Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations

Changes from May 27, 2020 to September 30, 2021

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations
~~May 27, 2020~~
~~Historical y~~September 30, 2021 Historically, Egypt has been an important country for U.S. national security interests , Egypt has been an important country for U.S. national security interests
based on its geography, demography, and diplomatic posture. Egypt controls the Suez based on its geography, demography, and diplomatic posture. Egypt controls the Suez
Canal, which is one of Jeremy M. Sharp
~~Canal, which is one of~~ the world’s most the world’s most ~~wel~~ well-known maritime chokepoints, linking the -known maritime chokepoints, linking the
Mediterranean and Red Seas. Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
~~Mediterranean and Red Seas.~~ Egypt’s population of more than 100 Egypt’s population of more than 100 ~~mil ion people makes Eastern Affairs~~
million people makes it by far the most populous Arabic-it by far the most populous Arabic- Eastern Affairs speaking country. Although today it may not play the speaking country. Although today it may not play the

same type of leading political or military same type of leading political or military role in the Arab world as it has in the past, role in the Arab world as it has in the past,

Egypt may retain some “soft power” by virtue of its history, media, and culture. Cairo Egypt may retain some “soft power” by virtue of its history, media, and culture. Cairo
hosts both the 22-member Arab League and Al Azhar hosts both the 22-member Arab League and Al Azhar University, which claims to be the oldest continuously University, which claims to be the oldest continuously
operating university in the world and has symbolic importance as a leading source of Islamic scholarship. operating university in the world and has symbolic importance as a leading source of Islamic scholarship.
~~Additional y,~~ Additionally, Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel remains one of the most significant diplomatic achievements Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel remains one of the most significant diplomatic achievements
for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. While people-to-people relations remain cold, the Israeli and Egyptian for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. While people-to-people relations remain cold, the Israeli and Egyptian
governments have increased their cooperation against Islamist militants and instabilitygovernments have increased their cooperation against Islamist militants and instability in the Sinai Peninsula and in the Sinai Peninsula and
~~Gaza Strip.~~
~~Throughout the first half of 2020, the Trump Administration has continued its policy of fostering good relations~~
~~with the Egyptian government by advancing military-to-military ties, trade, and investment. Several issues have~~
~~caused tensions in U.S.-Egyptian relations, including Egypt’s continued detention of American citizens and the~~
~~Egyptian military’s possible purchase of advanced Russian fighter jets.~~
~~Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with over $84 bil ion in bilateral~~ Gaza Strip. Since taking office, President Biden has balanced some considerations in his approach to U.S.-Egyptian relations, praising Egyptian diplomacy while signaling U.S. displeasure for President Sisi’s continued domestic crackdown. In the year after the United States started facilitating the historic Abraham Accords between Israel and various Arab states, Egypt, which ha s maintained its peace treaty with Israel since 1979, has earned praise from U.S. officials by increasing its diplomatic outrea ch to Israel. Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with over $84 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in hist orical ~~foreign aid (calculated in~~
~~historical~~ dollars—not adjusted for inflation), with military and economic assistance increasing significantly after dollars—not adjusted for inflation), with military and economic assistance increasing significantly after
1979. Annual appropriations legislation includes several conditions governing the release of these funds. 1979. Annual appropriations legislation includes several conditions governing the release of these funds.
Successive U.S. Administrations have justified aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily Successive U.S. Administrations have justified aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily
on longon long -running cooperation with the Egyptian military and on sustaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. -running cooperation with the Egyptian military and on sustaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
Al All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense
contractors. contractors.
For For ~~FY2021, the President is requesting a total of $1.4 bil ion~~ FY2022, the Biden Administration has requested $1.4 billion in bilateral assistance for Egyptin bilateral assistance for Egypt, the same amount Congress appropriated the previous year. Nearly all ~~. Nearly al~~ of the of the
U.S. funds for Egypt come from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) U.S. funds for Egypt come from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) ~~account and provide grant aid with which~~
~~Egypt purchases and maintains U.S.-origin military equipment.~~
~~As the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic continues to spread throughout Egypt, the economy is~~
~~facing a downturn due to the loss of tourism, private sector investment, foreign remittances, and Suez Canal~~
~~revenue. To date, Egypt’s economic downturn has not outwardly affected the stability of the Egyptian~~
~~government, led by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi. To minimize economic damage from COVID-19~~
~~countermeasures, the Egyptian government has enacted stimulus packages and borrowed $2.7 bil ion from the~~
~~International Monetary Fund. President Sisi has maintained stability during the pandemic by continuing to use~~
~~emergency powers and broad legal authority granted to the executive by parliament to suppress opposition.~~
~~Beyond the United States, President Sisi has broadened Egypt’s international base of support to include several~~
account. All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors. As of September 20, 2021, the World Health Organization reports that since January 3, 2020, there have been 295,745 confirmed cases of COVID-19, with 16,938 deaths in Egypt. As of September 14, 2021, a total of 12,194,537 vaccine doses have been administered. As of September 15, the COVAX facility has delivered 2.9 million doses of the Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine to Egypt. Beyond the United States, President Sisi has improved or expanded Egypt’s ties with several key partners, including the Arab Gulf states, Israel, Russia, China, France, and Italy. key partners, including the Arab Gulf states, Israel, Russia, China, France, and Italy.
In April In April 2019, Egyptian voters approved constitutional amendments that extend Sisi’s current term until 2024 and 2019, Egyptian voters approved constitutional amendments that extend Sisi’s current term until 2024 and
permit him to run for a third term, permit him to run for a third term, ~~potential y~~potentially keeping him in office until 2030. keeping him in office until 2030.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations

Overview
As of fal 2021, Egypt, the Arab world’s most populous country of Egypt, the Arab world’s most populous country of ~~over~~more than 100 mil ion 100 mil ion people,1 is attempting to modernize and reassert itself on the regional stage. Led by President Abdel Fattah al Sisi (hereinafter referred to as President Sisi), a former military officer who took power in a 2013 coup, Egypt is undergoing significant infrastructure development, exemplified by the construction of a new capital city. Military modernization also is ongoing, as Egypt has become the world’s third-largest importer of weapons, acquiring fighter planes and warships from Russian and European suppliers. Diplomatical y, President Sisi has mediated a crisis in Gaza and expanded ties to Libya, Lebanon, and Iraq. Egypt’s renewed regional assertiveness and domestic activity follows a period of political unrest that had paralyzed the country in the previous decade. Egypt’s renewed confidence, however, may mask systemic underlying chal enges that could limit the extent of its regional influence. Economical y, while Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown, even throughout the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, poverty is pervasive—with the national rate at 29.7% (as of December 2020). Egypt’s national debt constitutes 92% of GDP (as of September 2021), and servicing it takes up nearly 36% of the national budget,2 limiting the state’s ability to invest in its citizenry’s wel -being. As of September 20, 2021, the World Health Organization reports that since January 3, 2020, there have been 295,745 confirmed cases of COVID-19, with 16,938 deaths in Egypt.3 As of September 14, 2021, a total of 12,194,537 vaccine doses have been administered. As of September 15, the COVAX facility has delivered 2.9 mil ion doses of the Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine to Egypt.4 In late September 2021, the United States provided Egypt with 1.6 mil ion doses of the Pfizer vaccine. President Sisi has used~~people,1 faces an uncertain~~
~~future with the COVID-19 pandemic coming after several years of modest economic growth.~~
~~Prior to the outbreak, macroeconomic trends had appeared to be moving in a somewhat positive~~
~~direction, and financial analysts considered Egypt to be one of the most promising emerging~~
~~market destinations for foreign investment worldwide.2 As the COVID-19 pandemic spreads~~
~~throughout Egypt, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that in 2020 Gross Domestic~~
~~Product (GDP) wil grow 2%, a figure wel below pre-pandemic forecasts of over 5.5% growth.3~~
~~The pandemic is depressing a number of economic sectors in Egypt, such as tourism, which~~
~~accounts for 9.5% of employment and 5.5% of GDP.4 Lower natural gas prices and drops in~~
~~worker remittances also are expected to depress government revenue and household incomes.~~
~~As of May 2020, Egypt’s economic downturn has not outwardly affected the stability of the~~
~~Egyptian government, led since 2014 by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi (herein referred~~
~~to as President Sisi). In order to minimize economic damage from COVID-19 countermeasures,~~
~~the government has instituted a policy it cal s “co-existing with coronavirus,” in which seeks to~~
~~balance restrictions such as partial curfews and quarantines with continued economic activity. The~~
~~Egyptian government also has enacted stimulus packages directed to the tourism sector, increased~~
~~the budget of the Ministry of Health, and upped its unemployment benefits for furloughed~~
~~workers. However, despite the government’s attempt to continue economic activity, according to~~
~~one account, “The looser lockdown has not spared Egypt an economic crisis….The private sector,~~
~~weak to start, is in free fal .”5 Although Egypt previously received IMF support ($12 bil ion loan~~
~~for 2016-2019)6 geared toward reducing overal debt, the IMF also has added a new $2.77 bil ion~~
~~tranche of financing to help Egypt during the pandemic.~~
~~In addition to expanding government benefits to low-income workers, President Sisi has~~
~~maintained stability during the pandemic by continuing to use emergency powers and broad legal~~
emergency powers and broad legal authority granted to the executive by authority granted to the executive by ~~parliament~~ parliament to suppress oppositionto suppress opposition and perceived criticism, both before and during the pandemic. . Authorities have used Authorities have used
media laws to arrest journalists who questioned government caseload media laws to arrest journalists who questioned government caseload statistics on charges of statistics on charges of
spreading “false news.”spreading “false news.”75 The Egyptian parliament also has amended and extended the nationwide The Egyptian parliament also has amended and extended the nationwide

~~1 Beyond the COVID-19 pandemic, Egypt has long struggled with strained~~state of emergency, which has been in place since April 2017, most recently in July 2021. Since taking office, President Biden has attempted to take a balanced approach to U.S.-Egyptian relations, praising Egyptian diplomacy while signaling U.S. displeasure for President Sisi’s continued domestic crackdown. In the year after the United States started facilitating the historic Abraham Accords between Israel and various Arab states, Egypt, which has maintained its peace 1 Beyond the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, Egypt has long struggled with scarce domestic resources due domestic resources due ~~overpopulation,~~
~~which~~to population pressures. Egypt’s population surpassed 100 million in 2020 and is predicted to rise as surpassed 100 million in 2020 and is predicted to rise as high high ~~as 150~~as 160 million by 2050 (United Nations million by 2050 (United Nations – –World World
Population ProspectsPopulation Prospects ~~– 2019). In Egypt, overpopulation~~–2019). Population size, particularly in the Cairo metropolis, has , particularly in the Cairo metropolis, has ~~resulted in~~
~~overcrowded~~ contributed to overcrowded classrooms, unemployment, and crippling traffic. Seeclassrooms, unemployment, and crippling traffic. See, “ As Egypt’s Population Hits 100 Million, “ As Egypt’s Population Hits 100 Million,
Celebration isCelebration is Muted,” Fanack.comMuted,” Fanack.com , December 19, 2019. T he Egyptian government has launched family planning , December 19, 2019. T he Egyptian government has launched family planning
initiatives, which isinitiatives, which is a challenge in more rural areas. Seea challenge in more rural areas. See~~, “'~~ “ ‘T wo is Enough,T wo is Enough,'’ Egypt T ells Poor Egypt T ells Poor ~~Families~~ Families as Population as Population
Booms,” Reuters, FebruaryBooms,” Reuters, February 20, 2019. 20, 2019.
2 Mirette Magdy and T arek El-T ablawy, “Egypt Keeps Interest Rate on Hold with an Eye on Fed T apering,” Bloom berg, September 16, 2021. 3 See the World Health Organization’s Egypt Dashboard at https://covid19.who.int/region/emro/country/eg. 4 “FACT BOX-Vaccines Delivered under COVAX Sharing Scheme for Poorer Countries,” Reuters, September 15, 2021. 5 Amnesty International, “Egypt: Prisons are Now Journalists’ Newsrooms,” Public Statement, May 3, 2020. Congressional Research Service 1 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations treaty with Israel since 1979, has earned praise from U.S. officials by increasing its diplomatic outreach to Israel.6 Figure 1. Map of Egypt Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS. Historical Background Since 1952, when a cabal of Egyptian Army officers, known as the Free Officers Movement, ousted the British-backed king, Egypt’s military has produced four presidents: Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954-1970), Anwar Sadat (1970-1981), Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), and Abdel Fattah al Sisi (2013-present). These four men have ruled Egypt with strong backing from the country’s security establishment almost continual y. The one exception has been the brief period of rule by Muhammad Morsi, who was affiliated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (see below). That organization has opposed single party military-backed rule and advocated for a state governed by a vaguely articulated combination of civil and Shariah (Islamic) law. For the most part, the Muslim Brotherhood has been the only significant and abiding opposition during the decades of military-backed rule. The one departure from Egypt’s decades of military rule, the brief period in which Morsi ruled, took place between 2011 and 2013, after popular demonstrations dubbed the “Arab Spring,” 6 U.S. State Department, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, At the One Year Anniversary of the Abraham Accords: Normalization Agreements in Action, September 17, 2021. Congressional Research Service 2 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations which had started in neighboring Tunisia, compel ed the military to force the resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. During this period, Egypt experienced tremendous political tumult, culminating in Morsi’s one-year presidency. When Morsi took office on June 30, 2012, after winning Egypt’s first truly competitive presidential election, his ascension to the presidency was expected to mark the end of a rocky 16-month transition period.7 Proposed timelines for elections, the constitutional drafting process, and the military’s relinquishing of power to a civilian government had been constantly changed, contested, and sometimes even overruled by the courts. Instead of consolidating democratic or civilian rule, Morsi’s rule exposed the deep divisions in Egyptian politics, pitting a broad cross-section of Egypt’s public and private sectors, the Coptic Church, and the military against the Brotherhood and its Islamist supporters. The atmosphere of mutual distrust, political gridlock, and public dissatisfaction that permeated Morsi’s presidency provided Egypt’s military, led by then-Defense Minister Sisi, with an opportunity to reassert political control. On July 3, 2013, following several days of mass public demonstrations against Morsi’s rule, the military unilateral y dissolved Morsi’s government, suspended the constitution that had been passed during his rule, and instal ed Sisi as interim president. The Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters declared the military’s actions a coup d’etat and protested in the streets. Weeks later, Egypt’s military and national police launched a violent crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood, resulting in police and army soldiers firing live ammunition against demonstrators encamped in several public squares and the kil ing of at least 1,150 demonstrators. The Egyptian military justified these actions by decrying the encampments as a threat to national security.8 Issues for Congress Egyptian Cooperation with Israel Following 30 years of intermittent war and enduring confrontation, ~~2 While the Egyptian economy has experienced growth in tourism and energy, non -oil business activity had declined~~
~~for six straight months prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, signaling that private sector growth was below expectations.~~
~~See, “Egypt Non-Oil Private Sector Shrinks Faster in Jan – PMI,” Reuters, February 3, 2020.~~
~~3 International Monetary Fund, Confronting the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Middle East and Central Asia, April 2020.~~
~~4 “Egypt: Country Outlook,” Economist Intelligence Unit, April 24, 2020.~~
~~5 “Egypt Chose a Looser Lockdown. Its Economy is Still in Crisis,” The Economist, May 23rd 2020 edition.~~
~~6 In 2016, the IMF and Egypt reached a three-year, $12 billion loan agreement predicated on Egypt undertaking key~~
~~reforms such as depreciating the currency, reducing public subsidies, and increasing taxes. While reforms such as~~
~~reduced subsidies for electricity helped to reduce the annual deficit, poverty rates in Egypt have increased from 28% in~~
~~2015 to 33% in 2019. See, “Arab States and the IMF: A Bit too Austere,” The Economist, February 22, 2020.~~
~~7 Amnesty International, “Egypt: Prisons Are Now Journalists' Newsrooms,” Public Statement, May 3, 2020.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~state of emergency, which has been in place since April 2017. While the government claims these~~
~~expansions were needed to cope with COVID-19, according to Human Rights Watch, only a few~~
~~of the new amendments are “clearly tied to public health developments.”8~~
~~Figure 1. Map of Egypt~~

Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS.
~~Throughout the first half of 2020, the Trump Administration has continued its policy of fostering~~
~~good relations with the Egyptian government by advancing military-to-military ties,9 trade, and~~
~~investment. Although the Administration has refrained from publicly rebuking the Sisi regime~~
~~over its human rights record, several issues have caused tensions in U.S.-Egyptian relations,~~
~~including Egypt’s continued detention of American citizens and the Egyptian military’s possible~~
~~purchase of advanced Russian fighter jets (see Issues for Congress section below). According to~~
~~multiple reports, the U.S. Defense Department is actively pursuing a policy review of~~
~~longstanding U.S. participation in the Sinai Peninsula peacekeeping and monitoring mission,~~
~~known as the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).10~~

~~8 Human Rights Watch, “ Egypt: Covid-19 Cover for New Repressive Powers,” May 7, 2020.~~
~~9 In May 2020, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a potential sale to Egypt of up tp 43~~
~~refurbished AH-64E Apache attack helicopters for an estimated cost of $2.3 billion. See, U.S. Department of Defense,~~
~~Defense Security Cooperation Agency, T ransmittal No: 19-74, May 7, 2020.~~
~~10 See CRS Insight IN11403, Possible Withdrawal of U.S. Peacekeepers from the Sinai Peninsula , by Jeremy M. Sharp.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Issues for Congress~~
~~Egyptian Cooperation with Israel~~
Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel remains one of the single most significant diplomatic Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel remains one of the single most significant diplomatic
achievements for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. Congress has long been concerned with the achievements for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. Congress has long been concerned with the
preservation of the peace treaty and has appropriated foreign assistance and exercised oversight to preservation of the peace treaty and has appropriated foreign assistance and exercised oversight to
~~ensure that~~help both parties maintain it. Since 2012, congressional appropriators have included both parties maintain it. Since 2012, congressional appropriators have included a requirement in in
foreign operations appropriations foreign operations appropriations ~~law a requirement~~ legislation that before foreign aid funds can be provided that before foreign aid funds can be provided
to Egypt, the Secretary of to Egypt, the Secretary of State must certify that Egypt is meeting its obligations under the 1979 State must certify that Egypt is meeting its obligations under the 1979
Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.119
While people-to-people relations remain While people-to-people relations remain ~~cold~~limited, Egypt and Israel have continued to find specific , Egypt and Israel have continued to find specific
areas in which they can cooperate, such as containing areas in which they can cooperate, such as containing ~~Hamas~~the Palestinian group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization) in the Gaza Strip, countering in the Gaza Strip, countering
terrorism, and developing natural terrorism, and developing natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean (gas in the Eastern Mediterranean (see sections below)). 7 David Kirkpatrick, “ Named Egypt’s Winner, Islamist Makes History,” New York Times, June 24, 2012. 8 “Egyptian Cabinet Vows to Disperse Pro-Morsi Protest Camps,” The Guardian (UK), July 31, 2013. 9 See Section 7041(a)(1) of P.L. 116-260, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021. In addition to sustaining the treaty, the certification also requires Egypt to sustain its “ strategic relationship with the United States.” Congressional Research Service 3 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Since 2020, when Israel reached various agreements to normalize or improve relations Figure 2. Bennett-Sisi Meeting with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), September 2021 in Egypt Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco (known as the “Abraham Accords”), there has been a noticeable increase in Israeli-Egyptian bilateral contacts. In February 2021, Egyptian Minister of Energy Tarek al Molla visited Israel to discuss cooperation on natural gas projects. Before this visit, no Egyptian cabinet officials other than foreign ministers or intel igence chiefs had visited Israel in the past 15 years. In May 2021, Israel’s then-Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi visited Cairo for meetings with Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, marking the first time in 13 years that an Israeli foreign minister had Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs official y visited Egypt. In August 2021, Abbas Kamel, the chief of Egypt’s General Intel igence Directorate, visited Israel to discuss the security situation in Gaza, where Egypt helped negotiate an end to Israel-Hamas hostilities earlier in the year (see below). Bilateral engagement increased in September 2021, when Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennet traveled to the resort town of Sharm al Sheikh in southern Sinai for a meeting with President Sisi. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last made an official visit to Egypt in 2011 (and an unofficial visit in 2018). Shortly after the Bennett-Sisi summit, EgyptAir, the national airline of Egypt, announced that it would offer direct flights between Cairo and Tel Aviv starting in October 2021. Previously, air travel between Egypt and Israel had been discreet, limited to unmarked planes run by a subsidiary of EgyptAir. .
Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinians
Egypt’s triangular relationship with Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip is complex. On the one Egypt’s triangular relationship with Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip is complex. On the one
hand, Israel and Egypt cooperate against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, as they have since hand, Israel and Egypt cooperate against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, as they have since ~~2013. Egypt~~
Sisi’s rise to power in 2013. In general, the Egyptian government is opposed to Islamist groups wielding political power across the Middle East, and opposes is opposed to Islamist groups wielding political power across the Middle East, and opposes
Turkish and Qatari support for Hamas.Turkish and Qatari support for Hamas.1210 On the Egyptian-Gaza border, Egypt has tried to thwart On the Egyptian-Gaza border, Egypt has tried to thwart
arms tunnel smuggling into arms tunnel smuggling into ~~Gaza~~Gaza11 and has accused Palestinian militants in Gaza of aiding terrorist and has accused Palestinian militants in Gaza of aiding terrorist
groups in the Sinai. On the other hand, in groups in the Sinai. On the other hand, in an acknowledgement of Hamas’ entrenched rule in an acknowledgement of Hamas’ entrenched rule in
~~Gaza, now in its second decade~~Gaza since 2007, Egypt couples its policy of containment with ongoing dialogue. , Egypt couples its policy of containment with ongoing dialogue.
~~The Egyptian-Hamas relationship~~Maintaining a relationship with Hamas has provided the Egyptian security and intel igence services an has provided the Egyptian security and intel igence services an
opportunity to opportunity to ~~play the role of mediator between Israel and Hamas~~mediate between Hamas and Israel 10 “How Israel and Egypt are Coordinating on Gaza,” Al Monitor, July 12, 2018. 11 T he Egyptian military has taken a number of steps to stop smuggling tunnel construction beneath the Egyptian -Gaza border. T o date, it has destroyed numerous tunnels and created a “buffer zone” along the Gaza border by demolishing parts of Rafah city and flooding trenches in the area with seawater from the Mediterranean. T he military also has erected concrete walls and barbed wire fencing along the buffer zone to protect against attacks from the Islamic State -Sinai Province. According to Human Rights Watch, which has criticized the military’s actions, since 2013, a little less than one-quarter of all northern Sinai residents have been displaced or otherwise left the region as a result of the home demolitions and intensifying military hostilities. See, Human Rights Watch, “ Egypt: Massive Sinai Demolitions Likely War Crimes,” March 17, 2021. Congressional Research Service 4 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations and between Hamas and its rival Palestinian faction Fatah (led by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas). Egypt, at times, has attempted ~~. Egypt, at times, has attempted~~
~~to broker a long-term Israel-Hamas truce.~~to broker a long-term Israel-Hamas truce.12 In a September 2021 speech, Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid set forth Israeli conditions for a possible truce with Hamas, and said, “It’s worth emphasizing the critical importance of Egypt in this whole process. It won't happen without the support and involvement of our Egyptian partners and without their ability to talk to everyone involved.”13 13
Egypt controls the Rafah border crossing into Gaza, making Rafah the only non-Israeli-controlled Egypt controls the Rafah border crossing into Gaza, making Rafah the only non-Israeli-controlled
passenger entryway into the Strip, which passenger entryway into the Strip, which itEgypt periodical y closes for security reasons. Control periodical y closes for security reasons. Control over over
the Rafah border crossing provides Egypt with some leverage over Hamas, though Egyptian the Rafah border crossing provides Egypt with some leverage over Hamas, though Egyptian
authorities appear to use it carefully authorities appear to use it carefully ~~in order not to spark~~to avoid sparking a humanitarian crisis on their border.14 a humanitarian crisis on their border.14
Egypt also controls the Salah al Din Gate, a previously used crossing north of Rafah that opened Egypt also controls the Salah al Din Gate, a previously used crossing north of Rafah that opened
for commercial use in 2018. According to one report, both Hamas and Egypt tax imported goods for commercial use in 2018. According to one report, both Hamas and Egypt tax imported goods
moving into Gaza through the gate, earning Hamas tens of mil ions of dollars per year in moving into Gaza through the gate, earning Hamas tens of mil ions of dollars per year in
revenue.15 revenue.15
~~After President Trump released his long-promised “Peace to Prosperity” plan for Israel and the~~
~~Palestinians on January 28, 2020, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry released a statement that~~
~~recognized “the importance of considering the U.S. administration’s initiative from the~~
~~perspective of the importance of achieving the resolution of the Palestinian issue, thus restoring to~~

~~11 See Section 7041(a)(1) of P.L. 116-94, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020. In addition to sustaining~~
~~the treaty, the certification also requires Egypt to sustain its “ strategic relationship with the United States.”~~
~~12 “How Israel and Egypt are Coordinating on Gaza,” Al Monitor, July 12, 2018.~~
13The May 2021 Israel-Hamas Conflict and Egyptian Mediation In May 2021, a conflict took place between Israel and Hamas in which Palestinian militants fired rockets at Israeli populated areas, while Israeli forces targeted Hamas and other militants in the densely populated urban areas of Gaza. After 11 days of fighting that resulted in over 250 Palestinians kil ed and 12 deaths inside Israel, Egypt helped mediate a cease-fire. President Sisi also provided Gaza with humanitarian aid and pledged $500 mil ion for reconstruction (Qatar also pledged $500 mil ion). On May 20, President Biden extended “my sincere gratitude to President Al Sisi and the senior Egyptian officials who played a critical role in this diplomacy. ”16 Days later, Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrived in Cairo for a meeting with President Sisi in which he conveyed “President Biden’s appreciation to President Sisi for Egypt’s critical mediation efforts in support of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas and other groups in Gaza and for Egypt’s help in evacuating American citizens to safety.”17 Since then, Egypt has kept open (with some exceptions) its Rafah border crossing to al ow for wounded Gazans to be evacuated and the import of reconstruction materials. According to one account, “Al of this is helpful for Palestinians—but it is more helpful stil for Mr. Sisi’s reputation.”18 As of September 2021, Egypt has continued to serve as a mediator between Israel and Hamas as both sides negotiate over the infusion of additional reconstruction aid for Gaza and the return of Israeli civilians held in Gaza.19 As in the aftermath of the three previous major Israel-Hamas conflicts (in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014), Egypt, Israel, and other international actors face chal enges in balancing Gaza’s humanitarian and economic needs with concerns that Hamas could divert money and supplies brought into Gaza for military purposes. 12 “Egypt T rying to Broker Broad Israel-Hamas T ruce, Hamas Says,” Associated Press, August 2, 2018. 13 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FM Lapid addresses World Summit on Counter T errorism, September 12, 2021. ~~“Egypt T rying to Broker Broad Israel-Hamas T ruce, Hamas Says,” Associated Press, August 2, 2018.~~
14 “For Hamas, Reconciliation with Egypt Worth More than Qatari Cash,” 14 “For Hamas, Reconciliation with Egypt Worth More than Qatari Cash,” Al Monitor, January 31, 2019. , January 31, 2019.
15 “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions about Blockade Policies,” 15 “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions about Blockade Policies,” PolicyWatch, number 3205, T he Washington , number 3205, T he Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019. Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019.
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~~the Palestinian people their full legitimate rights through the establishment of a sovereign~~
~~independent state in the Palestinian occupied territories in accordance with international~~
~~legitimacy and resolutions.”16~~
~~President Sisi has refrained from making any public statements assessing the U.S. peace plan or~~
~~the possibility of Israeli West Bank annexation. Instead, Egypt’s foreign ministry has worked~~
~~collectively with other Arab states through the Egypt-based Arab League to express opposition to~~
~~annexation. In late April 2020, Arab League foreign ministers issued a statement saying “The~~
~~implementation of plans to annex any part of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967,~~
~~including the Jordan Valley ... and the lands on which Israeli settlements are standing represents a~~
~~new war crime ... against the Palestinian people.”17~~16 T he White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East, May 20, 2021. 17 U.S. State Department, Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Egyptian President Al Sisi, May 26, 2021. 18 “Sisi Sees an Opportunity,” The Economist, Middle East & Africa, July 3, 2021 edition. 19 Hamas is holding two Israelis captive, Hisham al Sayed and Avera Mengistu. Israel is demanding their return and the return of the remains of two soldiers killed in Gaza during the 2014 war. Congressional Research Service 5 link to page 11 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations
Sinai Peninsula
Several terrorist groups based in the Sinai Peninsula (the Sinai) have been waging an insurgency Several terrorist groups based in the Sinai Peninsula (the Sinai) have been waging an insurgency
against the Egyptian government since 2011. The Islamic State’s Sinai Province affiliate (IS-SP) against the Egyptian government since 2011. The Islamic State’s Sinai Province affiliate (IS-SP)
is the most lethal terrorist organization in the peninsula.is the most lethal terrorist organization in the peninsula.1820 Since its inception in 2014, IS-SP has Since its inception in 2014, IS-SP has
attacked the Egyptian military continual y, targeted Coptic Christian individuals and places of attacked the Egyptian military continual y, targeted Coptic Christian individuals and places of
worship,worship,1921 and occasional y fired rockets into Israel. and occasional y fired rockets into Israel. ~~From January to November 2019, IS-SP~~
~~conducted 282 attacks in Sinai that resulted in the deaths of 269 people, most of whom were~~
~~Egyptian security personnel.20~~

~~16 Facebook, Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Statement (unofficial translation), January 28, 2020.~~
~~17 “Arab League Slams Israeli Plan to Annex Occupied West Bank,” Al Jazeera, April 30, 2020.~~
18 To counter IS-SP in northern Sinai, the Egyptian armed forces and police have declared a state of emergency, imposed curfews and travel restrictions, and erected police checkpoints along main roads. Egyptian counterterrorism efforts in the Sinai appear to have reduced the frequency of terrorist attacks somewhat. According to one analyst, as of late 2020, militant attacks had fal en to 15 a month from 40 in late 2017.22 However, though the pace of IS-SP attacks have dropped, other experts believe that IS-SP is a significant security threat, especial y when pitted against poorly trained Egyptian conscript soldiers serving in the Sinai. According to one report from IHS Markit, “Although militant capabilities have not returned to the levels of sophistication seen from 2014-16, the group has shown it stil retains high level capabilities.”23 The 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty limits the number of soldiers that Egypt can deploy in the Sinai, subject to the parties’ negotiation of changes to address particular circumstances. Egypt and Israel agree upon any short-term increase of Egypt’s military presence in the Sinai and to the construction of military and/or dual-use infrastructure. Since Israel returned control over the Sinai to Egypt in 1982, the area has been partial y demilitarized, and the Sinai has served as an effective buffer zone between the two countries. The Multinational Force and Observers, or MFO, which are partial y funded by the United States, are deployed in the Sinai to monitor the terms of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty (see Figure 3). 20 T his group was formerly known as T his group was formerly known as Ansar Bayt al Maqdis (Supporters of the Holy House or Partisans of Jerusalem). (Supporters of the Holy House or Partisans of Jerusalem).
It emerged after the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and affiliated with the Islamic State in 2014. Estimates of its It emerged after the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and affiliated with the Islamic State in 2014. Estimates of its
numerical composition range from 500 numerical composition range from 500 tot o 1,000. In Arabic, it is known as 1,000. In Arabic, it is known as Wilayat Sinai (Sinai Province). Also referred (Sinai Province). Also referred
to as ISIS-Sinai, ISIS-Egypt, and the Islamic State in the Sinai. to as ISIS-Sinai, ISIS-Egypt, and the Islamic State in the Sinai.
1921 In November 2018, IS-SP claimed responsibility for an attack against Coptic Christian pilgrims traveling In November 2018, IS-SP claimed responsibility for an attack against Coptic Christian pilgrims traveling ~~to t he~~t o the
monastery of Saint Samuel the Confessor 85monastery of Saint Samuel the Confessor 85~~-miles~~ miles south of Cairo in the western desert. south of Cairo in the western desert.
20 Amos Harel, “ ISIS Is Still Alive and Well in Sinai, and Israel Fears a Major Attack on Its Egypt Border ,” Ha’aretz
~~(Israel), December 18, 2019. T his article suggests that IS-SP attacks in the Sinai have decreased significantly, from 603~~
~~in 2017 to 333 in 2018~~22 “Shifting Militant T actics Curb Development in Egypt ’s North Sinai,” Reuters, November 9, 2020. 23 Jack Kennedy, “ T errorism in Egypt: Examining the Data and What to Expect in 2021,” IHS Markit, December 18, 2020. .
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At times, Egypt and Israel have cooperated At times, Egypt and Israel have cooperated
to counter terrorism in the Sinai. In a to counter terrorism in the Sinai. In a
Figure 23. The Sinai Peninsula
televised interview in 2019, President Sisi televised interview in 2019, President Sisi
responded to a question on whether responded to a question on whether
Egyptian-Israeli military cooperation was Egyptian-Israeli military cooperation was
the closest it has ever been, saying “That is the closest it has ever been, saying “That is
correct. The [Egyptian] Air Force sometimes correct. The [Egyptian] Air Force sometimes
needs to cross to the Israeli side. And that’s needs to cross to the Israeli side. And that’s
why we have a wide range of coordination why we have a wide range of coordination
with the Israelis.”with the Israelis.”2124 One news account One news account
suggested that, as of February 2018, Israel, suggested that, as of February 2018, Israel,
with Egypt’s approval, had used its own with Egypt’s approval, had used its own
drones, helicopters, and aircraft to carry out drones, helicopters, and aircraft to carry out
more than 100 covert airstrikes inside Egypt more than 100 covert airstrikes inside Egypt
against militant targets. against militant targets.22
~~The 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty~~
~~limits the number of soldiers that Egypt can~~
~~deploy in the Sinai, subject to the parties’~~
~~negotiation of changes to address particular~~
~~circumstances. Egypt and Israel agree upon~~
~~any short-term increase of Egypt’s military~~
~~presence in the Sinai and to the construction~~
~~of military and/or dual-use infrastructure.~~

~~Since Israel returned control over the Sinai~~
Source: http://www.mfo.org
~~to Egypt in 1982, the area has been partial y demilitarized, and the Sinai has served as an~~
~~effective buffer zone between the two countries. The Multinational Force and Observers, or MFO,~~
are deployed in the Sinai to monitor the terms of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty (see Figure 1).25
Natural Gas
Israeli-Egyptian energy cooperation has significantly expanded since 2018. For Egypt, Israeli-Egyptian energy cooperation has significantly expanded since 2018. For Egypt,
cooperation with Israel is a key component of its broader regional strategy to become a cooperation with Israel is a key component of its broader regional strategy to become a ~~key~~major player player
in the development in the development of undersea natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean. of undersea natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean. 23 Egypt is attempting to Egypt is attempting to
Source: http://www.mfo.org position itself as a regional gas hub, whereby its own gas fields meet domestic demand while position itself as a regional gas hub, whereby its own gas fields meet domestic demand while
imported gas from Israel and Cyprus can be liquefied in Egypt and reexported.imported gas from Israel and Cyprus can be liquefied in Egypt and reexported.2426 Egypt has the Egypt has the
Eastern Mediterranean’s only two large-scale liquefied natural gas terminals (located at Idku and Eastern Mediterranean’s only two large-scale liquefied natural gas terminals (located at Idku and
Damietta), operating as partnerships between the state and foreign companies such as Italy’s ENI Damietta), operating as partnerships between the state and foreign companies such as Italy’s ENI
and Royal Dutch Shel . and Royal Dutch Shel .
In 2018, Israeli and Egyptian companies entered into a decade-long agreement In 2018, Israeli and Egyptian companies entered into a decade-long agreement ~~by reaching a~~ worth an estimated $15 ~~$15~~
bil ionbil ion, ~~natural gas deal,~~ according to which Israeli off-shore natural gas is exported to Egypt for according to which Israeli off-shore natural gas is exported to Egypt for
either domestic use or liquefaction either domestic use or liquefaction ~~before being exported elsewhere.~~

21and reexport. In August 2021, Israeli and Egyptian officials discussed possible plans to liquefy Israeli gas for reexport at the Egyptian terminals mentioned above. Israeli and Egyptian companies bought significant shares of an unused undersea pipeline (the EMG pipeline) connecting Israel to the northern Sinai Peninsula. The pipeline is now used to transport natural gas from Israel to Egypt as part of the previously mentioned gas deal. As energy ties bind Israel and Egypt closer together, they have also made both parties wary of competitors such as Turkey. In January 2019, Egypt convened the first ever Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a regional consortium consisting of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy, intended to consolidate regional energy policies 24 “Egypt’s President El-Sisi Denies Ordering Massacre in Interview his Government Later T ried to Block,” “Egypt’s President El-Sisi Denies Ordering Massacre in Interview his Government Later T ried to Block,” 60
Minutes, January 6, 2019. , January 6, 2019.
2225 “Secret Alliance: Israel Carries Out Airstrikes in Egypt, with Cairo’s O.K,” “Secret Alliance: Israel Carries Out Airstrikes in Egypt, with Cairo’s O.K,” New York Times, February 3, 2018. , February 3, 2018.
~~23 T he COVID-19 pandemic is significantly slowing natural gas production in the Eastern Mediterranean in spring~~
~~2020, as many analysts expect weaker demand in the months ahead. See, Clifford Krauss, “ Natural Gas Exports Slow~~
~~as Pandemic Reduces Global Demand,” New York Tim es, May 11, 2020.~~
2426 “Egypt Says U.S. Oil Firms Showing Appetite for Offshore P rojects,” “Egypt Says U.S. Oil Firms Showing Appetite for Offshore P rojects,” ~~Reuters~~Reuters, November 24, 2018. , November 24, 2018.
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Figure 3.Israel Participates in Egypt-led Gas Forum~~

Source: Egypt’s Ministry of Petroleum.
Note: Photo also features former U.S. Secretary of Energy Rick Perry (second from left).
~~Israeli and Egyptian companies have bought significant shares of an unused undersea pipeline~~
~~(the EMG pipeline) connecting Israel to the northern Sinai Peninsula. The pipeline is now used to~~
~~transport natural gas from Israel to Egypt as part of the previously mentioned gas deal between~~
~~the U.S.-based company Noble Energy, its Israeli partner Delek, and the Egyptian company~~
~~Dolphinus Holdings.~~
~~As energy ties bind Israel and Egypt closer together, it also has made both parties wary of~~
~~competitors such as Turkey. In January 2019, Egypt convened the first ever Eastern~~
~~Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a regional consortium consisting of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the~~
~~Palestinian Authority, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy, intended to consolidate regional energy policies~~
~~and reduce costs.25 Since then, it has held two other EMGFs, most recently in January 2020.~~
~~Turkey, which is considered a rival in the competition to secure energy resources in the~~
~~Mediterranean, is not a member of the EMGF. As Turkey has expanded its role in Libya, Libya’s~~
~~Government of National Accord (GNA) signed a maritime boundary agreement with Turkey in~~
~~late 2019 which many observers view as favorable for Turkish interests in the Eastern~~
~~Mediterranean.26 Afterward, Egypt cal ed the deal “il egal and not binding;” Israel said the deal~~
~~could “jeopardize peace and stability in the area.”27~~

~~25 “Natural Gas Fields Give Israel a Regional Political Boost,”~~ Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations and reduce costs.27 In September 2020, the EMGF became an official intergovernmental organization based in Cairo. Turkey, which has longstanding disputes with Greece and Cyprus that have shaped Eastern Mediterranean energy debates, is considered a rival of the EMGF countries.28 As Turkey expanded its role in Libya, Libya’s then-Government of National Accord (GNA) signed a maritime boundary agreement with it in late 2019.29 Egypt cal ed the deal “il egal and not binding”; Israel said the deal could “jeopardize peace and stability in the area.”30 In 2020, Egypt and Greece signed an exclusive economic zone agreement—general y seen in part as a response to the Turkey-Libya deal—in an area of the Mediterranean containing oil and gas reserves. Turkey claims that this zone fal s in the area of its continental shelf.31 Possible Egyptian Purchase of Russian Advanced Fighter Aircraft Since 2018, there have been periodic reports of Egyptian plans to purchase Russian Sukhoi Su-35 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft, a move that could potential y trigger U.S. sanctions under Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L. 115-44/H.R. 3364, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA], Title II—hereinafter referred to as CAATSA).32 In May 2020, TASS Russian News Agency reported that the Gagarin Aircraft Manufacturing Association in Komsomolsk-on-Amur had started production of the aircraft under a contract signed in 2018.33 As of September 2021, U.S. officials have not publicly confirmed that Egypt and Russia are moving ahead with the deal. The Su-35 is Russia’s most advanced fighter aircraft. In May 2021, a report suggested that Russia had delivered five Su-35s to Egypt.34 A month later, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov said that 11 Su-35 aircraft wil be delivered to Egypt this year.35 Several months earlier, in a phone cal with the Egyptian foreign minister, Secretary of State Antony Blinken “raised concerns over human rights, which he emphasized would be central to the U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship, and Egypt’s potential procurement of Su-35 fighter aircraft from Russia.”36 Section 231 of CAATSA requires that the President impose a number of sanctions on a person or entity who knowingly engages in a significant transaction with anyone who is part of, or operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intel igence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation. The Secretary of State has determined that the manufacturer of the Su-35, Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Production Organization (KNAAPO) is a part of, or operates on 27 “Natural Gas Fields Give Israel a Regional P olitical Boost,” Associated Press, January 23, 2019. , January 23, 2019.
~~26 Selcan~~ 28 CRS Report R44000, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton T homas. 29 Selcan Hacaoglu and Firat Kozok, “T urkish Offshore Gas Deal with Libya Upsets Mediterranean Boundaries,”Hacaoglu and Firat Kozok, “T urkish Offshore Gas Deal with Libya Upsets Mediterranean Boundaries,”
Bloom berg, December 6, 2019. , December 6, 2019.
27 30 “T urkey-Libya Maritime Deal Rattles East Mediterranean,” Reuters, December 25, 2019. 31 “Egypt and Greece Sign Agreement on Exclusive Economic Zone,” Reuters, August 6, 2020. 32 Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 , title II, Countering America’s Adversaries T hrough Sanctions Act (CAAT SA; P.L. 115-44). For additional background, see CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt . 33 Derek Bisaccio, “Su-35 Production for Egypt Begins,” Defense and Security Monitor, May 18, 2020. 34 Dan Arkin, “Egyptian Air Force Starts to Receive Su-35 Fighter,” Israel Defense, May 7, 2021. 35 Jeremy Binnie, “Russian Official Indicates Egypt Will Receive 11 Su-35s this Year,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 23, 2021. 36 U.S. State Department, Secretary Blinken’s Call with Egyptian Foreign Minister Shoukry, February 23, 2021. ~~“T urkey-Libya Maritime Deal Rattles East Mediterranean,” Reuters, December 25, 2019.~~
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~~Figure 4. Competition for Natural Gas in the Mediterranean~~

~~Source:~~ ~~Bloomberg~~behalf of, Russia’s defense and intel igence sectors for the purpose of meeting the definitional requirements of CAATSA Section 231.37 While Egypt’s procurement of Russian (and French) fighter aircraft has drawn media attention, U.S.-origin aircraft compose the largest component of Egypt’s fixed-wing inventory, including around 200 F-16 variant combat aircraft. Egypt’s diversification strategy is particularly chal enging for its air force, which must balance different training and maintenance procedures for European, Russian, and U.S. platforms.
Democracy, Human Rights, and Religious Freedom
Egypt’s record on human rights and democratization has sparked regular criticism from U.S. Egypt’s record on human rights and democratization has sparked regular criticism from U.S.
officials and some Members of Congress. The Egyptian government rejects foreign criticism of officials and some Members of Congress. The Egyptian government rejects foreign criticism of
its human rights practices as il egitimate interference in Egypt’s domestic affairs.its human rights practices as il egitimate interference in Egypt’s domestic affairs.2838 Certain Certain
practices of practices of President Sisi’s government, the parliament, and the security apparatus have been the subjects Sisi’s government, the parliament, and the security apparatus have been the subjects
of U.S criticism. According to the U.S. State Department’s report on human rights of U.S criticism. According to the U.S. State Department’s report on human rights conditions in conditions in
Egypt in Egypt in ~~2019~~2020: :
Significant human rights issues included: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including Significant human rights issues included: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including
extrajudicial killings by the government or its agents and terrorist groups; forced extrajudicial killings by the government or its agents and terrorist groups; forced
disappearance; torturedisappearance; torture~~; arbitrary detention~~ and cases of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions;conditions;
~~political prisoners;~~ arbitrary detention; political prisoners or detainees; politically motivated reprisal against individuals located outside the country; arbitrary or unlawful interferencearbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; with privacy; ~~the worst forms of~~
serious restrictions on free expression, the press, and the internet, including arrests or prosecutions restrictions on free expression, the press, and the internet, including arrests or prosecutions
~~against~~of journalists, censorship, site blocking, and the existence of journalists, censorship, site blocking, and the existence of ~~unenforced criminal~~
~~libel; substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of~~
~~association, such as overly restrictive laws governing civil society organizations;~~
~~restrictions on political participation; violence involving religious minorities;~~ criminal libel laws, which were not enforced; substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, such as overly restrictive laws governing civil society organizations; restrictions on political participation; violence violence
targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex ~~(LGBTI) persons;~~persons and use of the law use of the law
~~to arbitrarily~~ to arrest and prosecute arrest and prosecute ~~LGBTI~~arbitrarily such persons; and forced or persons; and forced or compulsory child labor, including its worst forms.39 Egyptian authorities employ a host of legal authorities to suppress peaceful political opposition and civil society, including the folowing:  Emergency Law. As previously mentioned, Egypt has been in a near continuous state of emergency since 2017.40 The 2014 constitution, as amended, limited the president’s ability to declare an indefinite state of emergency, though the pro-government parliament has continuously approved three-month extensions of the President’s emergency declarations (most recently in July 2021). Emergency powers, which were in effect for decades under the rule of the late Hosni Mubarak, enable the state to refer civilians to State Security Emergency Courts rather than civilian courts for various infractions.  Anti-terrorism law. Egypt’s 2015 anti-terrorism law has been widely criticized by human rights groups for creating a broad definition of terrorism that can be used by authorities to crack down against peaceful political opposition. According to one critique, “By writing into law a broad definition for terrorism and creating new prosecutorial and 37 See U.S. State Department, Section 231 of CAAT SA, at https://www.state.gov/t/isn/caatsa/. 38 “Egypt calls on US not to interfere in its Affairs,” The Middle East Monitor, March 15, 2019. 39 U.S. State Department , 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Egypt, March 30, 2021. 40 For an overview of the Egypt’s emergency law, see “Egypt’s Emergency Law Explained,” Al Jazeera, April 11, 2017. Congressional Research Service 9 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations judicial mechanisms, the Counter-terrorism Law expands the scope of acts that can be tried as terrorism; subjects even nonviolent, constitutional y protected actions of everyday citizens, journalists, and rights defenders to possible prosecution under terrorism legislation; and contributes to a culture in which national security concerns automatical y trump human rights and legal obligations.”41  NGO Law. For years, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Egypt have charged that the government has used the legal system to restrict civil organizations from conducting lawful activities without government interference. Egypt’s Law #149 of 2019 on activities of nongovernmental organizations prohibits domestic and foreign NGOs from pursuing activities that violate “national security,” “public order,” “public morals,” and “national unity” without defining any of these terms.42 Authorities also~~compulsory child labor.~~
~~The government inconsistently punished or prosecuted officials wh o committed abuses,~~

~~28 “Egypt calls on US not to interfere in its Affairs,” The Middle East Monitor, March 15, 2019.~~
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7

~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~whether in the security services or elsewhere in government. In most cases the government~~
~~did not comprehensively investigate allegations of human rights abuses, including most~~
~~incidents of violence by security forces, contributing to an environment of impunity.29~~
~~Authorities~~ restrict access to the internet, censor online content, and monitor private online restrict access to the internet, censor online content, and monitor private online
communications.communications.3043 In 2018, parliament passed amendments to the Media and Press Law that, In 2018, parliament passed amendments to the Media and Press Law that,
among other changes, grant the regulatory body known as the Supreme Media Council among other changes, grant the regulatory body known as the Supreme Media Council “the the
authority to suspend a social media account that has 5,000 followers or more if it posts false authority to suspend a social media account that has 5,000 followers or more if it posts false
news, promotes violence, or spreads hateful views.”news, promotes violence, or spreads hateful views.”3144 The Egyptian government also has The Egyptian government also has
attempted to require that technology companies share their user data with authorities.attempted to require that technology companies share their user data with authorities.3245 In October In October
2019, the Egyptian cabinet issued a resolution mandating, among other things, that ride-sharing 2019, the Egyptian cabinet issued a resolution mandating, among other things, that ride-sharing
companies such as Uber submit to the Ministry of Transportation six months’ worth of customers’ companies such as Uber submit to the Ministry of Transportation six months’ worth of customers’
data from al rides. data from al rides.3346
Select international human rights, democracy, and development monitoring organizations provide Select international human rights, democracy, and development monitoring organizations provide
the following global rankings for Egypt. the following global rankings for Egypt.
Table 1. Democracy, Human Rights, and Development Indicators
Issue
Index

Ranking
Democracy Democracy
Freedom House, Freedom in the World Freedom House, Freedom in the World ~~2020~~

2021 “Not Free” “Not Free”
Press Freedom Press Freedom
Reporters Without Borders, World Press Reporters Without Borders, World Press

166/180 Countries 166/180 Countries
Freedom Index Freedom Index ~~2020~~2021
Corruption Corruption
Transparency International, Corruption Transparency International, Corruption

~~106~~ 117/180 Countries /180 Countries
Perceptions Index Perceptions Index ~~2019~~2020
Human Human
United Nations Human Development United Nations Human Development

116/189 Countries 116/189 Countries
Development Development
Programme, Human Development Index Programme, Human Development Index ~~2019~~
~~Source~~2020 Sources: Freedom House, Freedom House, ~~Reporters~~ Reporters Without Borders, Transparency International, and United Nations Human Without Borders, Transparency International, and United Nations Human
Development Programme. Development Programme.
~~Detention of American Citizens in Egypt~~
~~The detention of American citizens/dual nationals in Egypt has strained U.S.-Egyptian relations at~~
~~times. On January 13, 2020, Mustafa Kassem, a dual U.S.-Egyptian citizen who had been~~
~~detained in Egypt since 2013, died of heart failure in an Egyptian prison after a two-year hunger~~
~~strike. Some Members of Congress had long been concerned for Kassem, arguing that Egyptian~~
~~authorities unlawfully detained and wrongfully convicted him.34 The Egyptian government has~~
~~defended its treatment of Kassem, claiming that he received adequate medical care and legal~~
~~rights. After Kassem’s death, one report suggests that the State Department’s Bureau of Near~~

~~29 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights~~
~~Practices for 2019, Egypt~~
~~30 See,~~ 41 T he T ahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, “T IMEP Brief: Counter-T errorism Law,” August 15, 2018. 42 George Sadek, “Egypt: New Law Enacted Regulating Activities of Nongovernmental Organizations,” Global Legal Monitor, T he Law Library, Library of Congress, September 11, 2019. 43 See “T he Eye on the Nile,” “T he Eye on the Nile,” Check Point Research, October 3, 2019. , October 3, 2019.
3144 “Egypt: Parliament Passes Amendments to Media and Press Law,” “Egypt: Parliament Passes Amendments to Media and Press Law,” Global Legal Monitor, , ~~the~~T he Law Library, Library Law Library, Library
of Congress, August 6, 2018. of Congress, August 6, 2018.
32 45 “Dilemma for Uber and Rival: Egypt’s Demand for Data on Riders,” “Dilemma for Uber and Rival: Egypt’s Demand for Data on Riders,” New York Times, June 10, 2017. , June 10, 2017.
3346 “Egypt: Ministerial Resolution Issued to Regulate Activities of Ride-Sharing Companies,” “Egypt: Ministerial Resolution Issued to Regulate Activities of Ride-Sharing Companies,” Global Legal Monitor, ,
T he Law Library, Library of Congress, October 22, 2019. T he Law Library, Library of Congress, October 22, 2019.
~~34 For additional background, see CRS Insight IN11216,~~ ~~Egypt: Death of American Citizen and Congressional~~
~~Response, by Jeremy M. Sharp.~~
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

810 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Gender Equality Despite a constitutional provision affirming gender equality, Egyptian women do not enjoy the same legal rights and opportunities as men and experience widespread discrimination.47 The World Economic Forum ranks Egypt 129th of 156 countries on the Global Gender Gap index, and 4th within the MENA region; the country performs in the bottom 10 countries on the measure of women’s economic participation and opportunity. Men participate in the labor force at more than three times the rate of women in Egypt (75.2% compared with 20% for women), and less than 10% of firms have women in top management positions.48 Egypt performs lower than the regional MENA average on the Women, Business, and the Law index, an annual study by the World Bank that measures the laws and regulations that affect women’s economic opportunity in 190 economies. The World Bank has found that “constraints on freedom of movement, laws affecting women’s decisions to work, laws affecting women’s pay, constraints related to marriage, laws affecting women’s work after having children, constraints on women’s starting and running a business, and gender differences in property and inheritance” contribute to Egypt’s score of 45 out of 100.49 Violence against women and rampant sexual harassment remain problems in Egypt, due in part to the lack of a comprehensive law criminalizing al forms of violence against girls and women.50 Child marriage and female genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C) are both practiced to some extent, despite laws against them. The State Department reports the government “did not effectively enforce the FGM/C law” and that FGM/C remains a “serious problem.”51 Egyptian law does not prohibit domestic violence or spousal abuse. The government has recently increased the punishment for sexual harassment and claims to be prioritizing efforts to address it, perhaps in response to the 2020 social media movement about sexual assault that some dubbed Egypt’s #MeToo moment.52 Coptic Christians Most Egyptians are Sunni Muslims, but a relatively

~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Eastern Affairs had raised the option of possibly cutting up to $300 mil ion in foreign aid to~~
~~Egypt.35~~
~~Although some U.S. citizens may be detained in Egypt on non-political charges (such as narcotics~~
~~possession), notable detainee cases that may involve political y motivated charges include the~~
~~following:~~
~~ Khaled Hassan. Detained since January 2018, Hassan is a limousine driver from~~
~~New York who has been accused of joining Islamic State-Sinai Province (IS-SP).~~
~~Human rights organizations al ege that Hassan has been tortured while in~~
~~prison.36 Hassan is a dual U.S. and Egyptian citizen.~~
~~ Mohammed al Amashah. Detained since March 2019, al Amashah is a 23-year-~~
~~old medical student who was arrested in Tahrir Square on charges of misusing~~
~~social media and helping a terrorist group after he displayed a sign that read,~~
~~“Freedom for al prisoners.” In March 2020, he went on a hunger strike to protest~~
~~his imprisonment. Al Amashah is a dual U.S. and Egyptian citizen.~~
~~As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to spread worldwide, particularly in prisons, some human~~
~~rights advocates and Members of Congress37 have cal ed on the Egyptian government to release~~
~~some of its detainees, including the few American citizens held on political y motivated charges.38~~
~~On April 10, a bipartisan group of Senators wrote a letter to Secretary of State Michael Pompeo~~
~~urging him to “publicly cal for the release of Americans and political prisoners locked up abroad~~
~~on baseless charges” to include detained American citizens in Egypt.39 The Egyptian government~~
~~claims that it is taking preventive and protective measures for prisoners and prison staff and has~~
~~suspended family visits to prisons to limit risk of infection.40 On April 23 in a phone cal between~~
~~Secretary of State Pompeo and Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, Secretary Pompeo~~
~~“emphasized that detained U.S. citizens be kept safe and provided consular access during the~~
~~COVID-19 pandemic.”41~~
~~In early May 2020, Reem Mohamed Desouky, a teacher from Pennsylvania who was arrested at~~
~~the Cairo airport on charges of improper use of social media and who had been detained since~~
~~July 2019, was released from prison and returned safely to the United States after she renounced~~
~~her Egyptian citizenship. Desouky had been a dual U.S. and Egyptian citizen.~~
~~Coptic Christians~~
~~Most Egyptians are Sunni Muslims, but a~~ smal percentage (perhaps 5% or less) are Coptic smal percentage (perhaps 5% or less) are Coptic
Christians, and this minority has faced discrimination and persecution, from the government as Christians, and this minority has faced discrimination and persecution, from the government as
wel as from other citizens and terrorist groups. Congress has at times urged the wel as from other citizens and terrorist groups. Congress has at times urged the government of Egypt to protect this community. For example, in the 117th Congress, H.Res. 117, among other provisions, urges the Government of Egypt to enact “serious and legitimate reforms in the public sector, athletics, and society to ensure Coptic Christians are given the same rights and opportunities as al other Egyptian citizens.” For years, the Coptic Christian community in Egypt has cal ed for equal treatment under the law.53 Since taking office, President Sisi has publicly cal ed for greater Muslim-Christian 47 Op.cit., U.S. State Department, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Egypt, March 30, 2021. 48 World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2021, March 2021. 49 World Bank, Women, Business, and the Law 2021, data as of October 1, 2020. 50 Statement by Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Efforts to Combat Violence against Women in Egypt: Milestones, Challenges, and Recommendations,” UN Human Rights Council, June 8, 2021. 51 Op.cit., U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Hum an Rights Practices: Egypt, March 30, 2021. 52 “Egypt tightens punishment for sexual harassment ,” Reuters, July 12, 2021; Declan Walsh, “ T he 22-Year-Old Force Behind Egypt’s Growing #MeT oo Movement,” The New York Times, October 2, 2020. 53 In late 2019, an Egyptian Coptic woman won a landmark inheritance case before the Cairo Court of Appeal. T he court granted the plaintiff, a Coptic Christian woman, a share of her late father’s inheritance equal to that of her two male brothers by applying Christian Orthodox Personal Status Bylaws rather than Islamic law (which grants sons twice Congressional Research Service 11 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations ~~government of~~

~~35 Jack Detsch, Robbie Gramer, Colum Lynch, “After Death of U.S. Citizen, State Department Floats Slashing Egypt~~
~~Aid,” Foreignpolicy.com , March 31, 2020.~~
~~36 “Jailed in Egypt, American Limo Driver Attempts Suicide,” Washington Post, August 9, 2019.~~
~~37 https://www.murphy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/murphy-statement-on-us-citizens-unjustly-detained-in-~~
~~egypt~~
~~38 “Working Group on Egypt Call to Release Detainees,” March 26, 2020. Available online at:~~
~~[https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/26/working-group-on-egypt-call-to-release-detainees-pub-81381]~~
~~39 See Senators T oomey, Casey Urge Release of Americans and Political Prisoners Detained Abroad to Protect them~~
~~from COVID-19, April 10, 2020.~~
~~40 “Fear of Coronavirus Haunts Egypt's Cramped Jails,” Reuters, April 22, 2020.~~
~~41 U.S. State Department, Secretary Pompeo’s Call with Egyptian Foreign Minister Shoukry, April 23, 2020.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Egypt to protect this community. For example, in the 116th Congress, H.Res. 49, among other~~
~~provisions, urges the Government of Egypt to enact “reforms to ensure Coptic Christians are~~
~~given the same rights and opportunities as al other Egyptian citizens…”~~
~~For years, the Coptic Christian community in Egypt has cal ed for equal treatment under the~~
~~law.42 Since taking office, President Sisi has publicly cal ed for greater Muslim-Christian~~
coexistence and national unity. In January 2019, he inaugurated Egypt’s Coptic Cathedral of coexistence and national unity. In January 2019, he inaugurated Egypt’s Coptic Cathedral of
Nativity in the new administrative capital east of Cairo saying, “This is an important moment in Nativity in the new administrative capital east of Cairo saying, “This is an important moment in
our history. our history. ... We are one and we wil remain one.”... We are one and we wil remain one.”4354
Despite these public cal s for improved interfaith relations in Egypt, the minority Coptic Christian Despite these public cal s for improved interfaith relations in Egypt, the minority Coptic Christian
community continues to face professional and social discrimination, along with occasional community continues to face professional and social discrimination, along with occasional
sectarian attacks. According to the sectarian attacks. According to the ~~latest annual~~2021 U.S. Commission on International Religious U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom report, “religious discrimination [in Egypt] remained pervasive, including a disparity in Freedom report, “religious discrimination [in Egypt] remained pervasive, including a disparity in
policies regarding places of worship, a lack of opportunities for non-Muslims to work in key policies regarding places of worship, a lack of opportunities for non-Muslims to work in key
areas of areas of government service, state security harassment of former Muslims, and recurring incidents government service, state security harassment of former Muslims, and recurring incidents
of anti-of anti-~~Christian~~ Christian mob violence, particularly in rural areas.” violence, particularly in rural areas.”4455
Major terrorist attacks against Christian places of worship also continue to threaten the Coptic Major terrorist attacks against Christian places of worship also continue to threaten the Coptic
community. Suicide bomber attacks against Coptic cathedrals in 2011, 2016, and 2017 community. Suicide bomber attacks against Coptic cathedrals in 2011, 2016, and 2017
collectively kil ed over 95 people and injured hundreds of others. In collectively kil ed over 95 people and injured hundreds of others. In ~~spring 2020, the Egyptian~~
~~Ministry of the Interior broke up a terrorist cel planning attacks over Coptic Easter. One~~
~~policeman and seven suspects were kil ed in the operation.45~~April 2021, IS-SP posted a video depicting the group’s murder of a 62-year-old Copt from Bir al Abd in North Sinai.
Coptic Christians also have long voiced concern about state regulation of church construction. Coptic Christians also have long voiced concern about state regulation of church construction.
They have demanded that the government reform long-standing laws (some dating back to the They have demanded that the government reform long-standing laws (some dating back to the
nineteenth century) on building codes for Christian places of worship. Article 235 of Egypt’s nineteenth century) on building codes for Christian places of worship. Article 235 of Egypt’s
2014 constitution mandates that parliament reform these building code regulations. In 2016, 2014 constitution mandates that parliament reform these building code regulations. In 2016,
parliament approved a church construction law (Law 80 of 2016) that expedited the government parliament approved a church construction law (Law 80 of 2016) that expedited the government
approval process for the construction and restoration of Coptic churches, among other structures. approval process for the construction and restoration of Coptic churches, among other structures.
Although Coptic Pope Tawadros II welcomed the law,Although Coptic Pope Tawadros II welcomed the law,4656 critics claimed that it continues to al ow critics claimed that it continues to al ow
for discrimination. According to for discrimination. According to Human Rights Watch, “the new law al ows governors to deny , “the new law al ows governors to deny
church-building permits with no stated way to appeal, requires that churches be built church-building permits with no stated way to appeal, requires that churches be built
‘commensurate with’ the number of Christians in the area, and contains security provisions that ‘commensurate with’ the number of Christians in the area, and contains security provisions that
risk subjecting decisions on whether to al ow church construction to the whims of violent risk subjecting decisions on whether to al ow church construction to the whims of violent
mobs.” mobs.”47

~~42 In late 2019, an Egyptian Coptic woman won a landmark inheritance case before the Cairo Court of Appeal. T he~~
~~court granted the plaintiff, a Coptic Christian woman, a share of her late father’s inheritance equal to that of her two~~
~~male brothers by applying Christian Orthodox Personal Status Bylaws rather than Islamic law (which grants sons twice~~
57 Domestic Developments Domestic Politics President Abdel Fattah al Sisi’s tenure appears to have been predicated on the idea that a sufficient segment of the public, exhausted after several years of unrest and distrustful of Islamist rule, remains wil ing to forgo democratic liberties in exchange for the rule of a strongman hailing from the military. The extent to which Egyptians political quiescence reflects endorsement of military rule or strategic silence in the face of suppression is impossible to quantify, given the closed political environment enforced by the current government. The authorities have limited dissent by maintaining a constant crackdown, which initial y was aimed at the Muslim the share of daughters). T he plaintiff had argued that, per the Egyptian Constitution of 2014, she should not be subject the share of daughters). T he plaintiff had argued that, per the Egyptian Constitution of 2014, she should not be subject
to Islamic law in matters related to family law. Seeto Islamic law in matters related to family law. See, George Sadek, “ Egypt: Court Grants Christian Woman Share of George Sadek, “ Egypt: Court Grants Christian Woman Share of
Father’s Estate Equal to Share of Her T wo Brothers,” Father’s Estate Equal to Share of Her T wo Brothers,” T he Law Library, Library of Congress, Library of Congress, Global Legal Monitor, January 9, 2020. , January 9, 2020.
4354 “Egypt’s Sisi Opens Mega-Mosque and Middle East’s Largest Cathedral in New Capital,” “Egypt’s Sisi Opens Mega-Mosque and Middle East’s Largest Cathedral in New Capital,” ~~Reuters~~Reuters, January 6, 2019. , January 6, 2019.
4455 Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, April Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, April ~~2020.~~
~~45 Samy Magdy, “Egypt: Police Kill 7 Suspected Militants in Cairo Suburb, ABC News, April 14, 2020.~~
462021. 56 “HH Pope T awadros II: Church Construction Law Corrected an Error and Bandaged “HH Pope T awadros II: Church Construction Law Corrected an Error and Bandaged ~~W ounds~~Wounds,” Coptic Orthodox ,” Coptic Orthodox
Cultural Center, September 1, 2016. Cultural Center, September 1, 2016.
4757 “Egypt: New Church Law Discriminates Against Christians,” “Egypt: New Church Law Discriminates Against Christians,” Human Rights Watch, September 15, 2016. , September 15, 2016.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Brotherhood, but has evolved to cover a broader range of political speech, encompassing anyone criticizing the government. While successive Egyptian presidents since 1952 were effective at centralizing power, both within the ruling system and outside it, certain institutions (judiciary, military) and individuals enjoyed a considerable degree of independence from the executive. However, under President Sisi, there has been arguably an unprecedented attempt to consolidate control over al branches of government while stymying opposition to his rule. In April 2019, voters approved amendments to the constitution that extend President Sisi’s current term until 2024 and permit him to run for a third term, potential y keeping him in office until 2030. The amendments also granted the president the authority to appoint al chief justices of Egyptian judicial bodies and the public prosecutor. During summer 2019, President Sisi made those judicial appointments, leading one anonymous Egyptian judge to question this authority, saying that “The role of the judge is to be at arm’s length from the executive, but this is inconsistent now with the fact the president of the republic is involved with a judge’s transfer, promotion and accountability.”58 President Sisi also placed his older brother and oldest son in key security and intel igence positions, although his son is no longer in that role.59 Egypt’s bicameral parliament consists of a 596-member House of Representatives (568 Figure 4. President Abdel Fattah al Sisi elected and 28 appointed by the president) and a 300-member Senate (200 of whom are elected, and 100 appointed by the president). According to Egypt’s Political Rights Law, at least 25% of the elected seats in the House of Representatives are set aside for female candidates; 10% of al Senate seats are designated for women. 60 Women’s right to vote was recognized in 1956, and women currently constitute 27.7% of representatives in the lower parliament and 13% of seats in Source: Egyptian State Information Service. the upper house.61 Parliamentary elections took place in late 2020 amidst a turnout estimated at less than 30%. Mostaqbal Watan (translated as either Future of the Homeland or Nation’s Future)62 emerged as the leading pro-Sisi party, with 316 seats in the House. When parliament began its work in early 2021, it featured the most women legislators in Egypt’s history. Egyptian lawmakers overwhelmingly support the president’s legislative agenda, as Mostaqbal Watan has become the 58 “Fears Over Egypt’s Judiciary Abound after Sisi Appointments,” Agence France Presse, August 21, 2019. 59 Reportedly, President Sisi has since removed his son Mahmoud from the deputy head of the GIS. According to one controversial report in the Egyptian publication Mada Masr, Mahmoud Sisi lost his position in the GIS after the president’s inner circle concluded that his reputation was harmful to the Sisi regime. See “President’s Eldest Son, Mahmoud al-Sisi, Sidelined from Powerful Intelligence Position to Diplomatic Mission in Russia,” Mada Masr, November 20, 2019. After Mada Masr published this account, security services temporarily detained an editor and two journalists and had their personal electronics confiscated. See “ Egypt News Outlet Raided after Report on Sisi’s Son,” Financial Tim es, November 24, 2019. 60 See, Genders Quota Database, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) , Stockholm, Sweden. 61 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Monthly Ranking of Women in National Parliaments, accessed September 9, 2021. 62 T he party’s website is available in English at https://mostaqbal-watan.org/en/. Congressional Research Service 13 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations successor to the now-defunct National Democratic Party (NDP), the former pro-government party of the late Hosni Mubarak. According to one observer, “Sisi’s circle is presenting a democratic, pluralistic picture of this outcome, but in truth the legislature wil be dominated by one major party surrounded by smal parties that serve as window dressing, thereby mimicking an opposition just enough to occasional y channel the public’s frustration at socioeconomic conditions. This is straight from the Mubarak playbook.”63 The next parliamentary elections are expected to take place in 2025. The Economy As an emerging market, Egypt has weathered the COVID-19 pandemic and has witnessed positive GDP growth both in 2020 (3.6%) and 2021 (2.8% estimated). In the face of the pandemic’s disruption to global tourism (tourism in Egypt accounts for 9.5% of al employment), the Egyptian government has enacted various fiscal stimulus measures while receiving various low-interest loans from international financial institutions, such as the IMF. According to a July 2021 IMF analysis, over the past 12 months, the [Egyptian] authorities’ commitment to prudent policies and their strong performance under the IMF program have helped mitigate the health and social impact of the pandemic while safeguarding economic stability, debt sustainability, and investor confidence. Growth is expected to rebound strongly in FY2021/22 to 5.2 percent, but the outlook is still clouded by uncertainty related to the pandemic, including regarding the full recovery of tourism.64 Egypt Constructs a New Capital City Since 2015, Egypt has been constructing a yet unnamed new capital city (temporarily referred to as the New Administrative Capital, or NAC) 28 miles east of Cairo. The new city is planned to house 6.5 mil ion people and is to feature new headquarters for most government agencies and a new financial center. The city is designed to be a “smart” city, in which residents may use smartphone applications to access basic services. The city is to feature an extensive surveil ance network of cameras to “monitor crowds and traffic congestion, detect incidents of theft, observe suspicious people or objects, and trigger automated alarms in emergency situations,” according to Honeywel , the contractor building the network.65 The German company Siemens Mobility is partnering with local Egyptian companies to construct a high-speed rail line linking Cairo to the NAC and Red Sea coastal cities to ports on the Mediterranean. The construction of the NAC is the biggest “mega project” inaugurated by President Sisi. Since his ascension to power, Egypt has widened the Suez Canal, expanded the network of tunnels and bridges connecting the Sinai Peninsula to the mainland, and constructed several new military bases. Some observers, however, have questioned the economic and environmental viability of building a city of 6 mil ion in an undeveloped desert area. According to The Economist, “There are myriad questions about the city’s viability. Water is scarce; property prices are too high for most Egyptians. Critics say the money would be better spent fixing the poor infrastructure in ‘old’ Cairo.”66 While Egypt has been able to access global capital to finance its infrastructure expansion, demand for its debt could shift if interest rates rise elsewhere. Egypt’s Central Bank offers one of the highest bond interest rates (8.25%) among emerging market economies, making the country’s debt attractive to foreign investors. Overseas investors hold around $33 bil ion of Egypt’s 63 Haisam Hassanein, “Egypt’s New Parliament: Reopening Political Life, But Only So Far,” Policy Analysis, T he Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 26, 2021. 64 T he International Monetary Fund, “Egypt: Overcoming the COVID Shock and Maintaining Growth,” July 14, 2021. 65 “From Creaking Cairo, Egypt Plans High-T ech Leap with new Capital,” Reuters, September 2, 2021. 66 “Egypt: Always Going Big,” The Economist, April 3, 2021. Congressional Research Service 14 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Treasury bil s and bonds.67 International financial institutions now hold about half of Egypt’s external debt. However, some economists are concerned that any increase in U.S. and European interest rates may lead investors to sel Egyptian debt and move their money into safer markets. Relatively low borrowing costs have enabled Egypt to finance public works projects and other deficit spending initiatives. According to S&P Global Ratings, Egypt’s has one of the highest debt-service burdens among al sovereigns, and the government requires funding from equity sources in order to cope with possible increases in global interest rates.68 Some economists argue that Egypt relies too heavily on a few key economic sectors, such as energy and tourism, while the rest of the private sector remains underdeveloped and poverty rates remain high. According to the Economist, “The purchasing managers’ index, a measure of private-sector activity, has spent most of the past five years contracting. As many as 30% of Egyptians fel below the official poverty line of 857 pounds ($55) a month at the end of 2020.”69 For decades, Egypt’s military has played a key role in the nation’s economy as a food producer and low-cost domestic manufacturer of consumable products; however, due to political sensitivities, the extent of its economic power is rarely quantified. Egypt’s military is believed to be largely economical y self-sufficient. It produces what it consumes (food and clothes) and then sel s surplus goods for additional revenue. Under President Sisi, who has commissioned massive infrastructure projects, Egyptian military companies have been the main beneficiaries of government contracts.70 Military-owned manufacturing companies have expanded into new markets, producing goods that are cheaper than either foreign imports or domestical y produced goods made by the private sector (including appliances, cement, fertilizer, solar panels, some electronics, and some medical equipment). Proponents of the military’s expanded role argue that its companies can move goods to market more quickly and sel them to consumers at prices below those charged by private corporations. Critics argue that the military is distorting the economic system and benefitting from a legal system that gives the military unfair advantages. Reportedly, the military does not pay corporate income taxes and employs low-wage conscript labor to keep overhead costs at a minimum.71 Egypt’s Foreign Policy Under President Sisi, Egypt’s foreign policy has been more active after a period of dormancy during the latter years of the late President Hosni Mubarak and the tumultuous two-and-a-half-year transition that followed Mubarak’s resignation.72 While President Sisi has continued Egypt’s 67 Mirette Magdy and T arek El-T ablawy, “Egypt Keeps Interest Rate on Hold with an Eye on Fed T apering,” Bloom berg, September 16, 2021. 68 Op.cit., Mirette Magdy and Manus Cranny, “Egypt Has Crisis Experience to Handle a Fed T aper, Minister Says,” Bloom berg, September 8, 2021. 69 “Egypt is again under Military Rule, but Sisi Lacks Nasser’s Appeal,” The Economist, August 28, 2021 edition. 70 “Egypt’s Economy Falls to the Military,” Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2018. 71 “Army’s Economic Role Fuels Debate in Egypt,” Middle East Online, April 3, 2018. 72 From about 2000 to 2013, Egypt had turned inward, unable to either lend its support or unilaterally advance major U.S. initiatives in the region, such as the war in Iraq or the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Moreover, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, profoundly and negatively impacted how some U.S. policymakers viewed Egypt. Whereas the bilateral relationship had previously focused on promoting regional peace and stability, the 9/11 attacks reoriented U.S. policy during the George W. Bush Administration, as Americans considered the possibility that popular disillusionment from authoritarianism might contribute to terrorism. Egypt has been a key element of this reorient ation, Congressional Research Service 15 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations longtime policy of playing an intermediary role between Israel and the Palestinians, Egypt under President ~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Possible Egyptian Purchase of Russian Advanced Fighter Aircraft~~
~~For over a year,48 there have been periodic reports of Egyptian plans to purchase Russian Sukhoi~~
~~Su-35 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft, a move that could potential y trigger U.S. sanctions under the~~
~~Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L. 115-44/H.R.~~
~~3364, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA], Title II – hereinafter~~
~~referred to as CAATSA).49 In May 2020, TASS Russian News Agency reported that the Gagarin~~
~~Aircraft Manufacturing Association in Komsomolsk-on-Amur had started production of the~~
~~aircraft under a contract signed in 2018.50 As of May 2020, U.S. officials have not publicly~~
~~confirmed that Egypt and Russia are moving ahead with the deal. The Su-35 is Russia’s most~~
~~advanced fighter aircraft. Indonesia and Turkey also may purchase the Su-35.51~~
~~Section 231 of CAATSA requires that the President impose a number of sanctions on a person or~~
~~entity who knowingly engages in a significant transaction with anyone who is part of, or operates~~
~~for or on behalf of, the defense or intel igence sectors of the Government of the Russian~~
~~Federation. The Secretary of State has determined that the manufacturer of the Su-35,~~
~~Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Production Organization (KNAAPO) is a part of, or operates on~~
~~behalf of, Russia’s defense and intel igence sectors for the purpose of meeting the definitional~~
~~requirements of CAATSA Section 231.52 On September 20, 2018, the U.S. Treasury Department~~
~~made its first designations pursuant to Section 231 against the Equipment Development~~
~~Department of China’s Central Military Commission, as wel as its director, for taking delivery~~
~~from Russia of 10 Su-35 combat aircraft in December 2017 and S-400 surface-to-air missile~~
~~system-related equipment in 2018.53~~
~~On April 8, 2019, a bipartisan group of 17 Senators wrote a letter to Secretary of State Mike~~
~~Pompeo expressing concern regarding Egypt’s possible purchase of the Su-35.54 The next day, in~~
~~testimony before the Senate, Secretary Pompeo remarked that “We’ve made clear that, if those~~
~~systems were to be purchased, [under] statute CAATSA would require sanctions on the regime….~~
~~We have received assurances from [the Egyptians] that they understand that [sanctions wil be~~
~~imposed] and I am very hopeful that they wil decide not to move forward with that~~
~~acquisition.”55~~
~~In November 2019, new reports surfaced indicating that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and~~
~~Secretary of Defense Mark Esper warned the Egyptian government that “Major new arms deals~~
~~with Russia would—at a minimum—complicate future U.S. defense transactions with and~~

~~48 In April 2019, reports surfaced that the Egyptian Air Force was considering procuring over 20 Russian Sukhoi Su-35~~
~~Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft in a deal worth $2 billion . See, “ Egypt Signs $2 bln Deal to Buy Russian Fighter Jets –~~
~~Kommersant,” Reuters, March 18, 2019.~~
~~49 Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 , title II, Countering America’s Adversaries~~
~~T hrough Sanctions Act (CAAT SA; P.L. 115-44). For additional background, see CRS Report R45415,~~ ~~U.S. Sanctions~~
~~on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt .~~
~~50 Derek Bisaccio , “Su-35 Production for Egypt Begins,” Defense and Security Monitor, May 18, 2020.~~
~~51 “Russia Completes Deliveries of SU-35 Fighter Aircraft to China,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 16, 2019.~~
~~52 See, U.S. State Department, Section 231 of CAAT SA, https://www.state.gov/t/isn/caatsa/~~
~~53 https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20180920_33.aspx.~~
~~54 Senator Bob Menendez website, Leading Senators Call on Sec. Pompeo to Raise Key Concerns during Bilateral~~
~~Meeting with Egyptian President Sisi, April 8, 2019.~~
~~55 Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations Holds Hearing on Fiscal 2020 Budget Request~~
~~for the State Department , CQ Transcripts, April 9, 2019.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~security assistance to Egypt.”56 Another U.S. official cautioned that the purchase puts Egypt “at~~
~~risk of sanctions and it puts them at risk of loss of future acquisition.”57 Since then, there have~~
~~been no additional official U.S. public statements regarding the possibility of sanctioning Egypt.~~
~~Historical Background~~
~~Since 1952, when a cabal of Egyptian Army officers, known as the Free Officers Movement,~~
~~ousted the British-backed king, Egypt’s military has produced four presidents; Gamal Abdel~~
~~Nasser (1954-1970), Anwar Sadat (1970-1981), Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), and Abdel Fattah al~~
~~Sisi (2013-present). These four men have ruled Egypt with strong backing from the country’s~~
~~security establishment almost continual y. The one exception has been the brief period of rule by~~
~~Muhammad Morsi, who was affiliated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (see below). That~~
~~organization that has opposed single party military-backed rule and advocated for a state~~
~~governed by a vaguely articulated combination of civil and Shariah (Islamic) law. For the most~~
~~part, the Muslim Brotherhood has been the only significant and abiding opposition during the~~
~~decades of military-backed rule.~~
~~The one departure from Egypt’s decades of military rule, the brief period in which Morsi ruled,~~
~~took place between 2011 and 2013, after popular demonstrations dubbed the “Arab Spring,”~~
~~which had started in neighboring Tunisia, compel ed the military to force the resignation of~~
~~former President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. During this period, Egypt experienced~~
~~tremendous political tumult, culminating in Morsi’s one-year presidency. When Morsi took office~~
~~on June 30, 2012, after winning Egypt’s first truly competitive presidential election, his ascension~~
~~to the presidency was expected to mark the end of a rocky 16-month transition period. Proposed~~
~~timelines for elections, the constitutional drafting process, and the military’s relinquishing of~~
~~power to a civilian government had been constantly changed, contested, and sometimes even~~
~~overruled by the courts. Instead of consolidating democratic or civilian rule, Morsi’s rule exposed~~
~~the deep divisions in Egyptian politics, pitting a broad cross-section of Egypt’s public and private~~
~~sectors, the Coptic Church, and the military against the Brotherhood and its Islamist supporters.~~
~~The atmosphere of mutual distrust, political gridlock, and public dissatisfaction that permeated~~
~~Morsi’s presidency provided Egypt’s military, led by then-Defense Minister Sisi, with an~~
~~opportunity to reassert political control. On July 3, 2013, following several days of mass public~~
~~demonstrations against Morsi’s rule, the military unilateral y dissolved Morsi’s government,~~
~~suspended the constitution that had been passed during his rule, and instal ed Sisi as interim~~
~~president. The Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters declared the military’s actions a coup~~
~~d’etat and protested in the streets. Weeks later, Egypt’s military and national police launched a~~
~~violent crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood, resulting in police and army soldiers firing~~
~~live ammunition against demonstrators encamped in several public squares and the kil ing of at~~
~~least 1,150 demonstrators. The Egyptian military justified these actions by decrying the~~
~~encampments as a threat to national security.58~~
~~Domestic Developments~~
~~President Abdel Fattah al Sisi’s tenure appears to have been predicated on the idea that a~~
~~significant segment of the public, exhausted after several years of unrest and distrustful of~~
~~Islamist rule, remains wil ing to forgo democratic liberties in exchange for the rule of a~~

~~56 “Pompeo Warns Egypt of Sanctions Over Russian Arms,” The Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2019.~~
~~57 “US: Egypt Could Face Sanctions if it Purchases Russian Fighter Jets,” Associated Press, November 18, 2019.~~
~~58 “Egyptian Cabinet Vows to Disperse Pro-Morsi Protest Camps,” The Guardian (UK), July 31, 2013.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~strongman hailing from the military. The authorities have limited dissent by maintaining a~~
~~constant crackdown, which initial y was aimed at the Muslim Brotherhood but has evolved to~~
~~cover a broader range of political speech, encompassing anyone criticizing the government.~~
~~While successive Egyptian presidents since 1952 were effective at centralizing power, both~~
~~within the ruling system and outside it, certain institutions (judiciary, military) and individuals~~
~~enjoyed a considerable degree of independence from the executive. However, under President~~
~~Sisi, there has been arguably an unprecedented attempt to consolidate control over al branches of~~
~~government while stymying opposition to his rule. In April 2019, voters approved amendments to~~
~~the constitution that extend Sisi’s current term until 2024 and permit him to run for a third term,~~
~~potential y keeping him in office until 2030. The amendments also granted the president the~~
~~authority to appoint al chief justices of Egyptian judicial bodies and the public prosecutor.~~
~~During summer 2019, Sisi made those judicial appointments, leading one anonymous Egyptian~~
~~judge to question this authority, saying that “The role of the judge is to be at arm’s length from~~
~~the executive, but this is inconsistent now with the fact the president of the republic is involved~~
~~with a judge’s transfer, promotion and accountability.”59 Sisi also placed his older brother and~~
~~oldest son in key security and intel igence positions, although his son is no longer in that role.60~~
~~Egypt’s unicameral parliament consists of~~
~~several parties and has been largely~~
~~Figure 5. President Abdel Fattah al Sisi~~
~~supportive of the government’s legislative~~
~~agenda. One report suggests that the~~
~~parliament is general y pliant to the~~
~~presidency and that lawmakers who have~~
~~opposed government initiatives have at times~~
~~been subject to smear campaigns and~~
~~intimidation.61~~
~~Parliamentary elections were last held in late~~
~~2015. New elections are anticipated in late~~
~~2020 for the House/Chamber of~~

~~Representatives (HOR—450 seats) and a to-~~
Source: Egyptian State Information Service.
~~be-resurrected upper chamber (Consultative Assembly—180 seats). The~~ ~~Economist Intelligence~~
~~Unit~~ ~~expects that “parliament wil remain subservient to the interests of Mr Sisi and to those of~~
~~the military and other favoured institutions. The public is broadly aware that this wil be the case,~~
~~and turnout is likely to be low at both the municipal and parliamentary votes.”62 In summer 2019,~~
~~when a group of leftist and labor activist politicians attempted to form what they referred to as a~~
~~“coalition of hope” to compete in the 2020 elections, the Interior Ministry arrested several of the~~

~~59 “Fears Over Egypt’s Judiciary Abound After Sisi Appointments,” Agence France Presse, August 21, 2019.~~
~~60 Reportedly, President Sisi has since removed his son Mahmoud from the deputy head of the GIS. According to one~~
~~controversial report in the Egyptian publication Mada Masr, Mahmoud Sisi lost his position in the GIS after the~~
~~president’s inner circle concluded that his reputation was harmful to the Sisi regime. See, “President’s Eldest Son,~~
~~Mahmoud al-Sisi, Sidelined from Powerful Intelligence Position to Diplomatic Mission in Russia,” Mada Masr,~~
~~November 20, 2019. After Mada Masr published this account, security services temporarily detained an editor and two~~
~~journalists and had their personal electronics confiscated. See, “Egypt News Outlet Raided after Report on Sisi’s Son,”~~
~~Financial T imes, November 24, 2019.~~
~~61 “How Egypt’s President T ightened his Grip,” Reuters, August 1, 2019.~~
~~62 “Election Preparations Get Under Way,” Economist Intelligence Unit, October 23, 2019.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~coalition’s members, charging them with attempting to bring down the state using entities~~
~~connected to the Muslim Brotherhood.63~~
~~Egypt’s Foreign Policy~~
~~Under President Sisi, Egypt’s foreign policy has been more active after a period of dormancy~~
~~during the latter years of the late President Hosni Mubarak and the tumultuous two-and-a-half-~~
~~year transition that followed Mubarak’s resignation.64 While President Sisi has continued Egypt’s~~
~~longtime policy of playing an intermediary role between Israel and the Palestinians, Egypt under~~
Sisi has attempted to play a bigger role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Since Sisi has attempted to play a bigger role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Since
2014, as Egypt has developed off-shore natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean, President Sisi 2014, as Egypt has developed off-shore natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean, President Sisi
has modernized the Egyptian Navy and improved economic ties with Israel, Italy, and Cyprus has modernized the Egyptian Navy and improved economic ties with Israel, Italy, and Cyprus
while also looking to deter regional rivals, such as Turkey. In January 2020, Egypt inaugurated a while also looking to deter regional rivals, such as Turkey. In January 2020, Egypt inaugurated a
new base (Berenice) on the Red Sea which, according to one account, wil al ow Egypt to new base (Berenice) on the Red Sea which, according to one account, wil al ow Egypt to
“project military power into the southern Red Sea.” “project military power into the southern Red Sea.”6573
As part of President Sisi’s strategy to revitalize Egyptian power in its immediate vicinity, it has As part of President Sisi’s strategy to revitalize Egyptian power in its immediate vicinity, it has
maintained longstanding U.S.-Egyptian security ties while maintained longstanding U.S.-Egyptian security ties while ~~prioritizing~~strengthening defense relationships with defense relationships with
other actors.other actors.6674 During Sisi’s presidency, Egypt has diversified its military-to-military and trade During Sisi’s presidency, Egypt has diversified its military-to-military and trade
relationships away from the United States to include closer relations with Russia, China, and relationships away from the United States to include closer relations with Russia, China, and
European nations such as France, Italy,European nations such as France, Italy,6775 and Germany. and Germany.6876 Between Between ~~2014~~2016 and and ~~2018~~2020, Egypt was the , Egypt was the
third-largest arms importer global y (after Saudi Arabia and India) with Francethird-largest arms importer global y (after Saudi Arabia and India) with France ~~and Russia being~~
, Russia, and the United States being Egypt’s principal suppliers.Egypt’s principal suppliers.69

~~63 “Prosecution T akes Up Political Line in Interrogation of Several Coalition for Hope Defendants, Hands Down 15 -~~
~~day Detention Orders,” Mada Masr, June 27, 2019.~~
~~64 From about 2000 to 2013, Egypt had turned inward, unable to either lend its support or unilaterally advance major~~
~~U.S. initiatives in the region, such as the war in Iraq or the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Moreover, the terrorist~~
~~attacks of September 11, 2001 profoundly and negatively impacted how some U.S. policymakers viewed Egypt.~~
~~Whereas the bilateral relationship had previously focused on promoting regional peace and stability, the 9/11 attacks~~
~~reoriented U.S. policy during the George W. Bush Administration, as Americans considered the possibility that popular~~
~~disillusionment from authoritarianism might contribute to terrorism. Egypt has been a key element of this reorientation,~~
77 In 2021, Egypt also has been more active in the Middle East, specifical y in Lebanon and Iraq, two countries where Iran exerts influence over some of the Shia Arab population. In Lebanon, which remains in the throes of a crippling economic and energy crisis, Egypt is planning to ship natural gas through Jordan and Syria to the Deir Ammar power plant in Lebanon.78 Egypt may need to receive a waiver from the United States in order to comply with the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-92, Title LXXIV). According to Barbara Leaf, the President’s nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, “This is a project that, as I understand, it is endorsed by the World Bank, so that a State Department is looking at it carefully within the framework of US law and sanctions policy. But it shows some promise on the face of it. And of course, the department wil consult thoroughly with Treasury on the way forward.”79 In Iraq in 2021, President Sisi became the first Egyptian president to visit Baghdad in 30 years. as several Egyptian terrorists helped form the original core of Al Qaeda. For example, see Nabil Fahmy, “ Egypt in the as several Egyptian terrorists helped form the original core of Al Qaeda. For example, see Nabil Fahmy, “ Egypt in the
World,” World,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Summer 2012. , Summer 2012.
6573 Jeremy Binnie, “Egypt Inaugurates Major Red Sea Base Complex,” Jeremy Binnie, “Egypt Inaugurates Major Red Sea Base Complex,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 16, 2020. , January 16, 2020.
6674 T he United States continues to fund the procurement of major defense systems, as the Defense Security Cooperation T he United States continues to fund the procurement of major defense systems, as the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA) has notified Congress of potential defense sales to Egypt worth an estimated $Agency (DSCA) has notified Congress of potential defense sales to Egypt worth an estimated $~~1.8~~4.9 billion since billion since ~~2017.~~
2018. For a list of major arms sales notifications to Egypt, see https://www.dsca.mil/tags/Egypt . For a list of major arms sales notifications to Egypt, see https://www.dsca.mil/tags/Egypt .
~~67 T he Egyptian Navy is reportedly in discussions to purchase two Italian~~75 Italy has supplied the Egyptian Navy with two FREMM Frigates from the Italian defense FREMM Frigates from the Italian defense
contractor Fincantieri for an estimated $1.contractor Fincantieri for an estimated $1.~~3 billion. See, T om Kington, “ Italy in T alks to Sell Frigates to Egypt ,”~~
Defense News, February 18, 2020.
~~68 T hyssenKrupp Marine Systems (T KMS) supplies the Egyptian Navy with T ype 209/1400mod submarines~~4 billion. Egypt has also armed its Italian frigates with Aster-15 medium-range surface-to-air missiles. See, “Italy Advances Arms Deals with Egypt Despite Opposition,” Al Monitor, March 27, 2021. A year earlier, Egypt purchased 24 AW149 and eight AW189 helicopters from Italian defense contractor Leonardo for $957 million . See Gareth Jennings, “Italy Reveals Leonardo Helo Sales to Egypt,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 21, 2020. 76 T hyssenKrupp Marine Systems (T KMS) is supplying the Egyptian Navy with four T ype 209/1400mod submarines (for $1.7 billion). T he same . T he same
German company also isGerman company also is providing the navy with MEKO A‑200providing the navy with MEKO A‑200 frigates. Egypt is procuring VL MICA NG surface-to-air missiles from MBDA to protect these new frigates. 77 ~~frigates.~~
69 “T rends in International Arms T ransfers, “T rends in International Arms T ransfers, ~~2018~~2020,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ( SIPRI), March ,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ( SIPRI), March
~~2019~~2021. .
“Egypt looks beyond the US to meet Defence Needs,” “Egypt looks beyond the US to meet Defence Needs,” Economist Intelligence Unit, April 15, 2019. Report used data , April 15, 2019. Report used data
from the Stockholm International from the Stockholm International ~~Peace~~P eace Research Institute’s database on arms transfers. Research Institute’s database on arms transfers.
78 “Lebanon to get Egyptian Gas via Syria in Plan to Ease Crisis,” Reuters, September 8, 2021. 79 “Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on Pending Nominations,” Congressional Quarterly, Congressional T ranscripts, September 15, 2021. Congressional Research Service 16 link to page 36 ~~Congressional Research Service~~

14

Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations

~~Libya~~
~~The Egyptian government supports Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army~~
~~(LNA) movement, which controls most of eastern Libya and has sought to take control of the rest~~
~~of the country by force since April 2019. Haftar’s politics closely align with President Sisi’s, as~~
~~both figures hail from the military and broadly oppose Islamist political forces. From a security~~
~~standpoint, Egypt seeks the restoration of order on its western border, which has experienced~~
~~occasional terrorist attacks and arms smuggling.70 From an economic standpoint, thousands of~~
~~Egyptian guest workers were employed in Libya’s energy sector prior to unrest in Libya in 2011,~~
~~and Egypt seeks their return to Libya and a resumption of the vital remittances that those workers~~
~~provided the Egyptian economy.~~
~~As the war in Libya has escalated since Haftar launched his April 2019 offensive to seize Tripoli,~~
~~there has been renewed attention to the role of outside actors in the Libya conflict. Although~~
~~Egypt has participated in international diplomatic efforts (such as the January 2020 Berlin~~
~~Conference) to halt fighting and reunify Libya, broadly speaking, Egypt’s policy toward Libya~~
~~also is closely aligned with other foreign backers of the LNA, including Russia, France, and the~~
~~United Arab Emirates (UAE). As Turkey’s support for the Government of National Accord~~
~~(GNA) has increased over the past year, there is some concern that foreign backers of Haftar wil~~
~~increase their support and further destabilize Libya. In late 2019, President Sisi responded to~~
~~reports of Turkey’s increased role by stating, “We wil not al ow anyone to control Libya ... it is a~~
~~matter of Egyptian national security.”71~~
~~To date, Egypt’s support for the LNA has included, among other things, the following:~~
~~ In 2014, Egypt donated used combat aircraft (MiG-21s) and helicopters from its~~
~~own air force to the LNA.72~~
~~ According to the United Nations Panel of Experts on Libya, Egypt conducted air~~
~~strikes against targets in Libya’s oil producing regions to support the LNA’s~~
~~offensive there in 2017.73~~
~~ According to the United Nations Panel of Experts on Libya, Egypt al owed the~~
~~United Arab Emirates to refuel aircraft in Egypt before launching sorties in~~
~~Libya.74~~
~~ According to one source, Egypt al owed the UAE to base its fleet of armed~~
~~Chinese-manufactured unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at air bases in western~~
~~Egypt.75~~

~~70 Egyptian officials have argued that terrorist violence emanating from Libya and directed against Egyptian citizens~~
~~living and working there has compelled Egypt to militarily intervene in its neighbor’s civil war. On February 15, 2015,~~
~~Islamists allied with the Islamic State released a video in which 21 hostages, most of whom were Egyptian Coptic~~
~~Christians, were beheaded on a beach near the central Libyan town of Sirte. T he following morning, Egypt resp onded~~
~~with air strikes against terrorist camps in Derna, which had been a former Islamic State stronghold in eastern Libya.~~
~~71 “Egypt's Sissi Slams Attempts to 'Control Libya,'” Agence France-Presse, December 17, 2019.~~
~~72 “T he Rise of Libya’s Renegade General: How Haftar built his War Machine,” Middle East Eye, May 14, 2019.~~
~~73 Letter dated 5 September 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011)~~
~~addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2018/812, September 5, 2018.~~
~~74 Letter dated 29 November 2019 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011)~~
~~addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2019/914, December 9, 2019.~~
~~75 Christopher Biggers, “Wing Loong II UAVs Deployed to Western Egyptian Base,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February~~
~~27, 2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

15

~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~ Egypt has al owed UAE aircraft to deliver equipment to Libya via Egyptian~~
~~airspace.76~~
~~ Egypt may have permitted the UAE’s Mirage 2000-9 fighter aircraft to be housed~~
~~at Sidi Barrani Air Base in western Egypt between deployments to Libya.77~~
~~The Nile Basin Countries~~
~~Egypt relies on the Nile River78 for~~
~~hydroelectricity, agriculture, and most of its~~
~~Figure 6.GERD Talks in Washington DC~~
~~domestic water needs, and thus treats~~
~~restrictions to the flow of the Nile from~~
~~upstream countries as an existential issue.~~
~~According to the United Nations, “Egypt’s~~
~~dependency ratio is one of the world’s highest~~
~~with 96.9 percent of the total renewable water~~
~~resources flowing into the country from~~
~~neighbouring countries. The total renewable~~
~~water resources per capita stands at 700~~
~~m3/year/capita in 2014, but considering~~

~~population growth is expected to drop below~~

~~the 500 m3 threshold of absolute water~~
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury.
~~scarcity by 2030.”79 Experts expect climate change to increase the frequency of hot and dry years~~
~~for farmers along the Nile.80~~
~~The government has been at odds with Nile Basin countries to Egypt’s south that seek to revisit~~
~~colonial-era treaties governing the Nile waters. Tensions are particularly strong with Ethiopia~~
~~(population 105 mil ion), which is nearing completion of the $4.2 bil ion Grand Ethiopian~~
~~Renaissance Dam (GERD), a major hydroelectric project on the Blue Nile, which starts in~~
~~Ethiopia. Egypt argues that the dam, once fil ed, wil limit the flow of the Nile below Egypt’s~~
~~share81, as agreed upon in a 1959 deal with Sudan (of which Ethiopia was not part).82 Ethiopia~~
~~claims that the dam, which would double its electricity generating capacity, is critical to its efforts~~
~~to eradicate poverty. Sudan, which sits in the middle of the dispute, stands to benefit from~~

~~76 Jared Malsin and Benoit Faucon, “Libya Fighting Resumes After a Brief Lull,” The Wall Street Journal, January 31,~~
~~2020.~~
~~77 Kerry Herschelman, “UAE Mirages using Egyptian Airbase, Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 14, 2020.~~
~~78 T he Nile is the longest river in the world (4,184), stretching from Kenya’s Lake Victoria to the Mediterranean Sea.~~
~~T he Blue Nile and White Nile merge in Sudan before flowing into Egypt.~~
~~79 FAO. 2016. AQUAST AT Country Profile –~~ Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan have agreed to expand various energy and military cooperation, as wel as trilateral trade and investment.80 Russia Egypt and Russia, close partners in the early years of the Cold War, have again strengthened bilateral ties under President Sisi, who has promised to restore Egyptian stability and international prestige. His relationship with Russian President Putin, in the words of one observer, has benefitted from “a romanticized memory of relations with Russia during the Nasser era.”81 President Sisi turned to Russia during the Obama Administration, when the U.S.-Egyptian relationship became more strained (see the Appendix).82 Since 2014, Egypt and Russia have strengthened their ties in a number of ways, including through arms deals and joint military exercises. Reportedly, Egypt is upgrading its aging fleet of legacy Soviet MiG-21 aircraft to a fourth generation MiG-29M variant.83 Egypt also has purchased 46 standard Ka-52 Russian attack helicopters for its air force, along with the naval version of the Ka-52 for use on Egypt’s two French-procured Mistral-class helicopter dock vessels, and the S-300VM surface-to-air missile defense system from Russia.84 In June 2020, Egyptian media reported that the Egyptian Army had agreed to purchase 500 Russian T-90 Main Battle Tanks from Uralvagonzavod, though reportedly both sides are stil negotiating whether the tanks can be assembled in Egypt (M1A1 tanks have been assembled in Egypt).85 Additional y, Egypt and Russia reportedly have expanded their cooperation on nuclear energy. In 2015, Egypt reached a deal with Russian state energy firm Rosatom to construct a 4,800-megawatt nuclear power plant in the Egyptian Mediterranean coastal town of Daba’a, 80 miles northwest of Cairo. Russia is lending Egypt $25 bil ion over 35 years to finance the construction and operation of the nuclear power plant (this loan is to cover 85% of the project’s total costs). The contract also commits Russia to supply the plant’s nuclear fuel for 60 years and to transfer and store depleted nuclear fuel from the reactors. Rosatom anticipates that construction wil begin in 2022 and that the plant wil be operational in 2028.86 Egyptian-Russian ties are not without complications. In the aftermath of a 2015 terrorist attack against a Russian passenger jet departing from Sharm El Sheikh, visits to Egypt by Russian tourists, previously the country’s largest source of tourists, dropped.87 Russian commercial aircraft have resumed direct flights to Cairo and, after six years, to Sharm El Sheikh. Egypt and Russia also engaged in a trade dispute in 2016 over Russian wheat imports. Egypt is the largest global importer of wheat, and the largest export market for Russian wheat. Several possible reasons could explain why Egyptian-Russian relations have improved under President Sisi, none of which are mutual y exclusive. For one, President Sisi has most likely made the determination that Egypt’s national security interests are best served by having global powers 80 “Is Egypt Back as a Power Player in the MENA Region?” Fanack.com , August 30, 2021. 81 “T he United States and the Future of Egyptian-Russian Relations,” The Caravan, Hoover Institution, March 9, 2017. 82 “Analysis: Egyptian Air Force Modernization,” Jane’s International Defence Review, November 10, 2016. 83 See Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Air Force- Egypt, August 7, 2018. 84 “Egyptian S-300VM SAM Delivery Confirmed,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 6, 2017. 85 See, Jane’s World Armies, Egypt, March 17, 2021. 86 “Egypt’s Nuclear Power Plans Back on T rack,” Economist Intelligence Unit, August 4, 2021. 87 Before 2015, Russian visitors accounted for 20%-30% of Egypt’s tourist arrivals. “Russian T ourist Numbers Set to Recover Slowly,” Economist Intelligence Unit, May 4, 2018. Congressional Research Service 17 link to page 36 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations compete for Egypt’s favor. As a lower-middle-income country with relatively high poverty (29.7%) and a military that relies on the appearance of strength for deterrence, Egypt seeks cost efficiencies for its military acquisitions. Part of Egypt’s rebalancing of its foreign policy may be seen as a quest to secure the most advanced hardware on the most generous financing terms available. With U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants relatively unchanged since 1987 (Congress has appropriated $1.3 bil ion a year since then), the purchasing power of U.S. military aid has decreased substantial y given the rising costs of major defense systems. Moreover, U.S. defense technology, particularly fighter aircraft, has evolved to the point where Egypt either cannot afford the latest generation of U.S. fighters (such as the F-35), lacks the technical know-how to maintain them, or may be prohibited from purchasing certain items if they negate Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME).88 Egypt has turned to Russia and France in recent years to source naval and air force acquisitions (fourth-generation fighters, such as the Su-35 from Russia and the Rafale from France) while using U.S. assistance to maintain its existing stocks of U.S. materiel. According to SIPRI, from 2000 to 2009, Egypt’s major arms supplier was the United States, accounting for 75% of Egypt’s total arms imports; however, from 2010 to 2019, U.S. arms imports accounted for 23% of Egypt’s total arms imports.89 Since the Egyptian military ousted former President Morsi in 2013, the Egyptian government under President Sisi has rejected international criticism of its human rights record90 and has sought out foreign partners that do not condition support based on Egyptian domestic policies.91 In 2014, while U.S. assistance to Egypt was under review (see the Appendix), then-Defense Minister Sisi and Russian President Vladmir Putin held a series of meetings in which President Putin endorsed Sisi for president, and the two leaders signed several unnamed military deals possibly financed by Gulf Arab states.92 Russia and Egypt issued a joint communique at the time that “condemned foreign interference in domestic affairs of any country and cal ed for solving al existing problems and crises exclusively by peaceful means and broad al -inclusive dialogue.”93 France Like Russia, France stands out as a country with which President Sisi has sought to build a diplomatic and military procurement relationship. In late 2020, President Sisi visited France, and French President Emmanuel Macron stated during a joint press conference that “I wil not condition matters of defence [sic] and economic cooperation on these disagreements [over human rights].... It is more effective to have a policy of demanding dialogue than a boycott which would only reduce the effectiveness of one of our partners in the fight against terrorism.”94 Egypt has purchased major air and naval defense systems from French defense contractors, including the following:  54 Rafale multirole fighters (produced by Dassault Aviation). In 2015, Egypt became the first foreign buyer of the Rafale when it ordered 24 fighter jets. In 2018, French officials said that the United States would not permit France to 88 See CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Em irates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti. 89 Alexandra Kuimova, “Understanding Egyptian Military Expenditure,” SIPRI Background Paper, October 2020. 90 “Egypt Rejects Western Countries’ Criticism at UN Human Rights Council,” Al Ahram, March 12, 2021. 91 “Macron avoids ‘lecturing’ Egypt on rights, Sisi defends his record,” Reuters, October 24, 2017. 92 See, Molly Hunter, “From Russia with Love: Vladimir Putin Gives Sissi AK-47,” ABC News, February 10, 2015. 93 “Vladimir Putin pre-empts presidency bid by Egypt’s military chief,” Associated Press, February 13, 2014. 94 “Macron says French arms sales to Egypt will not be conditional on human r ights,” France 24, December 7, 2020. Congressional Research Service 18 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations export the U.S.-made SCALP air-launched land-attack cruise missile used on the Rafale to Egypt under the International Trade in Arms Regulation (ITAR) agreement.95 The United States may have been concerned over the transfer of sensitive technology to Egypt. In 2021, Egypt purchased an additional 30 Rafale fighters in a $4.5 bil ion deal financed by a French sovereign loan guarantee on 85% of the total amount borrowed from various French commercial banks (BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Société Générale and CIC).96 France also provided a sovereign loan guarantee on 65% of the financing for Egypt’s initial purchase of 24 jets.97  Four Gowind Corvettes (produced by Naval Group). This deal was signed in July 2014. As part of the French-Egyptian arrangement, some of the Corvette construction has taken place at the Alexandria Shipyard in Egypt.98  One FREMM multi-mission Frigate (produced by Naval Group). Named the Tahya Misr (Long Live Egypt), this vessel was delivered to Egypt in 2015. This ship has participated in an annual joint French-Egyptian naval exercise, known as Cleopatra.  Two Mistral-class Helicopter Carriers (produced by Naval Group). In fal 2015, France announced that it would sel Egypt two Mistral-class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) vessels (each carrier can carry 16 helicopters, 4 landing craft, and 13 tanks) for $1 bil ion. The LHDs were delivered in 2016. In 2017, Egypt announced that it would purchase Russian 46 Ka-52 Al igator helicopters, which can operate on the LHDs.99 China Unlike Russia, France, and the United States, China has not been a key military partner of the Egyptian Armed Forces, with the exception of its exports of armed drones to the Egyptian Air Force.100 Moreover, although China has received some media attention for its investment in projects relating to Egypt’s construction of its new capital,101 Chinese-Egyptian trade remains 95 “France Could Replace US Parts in SCALP Missile to Circumvent IT AR Restrictions for Egypt, But at Some Delay,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 2, 2018. 96 Although unconfirmed, the French newspaper La Tribune also reported that Egypt intends to buy two Airbus MRT T refueling tankers, four T hales Ground Master 400 long-range air surveillance radars, and one Airbus observation satellite. See Michel Cabirol, “ Egypt: a Contract (Rafale) May Hide Other Orders (Spy Satellite, MRT T ),” La Tribune (France), May 6, 2021. 97 “Egypt Buys French Fighter Jets,” Economist Intelligence Unit, May 5, 2021. 98 In fall 2018, it was reported that the German manufacturer T hyssenKrupp Marine Systems is competing with the French company Naval Group for a possible new Egyptian Navy purchase of corvettes. 99 According to one report, the effectiveness of the Mistral as a helicopter carrier depends on whether the helicopters on board have foldable rotors. If they don’t, it “ reduces the size of their air wings from 16 helicopters to the six that can be carried on deck.” See Jeremy Binnie, “ Egypt Deploys Ka-52s on Mistral LHD,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 7, 2020. 100 “T he Aisheng ASN-209 was a Joint-Development of a MAME UAV System between China and Egypt,” militaryfactory.com, April 27, 2020. 101 T he Chinese State Construction and Engineering Company (CSCEC) has secured a contract to build the business district of Egypt’s New Administrative Capital. In the Suez Canal industrial zone, Chinese state-owned conglomerate T EDA operates an industrial park with 85 companies and more than 4,000 employees. See “ T he Competition for Egypt: China, the West, and Megaprojects,” Al Jazeera, March 15, 2021. Congressional Research Service 19 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations relatively modest. According to one report, Egypt represents less than 5% of China’s trade with Middle Eastern and North African countries.102 Though Chinese-Egyptian trade and investment does not match China’s presence in other parts of the region, the United States has warned Egypt over accepting Chinese investment in critical technological infrastructure, such as 5G networks. According to one report, during the Trump Administration, U.S. officials warned Egypt not to al ow Chinese companies, such as Huawei, to build critical data networks in Egypt due to their inability to protect user data.103 The Nile Basin Countries Egypt relies on the Nile River104 for hydroelectricity, agriculture, and most of its Figure 5. GERD Talks in Washington, DC domestic water needs, and thus treats restrictions to the flow of the Nile from upstream countries as an existential issue. According to the United Nations, “Egypt’s dependency ratio is one of the world’s highest with 96.9 percent of the total renewable water resources flowing into the country from neighboring countries. The total renewable water resources per capita stands at 700 m3/year/capita in 2014, but considering population growth is expected to drop below the 500 m3 threshold of absolute water Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury. scarcity by 2030.”105 Experts expect climate change to increase the frequency of hot and dry years for farmers along the Nile.106 The government has been at odds with Nile Basin countries to Egypt’s south that seek to revisit colonial-era treaties governing the Nile waters. Tensions are particularly strong with Ethiopia (population 110 mil ion), which is nearing completion of the $4.2 bil ion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a major hydroelectric project on the Blue Nile, which starts in Ethiopia. Egypt argues that the dam, once fil ed, wil limit the flow of the Nile below Egypt’s share,107 as agreed upon in a 1959 deal with Sudan (of which Ethiopia was not part).108 Ethiopia 102 Mohamed El Dahshan, “Egyptian Exceptionalism in a Chinese-led World,” Chatham House, February 10, 2021. 103 Khalid Hassan, “US Warns Egypt to Avoid Chinese Companies on 5G Connections,” Al Monitor, November 3, 2020. 104 T he Nile is the longest river in the world (4,184), stretching from Kenya’s Lake Victoria to the Mediterranean Sea. T he Blue Nile and White Nile merge in Sudan before flowing into Egypt. 105 FAO. 2016. AQUAST AT Country Profile—Egypt. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Egypt. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
Rome, Italy. Rome, Italy.
80106 Declan Walsh and Somini Sengupta, “For T housands of Years, Egypt Controlled the Nile. A New Dam T hreatens Declan Walsh and Somini Sengupta, “For T housands of Years, Egypt Controlled the Nile. A New Dam T hreatens
T hat,” T hat,” New York Times, February 9, 2020. , February 9, 2020.
81107 “Egypt Denounces Ethiopia for Moving Ahead with Nile Dam Amid Water: Shortage Fears,” “Egypt Denounces Ethiopia for Moving Ahead with Nile Dam Amid Water: Shortage Fears,” ~~Reuters~~Reuters, October 3, , October 3,
2019. 2019.
82108 International agreements on apportioning the flow of the Nile River date back to the British colonial International agreements on apportioning the flow of the Nile River date back to the British colonial ~~perio d~~period when when
some Nile riparian countries were not parties themselves to the some Nile riparian countries were not parties themselves to the ~~agreements~~agreemen ts. T he last major agreement, the 1959 Nile . T he last major agreement, the 1959 Nile
Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, divided the entire average annual flow of the Nile between Egypt and Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, divided the entire average annual flow of the Nile between Egypt and
Sudan. Ethiopia was not part of this agreement. Sudan. Ethiopia was not part of this agreement.
T he 1959 agreement revised Egypt’s share of the Nile waters upward from a previous arrangement reached between Egypt and the British colonial authorities in Sudan , which also excluded Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1620

Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations

claims that the dam, which would double its electricity generating capacity, is critical to its efforts to eradicate poverty. Sudan, which sits in the middle of the dispute, stands to benefit from Ethiopia’s prospective electricity exports and the regulated water flow, which would curtail Ethiopia’s prospective electricity exports and the regulated water flow, which would curtail
flooding and improve its agricultural potential. flooding and improve its agricultural potential.83109
After years of failed talks, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan continue to disagree over how long After years of failed talks, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan continue to disagree over how long
Ethiopia should take to fil the dam, as wel as how much water should be released from the Ethiopia should take to fil the dam, as wel as how much water should be released from the
GERD on an annual basis, particularly during prolonged droughts.GERD on an annual basis, particularly during prolonged droughts.84110 Reduced Nile flow through Reduced Nile flow through
Sudan into Egypt may exacerbate existing water shortages in both countries and cause short-term Sudan into Egypt may exacerbate existing water shortages in both countries and cause short-term
political problems for the Egyptian government, given its extensive unmet domestic water needs. political problems for the Egyptian government, given its extensive unmet domestic water needs.
~~To break the deadlock over Nile water-sharing, Egypt has repeatedly sought third-party~~
~~mediation, particularly from the United States. On November 6, 2019, the U.S. Treasury~~
~~Department hosted ministers from Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan for talks on the GERD just weeks~~
~~after the issue was discussed on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa summit in Sochi, Russia. In a~~
~~joint statement, al sides agreed that water ministers would continue to hold technical meetings on~~
~~the GERD, with the United States and World Bank serving as observers, with the goal of reaching~~
~~an agreement by January 15, 2020.85~~
Rising Sea Levels and the Nile Delta
Low-lying deltas like Egypt’s Nile Delta and other parts of Egypt’s coast are susceptible to sea-level rise. Higher Low-lying deltas like Egypt’s Nile Delta and other parts of Egypt’s coast are susceptible to sea-level rise. Higher
sea levels can result in more frequent flooding from high tides and extreme rainfal , greater impacts from coastal sea levels can result in more frequent flooding from high tides and extreme rainfal , greater impacts from coastal
storms, damage to coastal fresh groundwater, changes to coastal habitats for fish and other species, and land lost storms, damage to coastal fresh groundwater, changes to coastal habitats for fish and other species, and land lost
to coastal erosion and inundation.to coastal erosion and inundation.86111 The Nile Delta is Egypt’s most important agricultural region and home to The Nile Delta is Egypt’s most important agricultural region and home to
significant population and economic centerssignificant population and economic centers, such as Alexandria and Port Said. Scientists have warned that the Nile such as Alexandria and Port Said. Scientists have warned that the Nile
Delta’s flood risk may increase in the years ahead due to a combination of factors.Delta’s flood risk may increase in the years ahead due to a combination of factors.87112 These include rising sea levels, These include rising sea levels,
which general ywhich general y are anticipated to increaseare anticipated to increase in the coming decades with warming temperatures, and local in the coming decades with warming temperatures, and local
conditions contributing to land subsidence and loss, such as upstream dams capturing sediments needed for conditions contributing to land subsidence and loss, such as upstream dams capturing sediments needed for
maintaining the delta and land subsidence from groundwater, oil, and gas extraction.maintaining the delta and land subsidence from groundwater, oil, and gas extraction.88113 According to the According to the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “The low-lying northern coast and Nile Delta region are a Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “The low-lying northern coast and Nile Delta region are a
high priority for adaptation to climate change.”high priority for adaptation to climate change.”89114
The Egyptian government is taking some steps to address climate change. With support from the International The Egyptian government is taking some steps to address climate change. With support from the International
Finance Corporation, it has built one of the world’s largest solar parks at Benban in Aswan and aims to Finance Corporation, it has built one of the world’s largest solar parks at Benban in Aswan and aims to
dramatical y increase its national reliance on solar power. It also has built storm barriers along Alexandria’s shore dramatical y increase its national reliance on solar power. It also has built storm barriers along Alexandria’s shore
to stave off flooding, and has received funding from the United Nations Development Program to protect dams to stave off flooding, and has received funding from the United Nations Development Program to protect dams
along the Nile.along the Nile.
~~The parties subsequently convened for three rounds of talks in Washington DC between January~~
~~and February 2020, but an agreement has been elusive. Among the outstanding disagreements is~~
~~how many bil ions cubic meters (bcm) of the Blue Nile’s downstream annual flow (total of~~

~~83 See, International Crisis Group, “Bridging the Gap in the Nile Waters Dispute,” March 20, 2019.~~
~~84 See, International Crisis Group, “Calming the Choppy Nile Dam T alks,” October 23, 2019.~~
~~85 U.S. Department of the T reasury, Joint Statement of Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, the United States, and the World Bank,~~
~~November 6, 2019.~~
86 In order to cope with anticipated freshwater shortages, Egypt is building two large wastewater treatment plants, limiting cultivation of water-intensive crops such as bananas and rice, and planning to construct desalination plants. 115 To break the deadlock over Nile water-sharing, Egypt has repeatedly sought third-party mediation, particularly from the United States,116 the United Nations, and the Africa Union. Ethiopia. 109 See International Crisis Group, “Bridging the Gap in the Nile Waters Dispute,” March 20, 2019. 110 See International Crisis Group, “Calming the Choppy Nile Dam T alks,” October 23, 2019. 111 For more information on how sea levels may effect coasts, see CRS Report R44632, For more information on how sea levels may effect coasts, see CRS Report R44632, Sea-Level Rise and U.S. Coasts:
Science and Policy Considerations, by Peter Folger and Nicole T . Carter. Higher sea levels, by Peter Folger and Nicole T . Carter. Higher sea levels can impair drainage of can impair drainage of
runoff from rainfall events. runoff from rainfall events.
87 112 Mohamed Shaltout, Kareem T onbol, and Anders Omstedt, “Sea-Level Change and Projected Future Flooding Along Mohamed Shaltout, Kareem T onbol, and Anders Omstedt, “Sea-Level Change and Projected Future Flooding Along
the Egyptian Mediterranean Coast,” the Egyptian Mediterranean Coast,” Oceanologia, vol. 57, no. 4 (2015); , vol. 57, no. 4 (2015); IPCC, IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere in a Changing Clim ate, in press, September 24, 2019, p. 4-61. , in press, September 24, 2019, p. 4-61.
88113 Esayas Gebremichael et al., “Assessing Land Deformation and Sea Encroachment in the Nile Delta: A Radar Esayas Gebremichael et al., “Assessing Land Deformation and Sea Encroachment in the Nile Delta: A Radar
Interferometric and Inundation Modeling Approach,” Interferometric and Inundation Modeling Approach,” JGR Solid Earth, vol. 123, no. 4 (April 2, 2018). , vol. 123, no. 4 (April 2, 2018).
89114 IPCC, IPCC, IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, in press, September 24, 2019, p. , in press, September 24, 2019, p.
~~4-61.~~
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~~49bcm) Ethiopia should use to fil the GERD’s reservoir and how much flow should be released~~
~~to Egypt. Ethiopia reportedly offered 31bcm to Egypt, which seeks a flow no lower than 40bcm.~~
~~The United States government proposed a compromise of 37bcm.90 In late February 2020,~~
~~Ethiopia and Sudan declined to sign a U.S.-drafted agreement,91 and Ethiopia asked for a~~
~~postponement in negotiations. In March, after a phone cal between President Trump and~~
~~President Sisi, President Trump “expressed hope that an agreement on the Grand Ethiopian~~
~~Renaissance Dam would be finalized soon and benefit al parties involved.”92 Since then, Ethiopia~~
~~has said that it is working on a new compromise, but on April 1, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy~~
~~Ahmed reiterated that Ethiopia would begin fil ing the GERD’s reservoir at the start of the~~
~~upcoming rainy season in June 2020, chal enging the Trump Administration’s position that fil ing~~
~~should not commence until an agreement is reached.~~
~~Russia~~
~~Egypt and Russia, close al ies in early years of the Cold War, have again strengthened bilateral~~
~~ties under President Sisi, whose relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin has rekindled,~~
~~in the words of one observer, “a romanticized memory of relations with Russia during the Nasser~~
~~era.”93 President Sisi first turned back toward Russia during the Obama Administration, when~~
~~U.S.-Egyptian ties were strained.94~~
~~Since 2014, Egypt and Russia have improved ties in a number of ways, including through arms~~
~~deals. Reportedly, Egypt is upgrading its aging fleet of legacy Soviet MiG-21 aircraft to a fourth~~
~~generation MiG-29M variant.95 Egypt also has purchased 46 standard Ka-52 Russian attack~~
~~helicopters for its air force, in addition to reportedly purchasing the naval version of the Ka-52 for~~
~~use on Egypt’s two French-procured Mistral-class helicopter dock vessels (see “France” below).~~
~~Egypt has further purchased the S-300VM surface-to-air missile defense system from Russia.96~~
~~Additional y, Egypt and Russia reportedly have expanded their cooperation on nuclear energy. In~~
~~2015, Egypt reached a deal with Russian state energy firm Rosatom to construct a 4,800-~~
~~megawatt nuclear power plant in the Egyptian Mediterranean coastal town of Daba’a, 80 miles~~
~~northwest of Cairo. Russia is lending Egypt $25 bil ion over 35 years to finance the construction~~
~~and operation of the nuclear power plant (this is to cover 85% of the project’s total costs). The~~
~~contract also commits Russia to supply the plant’s nuclear fuel for 60 years and transfer and store~~
~~depleted nuclear fuel from the reactors.~~
~~As Egyptian and Russian foreign policies have become more closely aligned in conflict zones~~
~~such as eastern Libya, bilateral military cooperation has expanded. Several years ago, one report~~
~~had suggested that Russian Special Forces based out of an airbase in Egypt’s western desert (Sidi~~

~~90 “Sources: US-Proposed GERD Deal sets Ethiopia Water Release at 37 bcm, Major Disputes Remain, Mada Masr,~~
~~February 17, 2020.~~
~~91 U.S. T reasury Department, Statement by the Secretary of the T reasury on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,~~
~~February 28, 2020.~~
~~92 “T rump tells Sisi U.S. to Pursue Efforts for Deal on Ethiopia Dam: Egypt P residency,” Reuters, March 3, 2020.~~
~~93 “T he United States and the Future of Egyptian-Russian Relations,” The Caravan, Hoover Institution, March 9, 2017.~~
~~94 According to Jane’s, “T he two-year U.S. suspension of delivery of US F-16C/Ds in the wake of the Arab Spring~~
~~reinforced the notion among Egyptian leaders that Egypt should maintain a diverse defense supply base to avoid being~~
~~hamstrung by politically driven interruption of it s defense supply chain.” See, “ Analysis: Egyptian Air Force~~
~~Modernization,” Jane’s International Defence Review,” November 10, 2016.~~
~~95 See, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Air Force- Egypt, August 7, 2018.~~
~~96 “Egyptian S-300VM SAM Delivery Confirmed,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 6, 2017.~~
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~~Barrani) were aiding General Haftar.97 In November 2017, Egypt and Russia signed a draft~~
~~agreement governing the use of each other’s air space.98~~
~~While Egyptian-Russian ties have grown warmer in recent years, they are not without~~
~~complications. In the aftermath of an October 2015 terrorist attack against a Russian passenger jet~~
~~departing from Sharm El Sheikh, tourism to Egypt from Russia, previously the country’s largest~~
~~source of tourists, dropped significantly.99 Russian commercial aircraft have resumed direct~~
~~flights to Cairo but not to Sharm El Sheikh. Egypt and Russia also engaged in a trade dispute in~~
~~2016 over Russian wheat imports. Egypt is the largest global importer of wheat, and the largest~~
~~export market for Russian wheat.~~
~~Figure 7.Growing Russian and French Arms Sales to Egypt~~

Source: Stratfor, using Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfer Database data.

~~97 “Russia Appears to Deploy Forces in Egypt, Eyes on Libya Role – Sources,” Reuters, March 14, 2017.~~
~~98 According to one report, “Russian and Egyptian war planes would be able to use each other’s air space and airfields~~
~~by giving five days advance notice, according to the draft agreement, which is expected to be valid for five years and~~
~~could be extended.” See “Russian Military Working on Deal to use Egyptian Air Bases: Document,” Reuters,~~
~~November 30, 2017.~~
~~99 Before 2015, Russian visitors accounted for 20%-30% of Egypt’s tourist arrivals. See, “Russian T ourist Numbers set~~
~~to recover slowly,” Economist Intelligence Unit, May 4, 2018.~~
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~~France~~
~~Like Russia, France stands out as a non-U.S. country with which President Sisi has sought to~~
~~build a diplomatic and military procurement relationship. In the years since 2015, as French-~~
~~Egyptian ties have improved, Egypt has purchased major air and naval defense systems from~~
~~French defense contractors, including the following:~~
~~ Four Gowind Corvettes (produced by Naval Group). This deal was signed in July~~
~~2014. As part of the French-Egyptian arrangement, some of the Corvette~~
~~construction has taken place at the Alexandria Shipyard in Egypt.100~~
~~ One FREMM multi-mission Frigate (produced by Naval Group). Named the~~
Tahya Misr (Long Live Egypt), this vessel was delivered to Egypt in 2015. This
~~ship has participated in an annual joint French-Egyptian naval exercise, known as~~
~~Cleopatra.~~
~~ 24 Rafale multirole fighters (produced by Dassault Aviation). In 2018, French~~
~~officials said that the United States would not permit France to export the SCALP~~
~~air-launched land-attack cruise missile used on the Rafale to Egypt under the~~
~~International Trade in Arms Regulation (ITAR) agreement.101 The United States~~
~~may have been concerned over the transfer of sensitive technology to Egypt.~~
~~ Two Mistral-class Helicopter Carriers (produced by Naval Group). In fal 2015,~~
~~France announced that it would sel Egypt two Mistral-class Landing Helicopter~~
~~Dock (LHD) vessels (each carrier can carry 16 helicopters, 4 landing craft, and~~
~~13 tanks) for $1 bil ion. The LHDs were delivered in 2016. In 2017, Egypt~~
~~announced that it would purchase Russian 46 Ka-52 Al igator helicopters, which~~
~~can operate on the LHDs.102~~
~~U.S.-Egyptian Relations~~
~~At a broad level, the United States views the stability of Egypt as key to the stability of the~~
~~Middle East, and therefore maintains a decades-long security partnership to strengthen Egypt’s~~
~~armed forces and its ability to combat terrorism.103 During the Obama Administration, U.S.-~~
~~Egyptian relations became strained, particularly after President Sisi’s ascension to power in 2013.~~
~~Under the Trump Administration, the President and other high-level U.S. officials have largely~~
~~refrained from criticizing Egypt publicly over its poor human rights record.104 U.S. officials also~~

~~100 In fall 2018, it was reported that the German manufacturer T hyssenKrupp Marine Systems is competing with the~~
~~French company Naval Group for a possible new Egyptian Navy purchase of corvettes.~~
~~101 “France Could Replace US Parts in SCALP Missile to Circumvent IT AR Restrictions for Egypt, But at Some~~
~~Delay,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 2, 2018.~~
~~102 According to one report, the effectiveness of the Mistral as a helicopter carrier depends on whether the helicopters~~
~~on board have foldable rotors. If they don’t, it “ reduces the size of their air wings from 16 helicopters to the six that can~~
~~be carried on deck.” See, Jeremy Binnie, “ Egypt Deploys Ka-52s on Mistral LHD,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 7,~~
~~2020.~~
~~103 T he White House, President Donald J. T rump Remains Committed to Egypt and Middle East Stability, April 9,~~
~~2019.~~
~~104 One exception was during a 2019 hearing before Congress, when Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern~~
~~Affairs David Schenker remarked that “Egypt has a long way to go on human rights. ” See, House Foreign Affairs~~
~~Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International T errorism, Hearing entitled, U.S.~~
~~Middle East Policy Objectives/Budget, October 29, 2019.~~
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~~have praised Egypt for the role it is playing in combatting terrorism, empowering women,~~
~~reforming the economy, and promoting religious freedom.105 The Trump Administration has been~~
~~more open than its predecessors in acknowledging that Egypt’s brand of authoritarianism does~~
~~not disqualify it from U.S. support due to its cooperation with the United States on countering~~
~~terrorism. In an April 2019 exchange with Senator Pat Leahy over Egypt’s human rights record,~~
~~Secretary of State Pompeo stated~~
~~Senator, there’s no doubt that it’s a mean nasty world out there, but [not] every one of these~~
~~leaders is the same. Some of them are trying to wipe entire nations off the face of the Earth.~~
~~And others are actually partnering with us to help keep America safe. There’s a difference~~
~~among leaders. You might call them tyrants; you might call them authoritarians. But,~~
~~there’s a fundamental difference. And therefore, a fundamental difference in the way the~~
~~United States should respond….The president gets to choose his own words, how he speaks~~
~~about these people. There’s no doubt the Egyptians have been an important security~~
~~partner, helping us take down terror threats in the Sinai that have reduced risks to the United~~
~~States of America. There’s no doubt about that. And for that, I am deeply appreciative of~~
~~President Sisi. He has also been remarkably good with respect to religious freedom. I had~~
~~a chance to travel there and see it. He has been a remarkable beacon in the Middle East for~~
~~religious freedom.106~~
~~President Trump has continued to request that Congress appropriate $1.3 bil ion in military aid to~~
~~Egypt (the same amount since 1987: see below), but he has not restored the Egyptian military’s~~
~~ability to benefit from “Cash Flow Financing (CFF)”—a mechanism granted by the President to~~
~~enable Egypt to purchase U.S. defense equipment on credit financed over several years.107~~
~~Moreover, President Trump reduced the FY2017 FMF obligation to Egypt by $65.7 mil ion as a~~
~~result of “Egypt’s ongoing relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, lack of~~
~~progress on the 2013 convictions of U.S. and Egyptian nongovernmental organization (NGO)~~
~~workers, and the enactment of a restrictive NGO law that wil likely complicate ongoing and~~
~~future U.S. assistance to the country.”108 In April 2019, Egypt withdrew from the Trump~~
~~Administration’s Middle East Strategic Al iance (MESA) initiative, and it did not send a high-~~
~~level official to a 2019 MESA meeting in Washington DC.109~~

~~105 T he White House, President Donald J. T rump Remains Committed to Egypt and Middle East Stability, April 9,~~
~~2019.~~
~~106 Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations, Hearing entitled, Fiscal 2020~~
~~Budget Request for the State Department , CQ Congressional T ranscripts, April 9, 2019.~~
~~107 On March 31, 2015, then National Security Council Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan remarked that “ First,~~
~~beginning in fiscal year 2018, we will discontinue Egypt’s use of cash flow financing (CFF) – the financial mechanism~~
~~that enables Egypt to purchase equipment on credit. By ending CFF, we will have more flexibility to, in coordination~~
~~with Egypt, tailor our military assistance as conditions and needs on the ground change.” See, Comment from NSC~~
~~Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan regarding Egypt, March 31, 2015.~~
~~108 Congressional Notification T ransmittal Sheet, Mary K. Water, Assistant Secretary of Legislat ive Affairs, January~~
~~23, 2018.~~
~~109 “Egypt Withdraws from U.S.-Led Anti-Iran Security Initiative – Sources,” Reuters, April 10, 2019. See also, U.S.~~
~~Department of State, Middle East Strategic Alliance General Conference, November 13, 2019.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~One key U.S. component of U.S.-Egyptian~~
~~military cooperation has been expedited naval~~
~~Figure 8.The aircraft carrier USS~~
~~access through the Suez Canal. In May 2019,~~
~~Abraham Lincoln transits the Suez Canal.~~
~~amidst rising U.S.-Iranian tensions around the~~
~~Strait of Hormuz, the United States deployed~~
~~the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and~~
~~its strike group through the Suez Canal. The~~
~~Egyptian Navy facilitated the passage and,~~
~~according to the U.S. Navy, “The expedited~~
~~transit of ABECSG [Abraham Lincoln Strike~~
~~Group] through the Suez and into the 5th Fleet~~

~~area of operation demonstrates the flexibility~~
~~of a multinational, multi-platform unit to~~
Source: Department of the Navy.
~~respond whenever and wherever is required.”110~~
~~Though military-to-military relations remain the backbone of the bilateral relationship, Egypt is~~
~~increasingly seeking greater U.S. foreign direct investment in the private sector while the Trump~~
~~Administration supports a “fair and reciprocal” trade relationship built on cooperation and~~
~~“mutual benefit.”111 Despite having the largest population in the Middle East, Egypt ranks as the~~
~~region’s fifth-largest economy by GDP. By total 2019 volume of trade, Egypt ranks as the 59th-~~
~~largest U.S. trading partner at $8.5 bil ion in 2019. The United States has a trade surplus with~~
~~Egypt and exports wheat and corn, mineral fuel and oil, machinery, aircraft, and iron and steel~~
~~products. U.S. imports include apparel, natural gas and oil, fertilizers, textiles, and agricultural~~
~~products.112 According to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Egypt Country Commercial~~
~~Guide, U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Egypt was $9.4 bil ion in 2017 (latest data~~
~~available), a 25.5% decrease from 2016.113~~
~~Other Issues in U.S.-Egyptian Relations~~
~~Possible Muslim Brotherhood Designation~~
~~In late April 2019, media reports suggested that the Trump Administration was considering~~
~~designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).114 According to~~
~~one unnamed senior U.S. official, “The President has heard the concerns about the Muslim~~
~~Brotherhood from our friends and al ies in the Middle East, as wel as here at home….Any~~
~~potential designation would go through a robust, deliberate, and inclusive interagency process.”115~~
~~Opponents of designating the Muslim Brotherhood movement as an FTO have argued that it~~
~~would be difficult because “[t]here is no single thing cal ed the Muslim Brotherhood, but instead~~
~~a number of organizations, movements, parties, associations, and informal groups that take some~~

~~110 U.S. Navy, Abraham Lincoln T ransits Suez Canal, Story Number: NNS190509-07, May 9, 2019.~~
~~111 Op.cit. White House, April 9, 2019.~~
~~112 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations with Egypt, Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs,~~
~~September 20, 2019.~~
~~113 U.S. Department of Commerce, International T rade Administration, Egypt Country Commercial Guide, Updated~~
~~August 9, 2019.~~
~~114 “T rump Pushes to Designate Muslim Brotherhood a T errorist Group,” New York Times, April 30, 2019. See also,~~
~~CRS In Focus IF10613, Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), by John W. Rollins.~~
~~115 “T rump Weighs Labeling Muslim Brotherhood a T errorist Group,” Reuters, April 30, 2019.~~
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~~link to page 28 link to page 28~~ ~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~inspiration, sometimes direct and sometimes remote, from the original movement founded in~~
~~Egypt in 1928 and the core texts its founder produced.”116 Some legal scholars have argued that~~
~~“[b]y statute, only foreign organizations that engage in, or retain the capacity and intent to engage~~
~~in, terrorist activity that threatens U.S. nationals or U.S. national security can be designated as~~
~~FTOs. On their face, these prerequisites disqualify nonviolent Muslim Brotherhood affiliates as~~
~~wel as those based in the United States.”117 H.R. 2412, the Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist~~
~~Designation Act of 2019, would cal on the Secretary of State, in consultation with the~~
~~intel igence community, to report to Congress on whether the Muslim Brotherhood meets the~~
~~criteria for designation as an FTO under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8~~
~~U.S.C. 1189).~~
~~The April Corley Case~~
~~In September 2015 in Egypt’s western desert, an Egyptian-operated, U.S.-supplied Apache~~
~~helicopter attacked a group of tourists, resulting in the deaths of 12 people. During the attack,~~
~~American citizen April Corley was severely injured.118 Based on the severity of Corley’s wounds~~
~~and ongoing medical treatment, Egypt offered her what she claims was an inadequate amount of~~
compensation. Corley has publicly advocated for the withholding of U.S. aid to Egypt (see Table
~~2) until she is fairly compensated and an amendment has been made to the Foreign Sovereign~~
~~Immunities Act, “which currently prevents private citizens from suing Egypt or other countries in~~
~~U.S. courts.”119~~
~~Some lawmakers have supported Corley’s cause. Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations~~
~~Committee Senator Leahy has asked the State Department to withhold $105 mil ion in FY2018~~
~~FMF funds “over Cairo’s detention of former New York taxi driver Mustafa Kassem as wel as~~
~~Corley’s medical bil s.”120 In April 2019, House Committee on Appropriations Chairwoman Nita~~
~~Lowey wrote in a letter to President Sisi that “Until this American citizen is provided~~
~~compensation that is commensurate with her pain, suffering, and loss, I regret to inform you that I~~
~~wil have to oppose any additional sale or upgrades of any AH-64E Apache helicopters to~~
~~Egypt.”121 In May 2020, as mentioned above (see footnote 8), the United States approved a~~
~~foreign military sale to Egypt of 43 refurbished Apache helicopters for $2.3 bil ion. According to~~
~~R. Clarke Cooper, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, “We have been very~~
~~clear with our Egyptian counterparts and interlocutors about the death of Mustafa Kassem and~~
~~about the case with April Corley and that settlement….Those have not gone away and they have~~
~~not gone off the table.”122~~

~~116 “Black Label”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 25, 2017.~~
~~117 “How T rump Might Designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a T errorist Organization,” Lawfare (Brookings~~
~~Institution), May 13, 2019.~~
~~118 Corley’s legal representation has posted information on her case at https://www.perseus-strategies.com/april-corley-~~
~~us-egypt/~~
~~119 “Egypt Almost Killed Me Four Years Ago. T he U.S. Must Hold its Government Accountable,” Washington Post,~~
~~October 2, 2019.~~
~~120 “Key Senator Looks to Block Apache Sale to Egypt Over Injured American,” Al Monitor, March 28, 2019.~~
~~121 Congresswoman Nita Lowey, Lowey Calls on Egyptian President to Fairly and Swiftly Resolve April Corley Case,~~
~~Press Release, April 8, 2019.~~
~~122 “US Approves Helicopters to Egypt but Says Rights Concerns Remain,” Al Monitor, May 8, 2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

234-61. 115 “Egypt Seeks to Diversify its Water Supply Sources,” Economist Intelligence Unit, May 4, 2021. 116 During a June 2021 hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ambassador Robert F. Godec, Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs, stated, “ What I would emphasize is that there are solutions—technical solutions that address the concerns of all of the parties, that allow Ethiopia to build the dam and have electricity, that allows Egypt to have water, that allows Sudan to have water, and meets the needs of all of the people of the region. T he issue is really a question of political will. T he leaders in these countrie s have to come to an agreement.” Congressional Research Service 21 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations However, as of September 2021, Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia continue to be at an impasse in reaching a trilateral agreement governing Ethiopia’s usage of the GERD to manage the flow of the Nile River. International mediation efforts by the United States and the Africa Union (AU), among others, have to date not resolved the dispute.117 After numerous rounds of unsuccessful talks, Egypt’s negotiating position remains focused on securing a long term, international y legal y binding agreement limiting Ethiopia’s dam-fil ing in drought years. Ethiopia, which perceives its control over the dam as a matter of national pride and sovereignty, has sought to retain the flexibility to release waters from the dam’s reservoir. In July 2021, Ethiopia fil ed the dam’s reservoir for the second time, potential y fil ing it enough to begin producing hydroelectricity for the first time. Egypt, with support from the Arab League, also has continued to press the issue at the Figure 6. The Nile River United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In July 2021, the UNSC held a meeting on the GERD, in which Egypt presented draft text for a UNSC resolution cal ing for a binding agreement within six months; for the rejection of unilateral actions, including the fil ing of the dam; and for world powers to play a more active role in mediation.118 In September 2021, the Security Council adopted a presidential statement cal ing for a resumption of African Union-led negotiations in order to reach a “binding agreement on the fil ing and operation of the GERD.”119 However, Egypt’s entreaties to the international community have not born fruit. According to one analyst, “From a psychological point of view, Egypt is for the first time dependent on a major country of a size that is comparable to Egypt, of an economic power that is quickly catching up with Egypt.” 120 Source: CRS Graphics. Libya Since the 2011 uprising that toppled long-time authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi, Egyptian policy in Libya has focused on securing its western border, protecting its citizens working in Libya, and supporting eastern Libyan political and military forces. During Libya’s recent period of internal conflict (2014-2020), Egypt intervened militarily to strike armed Islamist See House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing entitled, T he Conflict in Ethiopia, June 29, 2021. 117 A mediation effort by the T rump Administration stalled in 2020 after Ethiopia rejected a draft agreement put forth by then-T reasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and accused the United States of bias toward Egypt. 118 United Nations, “ Meeting on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Regional Relations,” What’s in Blue, July 7, 2021. 119 “Security Council Presidential Statement on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD),” What’s in Blue, September 15, 2021. 120 Max Bearak and Sudarsan Raghavan, “Africa’s Largest Dam Powers Dreams of Prosperity in Ethiopia —and Fears of Hunger in Egypt,” Washington Post, October 15, 2020. Congressional Research Service 22 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations groups in eastern Libya and provided diplomatic and material support to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) movement. The LNA stil controls most of eastern Libya despite its unsuccessful attempt to seize al of Libya between 2019 and 2020. Although Egypt’s support to Haftar and the LNA has been limited, Haftar’s priorities align with President Sisi’s to a certain extent, as both men hail from the military and broadly oppose Islamist political forces. Beyond its immediate borders and from a broader geo-political perspective, Egypt seeks to limit Turkish influence in Libya, which it sees as destabilizing. Turkey’s support for Islamist movements, including the Egyptian-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, has long been a strain in their bilateral relationship, particularly since the ouster of former president Muhammad Morsi in 2013. Support for opposing factions in Libya further exacerbated tensions. Since a cease-fire among Libyans went into effect in October 2020, Egypt has engaged diplomatical y with Libyan military leaders and the interim Government of National Unity (GNU). In 2021, President Sisi has met several times with GNU interim Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dabaiba. Egypt has pledged to reopen its embassy in Tripoli (which has been closed since 2014) and consulate in Benghazi. At the same time, Egypt has engaged Turkey in a series of bilateral talks (the first since 2013) aimed at reaching mutual understandings in Libya and the eastern Mediterranean. Despite improved ties, Cairo may stil be suspicious of Turkish long-term intentions in Libya. According to Egypt’s Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, progress in Libya depends on “real change in Turkish policy,” and “words are not enough, they must be matched by deeds.”121 According to one analyst, “Egypt fears that Ankara’s military patronage of Tripoli combined with the long-lasting Turkish support for the Muslim Brotherhood could create an Islamic-oriented government in Tripoli. This is a risk that Egyptian President Sisi does not want to run.”122 U.S.-Egyptian Relations Key Components At a broad level, the United States views the stability of Egypt, the most populous country in the Middle East, as key to regional stability, and therefore maintains a decades-long security partnership to strengthen Egypt’s armed forces and its ability to combat terrorism.123 In April 2021, Egypt joined the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s Combined Maritime Forces,124 a 34-nation naval partnership to combat terrorism, prevent piracy, and encourage regional cooperation. In September 2021, 600 U.S. service personnel from the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) participated in Operation Bright Star,125 a biennial multinational military training 121 Lazar Berman, “Egypt Uses Military to Send Firm Message to Newly Conciliatory T urkey, Times of Israel, July 7, 2021. 122 Alessia Melcangi, “Egypt recalibrated its strategy in Libya because of T urkey,” MENASource, Atlantic Council, June 1, 2021. 123 T he White House, President Donald J. T rump Remains Committed to Egypt and Middle East Stability, April 9, 2019. 124 See https://www.cusnc.navy.mil/Combined-Maritime-Forces/. 125 Since 1980, shortly after the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the United States and Egypt have conducted large-scale joint military exercises known as “ Bright Star.” In 1980, both countries conducted annual single service bilateral ground maneuver events. However, starting in the mid-1980s, Bright Star became a biennial multinational military training exercise. For the first 25 years of its existence, Bright Star was one of the largest Congressional Research Service 23 link to page 8 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations exercise cohosted by the United States and Egypt that, since the early 1980s, has helped foster the interoperability of U.S. and Egyptian forces.126 Another key U.S. component of U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation has been expedited naval access through the Suez Canal. The Egyptian government has long provided U.S. warships with the courtesy of front-of-the-line access to the Canal for expedited passage.127 After the March 2021 temporary blockage of the canal by a stranded container ship, U.S. officials have reiterated the importance of open access to the canal for commercial trade and military operations.128 Successive Administrations also have expressed admiration for Egypt’s role in Middle East peacemaking (see the “Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinians” section above). According to U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Jonathan Cohen, “The U.S.-Egypt strategic partnership is vital to both nations and spans decades. We have cooperated with one another every day, across the administrations of eight U.S. presidents on a wide agenda which began with Egypt’s pioneering role in promoting Middle East peace.”129 Since 1982, the United States has continued to participate in the Sinai Peninsula peacekeeping and monitoring mission, know n as the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).130 Though military-to-military relations remain the backbone of the bilateral relationship, the United States and Egypt seek opportunities to expand trade and investment deemed mutual y beneficial. Despite having the largest population in the Middle East, Egypt ranks as the region’s fifth-largest economy by GDP (behind Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel). By total 2020 volume of trade, Egypt ranks as the 50th-largest U.S. trading partner, at $6.8 bil ion (a 20% drop from 2019 due to the pandemic).131 The United States has a trade surplus with Egypt and exports wheat and coalition military exercise conducted by CENT COM. It included the ground, naval, and air forces of both the United States and Egypt, along with troops from France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE, T urkey, Pakistan, and Kuwait. During the 1999/2000 eve nt, 11 nations contributed over 70,000 troops to the exercise. At times, regional conflict or tensions in the U.S. -Egyptian relationship have led to the cancellation of Bright Star. Due to the wars in Iraq, Bright Star was cancelled in 1991 and 2003. Due t o political unrest in Egypt, the Egyptian armed forces cancelled Bright Star in 2011. In 2013, President Obama suspended U.S. participation in Bright Star due to U.S. concerns over the military’s ousting of Egypt’s civilian -led government. T hus, Bright Star did not take place from 2010 to 2016. It resumed in September 2017, when an estimated 200 U.S. soldiers participated in the exercise at Mohamed Naguib Military Base in Egypt, where U.S. and Egyptian forces conducted battle simulations involving U.S.-origin major defense equipment, such as Egyptian F-16s and M1A1 Egyptian tanks. In August 2018, approximately 800 U.S. troops participated in Operation Bright Star 18. T hat event featured Egyptian special operations forces conducting counterterrorism and irregular warfare training operations, working in close collaboration with US special operators. In 2020, the United States and Egypt cancelled Bright Star due to the COVID -19 pandemic. 126 U.S. Department of Defense, United States Central Command, Readout from Gen. McKenzie’s Visit to Egypt, September 11, 2021. 127 While the Suez Canal T ransit Authority provides the U.S. Navy with expedited passage, the United States, like other foreign nations transiting the canal, pays the authority fees for transit, tug boat assistance, late fees, and port dues. 128 See testimony of Amanda Dory, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, House Armed Services Committee Hearing entitled “ National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activities in the Greater Middle East and Africa,” April 20, 2021. See also John Bowden, “Pentagon: Suez Canal Stoppage may Impact T ransit of Military Vessels,” The Hill, March 28, 2021. 129 Hany Assai, “INT ERVIEW: US Ambassador to Cairo says Strategic Partnership Vital to both Nations, Spans Decades,” Ahram online, July 4, 2021. 130 See CRS Insight IN11403, Possible Withdrawal of U.S. Peacekeepers from the Sinai Peninsula , by Jeremy M. Sharp. P.L. 116-283, the William M. (Mac) T hornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 , includes Section 1292, which requires the Secretary of Defense to notif y Congress of any planned withdrawal of U.S. troops that would bring total U.S. military participation in the MFO below 430 soldiers. 131 T rade statistics generated by T rade Data Monitor, LLC using trade information from Egypt’s Central Agency for Congressional Research Service 24 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations corn, mineral fuel and oil, machinery, aircraft, and iron and steel products. U.S. imports include apparel, natural gas and oil, fertilizers, textiles, and agricultural products.132 According to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Egypt Country Commercial Guide, U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Egypt was $1.37 bil ion in 2019 (latest data available), making the United States the third-largest foreign investor in Egypt, behind the United Kingdom and Belgium. Most FDI from the United States is concentrated in the oil and natural gas sectors.133 Challenges in the Bilateral Relationship Various U.S. concerns about Egypt’s internal security, political repression, and social stagnation complicate longstanding bilateral military and economic cooperative endeavors, but the countries continue to share security interests. After nearly a decade of terrorist attacks and insurgent warfare, the Sinai Peninsula continues to be an area of significant concern to U.S. policymakers. According to the latest U.S. State Department Report on Terrorism, “Nearly al terrorist attacks in Egypt took place in the Sinai Peninsula and largely targeted security forces, but terrorist attacks targeting civilians, tourists, and security personnel in mainland Egypt remained a concern.”134 Beyond the spate of violence emanating from the Sinai is concern over Egypt’s dynamism as a 21st-century nation state that meets the growing demands of its educated and interconnected youth. According to Tamara Cofman Wittes, the President’s nominee for USAID assistant administrator for Middle East: Even in the face of a relationship that has today as many differences as areas of agreement, many parts of the United States government continue to view the nation of Egypt as ‘too big to fail.’ There is good reason for this view. Egyptians represent a full one-fifth of the entire Arab world. An economic or political disruption in Egypt would, as it did in 2011, have profound effects across the region.135 The COVID-19 pandemic has further strained state finances, forcing the government to continue to rely on foreign creditors to finance its large public debt, which, as of September 2021, was equal to 92% of Gross Domestic Product. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has repeatedly lent Egypt funds with the stipulation that it cuts spending on food and fuel subsidies, changes that successive Egyptian governments have been slow to make because of fear of igniting popular unrest. Since 2016, the IMF has lent Egypt $20 bil ion; it continues to emphasize that in order for Egypt to unlock its growth potential, Egypt’s private sector needs to grow and the state needs to reduce its role in certain sectors while “fostering labor market participation of women and youth, and encouraging exports.”136 According to one longtime expert on Egypt, Professor Robert Springborg: Egypt’s biggest challenge comes down to the state’s money: where does it come from and where does it go? The al-Sisi regime is based on the proposition that Egypt is too big to Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). 132 U.S. State Department, U.S. Relations with Egypt, Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, September 20, 2019. 133 U.S. Commerce Department, International T rade Administration, Egypt Country Commer cial Guide, Updated September 5, 2021. 134 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Egypt. 135 T estimony of T amara Wittes, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and International T errorism, hearing entitled “ Egypt Politics-Economics-Human Rights,” September 9, 2020. 136 T he International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Completes the Second Review under the Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) for the Arab Republic of Egypt and Concludes 2 021 Article IV Consultation, June 23, 2021. Congressional Research Service 25 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations fail and therefore that the world will continue to support it financially. But there are serious questions regarding regime sustainability in the face of a global financial crisis. Egypt’s foreign debt position is extremely vulnerable. Foreign direct investment is limited to hydrocarbons and real estate investment, which create few jobs. As for where the money goes, it is not being distributed fairly. The regime is not investin g in public services, education, or health care. Sectors that according to the 2014 constitution are supposed to receive at minimum between three to four percent of annual GDP do not. Seventy percent of Egyptians are living on less than five and a half dollars a day.137 Successive U.S. Administrations also have expressed concerns over the Sisi government’s continued crackdown against political dissent and nonviolent opposition. Biden Administration officials have reiterated this concern while attempting to maintain the uneasy balance of U.S. longstanding concern for human rights in Egypt with close ties to the military. During a 2021 State Department press conference, State Department Spokesperson Ned Price remarked: When it comes to Egypt, it is true that Egypt plays an important role in promoting some of our key interests in the region: regional security and stability through the guardianship of the Suez Canal; counterterrorism cooperation; and its leadership in promoting Middle East peace. Secretary Blinken has had an opportunity to discuss some of these issues with his counterpart, Foreign Minister Shoukry, just as we raise human rights, just as we raise our values. These two things, they’re not separate. They’re inextricably linked. If we don’t stick up for our values, if we don’t stick up for human rights, we’re not sticking up for our interests. We recognize that, and we can do both. We have deep concerns, as we have said, about the human rights situation in Egypt, including undue res trictions on civil society, undue restrictions on freedom of expression, some of the detentions you have mentioned. There is repression of civil society and human rights abuses. They undercut Egypt’s own dynamism and stability as a partner of ours. We will consistently raise these issues. We will not shy away from them. We’ll do that both publicly, as we have, and we’ll do it privately, too. We’ll also work and seek to find a partner in Congress to champion these same issues.138 Recent Action on U.S. Foreign Aid to Egypt Egypt’s record on human rights and democratization has sparked regular criticism from U.S. officials and some Members of Congress. Since FY2012, Congress has passed appropriations legislation that withholds the obligation of FMF to Egypt until the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is taking various steps toward supporting democracy and human rights. With the exception of FY2014, lawmakers have included a national security waiver to al ow the Administration to waive these congressional y mandated certification requirements under certain conditions. When Congress appropriates FMF to Egypt, it typical y makes funds available for two years only. 137 Clare Ulmer, “T en Years after Mubarak’s Fall, What is Egypt’s Biggest Challenge?” Project on Middle East Democracy, February 22, 2021. 138 https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-march-11-2021/#post-225613-EGYPT 1. Congressional Research Service 26 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 7. Egypt: Withholding Conditions on U.S. Military Assistance Allocations In mil ions of current dol ars Sources: Prepared by CRS based on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) al ocations and terms from annual SFOPS appropriations acts, FY2011-FY2021. Notes: In FY2014, Congress did not provide a waiver for certification requirements but al owed for the obligation of tranches of aid for defined purposes and at defined rates if the executive branch could not make certain democracy and human rights-related certifications. For FY2015, Congress again linked aid tranches and rates to certain democracy and human rights-related certifications, but provided a waiver. From FY2012 through FY2021, Congress conditioned al U.S. assistance to Egypt by requiring the executive branch to certify that Egypt was meeting its commitments under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and sustaining its strategic relationship with the United States. From FY2014 onward, Congress did not provide a waiver for these certifications. FY2020 Section 7041(a)(3) of the FY2020 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-94) provided $1.3 bil ion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) “to remain available until September 30, 2021.” The act also withheld $300 mil ion in FMF unless the Secretary of State could make a certification on democracy-related conditions in Egypt. Congress also enabled the Secretary to waive the certification requirement on national security grounds. In October 2020, the State Department notified Congress of its intent to obligate $1 bil ion in FY2020 FMF. Several lawmakers and human rights advocates had cal ed on the Administration to not exercise the waiver authority.139 Biden Administration Withholds Some Military Aid On September 14, 2021, the Administration notified Congress its intent to obligate the remaining $300 mil ion in FY2020 FMF using the authority in Section 7041(a)(3)(A) of P.L. 116-94, which exempts FY2020 FMF funds from certification if used for “counterterrorism, border security, and nonproliferation programs” for Egypt.140 In its communications to Congress, the Administration 139 For example, see Charles Dunne, “It’s T ime for Biden to Get T ough on Sisi,” foreignpolicy.com , July 20, 2021, and Nahal T oosi, “ In D.C. Visit, Egypt Spy Boss Claims U.S. Agreed—in Writing—to Jail American Activist ,” Politico, July 12, 2021. 140 T his provision in appropriations for Egypt dates back to P.L. 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (passed January 2014). At the time, President Obama had initiated a review of U.S. military assistance to Egypt. P.L. 113-76 divided annual aid to Egypt into two tranches ($976 million and $576.8 million) and conditioned their Congressional Research Service 27 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations claimed that it could not certify that Egypt is taking sustained and effective steps related to the human rights-related conditions. However, because human rights concerns remain, the State Department has said that it wil not move forward with the application of $130 mil ion in FMF, the maximum amount it can withhold, and wil not deposit it into Egypt’s Federal Reserve Bank account unless Egypt affirmatively addresses U.S. concerns.141 The Biden Administration suspension represents the first time any Administration has refused to waive Egypt democracy and human conditions on national security grounds since Congress inserted such criteria in FY2012. Though the Administration did not official y use the waiver to obligate the $300 mil ion withheld FMF, it did use another broad authority Congress has granted the executive for years in exempting “counterterrorism, border security, and nonproliferation programs” from certification. Congress has not defined in law which programs qualify as “counterterrorism, border security, and nonproliferation.” If the Biden Administration ultimately decides that Egypt cannot meet its human rights criteria,142 then the $130 mil ion in FY2020 FMF would presumably by reprogrammed for other uses, and would represent the largest amount of FMF ever rescinded (other than by across the board spending cuts by Congress). President Trump reduced the FY2017 FMF obligation to Egypt by $65.7 mil ion, citing “Egypt’s ongoing relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, lack of progress on the 2013 convictions of U.S. and Egyptian nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers, and the enactment of a restrictive NGO law that wil likely complicate ongoing and future U.S. assistance to the country.”143 A coalition of 19 human rights group cal ed the Biden Administration’s obligation of the $300 mil ion in FMF a “terrible blow to its stated commitment to human rights and to the rule of law.”144 There has been no official response from the Egyptian government, though the state did release a “National Strategy for Human Rights” the same week that Biden obligated the remaining FY2020 FMF aid. Former Egyptian foreign minister Nabil Fahmy remarked that “constructive engagement is a better approach than attempting to use assistance as a weapon or the withholding of access to facilities.”145 obligation without providing a national security waiver. T hus, this provision may have been inserted to allow for greater flexibility in providing certain types of military aid to Egypt. 141 U.S. State Department, Press Briefing, September 15, 2021. 142 According to one unnamed U.S. official, the Biden Administration will provide the $130 million on the condition that “ Egypt ends protracted prosecutions against rights and civil society organizations known as Case 173, and drops charges against or releases 16 individuals the United States has identified and raised with Cairo since June.” See, John Hudson and Missy Ryan, “Facing Pressure on Human Rights, Biden Administration Attaches New Conditions to Egypt Security Aid,” Washington Post, September 14, 2021. In 2013, an Egyptian court convicted and sentenced 43 individuals from the United States, Egypt, and Europe, including the Egypt country directors of the Nati onal Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), for spending money from organizations that were operating in Egypt without a license and for receiving foreign funds (known as Case 173, or the “foreign funding case”). In 2018, the individuals were acquitted of all charges, but Case 173 has since remained active, as the judiciary has imposed asset freezes and travel bans on several Egyptian civil society activists. See Hadeer El-Mahdawy, “What’s Next in Case 173? 4 NGOs, 5 Civil Society Workers in the Clear but Investigations Continue,” Mada Masr, September 1, 2021. 143 Congressional Notification T ransmittal Sheet, Mary K. Water, Assistant Secretary of Legislative Affairs, January 23, 2018. 144 Biden Decision to Grant Military Aid to Egypt a Betrayal of Human Rights Commitments, Project on Middle East Democracy, September 14, 2021. 145 “T he T akeaway: Business As Usual: US-Egypt Alliance Finds its Center,” Al Monitor, September 16, 2021. Congressional Research Service 28 link to page 14 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations In Congress, Republicans largely refrained from commenting on the Administration’s action, while Democrats were somewhat divided on the issue. Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Gregory Meeks stated, “I support the Biden administration’s decision to withhold a portion of security assistance to Egypt contingent on measurable progress on important bipartisan human rights criteria.... This decision is consistent with the law and our values as a country.”146 In the Senate, Senator Christopher Murphy stated, “This was a big missed opportunity to stand up strongly and unequivocal y for human rights. Egypt had almost two years to meet the human rights improvements required by Congress, but arguably the situation on the ground in Egypt has gotten worse.”147 Analysis The Biden Administration’s withholding of some military aid has reignited a longstanding debate in the broader foreign policy community over the efficacy of using foreign aid as leverage to promote greater respect for human rights in the Middle East and elsewhere.148 In Egypt’s case, this debate usual y breaks down between the human rights community, which seeks to either end U.S. military aid to Egypt or reprogram it as economic and democracy assistance,149 and those who do not support modifying or conditioning longstanding military-to-military ties seen as contributing to Egypt’s peaceful relationship with Israel150 and its efforts to counter terrorism in the Sinai.151 Successive Administrations have often found themselves in the midst of the debate, attempting to balance the security relationship with congressional prerogatives to consider what many international monitoring organizations believe is the country’s woeful human rights record (see Table 1). As mentioned above, since 2013, the Obama, Trump, and now Biden Administrations have al taken various actions (suspended weapons deliveries, ended cash flow financing, reprogrammed aid and withheld assistance) to limit U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation. In looking back at these past nine years, proponents of cutting aid argue that the lack of any credible, discernable change in Egypt’s behavior is because the United States has not used al of its policy levers to pressure the Sisi government enough.152 Opponents of halting assistance often charge that conditioning aid wil only further harden Egypt’s resolve to resist U.S. pressure and push Egypt to develop deeper ties with countries less concerned about its human rights record. Others have argued that U.S.- Egyptian relations have atrophied since the arguable high point in the 1980s to the point in which U.S. leverage is overestimated by participants in this debate.153 According to David Schenker, a 146 Meeks Issues Statement on Admin Placing Human Rights Conditions on Part of Egypt’s Security Aid, House Foreign Affairs Committee, September 14, 2021. 147 Senator Chris Murphy, Murphy on Administration’s Decision to Send Aid to Egypt Despite Human Rights Concerns, September 13, 2021. 148 In 2021, the journal Democracy in Exile, published by the human rights organization known as Dawn (Democracy for the Arab World Now), published a series of articles on foreign aid conditionality in the Middle East. See https://dawnmena.org/dawns-advocacy/aid-conditionality/. 149 T estimony of Michele Dunne, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and International T errorism, hearing entitled “ Egypt Politics-Economics-Human Rights,” September 9, 2020. 150 Jacob Magid, “Israeli Officials Cautioned Biden against Heavy Criticism of Egypt, Saudi Arabia,” Times of Israel, September 2, 2021. 151 Rachel Oswald, “Military Aid to Egypt Shapes Up as Human Rights T est for Biden,” Congressional Quarterly, August 16, 2021. 152 Charles Dunne, “It’s T ime for Biden to Get T ough on Sisi,” ForeignPolicy.com , July 20, 2021. 153 Senator Murphy, Congressional Record, Senate Procedural Matters, p. S5129, July 28, 2021. Congressional Research Service 29 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations former Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs at the State Department, the value of U.S. military aid to Egypt has declined over time and aid cuts or even sanctions would not effectively change Egypt’s behavior.154 Schenker argues that the U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship may need to be recalculated and reducing some aid to Egypt would al ow the United States to send a signal to Cairo of its displeasure with its policies without causing a permanent diplomatic rupture.155 FY2021

~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Recent Action on U.S. Foreign Aid to Egypt~~
For FY2021, the Trump Administration For FY2021, the Trump Administration ~~has~~ requested a total of $1.4 bil ion in bilateralrequested a total of $1.4 bil ion in bilateral assistance for Egypt, the same amount Congress appropriated in FY2020~~assistance~~
~~for Egypt. In FY2018 and FY2019, Congress appropriated $1.4 bil ion in annual bilateral aid for~~
~~Egypt~~. Nearly al of the U.S. funds for Egypt come from the FMF account and are in turn used to . Nearly al of the U.S. funds for Egypt come from the FMF account and are in turn used to
purchase U.S.-origin military equipment, purchase U.S.-origin military equipment, spare parts, training, and maintenance from U.S. firms. spare parts, training, and maintenance from U.S. firms.
~~Table 2. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Egypt: FY2016-FY2021~~
~~current U.S. dol ars in mil ions~~
~~FY2016~~
~~FY2017~~
~~FY2018~~
~~FY2019~~
~~FY2020~~
~~FY2021~~
~~Account~~
~~actual~~
~~actual~~
~~actual~~
~~actual~~
~~enacted~~
~~request~~
~~FMF~~
~~$1,300.000~~
~~$1,234.300~~
~~$1,300.000~~
~~$1,300.000~~
~~$1,300.000~~
~~$1,300.000~~
~~ESF~~
~~$112.250~~
~~$112.500~~
~~$106.869~~
~~$112.500~~
~~$125.000~~
~~$142.65~~
~~INCLE~~
~~$2.000~~
~~$2.000~~
~~$2.000~~
~~$2.000~~
~~$2.000~~
~~$2.000~~
~~NADR~~
~~$2.500~~
~~$3.000~~
~~$3.000~~
~~$3.000~~
~~$3.000~~
~~$2.500~~
~~IMET~~
~~$1.800~~
~~$1.739~~
~~$1.800~~
~~$1.800~~
~~$1.800~~
~~$1.800~~
~~Total~~
~~$1,418.550~~
~~$1,353.539~~
~~$1,413.669~~
~~$1,419.300~~
~~$1,431.800~~
~~$1,448.950~~
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications
~~(FY2017-FY2021), P.L. 116-94, and CRS calculations and rounding.~~
Notes: In 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress that it was reprogramming for other purposes
~~$108 mil ion of ESF that had been appropriated for Egypt in FY2015 but remained unobligated. In 2017, the~~
~~Trump Administration also reprogrammed approximately $37 mil ion in FY2016 ESF for Egypt to support, among~~
~~other things, water programs in the West Bank. Funding levels in this table include both enduring (base) and~~
~~Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds. ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF = Foreign Military Financing;~~
~~IMET = International Military Education & Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control + Law~~
~~Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related~~
~~Egypt’s record on human rights and democratization has sparked regular criticism from U.S.~~
~~officials and some Members of Congress. Since FY2012, Congress has passed appropriations~~
~~legislation that withholds the obligation of FMF to Egypt until the Secretary of State certifies that~~
~~Egypt is taking various steps toward supporting democracy and human rights. With the exception~~
~~of FY2014, lawmakers have included a national security waiver to al ow the Administration to~~
~~waive these congressional y mandated certification requirements under certain conditions.~~
~~When Congress appropriates FMF to Egypt, it typical y makes funds available for two years only.~~
~~FY2019 FMF is currently available until September 30, 2020. To date, the Trump Administration~~
~~has obligated $1 bil ion in FY2019 FMF for Egypt. $300 mil ion in FMF remains withheld until~~
~~the Secretary issues a determination pursuant to Section 7041(a)(3)(B) of P.L. 116-6, the FY2019~~
~~Consolidated Appropriations Act.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

24

~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Appendix. Background on U.S. Foreign Assistance~~
~~to Egypt~~
~~Overview~~
~~Between 1946 and 2018, the United States provided Egypt with $79.9 bil ion in bilateral foreign~~
~~aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation).123~~The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2021 (P.L. 116-260) withholds $225 mil ion in FMF from obligation until the Secretary of State makes democracy-related certifications and provides waiver authority on national security grounds. The act also includes a condition that withholds $75 mil ion in FMF until the Secretary of State determines that the Government of Egypt is making clear and consistent progress in releasing political prisoners and providing detainees with due process of law. This condition is new in the FY2021 act and affords no national security waiver. Because the act made the funds available for two years, obligation decisions about FY2021 assistance for Egypt may not occur until calendar year 2022. Table 2.Bilateral Aid to Egypt current U.S. dol ars in mil ions FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021 FY2022 actual actual actual actual allocated request ESF 112.50 106.87 112.50 125.00 125.00 125.00 FMF 1,234.30 1,300.00 1,300.00 1,300.00 1,300.00 1,300.00 IMET 1.74 1.80 1.80 0.00 1.80 1.80 INCLE 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.35 0.00 NADR 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.50 3.00 3.50 Total 1,353.54 1,413.67 1,419.30 1,430.50 1,430.15 1,430.30 Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2019-FY2022), Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Al ocation Report, and CRS calculations. Note: Economic Support Fund (ESF), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR). FY2022 For FY2022, the Biden Administration has requested $1.4 bil ion in bilateral assistance for Egypt, the same amount Congress appropriated the previous year. H.R. 4373, the House-passed version 154 David Schenker, “Getting T ough with Egypt Won’t Work,” Policy Analysis, PolicyWatch 3459, T he Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 25, 2021. 155 Op.cit, Schenker, “Getting T ough wit h Egypt Won’t Work.” Congressional Research Service 30 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022, would:  Provide not less than $125 mil ion in ESF, of which not less than $40 mil ion should be made available for higher education programs, including not less than $15 mil ion for scholarships.  Provide $1.3 bil ion in FMF, provided that $150 mil ion of FMF funds shal be withheld from obligation until the Secretary of State certifies that the Government of Egypt is taking sustained and effective steps to, among other things, strengthen the rule of law, democratic institutions and, human rights in Egypt, implement reforms to protect civil liberties, hold Egyptian security forces accountable, investigate and prosecute cases of extrajudicial kil ing and forced disappearances, provide access for U.S. officials to monitor such assistance, and prevent the intimidation and harassment of American citizens. This certification shal not apply to funds appropriated for counterterrorism, border security, and nonproliferation programs, and may be waived if the Secretary determines that it is in the national security interest of the United States. An additional $135 mil ion in FMF, not subject to a waiver, would be withheld until the Secretary of State determines and reports that the Government of Egypt is making progress in releasing political prisoners. An additional $15 mil ion in FMF, not subject to a waiver, would be withheld until the Secretary of State determines and reports that the Government of Egypt has provided American citizens with fair and commensurate compensation for injuries suffered as a result of an attack against a tour group by the Egyptian military.  Reauthorize ESF for loan guarantees. The Biden Administration has indicated that it would oppose certain FMF conditions contained in H.R. 4373. According to the Office of Management and Budget, “The administration strongly opposes section 7041(a) of the bil , which would reduce the administration’s flexibility in regards to FMF [Foreign Military Financing] to Egypt undermining its leverage as it operationalizes its commitment to a constructive human rights dialogue with Egypt.”156 156 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4373—Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022, July 27, 2021. Congressional Research Service 31 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Appendix. Background on U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt Overview Between 1946 and 2019, the United States provided Egypt with $81.4 bil ion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation).157 The 1979 Peace Treaty The 1979 Peace Treaty
between Israel and Egypt ushered in the current era of U.S. financial support for peace between between Israel and Egypt ushered in the current era of U.S. financial support for peace between
Israel and its Arab neighbors. In two separate memoranda accompanying the treaty, the United Israel and its Arab neighbors. In two separate memoranda accompanying the treaty, the United
States outlined commitments to Israel and Egypt, respectively. In its letter to Israel, the Carter States outlined commitments to Israel and Egypt, respectively. In its letter to Israel, the Carter
Administration pledged that it would “endeavor to take into account and wil endeavor to be Administration pledged that it would “endeavor to take into account and wil endeavor to be
responsive to military and economic assistance requirements of Israel.” In his letter to Egypt, responsive to military and economic assistance requirements of Israel.” In his letter to Egypt,
former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown wrote the following: former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown wrote the following:
In the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the United States is prepared In the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the United States is prepared
to enter into an expanded security relationship with Egypt with regard to the sales of to enter into an expanded security relationship with Egypt with regard to the sales of
military equipment and services and the financing of, at least a portion of those sales, military equipment and services and the financing of, at least a portion of those sales,
subject to such Congressional review and approvals as may be requiredsubject to such Congressional review and approvals as may be required ~~.124~~.158
Al U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (or any country) is Al U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (or any country) is appropriated and authorized by Congress. The . The
1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty is a bilateral peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, and the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty is a bilateral peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, and the
United States is not a legal party to the treaty. The treaty itself does not include any U.S. aid United States is not a legal party to the treaty. The treaty itself does not include any U.S. aid
obligations, and any assistance commitments to Israel and Egypt that could be obligations, and any assistance commitments to Israel and Egypt that could be ~~potentially~~potential y
construed in conjunction with the treaty were through ancil ary documents or other construed in conjunction with the treaty were through ancil ary documents or other
communications and were—by their terms—subject to congressional approval (see above). communications and were—by their terms—subject to congressional approval (see above).
However, as the peace broker between Israel and Egypt, the United States has traditional y However, as the peace broker between Israel and Egypt, the United States has traditional y
provided foreign aid to both countries to ensure a regional balance of power and sustain security provided foreign aid to both countries to ensure a regional balance of power and sustain security
cooperation with both countries. cooperation with both countries.
In some cases, an Administration may sign a bilateral “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) In some cases, an Administration may sign a bilateral “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU)
with a foreign country pledging a specific amount of foreign aid to be provided over a selected with a foreign country pledging a specific amount of foreign aid to be provided over a selected
time period subject to the approval of Congress. In the Middle East, the United States has signed time period subject to the approval of Congress. In the Middle East, the United States has signed
foreign assistance MOUs with Israel and Jordan foreign assistance MOUs with Israel and Jordan~~. Currently, there is no U.S.-Egyptian MOU.125~~, but not with Egypt.159
Congress typical y specifies a precise al ocation of most foreign assistance for Egypt in the Congress typical y specifies a precise al ocation of most foreign assistance for Egypt in the
foreign operations appropriations bil . Egypt receives the bulk of foreign aid funds from three foreign operations appropriations bil . Egypt receives the bulk of foreign aid funds from three
primary accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and primary accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and

~~123~~157 U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945 -September 30, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945 -September 30, ~~2018.~~
~~124~~2019. 158 See Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Brown) to-the Egyptian Minister of Defense and War Production (Ali), See Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Brown) to-the Egyptian Minister of Defense and War Production (Ali),
March 23, 1979, “United States Sales of Military Equipment and Services to Egypt.” Ultimately, the United States March 23, 1979, “United States Sales of Military Equipment and Services to Egypt.” Ultimately, the United States
provided a total of $7.3 billion to both parties in 1979. T he Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979 ( P.L. provided a total of $7.3 billion to both parties in 1979. T he Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979 ( P.L.
96-35) provided both military and economic grants to Israel and Egypt at a ratio of 3 to 2, respectively, though this 96-35) provided both military and economic grants to Israel and Egypt at a ratio of 3 to 2, respectively, though this
ratio was not enshrined in the treaty as Egypt would later claim. ratio was not enshrined in the treaty as Egypt would later claim.
~~125~~159 In July 2007, the George W. Bush Administration In July 2007, the George W. Bush Administration ~~had~~ announced, as a part of a larger arms package to the region, announced, as a part of a larger arms package to the region,
that it would beginthat it would begin discussions with Egypt on a proposed $13 billion military aid agreement over a 10 -year period. discussions with Egypt on a proposed $13 billion military aid agreement over a 10 -year period.
~~Since~~ Since Egypt was already receiving approximately $1.3 billion a year in military assistance, the announcement Egypt was already receiving approximately $1.3 billion a year in military assistance, the announcement
represented no major change in U.S. aidrepresented no major change in U.S. aid policy toward Egypt. No suchpolicy toward Egypt. No such bilateral MOU on U.S.bilateral MOU on U.S. military aid to Egypt has military aid to Egypt has
been reached by the Bush, Obama, been reached by the Bush, Obama, or T rumpT rump , or Biden Administrations with the Egyptian government.Administrations with the Egyptian government.
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International Military Education and Training (IMET). International Military Education and Training (IMET).~~126~~160 The United States offers IMET training The United States offers IMET training
to Egyptian officers in order to facilitate U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation over the long term. to Egyptian officers in order to facilitate U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation over the long term.
Military Aid and Arms Sales
Overview
Since the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the United States has provided Egypt with large Since the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the United States has provided Egypt with large
amounts of military assistance. U.S. policymakers have routinely justified this aid to Egypt as an amounts of military assistance. U.S. policymakers have routinely justified this aid to Egypt as an
investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and
sustaining the treaty—principles that are supposed to be mutual y reinforcing. Egypt has used sustaining the treaty—principles that are supposed to be mutual y reinforcing. Egypt has used
U.S. military aid through the FMF to (among other things) purchase major U.S. defense systems, U.S. military aid through the FMF to (among other things) purchase major U.S. defense systems,
such as the F-16 fighter aircraft, the M1A1 Abrams battle tank, and the AH-64 Apache attack such as the F-16 fighter aircraft, the M1A1 Abrams battle tank, and the AH-64 Apache attack
helicopter. helicopter.
Frequently Asked Question: Is U.S. Military Aid Provided to Egypt
as a Cash Transfer?
No. Al U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services No. Al U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense
contractors..~~127~~161 The United States provides military assistance to U.S. partners and al ies to help them acquire U.S. The United States provides military assistance to U.S. partners and al ies to help them acquire U.S.
military equipment and training. Egypt is one of the main recipients of FMF, a program with a corresponding military equipment and training. Egypt is one of the main recipients of FMF, a program with a corresponding
appropriations account administered by the Department of State but implemented by the Department of Defense. appropriations account administered by the Department of State but implemented by the Department of Defense.
FMF is a grant program that enables governments to receive equipment and associated training from the U.S. FMF is a grant program that enables governments to receive equipment and associated training from the U.S.
government or to access equipment directly through U.S. commercial channels. government or to access equipment directly through U.S. commercial channels.
Most countries receiving FMF general y purchase goods and services through government-to-government Most countries receiving FMF general y purchase goods and services through government-to-government
contracts, also known as Foreign Military Sales (FMS). According to the Government Accountability Office, “under contracts, also known as Foreign Military Sales (FMS). According to the Government Accountability Office, “under
this procurement channel, the U.S. government buys the desired item on behalf of the foreign country (Egypt), this procurement channel, the U.S. government buys the desired item on behalf of the foreign country (Egypt),
general y employing the same criteria as if the item were being procured for the U.S. military.” The vast majority general y employing the same criteria as if the item were being procured for the U.S. military.” The vast majority
of what Egypt purchases from the United States is conducted through the FMS program funded by FMF.of what Egypt purchases from the United States is conducted through the FMS program funded by FMF. ~~Egypt uses~~
~~few of its own~~ However, U.S. officials have been encouraging Egypt to use national funds for U.S. military equipment purchases. national funds for U.S. military equipment purchases.
162 Under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress must be formal y notified 30 calendar Under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress must be formal y notified 30 calendar
days before the Administration can take the final steps of a government-to-government foreign military sale of days before the Administration can take the final steps of a government-to-government foreign military sale of
major U.S.-origin defense equipment valued at $14 mil ion or more, defense articles or services valued at $50 major U.S.-origin defense equipment valued at $14 mil ion or more, defense articles or services valued at $50
mil ion or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 mil ion or more. In practice pre-notifications mil ion or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 mil ion or more. In practice pre-notifications
to congressional committees of jurisdiction occur, and proposed arms sales general y do not proceed to the public to congressional committees of jurisdiction occur, and proposed arms sales general y do not proceed to the public
official notification stage until issues of potential concern to key committees have been resolved. official notification stage until issues of potential concern to key committees have been resolved.
Special Military Assistance Benefits for Egypt
In addition to substantial amounts of annual U.S. military assistance, Egypt has benefited from In addition to substantial amounts of annual U.S. military assistance, Egypt has benefited from
certain aid provisions that have been available to only a few other countries, listed below. certain aid provisions that have been available to only a few other countries, listed below.

~~126~~160 Egypt also receives, though not consistently, relatively small sums from the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Egypt also receives, though not consistently, relatively small sums from the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account and the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account and the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) account. NADR funds support counterterrorism training through the Antiterrorism Assistance Program. (INCLE) account. NADR funds support counterterrorism training through the Antiterrorism Assistance Program.
INCLE funds support police training and respect INCLE funds support police training and respect ~~for h uman~~fo r human rights in law enforcement. The Administration typically rights in law enforcement. The Administration typically
requests these funds, but they are not usually specifically earmarked for Egypt (or for most other countries) in requests these funds, but they are not usually specifically earmarked for Egypt (or for most other countries) in
legislation. After the passage of a foreign operations appropriations bill, federal agencies such as the State Department legislation. After the passage of a foreign operations appropriations bill, federal agencies such as the State Department
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocate funds to Egypt from these aid accounts. T hey and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocate funds to Egypt from these aid accounts. T hey
then submit a country allocation report (653a Report) to Congress for review. then submit a country allocation report (653a Report) to Congress for review.
~~127~~161 For the relevant legal authorities, see §604 of the Foreign Assistance Act as amended (22 U.S.C. 2354) and §503 of For the relevant legal authorities, see §604 of the Foreign Assistance Act as amended (22 U.S.C. 2354) and §503 of
the Foreign Assistance Act as amended (22 U.S.C. 2311). the Foreign Assistance Act as amended (22 U.S.C. 2311).
162 During a 2021 hearing on security assistance, Dana Stroul, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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  Early Disbursal and Interest-Bearing Account: Between FY2001 and FY2011, : Between FY2001 and FY2011,
Congress granted Egypt early disbursement of FMF funds (within 30 days of the Congress granted Egypt early disbursement of FMF funds (within 30 days of the
enactment of appropriations legislation) to an interest-bearing account at the enactment of appropriations legislation) to an interest-bearing account at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.Federal Reserve Bank of New York.~~128~~163 Interest accrued from the rapid Interest accrued from the rapid
disbursement of aid has al owed Egypt to receive additional funding for the disbursement of aid has al owed Egypt to receive additional funding for the
purchase of U.S.-origin equipment. In FY2012, Congress began to condition the purchase of U.S.-origin equipment. In FY2012, Congress began to condition the
obligation of FMF, requiring the Administration to certify certain conditions had obligation of FMF, requiring the Administration to certify certain conditions had
been met before releasing FMF funds, thereby eliminating their automaticbeen met before releasing FMF funds, thereby eliminating their automatic early early
disbursal. However, Congress has permitted Egypt to continue to earn interest on disbursal. However, Congress has permitted Egypt to continue to earn interest on
FMF funds already deposited in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. FMF funds already deposited in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  The Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program provides one means by which the provides one means by which the
United States can advance foreign policy objectives—assisting friendly and United States can advance foreign policy objectives—assisting friendly and
al ied nations through provision of equipment in excess of the requirements of its al ied nations through provision of equipment in excess of the requirements of its
own defense forces. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) manages own defense forces. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) manages
the EDA program, which enables the United States to reduce its inventory of the EDA program, which enables the United States to reduce its inventory of
outdated equipment by providing friendly countries with necessary supplies at outdated equipment by providing friendly countries with necessary supplies at
either reduced rates or no charge. As a designated “major non-NATO al y,” Egypt either reduced rates or no charge. As a designated “major non-NATO al y,” Egypt
is eligible to receive EDA under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act and is eligible to receive EDA under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act and
Section 23(a) of the Arms Export Control Act. Section 23(a) of the Arms Export Control Act.

~~128~~ Egypt: Aid Conditionality and Human Rights Historical y, Congress had placed certain conditions on economic aid to Egypt. After Egypt’s 2011 uprising and initial change of government, lawmakers have conditioned, and in some cases withheld, U.S. military aid to Egypt on executive branch certifications to the Committees on Appropriations that the Egyptian government is taking steps toward democratic governance and supporting human rights. East , remarked, “ In terms of the FMF, it remains an important tool for us to work with Egypt in making sure that they have U.S.-origin defense articles oriented towards what we assess to be shared security threats, whether it ’s counterterrorism, maritime security, border security. And I would note here that Egypt is interested in continuing this relationship with us. T hey recently agreed to upgrade their Apache helicopter fleet by using blended financing, not just U.S. security assistance but also Egyptian national funds.” See Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterorism Hearing on Middle East Security Assistance, August 10, 2021. 163 By law, Egypt and Israel are permitted to earn interest on congressionally appropriated Foreign Military Financing By law, Egypt and Israel are permitted to earn interest on congressionally appropriated Foreign Military Financing
(FMF). During the late 1990s, the Clinton Administration (especially the U.S. Defense Department) and the Egyptian (FMF). During the late 1990s, the Clinton Administration (especially the U.S. Defense Department) and the Egyptian
government sought to increase U.S. military aid to Egypt. One proposal had been to grant Egypt a benefit government sought to increase U.S. military aid to Egypt. One proposal had been to grant Egypt a benefit ~~alr eady~~already
enjoyed by Israel—the use of an interest -bearing account in which unspent FMF funds can accumulate interest to be enjoyed by Israel—the use of an interest -bearing account in which unspent FMF funds can accumulate interest to be
used for future purchases. During Senate consideration of legislation to provide used for future purchases. During Senate consideration of legislation to provide ~~Egypt~~E gypt access to an interest -bearing access to an interest -bearing
account, Sen. Mitch McConnell remarked that “account, Sen. Mitch McConnell remarked that “ In the State Department briefing justifying the request, U.S. officials In the State Department briefing justifying the request, U.S. officials
urged our support because of Mubarak’s need to address the requirements of ‘his key constituents, the military.’ urged our support because of Mubarak’s need to address the requirements of ‘his key constituents, the military.’
Frankly, I think Mr. Mubarak needs to worry less about satisfying the military and spend more time and effort shoring Frankly, I think Mr. Mubarak needs to worry less about satisfying the military and spend more time and effort shoring
up democratic institutions and civic society.” See Congressional Record-Senate, S5508, June 21, 2000. In October up democratic institutions and civic society.” See Congressional Record-Senate, S5508, June 21, 2000. In October
2000, Congress passed P.L. 106-280, the Security Assistance Act of 2000, which authorized FY2001 FMF funds for 2000, Congress passed P.L. 106-280, the Security Assistance Act of 2000, which authorized FY2001 FMF funds for
Egypt to be disbursed to an interest -bearing account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. T he law required that Egypt to be disbursed to an interest -bearing account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. T he law required that
none of the interest accrued by such account should be obligated unless first notified to relevant congressional none of the interest accrued by such account should be obligated unless first notified to relevant congressional
appropriations and oversight committees. In November 2000, Congress passed P.L. 106-429, the FY2001 Foreign appropriations and oversight committees. In November 2000, Congress passed P.L. 106-429, the FY2001 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act, which included an interest-bearing account for Egypt in appropriations legislation. Operations Appropriations Act, which included an interest-bearing account for Egypt in appropriations legislation.
Since then, this provision has remained in annual appropriations legislation, most recently in P.L. 114-113, the Since then, this provision has remained in annual appropriations legislation, most recently in P.L. 114-113, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016.
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Figure A-1. The Military Aid “Pipeline”

Source: Information from Defense Security Cooperation Agency.Information from Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Graphic created by CRS. In response to political changes in Egypt from 2011 through 2016, the Obama Administration and Congress altered U.S. foreign aid to Egypt, and strains increased in U.S.-Egyptian relations. In FY2012, Congress enacted new restrictions on aid to Egypt that have carried forward to today. The FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Section 7041 of Division I, P.L. 112-74) specified that no funds could be made available to Egypt until the Secretary of State certified that Egypt was meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (due to concerns that a future democratical y elected Egyptian government might abrogate the treaty). It further specified that no military funds could be provided until the Administration certified that the government of Egypt was supporting a transition to civilian rule, including by holding free and fair elections and by implementing policies to protect freedom of expression, association, and religion, and due process of law. It permitted the Secretary of State to waive these requirements by reporting to Congress with a “detailed justification” that doing so was “in the national security interest of the United States.” On July 3, 2013, the Egyptian military suspended the constitution and ousted former President Mohamed Morsi. Subsequently, the Obama Administration took several steps to express U.S. displeasure with Morsi’s ouster. In 2013, President Obama announced a comprehensive review of U.S. foreign assistance policy toward Egypt, canceled a joint U.S.-Egypt military exercise (Operation Bright Star), suspended the deliveries of certain military items to Egypt (such as F-16s, along with Apache helicopters, Harpoon missiles, and M1A1 tanks) pending progress toward democracy, and cancel ed planned cash transfers of economic aid.164 Ultimately, the Obama Administration accepted the Egyptian military’s overthrow of a democratical y elected president 164 U.S. State Department, “U.S. Assistance to Egypt,” Press Statement, October 9, 2013. Congressional Research Service 35 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations as a fait accompli and attempted to redefine certain components of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship.165 In FY2014, Congress further conditioned the obligation aid for Egypt by applying certification requirements to distinct tranches of aid; for example, the Secretary of State was required to certify to the Committees on Appropriations prior to obligation of one tranche that Egypt had held a constitutional referendum and was taking steps to support a democratic transition. Prior to obligation of a second tranche, Congress required certification that Egypt had held parliamentary and presidential elections, and had a new elected government that was taking steps to govern democratical y.166 By the spring of 2015, as terrorist attacks against Egypt continued amid the global rise of the Islamic State, some lawmakers cal ed on the Administration to end its weapons export suspension.167 The Obama Administration responded with a change in U.S. policy. On March 31, 2015, the White House announced it would al ow the deliveries of select weapons systems to Egypt that had been on hold since October 2013, and pledged to continue seeking $1.3 bil ion in annual military aid from Congress. However, the White House simultaneously announced that future military assistance to Egypt would be largely reformulated by ending cash flow financing.168 Section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, 22 U.S.C. §2763) authorizes the President to finance the “procurement of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services by friendly foreign countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may determine consistent with the requirements of this section.” Successive Administrations have used this authority to permit Israel (and, until 2018, Egypt) to set aside almost al FMF funds for current year payments only, rather than set aside the amount needed to meet the full cost of multiyear purchases. From 2017 through 2020, some bilateral tensions diminished as President Trump sought to improve ties with President Sisi. President Trump continued to request that Congress appropriate $1.3 bil ion in military aid to Egypt, but did not restore the Egyptian military’s ability to benefit from Cash Flow Financing. Moreover, as previously mentioned, President Trump reduced the 165 President Obama said, “Going forward, the United States will maintain a constructive relationship with the Interim Government that promotes core interests like the Camp David Accords and counterterrorism. We'll continue support in areas like education that directly benefit the Egyptian people. But we have not proceeded with the delivery of certain military systems, and our support will depend upon Egypt ’s progress in pursuing a more democratic path.” U.S. President (Obama), “ Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents, 2013 DCPD-201300655, September 24, 2013, pp. 6 -7. 166 Congress did not provide a waiver for these conditions, but took steps to allow for the continuation of some aid under some circumstances. Congress provided that if the certifications could not be made, then FMF obligations were to “be made available at the minimum rate necessary to continue existing contracts ... except that defense articles and services from such contracts” were not to be delivered until the certification requirements were met. Congress applied parallel requirements on any use of prior-year FMF and International Military Education and T raining (IMET ) funds that remained available. Congress exempted funds that were to be used for counterterrorism, border security, and nonproliferation programs in Egypt, and for development activities in the Sinai. Congress applied a similar tranche and minimum rate necessary framework in FY2015, requiring certification of different criteria, and providing a waiver. 167 In February 2015, House State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee Chairwoman Kay Granger wrote t o President Obama stating that “ t hey [the Egyptians] need these planes and other weapons immediately to continue the fight against ISIL and other terrorists threatening Egypt ’s security, but your Administration has refused to use the authority Congress provided you in law to provide Egypt these weapons.” 168 For more information, see CRS Report R44060, Ending Cash Flow Financing to Egypt: Issues for Congress, by Jeremy M. Sharp (out of print but available to congressional requesters from the author). Congressional Research Service 36 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations FY2017 FMF obligation to Egypt by $65.7 mil ion as a result of Egypt’s relationship with North Korea and prosecution of U.S. and Egyptian nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers~~Graphic created by CRS~~. .
Economic Aid
Overview
~~Over the past two decades~~From the early 1980s until the late 1990s, U.S. economic aid to Egypt , U.S. economic aid to Egypt ~~has been significantly reduced~~helped modernize the nation’s energy, telecommunications, and waste water infrastructure. Beginning . Beginning
in the mid to late 1990s, as Egypt moved from being an impoverished country to a lower-middle-in the mid to late 1990s, as Egypt moved from being an impoverished country to a lower-middle-
income economy,income economy,~~129~~169 the United States and Egypt began to rethink the assistance relationship, the United States and Egypt began to rethink the assistance relationship,
emphasizing “trade not aid.”emphasizing “trade not aid.”~~130~~170 Congress began to scale back economic aid both to Egypt and Congress began to scale back economic aid both to Egypt and
Israel due to a 10-year agreement reached between the United States and Israel in the late 1990s Israel due to a 10-year agreement reached between the United States and Israel in the late 1990s
known as the known as the “Glide Path Agreement,” which gradual y reduced U.S. economic aid to Egypt to “Glide Path Agreement,” which gradual y reduced U.S. economic aid to Egypt to
$400 mil ion$400 mil ion by 2008.by 2008.~~131~~171 Congress also placed conditions on economic assistance in order to encourage Egypt to modernize its economy and political system. 172 U.S. economic aid to Egypt stood at $200 mil ion U.S. economic aid to Egypt stood at $200 mil ion per year by the end of per year by the end of
the George W. Bush Administration, whose relations with then-President the George W. Bush Administration, whose relations with then-President Hosni Mubarak suffered173 over the latter’s reaction to the Administration’s democracy agenda in the Arab world.174 During the Obama Administration, the President and Congress found common support for the use of enterprise funds, which are U.S. government-funded entities whose purpose is to promote the development and strengthening of a private sector in a foreign country by directly investing in its local firms. In May 2011, President Obama laid out his Administration’s initial response to Middle East uprisings by remarking that U.S. officials were “working with Congress to create enterprise funds to invest in Tunisia and Egypt. And these wil be modeled on funds that supported the transitions in Eastern Europe after the fal of the Berlin Wal .”175 In December 2011, Congress drew on a late Cold War precedent to authorize the establishment of enterprise~~Hosni Mubarak~~

~~129~~169 See World Bank historic data at See World Bank historic data at: https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519 https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519 -world-bank--world-bank-
country-and-lending-groups country-and-lending-groups
~~130~~ 170 Ahmed Galal, Robert Z. Lawrence (editors), Ahmed Galal, Robert Z. Lawrence (editors), Building Bridges: An Egypt-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Brookings , Brookings
Institution Press, 1998. Institution Press, 1998.
~~131~~171 In January 1998, Israeli officials, sensing that their economic growth had obviated the need for that type of U.S. aid In January 1998, Israeli officials, sensing that their economic growth had obviated the need for that type of U.S. aid
at a time when Congress sought to reduce foreign assistance expenditures, negotiated with the United States to reduceat a time when Congress sought to reduce foreign assistance expenditures, negotiated with the United States to reduce
economic aid and increase military aid over a 10 -year period. A 3:2 ratio that long prevailed in the overall levels of economic aid and increase military aid over a 10 -year period. A 3:2 ratio that long prevailed in the overall levels of
U.S. aid to Israel and Egypt was applied to the reduction in economic aid ($60 million reduction for Israel and $40 U.S. aid to Israel and Egypt was applied to the reduction in economic aid ($60 million reduction for Israel and $40
million reduction for Egypt), but Egypt did not receive an increase in military assistance. T hus, Congress reduced ESF million reduction for Egypt), but Egypt did not receive an increase in military assistance. T hus, Congress reduced ESF
aid to Egypt from $815 million in FY1998 to $411 million in FY2008aid to Egypt from $815 million in FY1998 to $411 million in FY2008. 172 From the late 1990s through FY2005, Congress specified that economic aid (ESF cash transfer) would be provided “with the understanding that Egypt will undertake significant economic reforms” beyond those previously undertaken. Beginning in the FY2006 appropriations act (P.L. 109-102), Congress changed the phrasing of this condition to include “significant economic and political reforms” (emphasis added). Beginning in FY2008 and thereafter through FY2010, Congress changed the condition phrasing to “significant economic and democratic reforms.” For FY2010, Congress also allocated “up to” $20 million for democracy, human rights and governance programs, and “not less than” $35 million for education programs. See Division F, T itle III, Econom ic Support Fund, P.L. 111-117. 173 See Helene Cooper, “ With Egypt, Diplomatic Words Often Fail,” New York Times, January 29, 2011. 174 T he George W. Bush Administration requested that Congress cut ESF aid by half in FY2009 to $200 million. Congress appropriated the President’s request. 175 NARA, Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack H. Obama, 2011, Book 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014), Remarks at the Department of State, May 19, 2011, pp. 552 -560. Congressional Research Service 37.
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~~suffered132 over the latter’s reaction to the Administration’s democracy agenda in the Arab~~
~~world.133~~
~~During~~funds in Egypt in the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Section 7041 of Division I, P.L. 112-74) The Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund (EAEF) was established by grant agreement with USAID on March 23, 2013. After eight years in operation, it general y has been considered a modest success in boosting Egypt’s private sector, particularly in the financial and technology sectors. According to USAID, the EAEF produced an annual return of 17.5% and has helped create 5,000 new full-time jobs, attracted several hundred mil ion dollars in foreign direct investment, and seeded some of the top private equity funds in Egypt.176 Since its inception, the EAEF has received $300 mil ion in ESF funds. As of May 2021, the EAEF has invested in 94 companies, supported 15,000 jobs and has a market value of over $600 mil ion.177 During the Obama Administration, the Egyptian military pushed back against U.S. support for a competitive, transparent electoral process.178 After reasserting power in 2013, the military moved to arrest American employees (as wel as Egyptian and other foreign nationals) of U.S.-based and foreign democracy promotion organizations.179 In the final years of the Obama Administration, wariness of U.S. democracy promotion ~~the final years of the Obama Administration, wariness of U.S. democracy promotion~~
assistance led the Egyptian government to obstruct many U.S.-funded economic assistance assistance led the Egyptian government to obstruct many U.S.-funded economic assistance
programs.programs.~~134~~ 180 According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of State According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of State
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reported hundreds of mil ions of and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reported hundreds of mil ions of
dollars ($460 mil ion as of 2015) in unobligated prior year ESF funding.dollars ($460 mil ion as of 2015) in unobligated prior year ESF funding.~~135~~181 These growing These growing
unobligated balances unobligated balances created pressure on the Obama Administration to reobligate ESF funds for created pressure on the Obama Administration to reobligate ESF funds for
other purposes. In 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress that it was reprogramming other purposes. In 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress that it was reprogramming
for other purposes $108 mil ionfor other purposes $108 mil ion of ESF that had been appropriated for Egypt in FY2015 but of ESF that had been appropriated for Egypt in FY2015 but
remained unobligated. The Administration claimed that its actions were due to “continued remained unobligated. The Administration claimed that its actions were due to “continued
government of Egypt process delays that have impeded the effective implementation of several government of Egypt process delays that have impeded the effective implementation of several
programs.”programs.”~~136~~182 In 2017, the In 2017, the Trump Administration also reprogrammed FY2016 ESF for Egypt. Trump Administration also reprogrammed FY2016 ESF for Egypt.
~~U.S. economic aid to Egypt is divided into two components: (1) USAID-managed programs~~
~~(public health, education, economic development, democracy and governance); and (2) the U.S.-~~
~~Egyptian Enterprise Fund.137 Both are funded primarily through the Economic Support Fund~~
~~(ESF) appropriations account.~~
~~Table A-1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt: 1946-2020~~
~~(calculated in historical dol ars—~~During the Trump and Biden Administrations, U.S. economic assistance has averaged $114 mil ion a year in ESF. From 2017 to present, USAID has expanded its role in assisting the Egyptian government develop the Sinai Peninsula. In north Sinai, the United States has funded 176 USAID, “Activity Fact Sheet: Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund, available at https://www.usaid.gov/egypt/economic-growth-and-trade/egyptian-american-enterprise-fund. 177 T he Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund, Press Release, “ T he Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund Sells Stake in Part of Fawry’s $80 Million Secondary Offering,” August 23, 2021. 178 Prior to 2011, U.S. funding for democracy promotion activities and good govern ance had been a source of acrimony between the United States and Egypt. Using the appropriations process, Congress has mandated that “ democracy and governance activities shall not be subject to the prior approval by the government of any foreign country. ” Originally referred to as the Brownback amendment, this legislative language began in reference to Egypt (Division D, T itle II, Econom ic Support Fund, P.L. 108-447), and was expanded in FY2008 to include “ any foreign country.” (Division J, Sec. 634(o), P.L. 110-161). 179 See footnote 150 on Case 173. From FY2014 to FY2019, Congress mandated in annual appropriations legislation that the Secretary of State shall withhold an amount of ESF to Egypt determined to be equivalent to that expended by the United States Government for bail, and by nongovernmental organizations for legal and court fees, associated with democracy-related trials in Egypt until the Secretary certifies that Egypt has dismissed the convictions issued by the Cairo Criminal Court on June 4, 2013. 180 House Foreign Affairs Committee, hearing entitled, “Egypt: Challenges and Opportun ities for U.S. Policy,” Prepared Statement by Amy Hawthorne, Project on Middle East Democracy, June 15, 2016. 181 EGYPT : U.S. Government Should Examine Options for Using Unobligated Funds and Evaluating Security Assistance Programs, GAO-15-259: Published: February 11, 2015. Publicly Released: March 12, 2015. 182 “US Shifts Egypt Aid to Other Countries,” Al Monitor, October 16, 2016. Congressional Research Service 38 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations the Al Arish desalination facility that provides 126,000 residents with potable water.183 USAID also has delivered commuter buses to isolated communities in central Sinai to improve access to workplaces, commerce, education, and government services.184 Table A-1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt: 1946-2020 (calculated in historical dol ars, not adjusted for inflation) not adjusted for inflation)
Year
Military
Economic
Annual Total
1946 1946
n/a n/a
$9,600,000 $9,600,000
$9,600,000 $9,600,000
1948 1948
n/a n/a
$1,400,000 $1,400,000
$1,400,000 $1,400,000
1951 1951
n/a n/a
$100,000 $100,000
$100,000 $100,000
1952 1952
n/a n/a
$1,200,000 $1,200,000
$1,200,000 $1,200,000
1953 1953
n/a n/a
$12,900,000 $12,900,000
$12,900,000 $12,900,000
1954 1954
n/a n/a
$4,000,000 $4,000,000
$4,000,000 $4,000,000
1955 1955
n/a n/a
$66,300,000 $66,300,000
$66,300,000 $66,300,000
1956 1956
n/a n/a
$33,300,000 $33,300,000
$33,300,000 $33,300,000
1957 1957
n/a n/a
$1,000,000 $1,000,000
$1,000,000 $1,000,000
1958 1958
n/a n/a
$601,000 $601,000
$601,000 $601,000
1959 1959
n/a n/a
$44,800,000 $44,800,000
$44,800,000 $44,800,000
1960 1960
n/a n/a
$65,900,000 $65,900,000
$65,900,000 $65,900,000
1961 1961
n/a n/a
$73,500,000 $73,500,000
$73,500,000 $73,500,000

~~132 See, Helene Cooper, “ With Egypt, Diplomatic Words Often Fail,” New York Times, January 29, 2011.~~
~~133 T he George W. Bush Administration requested that Congress cut ESF aid by half in FY2009 to $200 million.~~
~~Congress appropriated the President’s request.~~
~~134 House Foreign Affairs Committee, hearing entitled, “Egypt: Challenges and Opportunities fo r U.S. Policy,”~~
~~Prepared Statement by Amy Hawthorne, Project on Middle East Democracy, June 15, 2016.~~
~~135 EGYPT : U.S. Government Should Examine Options for Using Unobligated Funds and Evaluating Security~~
~~Assistance Programs, GAO-15-259: Published: February 11, 2015. Publicly Released: March 12, 2015.~~
~~136 “US Shifts Egypt Aid to Other Countries,” Al Monitor, October 16, 2016.~~
~~137 “Here’s One U.S. - Egypt Success Story,” Washington Post, April 5, 2019.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

29

~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Year~~
~~Military~~
~~Economic~~
~~Annual Total~~
1962 1962
n/a n/a
$200,500,000 $200,500,000
$200,500,000 $200,500,000
1963 1963
n/a n/a
$146,700,000 $146,700,000
$146,700,000 $146,700,000
1964 1964
n/a n/a
$95,500,000 $95,500,000
$95,500,000 $95,500,000
1965 1965
n/a n/a
$97,600,000 $97,600,000
$97,600,000 $97,600,000
1966 1966
n/a n/a
$27,600,000 $27,600,000
$27,600,000 $27,600,000
1967 1967
n/a n/a
$12,600,000 $12,600,000
$12,600,000 $12,600,000
1972 1972
n/a n/a
$1,500,000 $1,500,000
$1,500,000 $1,500,000
1973 1973
n/a n/a
$800,000 $800,000
$800,000 $800,000
1974 1974
n/a n/a
$21,300,000 $21,300,000
$21,300,000 $21,300,000
1975 1975
n/a n/a
$370,100,000 $370,100,000
$370,100,000 $370,100,000
1976 1976
n/a n/a
$464,300,000 $464,300,000
$464,300,000 $464,300,000
1976tq
n/a
$552,501,000
$552,501,000
1977 1977
n/a n/a
$907,752,000 $907,752,000
$907,752,000 $907,752,000
1978 1978
$183,000 $183,000
$943,029,000 $943,029,000
$943,212,000 $943,212,000
1979 1979
$1,500,379,000 $1,500,379,000
$1,088,095,000 $1,088,095,000
$2,588,474,000 $2,588,474,000
1980 1980
$848,000 $848,000
$1,166,423,000 $1,166,423,000
$1,167,271,000 $1,167,271,000 183 U.S. State Department, U.S. Embassy Egypt, U.S. Ambassador Visits North Sinai, June 24, 2021. 184 U.S. State Department, U.S. Embassy Egypt, United States Delivers 20 Brand New Buses to North Sinai Governorate, August 16, 2021. Congressional Research Service 39 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Year Military Economic Annual Total
1981 1981
$550,720,000 $550,720,000
$1,130,449,000 $1,130,449,000
$1,681,169,000 $1,681,169,000
1982 1982
$902,315,000 $902,315,000
$1,064,936,000 $1,064,936,000
$1,967,251,000 $1,967,251,000
1983 1983
$1,326,778,000 $1,326,778,000
$1,005,064,000 $1,005,064,000
$2,331,842,000 $2,331,842,000
1984 1984
$1,366,458,000 $1,366,458,000
$1,104,137,000 $1,104,137,000
$2,470,595,000 $2,470,595,000
1985 1985
$1,176,398,000 $1,176,398,000
$1,292,008,000 $1,292,008,000
$2,468,406,000 $2,468,406,000
1986 1986
$1,245,741,000 $1,245,741,000
$1,293,293,000 $1,293,293,000
$2,539,034,000 $2,539,034,000
1987 1987
$1,301,696,000 $1,301,696,000
$1,015,179,000 $1,015,179,000
$2,316,875,000 $2,316,875,000
1988 1988
$1,301,477,000 $1,301,477,000
$873,446,000 $873,446,000
$2,174,923,000 $2,174,923,000
1989 1989
$1,301,484,000 $1,301,484,000
$968,187,000 $968,187,000
$2,269,671,000 $2,269,671,000
1990 1990
$1,295,919,000 $1,295,919,000
$1,093,358,000 $1,093,358,000
$2,389,277,000 $2,389,277,000
1991 1991
$1,301,798,000 $1,301,798,000
$998,011,000 $998,011,000
$2,299,809,000 $2,299,809,000
1992 1992
$1,301,518,000 $1,301,518,000
$933,320,000 $933,320,000
$2,234,838,000 $2,234,838,000
1993 1993
$1,302,299,892 $1,302,299,892
$753,532,569 $753,532,569
$2,055,832,461 $2,055,832,461
1994 1994
$1,329,014,520 $1,329,014,520
$615,278,400 $615,278,400
$1,944,292,920 $1,944,292,920
1995 1995
$1,342,039,999 $1,342,039,999
$975,881,584 $975,881,584
$2,317,921,583 $2,317,921,583
1996 1996
$1,373,872,023 $1,373,872,023
$824,526,772 $824,526,772
$2,198,398,795 $2,198,398,795
1997 1997
$1,304,889,154 $1,304,889,154
$811,229,175 $811,229,175
$2,116,118,329 $2,116,118,329
1998 1998
$1,303,343,750 $1,303,343,750
$833,244,554 $833,244,554
$2,136,588,304 $2,136,588,304
1999 1999
$1,351,905,310 $1,351,905,310
$862,062,972 $862,062,972
$2,213,968,282 $2,213,968,282
2000 2000
$1,333,685,882 $1,333,685,882
$742,458,662 $742,458,662
$2,076,144,544 $2,076,144,544
2001 2001
$1,299,709,358 $1,299,709,358
$393,734,896 $393,734,896
$1,693,444,254 $1,693,444,254
~~Congressional Research Service~~

30

~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Year~~
~~Military~~
~~Economic~~
~~Annual Total~~
2002 2002
$1,301,367,000 $1,301,367,000
$1,046,193, $1,046,193,~~773~~772
$2,347,560, $2,347,560,~~773~~772
2003 2003
$1,304,073,715 $1,304,073,715
$646,856, $646,856,~~657~~655
$1,950,930, $1,950,930,~~372~~370
2004 2004
$1,318,119,661 $1,318,119,661
$720,241, $720,241,~~711~~709
$2,038,361, $2,038,361,~~372~~370
2005 2005
$1,294,700,384 $1,294,700,384
$495,849, $495,849,~~549~~544
$1,790,549, $1,790,549,~~933~~928
2006 2006
$1,301,512,728 $1,301,512,728
$351,242, $351,242,~~865~~871
$1,652,755, $1,652,755,~~593~~599
2007 2007
$1,305,235,109 $1,305,235,109
$737,348, $737,348,~~766~~773
$2,042,583, $2,042,583,~~875~~882
2008 2008
$1,294,902,533 $1,294,902,533
$314,498, $314,498,~~953~~954
$1,609,401, $1,609,401,~~486~~487
2009 2009
$1,301,332,000 $1,301,332,000
$688,533, $688,533,~~320~~322
$1,989,865, $1,989,865,~~320~~322
2010 2010
$1,301,900,000 $1,301,900,000
$ $~~301,154,735~~
~~$1,603,054,735~~300,943,891 $1,602,843,891
2011 2011
$1,298,779,449 $1,298,779,449
$ $~~240,529,294~~
~~$1,539,308,743~~,242,205,488 $1,540,984,937
2012 2012
$1,302,233,562 $1,302,233,562
$90,260, $90,260,~~725~~730
$1,392,494, $1,392,494,~~287~~292
2013 2013
$1,239,659,511 $1,239,659,511
$330, $330,~~576,763~~610,024
$1,570, $1,570,~~236,274~~269,534
2014 2014
$ $~~300.000~~
~~$179,300,000~~
~~$179,600.000~~274,031 $178,748,169 $179,022,200
2015 2015
$1,345,091,943 $1,345,091,943
$222, $222,~~200,000~~864,445
$1,567, $1,567,~~291,943~~956,387
2016 2016
$1, $1,~~105,882,379~~126,658,738
$133, $133,~~300,000~~
~~$1,239,182,379~~
~~2017~~
~~$1,302,300,000~~
~~$173,200,000~~
~~$1,475,500.000~~
~~2018~~
~~$1,306,800,000~~
~~$233,700,000~~
~~$1,540,500.000~~
~~2019~~
~~$1,306,800,000~~
~~$112,500,000~~
~~$1,419,300.000~~
~~2020~~
~~$1,300,000,000~~
~~$125,000,000~~
~~$1,425,000,000~~
~~Totals~~
~~$51,045,162.162~~
~~$33,136,725.695~~
~~$84,181,887.860~~150,380 $1,259,809,118 2017 $201,103,590 $173,179,863 $374,283,453 Congressional Research Service 40 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations 2018 $1,002,517,764 $233,703,233 $1,236,220,998 2019 $1,05,992,890 $161,968,390 $1,419,961,281 2020 $1,301,497,657 $126,511,470 $1,428,009,127 Totals $49,661,424,152 $33,189,150,268 $82,850,574,420
Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30,
~~2018, and Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2019-FY20201).~~
2019, and ForeignAssistance.gov, last updated July 26, 2021 (the year FY2020 is partial y reported). Note: This chart does not account for the repurposing of assistance funds which had been previously This chart does not account for the repurposing of assistance funds which had been previously ~~obligated~~obliga ted
for Egypt. Total numbers may be slightly higher than official sourcesfor Egypt. Total numbers may be slightly higher than official sources ~~since there is~~ due to a time a time delay in government delay in government
agency reporting of obligated funds. It is unclear why FY2014 militaryagency reporting of obligated funds. It is unclear why FY2014 military assistance funds are significantly lower than assistance funds are significantly lower than
previous years.previous years.

Author Information

Jeremy M. Sharp Jeremy M. Sharp

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

~~Congressional Research Service~~

31

~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

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