crisis endangering King Abdullah’s rule, public infighting from within the royal family, periodic protests from economical y disaffected Jordanians, and a recent resumption in Israeli-Palestinian violence may be cause for concern among some U.S. policymakers.1 The United States considers Jordan a key partner in promoting Middle East peace, countering terrorism, and promoting interfaith cooperation in a volatile region. No other country in the world receives as much direct U.S. economic budgetary aid on an annual basis as Jordan. Before the pandemic, Jordan had already faced numerous systemic and regional chal enges not entirely of its own making. Demographical y, the population has doubled since King Abdullah II ascended the throne in 1999.2 Since 2011, Syrian refugees (666,000 registered with the United Nations as of mid-2021) have resided in Jordan, where the kingdom and international aid agencies have provided them with basic services. Water availability is approaching crisis levels; according to the World Resources Institute, Jordan ranks as the fifth most water-stressed country in the world.3 Economical y, Jordan has endured a decade of stagnation, in which per capita incomes have declined and social unrest among young, educated workers has grown.4 International y, Jordan also finds itself more isolated. Its relationship with Israel has been repeatedly characterized as strained throughout Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent 12 consecutive years as prime minister (see below). Bilateral trade with the neighboring war-torn countries of Syria and Iraq has declined, as the threat of infiltration from Islamic State terrorists has forced the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) to strengthen their border security. Jordan’s relationships with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also have been more distant. The kingdom broke ranks with the Saudi and Emirati blockade of Qatar (2017-2021) by reestablishing diplomatic relations in 2019. Final y, while Jordan did not publicly reject President Trump’s 2020 Middle East peace plan, it quietly opposed it; Jordanian officials also may feel isolated by the Abraham Accords for encouraging Israeli-Arab normalization without regard to a final settlement with the Palestinians.5 One policy dilemma for the Biden Administration is how to strengthen Jordan in a regional environment in which Israel and the Palestinians just endured another round of violence; the Administration itself has not committed to restarting direct negotiations between Israel and the 1 According to the readout of a recent call between Vice President Kamala Harris and King Abdullah II, “ T he Vice President and the King also discussed the economic challenges that Jordan faces, which have been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Vice President highlighted the importance of impactful, high -quality economic reforms.” See White House, Readout of Vice President Harris Call with King Abdullah II of Jordan, May 20, 2021. 2 For demographic estimates, see T he United Nations, 2019 Revision of World Population Prospects. 3 Hannah Dormido, “T hese Countries are the Most at Risk from a Water Crisis,” Bloomberg, August 6, 2019. 4 See United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Jordan, Economic Development, available at https://www.usaid.gov/jordan/economic-growth-and-trade. 5 Nicolai Due-Gundersen, “How the Israel-UAE Deal Could Leave Jordan Out in the Cold,” Middle East Eye, September 2, 2020. Congressional Research Service 1 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Palestinians. With Israeli-Arab tensions stil lingering over East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, the Administration could rely on Jordan to play a more active diplomatic role in the months ahead. COVID-19 and the Economic Crisis in Jordan To date, the impact of COVID-19 on Jordan has been significant in terms of the human and economic costs. As of early July 2021, Jordan has had over 750,000 cases and nearly 10,000 deaths, peaking in March 2021, according to the World Health Organization.6 In late May 2021, the Jordanian government announced plans to return to normal activity as the kingdom recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic. Currently, the kingdom is in the second phase of reopening, which includes shortened curfew hours and measures to stimulate the tourism sector. By September, al curfew restrictions wil be lifted, and schools wil resume lessons in classrooms. As of July 12, 2021, just over 26% of Jordanians had received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine. Jordan’s fiscal situation is extremely difficult. Real GDP contracted by -1.5% in 2020 and is expected to grow by only 1% in 2021. The official unemployment rate is close to 25%, but probably much higher amongst youth and particularly women (see textbox below).7 In November 2020, Minister of Finance Mohamad al-Ississ projected a $2.89 bil ion annual budget deficit, with public debt forecast to be 117% of GDP. Of the government’s FY2021 budget of $11.1 bil ion, 65% wil be al ocated for salaries and pensions, including for retired military personnel.8 In May 2021, the World Bank approved additional financing of more than $1.1 bil ion for Jordan to cope with the pandemic. In July, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) made available another $206 mil ion in lending to Jordan, bringing total IMF disbursements to Jordan since the start of 2020 to $900 mil ion.9 According to the IMF, “successive COVID-19 waves and the sharp decline in tourism have taken a significant human and economic toll, with unemployment reaching record high levels, and the recovery delayed.”10 Country Background Jordan is arguably one of the closest U.S. Arab partners in the Middle East. The kingdom depends on its strong relations with global powers and its standing in the international community, where it has played an outsized role in leading international organizations.11 Jordan’s smal size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position—wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia, Arabia—has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its powerful neighborshas made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its powerful neighbors, but has also
but has 6 Available online at https://covid19.who.int/region/emro/country/jo. 7 “Data Reveal Soaring Unemployment in Jordan in 2020,” Economist Intelligence Unit, July 2, 2021. 8 Osama Al Sharif, “Jordan’s 2021 Budget is a Harbinger of Worse T hings to Come,” Al Monitor, December 7, 2020. 9 International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Concludes Second Review Under Jordan’s Extended Arrangement and Request for Augmentation of Access to Address the Impact of COVID-19, July 1, 2021. 10 Op. cit. 11 For example, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al Hussein, a member of the Hashemite dynasty (from the branch of the royal family that had ruled Iraq), served as the former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights from 2014 to 2018. Congressional Research Service 2 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial
relations with one another. relations with one another.
Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initial y consisted of desert or semidesert Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initial y consisted of desert or semidesert
territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of Bedouin tribal background, the territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of Bedouin tribal background, the
original “East Bank” Jordanians.original “East Bank” Jordanians.712 The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 brought large The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 brought large
numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which subsequently unilateral y annexed a Palestinian numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which subsequently unilateral y annexed a Palestinian
enclave west of the Jordan River known as the West Bank.enclave west of the Jordan River known as the West Bank.813 The “East Bank” Jordanians, though The “East Bank” Jordanians, though
probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s political and probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s political and
military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the Jordanian monarchy. Jordanians military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the Jordanian monarchy. Jordanians
of Palestinian origin of Palestinian origin comprisemake up an estimated 55% to 70% of the population. They tend to gravitate an estimated 55% to 70% of the population. They tend to gravitate
toward employment in the private sector, most likely due to their al eged general exclusion from toward employment in the private sector, most likely due to their al eged general exclusion from
certain public-sector and military positions. certain public-sector and military positions.914 Figure 1. Jordan at a Glance Area: 89,342 sq. km. (34,495 sq. mi., slightly smal er than Indiana). Population: 10,458,413 (July 2018); Amman (capital): 4.008 mil ion (2015). Ethnic Groups: Arabs 97%; other 2.6% (includes Armenians, Circassians) (2015). Religion: Sunni Muslim 97.2%; Christian 2.2%; Buddhist 0.4%; Hindu 0.1%. Percent of Population Under Age 25: 54% (2018). 12 For historical background, see Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Country Profile: Jordan, September 2006. 13 T hough there was little international recognition of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, Jordan maintained control of it (including East Jerusalem) until Israel took military control of it during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and maintained its claim to it until relinquishing the claim to the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1988. 14 Speculation over the ratio of East Bankers to Palestinians (those who arrived as refugees and immigrants since 1948) in Jordanian society is a sensitive domestic issue. Jordan last conducted a national census in 2015, and it is unclear whether or not the government maintains such national-origin statistics. Over time, intermarriage has made it more difficult to discern distinct differences between the two communities, though divisions do persist. Congressional Research Service 3 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Literacy: 95.4% (2015). Youth Unemployment (ages 15-24): 40.1% (2019). Source: Graphic created by CRS; facts from CIA World Factbook and World Bank.
The Hashemite Royal Family
Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy under the prestigious Hashemite family, which Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy under the prestigious Hashemite family, which
claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad. King Abdullah II (age claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad. King Abdullah II (age 5859) has ruled the country ) has ruled the country
since 1999, when he succeeded to the throne upon the death of his father, the late King Hussein, since 1999, when he succeeded to the throne upon the death of his father, the late King Hussein,
who had ruled for 47 years. Educated largely in Britain and the United States, King Abdullah II who had ruled for 47 years. Educated largely in Britain and the United States, King Abdullah II
had earlier pursued a military career, ultimately serving as commander of Jordan’s Special had earlier pursued a military career, ultimately serving as commander of Jordan’s Special
Operations Forces with the rank of major general. The king’s son, Prince Hussein bin Abdullah Operations Forces with the rank of major general. The king’s son, Prince Hussein bin Abdullah
(born in 1994), is the designated crown prince. (born in 1994), is the designated crown prince.1015
The king appoints a prime minister to head the government and the Council of Ministers The king appoints a prime minister to head the government and the Council of Ministers
(cabinet). On average, Jordanian governments last no more than 15 months before they are (cabinet). On average, Jordanian governments last no more than 15 months before they are
dissolved by royal decree. The king also appoints al judges and is commander of the armed dissolved by royal decree. The king also appoints al judges and is commander of the armed
forces. forces.
Political System and Key Institutions
The Jordanian constitution, most recently amended in 2016, gives the king broad executive
powers. The king appoints the prime minister and may dismiss him or accept his resignation. He
also has the sole power to appoint the crown prince, senior military leaders, justices of the
constitutional court, and al 75 members of the senate, as wel as cabinet ministers. The
constitution enables the king to dissolve both houses of parliament and postpone lower house

7 For historical background, see Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Country Profile: Jordan, September
2006.
8 T hough there was little international recognition of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, Jordan maintained control
of it (including East Jerusalem) until Israel took military control of it during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and
maintained its claim to it until relinquishing the claim to the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1988.
9 Speculation over the ratio of East Bankers to Palestinians (those who arrived as refugees and immigrants since 1948)
in Jordanian society is a sensitive domestic issue. Jordan last co nducted a national census in 2015, and it is unclear
whether or not the government maintains such national-origin statistics. Over time, intermarriage has made it more
difficult to discern distinct differences between the two communities, though divisions do persist.
10 In July 2009, King Abdullah II named Prince Hussein (then 15 years old), as crown prince. T he position had been
vacant since 2004, when King Abdullah II removed the title from his half -brother, Prince Hamzah.
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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

elections for two years.11 The king can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism
that al ows the cabinet to issue provisional legislation when parliament is not sitting or has been
dissolved.12 The king also must approve laws before they can take effect, although a two-thirds
majority of both houses of parliament can modify legislation. The king also can issue royal
decrees, which are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The king commands the armed forces,
declares war, and ratifies treaties. Final y, Article 195 of the Jordanian Penal Code prohibits
insulting the dignity of the king (lèse-majesté), with criminal penalties of one to three years in
prison.
Jordan’s constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article 97, “Judges are
independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other
than that of the law.” Jordan has three main types of courts: civil courts, special courts (some of
which are military/state security courts), and religious courts. State security courts administered
by military (and civilian) judges handle criminal cases involving espionage, bribery of public
officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketeering, and “security offenses.”13 The
Dispute Within the Royal Family In early April 2021, Jordan was thrown into disarray after reports surfaced of a plot to overthrow King Abdullah II. On April 3, 2021, Jordanian authorities detained 41-year-old Prince Hamzah bin Hussein, the king’s half-brother and former crown prince, and accused him of conspiring against the throne. In his defense, Prince Hamzah released two videotaped statements (one in English and the other in Arabic) filmed on the day of his arrest denying any participation in a conspiracy, while criticizing the country’s ruling system for its corruption, nepotism, and lack of reform. The Jordanian government then claimed that Prince Hamzah had collaborated with former Chief of the Royal Court Bassem Awadal ah and unnamed “foreign entities” to destabilize the kingdom.16 Awadal ah, who was an advisor to Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, was arrested along with 17 other prominent Jordanians on April 3.17 On April 4, Prince Hamzah escalated his confrontation with the government, vowing to disobey orders to remain silent. On April 5, King Abdullah II entrusted his uncle, Prince Hassan bin Abdullah, to serve as mediator between the Royal Court and Prince Hamzah, who subsequently signed a letter that same day pledging support for the king. A day later, a new audio recording surfaced, in which the Jordanian Military’s Chief of Staff, General Yousef Huneiti, told Prince Hamzah that he had been detained for meeting with government critics, who “started talking more than they should.” Weeks earlier, Prince Hamzah had attended several tribal meetings where grievances against the 15 In July 2009, King Abdullah II named his son, Prince Hussein (then 15 years old), as crown prince. T he position had been vacant since 2004, when King Abdullah II removed the title from his half -brother, Prince Hamzah. Crown Prince al Hussein bin Abdullah II, now 27, is a graduate of Georgetown University and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (UK). He holds the rank of second lieutenant in the Jordan Armed Forces. 16 Jassar al T ahat and Richard Spencer, “Family Feud and Jealousy behind Split in Arab Royal Family Loved by the West,” The Times (UK), April 14, 2021. 17 On April 5, the Washington Post reported that during a surprise Saudi delegation visit to Amman led by Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan, the Saudi government requested the release of Bassem Awadallah. Shira Rubin, Sarah Dadouch, and Joby Warrick, “Jordan’s Prince Hamzeh, under House Arrest after Alleged Coup Attempt, Appears to Affirm Loyalty to the King,” Washington Post, April 5, 2021. Originally born in east Jerusalem, Bassem Awadallah was a former minister of international cooperation and planning and finance. He also served as h ead of the King’s royal court. He later worked for Arab Bank and served on the board of a banking group in Bahrain. Congressional Research Service 4 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations king and his government had been expressed. He also had met with relatives of victims of an oxygen outage at a coronavirus ward in a Jordanian hospital, an incident that had brought widespread public condemnation of the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.18 Prince Hamzah: Anti-Corruption Champion or Disgruntled Prince? Prince Hamzah, who is 41 years old, is one of King Abdul ah’s half-brothers. He is the oldest son of Queen Noor, the late King Hussein’s fourth wife. In 1999, when King Hussein named Abdul ah crown prince just a few weeks before his death, he asked that Abdul ah appoint Hamzah as his crown prince. Prince Hamzah served in this role until King Abdul ah II rescinded it in 2004. Five years later, King Abdul ah II appointed his own son, Hussein, as crown prince. According to one account, the decision to strip the title of crown prince devastated Hamzah, who had been considered “a favorite of King Hussein’s, a more polished orator with a more academic mind than King Abdul ah II, and had been groomed as a teenager for the throne. Suddenly he [Hamzah] was ejected from the circle of influence, and cast around for a new role.”19 In 2013, King Abdul ah II rejected Prince Hamzah’s proposal to consolidate the kingdom’s intel igence agencies into one and make the prince intel igence chief.20 Lacking a prominent role in government, in recent years, Prince Hamzah cultivated close ties to the various heads of Jordan’s elite tribal families, the core constituency of the Jordanian state. Some of these families had become disil usioned with Jordan’s unspoken social compact, in which the state provides wel -paying jobs in the civil service, military, and state-owned enterprises to “East Bank” Jordanians (see above) in return for their continued loyalty. According to one account, “Hamzah, with a physical likeness to his father, has since grown into a romanticized figure by tribal Jordanians pining for the ‘golden years’ of Hussein’s patriarchal reign, when the state was the main provider and employer, life was affordable, and inequality minimal.”21 As discontent simmered within certain East Bank political circles and youth tribal protest movements, Prince Hamzah received attention for publicly speaking out against government corruption.22 As previously mentioned, Prince Hamzah’s March 2021 visit to a hospital where nine Jordanians infected with COVID-19 died from a lack of oxygen—a visit that occurred just hours after King Abdul ah II met with the bereaved families and days before the crown prince visited—had been perceived by the king as a major slight to the crown prince.23 On April 11, King Abdullah II and Prince Hamzah appeared side-by-side at a public ceremony marking the kingdom’s independence centennial. A day later, Jordanian Prime Minister Bisher al Khasawneh told a closed session of parliament that Prince Hamzah would not stand trial for sedition and that there had been no attempt to overthrow the king, only one to destabilize the country. On April 14, the government announced that the other prominent Jordanians who were arrested wil stand trial for sedition before Jordan’s State Security Court.24 Since then, 16 of the original 18 individuals who were arrested in April have been released; Awadal ah (who holds U.S., Saudi, and Jordanian citizenship) and Sharif Hassan bin Zaid al Nasser (a distant member of the royal family with business ties to Saudi Arabia) stood trial for sedition. The trial, though it was closed to the public, became a major source of speculation inside Jordan, which some analysts warned may be further dividing society between those who support 18 Patrick Kingsley, Rana F. Sweis and Eric Schmitt , “Royal Rivalry Bares Social T ensions Behind Jordan’s Stable Veneer,” New York Tim es, April 10, 2021. 19 Ibid. 20 Mehul Srivastava and Andrew England, “Inside Jordan’s Royal Crisis: Why the Prince T urned to T ribal Leaders for Support ,” Financial Tim es, April 18, 2021. 21 T aylor Luck, “It Doesn’t Happen Here: Why ‘coup plot’ in Jordan sent Shock Waves,” Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 2021. 22 “Leading Jordanian Royal blasts Kingdom’s Corruption Problem,” The New Arab, September 26, 2018. 23 Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “T he Sudden Visit to COVID Victims’ Families that Sparked Jordan’s Royal Rift,” Reuters, April 8, 2021. 24 T he State Security Court has jurisdiction over the crimes of treason and espionage. George Sadek, “Jordan: Former Crown Prince and Others Accused of Destabilizing State Security to Be Referred to State Security Court,” Global Legal Monitor, Law Library, Library of Congress, April 12, 2021. Congressional Research Service 5 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations the king and those who are sympathetic to Prince Hamzah.25 Both defendants pleaded not guilty. On July 12, the court pronounced them guilty and sentenced Awadal ah and Sharif Hassan to 15 years in prison; a higher court has 30 days to confirm or overturn the verdict. Awadal ah’s attorney in the United States, Michael J. Sullivan, issued a statement after the verdict claiming that his client had been mistreated while in custody.26 Political System and Key Institutions The Jordanian constitution, most recently amended in 2016, gives the king broad executive powers. The king appoints the prime minister and may dismiss him or accept his resignation. He also has the sole power to appoint the crown prince, senior military leaders, justices of the constitutional court, and al 75 members of the senate, as wel as cabinet ministers. The constitution enables the king to dissolve both houses of parliament and postpone lower house elections for two years.27 The king can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism that al ows the cabinet to issue provisional legislation when parliament is not sitting or has been dissolved.28 The king also must approve laws before they can take effect, although a two-thirds majority of both houses of parliament can modify legislation. The king also can issue royal decrees, which are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The king commands the armed forces, declares war, and ratifies treaties. Final y, Article 195 of the Jordanian Penal Code prohibits insulting the dignity of the king (lèse-majesté), with criminal penalties of one to three years in prison. Jordan’s constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article 97, “Judges are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other than that of the law.” Jordan has three main types of courts: civil courts, special courts (some of which are military/state security courts), and religious courts. State security courts administered by military (and civilian) judges handle criminal cases involving espionage, bribery of public officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketeering, and “security offenses.”29 Religious courts for both Muslims and Christians adjudicate matters of personal status, including marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance.30 The king may appoint and dismiss judges by decree, though in practice a palace-appointed Higher king may appoint and dismiss judges by decree, though in practice a palace-appointed Higher
Judicial Council manages court Judicial Council manages court appointments, promotions, transfers, and retirements. appointments, promotions, transfers, and retirements.
King Abdullah II in 2013 laid out a vision of Jordan’s gradual transition from a constitutional King Abdullah II in 2013 laid out a vision of Jordan’s gradual transition from a constitutional
monarchy into a full-fledged parliamentary democracy,monarchy into a full-fledged parliamentary democracy,1431 but in reality, successive Jordanian 25 T aylor Luck, “In Jordan, Coup T rial Shakes Public Confidence in Royal Family,” Christian Science Monitor, June 23, 2021. 26 Karin Laub and Omar Akour, “In Jordan Sedition T rial, U.S. Defendant Alleges T orture,” Associated Press, July 11, 2021. 27 but in reality, successive Jordanian
parliaments have mostly complied with the policies laid out by the Royal Court. The legislative
branch’s independence has been curtailed not only by a legal system that rests authority largely in
the hands of the monarch, but also by electoral laws designed to produce pro-palace majorities
with each new election.15 Due to frequent gerrymandering in which electoral districts arguably are
drawn to favor more rural pro-government constituencies over densely populated urban areas,
parliamentary elections have produced large pro-government majorities dominated by
representatives of prominent tribal families.16 In addition, voter turnout tends to be much higher
in pro-government areas since many East Bank Jordanians depend on family/tribal connections as
a means to access patronage jobs.17 The next parliamentary election for the 130-seat House of
Deputies (lower chamber) is tentatively scheduled for September 2020.

11 T he king also may declare martial law. According to Article 125, “ In the event of an emergency of such a serious T he king also may declare martial law. According to Article 125, “ In the event of an emergency of such a serious
nature that action under the preceding Article of the present Constitution will be considered insufficient for the defense nature that action under the preceding Article of the present Constitution will be considered insufficient for the defense
of the Kingdom, the King may by a Royal Decree, based on a decision of the Council of Ministers, declare martial law of the Kingdom, the King may by a Royal Decree, based on a decision of the Council of Ministers, declare martial law
in the whole or any part of the Kingdom.” in the whole or any part of the Kingdom.”
1228 New amendments to Article 94 in 2011 have put some restrictions on when the executive is allowed to issue New amendments to Article 94 in 2011 have put some restrictions on when the executive is allowed to issue
temporary laws. temporary laws.
1329 See See, U.S. U.S. Embassy Embassy in Jordan, Jordanian Legal System, availablein Jordan, Jordanian Legal System, available online at https://jo.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen- at https://jo.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-
services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/attorneys/jordanian-legal-system/. services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/attorneys/jordanian-legal-system/.
14 See “Making Our Democratic System Work for All Jordanians,” Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein, January 16, 2013.
15 “How Jordan’s Election Revealed Enduring Weaknesses in Its Political System,” Washington Post, October 3, 2016.
16 Rachel Bessette, “Jordan’s Parliamentary Elections: Why T hey Do (and Don’t) Matter for the Kingdom’s Future,”
Lawfare, September 29, 2016.
17 Sean L. Yom, “T ribal Politics in Contemporary Jordan: T he Case of the Hirak Movement,” Middle East Journal,
Vol. 68, No. 2 (Spring 2014), pp. 229 -247.
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30 In sharia courts, the testimony of one man equals that of two women, with exceptions in certain cases. U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country reports on Hum an Rights Practices: Jordan , March 30, 2021. 31 See “Making Our Democratic System Work for All Jordanians,” Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein, January 16, 2013. Congressional Research Service 6 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations parliaments have mostly complied with the policies laid out by the Royal Court. The legislative branch’s independence has been curtailed not only by a legal system that rests authority largely in the hands of the monarch, but also by electoral laws designed to produce pro-palace majorities with each new election.32 Due to frequent gerrymandering in which electoral districts arguably are drawn to favor more rural pro-government constituencies over densely populated urban areas, parliamentary elections have produced large pro-government majorities dominated by representatives of prominent tribal families.33 In addition, voter turnout tends to be much higher in pro-government areas since many East Bank Jordanians depend on family/tribal connections as a means to access patronage jobs.34 Gender Equality in Jordan Jordan has consistently ranked among the bottom performers of the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap index (138 of 153 countries in 2020). Some have pointed to “traditional attitudes, discriminatory legislation, a lack of access to public transportation and pay disparities” as barriers to women’s advancement in Jordan.35 Despite cal s from women and activists during the Arab Spring, amendments to the country’s constitution in 2011 did not include a provision for gender equality. Women’s involvement in the labor force and in politics is limited, though female educational attainment in the country is high. Effects of COVID-19. Before the pandemic, Jordan had the lowest rate of female labor force participation among MENA countries not experiencing conflict (14.4% compared to the global average of 48%), and some worry that the pandemic wil have further negative effects on women’s employment in Jordan.36 The pandemic has increased the already substantial amount of unpaid work for women in Jordan, where “women spend 17.1 times more time than men on unpaid work (vs. a global average of 3.2), while men spend 6.5 more time on paid work than women (vs. a global average of 1.8).”37 As in other MENA countries, domestic violence reports have increased during the pandemic: a recent Arab Barometer survey found the perceived increase of gender-based violence in Jordan to be 27%.38 U.S. Assistance. Jordan has received funding through the USAID-administered Women’s Global Development and Prosperity (W-GDP) Fund, launched in 2019, specifical y to support government efforts to amend the country’s labor code to prohibit gender discrimination.39 The Biden Administration has requested $24 mil ion in FY2022 for gender programs in Jordan, and its ESF funding request aims to “support the adoption of positive social norms for gender equality and positive youth engagement and strengthen regulatory and institutional frameworks to mitigate barriers to increase economic and political participation.”40 32 “How Jordan’s Election Revealed Enduring Weaknesses in Its Political System,” Washington Post, October 3, 2016. 33 Rachel Bessette, “Jordan’s Parliamentary Elections: Why T hey Do (and Don’t) Matter for the Kingdom’s Future,” Lawfare, September 29, 2016. 34 Sean L. Yom, “T ribal Politics in Contemporary Jordan: T he Case of the Hirak Movement,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Spring 2014), pp. 229 -247. 35 Rana F. Sweis, “Women, 86 Percent Absent From Jordan’s Work Force, Are Left Behind,” New York Times, April 3, 2021. 36 CRS Report R46423, Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Issues for Congress, by Zoe Danon and Sarah R. Collins; Valentine M. Moghadam, “ COVID-19 and Female Labor in the MENA Region ,” Middle East Institute, June 8, 2021. 37 U.N. Women, “ COVID-19 and Women’s Economic Empowerment: Policy Recommendations for Strengthening Jordan’s Recovery,” September 1, 2020. 38 Aseel Alayli, “COVID-19 Magnifies Pre-Existing Gender Inequalities in MENA,” Arab Barometer, December 1, 2020. 39 U.S. Department of State, Women’s Global Development and Prosperity Annual Report 2020 -2021, January 2021. 40 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Rela ted Program s, FY2022, Appendix 2, June 2021, p. 249. Congressional Research Service 7 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations 2020 Parliamentary Elections In November 2020, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the kingdom held parliamentary elections for the 130-seat House of Deputies (lower chamber) without permitting either early or remote voting. Due to the pandemic, the government curtailed campaign events, which usual y feature festive public gatherings in smal towns and rural areas.41 Overal turnout (official y 30%) was slightly lower than usual and noticeably lower in urban areas. Out of the 1,700 candidates (368 of whom were women) who ran, no female candidate won a seat in any of the competitive races under the open list proportional representation system.42 Jordan’s electoral system does reserve 15 parliamentary seats for women under its quota system. Unlike in neighboring Egypt, the kingdom tolerates Muslim Brotherhood political activity, and Brotherhood candidates sometimes compete in parliamentary elections. (The Brotherhood also has boycotted previous elections in protest.) The Brotherhood is currently divided between Islamists who are wil ing to participate in the political system and those who reject it. In 2020, Brotherhood candidates ran together on a list cal ed the National Al iance Reform and won 10 seats (down from 16 in 2016 election), though of those 10, only 6 belonged to actual Islamist- leaning candidates.43 Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians The Jordanian government has long described efforts to secure a lasting end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as one of its highest priorities. In 1994, Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty.44 Nearly 27 years after the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, the persistence of Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a major chal enge for Jordan, as the issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population, and the conflict has soured attempts to improve Jordanian-Israeli people-to-people relations. With the recent formation of a new coalition government in Israel, Jordan and Israel may be looking to turn the page in their bilateral relationship after an era of strained ties between the King and former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.45 Over the past decade, there have been numerous irritants and incidents both between the two leaders and in broader diplomatic 41 T aylor Luck, “Pandemic Politics? In Jordan, it has Leveled the Playing Field,” Christian Science Monitor, November 2, 2020. 42 According to one analysis of Jordan’s electoral system, “ Candidates must enter into joint electoral lists with a minimum of three candidates on the ballot. Voters then select a list and their preferred candidates within this list. T he 2016 elections showed that this system makes it difficult for any single list to win more than one seat per district. Since only the top candidate is likely to win, list members have incentives to discourage their voters from supporting their li st allies.” See, Kristen Kao and E.J. Karmel, “ T he Pandemic Compromised Jordan’s Parliamentary Elections,” Washington Post, November 20, 2020. 43 Suha Ma’ayeh and Rana F. Sweis, “Jordan’s 2020 Parliamentary Election: Settling for the Status Quo,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, February 2021. 44 Jordan and Israel signed the peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors, Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan, the parliament repealed laws banning contacts with Israel, and the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water from Lake T iberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year —a little over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty). See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on Water Agreement with Jordan, May 27, 1997. 45 “Lapid Vows to Rebuild International T ies after ‘Reckless’ Last Government,” The Times of Israel, June 14, 2021. Congressional Research Service 8 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations ties.46 The Biden Administration has attempted to heal the rift by encouraging smal steps toward improved relations. In spring 2021, Israel approved a Jordanian request for additional water supplies. Israel had initial y denied this request in retaliation over a dispute with Jordan centered around a royal visit to holy sites in Jerusalem; however, after some intervention by the U.S. State Department, Israel acceded to the request, which it had customarily approved in previous years.47 Jordan played several different roles during spring 2021 clashes in and around Jerusalem and the May 2021 conflict in Gaza. On the one hand, Jordan has tried to portray itself as a defender of Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem and a supporter of the Palestinian national cause. After a violent standoff between Israeli police and Palestinian protestors who had encamped at the Al Aqsa Mosque compound on the Temple Mount, the Jordanian government issued an official statement saying, “What the Israeli police and special forces are doing, from violations against the mosque to attacks on worshippers, is barbaric (behavior) that is rejected and condemned.”48 Days later, after further hostilities erupted between Israel and Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza, Jordan attempted to play a supportive role in joining Egypt, France, the United States, and others in cal ing for a cease-fire.49 During the outbreak of violence, U.S. and Jordanian officials spoke and agreed on the “urgency of de-escalation and the importance of preserving the historic status quo at the holy sites in Jerusalem as wel as Jordan’s role there.”50 Holy Sites in Jerusalem51 Per arrangements with Israel dating back to 1967 (when the Israeli military seized East Jerusalem—including its Old City—from Jordan) and then subsequently confirmed in the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, Israel acknowledges a continuing role for Jordan vis-à-vis Jerusalem’s historic Muslim shrines.52 A Jordanian waqf (or Islamic custodial trust) has long administered the Temple Mount (known by Muslims as the Haram al Sharif or Noble Sanctuary) and its holy sites, and this role is key to bolstering the religious legitimacy of the Jordanian royal family’s rule.53 Jordanian monarchs trace their lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. Disputes over Jerusalem that appear to circumscribe King Abdul ah II’s role as guardian of the Islamic holy sites create a domestic political problem for the King. Jewish worship on the Mount/Haram is prohibited under a long-standing “status quo” arrangement that dates back to the era of Ottoman control before World War I. 46 David Schenker and Ghaith al-Omari, “Getting the Israel-Jordan Relationship back on T rack,” Policy Alert, T he Washington Institut e for Near East Policy, March 12, 2021. 47 Barak Ravid, “Israel Agrees to Send More Water to Jordan after Push from Biden,” Axios, April 12, 2021. 48 “Jordan Warns Israel against ‘Barbaric’ Attacks on Mosque,” Reuters, May 9, 2021. 49 “France’s Macron Says to Work with Jordan, Egypt Leaders on Israel-Gaza Ceasefire,” Reuters, May 17, 2021. 50 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Jordanian Foreign Minister Safadi, May 10, 2021. 51 For more information on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 52 Article 9, Clause 2, of the peace treaty says that “Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.” In 2013, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) reaffirmed in a bilateral agreement with Jordan that the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will continue to serve as the “ Custodian of the Holy Sites in Jerusalem,” a title that successive Jordanian monarchs have used since 1924 (see footnote below). 53 After the Ottoman conquest of the Mamluk Sultanate in 1517, the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina, which had long been under the custodianship of the Hashemite family, became nominally part of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman leaders also assumed the title of “ Caliph,” or leader of the Muslim world. In practice, successive Ottoman Caliphs recognized the role of the Hashemite family in sharing custodianship over Mecca and Medina. T his dual arrangement lasted until 1924, when the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished by the nascent republic of T urkey. Hussei n bin Ali, then Sharif of Mecca and head of the Hashemite family, declared himself Caliph over all Muslims, but his claim was not universally recognized, and the Hashemites soon lost control over Mecca and Medina to Ibn Saud, founder of modern Saudi Arabia. However, in 1924 Arab religious authorities (the Grand Muftī of Jerusalem and Congressional Research Service 9 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Water Scarcity and the Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian Water Deal Jordan is a water-poor nation and, according to the World Resources Institute, is one of the top- five most water-stressed countries in the world.54 Jordan’s increase in water scarcity over the past 75 years is attributable to population growth, a decrease in the flow of the Yarmouk River due to the building of dams upstream in Syria, gradual declines in rainfal , and depleting groundwater resources due to overuse.55 The il egal construction of thousands of private wel s also has led to unsustainable groundwater extraction. The large influx of Syrian refugees has heightened water demand in the north. A Stanford University study predicts that dwindling water supplies and continued population growth wil , without intervention, halve per capita water use in Jordan by the end of this century. 56 As of July 2021, Jordan is experiencing a severe drought. During the last rainy season (October 2020-April 2021), the kingdom received 60% of normal rainfal .57 In the spring of 2021, water authorities announced that the state would reduce water availability hours for specific regions of the country during the summer. An infestation of desert locusts also has plagued Jordan this spring, leading to significant crop losses in certain regions.58 To secure new sources of fresh water, Jordan has pursued cooperative water projects with its neighbors. In 2013, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority signed a regional water agreement (official y known as the Memorandum of Understanding on the Red-Dead Sea Conveyance Project) to pave the way for the Red-Dead Canal, a multibil ion-dollar project to address declining water levels in the Dead Sea and provide desalinated water to the parties to the agreement.59 Congress had supported the Red-Dead Sea Conveyance Project. P.L. 114-113, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, specified that $100 mil ion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) was to be set aside for water sector support for Jordan, to support the Red Sea-Dead Sea water project. However, after several years of delays, financing concerns, and Israeli uncertainty owing both to environmentalist objections and lack of a functioning government, Jordan decided Supreme Muslim Council) in British-controlled mandatory Palestine, did recognize Hussein bin Ali’s custodianship over holy sites in Jerusalem, which is considered the third holiest city in Islam after Mecca and Medina. Reflecting military and political ties developed between the United Kingdom and the Hashemites during World War 1, Hussein’s son Abdullah ruled Jordan after its creation (as T ransjordan under British mandatory con trol) in the 1920s under the post -Ottoman settlement of World War I. When Abdullah became Jordan’s first king (Abdullah I) in 1946, the West Bank remained under the British Mandate for Palestine. During Abdullah’s kingship, Jordan invaded the West Bank and gained control of East Jerusalem and its holy sites in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. King Abdullah I was assassinated in 1951 on the Mount/Haram (during a visit to the Al Aqsa Mosque for Friday prayers) by a Palestinian supposedly concerned about possible Jordan-Israel peace talks. For background, see Victor Kattan, “ T he Special Role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the Muslim Holy Shrines in Jerusalem,” Arab Law Quarterly, July 13, 2020. 54 Rutger Willem Hofste, Paul Reig and Leah Schleifer, “17 Countries, Home to One-Quarter of the World’s Population, Face Extremely High Water Stress,” World Resources Institute, August 6, 2019. 55 Deepthi Rajsekhar and Steven M. Gorelick, “Increasing drought in Jordan: Climate Change and Cascading Syrian Land-Use Impacts on Reducing T ransboundary Flow,” Science Advances, August 30, 2017: vol. 3, no. 8. 56 Josie Garthwaite, “Stanford Study Reveals a Deepening Water Crisis in Jordan – and a Way Forward,” Stanford University News, March 29, 2021. 57 “Jordan Facing ‘One of the most Severe’ Droughts in its History,” Al Jazeera, May 6, 2021. 58 Jack Kennedy, “Jordan’s Drought and Locust Infestation expected to Increase Unrest, but Protests unlikely to Remove Prime Minister, Jane’s Country Risk Daily Report, May 27, 2021. 59 On February 26, 2015, Israel and Jordan signed a bilateral agreement (“Seas Canal” Agreement) on the implementation of the Red-Dead Sea Conveyance Project, specifically on the construction of a desalination plant north of Aqaba that would supply water to the Aravah region in Israel and to Aqaba in Jordan. Congressional Research Service 10 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations in the summer of 2021 to cancel the project and wil instead build its own desalination plant along the Red Sea.60 Syria Jordanian-Syrian relations have been strained since 2011. King Abdullah II was the first Arab leader to openly cal for Syrian President Bashar alJordan: Background and U.S. Relations

Figure 1. Jordan at a Glance

Area: 89,342 sq. km. (34,495 sq. mi., slightly smal er than Indiana)
Population: 10,458,413 (July 2018); Amman (capital): 4.008 mil ion (2015)
Ethnic Groups: Arabs 97%; other 2.6% (includes Armenians, Circassians) (2015)
Religion: Sunni Muslim 97.2%; Christian 2.2%; Buddhist 0.4%; Hindu 0.1%
Percent of Population Under Age 25: 54% (2018)
Literacy: 95.4% (2015)
Youth Unemployment (ages 15-24): 40.1% (2019)
Source: Graphic created by CRS; facts from CIA World Factbook and World Bank.

Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians
The Jordanian government has long described efforts to secure a lasting end to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict as one of its highest priorities. In 1994, Jordan and Israel signed a peace
treaty.18 Nevertheless, the persistence of Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a major
chal enge for Jordan, as the issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population.
Twenty-five years after the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, the Israeli-Palestinian

18 Jordan and Israel signed the peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors,
Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan, the pa rliament repealed laws
banning contacts with Israel, and the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to
normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when
the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water
from Lake T iberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year —a little
over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty). See, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs statement on Water Agreement with Jordan, May 27, 1997.
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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

conflict has soured attempts to improve Jordanian-Israeli people-to-people relations. Even before
the current annexation issue, various short-lived diplomatic disputes (see below) between Jordan
and Israel have led to tensions in government-to-government relations, despite ongoing security
cooperation. Israeli control of Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem (see text box below) is a perpetual
concern for the Jordanian monarchy and its domestic legitimacy.19
Holy Sites in Jerusalem20
Per arrangements with Israel dating back to 1967 (when the Israeli military seized East Jerusalem—including its
Old City—from Jordan) and then subsequently confirmed in the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, Israel
acknowledges a continuing role for Jordan vis-à-vis Jerusalem’s historic Muslim shrines.21 A Jordanian waqf (or
Islamic custodial trust) has long administered the Temple Mount (known by Muslims as the Haram al Sharif or
Noble Sanctuary) and its holy sites, and this role is key to bolstering the religious legitimacy of the Jordanian royal
family’s rule. Jordanian monarchs trace their lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. Disputes over Jerusalem that
appear to circumscribe King Abdul ah II’s role as guardian of the Islamic holy sites create a domestic political
problem for the King. Jewish worship on the Mount/Haram is prohibited under a long-standing “status quo”
arrangement that dates back to the era of Ottoman control before World War I.
Jordan and Trump Administration Peace Plans
Since December 2017, when the Palestinians broke off high-level political contacts with the
United States after President Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and
relocate the U.S. embassy there, Jordan has been caught in the middle of acrimony between the
Trump Administration and the Palestinian Authority. Jordan has expressed solidarity with the
Palestinians and tried to encourage the Administration to commit to the two-state solution.
Jordanian officials have repeatedly stated that it is the kingdom’s long-standing position that any
final Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement should include a Palestinian state based on the 1967
borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.22 While Jordan did not outright reject President
Trump’s January 2020 Peace-to-Prosperity plan, two days before the plan’s release, King
Abdullah II stated “Our position is perfectly wel known. We wil not agree to proposals that
come at our expense.”23 Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi also issued a statement
responding to the proposed Peace-to-Prosperity plan that reiterated Jordan’s support for a two-
state solution, warned against the “dangerous consequences of unilateral Israeli measures,” and
cal ed for direct negotiations on al final status issues.24

19 Abdullah Sawalha, “Why Israel Should Listen to Jordan on the T emple Mount,” Fikra Forum, T he Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, August 11, 2017.
20 For more information on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
21 Article 9, Clause 2 of the peace treaty says that “Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give
high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.” In 2013, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
reaffirmed in a bilateral agreement with Jordan that the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will continue to
serve as the “ Custodian of the Holy Sites in Jerusalem,” a title that successive Jordanian monarchs have used since
1924.
22 See, for example, Felicia Schwartz and Suha Ma'ayeh, “T rump Peace Effort Puts Jordan in a Bind,” The Wall Street
Journal, July 6, 2019.
23 “Jordan's King Abdullah Publicly Slams Deal of T he Century,” Al Bawaba News, January 28, 2020.
24 “Jordan Says T wo-State Solution Only Path to Mideast P eace,” Reuters, January 28, 2020.
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Possible Israeli Annexation of the West Bank
Multiple Jordanian leaders have expressed strong opposition to a possible Israeli cabinet and
Knesset vote on annexing West Bank territory—in coordination with the United States—after
July 1, 2020.25 Since its peace treaty with Israel in 1994, Jordan has emphasized that any final
Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement should include a Palestinian state based on 1949-1967 Israel-
Jordan armistice line, with East Jerusalem as its capital.26 According to one account, Jordanian
leaders are concerned that should Israel proceed with annexation, it would end the possibility of a
viable two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and lend credence to the claim by
influential elements on the right of the Israeli political spectrum that “Jordan is Palestine.”27
It is unclear to what extent Jordanian-Israeli tensions are permeating Jordan’s traditional y strong
relationship with the United States. In a late May 2020 conversation between U.S. Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo and Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, the Jordanian foreign minister
expressed strong opposition to Israeli annexation of the West Bank, claiming that it would
endanger prospects for peace.28 While King Abdullah II has refrained from directly criticizing
Trump Administration policy changes in its approach toward Israel and the Palestinians,29 as wel
as the President’s January 2020 peace plan,30 the king has signaled that should Israel go ahead
with annexation, Jordan is prepared to escalate its confrontation with Israel. In a May 2020
interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel, King Abdullah II remarked:
What would happen if the Palestinian National Authority collapsed? There would be more
chaos and extremism in the region. If Israel really annexes the West Bank in July, it would
lead to a massive conflict with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan…. I don't want to make
threats and create a loggerheads atmosphere, but we are considering all options. We agree
with many countries in Europe and the international community that the law of the
strongest should not apply in the Middle East.31
Possible Jordanian Reactions to Annexation
As Jordanian officials have used strong rhetoric to signal opposition to annexation, many
observers have speculated as to what concrete steps the kingdom may take should Israel begin
any annexation process. Jordan has already taken one step to signal possible displeasure with
Israel. In November 2019, Jordan did not renew a provision in its 1994 peace treaty with Israel

25 U.S. officials have said that any U.S. approval for Israeli annexation of West Bank areas would co me after a U.S.-
Israel committee (established under the T rump Administration peace plan) can pinpoint areas earmarked for eventual
Israeli sovereignty. See, CRS Report R44245, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti.
26 In 1988, the late King Hussein of Jordan renounced Jordan’s claim to the West Bank, saying, “ 'We respect the wish
of the P.L.O., [Palestine Liberation Organization] the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to secede
from us in an independent Palestinian state.” John Kifner, “ Hussein Surrenders Claims on West Bank to the P.L.O.;
U.S. Peace Plan in Jeopardy; Internal T ensions,” New York Times, August 1, 1988.
27 Ofer Zalzberg, “T he Regional Stakes of Soured Israeli-Jordanian Relations,” International Crisis Group, March 23,
2020.
28 See, “Jordan Warns Washington, London of ‘Unprecedented T hreat’ of Annexation,” Times of Israel, May 29, 2020.
29 T aylor Luck, “In T rump Peace Conference, a Perilous Balancing Act for Jordan,” Christian Science Monitor, June
17, 2019.
30 Abdullah Sawalha, “Jordan’s Balancing Act: Overcoming the Challenges Posed by T rump’s ‘Deal of the Century,’”
Fikra Forum , February 12, 2020.
31 Interview Conducted by Susanne Koelbl and Maximilian Popp, “T he Danger of People Starving to Death Is Greater
than the Danger from the Virus,” Spiegel International, May 15, 2020.
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that al owed Israel access to the Jordanian territories of Baqoura and Al Ghumar (see below),
which are agricultural areas in northern and southern Jordan, respectively.
Since its 1994 peace treaty with Israel, Jordan has oriented its foreign policy toward promoting
Middle East peace, combatting extremism, and developing close ties to the United States. The
1994 treaty enables water sharing between the two countries, as wel as Jordanian overflight of
Israeli territory.32 Beyond the treaty, Jordan now imports natural gas from Israel (see below).
Any departure from these aspects of cooperation would be a major reorientation for the kingdom.
Before taking any steps, Jordanian leaders would be likely to calculate the degree of public
opposition to any Israeli action, how much support the kingdom enjoys from key international
partners such as Saudi Arabia and the European Union, and most importantly, how any reaction
would be perceived in Israel and the United States. Partly because of the complexity and
uncertainty involved in whether and how Israel might annex West Bank territory, and how other
key international actors might react, many analysts argue that Jordan is likely to take calculated,
gradual steps in revisiting ties with Israel rather than any drastic action.33 The following offer a
range of possible options Jordan may be considering.34
 Recall Jordan’s Ambassador to Israel. Although Article 5 of the 1994 peace
treaty cal s on both parties to establish full diplomatic relations, Jordan has
frequently recal ed its ambassador from Tel Aviv either to protest Israeli military
action in Gaza or because of a bilateral dispute over Jerusalem and other issues.
Most recently, Jordan left the ambassador position in Israel vacant from 2009 to
2012 and recal ed its ambassador from Israel in 2014 and 2017. Given this
history, the recal would be a likely option and would not be a significant
departure from precedent.
 Reduce Jordanian-Israeli Security Cooperation. Palestinian Authority
President Mahmoud Abbas’s May 2020 declaration abrogating al agreements
and understandings with the American and Israeli governments, including
security cooperation, could be a precursor to Jordan reducing its own security
cooperation with Israel should annexation occur. According to Bruce Riedel of
the Brookings Institution, “For decades, the two countries’ intel igence agencies
have been close partners in counterterrorism…. Drastical y cutting down on the
covert connection wil have impact. But of course by definition, cutting the
clandestine relationship is not public, which leaves Abdullah stil in need of a
dramatic response.”35
 Cancel Natural Gas Deal with Israel. In September 2016, Jordan's state-run
National Electric Power Company (NEPCO) signed a 15-year, $10 bil ion natural
gas import deal with a consortium of U.S. (Noble Energy Inc.) and Israeli (Delek
Dril ing-LP and others) companies. The contract would reportedly meet an
estimated 40% of Jordan’s electricity needs and save the Jordanian government
hundreds of mil ions of dollars annual y in energy costs. However, anti-
normalization forces (Jordanians opposed to cooperation with Israel) within
Jordan have used the gas deal as a ral ying cry, cal ing on the government to
cancel the deal. The Lower House of parliament approved a draft bil to ban gas

32 See footnote 18.
33 William Christou, “Will West Bank Annexation Harm US-Jordan Security Cooperation?” Al Monitor, June 2, 2020.
34 “Jordan to Mull Canceling Peace Deal if Israel Annexes – Report,” Times of Israel, June 7, 2020.
35 Bruce Riedel, “With Israel’s Annexation Plans Looming, an Hour of Decision for Jordan’s Hashemites,” Brookings,
June 1, 2020.
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imports from Israel in January 2020, but Jordan's Constitutional Court ruled in
May 2020 that only the king can declare war, ratify, or amend treaties and
international agreements. If the king were to cancel the deal in response to
annexation, Jordan would need to find alternative sources of imported natural
gas, perhaps at higher costs. NEPCO also may be liable for cancel ation fees that
could run into the hundreds of mil ions of dol ars.
 Partially or Fully Suspend the 1994 Treaty. Perhaps the most serious step
would involve Jordan suspending its treaty with Israel. Jordan might argue that a
suspension is justified because Israeli annexation of the Jordan Val ey would
violate the delineation of borders between Israel and Jordan.36 However, Israel
could counter that the peace treaty only outlines the international border between
Jordan and Israel, and does not address boundary questions where Jordan’s
territory meets the West Bank. Article 3 Clause 2 of the treaty states, “The
boundary, as set out in Annex I (a), is the permanent, secure and recognized
international boundary between Israel and Jordan, without prejudice to the status
of any territories that came under Israeli military government control in 1967.”37
Regardless of the legal justifications for doing so, any Jordanian revocation or
suspension of the peace treaty, while potential y popular domestical y,38 would
risk jeopardizing key Jordanian national interests, such as Israeli recognition of
King Abdullah II’s role as guardian of the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem.
Perhaps most importantly, Jordan’s peace with Israel has been one of the
foundations of strong U.S.-Jordanian ties. According to one Israeli news report,
an unnamed senior Jordanian official said that the king wants to maintain his
status as custodian of holy sites in Jerusalem and his good relations with
President Trump.39
One major unknown factor in the discussion of heightened Israeli-Jordanian tensions over
annexation is the possible Jordanian public reaction and what it bodes for the stability of the
kingdom. Given Jordan’s precarious financial situation (exacerbated by the COVID-19
pandemic), recent instances of public protests, and longtime public support for Palestinian
national aspirations, it is conceivable that the issue of annexation could ignite popular anger
against Israel, the United States, and the king himself. Recent large-scale protests in Jordan have
been focused on economic grievances, rather than on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Nevertheless, some Israeli commentators have stressed that Israel has a vested interest in Jordan’s
stability and have cautioned against taking provocative steps that could trigger unrest next door.40





36 Osama al Sharif, “What are Jordan’s Options if Israel Annexed the West Bank?” Al Monitor, May 25, 2020.
37 T reaty of Peace Between T he State of Israel and T he Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, October 26, 1994.
38 “King Abdullah Issues Warning over West Bank Annexation,” Economist Intelligence Unit, May 28, 2020.
39 Daniel Siryoti, “'Next Few Weeks will Determine Whether Future Decades will see Peace or Bloodshed,'” Israel
Hayom , May 27, 2020.
40 Oded Eran, “Concerns for Jordan's Stability,” INSS, Insight No. 1169, May 21, 2019.
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Jordan Ends Israeli Access to Two Territories
In late 2018, the king announced (via Twitter)
that his government would not renew a
Figure 2. Jordanian Officials Pray at Area
provision in its 1994 peace treaty with Israel
Recently Reclaimed from Israel
that al owed Israel access to the Jordanian
territories of Baqoura and Al Ghumar, which
are agricultural areas in northern and southern
Jordan, respectively.41 According to one
Jordanian commentator, “Domestical y, the
King’s decision is a much-needed shot in the
arm for the government at a time when it is
facing public pressure over its unpopular
economic policies.”42 After several failed
Israeli attempts to negotiate with Jordan over
the renewal of access to the territories, Jordan

ended its lease to Israel on November 10,
Source: Royal Hashemite Court.
2019. A day later, King Abdullah, the Crown
Prince, and several high level military officials made an official visit to Baqoura to publicly
demonstrate Jordanian sovereignty over the area.43
Syria
Jordanian-Syrian relations have been strained since 2011. King Abdullah was the first Arab leader
to openly cal for Syrian President Bashar Al Asad’s resignation in November 2011, and Jordan Asad’s resignation in November 2011, and Jordan
supported moderate Syrian rebel groups operating in southwestern Syria until supported moderate Syrian rebel groups operating in southwestern Syria until Asad largely
the Asad government largely defeated these groups in 2018.defeated these groups in 2018.4461 Since the Asad regime reclaimed control of southern Syria (with Since the Asad regime reclaimed control of southern Syria (with
the help of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah), Jordan has sought to return to normal bilateralthe help of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah), Jordan has sought to return to normal bilateral ties. ties.
Along the kingdom’s northern border with Syria, many Jordanian residents share familialAlong the kingdom’s northern border with Syria, many Jordanian residents share familial ties ties
with Syrian families. While Jordan and Syria opened the Nasib/Jaber border crossing to facilitate with Syrian families. While Jordan and Syria opened the Nasib/Jaber border crossing to facilitate
greater bilateral trade, economic relations have not returned to pre-2011 greater bilateral trade, economic relations have not returned to pre-2011 levels, arguably because levels, arguably because
of trade barriers, sanctions, and security impediments.of trade barriers, sanctions, and security impediments.4562
Syria remains a primary problem for Jordan’s security. The kingdom shares security concerns Syria remains a primary problem for Jordan’s security. The kingdom shares security concerns
with Israel over the presence of Iranian and Hezbollah forces operating near Jordan’s borders. with Israel over the presence of Iranian and Hezbollah forces operating near Jordan’s borders.
According to one account, “Former Free Syrian Army rebels who have returned to their According to one account, “Former Free Syrian Army rebels who have returned to their
hometowns in southern Syria after an amnesty agreement with the regime say Hezbollah is hometowns in southern Syria after an amnesty agreement with the regime say Hezbollah is
effectively ‘governing’ several towns and vil ages. Hezbollah and Shiite militias patrol areas effectively ‘governing’ several towns and vil ages. Hezbollah and Shiite militias patrol areas

41 T hese two Jordanian-leased agricultural territories to Israel are known in Hebrew as Naharayim and T zofar, where
Israeli farmers have tilled the land since 1949. In 1997, three years after the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, on the island
of Naharayim, a Jordanian soldier killed seven Israeli schoolgirls who were visiting Naharayim on a field trip. T he late
King Hussein of Jordan visited Israel after the shooting, and Naharayim was renamed the “Isle of Peace” (it is a man -
made island in the vicinity of the Jordan River) to commemorate those killed. See, “At Bloodied Isle of Peace, Some
Israelis Still Hope to Bridge Divide with Jordan,” Tim es of Israel, March 13, 2019.
42 “King’s T ermination of Peace T reaty Annexes unites Jordanians,” Jordan Times, October 23, 2018.
43 Petra (Jordan News Agency), website of the official news agency of the Jordanian Government, November 12, 2019.
44 Steven Simon and James Fromson, “Jordan's Pragmatism in Syria, How It Became a Reliable Partner to
Washington,” Foreign Affairs, June 22, 2016.
45 Nabih Bulos, “Sanctions on Syria Also Felt By U.S. Allies,” Los Angeles Times, September 13, 2019.
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dressed as uniformed Syrian regime forces in order to avoid being hit by Israeli airstrikes, they
say, or, more frequently, deploy former rebel fighters to patrol areas and provide intel igence
directly to the Iran-backed paramilitary group.”46
The kingdom also continues to host hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees, many of whom are
reluctant to return to their homes for fear of Syrian regime retribution against them. 47 Since 2011,
the influx of Syrian refugees has placed tremendous strain on Jordan’s government and local
economies, especial y in the northern governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, Ar Ramtha, and Zarqa. As of
June 2020, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there
are 657,287 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan.
The United States has used Jordanian territory to monitor and implement U.S. assistance
programs to opposition-held areas in Syria. While the Trump Administration ended U.S. funding
for stabilization assistance to Syria in 2018, some programs have continued using non-U.S.
funding, and the Southern Syria Assistance Platform (SSAP) based in Amman continues to
monitor foreign assistance to opposition-held areas in Syria.48
U.S. Relations
U.S. officials frequently express their support for Jordan, citing its role in countering the Islamic
State, supporting U.S. policy toward Syria, and having a moderating influence in the Arab world,
both in its regional outlook and internal politics.49 At a time when traditional U.S. partnerships
with key regional actors like Saudi Arabia and Turkey are fraught, U.S.-Jordanian relations
remain solid. President Trump has acknowledged Jordan’s role as a key U.S. partner in
countering the Islamic State, as many U.S. policymakers advocate for continued robust U.S.
assistance to the kingdom. Annual aid to Jordan has nearly quadrupled in historical terms over the
last 15 years. Jordan also hosts U.S. troops. According to President Trump’s June 2020 War
dressed as uniformed Syrian regime forces in order to avoid being hit by Israeli airstrikes, they say, or, more frequently, deploy former rebel fighters to patrol areas and provide intel igence directly to the Iran-backed paramilitary group.”63 The kingdom also continues to host hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees, many of whom are reluctant to return to their homes for fear of Syrian regime retribution against them.64 As of June 2021, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are 668,332 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan. Since 2011, the influx of Syrian refugees has placed tremendous strain on Jordan’s government and local economies, especial y in the northern governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, Ar Ramtha, and Zarqa. Due to the Syrian civil war and the continued presence of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, Jordan has had to more carefully monitor its borders and its citizens, some of whom may have joined terrorist groups abroad. According to the State Department, “There were many Jordanian nationals among FTFs [foreign terrorist fighters] in Iraq and Syria, and the threat of domestic radicalization, especial y online, remains. Returning FTFs are an ongoing concern for Jordan’s security services.”65 Congress has contributed funding to Jordan’s border security efforts in recent defense appropriations legislation (see below). 60 “After Years of Delays, Jordan Said to Nix Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal with Israel, PA,” The Times of Israel, June 17, 2021. 61 Steven Simon and James Fromson, “Jordan’s Pragmatism in Syria, How It Became a Reliable Partner to Washington,” Foreign Affairs, June 22, 2016. 62 Nabih Bulos, “Sanctions on Syria Also Felt By U.S. Allies,” Los Angeles Times, September 13, 2019. 63 T aylor Luck, “What Russian Deal? Israel and Jordan Cast Wary Eye T oward Syria,” Christian Science Monitor, August 12, 2019. 64 “T rapped in Jordan, Syrian Refugees See No Way Home,” Associated Press, September 11, 2019. 65 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Jordan, June 24, 2020. Congressional Research Service 11 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations U.S. Relations U.S. officials frequently express their support for Jordan, citing its role in promoting Middle East peace, upholding U.S. policy toward Syria, and having a moderating influence in the Arab world, both in its regional outlook and internal politics.66 Many U.S. policymakers advocate for continued robust U.S. assistance to the kingdom. Annual aid to Jordan has nearly quadrupled in historical terms over the past 15 years (see below). According to the U.S. State Department, the United States and Jordan have a 1996 Status of Forces Agreement, a 2006 Acquisition and Cross- Servicing Agreement, and a 2021 Defense Cooperation Agreement.67 Jordan also hosts U.S. troops. According to President Biden’s June 2021 War Powers Resolution Powers Resolution Report to Congress, “At the request of the Government of Jordan, Report to Congress, “At the request of the Government of Jordan,
approximately approximately 3,1452,976 United States military personnel are deployed to Jordan to support Defeat- United States military personnel are deployed to Jordan to support Defeat-
ISIS operations, enhance ISIS operations, enhance Jordan’s security, and promote regional stability.”68 In summer 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that equipment and materiel previously stored at a now-closed U.S. base in Qatar would be moved to Jordan.69 The Case of Ahlam al Tamimi Ahlam al Tamimi is a Jordanian national who participated in the 2001 suicide bombing of a Jerusalem pizza restaurant that kil ed 15 people, including two Americans. In Israel, Jordan’s security, and promote regional stability.”50







46 T aylor Luck, “What Russian Deal? Israel and Jordan Cast Wary Eye T oward Syria,” Christian Science Monitor,
August 12, 2019.
47 Associated Press, “T rapped in Jordan, Syrian Refugees See No Way Home,” September 11, 2019.
48 Department of Defense, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report T o T he United States Congress,
July 1, 2019‒October 25, 2019.
49 U.S. Embassy in Jordan, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo and Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi at a
Press Availability, January 9, 2019.
50 T he White House, Office of the Press Secretary, T ext of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President Pro T empore of the Senate, June 9, 2020.
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The Case of Ahlam al Tamimi
Ahlam al Tamimi is a Jordanian national who participated in the 2001 suicide bombing of a Jerusalem pizza
restaurant that kil ed 15 people, including two Americans. In Israel, she had been sentenced to lifeshe had been sentenced to life in prison but in prison but
was releasedwas released and returned to Jordan in 2011 as part of a prisonerand returned to Jordan in 2011 as part of a prisoner exchange deal between Israel and Hamas. The exchange deal between Israel and Hamas. The
U.S. Justice Department filed criminalU.S. Justice Department filed criminal charges against Al Tamimicharges against Al Tamimi in 2013, and those charges werein 2013, and those charges were unsealed in early unsealed in early
2017. Al Tamimi2017. Al Tamimi is on the is on the Federal Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Most Wanted TerroristBureau of Investigation’s Most Wanted Terrorist List.List.5170 The United States and The United States and
Jordan Jordan have an extradition treaty, which, according to the U.S. State Department, entered into force on July 29, have an extradition treaty, which, according to the U.S. State Department, entered into force on July 29,
1995.1995. 5271 The United States requested Al Tamimi’s The United States requested Al Tamimi’s extradition in 2017, but Jordan’s Court of Cassation ruled that extradition in 2017, but Jordan’s Court of Cassation ruled that
the extradition treaty was invalid. In Novemberthe extradition treaty was invalid. In November 2019, the State 2019, the State Department,Department, said that “said that “Thethe United States regards United States regards
the extradition treaty as valid.”
On April 30, 2020, seven House lawmakers sent a letter to the Jordanian Ambassador in Washington DC stating
that “We believe it is of the highest importance to US/Jordan relations that an outcome is found that honors
Jordanian law while ensuring this unrepentant terrorist and murderer of innocent Americans is brought to US
justice.”53 Section 7055 of P.L. 116-94, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, prohibits certain
foreign assistance funds for the central government of a country that has “notified the Department of State of its
refusal to extradite to the United States any individual indicted for a criminal offense for which the maximum
penalty is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or for kil ing a law enforcement officer, as specified in
a United States extradition request.” Section 7055 does contain a clause al owing the Secretary of State to waive
the provision if it is important to the national security interests of the United States.
In June 2020, the Associated Press published U.S. Ambassador to Jordan Henry Wooster’s written responses to
questions for the record on Tamimi’s case after his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. In one response to a question posed by Senator Ted Cruz, Wooster wrote that “The United States
has multiple options and different types of leverage to secure Ahlam Aref Ahmad Al-Tamimi’s extradition …. We
wil continue to engage Jordanian officials at al levels not only on this issue, but also on the extradition treaty
more broadly. US generosity to Jordan in Foreign Military Financing as wel as economic support and other
assistance is careful y calibrated to protect and advance the range of US interests in Jordan and in the region…. If
confirmed, I would explore al options to bring Ahlam Aref Ahmad Al Tamimi to justice, secure her extradition,
and address the broader issues associated with the extradition treaty.”54the extradition treaty as valid.” According to one recent report, one reason why the U.S. and Israeli governments have not applied further pressure on the government of Jordan to extradite Tamimi is concern for the stability of Jordan.72 One unnamed U.S. State Department official noted that “while [King] Abdullah has no love for Tamimi, giving her up to America would put the king in a very difficult position with his own people.”73 66 U.S. Embassy in Jordan, Secretary of State Blinken’s Meeting with His Majesty King Abdullah II, May 26, 2021. 67 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Security Cooperation With Jordan, Fact Sheet, May 21, 2021. 68 T he White House, Office of the Press Secretary, T ext of a Letter from the President to the Spe aker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro T empore of the Senate Regarding the War Powers Report , June 8, 2021. 69 J.P. Lawrence, “US Military Shifts Army Basing from Qatar to Jordan in Move that Could Provide Leverage against Iran,” Stars and Stripes, July 1, 2021. 70 https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/ahlam-ahmad-al-tamimi/@@download.pdf. T he kingdom’s courts have ruled that Al T amimi cannot be extradited until such a treaty is endorsed by the Jordanian parliament. 72 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Justice Ignored,” Jerusalem Post, April 30, 2021. 73 Op. cit. Congressional Research Service 12 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan
The United States has provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, The United States has provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957,
respectively. Total bilateral U.S. aid (overseen by the Departments of State and Defense) to respectively. Total bilateral U.S. aid (overseen by the Departments of State and Defense) to
Jordan through FY2018 amounted to approximately $22 bil ion. Jordan also has received over Jordan through FY2018 amounted to approximately $22 bil ion. Jordan also has received over
one 1 bil ion dollars in additionalbil ion dollars in additional military aid since FY2014military aid since FY2014, channeled through the Defense channeled through the Defense
Department’s various security assistance accounts. Currently, Jordan is the third-largest recipient Department’s various security assistance accounts. Currently, Jordan is the third-largest recipient
of annual U.S. foreign aid global y, after Afghanistan and Israel. of annual U.S. foreign aid global y, after Afghanistan and Israel.



51 https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/ahlam-ahmad-al-tamimi/@@download.pdf.
52 T he kingdom’s courts have ruled that Al T amimi cannot be extradited until such a treaty is endorsed by the Jordanian
parliament.
53 https://emetonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/attachment-1.pdf.
54 Associated Press and David Horovitz, “US Mulls Withholding Aid to Jordan to Force Extradition of Palestinian
T errorist ,” Tim es of Israel, June 16, 2020.
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Table 1. Bilateral Aid to Jordan
current U.S. dol ars in mil ions current U.S. dol ars in mil ions

FY2016
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021 FY2022 actual
actual
actual
actual
enacted
request
ESF/ESDF
812.35
832.35
1,082.40
1,082.40
1,207.40
910.80
FMF
450.00
470.00
425.00
425.00
425.00
350.00
IMET
3.73
3.88
4.01
3.99
4.00
3.80
NADR
8.85
13.60
13.60
13.60
13.60
10.40
Total
1,274.93
1,319.83
1,525.01
1,524.99
1,650.00
1,275.00
DA — — — — 85.00 — ESF 832.35 1,082.40 1,082.40 1,082.40 1,122.40 910.80 FMF 470.00 425.00 425.00 425.00 425.00 350.00 IMET 3.88 4.01 3.99 4.00 4.00 3.80 NADR 13.60 13.60 13.60 13.60 13.60 10.40 Total 1,319.83 1,525.01 1,524.99 1,525.00 1,650.00 1,275.00 Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications
((FY2017-FY2021FY2019-FY2022), P.L. 116-), P.L. 116-94260, and CRS calculations and rounding., and CRS calculations and rounding. Notes: Prior-year funds not included in this table: $125 mil ion in ESF in FY2020 (P.L. 116-93 ); $50 mil ion in Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF) aid in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6
Notes: The Administration amended the FY2021 request to realign funding with the MOU. Funding levels for
FY2020 enacted include $125 mil ion in ESF from prior acts. Under P.L. 116-6 (FY2019 omnibus), Congress
provided an additional $50 mil ion in prior-year Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF) aid for Jordan. Funding levels
combine both regular appropriations and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). ).
U.S.-Jordanian Agreement on Foreign Assistance
On February 14, 2018, the United States and Jordan signed a Memorandum of Understanding On February 14, 2018, the United States and Jordan signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) on U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan. The MOU, the third such agreement between the (MOU) on U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan. The MOU, the third such agreement between the
United and Jordan, commits the United States to providing $1.275 bil ion per year in bilateral United and Jordan, commits the United States to providing $1.275 bil ion per year in bilateral
foreign assistance over a five-year period for a total of $6.375 bil ion (FY2018-FY2022). This foreign assistance over a five-year period for a total of $6.375 bil ion (FY2018-FY2022). This
latest MOU represents a 27% increase in the U.S. commitment to Jordan above the previous latest MOU represents a 27% increase in the U.S. commitment to Jordan above the previous
iteration and is the first five-year MOU with the kingdom. The previous two MOU agreements iteration and is the first five-year MOU with the kingdom. The previous two MOU agreements
had each been in effect for three years. had each been in effect for three years.
Congressional Research Service 13 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 2. State Department and USAID Assistance to Jordan, FY2011-FY2021 Executive branch requests vs. actual al ocations in mil ions of current dol ars Source: Created by CRS using data from annual State Department Congressional Budget Justifications, legislation, and explanatory statements. Notes: Economic aid from the fol owing accounts: Economic Support Fund (ESF), and Food for Peace Act, Title II (P.L.480). Military aid from the fol owing accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR). Economic Assistance
The United States provides economic aid to Jordan for (1) budgetary support (cash transfer), (2) The United States provides economic aid to Jordan for (1) budgetary support (cash transfer), (2)
USAID programs in Jordan, and (3) loan guarantees. The cash transfer portion of U.S. economic USAID programs in Jordan, and (3) loan guarantees. The cash transfer portion of U.S. economic
assistance to Jordan is the largest amount of budget support given to any U.S. foreign aid assistance to Jordan is the largest amount of budget support given to any U.S. foreign aid
recipient worldwide.recipient worldwide.5574 U.S. cash assistance is provided to help the kingdom with foreign debt U.S. cash assistance is provided to help the kingdom with foreign debt
payments, Syrian refugee support, and fuel import costspayments, Syrian refugee support, and fuel import costs. (Jordan is almost entirely reliant on (Jordan is almost entirely reliant on
imports for its domestic energy needsimports for its domestic energy needs)..) According to USAID, ESF cash transfer funds are According to USAID, ESF cash transfer funds are
deposited in a single tranche into a U.S.-domiciled interest-bearing account and are not deposited in a single tranche into a U.S.-domiciled interest-bearing account and are not
commingled with other funds. commingled with other funds.5675

5574 Other budget support aid recipients include Other budget support aid recipients include: the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau. Palau.
5675 USAID Congressional Notification, May 15, 2020. USAID Congressional Notification, May 15, 2020.
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Figure 3. U.S. Cash Transfers to Jordan
Obligated Obligated Funds (dol ars in mil ions) FY2014-FY2020

Source: CRS analysis of USAID Notifications to Congress.funds since 2011 in mil ions of dol ars Source: Created by CRS with data from USAID Foreign Aid Explorer.
USAID programs in Jordan focus on a variety of sectors USAID programs in Jordan focus on a variety of sectors, including democracy assistance, water including democracy assistance, water
conservation, decentralization, conservation, decentralization, health, and education (particularly building and renovating public and education (particularly building and renovating public
schools). schools). In the democracy  In the democracy sector, U.S. assistance has supported capacity-building sector, U.S. assistance has supported capacity-building programs for programs for
the parliamentthe parliament'’s support offices, the Jordanian Judicial Council, the Jordan Integrity and Anti-s support offices, the Jordanian Judicial Council, the Jordan Integrity and Anti-
Corruption Commission, and the Ministry of Justice. The International Republican Institute and Corruption Commission, and the Ministry of Justice. The International Republican Institute and
the National Democratic Institute also have received U.S. grants to train, among other groups, the the National Democratic Institute also have received U.S. grants to train, among other groups, the
Jordanian Independent Election Commission (IEC),Jordanian Independent Election Commission (IEC),5776 Jordanian political parties, and members of Jordanian political parties, and members of
parliament. In the area of decentralizationparliament.  In the water sector, the bulk of U.S. economic assistance is devoted to optimizing the management of scarce water resources. USAID helps improve the capacity of the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, as wel as local water utilities, such as Miyahuna, Aqaba Water Company, the Yarmouk Water Companies, the Water Authority of Jordan, and the Jordan Val ey Authority.  In the area of decentralization, Chemonics International is USAID’s primary , Chemonics International is USAID’s primary U.S. U.S.
partner in implementingpartner in implementing the Cities Implementing Transparent, Innovative, the Cities Implementing Transparent, Innovative, and Effective Solutions and Effective Solutions
(CITIES) project, which aims to improve how Jordanian municipalities deliver core services.(CITIES) project, which aims to improve how Jordanian municipalities deliver core services.58
77 USAID also uses ESF to fund 76 USAID also has provided grant assistance to the IEC to improve the transparency of elections administration. 77 Chemonics International, Strengthening Municipal Governance in Jordan, at https://chemonics.com/projects/strengthening-municipal-governance-jordan/. Congressional Research Service 15 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations USAID also uses ESF to fund infrastructure development in Jordanian municipalities in order to infrastructure development in Jordanian municipalities in order to
help create jobs for Syrian refugees and Jordanians.help create jobs for Syrian refugees and Jordanians.  In the In the water sector, the bulk of U.S.
economic assistance is devoted to optimizing the management of scarce water resources. As
mentioned above, Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the world.59 USAID
subsidizes several waste treatment and water distribution projects in the Jordanian cities of
Amman, Mafraq, Aqaba, and Irbid.60health sector, USAID grants support the Jordanian Ministry of Health in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, in conjunction with implementing partners, such as Family Health International (FHI), Management Systems International (MSI), and Abt Associates, USAID provides funding to delivery improved reproductive, maternal, neonatal, and child health services.78  In the education sector, USAID has supported the Jordan Compact Education Fund, a multidonor funding mechanism that has enabled 134,121 Syrian children to enroll in Jordanian schools.79
U.S. Sovereign Loan Guarantees (or LGs) al ow recipient governments (in this case U.S. Sovereign Loan Guarantees (or LGs) al ow recipient governments (in this case, Jordan) to Jordan) to
issue debt securities that are fully guaranteed by the United States government in capital issue debt securities that are fully guaranteed by the United States government in capital
markets,markets,6180 effectively subsidizing the cost for governments of accessing financing. Since 2013, effectively subsidizing the cost for governments of accessing financing. Since 2013,

57 USAID also has provided grant assistance to the IEC to improve the transparency of elections administration.
58 Chemonics International, Strengthening Municipal Governance in Jordan, at
https://chemonics.com/projects/strengthening-municipal-governance-jordan/.
59 “Five Countries with the Greatest Water Scarcity Issues,” Mel & Enid Zuckerman College of Public Health,
University of Arizona, March 31, 2016.
60 USAID, “USAID Improves Water Security in Jordan,” Office of Press Relations, August 8, 2018.
61 “A Helping Hand,” International Financial Law Review, April 2014.
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Congress has authorized62Congress has authorized81 LGs for Jordan and appropriated $413 mil ion in ESF (the “subsidy LGs for Jordan and appropriated $413 mil ion in ESF (the “subsidy
cost”) to support three separate tranches, enabling Jordan to borrow a total of $3.75 bil ion at cost”) to support three separate tranches, enabling Jordan to borrow a total of $3.75 bil ion at
concessional lending rates. concessional lending rates.6382
Humanitarian Assistance for
Figure 4. U.S., Jordan Sign Aid Agreement
Syrian Refugees in Jordan
($340 mil ion assistance agreement signed May 2020) ($340 mil ion assistance agreement signed May 2020)
The U.S. State Department estimates that, The U.S. State Department estimates that,
since large-scale U.S. aid to Syrian refugees since large-scale U.S. aid to Syrian refugees
began in FY2012, it has al ocated more than began in FY2012, it has al ocated more than
$1.$1.58 bil ion in humanitarian assistance from bil ion in humanitarian assistance from
global accounts for programs in Jordan to global accounts for programs in Jordan to
meet the needs of Syrian refugees and, meet the needs of Syrian refugees and,
indirectly, to ease the burden on Jordan.indirectly, to ease the burden on Jordan.64
83 U.S. humanitarian assistance is provided both U.S. humanitarian assistance is provided both
as cash assistance to refugees and through as cash assistance to refugees and through
programs to meet their basic needs, such as programs to meet their basic needs, such as

child health care, education, water, and child health care, education, water, and
Source: U.S. Embassy AmmanU.S. Embassy Amman.
sanitation. To help prevent the spread of COVID-19 in Jordan, the United States has provided sanitation. To help prevent the spread of COVID-19 in Jordan, the United States has provided
$8.4 mil ion in aid, most of which is targeted toward Syrian refugees living in Jordan. $8.4 mil ion in aid, most of which is targeted toward Syrian refugees living in Jordan.65
Military Assistance
U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation is a key component in bilateral relations. U.S. military
assistance is primarily directed toward enabling the Jordanian military to procure and maintain
U.S.-origin conventional weapons systems.66 According to the State Department, Jordan receives
one of the largest al ocations of International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding
worldwide, and IMET graduates in Jordan include “King Abdullah II, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman, the Air Force commander, the Special Forces commander, and
numerous other commanders.”67

6284 78 USAID, Congressional Notification #59, FY2020 – Country Narrative, December 3, 2020. 79 Op. cit., Country Reports on T errorism 2019. 80 “A Helping Hand,” International Financial Law Review, April 2014. 81 Congress initially authorized additional economic assistance to Jordan in Section 7041 of P.L. 112-74, the Congress initially authorized additional economic assistance to Jordan in Section 7041 of P.L. 112-74, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013
2013, specified that such assistance should take the form of a loan guarantee. Section 1706(j) of the same act also specified that such assistance should take the form of a loan guarantee. Section 1706(j) of the same act also
appropriat edappropriated $30 million (from FY2011) for the initial cost of sovereign loan guarantees. Congress reauthorized loan $30 million (from FY2011) for the initial cost of sovereign loan guarantees. Congress reauthorized loan
guarantees for Jordan in Section 7034 in each of the guarantees for Jordan in Section 7034 in each of the last sixpast seven consolidated appropriations acts (FY2015 - consolidated appropriations acts (FY2015 -FY2020).
63FY2021). 82 For the latest Loan Guarantee Agreement between the United States and Jordan, see T reaties and other International For the latest Loan Guarantee Agreement between the United States and Jordan, see T reaties and other International
Acts Series 15-624, Loan Guarantee Agreement between the United States Acts Series 15-624, Loan Guarantee Agreement between the United States ofo f America and Jordan, Signed at Amman America and Jordan, Signed at Amman
May 31, 2015. May 31, 2015.
64 Statement of Henry Wooster, Nominee for U.S. Ambassador to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, May 13, 2020.
6583 CRS Correspondence with the U.S. State Department, June 2021. 84 USAID, “ State Department: Update: T he United States Continues to Lead the Global Response to COVID-19, State Department: Update: T he United States Continues to Lead the Global Response to COVID-19, available online
” available at https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/coronavirus/factat https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/coronavirus/fact -sheets/may-29-2020-update-united-states-continues-lead-
global-response-covid-19.
66 According to Jane's Defence Procurement Budgets, Jordan’s 2020 defense budget is $2.05 billion. See Jane’s
Defence Budgets, Jordan, May 15, 2020.
67 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Security Cooperation with Jordan, Fact Sheet , Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
October 26, 2018.
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-sheets/may-29-2020-update-united-states- Congressional Research Service 16 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Military Assistance U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation is a key component in bilateral relations. U.S. military assistance is primarily directed toward enabling the Jordanian military to procure and maintain U.S.-origin conventional weapons systems.85 According to the State Department, Jordan receives one of the largest al ocations of International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding worldwide, and IMET graduates in Jordan include “King Abdullah II, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman, the Air Force commander, the Special Forces commander, and numerous other commanders.”86
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and DOD Security Assistance
FMF overseen by the State Department is designed to support the Jordanian armed forces’ FMF overseen by the State Department is designed to support the Jordanian armed forces’
multiyear (usual y five-year) procurement plans, while DOD-administered security assistance multiyear (usual y five-year) procurement plans, while DOD-administered security assistance
supports ad hoc defense systems to respond to immediate threats and other contingencies. FMF supports ad hoc defense systems to respond to immediate threats and other contingencies. FMF
may be used to purchase new equipment (e.g., precision-guided munitions, night vision) or to may be used to purchase new equipment (e.g., precision-guided munitions, night vision) or to
sustain previous acquisitions (e.g., Blackhawk helicopters, AT-802 fixed-wing aircraft). FMF sustain previous acquisitions (e.g., Blackhawk helicopters, AT-802 fixed-wing aircraft). FMF
grants have enabled the Royal Jordanian Air Force to procure munitions for its F-16 fighter grants have enabled the Royal Jordanian Air Force to procure munitions for its F-16 fighter
aircraft and a fleet of aircraft and a fleet of 2831 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters. UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters.6887 Figure 5. U.S.-Supplied Black Hawk Helicopters for Jordan Source: Jane’s Defence Weekly.
As a result of the Syrian civil war and U.S. Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State, As a result of the Syrian civil war and U.S. Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State,
the United States has increased military aid to Jordan and channeled these increases through the United States has increased military aid to Jordan and channeled these increases through
DOD-managed accounts. Although Jordan stil receives the bulk of U.S. military aid through the DOD-managed accounts. Although Jordan stil receives the bulk of U.S. military aid through the
FMF account, Congress has authorized defense appropriations to strengthen Jordan’s border FMF account, Congress has authorized defense appropriations to strengthen Jordan’s border
security. U.S. assistance has helped finance the creation of the Jordan Border Security System, an security. U.S. assistance has helped finance the creation of the Jordan Border Security System, an
continues-lead-global-response-covid-19. 85 According to Jane’s Defence Procurement Budgets, Jordan’s 2020 defense budget is $2.07 billion. See Jane’s Defence Budgets, Jordan, February 2, 2021. 86 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Jordan,” Fact Sheet, October 26, 2018. 87 Gareth Jennings, “US Contracts Black Hawk for Jordan’s Royal Squadron,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 21, 2020. Congressional Research Service 17 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations integrated network of guard towers, surveil ance cameras, and radar to guard the kingdom’s integrated network of guard towers, surveil ance cameras, and radar to guard the kingdom’s
borders with Syria and Iraq.borders with Syria and Iraq.6988 Since FY2015, total DOD security cooperation funding for Jordan Since FY2015, total DOD security cooperation funding for Jordan
has amounted to has amounted to nearly 1$1.5 bil ion bil ion dollars.dollars.7089
Excess Defense Articles
In 1996, the United States granted Jordan Major Non-NATO Al y (MNNA) status, a designation In 1996, the United States granted Jordan Major Non-NATO Al y (MNNA) status, a designation
that, among other things, makes Jordan eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, training, that, among other things, makes Jordan eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, training,
and loans of equipment for cooperative research and development.and loans of equipment for cooperative research and development.7190 In the In the last five years, excess
past decade, the United States has provided $83 mil ion (current $ value) in excess U.S. defense articles U.S. defense articles provided to Jordanto Jordan include, including three AH-1 Cobra Helicopters, 45 Mine- three AH-1 Cobra Helicopters, 45 Mine-
Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs), and M577A3 Tracked Command Post Carriers.(MRAPs), and M577A3 Tracked Command Post Carriers.7291
Table 2. U.S. Foreign Aid Obligations to Jordan: 1946-2018
current dol ars in mil ions(in mil ions of current dol ars)
Total Economic Assistance
Total Military Assistance
Total
$13,846.400 $13,846.400
$8,252.900 $8,252.900
$22,099.300 $22,099.300
Source: USAID Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945-September 30, 2018. USAID Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945-September 30, 2018.

Author Information

Jeremy M. Sharp Jeremy M. Sharp

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs


68 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Security Cooperation with Jordan, Fact Sheet, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
March 23, 2018.
69 Jeremy Binnie, “Jordan Planning Border Security Upgrade,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 17, 2019.
70 DOD congressional notifications to Congress.
71 See Designation of Jordan As Major Non-NAT O Ally, Determination of President of the United States, No. 97 -4,
November 12, 1996, 61 F.R. 59809.
72 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, EDA DataBase T ool, Accessed November 2019.
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88 Jeremy Binnie, “Jordan Planning Border Security Upgrade,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 17, 2019. 89 DOD congressional notifications to Congress. 90 See Designation of Jordan As Major Non-NAT O Ally, Determination of President of the United States, No. 97 -4, November 12, 1996, 61 F.R. 59809. 91 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, EDA DataBase T ool, accessed July 2021. Congressional Research Service RL33546 · VERSION 80 · UPDATED 18 Congressional Research Service
RL33546 · VERSION 78 · UPDATED
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