Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options

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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and
~~May 20~~December 9, 2020 , 2020
Options
Kenneth Katzman
U.S.-Iran relations have been mostly adversarial since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, U.S.-Iran relations have been mostly adversarial since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran,
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
occasionally flaring into direct conflict while at other times witnessing negotiations or tacit occasionally flaring into direct conflict while at other times witnessing negotiations or tacit
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
cooperation on selected issues. U.S. officials have consistently identified cooperation on selected issues. U.S. officials have consistently identified ~~Iran~~the regime’s support for ’s support for

militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies, and militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies, and limiting the expansion of Iran’s nuclear Iran’s nuclear
~~program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as that program advanced~~program has been a key U.S. policy goal for nearly two decades. .

The Obama Administration The Obama Administration ~~sought to change longstanding policy toward Iran by engaging it directly to obtain a limited~~ engaged Iran directly and obtained a July July
2015 multilateral nuclear agreement 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement ~~known as the~~ (Joint Comprehensive Plan of ActionJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action ~~(JCPOA). That agreement~~, JCPOA) that exchanged exchanged
sanctions relief for limits on Iran’s nuclear programsanctions relief for limits on Iran’s nuclear program~~, but~~. The accord did not contain binding curbs on Iran’s missile program or its did not contain binding curbs on Iran’s missile program or its
regional interventions, or any requirements that the Iranian government regional interventions, or any requirements that the Iranian government ~~end~~improve its human rights its human rights ~~abuses~~practices. The Trump . The Trump
Administration Administration ~~largely~~criticized the JCPOA’s perceived shortcomings and returned to prior policies of seeking to weaken Iran strategically. returned to prior policies of seeking to weaken Iran strategically. ~~Trump Administration officials cited~~
~~the JCPOA’s perceived shortcomings in a May 8, 2018 U.S. exit from the JCPOA and the subsequent re-imposition of all~~
~~U.S. secondary sanctions to apply “maximum pressure” on Iran. The stated intent of Trump Administration policy is to~~
~~compel Iran to~~On May 8, 2018, the Administration announced it would no longer implement the U.S. commitments under the JCPOA and it re-imposed all U.S. secondary sanctions. The stated intent of the Trump Administration’s “maximum pressure” policy on Iran is to compel it change its behavior, including negotiating a new nuclear agreement that encompasses the broad range of U.S. change its behavior, including negotiating a new nuclear agreement that encompasses the broad range of U.S.
concerns. Iran has responded by concerns. Iran has responded by ~~undertaking actions against~~exceeding nuclear limits set by the JCPOA and by attacking Saudi Arabia as well as commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf, commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf, and supporting attacks by supporting attacks by
its allies in Iraq and Yemen allies in Iraq and Yemen ~~to attack~~on U.S., Saudi, and other targets in the region U.S., Saudi, and other targets in the region~~, and by exceeding nuclear limits set by the~~
~~JCPOA. The Administration has added forces to the Gulf region, as well as explained the January 3, 2020, airstrike that killed~~
~~a top Iranian commander, Qasem Soleimani, as efforts to deter further such Iranian or Iran -backed actions.~~
. Along with Along with ~~the Trump Administration~~its shift in policy, the shift in policy, the ~~United States and Iran have~~Trump Administration has had minimal direct contact since 2017. had minimal direct contact since 2017.
~~However, President Trump continues to indicate~~President Trump has expressed a willingness to meet with Iranian leaders without preconditions a willingness to meet with Iranian leaders without preconditions., but Iranian Iranian
~~leaders say there will be no direct high level U.S.-Iran~~leaders refused such meetings until the United States meetings until the United States ~~reenters~~reentered the 2015 JCPOA and the 2015 JCPOA and ~~lifts~~
lifted U.S. sanctionsU.S. sanctions ~~as provided for in that agreement.~~. Trump Administration officials Administration officials ~~have~~ detailed a litany of objectionable behaviors detailed a litany of objectionable behaviors
that Iran must change for there to be a normalization of relations, that Iran must change for there to be a normalization of relations, ~~most of which require Iran to cease~~including a cessation of arming and supporting arming and supporting
armed factions in the region. armed factions in the region.
Some experts assert that the threat posed by Iran stems from the nature and ideology of Iran’s regime, and that the unstated Some experts assert that the threat posed by Iran stems from the nature and ideology of Iran’s regime, and that the unstated
goal of Trump Administration policy goal of Trump Administration policy ishas been to bring about regime collapse. to bring about regime collapse. ~~President Trump has specifically denied that t his is~~
~~the U.S. objective. Any~~ Any U.S. regime change strategy presumably would take advantage of divisions and fissures within Iran, U.S. regime change strategy presumably would take advantage of divisions and fissures within Iran,
as well as evident popular unrest resulting from political and economic frustration. Significant protests and riots, including as well as evident popular unrest resulting from political and economic frustration. Significant protests and riots, including
burning of some government installations and private establishments, have broken out since 2017.burning of some government installations and private establishments, have broken out since 2017. ~~There has not been unrest~~
~~recently in response to the government’s response to the COVID-19 outbreak, which has affected Iran significantly and in~~
~~which the official response has been widely criticized as ineffective.~~
There are also significant leadership differences in Iran. Hassan Rouhani, who seeks to improve Iran’s relations with the There are also significant leadership differences in Iran. Hassan Rouhani, who seeks to improve Iran’s relations with the
West, including the United States, won successive presidential elections in 2013 and 2017West, including the United States, won successive presidential elections in 2013 and 2017~~, and reformist~~. Reformist and moderate and moderate
candidates won overwhelmingly in concurrent municipal council elections in all the major cities. However, the killing of candidates won overwhelmingly in concurrent municipal council elections in all the major cities. However, the killing of
~~Soleimani~~the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps –Qods Force commander (IRGC –QF) Qasem Soleimani by a U.S. strike in January 2020 contributed to a significant victory by hardliners in the February 21, 2020, contributed to a significant victory by hardliners in the February 21, 2020, Majles (parliamentary) elections. (parliamentary) elections.
Hardliners also continue to control the state institutions that maintain internal security largely through suppression and by all Hardliners also continue to control the state institutions that maintain internal security largely through suppression and by all
accounts have been emboldened by U.S. policy to challenge the United States and pursue accounts have been emboldened by U.S. policy to challenge the United States and pursue ~~signific ant~~significant U.S. concessions in U.S. concessions in
order to order to avoid conflict. Several hardliners linked to the IRGC have stated that they will run in June 2021 presidential elections. The outcome of those Iranian elections could determine whether the next U.S. Administration of the presumptive winner of the 2020 U.S. election, former Vice President Joseph Biden, accomplishes its stated objective of returning the JCPOA if Iran returns to full compliance with the accord. The former Vice President has indicated that negotiations on other outstanding issues could follow a U.S. return to implementing the JCPOA.~~avoid conflict.~~
See also CRS Report R43333, See also CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit, by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report , by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report
RS20871,RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R44017, , by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth , by Kenneth
Katzman; and CRS Report R45795, Katzman; and CRS Report R45795, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J. , by Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J.
McInnis, and Clayton Thomas. McInnis, and Clayton Thomas.
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options

Political History
Iran is a country of nearly 80 Iran is a country of nearly 80 ~~mil ion~~million people, located in the heart of the Persian Gulf region. The people, located in the heart of the Persian Gulf region. The
United States was an United States was an ~~al y~~ally of the late Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (“the Shah”), who of the late Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (“the Shah”), who
ruled from 1941 until his ouster in February 1979. The Shah assumed the throne when Britain and ruled from 1941 until his ouster in February 1979. The Shah assumed the throne when Britain and
Russia forced his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi (Reza Shah), from power because of his perceived Russia forced his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi (Reza Shah), from power because of his perceived
alignment with Germany in World War II. Reza Shah had assumed power in 1921 when, as an alignment with Germany in World War II. Reza Shah had assumed power in 1921 when, as an
officer in Iran’s only military force, the Cossack Brigade (reflecting Russian influence in Iran in officer in Iran’s only military force, the Cossack Brigade (reflecting Russian influence in Iran in
the early 20th century), he launched a coup against the government of the Qajar Dynasty, which the early 20th century), he launched a coup against the government of the Qajar Dynasty, which
had ruled since 1794. Reza Shah was proclaimed Shah in 1925, founding the Pahlavi dynasty. had ruled since 1794. Reza Shah was proclaimed Shah in 1925, founding the Pahlavi dynasty.
The Qajar dynasty had been in decline for many years before Reza Shah’s takeover. That The Qajar dynasty had been in decline for many years before Reza Shah’s takeover. That
dynasty’s perceived manipulation by Britaindynasty’s perceived manipulation by Britain and Russia had been one of the causes of the 1906 and Russia had been one of the causes of the 1906
constitutionalist movement, which forced the Qajar dynasty to form Iran’s first constitutionalist movement, which forced the Qajar dynasty to form Iran’s first Majles
(parliament) in August 1906 and promulgate a constitution in December 1906. Prior to the Qajars, (parliament) in August 1906 and promulgate a constitution in December 1906. Prior to the Qajars,
what is now Iran was the center of several Persian empires and dynasties whose reach shrank what is now Iran was the center of several Persian empires and dynasties whose reach shrank
steadily over time. After the 16th century, Iranian empires lost control of Bahrain (1521), Baghdad steadily over time. After the 16th century, Iranian empires lost control of Bahrain (1521), Baghdad
(1638), the Caucasus (1828), western Afghanistan (1857), Baluchistan (1872), and what is now (1638), the Caucasus (1828), western Afghanistan (1857), Baluchistan (1872), and what is now
Turkmenistan (1894). Iran adopted Shia Islam under the Safavid Dynasty (1500-1722), which Turkmenistan (1894). Iran adopted Shia Islam under the Safavid Dynasty (1500-1722), which
ended a series of Turkic and Mongol conquests. ended a series of Turkic and Mongol conquests.
During the Cold War, the United States viewed the Shah as a bulwark against the expansion of During the Cold War, the United States viewed the Shah as a bulwark against the expansion of
Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and a counterweight to pro-Soviet Arab regimes and Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and a counterweight to pro-Soviet Arab regimes and
movements. Israel maintained a representative office in Iran during the Shah’s time and the Shah movements. Israel maintained a representative office in Iran during the Shah’s time and the Shah
supported a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In 1951, under pressure from supported a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In 1951, under pressure from
nationalists in the nationalists in the Majles (parliament) who gained strength in 1949 elections, he appointed a (parliament) who gained strength in 1949 elections, he appointed a
popular nationalist parliamentarian, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, as prime minister. Mossadeq was popular nationalist parliamentarian, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, as prime minister. Mossadeq was
widely considered left-leaning, and the United States opposed his drive to nationalizewidely considered left-leaning, and the United States opposed his drive to nationalize the oil the oil
industry, which had been controlled since 1913 by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. His followers industry, which had been controlled since 1913 by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. His followers
began an uprising in August 1953 when the Shah tried to dismiss him, and the Shah fled. The began an uprising in August 1953 when the Shah tried to dismiss him, and the Shah fled. The
Shah was restored to power in a CIA-supported uprising that toppled Mossadeq (“Operation Shah was restored to power in a CIA-supported uprising that toppled Mossadeq (“Operation
Ajax”) on August 19, 1953. Ajax”) on August 19, 1953.
The Shah tried to modernize Iran, but in so doing he alienated the Shia clergy and religious The Shah tried to modernize Iran, but in so doing he alienated the Shia clergy and religious
Iranians. He incurred broader resentment by using his SAVAKIranians. He incurred broader resentment by using his SAVAK ~~intel igence~~ intelligence service to repress service to repress
dissent. The Shah exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeinidissent. The Shah exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1964 because of Khomeini’s active in 1964 because of Khomeini’s active
opposition to what he asserted were the Shah’s anticlerical policies and forfeiture of Iran’s opposition to what he asserted were the Shah’s anticlerical policies and forfeiture of Iran’s
sovereignty to the United States. Khomeini fled to and taught in Najaf, Iraq, a major Shia sovereignty to the United States. Khomeini fled to and taught in Najaf, Iraq, a major Shia
theological center. In 1978, three years after the March 6, 1975, Algiers Accords between the theological center. In 1978, three years after the March 6, 1975, Algiers Accords between the
Shah and Iraq’s Baathist leaders that temporarily ended mutual hostile actions, Iraq Shah and Iraq’s Baathist leaders that temporarily ended mutual hostile actions, Iraq ~~expel ed~~expelled
Khomeini to France, where he continued to agitate for revolution that would establish Islamic Khomeini to France, where he continued to agitate for revolution that would establish Islamic
government in Iran. Mass demonstrations and government in Iran. Mass demonstrations and ~~guerril a~~guerrilla activity by pro-Khomeini activity by pro-Khomeini and other anti-and other anti-
government forces caused the Shah’s government to collapse. Khomeini returned from France on government forces caused the Shah’s government to collapse. Khomeini returned from France on
February 1, 1979, and, on February 11, 1979, he declared an Islamic Republic of Iran. February 1, 1979, and, on February 11, 1979, he declared an Islamic Republic of Iran.
Khomeini’s concept of Khomeini’s concept of velayat-e-faqih (rule by a supreme Islamic jurisprudent, or “Supreme (rule by a supreme Islamic jurisprudent, or “Supreme
Leader”) was enshrined in the constitution that was adopted in a public referendum in December Leader”) was enshrined in the constitution that was adopted in a public referendum in December
1979 (and amended in 1989). The constitution provided for the post of Supreme Leader of the 1979 (and amended in 1989). The constitution provided for the post of Supreme Leader of the
Revolution. The regime based itself on strong opposition to Western influence, and relations Revolution. The regime based itself on strong opposition to Western influence, and relations
between the United States and the Islamic Republic turned openly hostile after the November 4, between the United States and the Islamic Republic turned openly hostile after the November 4,
1979, seizure of the U.S. Embassy and its U.S. diplomats by pro-Khomeini radicals, which began 1979, seizure of the U.S. Embassy and its U.S. diplomats by pro-Khomeini radicals, which began
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options

the so- the so-~~cal ed~~called hostage crisis that ended in January 1981 with the release of the hostages. hostage crisis that ended in January 1981 with the release of the hostages.1 Ayatollah Ayatollah
Khomeini died on June 3, 1989, and was succeeded by Ayatollah AliKhomeini died on June 3, 1989, and was succeeded by Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i. Khamene’i.
The regime faced serious unrest in its first few years, including a June 1981 bombing at the The regime faced serious unrest in its first few years, including a June 1981 bombing at the
headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and the prime minister’s office that headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and the prime minister’s office that ~~kil ed~~killed
several senior elected and clerical leaders, including then-Prime Minister Javad Bahonar, elected several senior elected and clerical leaders, including then-Prime Minister Javad Bahonar, elected
President AliPresident Ali Raja’i, and IRP head and top Khomeini disciple Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Raja’i, and IRP head and top Khomeini disciple Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein
Beheshti. The regime used these events, along with the hostage crisis with the United States, to Beheshti. The regime used these events, along with the hostage crisis with the United States, to
justify purging many of the secular, liberal, and left-wing personalities that had been prominent in justify purging many of the secular, liberal, and left-wing personalities that had been prominent in
the years just after the revolution. Examples included the regime’s first Prime Minister Mehdi the years just after the revolution. Examples included the regime’s first Prime Minister Mehdi
Bazargan; the pro-Moscow Tudeh Party (Communist); the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Bazargan; the pro-Moscow Tudeh Party (Communist); the People’s Mojahedin Organization of
Iran (PMOI, see below); and the first elected president, Abolhassan Bani Sadr. The regime was Iran (PMOI, see below); and the first elected president, Abolhassan Bani Sadr. The regime was
under economic and military threat during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, in part due to the under economic and military threat during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, in part due to the
destruction of its oil export capacity and its need to ration goods. destruction of its oil export capacity and its need to ration goods.
Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition
The structure of authority in Iran defies easy categorization. The structure of authority in Iran defies easy categorization. ~~There are elected leadership posts~~
~~and a diversity of opinion among the ruling elite, but~~ Iran’s constitution—adopted in public Iran’s constitution—adopted in public
referenda in late 1979 and again in 1989—referenda in late 1979 and again in 1989—~~reserves~~assigns paramount paramount ~~decisionmaking~~decision making authority for a authority for a
“Supreme Leader” (known in Iran as “Leader of the Revolution”). “Supreme Leader” (known in Iran as “Leader of the Revolution”). ~~The~~ However, choosing the successor to the Supreme Leader is the duty of an elected body called the Assembly of Experts. A President and the President and the Majles
(unicameral parliament) are directly elected, and since 2013, there have been elections for (unicameral parliament) are directly elected, and since 2013, there have been elections for
municipal councils that select mayors and set local development priorities. Throughout Iran’s municipal councils that select mayors and set local development priorities. Throughout Iran’s
power structure, there are disputes between those who insist on ideological purity and those power structure, there are disputes between those who insist on ideological purity and those
considered more pragmatic. Nonetheless, the preponderant political power wielded by the Shia considered more pragmatic. Nonetheless, the preponderant political power wielded by the Shia
Islamic clergy and the security apparatus has contributed to the eruption of repeated periodic Islamic clergy and the security apparatus has contributed to the eruption of repeated periodic
unrest from unrest from ~~intel ectuals~~intellectuals, students, labor groups, the poor, women, and members of Iran’s , students, labor groups, the poor, women, and members of Iran’s
minority groups. (Iran’s demographics are depicted in a text box below.) minority groups. (Iran’s demographics are depicted in a text box below.)
U.S. officials in successive Administrations have accused Iran’s regime of widespread corruption, U.S. officials in successive Administrations have accused Iran’s regime of widespread corruption,
both within the government and among its both within the government and among its ~~pil ars~~pillars of support. In a speech on Iran on July 22, of support. In a speech on Iran on July 22,
2018, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo characterized Iran’s government as “something that 2018, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo characterized Iran’s government as “something that
resembles the mafia more than a government.”resembles the mafia more than a government.” 21 He detailed He detailed ~~al egations~~allegations of the abuse of privileges of the abuse of privileges
enjoyed by Iran’s leaders and supporting elites to enrich themselves and their supporters at the enjoyed by Iran’s leaders and supporting elites to enrich themselves and their supporters at the
expense of the public good. The State Department’s expense of the public good. The State Department’s ~~September 2018~~ “Outlaw Regime” report “Outlaw Regime” report ~~(p.~~
~~41) states that “~~on Iran, first released in 2018 and updated in 2020, cite widespread corruption and mismanagement at the highest levels of the Iranian regime corruption and mismanagement at the highest levels of the Iranian regime “have have
~~produced years of environmental exploitation and degradation throughout the country.”3~~

~~1 T he U.S. Embassy hostages are to be compensated for their detention in Iran from proceeds received from various~~
~~banks to settle allegations of concealing financial transactions on behalf of Iranian clients, under a provision of the~~
~~FY2016 Consolidated Appropriation.~~
2produced years of environmental exploitation and degradation, with tragic results for the Iranian people.”2 1 Secretary of State Michael Pompeo. “Supporting Iranian Voices.” Reagan Secretary of State Michael Pompeo. “Supporting Iranian Voices.” Reagan Library, JulyLibrary, July 22, 2018. 22, 2018.
32 Department of State. “ Department of State. “ Outlaw Regime: A Chronicle of Iran’s Destructive ActivitiesOutlaw Regime: A Chronicle of Iran’s Destructive Activities, 2020.” September .” September ~~25, 2018~~19, 2020
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Supreme Leader:
Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i
Born in July 1939 to an Azeri Born in July 1939 to an Azeri (Turkic) family from(Turkic) family from the northern city of Mashhad. Was jailedthe northern city of Mashhad. Was jailed by the Shah of by the Shah of
Iran for supporting Ayatol ah Khomeini’sIran for supporting Ayatol ah Khomeini’s revolution.revolution. After the regimeAfter the regime took power in 1979, helped organize took power in 1979, helped organize
Revolutionary Guard and other security organs. Lost someRevolutionary Guard and other security organs. Lost some use of right arm in purported assassination use of right arm in purported assassination
attempt in June 1981. Was elected president in 1981 and served until 1989. Was selectedattempt in June 1981. Was elected president in 1981 and served until 1989. Was selected Khomeini’s Khomeini’s
successorsuccessor in June 1989. Upon that selection,in June 1989. Upon that selection, Khamene’i’sKhamene’i’s ~~religious~~ religious ranking was advanced in official organs to ranking was advanced in official organs to
“Grand Ayatol ah” from“Grand Ayatol ah” from the lower-ranking “Hoj at ol-Islam.”the lower-ranking “Hoj at ol-Islam.” ~~He stil~~ He lacks the undisputed authority lacks the undisputed authority ~~and the~~
~~public adoration Khomeini~~ Khomeini had, and competes with Grand Ayatol ah Alihad, and competes with Grand Ayatol ah Ali al-Sistani of Iraq and other Shia al-Sistani of Iraq and other Shia
~~clerics~~ clerics for the role of for the role of marja taqlid (“source of inspiration”)—the leading Shia figure who holds the (“source of inspiration”)—the leading Shia figure who holds the ~~al egiance~~
allegiance of mil ionsof mil ions of Shias regionwide and worldwide.of Shias regionwide and worldwide. As to Khamene’i’sAs to Khamene’i’s health situation, the government health situation, the government
acknowledged that he underwent prostate surgery in Septemberacknowledged that he underwent prostate surgery in September 2014, but he has since appeared in public 2014, but he has since appeared in public
~~regularly.~~ regularly. Reports in late 2020 that he has suffered health setbacks have not been widely corroborated. Has not traveled outside Iran since becoming Has not traveled outside Iran since becoming ~~Supreme~~ Supreme Leader.Leader. Lives in the Pasteur district of Lives in the Pasteur district of
Tehran. He and his wife have four sons and two daughters. Tehran. He and his wife have four sons and two daughters.
Policies
Khamene’i Khamene’i ~~sets overal~~ sets overall policy direction,policy direction, particularly on regional and national security issues,particularly on regional and national security issues, but tends to but tends to
~~al ow~~allow elected presidents elected presidents to pursue policy initiatives that they assert advances Iran’s interests,to pursue policy initiatives that they assert advances Iran’s interests, for example the for example the
JCPOA. Throughout career,JCPOA. Throughout career, has consistently taken hardline stances on regionalhas consistently taken hardline stances on regional issues,issues, particularly toward particularly toward
Israel,Israel, ~~repeatedly cal ing~~ repeatedly calling it a “cancerous tumor” that needs to be excised from the region. In March 2014, it a “cancerous tumor” that needs to be excised from the region. In March 2014,
publicly questioned whether the Holocaust occurredpublicly questioned whether the Holocaust occurred~~—an issue highlighted by former president Ahmadinejad.~~
. He is widely believed to fear direct militaryHe is widely believed to fear direct military confrontation with United States on Iranian soil.confrontation with United States on Iranian soil. He meetsHe meets with with
few Westernfew Western ~~officials~~ officials and is avowedly and is avowedly ~~suspicious~~ suspicious of relations with the West,of relations with the West, particularly the United States, as particularly the United States, as
~~potential y~~potentially making Iran vulnerable to making Iran vulnerable to ~~Western~~ Western cultural influence, spying, cultural influence, spying, ~~and possible regime~~ acts of sabotage and assassination, and regime destabilization destabilization
efforts. efforts. ~~Largely~~ Largely bowing to public opinion, Khamene’i acquiesced to the election in 2013 of the relatively bowing to public opinion, Khamene’i acquiesced to the election in 2013 of the relatively
~~moderate~~ moderate President Hassan Rouhani. In 2019, fol owing the Trump Administration exit from the JCPOA, he directly criticized President Hassan Rouhani for ~~President Hassan Rouhani. Khamene’i did not oppose the JCPOA, paving the way for its adoption~~
~~by the Majles and the Council of Guardians. In 2016, he accused the United States of not implementing~~
~~JCPOA-related sanctions relief ful y and thereby deterring foreign firms from returning to Iran. In 2019, he~~
~~directly criticized President Hassan Rouhani for~~ expecting the United States to uphold the JCPOA long term.expecting the United States to uphold the JCPOA long term.
Earlier,Earlier, he reputedly issued religioushe reputedly issued religious proclamation (2003) against Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, and has proclamation (2003) against Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, and has
publicly (2012) publicly (2012) ~~cal ed~~called doing so a “sin.” He ful y backs efforts by the IRGC to support regional pro-Iranian doing so a “sin.” He ful y backs efforts by the IRGC to support regional pro-Iranian
movementsmovements and governments.and governments. ~~Earlier~~ Earlier in his career,in his career, Khamene’iKhamene’i tended to support the business community tended to support the business community
(bazaaris), and opposed state control of the economy,(bazaaris), and opposed state control of the economy, but as Supremebut as Supreme Leader he has Leader he has ~~asserted that officials,~~
~~including Rouhani,~~promoted the need to need to ~~promote~~develop a self-sufficient economy that can withstand the effects of international a self-sufficient economy that can withstand the effects of international
sanctions (“resistance economy”). Attributed late 2017-early 2018 unrest to meddling by the United States, sanctions (“resistance economy”). Attributed late 2017-early 2018 unrest to meddling by the United States,
Saudi Arabia, and Israel,Saudi Arabia, and Israel, but also acknowledged that protestersbut also acknowledged that protesters had legitimatehad legitimate grievances.grievances.
Khamene’i’sKhamene’i’s office is run by Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani, with significant input from Khamene’i’s office is run by Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani, with significant input from Khamene’i’s
second and increasingly influential son, Mojtaba. Khamene’isecond and increasingly influential son, Mojtaba. Khamene’i is advised is advised ~~formal y~~ formally by the Expediency Council, and by the Expediency Council, and
~~informal y~~ informally by by Keyhan editor Hossein editor Hossein Shariatmadari and numerous other current and formerShariatmadari and numerous other current and former officials,officials, clerics, clerics,
and other notables. Mojtaba was sanctioned by the Trump Administrationand other notables. Mojtaba was sanctioned by the Trump Administration in November 2019.in November 2019.
Photograph from http://www.leader.ir.Photograph from http://www.leader.ir. Sources: various press Sources: various press

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Unelected or Indirectly Elected Institutions: The Supreme Leader,
Council of Guardians, and Expediency Council
Iran’s power structure consists of unelected or indirectly elected persons and institutions. Iran’s power structure consists of unelected or indirectly elected persons and institutions.
The Supreme Leader
At the apex of the Islamic Republic’s power structure is the “Supreme Leader.” He is chosen by At the apex of the Islamic Republic’s power structure is the “Supreme Leader.” He is chosen by
an elected body—the Assembly of Experts—which also has the constitutional power to remove an elected body—the Assembly of Experts—which also has the constitutional power to remove
him, as him, as ~~wel~~ well as to redraft Iran’s constitutionas to redraft Iran’s constitution ~~and submit it~~. A revised constitution is to be submitted for approval in a national referendum. for approval in a national referendum.
The Supreme Leader is required to be a senior Shia cleric. Upon The Supreme Leader is required to be a senior Shia cleric. Upon ~~Ayatollah~~ Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, the Khomeini’s death, the
Assembly selected one of his disciples, Ayatollah AliAssembly selected one of his disciples, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, as Supreme Leader.Khamene’i, as Supreme Leader.43 Although Although
he has never had Khomeini’s undisputed political or religious authority, the powers of the office he has never had Khomeini’s undisputed political or religious authority, the powers of the office
ensure that Khamene’i is Iran’s paramount leader. ensure that Khamene’i is Iran’s paramount leader.
Under the constitution, the Supreme Leader is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, giving him the power to appoint commanders. The Supreme Leader can remove an elected president, if the judiciary or the The Supreme Leader can remove an elected president, if the judiciary or the Majles (parliament) (parliament)
assert cause for removal. The Supreme Leader appoints half of the 12-member assert cause for removal. The Supreme Leader appoints half of the 12-member Council of
Guardians, , al all members of the members of the Expediency Council, , ~~and the judiciary head.~~
~~Under the constitution, the Supreme Leader is commander-in-chief~~the head of of the judiciary, and~~the armed forces, giving~~
~~him the power to appoint commanders. Khamene’i appoints~~ five out of the nine members of the five out of the nine members of the
country’s highest national security body, the country’s highest national security body, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), on
~~which sit~~. The body includes the heads of the regime’s top military, foreign policy, and domestic security the heads of the regime’s top military, foreign policy, and domestic security
organizations. Senior IRGC leader and former Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani, who espouses organizations. Senior IRGC leader and former Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani, who espouses
more moderate views than his IRGC peers, has headed more moderate views than his IRGC peers, has headed ~~that body~~it since September 2013. since September 2013.5
4 Succession to Khamene’i
There is no designated successor or immediately obvious choice to succeed Khamene’i. The There is no designated successor or immediately obvious choice to succeed Khamene’i. The
Assembly of Experts could conceivably use a constitutional provision to set up a three-person Assembly of Experts could conceivably use a constitutional provision to set up a three-person
leadership council as successor rather than select one new Supreme Leader. Khamene’i reportedly leadership council as successor rather than select one new Supreme Leader. Khamene’i reportedly
favors Hojjat ol-Eslam Ibrahim Raisi, whom he appointed in March 2019 as head of the judiciary, favors Hojjat ol-Eslam Ibrahim Raisi, whom he appointed in March 2019 as head of the judiciary,
and in 2016 to head the powerful Shrine of Imam Reza (Astan-e Qods Razavi) in Mashhad, and in 2016 to head the powerful Shrine of Imam Reza (Astan-e Qods Razavi) in Mashhad,
which controls vast property and many businesses in the province. Raisi has served as state which controls vast property and many businesses in the province. Raisi has served as state
prosecutor and was prosecutor and was ~~al egedly~~allegedly involved in the 1988 massacre of prisoners and other acts of involved in the 1988 massacre of prisoners and other acts of
repression.repression.65 Raisi lost the May 2017 presidential Raisi lost the May 2017 presidential election to Rouhani. election to Rouhani.
Raisi’s predecessor as judiciary chief, Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani, Raisi’s predecessor as judiciary chief, Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani,7 6 remains a succession candidate. remains a succession candidate.
Another Another widely mentioned contender is hardline Tehran Friday prayer leader Ayatollah Ahmad Khatemi, contender is hardline Tehran Friday prayer leader Ayatollah Ahmad Khatemi, ~~and some~~
Some consider President Rouhani as a contender as consider President Rouhani as a contender as ~~wel~~ well. .
Council of Guardians and Expediency Council
Two appointed councils play a major role on legislation, election candidate vetting, and policy. Two appointed councils play a major role on legislation, election candidate vetting, and policy.

4 3 At the time of his selection as Supreme At the time of his selection as Supreme Leader, Khamene’i wasLeader, Khamene’i was generally referred to at the rank of Hojjat ol-Islam, generally referred to at the rank of Hojjat ol-Islam,
one rank belowone rank below Ayatollah, suggestingAyatollah, suggesting his religioushis religious elevation waselevation was political rather than through traditional mechanisms. political rather than through traditional mechanisms.
54 Shamkhani was Shamkhani was sanctioned by the Administration in January 2020 as part of the Supreme Leader’s office. Seesanctioned by the Administration in January 2020 as part of the Supreme Leader’s office. See CRS CRS
Report RS20871, Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman. , by Kenneth Katzman.
65 “Iran cleric linked to 1988 mass executions to lead judiciary.”Associated “Iran cleric linked to 1988 mass executions to lead judiciary.”Associated Press, March 7, 2019. Press, March 7, 2019.
76 Larijani was Larijani was sanctioned by the Administration in 2019. sanctioned by the Administration in 2019.
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Council of Guardians
The 12-member Council of Guardians (COG) consists of six Islamic jurists appointed by the The 12-member Council of Guardians (COG) consists of six Islamic jurists appointed by the
Supreme Leader and six lawyers selected by the judiciary and confirmed by the Supreme Leader and six lawyers selected by the judiciary and confirmed by the Majles. Each . Each
councilor serves a six-year term, staggered such that half the body turns over every three years. councilor serves a six-year term, staggered such that half the body turns over every three years.
Currently headed by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, who is over 90 years of age, the conservative-Currently headed by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, who is over 90 years of age, the conservative-
controlled body reviews legislation to ensure it conforms to Islamic law. It also vets election controlled body reviews legislation to ensure it conforms to Islamic law. It also vets election
candidates by evaluating their backgrounds according to constitutional requirements that each candidates by evaluating their backgrounds according to constitutional requirements that each
candidate demonstrate knowledge of Islam, loyalty to the Islamic system of government, and candidate demonstrate knowledge of Islam, loyalty to the Islamic system of government, and
other criteria that are largelyother criteria that are largely subjective. The COG also certifies election results. Municipal subjective. The COG also certifies election results. Municipal
council candidates are vetted not by the COG but by local committees established by the council candidates are vetted not by the COG but by local committees established by the Majles. .
Expediency Council
The Expediency Council was established in 1988 to resolve legislative The Expediency Council was established in 1988 to resolve legislative disagreements between the disagreements between the
Majles and the COG. It has since evolved and the COG. It has since evolved primarily into a policy advisory body for the Supreme into a policy advisory body for the Supreme ~~Leader,~~
~~and it employs~~Leader. Its members serve five-year terms, assisted by researchers and experts researchers and experts towho help develop develop policy options~~policy options on various issues. Its members~~
~~serve five-year terms~~. Longtime regime stalwart Ayatollah Ali. Longtime regime stalwart Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-RafsanjaniAkbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani served served
as the body’s chairman until his January 2017 death. In August 2017, the Supreme Leader as the body’s chairman until his January 2017 death. In August 2017, the Supreme Leader
expanded the council from 42 to 45 members, and former judiciary head Ayatollah Mahmoud expanded the council from 42 to 45 members, and former judiciary head Ayatollah Mahmoud
Hashemi Shahroudi became chairman. Shahroudi passed away in December 2018 and Sadeq Hashemi Shahroudi became chairman. Shahroudi passed away in December 2018 and Sadeq
Larijani, who was then head of the judiciary, was appointed by the Supreme Leader as his Larijani, who was then head of the judiciary, was appointed by the Supreme Leader as his
replacement. Iran’s president and speaker of replacement. Iran’s president and speaker of Majles attend the body’s sessions in their official attend the body’s sessions in their official
capacities. capacities.

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Table 1. Other Major Institutions, Factions, and Individuals
Regime/Pro-regime
The regime The regime ~~derives~~ derives support from a network of organizations and institutions such as those discussed below.support from a network of organizations and institutions such as those discussed below.
Senior Shia Senior Shia
The most senior The most senior Shia clerics,Shia clerics, most of whom are in Qom,most of whom are in Qom, ~~are general y~~ are generally “quietists”—they “quietists”—they
Clerics/Grand Clerics/Grand
assert that the senior assert that the senior clergy should clergy should ~~general y~~generally refrain from refrain from involvement in politics, although involvement in politics, although
Ayatol ahs Ayatol ahs
they do speak out on political issues. they do speak out on political issues. The ranks of the most seniorThe ranks of the most senior clergy include Grand clergy include Grand
Ayatol ah Nasser Makarem Shirazi and Grand Ayatol ah Yusuf Sanei. SecretaryAyatol ah Nasser Makarem Shirazi and Grand Ayatol ah Yusuf Sanei. Secretary of State of State
Pompeo accused Shirazi in a July 22, 2018, speech of enriching himselfPompeo accused Shirazi in a July 22, 2018, speech of enriching himself through il icitthrough il icit trading trading
of sugar. Another seniorof sugar. Another senior ~~cleric~~ cleric is the hardline Ayatol ah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, who is the hardline Ayatol ah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, who
representsrepresents the “vocal” school of the senior clergy and is an assertivethe “vocal” school of the senior clergy and is an assertive defender of the powers defender of the powers
of the Supreme Leader.of the Supreme Leader. He lost his AssemblyHe lost his Assembly of Experts seat in February 2016 elections.of Experts seat in February 2016 elections.
Religious Religious
Iran has several Iran has several major religious foundations, cal ed “bonyads.” major parastatal religious foundations, called “bonyads.” Examples include the Examples include the ~~Martyr’s~~
Foundations Foundations
Martyr’s Foundation, the Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled,Foundation, the Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled, the Astan Qods Razavi the Astan Qods Razavi
(“ (“Bonyads”) ”)
Foundation (linked to the Shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad), and the Fifteen Khordad Foundation (linked to the Shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad), and the Fifteen Khordad
Foundation (which offers a bounty for Foundation (which offers a bounty for ~~the implementation of~~implementing Khomeini’s Khomeini’s ~~order~~ order that that Satanic
Verses author Salman Rushdie be kil ed). author Salman Rushdie be kil ed). The The bonyads,, ~~control ed by clerics and their al ies,~~
run by clerics, former IRGC officials, and other hardliners, control vast amounts of property and valuable businesses,control vast amounts of property and valuable businesses, ~~some~~ some of which were of which were ~~bu ilt~~built from from
assets left behind when the Shah and his assets left behind when the Shah and his ~~al ies~~ allies fled Iran in 1979. The fled Iran in 1979. The bonyads are loosely are loosely
regulated, regulated, ~~political y~~ politically influential, and largely exempt from taxation – an exemption that often influential, and largely exempt from taxation – an exemption that often
causes unrest and protest of privilegescauses unrest and protest of privileges enjoyed by regimeenjoyed by regime insiders.insiders.
The Islamic The Islamic
The IRGC is a military The IRGC is a military and internal security force, and an instrument of Iran’s regional policy. and internal security force, and an instrument of Iran’s regional policy.
Revolutionary Revolutionary
The IRGC is sanctioned under several The IRGC is sanctioned under several U.S. Executive orders,U.S. Executive orders, including E.O. 13224 that including E.O. 13224 that
Guard Corps Guard Corps
sanctions entities determined sanctions entities determined to be supporting acts of international terrorism.to be supporting acts of international terrorism. On AprilOn April 8, 8,
(IRGC) (IRGC)
2019, the IRGC was also designated as a foreign terrorist 2019, the IRGC was also designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), a designation organization (FTO), a designation
that has not previously been applied to a militarythat has not previously been applied to a military organization of any country. In Aprilorganization of any country. In April 2019, 2019,
the Supreme Leaderthe Supreme Leader replaced IRGC commander-in-chief Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari replaced IRGC commander-in-chief Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari
with his deputy, Major Generalwith his deputy, Major General ~~Hossein Salami, and he replaced several other IRGC officials~~
~~including the IRGC head of security.~~
Hossein Salami. Society of Society of
Longtime Longtime organization of moderate-to-hardline clerics.organization of moderate-to-hardline clerics. Its Secretary-GeneralIts Secretary-General is Ayatol ah is Ayatol ah
Militant Clerics Militant Clerics
Mohammad Ali Mohammad Ali Movahedi-Kermani.Movahedi-Kermani. President Rouhani is a member.President Rouhani is a member.
Sources: Various press accounts and author conversations with Iran experts in and outside Washington, DC. Various press accounts and author conversations with Iran experts in and outside Washington, DC.
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo “Supporting Iranian Voices,” Reagan Library,Secretary of State Michael Pompeo “Supporting Iranian Voices,” Reagan Library, California, July 22, 2018. The California, July 22, 2018. The
IRGC is discussed extensively in CRS Report R44017, IRGC is discussed extensively in CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman. See , by Kenneth Katzman. See
also CRS Insight IN11093, also CRS Insight IN11093, Iran’s Revolutionary ~~Guard~~ Guard Named a Terrorist Organization,, by Kenneth Katzman. by Kenneth Katzman.
Domestic Security Organs
The leaders and senior officials of a variety of overlapping domestic security organizations form a The leaders and senior officials of a variety of overlapping domestic security organizations form a
~~paral el~~ parallel power structure that is largely under the direct control of the Supreme Leader in his power structure that is largely under the direct control of the Supreme Leader in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. State Department and other human rights capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. State Department and other human rights
reports on Iran repeatedly assert that internal security personnel are not held accountable for reports on Iran repeatedly assert that internal security personnel are not held accountable for
human rights abuses. Several security organizations and their senior leaders are sanctioned by the human rights abuses. Several security organizations and their senior leaders are sanctioned by the
United States for human rights abuses and other violations of U.S. Executive Orders.United States for human rights abuses and other violations of U.S. Executive Orders.7
The domestic security organs include the following: The domestic security organs include the following:
  The IRGC and Basij. The IRGC‘s domestic security role is implemented The IRGC‘s domestic security role is implemented
primarily primarily through its volunteer militiathrough its volunteer militia ~~force cal ed~~ force called the the Basij. To suppress large To suppress large
and violent antigovernment demonstrations, the and violent antigovernment demonstrations, the Basij getsgets backing from thebacking from the
IRGC, whose bases are located mostly in urban areasIRGC, whose bases are located mostly in urban areas ~~and which can quickly~~
~~intervene~~. In July 2019, Khamene’i replaced appointed a new Basij commander, . In July 2019, Khamene’i replaced appointed a new Basij commander,
Gholamreza Soleimani, who was Gholamreza Soleimani, who was ~~sanctioned by the Administration in January~~
~~2020 and who is not related to the late IRGC-Qf commander Qasem Soleimani.~~
7 These persons and entities are listed in: CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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sanctioned by the Administration in January 2020 and who is not related to the late IRGC-QF commander Qasem Soleimani. The The Basij is widely accused of arresting women who violate the regime’s public is widely accused of arresting women who violate the regime’s public
dress codes and raiding Western-style parties that serve alcohol, which is dress codes and raiding Western-style parties that serve alcohol, which is ~~il egal~~
illegal in Iran. in Iran.
  Law Enforcement Forces. This body is an amalgam of regular police, This body is an amalgam of regular police,
gendarmerie, and riot police that serve throughout the country. These forces gendarmerie, and riot police that serve throughout the country. These forces
~~general y implement the regime’s initial response to~~generally are tasked with containing non-violent demonstrations non-violent demonstrations
or unrest. or unrest.
  Ministry of Interior. The ministry exercises civilian supervision of Iran’s police The ministry exercises civilian supervision of Iran’s police
and domestic security forces. The IRGC and and domestic security forces. The IRGC and Basij do not report to the ministry. do not report to the ministry.
  Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). The MOIS conducts domestic The MOIS conducts domestic
~~surveil ance~~surveillance to identify regime opponents. It also surveils anti-regime activists to identify regime opponents. It also surveils anti-regime activists
abroad through its network of agents placed in Iran’s embassies. It works closely abroad through its network of agents placed in Iran’s embassies. It works closely
with IRGC-Qods Force agents outside Iran, although the two institutions with IRGC-Qods Force agents outside Iran, although the two institutions
sometimes differ in their approaches, as has been reportedly the case in deciding sometimes differ in their approaches, as has been reportedly the case in deciding
on which politicians to support in Iraq.8on which politicians to support in Iraq.8
Elected Institutions/Recent Elections
Several major institutional positions are directly elected by the population, but international Several major institutional positions are directly elected by the population, but international
observers question the credibility of Iran’s elections because of the role of the COG in vetting observers question the credibility of Iran’s elections because of the role of the COG in vetting
candidates and limitingcandidates and limiting the size and ideologicalthe size and ideological diversity of the candidate field. Women can vote diversity of the candidate field. Women can vote
and run for most offices, but the COG has consistently interpreted the Iranian constitution as and run for most offices, but the COG has consistently interpreted the Iranian constitution as
prohibiting women from running for president. Candidates must receive more than 50% of the prohibiting women from running for president. Candidates must receive more than 50% of the
vote to avoid a runoff that is vote to avoid a runoff that is ~~usual y~~usually held several weeks later. held several weeks later.
Another criticism of the political Another criticism of the political process is the relative absence of political parties. Establishing a process is the relative absence of political parties. Establishing a
party requires the permission of the Interior Ministry (Article 10 of Iran’s constitution), but the party requires the permission of the Interior Ministry (Article 10 of Iran’s constitution), but the
standards to obtain approval are high. Since the regime was founded, numerous groups have filed standards to obtain approval are high. Since the regime was founded, numerous groups have filed
for permission to operate as parties, but only a few—considered loyal to the regime—have been for permission to operate as parties, but only a few—considered loyal to the regime—have been
granted licenses to operate. Some have been licensed and then banned after their leaders opposed granted licenses to operate. Some have been licensed and then banned after their leaders opposed
regime policies, such as the Islamic Iran Participation Front and Organization of Mojahedinregime policies, such as the Islamic Iran Participation Front and Organization of Mojahedin of the of the
Islamic Revolution, discussed in the text box below. Islamic Revolution, discussed in the text box below.
The Presidency
The top directly The top directly- elected institution is the presidencyelected institution is the presidency~~, which is formal y~~. The office is formally and in practice and in practice
subordinate to the Supreme Leadersubordinate to the Supreme Leader~~. Virtual y~~ , and virtually every president has tried but failed to expand his every president has tried but failed to expand his
~~authority relative to the Supreme Leader~~authority. Presidential authority, particularly on matters of national . Presidential authority, particularly on matters of national
security, is security, is ~~also often~~ circumscribed by key clerics and the IRGCcircumscribed by key clerics and the IRGC~~. However, the presidency is the~~
~~most influential economic policymaking position and a source of patronage~~, but the president has somewhat more autonomy on economic policymaking. The president . The president
appoints and supervises the cabinet, develops the budgets of cabinet departments, and imposes appoints and supervises the cabinet, develops the budgets of cabinet departments, and imposes
and collects taxes on corporations and other bodies. The presidency also runs oversight bodies and collects taxes on corporations and other bodies. The presidency also runs oversight bodies
such as the Anticorruption Headquarters and the General Inspection Organization, to which such as the Anticorruption Headquarters and the General Inspection Organization, to which
government officials are required to submit annual financial disclosures, and it oversees the government officials are required to submit annual financial disclosures, and it oversees the
various official pension funds and government-run social services agencies. various official pension funds and government-run social services agencies.
Prior to 1989, Iran had both an elected president and a prime minister selected by the elected Prior to 1989, Iran had both an elected president and a prime minister selected by the elected
Majles (parliament). However, the holders of the two positions were constantly in institutional Majles (parliament). However, the holders of the two positions were constantly in institutional

conflict and a 1989 constitutional revision eliminated the prime ministership. Khamene’i has 8 “Leaked Iranian intelligence reports illustrate the folly of the US’s Middle8 “Leaked Iranian intelligence reports illustrate the folly of the US’s Middle East strategyEast strategy ~~.” T he~~.” The Strategist, November Strategist, November
20, 2019. 20, 2019.
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~~conflict and a 1989 constitutional revision eliminated the prime ministership. In part because~~
~~Iran’s presidents have often sought to expand their authority, Khamene’i has periodical y raised~~
periodically raised the possibility of eliminatingthe possibility of eliminating the post of president and restoring the post of prime ministerthe post of president and restoring the post of prime minister.
The Majles
Iran’s Iran’s Majles, or parliament, is a 290-seat, , or parliament, is a 290-seat, al all-elected, unicameral body. There are five “reserved -elected, unicameral body. There are five “reserved
seats” for “recognized” minority communities—Jew, Zoroastrian, and Christian (three seats). The seats” for “recognized” minority communities—Jew, Zoroastrian, and Christian (three seats). The
Majles votes on each nominee to a cabinet post, and drafts and acts on legislation. Among its votes on each nominee to a cabinet post, and drafts and acts on legislation. Among its
main duties is to consider and enact a proposed national budget (which runs from March 21 to main duties is to consider and enact a proposed national budget (which runs from March 21 to
March 20 each year, coinciding with NowruzMarch 20 each year, coinciding with Nowruz~~). It~~, the Persian New Year), and it often legislates on legislates on domestic social issues. It~~domestic economic and social~~
~~issues, and~~ tends to defer to executive and security institutions on defense and foreign policy tends to defer to executive and security institutions on defense and foreign policy
~~issues. It is constitutional y~~issues, frequently passing non-binding resolutions supporting regime criticism of the United States and other Iran adversaries. It is constitutionally required to ratify major international agreements, and it ratified the required to ratify major international agreements, and it ratified the
JCPOA in October 2015. JCPOA in October 2015. ~~The ratification was affirmed by the COG.~~ Women regularly run and Women regularly run and
some some ~~general y~~generally are elected, and there is no “quota” for the number of women. are elected, and there is no “quota” for the number of women. Majles elections elections
occur in the year prior to the presidential elections. occur in the year prior to the presidential elections.
The Assembly of Experts
A major but little A major but little publicized elected institution is the 88-seat publicized elected institution is the 88-seat Assembly of Experts. Akin to a Akin to a
standing electoral college, it is empowered to choose a new Supreme Leader upon the death of standing electoral college, it is empowered to choose a new Supreme Leader upon the death of
the incumbent, and it the incumbent, and it ~~formal y “oversees”~~formally - although not necessarily in practice - oversees the work of the Supreme Leader. The Assembly can the work of the Supreme Leader. The Assembly can
replace him if necessary, although invoking that power would most likely occur only in the event replace him if necessary, although invoking that power would most likely occur only in the event
of a severe health crisis. The Assembly is also empowered to draft amendments to the of a severe health crisis. The Assembly is also empowered to draft amendments to the
constitution. It constitution. It ~~general y~~generally meets two times a year. meets two times a year.
Elections to the Assembly are held every 8-10 years, conducted on a provincial basis. Assembly Elections to the Assembly are held every 8-10 years, conducted on a provincial basis. Assembly
candidates must be able to interpret Islamic law. candidates must be able to interpret Islamic law. ~~In March 2011, the aging compromise candidate~~
The aging chairman, Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-KaniAyatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani ~~was named chairman, but he~~, died in 2014. His died in 2014. His
successor, Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, lost his seat in the Assembly of Experts election on successor, Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, lost his seat in the Assembly of Experts election on
February 26, 2016 (held concurrently with the February 26, 2016 (held concurrently with the Majles elections), and COG Chairman Ayatollah elections), and COG Chairman Ayatollah
Ahmad Jannati was appointed concurrently as the assembly chairman in May 2016. Ahmad Jannati was appointed concurrently as the assembly chairman in May 2016.
Recent ~~Elections~~
and Upcoming Elections Following the presidency of regime stalwart Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani during 1989-1997, a Following the presidency of regime stalwart Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani during 1989-1997, a
reformist, Mohammad Khatemi, won landslide victories in 1997 and 2001. However, hardliners reformist, Mohammad Khatemi, won landslide victories in 1997 and 2001. However, hardliners
marginalized him by the end of his term in 2005. Aided by widespread voiding of reformist marginalized him by the end of his term in 2005. Aided by widespread voiding of reformist
candidacies by the COG, conservatives won a slim majority of the 290 candidacies by the COG, conservatives won a slim majority of the 290 Majles seats in the seats in the
February 20, 2004, elections. In June 2005, the COG February 20, 2004, elections. In June 2005, the COG ~~al owed~~allowed eight candidates to compete (out of eight candidates to compete (out of
more than 1,000 who filed candidacies), including Rafsanjani,9 Alimore than 1,000 who filed candidacies), including Rafsanjani,9 Ali Larijani,Larijani, IRGC stalwart IRGC stalwart
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. With reported tacit Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. With reported tacit
backing from Khamene’i, Ahmadinejadbacking from Khamene’i, Ahmadinejad advanced to a runoff against Rafsanjani and then won by advanced to a runoff against Rafsanjani and then won by
a 62% to 36% vote. Splits later erupted among hardliners, and pro-Ahmadinejad and pro-a 62% to 36% vote. Splits later erupted among hardliners, and pro-Ahmadinejad and pro-
Khamene’i candidates competed against each other in the March 2008 Khamene’i candidates competed against each other in the March 2008 Majles elections. elections.
Disputed 2009 Election. Reformists sought to unseat Ahmadinejad in the June 12, 2009, . Reformists sought to unseat Ahmadinejad in the June 12, 2009,
presidential election by presidential election by ~~ral ying~~rallying to Mir Hossein Musavi, who served as prime minister during the to Mir Hossein Musavi, who served as prime minister during the
1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and, to a lesser extent, former 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and, to a lesser extent, former Majles speaker Mehdi Karrubi. speaker Mehdi Karrubi. ~~Musavi’s~~

The 9 Rafsanjani was9 Rafsanjani was constitutionally permitted to run becauseconstitutionally permitted to run because a third term woulda third term would not have been consecutive with his not have been consecutive with his
previous two terms. In the 2001 presidential election, the Council permitted 10 out of the 814 registered candidates.previous two terms. In the 2001 presidential election, the Council permitted 10 out of the 814 registered candidates.
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~~general y young, urban supporters used social media to organize large ral ies in Tehran, but pro-~~
~~Ahmadinejad ral ies were large as wel . Turnout was about 85%. The~~ Interior Ministry Interior Ministry
pronounced Ahmadinejad the winner (63% of the vote) two hours after the polls closed, pronounced Ahmadinejad the winner (63% of the vote) two hours after the polls closed,
prompting Musavi supporters (who was announced as receiving 35% of the vote) to protest the prompting Musavi supporters (who was announced as receiving 35% of the vote) to protest the
results as fraudulent. results as fraudulent. ~~But, some~~Some outside analysts said the results tracked outside analysts said the results tracked ~~preelection~~ pre-election polls.10 Large polls.10 Large
antigovernment demonstrations occurred June 13-19, 2009. Security forces antigovernment demonstrations occurred June 13-19, 2009. Security forces ~~kil ed~~ killed over 100 over 100
protesters (opposition figure—Iran government figure was 27), including a 19-year-old woman, protesters (opposition figure—Iran government figure was 27), including a 19-year-old woman,
Neda Soltani, who became an icon of the uprisingNeda Soltani, who became an icon of the uprising.
~~The opposition~~, which congealed into the “Green Movement of Hope and Change.” Some protests in congealed into the “Green Movement of Hope and Change.” Some protests in
December 2009 overwhelmed regime security forces in some parts of Tehran, but the December 2009 overwhelmed regime security forces in some parts of Tehran, but the
movement’s activity declined after the regime successfully suppressed its demonstration on the movement’s activity declined after the regime successfully suppressed its demonstration on the
February 11, 2010, anniversary of the founding of the Islamic February 11, 2010, anniversary of the founding of the Islamic Republic. As unrest ebbed, a rift opened between Ahmadinejad and Khamene’i. In the March ~~Republic. As unrest ebbed,~~
~~Ahmadinejad promoted his loyalists and a nationalist version of Islam that limits clerical~~
~~authority, bringing him into conflict with Supreme Leader Khamene’i. Amid that rift, in the~~
~~March~~ 2012 2012 Majles elections, candidates supported by Khamene’i won 75% of the seats, elections, candidates supported by Khamene’i won 75% of the seats,
weakening Ahmadinejad.weakening Ahmadinejad. Since leaving office in 2013, and despite being appointed by Since leaving office in 2013, and despite being appointed by
Khamene’i to the Expediency Council, Ahmadinejad has emerged as a regime critic meanwhile Khamene’i to the Expediency Council, Ahmadinejad has emerged as a regime critic meanwhile
also returning to his prior work as a professor of civil engineering. also returning to his prior work as a professor of civil engineering.

10 A paper published10 A paper published by Chatham House and the University of St. Andrewsby Chatham House and the University of St. Andrews strongly questions how Ahmadinejad’s vote strongly questions how Ahmadinejad’s vote
couldcould have been as large ashave been as large as reported by official results, in light of past voting patterns throughout Iran. “Preliminary reported by official results, in light of past voting patterns throughout Iran. “Preliminary
Analysis of the Voting FiguresAnalysis of the Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election,” http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk. in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election,” http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk.
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Reformist Leaders and Organizations
The figures discussed below are widely termed “reformists” The figures discussed below are widely termed “reformists” – they seek– they seek political freedomspolitical freedoms but do not advocate but do not advocate
replacementreplacement of the regime.of the regime. Since the 2009 Green Movement uprising, these reformistSince the 2009 Green Movement uprising, these reformist ~~leaders~~ leaders apparently are not apparently are not
as widely fol owedas widely fol owed as they were for the years just after the uprising, and they apparently have been as they were for the years just after the uprising, and they apparently have been ~~d isplaced~~displaced by by
younger, anti-regime activists skil edyounger, anti-regime activists skil ed in the use of social media.in the use of social media. The persons below are a The persons below are a ~~smal~~ small sample of political sample of political
opponents to the regime;opponents to the regime; the State Department’sthe State Department’s ~~September~~ September 2018 “Outlaw Regime”2018 “Outlaw Regime” report says that there are report says that there are
moremore than 800 prisonersthan 800 prisoners of conscience detained in Iran. of conscience detained in Iran.

Mir Hossein Musavi is the titular leader is the titular leader of the Green Movement, the coalition of youth and of the Green Movement, the coalition of youth and ~~intel ectuals~~intellectuals that led that led
the 2009-2010 uprising. A noncleric and formerthe 2009-2010 uprising. A noncleric and former ~~Khomeini~~ Khomeini aide, Musavi served as foreign ministeraide, Musavi served as foreign minister in 1980 and as in 1980 and as
Iran’s last primeIran’s last prime ~~minister~~ minister from 1981 to 1989, at which time constitutional reformsfrom 1981 to 1989, at which time constitutional reforms abolished the post. An advocate abolished the post. An advocate
of state-control ed economy,of state-control ed economy, as primeas prime minister,minister, Musavi often feuded with Khamene’i,Musavi often feuded with Khamene’i, who was president at that who was president at that
time.time. He was arrested in 2011 for sedition and he and his wife,He was arrested in 2011 for sedition and he and his wife, activist Zahra Rahnevard, remain under house activist Zahra Rahnevard, remain under house
arrest.arrest. Khamene’iKhamene’i has termed Musavi and Karrubi (below) as “seditionists” and insists that they remain confined. has termed Musavi and Karrubi (below) as “seditionists” and insists that they remain confined.

Mehdi Karrubi is an Iranian cleric,is an Iranian cleric, ~~former Majles~~ former Majles Speaker (1989-1992, 2000-2004), and supporter of the Green Speaker (1989-1992, 2000-2004), and supporter of the Green
Movement. FailedMovement. Failed presidential campaigns in 2005 and 2009 led Karrubi to question the elections’presidential campaigns in 2005 and 2009 led Karrubi to question the elections’ validity and to validity and to
support runner-up Mir Hossein Musavi’s dispute over the electionsupport runner-up Mir Hossein Musavi’s dispute over the election in 2009. Imprisoned in the 1970s for protesting in 2009. Imprisoned in the 1970s for protesting
the government of Mohammad Reza Shah, Karrubi became a leading politician of the Islamicthe government of Mohammad Reza Shah, Karrubi became a leading politician of the Islamic left fol owingleft fol owing the 1979 the 1979
revolution.revolution. Karrubi shares Musavi’s political views on the need for state-control ed economy and civilKarrubi shares Musavi’s political views on the need for state-control ed economy and civil rights for rights for
women.women. In 2014, Karrubi was moved from a detention facility to house arrest.In 2014, Karrubi was moved from a detention facility to house arrest. In August 2017, Karrubi In August 2017, Karrubi ~~chal enged~~challenged
the regimethe regime by going on a hunger strikeby going on a hunger strike to demand a formalto demand a formal trial and a withdrawal of security forces from his trial and a withdrawal of security forces from his
home. Security forceshome. Security forces left but remainleft but remain outside his home to control visits.outside his home to control visits. He reportedlyHe reportedly is in poor health. is in poor health.

Mohammad Khatemi captured global attention for his overwhelmingcaptured global attention for his overwhelming 1997 and 2001 presidential election 1997 and 2001 presidential election
victories,victories, and his subsequent attempts to ease social and political restrictionsand his subsequent attempts to ease social and political restrictions in the country. However,in the country. However, hardliners hardliners
marginalized him by the end of his presidency in 2005. Khatemi endorsed Musavi in the 2009 election and, marginalized him by the end of his presidency in 2005. Khatemi endorsed Musavi in the 2009 election and,
fol owing the 2009 uprising, had his travel restricted and discussion or images of him banned in Iranian media. fol owing the 2009 uprising, had his travel restricted and discussion or images of him banned in Iranian media.
Khatemi reportedlyKhatemi reportedly helped organize reformistshelped organize reformists and other pro-Rouhani candidates in the 2016 Majles elections, and other pro-Rouhani candidates in the 2016 Majles elections,
and Rouhani has sought to end the media ban on discussionsand Rouhani has sought to end the media ban on discussions of Khatemi. of Khatemi.

Pro-reformist Organizations
The reformistsThe reformists are supported by severalare supported by several long-standing factions that supported the regimelong-standing factions that supported the regime ~~but fel~~ but fell out with out with
hardliners and have become vocal regimehardliners and have become vocal regime critics.critics.
National Trust ( (Etemad-e-~~Mel i~~Melli). Opposition grouping formed by Karrubi after his defeat in the 2005 election. Some ). Opposition grouping formed by Karrubi after his defeat in the 2005 election. Some
of its leaders,of its leaders, such as Hengameh Shahidi, have been arrested and harassed by authorities.such as Hengameh Shahidi, have been arrested and harassed by authorities.
Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF). The most prominent and best organized proreform The most prominent and best organized proreform grouping, but in 2009 lost grouping, but in 2009 lost
political ground to Green Movement groups. IIPF leaders includepolitical ground to Green Movement groups. IIPF leaders include Mohammed Khatemi’sMohammed Khatemi’s brother, Mohammad Reza brother, Mohammad Reza
Khatemi (deputy speakerKhatemi (deputy speaker in the 2000-2004 Majles) and Mohsen Mirdamadi. Backed Musavi in June 2009 electionin the 2000-2004 Majles) and Mohsen Mirdamadi. Backed Musavi in June 2009 election , ,
and severaland several IIPF leadersIIPF leaders detained and prosecuted in postelection dispute. The party was outlawed in 2010. detained and prosecuted in postelection dispute. The party was outlawed in 2010.
Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution ~~Organization~~ Organization (MIR) Composed mainly of left-leaning Iranian figures who support ) Composed mainly of left-leaning Iranian figures who support
state control of the economy, but want greater political pluralismstate control of the economy, but want greater political pluralism and relaxation of rules on social behavior. A and relaxation of rules on social behavior. A
majormajor constituency of the reformistconstituency of the reformist camp. Its leader is formercamp. Its leader is former Heavy Industries MinisterHeavy Industries Minister Behzad Nabavi, who Behzad Nabavi, who
supported Musavi in 2009 election and has been incarcerated for most of the time since June 2009. The supported Musavi in 2009 election and has been incarcerated for most of the time since June 2009. The
organization was outlawed by the regimeorganization was outlawed by the regime ~~simultaneously~~ simultaneously with the outlawing of the IIPF, above.with the outlawing of the IIPF, above.
Combatant Clerics Association The group was formed in 1988 and its name is similarThe group was formed in 1988 and its name is similar to the Society of Militant to the Society of Militant
Clerics,Clerics, but the group is run by reformists.but the group is run by reformists. Leading figures include formerLeading figures include former president Mohammad Khatemi. president Mohammad Khatemi.
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~~June 2013 Election of Rouhani~~
Rouhani’s Election Wins and Presidency In the June 14, 2013, presidential elections, held concurrently with municipal elections, the major In the June 14, 2013, presidential elections, held concurrently with municipal elections, the major
candidates included the following: candidates included the following:
Congressional Research Service 10 Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options  Several hardliners that included Qalibaf (see above); Khamene’i foreign policy  Several hardliners that included Qalibaf (see above); Khamene’i foreign policy
advisor Velayati; advisor Velayati; and then-chief nuclear negotiator Seyed and then-chief nuclear negotiator Seyed ~~Jalil i.~~
Jalilli.  Former chief nuclear negotiator Hassan Rouhani, a moderate and Rafsanjani  Former chief nuclear negotiator Hassan Rouhani, a moderate and Rafsanjani ~~al y.~~
ally.  The COG denied Rafsanjani’s candidacy, which shocked many Iranians because  The COG denied Rafsanjani’s candidacy, which shocked many Iranians because
of Rafsanjani’s prominence, as of Rafsanjani’s prominence, as ~~wel~~ well as that of an Ahmadinejadas that of an Ahmadinejad ~~al y~~ ally. .
Green Movement supporters, who were Green Movement supporters, who were ~~first~~ expected to boycott the vote, mobilized behind expected to boycott the vote, mobilized behind
Rouhani after regime officials stressed that they were committed to a fair election. The vote Rouhani after regime officials stressed that they were committed to a fair election. The vote
produced a 70% turnout and a first-round victory for Rouhani, garnering about 50.7% of the 36 produced a 70% turnout and a first-round victory for Rouhani, garnering about 50.7% of the 36
~~mil ion~~ million votes cast. Hardliners votes cast. Hardliners ~~general y~~generally garnered control of municipal councils in the major cities. garnered control of municipal councils in the major cities.
Rouhani’s first term cabinet contained a mixture of hardliners and moderates, including the Rouhani’s first term cabinet contained a mixture of hardliners and moderates, including the
moderates Mohammad Javad Zarif, a former Ambassador to the United Nations in New York, moderates Mohammad Javad Zarif, a former Ambassador to the United Nations in New York,
appointed concurrently as chief nuclear negotiator, and Bijan Zanganehappointed concurrently as chief nuclear negotiator, and Bijan Zanganeh, returning as Oil Minister. Zanganeh as Oil Minister. Zanganeh
~~served in the same post during the Khatemi presidency and~~ replaced Rostam Qasemi, who was replaced Rostam Qasemi, who was
associated with the corporate arm of the IRGC. The notable hardliners included Defense Minister associated with the corporate arm of the IRGC. The notable hardliners included Defense Minister
Hosein Dehgan, an IRGC stalwart and early organizer of the IRGC’s Lebanon contingent that Hosein Dehgan, an IRGC stalwart and early organizer of the IRGC’s Lebanon contingent that
evolved into the IRGC-Qods Force. evolved into the IRGC-Qods Force. ~~He also was IRGC Air Force commander and deputy Defense~~
~~Minister. (He is currently a military advisor to the Supreme Leader.)~~ Another hardliner was Another hardliner was
Justice Minister Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi who, as deputy Justice Minister Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi who, as deputy ~~intel igence~~intelligence minister in late 1980s, minister in late 1980s,
reportedly was a decisionmaker in the 1988 mass executions of Iranian prisoners. reportedly was a decisionmaker in the 1988 mass executions of Iranian prisoners.

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Dr. Hassan Rouhani
Hassan Rouhani, a Hoj at ol-Islam in the Shia clergy (one rank below Ayatol ah) straddles the academic world as Hassan Rouhani, a Hoj at ol-Islam in the Shia clergy (one rank below Ayatol ah) straddles the academic world as
~~wel~~ well as holder of a Ph.D. in law fromas holder of a Ph.D. in law from Glasgow Caledonian University in Scotland. Rouhani, born in 1948, is a long-Glasgow Caledonian University in Scotland. Rouhani, born in 1948, is a long-
time regimetime regime stalwart who was part of Ayatol ah Khomeini’sstalwart who was part of Ayatol ah Khomeini’s ~~circle~~ circle prior to the triumph of the Islamicprior to the triumph of the Islamic revolution. revolution.
He is also an associate and protégé of Rafsanjani, and Rouhani’s pragmatic policy approach on issuesHe is also an associate and protégé of Rafsanjani, and Rouhani’s pragmatic policy approach on issues such as the such as the
nuclear issuenuclear issue and relationsand relations with the United States has complicated Rouhani’s relationswith the United States has complicated Rouhani’s relations with Khamene’i.with Khamene’i. Khamene’i Khamene’i
criticized Rouhani’s economiccriticized Rouhani’s economic and foreign policiesand foreign policies during the 2017 presidential election period,during the 2017 presidential election period, appearing to seek appearing to seek
Rouhani’s defeat. Rouhani’s defeat.
Career Background
Often nicknamed the “diplomat sheikh,” Rouhani was chief nuclear negotiator during 2003 Often nicknamed the “diplomat sheikh,” Rouhani was chief nuclear negotiator during 2003 -2005, when Iran did -2005, when Iran did
agree to suspend uranium enrichment.agree to suspend uranium enrichment. Rouhani is a longtime memberRouhani is a longtime member of the political establishment.of the political establishment. Then-Then-
President Rafsanjani appointed him a memberPresident Rafsanjani appointed him a member of the Supremeof the Supreme National Security Council in 1989, and he remains National Security Council in 1989, and he remains
on that body. He has been a memberon that body. He has been a member of the Assemblyof the Assembly of Experts since 1999 (and reelectedof Experts since 1999 (and reelected to that body in the to that body in the
February 2016 election), and was a memberFebruary 2016 election), and was a member of the Majles during 1980-2000, serving twice as deputy speaker.of the Majles during 1980-2000, serving twice as deputy speaker. He He
has also been a memberhas also been a member of the Expediency Council since 1991. He headed the Center for Strategic Studies, a of the Expediency Council since 1991. He headed the Center for Strategic Studies, a
foreign policy think tank that has advised the Expediency Council and the Supreme Leader,foreign policy think tank that has advised the Expediency Council and the Supreme Leader, since 1992. Although since 1992. Although
he supported the crackdown against an earlierhe supported the crackdown against an earlier student uprising in July 1999, during the presidency of reformist student uprising in July 1999, during the presidency of reformist
figure Mohammad Khatemi,figure Mohammad Khatemi, in 2013, Rouhani campaigned on a platform of easing the Islamic Republic’s social in 2013, Rouhani campaigned on a platform of easing the Islamic Republic’s social
restrictionsrestrictions and its suppression of freeand its suppression of free expression,expression, helping him draw support from reformists. helping him draw support from reformists.
Rouhani Presidency
Rouhani’s presidency has been marked Rouhani’s presidency has been marked by the JCPOA, reintegration into the global community, success in by the JCPOA, reintegration into the global community, success in
preservingpreserving the Asad regimethe Asad regime in Syria,in Syria, and further economicand further economic ~~turmoil~~ turmoil fol owing the 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the fol owing the 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the
JCPOA. HardlinersJCPOA. Hardliners who opposed Iranian concessions in the JCPOA were unable to persuade Khamene’i,who opposed Iranian concessions in the JCPOA were unable to persuade Khamene’i, the the
Majles, or the COG to block the accord, but he faces escalating political pressure, or the COG to block the accord, but he faces escalating political pressure from hardlinersfrom hardliners since the U.S. since the U.S.
withdrawal fromwithdrawal from the JCPOA. An il ustration of that pressurethe JCPOA. An il ustration of that pressure has been the conviction of his brother, Hossein has been the conviction of his brother, Hossein
Fereidoun,Fereidoun, on charges of corruption and his sentencing on October 1, 2019, to five years in prison, Rouhani has on charges of corruption and his sentencing on October 1, 2019, to five years in prison, Rouhani has
not sought changes in Iran’s regional policies.not sought changes in Iran’s regional policies. Sanctions reliefSanctions relief during 2016-2018 caused the economy to grow since during 2016-2018 caused the economy to grow since
sanctions weresanctions were lifted, but Khamene’i’slifted, but Khamene’i’s advocacy of a “resistanceadvocacy of a “resistance economy” have been widelyeconomy” have been widely interpreted as interpreted as
contradicting Rouhani’s emphasis on developing trade relations.contradicting Rouhani’s emphasis on developing trade relations.
Rouhani has sought to promote freedomRouhani has sought to promote freedom of expressionof expression and political tolerance over the objections and contrary and political tolerance over the objections and contrary
actions by hardliners in the judiciary and the security services.actions by hardliners in the judiciary and the security services. In SeptemberIn September 2016, Rouhani achieved adoption of a 2016, Rouhani achieved adoption of a
new “charter for citizen’s rights,” and he has achieved the releasenew “charter for citizen’s rights,” and he has achieved the release of someof some ~~prisoners~~ prisoners incarcerated for involvement incarcerated for involvement
in the 2009 uprising, including prominent human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh. However,in the 2009 uprising, including prominent human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh. However, the judiciary and the judiciary and
security institutions have continued to arrest and prosecute U.S.-Iran dual nationals and other dual nationals for security institutions have continued to arrest and prosecute U.S.-Iran dual nationals and other dual nationals for
~~al eged~~alleged efforts to undermine the regime, efforts to undermine the regime, and to incarcerate the leadersand to incarcerate the leaders of the 2009 uprising. Rouhani managed of the 2009 uprising. Rouhani managed
significant public unrest in late 2017-early 2018 by restraining hardline institutions from a majorsignificant public unrest in late 2017-early 2018 by restraining hardline institutions from a major crackdown and crackdown and
acknowledging protesteracknowledging protester grievances.grievances. Has also apparently prevailed on hardliners to easeHas also apparently prevailed on hardliners to ease enforcement of the public enforcement of the public
dress code for women.dress code for women. Has not succeeded, to date, in efforts to marginalize the IRGC roleHas not succeeded, to date, in efforts to marginalize the IRGC role in Iran’s economy. in Iran’s economy.
Photograph from http://www.rouhani.ir. Photograph from http://www.rouhani.ir.
Majles and Assembly of Experts Elections in 2016
On February 26, 2016, Iran held concurrent elections for the On February 26, 2016, Iran held concurrent elections for the Majles and for the Assembly of and for the Assembly of
Experts. The CoG approved 6,200 Experts. The CoG approved 6,200 Majles candidates, including 586 female candidates, and invalidated candidates, including 586 female candidates, and invalidated
about 6,000, including about 6,000, including al all but 100 reformists. Pro-Rouhani candidates won nearly halfbut 100 reformists. Pro-Rouhani candidates won nearly half ~~the seats,~~
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the seats, and the number of avowed hardliners in the body was reduced significantly. Independentsand the number of avowed hardliners in the body was reduced significantly. Independents~~, whose~~
~~alignments vary by issue,~~ won about 50 seats. Seventeen women were elected—the largest won about 50 seats. Seventeen women were elected—the largest
number since the revolution. The body reelected Alinumber since the revolution. The body reelected Ali ~~Larijani~~ Larijani as Speaker. as Speaker.
For the Assembly of Experts election, 161 candidates were approved out of 800 who applied to For the Assembly of Experts election, 161 candidates were approved out of 800 who applied to
run. Reformists and pro-Rouhani candidates defeated two prominent hardliners—the incumbent run. Reformists and pro-Rouhani candidates defeated two prominent hardliners—the incumbent
Assembly Chairman Mohammad Yazdi and Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi. COG Assembly Chairman Mohammad Yazdi and Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi. COG
head Ayatollah Jannati retained his seat, but came in last for the 30 seats elected from Tehran head Ayatollah Jannati retained his seat, but came in last for the 30 seats elected from Tehran
Province. He was subsequently named chairman of the body. Province. He was subsequently named chairman of the body.
Presidential ~~Election~~ Election of May 19, 2017
~~In the latest presidential election on~~ In the May 19, 2017May 19, 2017 election, Rouhani won , Rouhani won ~~a first-round victory~~re-election with about with about
57% of the vote. He defeated a major figure, Hojjat ol-Eslam Ibrahim Raisi, a close 57% of the vote. He defeated a major figure, Hojjat ol-Eslam Ibrahim Raisi, a close ~~al y~~ally of of
Khamene’i, even though other hardliners dropped out of the race to improve Raisi’s prospects.Khamene’i, even though other hardliners dropped out of the race to improve Raisi’s prospects.
Municipal elections were held concurrently. After vetting by local committees established by the Municipal elections were held concurrently. After vetting by local committees established by the
Majles, about 260,000 candidates competed for about 127,000 seats nationwide. More than 6% of , about 260,000 candidates competed for about 127,000 seats nationwide. More than 6% of
the candidates were women. The the candidates were women. The ~~al iance~~alliance of reformists and moderate-conservatives won control of reformists and moderate-conservatives won control
of the municipal councils of Iran’s largest cities, including of the municipal councils of Iran’s largest cities, including al all 21 seats on the Tehran municipal 21 seats on the Tehran municipal
~~council. The term of the existing councils expired in September 2017 and a reformist official,~~
~~Mohammad Ali Najafi, replaced Qalibaf as Tehran mayor. However, Najafi resigned in March~~
~~2018 after criticism for his viewing of a dance performance by young girls celebrating a national~~
~~holiday. The mayor, as of November 2018, is Pirouz Hanachi.~~
~~Rouhani’s second term cabinet nominations retained most of the same officials in key posts,~~
~~including Zarif. Since the Trump Administration withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018,~~
~~hardliners have threatened to try to impeach Zarif for negotiating that accord~~council. Rouhani’s second term cabinet nominations retained most of the same officials in key posts, including Zarif. In February 2019, . In February 2019,
after being excluded from a leadership meeting with visiting President Bashar Al Asad of Syria, after being excluded from a leadership meeting with visiting President Bashar Al Asad of Syria,
Zarif announced his resignation. Rouhani did not accept the resignation and Zarif stayed on.Zarif announced his resignation. Rouhani did not accept the resignation and Zarif stayed on.
Key changes to the second-term cabinet include the following: Key changes to the second-term cabinet include the following:
 Minister of Justice Seyed Alireza Avayee replaced Pour-Mohammadi. Formerly a  Minister of Justice Seyed Alireza Avayee replaced Pour-Mohammadi. Formerly a
state prosecutor, Avayee oversaw trials of protesters in the 2009 uprising and is state prosecutor, Avayee oversaw trials of protesters in the 2009 uprising and is
subject to EU travel ban and asset freeze. subject to EU travel ban and asset freeze.
 Defense Minister Amir Hatami became the first non-IRGC Defense Minister in  Defense Minister Amir Hatami became the first non-IRGC Defense Minister in
more than 20 years and the first regular military more than 20 years and the first regular military (Artesh) officer in that position. officer in that position.
 The cabinet has two women vice presidents, and one other woman as a member  The cabinet has two women vice presidents, and one other woman as a member
of the cabinet (but not heading any ministry). of the cabinet (but not heading any ministry).
Majles ~~Vote~~ Elections on February 21, 2020
The latest The latest Majles elections were held onelections were held on February 21, 2020February 21, 2020 ~~in the context of a balance of power~~
~~that shifted to hardliners, at least in part as a result of the U.S. policy of exiting~~. The 2018 U.S. exit from the Iran nuclear the Iran nuclear
~~deal and placing economic pressure on Iran. The~~deal and the outpouring of public grieving for the U.S. outpouring of public grieving for the U.S. ~~kil ing~~
killing of IRGC-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 of IRGC-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 ~~suggested that hardliners in~~
~~Iran have been ascendant~~appeared to shift public support toward hardliners. .
During December 2019, about 15,000 candidates filed candidacies for the 290 During December 2019, about 15,000 candidates filed candidacies for the 290 Majles seats. The seats. The
COG disqualifiedCOG disqualified nearly half, including 90 incumbents that were mostly professed moderates or nearly half, including 90 incumbents that were mostly professed moderates or
reformists. Among the reformists not reformists. Among the reformists not ~~al owed~~allowed to run was Rouhani’s son-in-law Kambiz to run was Rouhani’s son-in-law Kambiz
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~~Mehdizadeh.11 Speaker Larijani decided not to seek re-election, as did former speaker Gholam~~
~~Haddad Adel.~~Mehdizadeh.11 The turnout was about 42%, lower than in most recent Iranian elections, and The turnout was about 42%, lower than in most recent Iranian elections, and
hardliners won an overwhelming 230 of the 290 seats, including sweeping Tehran’s 30 seats in hardliners won an overwhelming 230 of the 290 seats, including sweeping Tehran’s 30 seats in
the body.12 The hardliner victory the body.12 The hardliner victory ~~has set up~~contributed to the IRGC stalwart and former Tehran mayor Mohammad IRGC stalwart and former Tehran mayor Mohammad
~~Baqr Qalibaf as the favorite to selected Majles speaker when the body is inaugurated on May 28.~~
~~The next presidential elections, in which Rouhani wil not be eligible to run again, is scheduled~~
Baqr Qalibaf’s selection as Speaker when the body was inaugurated on May 28. 11 US Institute of Peace. Iran Primer. “Iran’s 2020 Parliamentary Elections.” February 3, 2020. 12 “Factbox: The outcome of Iran’s 2020 parliamentary elections.” Atlantic Council, February 26, 2020. Congressional Research Service 13 Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options Presidential Election of June 2021 The next presidential elections, in which Rouhani will not be eligible to run again, is scheduled for May or June of 2021. The following figures, all of whom are considered hardliners, although to varying degrees, have indicated they are likely to run:  Hosein Dehgan. Former Defense Minister and IRGC stalwart.13 Mentioned above, perceived as the favorite of Khamene’i, who has called for the election of a “Hezbollahi” (hardline) government.  Parviz Fattah. Head of the Bonyad Mostazfan va Janbazan (Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled) and former IRGC officer and Energy Minister.14 The bonyad, among Iran’s largest, has long been linked to the IRGC and various clerics and revolutionary institutions.  Saeed Mohammad. Head of Khatam ol-Anbiya, the IRGC’s construction corporation. At about 52 years of age, he is somewhat younger than his political rivals and is considered somewhat more moderate.15 Periodic Unrest Challenges the Regime16 The~~for May or June of 2021.~~
~~Periodic Unrest Challenges the Regime13~~
~~As noted, the~~ regime has faced periodic flare-ups of significant unrest. In December 2017, regime has faced periodic flare-ups of significant unrest. In December 2017,
protests erupted in more than 80 cities, mostly based on economic conditions but protests erupted in more than 80 cities, mostly based on economic conditions but perhaps also reflecting reflecting
opposition to Iran’s leadership and the expenditure of resources on interventions throughout the opposition to Iran’s leadership and the expenditure of resources on interventions throughout the
Middle East. Middle East. ~~Some protesters were apparently motivated by Rouhani’s 2018-2019 budget~~
~~proposals to increase funds for cleric-run businesses (“bonyads”) and the IRGC. The government~~
The government defused the unrest by coupling acknowledgment of the legitimacy of some demonstrator defused the unrest by coupling acknowledgment of the legitimacy of some demonstrator
grievances with use of repressive force and a shutdown of access to social media sites such as the grievances with use of repressive force and a shutdown of access to social media sites such as the
messaging system messaging system ~~cal ed~~called “Telegram.” “Telegram.”1417 Iranian official media reported that 25 were Iranian official media reported that 25 were ~~kil ed~~killed and and
nearly 4,000 were arrested during that unrest. nearly 4,000 were arrested during that unrest.
In mid-2018, possibly to try to divert blame for Iran’s economic situation, the regime established special “anti-corruption courts” that have, in some cases, imposed the death penalty on businessmen accused of taking advantage of reimposed sanctions for personal profit.18 During 2018-19, small ~~During 2018-19, smal~~ protests and other acts of defiance took place, including shop closures in protests and other acts of defiance took place, including shop closures in
the Tehran bazaar in July 2018 and protests by some women against the strict public dress code. the Tehran bazaar in July 2018 and protests by some women against the strict public dress code.
~~In addition, workers~~Workers in various industries, including trucking and teaching, in various industries, including trucking and teaching, ~~have~~ conducted strikes conducted strikes
to demand higher wages to help cope with rising prices. In early 2019, protests took place in to demand higher wages to help cope with rising prices. In early 2019, protests took place in
southwestern Iran in response to the government’s missteps in dealing with the effects of southwestern Iran in response to the government’s missteps in dealing with the effects of
significant flooding in that area. The regime tasked the leadership of the relief efforts to the IRGC significant flooding in that area. The regime tasked the leadership of the relief efforts to the IRGC
and IRGC-QF, working with Iraqi Shia militias who are powerful on the Iraqi side of the borderand IRGC-QF, working with Iraqi Shia militias who are powerful on the Iraqi side of the border
~~where the floods took place.~~
~~In mid-2018, possibly to try to divert blame for Iran’s economic situation, the regime established~~
~~special “anti-corruption courts” that have, in some cases, imposed the death penalty on~~
~~businessmen accused of taking advantage of reimposed sanctions for personal profit.15 Iran also~~
~~has used military action against armed factions that are based or have support outside Iran.~~
~~Significant unrest flared again on November 15, 2019, in response to a sudden government~~
~~announcement of a~~ . In November 2019, significant unrest flared again after the government announced an immediate reduction in subsidies for the price of gasoline. Prices rose 50% for amounts reduction in subsidies for the price of gasoline. Prices rose 50% for amounts
~~up to 15 gal ons per month, and 300% (to about $1 per gal on) for amounts purchased beyond that~~
~~amount. The government explained the subsidy reduction as a consensus government decision~~
~~that was necessary in order to increase cash transfers to the poorest 75% of the population. To~~
~~counter the protests, the government al owed peaceful protests, used repression against violent~~
~~acts, and shut down access to the internet and social media. As he has done in past periods of~~
~~unrest, Supreme Leader Khamene’i blamed the protests on agitation by foreign powers, while~~

~~11 US Institute of Peace. Iran Primer. “ Iran’s 2020 Parliamentary Elections.” February 3, 2020.~~
~~12 “Factbox: T he outcome of Iran’s 2020 parliamentary elections.” Atlantic Council, February 26, 2020.~~
~~13 T he following information is derived from a wide range of press reporting in major newspapers and websites.~~ up to 15 gallons per 13 Iran’s top military figure announces presidential bid. Andadolu Agency, November 25, 2020. 14 Parviz Fattah: The new Ahmadinejad that may be running for president. Atlantic Council, September 17, 2020. 15 Kasra Aarabi. The IRGC’s Dark Horse for Iran’s 2021 Elections: Saeed Mohammad. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, December 3, 2020. 16 The following information is derived from a wide range of press reporting in major newspapers and websites. Some Some
Iranian activist sources report wide variations in protest sizes, cities involved, numbersIranian activist sources report wide variations in protest sizes, cities involved, numbers killed or arrested, andkilled or arrested, and other other
figures.figures. ~~CRS~~ CRS has no way to corroborate exact numbers cited. has no way to corroborate exact numbers cited.
1417 National Council of Resistance, “Khamene’i’s Belated Confession to Injustice and Inability to Reform, a Desperate National Council of Resistance, “Khamene’i’s Belated Confession to Injustice and Inability to Reform, a Desperate
Attempt to Escape Overthrow,” February 19, 2018. Attempt to Escape Overthrow,” February 19, 2018.
1518 Erin Cunningham. “In Iran, Graft Can Lead to the Gallows.” Erin Cunningham. “In Iran, Graft Can Lead to the Gallows.” Washington Post, December 1, 2018. , December 1, 2018.
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~~also accusing exiled opposition groups of involvement. He also stated that dissatisfaction over the~~
~~fuel price hikes was “understandable” but was necessary. On November 20, 2019, President~~
~~Rouhani stated that the regime had achieved “victory” and had put down the unrest.~~
~~In mid-December 2019, based on surveys of persons inside Iran, Amnesty~~ month, and 300% (to about $1 per gallon) for amounts purchased beyond that amount. The government explained the subsidy reduction as a consensus government decision that was necessary in order to increase cash transfers to the poorest 75% of the population. To counter the protests, the government allowed peaceful protests, used repression against violent acts, and shut down access to the internet and social media. As he has done in past periods of unrest, Supreme Leader Khamene’i blamed the protests on agitation by foreign powers and on exiled opposition groups. He also stated that dissatisfaction over the fuel price hikes was “understandable.” On November 20, 2019, President Rouhani stated that the unrest had been put down. Amnesty International asserted International asserted
that over 300 protesters had been that over 300 protesters had been ~~kil ed~~killed by security forces in the unrest, and thousands arrested. by security forces in the unrest, and thousands arrested.16
19 The Iranian government asserted the figure was “fabricated.” U.S. officials said in January 2020 The Iranian government asserted the figure was “fabricated.” U.S. officials said in January 2020
that, based on a Reuters report that said it had obtained information from security officials inside that, based on a Reuters report that said it had obtained information from security officials inside
Iran, security forces had Iran, security forces had ~~kil ed~~killed 1,500 protesters in the unrest. 1,500 protesters in the unrest.~~17In~~20 In the aftermath of the unrest, the the aftermath of the unrest, the
State Department solicited Iranians to send photos and other information to the State Department State Department solicited Iranians to send photos and other information to the State Department
documenting the Iranian crackdown and any other instances of regime human rights abuses.documenting the Iranian crackdown and any other instances of regime human rights abuses.
~~January 2020 Unrest.~~ Unrest re-emerged briefly in January 2020Unrest re-emerged briefly in January 2020~~. Demonstrators took to the~~
~~streets in mid-January 2020 after Iran~~ after the government admitted – after several days of concealment – that its admitted – after several days of concealment – that its
military forces had mistakenly shot down a Ukrainian passenger jet in the hours after Iran military forces had mistakenly shot down a Ukrainian passenger jet in the hours after Iran
launched its January 8, 2020, missile strike in Iraq that was retaliation for the launched its January 8, 2020, missile strike in Iraq that was retaliation for the U.S. killing of ~~U.S. kil ing of~~
IRGC-QF commander Soleimani. IRGC-QF commander Soleimani. Al All 176 passengers, which included 82 Iranians, were 176 passengers, which included 82 Iranians, were ~~kil ed.~~
killed. There have not been significant incidents of unrest reported to protest the government’s handling There have not been significant incidents of unrest reported to protest the government’s handling
of the COVID-19 outbreak in the winter-spring of 2020, even though many accounts indicate that of the COVID-19 outbreak in the winter-spring of 2020, even though many accounts indicate that
the government’s response to the outbreak has the government’s response to the outbreak has ~~been ineffective and lacking in~~lacked transparency. transparency.
The Trump Administration The Trump Administration ~~and other senior officials have~~has supported each wave of protests by supported each wave of protests by
~~warning the regime against using force and expressing solidarity with the protesters~~expressing solidarity with the protesters and, in some cases, imposing sanctions on regime officials connected with repressing the unrest. In response . In response
to the 2017 unrest, the Administration requested U.N. Security Council meetings to consider to the 2017 unrest, the Administration requested U.N. Security Council meetings to consider
Iran’s crackdown on the unrest, although no formal U.N. action was taken, and sanctioned then-Iran’s crackdown on the unrest, although no formal U.N. action was taken, and sanctioned then-
judiciary chief Sadeq Larijani.judiciary chief Sadeq Larijani. On November 18, 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo stated, “The On November 18, 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo stated, “The
United States is monitoring the ongoing protests closely. We condemn strongly any acts of United States is monitoring the ongoing protests closely. We condemn strongly any acts of
violence committed by this regime against the Iranian people and are deeply concerned by reports violence committed by this regime against the Iranian people and are deeply concerned by reports
of several fatalities. We’ve been at that since the beginning of this of several fatalities. We’ve been at that since the beginning of this administration.”21 In 2020, the Administration sanctioned several Iranian security personnel responsible for killing numerous protesters that had fled to, and purportedly briefly seized control of, the small city of Mah Shahr during the November 2019 unrest. ~~administration.”18~~
~~In the 115th Congress, several resolutions supported Iranian protestors, including H.Res. 676~~
~~(passed the House January 9, 2018), S.Res. 367, H.Res. 675, and S.Res. 368.~~ In the 116th In the 116th
Congress, H.Res. 752 passed the House on January 28, 2020. The resolution, among other Congress, H.Res. 752 passed the House on January 28, 2020. The resolution, among other
provisions: urges the Administration to work to convene emergency sessions of the United provisions: urges the Administration to work to convene emergency sessions of the United
Nations Security Council and the United Nations Human Rights Council to condemn the ongoing Nations Security Council and the United Nations Human Rights Council to condemn the ongoing
human rights violations perpetrated by the Iranian regime and establish a mechanism by which human rights violations perpetrated by the Iranian regime and establish a mechanism by which
the Security Council can monitor such violations; and encourages the Administration to provide the Security Council can monitor such violations; and encourages the Administration to provide
assistance to the Iranian people to have free and uninterrupted access to the assistance to the Iranian people to have free and uninterrupted access to the ~~internet~~Internet, including by , including by
broadening broadening ~~General License D–1 (which al ows for the exportation~~a general license for U.S. exports to Iran of equipment that to Iran of equipment that
citizens can use to circumvent regime censorship of the Internetcitizens can use to circumvent regime censorship of the Internet).

~~16“'Vicious crackdown'~~. 19“'Vicious crackdown’: Iran protest death toll at 304, Amnesty says.” December 17, 2019.: Iran protest death toll at 304, Amnesty says.” December 17, 2019.
17 20 “US Confirms Report Citing Iran Officials as Saying “US Confirms Report Citing Iran Officials as Saying 1,500 Killed in Protests.” Voice of America. December 23, 1,500 Killed in Protests.” Voice of America. December 23,
2019. 2019.
18 21 Department of State. “Press Briefing by Secretary Pompeo.” November 18, 2019. Department of State. “Press Briefing by Secretary Pompeo.” November 18, 2019.
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Demographics/Ethnic and Religious Minorities
General. Iran’s population is about 83 mil ion Iran’s population is about 83 mil ion persons.persons. About 60% is Persian; about 20%-25% is Azeri; about 7% About 60% is Persian; about 20%-25% is Azeri; about 7%
are Kurds; about 4% are Arabs; and about 2% are Baluchis. Iran is about 99% Muslim,are Kurds; about 4% are Arabs; and about 2% are Baluchis. Iran is about 99% Muslim, of which moreof which more than 90% are than 90% are
Shias; about 8% are Sunnis; and 1% are Jewish,Shias; about 8% are Sunnis; and 1% are Jewish, Christian, Zoroastrian,Christian, Zoroastrian, Baha’i’, or other. Baha’i’, or other.

Azeris. Azeris,. Azeris, who have a Turkic ethnicity, are predominant in northern Iran, particularly in areas bordering who have a Turkic ethnicity, are predominant in northern Iran, particularly in areas bordering
Azerbaijan. AzerisAzerbaijan. Azeris in Iran are mostlyin Iran are mostly ~~wel~~ well integrated into government and society (Khamene’iintegrated into government and society (Khamene’i himself is of Azeri himself is of Azeri
heritage), but many Azerisheritage), but many Azeris complain of ethnic and linguistic discrimination.complain of ethnic and linguistic discrimination. Each year, there are arrests of Azeris Each year, there are arrests of Azeris
who press for their right to celebrate their culture and history. The government accuses them of separatism. who press for their right to celebrate their culture and history. The government accuses them of separatism.

Kurds.. There are about 5 mil ion-11 mil ionThere are about 5 mil ion-11 mil ion Kurds in Iran. The Kurdish language is not banned, but schoolsKurds in Iran. The Kurdish language is not banned, but schools do not do not
teach it and Kurdish political organizations and media outlets are routinely closedteach it and Kurdish political organizations and media outlets are routinely closed for supporting greater Kurdish for supporting greater Kurdish
autonomy or for autonomy or for ~~al egedly~~ allegedly supporting Kurdish armed factions. In May 2015, violent unrest brokesupporting Kurdish armed factions. In May 2015, violent unrest broke out in the out in the
Kurdish city of Mahabad after a local woman was kil edKurdish city of Mahabad after a local woman was kil ed in a hotel there while with a memberin a hotel there while with a member of Iran’s of Iran’s ~~intel igence~~intelligence
services.services. Iranian Kurds recruited by the IslamicIranian Kurds recruited by the Islamic State terroristState terrorist organization attacked Iran’s parliament and organization attacked Iran’s parliament and ~~th e~~the
tomb of Ayatol ah Khomeinitomb of Ayatol ah Khomeini in June 2017, kil ingin June 2017, kil ing 17 persons.17 persons.

Arabs. Ethnic Arabs are prominent in southwestern Iran, particularly Khuzestan Province, Ethnic Arabs are prominent in southwestern Iran, particularly Khuzestan Province, where they are widely where they are widely
referredreferred to as Ahwazi Arabs. The approximately 3 mil ionto as Ahwazi Arabs. The approximately 3 mil ion Arabs in Iran encounter systematicArabs in Iran encounter systematic oppression and oppression and
discrimination,discrimination, including torture and a prohibition on speaking or studying Arabic. including torture and a prohibition on speaking or studying Arabic.

Baluchis. Iran has about 1.4 mil ion. Iran has about 1.4 mil ion Baluchis, living primarilyBaluchis, living primarily in poorly developed and in poorly developed and ~~economical y~~ economically depressed depressed
southeastern Iran, in the area bordering Pakistan. Baluchis in Iran are mostlysoutheastern Iran, in the area bordering Pakistan. Baluchis in Iran are mostly Sunni Muslims.Sunni Muslims.

Christians.. Christians, who number about 300,000, are a “protected minority”Christians, who number about 300,000, are a “protected minority” with three seats reservedwith three seats reserved in the in the
Majles.Majles. The majorityThe majority of Christians in Iran are ethnic Armenians,of Christians in Iran are ethnic Armenians, with Assyrian Christians contributing about with Assyrian Christians contributing about
10,000-20,000 practitioners. The IRGC scrutinizes churches and Christian religious10,000-20,000 practitioners. The IRGC scrutinizes churches and Christian religious practice, and numerous practice, and numerous
Christians remain incarcerated for actions related to religiousChristians remain incarcerated for actions related to religious practice, including using wine in services.practice, including using wine in services. At times, At times,
there have been unexplained assassinationsthere have been unexplained assassinations of pastors in Iran, as of pastors in Iran, as ~~wel~~ well as prosecutions for converting from Islam to as prosecutions for converting from Islam to
Christianity and for proselytizing. One Pastor, Yousef Nadarkhani, has been repeatedly arrested.Christianity and for proselytizing. One Pastor, Yousef Nadarkhani, has been repeatedly arrested.

Jews. Also a “recognized minority” with one seat in the Also a “recognized minority” with one seat in the Majles, the approximately 10,000-member (according to , the approximately 10,000-member (according to
the Tehran Jewish Committee)the Tehran Jewish Committee) Jewish community enjoys substantial freedoms.Jewish community enjoys substantial freedoms. However,However, the Iranian government the Iranian government
sometimessometimes ~~promotes~~ promotes anti-Semitic rhetoricanti-Semitic rhetoric in state-sanctioned media. Then-President Ahmadinejad often in state-sanctioned media. Then-President Ahmadinejad often
questioned the existence of the Holocaust. In June 1999, Iran arrestedquestioned the existence of the Holocaust. In June 1999, Iran arrested 13 Jews that it said were part of an 13 Jews that it said were part of an
“espionage ring” for Israel,“espionage ring” for Israel, and 10 were convicted. and 10 were convicted. ~~Al were released~~ All were released by April 2003. by April 2003.

Baha’is. There are an estimated 20,000 Baha’is in Iran, where this religion There are an estimated 20,000 Baha’is in Iran, where this religion started, based on a started, based on a ~~19 th~~19th century self- century self-
declared Iranian prophet named Baha’ul ah. The regimedeclared Iranian prophet named Baha’ul ah. The regime has subjected the Baha’is to unrelenting repressionhas subjected the Baha’is to unrelenting repression as
~~members~~ as members of what it describes as a “heretical” religion.of what it describes as a “heretical” religion. Baha’i leaders have been repeated imprisoned,Baha’i leaders have been repeated imprisoned, land and land and
property of Baha’i adherents has been seized, Baha’is are banned from serving in government,property of Baha’i adherents has been seized, Baha’is are banned from serving in government, and are routinely and are routinely
discriminateddiscriminated against for employment.against for employment. ~~Virtual y~~ Virtually yearly yearly congressional resolutionscongressional resolutions have condemned the repression have condemned the repression
of Iran’s Baha’is. The March 17, 2017, report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Iran (A/HRC/34/65) contained an of Iran’s Baha’is. The March 17, 2017, report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Iran (A/HRC/34/65) contained an
extensive appendix listing Baha’is in prison in Iran. Two of seven Baha’i leadersextensive appendix listing Baha’is in prison in Iran. Two of seven Baha’i leaders (the ”Yaran”) sentenced in 2008 to (the ”Yaran”) sentenced in 2008 to
20 years imprisonment20 years imprisonment for espionage werefor espionage were ~~released in the fal~~ released in the fall of 2018; the other five remainof 2018; the other five remain in jail.in jail.

Sufis. In February 2018, Iran arrested 300 Sufis demanding the release In February 2018, Iran arrested 300 Sufis demanding the release of their of their ~~fel ow~~ fellow faith members.faith members. Hundreds of Hundreds of
Sufis remain in prison for their religiousSufis remain in prison for their religious beliefs.beliefs. Human Rights Watch characterized the arrestsHuman Rights Watch characterized the arrests as “one of the as “one of the
largest crackdowns against a religiouslargest crackdowns against a religious minority in Iran in a decade.” minority in Iran in a decade.”

Sources:Sources: Various pressVarious press reports,reports, U.N. reports,U.N. reports, and human rights organization reports.and human rights organization reports.
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Human Rights ~~Practices19~~Practices22
U.S. State Department reports and reports from a U.N. Special Rapporteur have long cited Iran U.S. State Department reports and reports from a U.N. Special Rapporteur have long cited Iran
for a wide range of abuses—aside from its suppression of political opposition and use of force for a wide range of abuses—aside from its suppression of political opposition and use of force
against protesters. Such abuses includeagainst protesters. Such abuses include: use of capital punishment, executions of minors, denial of use of capital punishment, executions of minors, denial of
fair public trial, harsh and life-threatening conditions in prison, and unlawful detention and fair public trial, harsh and life-threatening conditions in prison, and unlawful detention and
torture. Many of these abuses have been reported to be practices among Iran’s regional neighbors torture. Many of these abuses have been reported to be practices among Iran’s regional neighbors
~~as wel~~ as well. Other than the release of U.S. and dual-nationals held, curtailing Iran’s human rights . Other than the release of U.S. and dual-nationals held, curtailing Iran’s human rights
abuses has not been named as a U.S. condition for improved relations. abuses has not been named as a U.S. condition for improved relations.
State Department and U.N. Special Rapporteur reports have noted that the 2013 revisions to the State Department and U.N. Special Rapporteur reports have noted that the 2013 revisions to the
Islamic Penal Code and the 2015 revisions to the CriminalIslamic Penal Code and the 2015 revisions to the Criminal Procedure Code made some reforms, Procedure Code made some reforms,
including eliminatingincluding eliminating death sentences for children convicted of drug-related offenses and death sentences for children convicted of drug-related offenses and
protecting the rights of the accused. A “Citizen’s Rights Charter,” issued December 19, 2016, at protecting the rights of the accused. A “Citizen’s Rights Charter,” issued December 19, 2016, at
least least ~~nominal y~~nominally protects free expression and is intended to raise public awareness of citizen rights. protects free expression and is intended to raise public awareness of citizen rights.
It also purportedly commits the government to implement the charter’s 120 articles. The State It also purportedly commits the government to implement the charter’s 120 articles. The State
Department’s recent human rights reports say that key charter protections for individual rights of Department’s recent human rights reports say that key charter protections for individual rights of
freedom to communicate and access information have not been implemented. freedom to communicate and access information have not been implemented.
A U.N. Special Rapporteur on Iran human rights was reestablished in March 2011 by the U.N. A U.N. Special Rapporteur on Iran human rights was reestablished in March 2011 by the U.N.
Human Rights Council (22 to 7 vote), resuming work done by a Special Rapporteur on Iran Human Rights Council (22 to 7 vote), resuming work done by a Special Rapporteur on Iran
human rights during 1988-2002. The rapporteur appointed in 2016, Asma Jahangir, issued two human rights during 1988-2002. The rapporteur appointed in 2016, Asma Jahangir, issued two
Iran reports, the latest of which was dated August 14, 2017 (A/72/322), before passing away in Iran reports, the latest of which was dated August 14, 2017 (A/72/322), before passing away in
February 2018. The Special Rapporteur mandate was extended on March 24, 2018, and British-February 2018. The Special Rapporteur mandate was extended on March 24, 2018, and British-
Pakistani lawyer Javaid Rehman was appointed in July 2018. The U.N. General Assembly has Pakistani lawyer Javaid Rehman was appointed in July 2018. The U.N. General Assembly has
insisted that Iran cooperate by insisted that Iran cooperate by ~~al owing~~allowing the Special Rapporteur to visit Iran, but Iran has instead the Special Rapporteur to visit Iran, but Iran has instead
only responded to Special Rapporteur inquiries through agreed “special procedures.” only responded to Special Rapporteur inquiries through agreed “special procedures.”
Despite the criticism of its human rights record, on April 29, 2010, Iran acceded to the U.N. Despite the criticism of its human rights record, on April 29, 2010, Iran acceded to the U.N.
Commission on the Status of Women. It also sits on the boards of the U.N. Development Program Commission on the Status of Women. It also sits on the boards of the U.N. Development Program
(UNDP) and UNICEF. Iran’s U.N. dues are about $9 (UNDP) and UNICEF. Iran’s U.N. dues are about $9 ~~mil ion~~million per year. per year.

19 22 Much of the information in this section comes from the State Department Country Report on Human Rights for Much of the information in this section comes from the State Department Country Report on Human Rights for
2019; Iran. 2019; Iran.
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Women’s Rights
Women Women can vote and run for office,can vote and run for office, but women who have sought to run for president have always been barred but women who have sought to run for president have always been barred
from doing so by the Council of Guardians. They have servedfrom doing so by the Council of Guardians. They have served in cabinet and vice presidentialin cabinet and vice presidential positions, as positions, as ~~wel~~ well as as
in mayoralin mayoral posts, but are not permitted to serve as judges. As noted above, in August 2017, Rouhani named three posts, but are not permitted to serve as judges. As noted above, in August 2017, Rouhani named three
women to his second-term cabinet, but he disappointed women’swomen to his second-term cabinet, but he disappointed women’s groups by not appointing any to ministerial groups by not appointing any to ministerial
posts. posts.
WomenWomen are often arrestedare often arrested if they do not cover their head in public, if they do not cover their head in public, ~~general y~~generally with a garment with a garment ~~cal ed~~called a a chador,, but, but,
in Decemberin December 2017, authorities announced they would no longer arrest2017, authorities announced they would no longer arrest dress code violators.dress code violators. Instead, violators are Instead, violators are
required to attend classes to correctrequired to attend classes to correct their behavior. Stil ,their behavior. Stil , ~~smal~~ small numbers of women in various citiesnumbers of women in various cities have been have been
protesting the code since February 2018 by taking off their hijab and holding them up in front of gathered crowds. protesting the code since February 2018 by taking off their hijab and holding them up in front of gathered crowds.
Government agents have arrestedGovernment agents have arrested some of those protesterssome of those protesters and, in May 2018, one such activist was sentenced to and, in May 2018, one such activist was sentenced to
20 years in prison. 20 years in prison.
WomenWomen are permitted to drive and workare permitted to drive and work outside the home without restriction,outside the home without restriction, including owning their own including owning their own
businesses,businesses, although lessalthough less than 20% of the workforcethan 20% of the workforce is female.is female. Despite femaleDespite female ~~majorities~~ majorities in higher education in in higher education in
past years, women are a third lesspast years, women are a third less ~~likely~~ likely to work after graduation than their male counterparts. to work after graduation than their male counterparts.
WomenWomen do not have inheritance or divorce rights equal to those of men,do not have inheritance or divorce rights equal to those of men, and their court testimony carriesand their court testimony carries half half
the weight of a male’s.the weight of a male’s. A woman’s husband has the power to restrictA woman’s husband has the power to restrict his wife’shis wife’s travel abroad, as travel abroad, as ~~wel~~ well as limitas limit her her
job prospects.job prospects. Laws against rape are not enforced effectively.Laws against rape are not enforced effectively. The law permitsThe law permits a man to have up to four wives as a man to have up to four wives as
~~wel~~ well as “temporary wives”—an arrangement reached after a religiousas “temporary wives”—an arrangement reached after a religious ceremony and civil contract outlining the ceremony and civil contract outlining the
relationship’srelationship’s conditions. Womenconditions. Women have also been banned from attending male sports matches, although that have also been banned from attending male sports matches, although that
restrictionrestriction was relaxed in 2017.was relaxed in 2017.2023
In recent years,In recent years, women have protested the ban on their attending sports events such as soccer matches. On women have protested the ban on their attending sports events such as soccer matches. On
October 10, 2019, fol owing negotiations between the FIFA world soccer organization and Iran, women were October 10, 2019, fol owing negotiations between the FIFA world soccer organization and Iran, women were
~~al owed~~allowed to attend a match between Iran and Cambodia. However, to attend a match between Iran and Cambodia. However, only a limitedonly a limited number of women werenumber of women were given given
seats and had to stay in a segregated,seats and had to stay in a segregated, cordoned-off areas of the stadium. cordoned-off areas of the stadium.

Iran has an official body, the High Council for Human Rights, headed by former Foreign Minister Iran has an official body, the High Council for Human Rights, headed by former Foreign Minister
Mohammad Javad LarijaniMohammad Javad Larijani (brother of the (brother of the Majles speaker). It speaker). It ~~general y~~generally defends the government’s defends the government’s
actions to outside bodies rather than oversees the government’s human rights practices, but actions to outside bodies rather than oversees the government’s human rights practices, but
Larijani, according to the Special Rapporteur, has questioned the effectiveness of drug-related Larijani, according to the Special Rapporteur, has questioned the effectiveness of drug-related
executions and other government policies. executions and other government policies.
As part of its efforts to try to compel Iran to improve its human rights practices, the United States As part of its efforts to try to compel Iran to improve its human rights practices, the United States
has imposed sanctions on Iranian officials has imposed sanctions on Iranian officials ~~al eged~~alleged to have committed human rights abuses, and on to have committed human rights abuses, and on
firms that help Iranian authorities censor or monitor the internet. Human rights-related sanctions firms that help Iranian authorities censor or monitor the internet. Human rights-related sanctions
are analyzed in significant detail in CRS Report RS20871, are analyzed in significant detail in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman. , by Kenneth Katzman.

~~20 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/bowing-to-pressure-iran-grants-women-spectators-~~
~~access_us_58a92da2e4b0fa149f9ac73d.~~
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Table 2. Human Rights Practices: General Categories
Media Freedoms Media Freedoms
The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance monitors The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance monitors journalist reporting fromjournalist reporting from Iran as Iran as
~~wel~~ well as media and communicationsas media and communications operations.operations. The government continues to block pro-The government continues to block pro-
reformreform websites,websites, social mediasocial media applications, and blogs—particularly during timesapplications, and blogs—particularly during times of of
unrest—and to close newspapers critical of the government.unrest—and to close newspapers critical of the government. Iran continues to arrest Iran continues to arrest
somesome activists who use social mediaactivists who use social media to agitate against the government.to agitate against the government. Iran has set up a Iran has set up a
national network that has a monopoly on national network that has a monopoly on ~~Internet~~internet service service for Iranians. for Iranians.

Labor Restrictions Labor Restrictions
Independent unions are legal but are restricted in practice. Many trade unionists remain Independent unions are legal but are restricted in practice. Many trade unionists remain
in jailin jail for protesting unpaid wages, precarious working conditions, and poor living for protesting unpaid wages, precarious working conditions, and poor living
conditions, or for peaceful trade union activities.conditions, or for peaceful trade union activities. The oneThe one authorized national labor 23 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/bowing-to-pressure-iran-grants-women-spectators-access_us_58a92da2e4b0fa149f9ac73d. Congressional Research Service 18 Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options ~~authorized national labor~~
organization is a state-control ed “Workers’organization is a state-control ed “Workers’ House” House” ~~umbrel a~~ umbrella but others, such as the but others, such as the
severalseveral unions representing Iran’s teachers, are tolerated. In 2014, Iran ratified an unions representing Iran’s teachers, are tolerated. In 2014, Iran ratified an
additional International Labour Organization convention.additional International Labour Organization convention.

Religious Religious ~~Freedom~~
Freedom Each year since 1999, the Secretary of State has designated Iran as a “Country of Each year since 1999, the Secretary of State has designated Iran as a “Country of
Particular Concern” under the International ReligiousParticular Concern” under the International Religious ~~Freedom~~ Freedom Act (IRFA) for engaging Act (IRFA) for engaging
in or tolerating particularly severein or tolerating particularly severe violations of religiousviolations of religious freedom.freedom. No sanctions have No sanctions have
been added on Iran under IRFA, on the grounds that Iran is already subject to extensive been added on Iran under IRFA, on the grounds that Iran is already subject to extensive
U.S. sanctions. The constitution specifies Ja’afari Shia Islam as the official state religion U.S. sanctions. The constitution specifies Ja’afari Shia Islam as the official state religion
and restrictionsand restrictions on religiouson religious ~~freedom~~ freedom for somefor some non-Shia groups are widely reported. non-Shia groups are widely reported.
Iran’s penal code provides the death penalty for attempts by non-Muslims to convert Iran’s penal code provides the death penalty for attempts by non-Muslims to convert
Muslims,Muslims, ~~as wel~~ as well as as moharebeh (enmity against God) and (enmity against God) and sabb al-nabi (insulting the (insulting the
prophets)—crimesprophets)—crimes applied to oppositionists.applied to oppositionists.

Executions Policy Executions Policy
Iran’s per capita execution rate is among the highest in the world, despite recent reforms Iran’s per capita execution rate is among the highest in the world, despite recent reforms
to reduce the number of executions for drug offenses.to reduce the number of executions for drug offenses. Iran reportedlyIran reportedly executed over executed over
100 persons between January 1 and June 30, 2019, including two juveniles.100 persons between January 1 and June 30, 2019, including two juveniles. Iran is a party Iran is a party
to the International Covenant on Civilto the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the and Political Rights and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, and is obligated to cease the executions of minors.Rights of the Child, and is obligated to cease the executions of minors. Iran has not held Iran has not held
accountable officialsaccountable officials involved in the summerinvolved in the summer 1988 executions of thousands of prisoners.1988 executions of thousands of prisoners.

Human Trafficking Human Trafficking
Since 2005, State Department “Trafficking in Persons” reports Since 2005, State Department “Trafficking in Persons” reports (including the report for (including the report for
2019) have placed Iran in Tier 3 (worst level) for failing to take significant action to 2019) have placed Iran in Tier 3 (worst level) for failing to take significant action to
prevent trafficking in persons. Iranian women,prevent trafficking in persons. Iranian women, boys, and girls are trafficked for sexual boys, and girls are trafficked for sexual
exploitation in Iran as exploitation in Iran as ~~wel~~ well as to Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, and Europe.as to Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, and Europe.

Corporal Corporal
Iran’s judiciary continues to sanction corporal punishment, including flogging, blinding, Iran’s judiciary continues to sanction corporal punishment, including flogging, blinding,
Punishments/Stoning stoning, and amputation. In 2002, the then-head of Iran’s judiciary issued a ban on Punishments/Stoning stoning, and amputation. In 2002, the then-head of Iran’s judiciary issued a ban on
stoning. However, stoning. However, Iranian officialsIranian officials ~~later cal ed~~ later called that directive “advisory,” thus putting that directive “advisory,” thus putting
stoning sentences at the discretionstoning sentences at the discretion of individual judges.of individual judges.

Sources: Most recent State Department reports on human rights practices, on international religious Most recent State Department reports on human rights practices, on international religious freedom, freedom,
and trafficking in persons. and trafficking in persons.
U.S.-Iran Relations, U.S. Policy, and Options
The February 11, 1979, The February 11, 1979, ~~fal~~ fall of the Shah of Iran led to a dissolution of U.S.-Iran relations. The of the Shah of Iran led to a dissolution of U.S.-Iran relations. The
Carter Administration’s efforts to build a relationship with the new regime in Iran ended after the Carter Administration’s efforts to build a relationship with the new regime in Iran ended after the
November 4, 1979, takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by radical pro-Khomeini “Students in November 4, 1979, takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by radical pro-Khomeini “Students in
the Line of the Imam.” The 66 U.S. diplomats there were held hostage for 444 days, and released the Line of the Imam.” The 66 U.S. diplomats there were held hostage for 444 days, and released
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pursuant to the January 20, 1981, Algiers Accords. Their release was completed minutes after pursuant to the January 20, 1981, Algiers Accords. Their release was completed minutes after
President Reagan’s inauguration on January 20, 1981.President Reagan’s inauguration on January 20, 1981.~~21The~~24The United States broke diplomatic United States broke diplomatic
relations with Iran on April 7, 1980, two weeks before the failed U.S. military attempt to rescue relations with Iran on April 7, 1980, two weeks before the failed U.S. military attempt to rescue
~~the hostages (“Desert One”).~~
the hostages (“Desert One”). 24 The text of the Algiers Accords can be found at https://www.nytimes.com/1981/01/20/world/text-of-agreement-between-iran-and-the-us-to-resolve-the-hostage-situation.html. The technical name of the Accords was: “The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,” reflecting that it was a result of a request by Iran and the United States for Algerian mediation of the hostage crisis. Congressional Research Service 19 Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options Iran has since pursued policies that every successive U.S. Administration has considered inimical Iran has since pursued policies that every successive U.S. Administration has considered inimical
to U.S. interests in the Near East region and beyond.to U.S. interests in the Near East region and beyond.2225 Iran’s authoritarian political system and Iran’s authoritarian political system and
human rights abuses have contributed to the U.S.-Iran rift. human rights abuses have contributed to the U.S.-Iran rift.
The two countries have minimal official direct contact. Iran has an interest section in Washington, The two countries have minimal official direct contact. Iran has an interest section in Washington,
D.C., under the auspices of the Embassy of Pakistan, and staffed by Iranian Americans. The D.C., under the auspices of the Embassy of Pakistan, and staffed by Iranian Americans. The
former Iranian Embassy closed in April 1980 when the two countries broke diplomatic relations, former Iranian Embassy closed in April 1980 when the two countries broke diplomatic relations,
and remains under the control of the State Department. Iran’s Mission to the United Nations in and remains under the control of the State Department. Iran’s Mission to the United Nations in
New York runs most of Iran’s diplomacy inside the United States. The U.S. interests section in New York runs most of Iran’s diplomacy inside the United States. The U.S. interests section in
Tehran, under the auspices of the Embassy of Switzerland, has no American personnel. In May Tehran, under the auspices of the Embassy of Switzerland, has no American personnel. In May
2015, the two governments granted each other permission to move their respective interests 2015, the two governments granted each other permission to move their respective interests
sections to more spacious locations. Since April 2019, Iran’s Ambassador to the United Nations sections to more spacious locations. Since April 2019, Iran’s Ambassador to the United Nations
has been Majid Takht Ravanchi. U.S. officials and U.S. government employees, including has been Majid Takht Ravanchi. U.S. officials and U.S. government employees, including
Members of Congress and staff, Members of Congress and staff, ~~general y~~generally are not granted visas by Iran to visit. are not granted visas by Iran to visit.
The following sections analyze some key The following sections analyze some key ~~hal marks~~hallmarks of past U.S. policies toward Iran. of past U.S. policies toward Iran.
Reagan Administration: Iran Placed on “Terrorism List”
The Reagan Administration designated Iran a “state sponsor of terrorism” in January 1984, The Reagan Administration designated Iran a “state sponsor of terrorism” in January 1984,
largely in response to Iran’s backing for the October 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks in largely in response to Iran’s backing for the October 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks in
Beirut.Beirut.2326 The Administration also “tilted” toward Iraq in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. The Administration also “tilted” toward Iraq in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.2427 During During
1987-1988, at the height of that war, U.S. naval forces fought several skirmishes with Iranian 1987-1988, at the height of that war, U.S. naval forces fought several skirmishes with Iranian
naval elements while protecting oil shipments transiting the Persian Gulf from Iranian mines and naval elements while protecting oil shipments transiting the Persian Gulf from Iranian mines and
other attacks. On April 18, 1988, Iran lost one-quarter of its larger naval ships in an engagement other attacks. On April 18, 1988, Iran lost one-quarter of its larger naval ships in an engagement
with the U.S. Navy (“Operation Praying Mantis”), including a frigate sunk. However, in 1986, the with the U.S. Navy (“Operation Praying Mantis”), including a frigate sunk. However, in 1986, the
~~Administration~~ Administration provided some arms to Iran (“TOW” anti-tank weapons and I-Hawk air defense provided some arms to Iran (“TOW” anti-tank weapons and I-Hawk air defense
batteries) in exchange for Iran’s help in the releasing of U.S. hostages held by pro-Iranian batteries) in exchange for Iran’s help in the releasing of U.S. hostages held by pro-Iranian
HezbollahHezbollah in Lebanon (“Iran-Contra Affair”). On July 3, 1988, U.S. forces in the Gulf mistakenly in Lebanon (“Iran-Contra Affair”). On July 3, 1988, U.S. forces in the Gulf mistakenly
shot down Iran Air Flight 655 over the Gulf, shot down Iran Air Flight 655 over the Gulf, ~~kil ing al~~ killing all 290 on board, almost 290 on board, almost al all of whom were of whom were
Iranian nationals, contributing to Iran’s decision to accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 598 Iranian nationals, contributing to Iran’s decision to accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 598
that provided for a cease-fire with Iraq in August 1988. that provided for a cease-fire with Iraq in August 1988.
George H. W. Bush Administration: “Goodwill Begets Goodwill”
The George H.W. Bush Administration appeared to hold out prospects for improved U.S.-Iran The George H.W. Bush Administration appeared to hold out prospects for improved U.S.-Iran
relations. In his January 1989 inauguration speech, President George H.W. Bush, stated that relations. In his January 1989 inauguration speech, President George H.W. Bush, stated that
““~~goodwil begets goodwil~~ goodwill begets goodwill” with respect to Iran, reportedly implying that U.S.-Iran relations ” with respect to Iran, reportedly implying that U.S.-Iran relations
could improve if Iran helped obtain the release of remaining U.S. hostages held by Hezbollahcould improve if Iran helped obtain the release of remaining U.S. hostages held by Hezbollah in

~~21 T he text of the Algiers Accords can be found at https://www.nytimes.com/1981/01/20/world/text-of-agreement-~~
~~between-iran-and-the-us-to-resolve-the-hostage-situation.html. T he technical name of the Accords was: “ T he~~
~~Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,” reflecting that it was a result of a~~
~~request by Iran and the United States for Algerian mediation of the hostage crisis.~~
~~22 T hose policies are assessed in CRS~~ in Lebanon. Iran’s apparent assistance led to the release of all remaining U.S. hostages by the end of 1991. No U.S.-Iran thaw followed, possibly because Iran continued to back violent groups opposed to the Administration’s push for Arab-Israeli peace that followed. Iran benefited strategically from the Bush Administration’s 1991 defeat of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, and pro-Iranian groups launched a significant but ultimately unsuccessful uprising against Saddam Hussein’s regime in the aftermath of that war. 25 Those policies are assessed in CRS Report R44017, Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman. , by Kenneth Katzman.
~~23 T he~~26 The terrorism list was established terrorism list was established in 1979 under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Actin 1979 under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act .
24. 27 Elaine Sciolino, Elaine Sciolino, The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein’s Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis (1991), p. 168. (1991), p. 168.
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~~Lebanon. Iran’s apparent assistance led to the release of al remaining U.S. hostages by the end of~~
~~1991. No U.S.-Iran thaw followed, possibly because Iran continued to back violent groups~~
~~opposed to the Administration’s push for Arab-Israeli peace that followed. Iran benefited~~
~~strategical y from the Bush Administration’s 1991 defeat of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, and~~
~~pro-Iranian groups launched a significant but ultimately unsuccessful uprising against Saddam~~
~~Hussein’s regime in the aftermath of that war.~~
Clinton Administration: “Dual Containment”
The Clinton Administration articulated a strategy of “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq—an The Clinton Administration articulated a strategy of “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq—an
attempt to keep both countries simultaneously weak rather than alternately tilting to one or the attempt to keep both countries simultaneously weak rather than alternately tilting to one or the
other.other.2528 As part of that policy, in 1995-1996, the Administration and Congress banned U.S. trade As part of that policy, in 1995-1996, the Administration and Congress banned U.S. trade
and investment with Iran and imposed penalties on foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector, in and investment with Iran and imposed penalties on foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector, in
response to Iran’s support for terrorist groups seeking to undermine the Israeli-Palestinian peace response to Iran’s support for terrorist groups seeking to undermine the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process. The election of the moderate Mohammad Khatemi as president in May 1997 precipitated process. The election of the moderate Mohammad Khatemi as president in May 1997 precipitated
a U.S. offer of direct dialogue, but Khatemi, possibly under pressure from Iran’s hardliner refused a U.S. offer of direct dialogue, but Khatemi, possibly under pressure from Iran’s hardliner refused
to enter into direct talks. As part of the unsuccessful attempt to reach out to Khatemi’s to enter into direct talks. As part of the unsuccessful attempt to reach out to Khatemi’s
government, in June 1998, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright government, in June 1998, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright ~~cal ed~~called for mutual for mutual
confidence building measures that could lead to a “road map” for normalization. In a March 17, confidence building measures that could lead to a “road map” for normalization. In a March 17,
2000, speech, Secretary Albright admitted past U.S. interference in Iran. 2000, speech, Secretary Albright admitted past U.S. interference in Iran.
George W. Bush Administration: Iran Part of “Axis of Evil”
In his January 2002 State of the Union message, President Bush named Iran as part of an “axis of In his January 2002 State of the Union message, President Bush named Iran as part of an “axis of
evil” includingevil” including Iraq and North Korea.Iraq and North Korea.2629 However, the Administration enlisted Iran’s diplomatic However, the Administration enlisted Iran’s diplomatic
help in efforts to try to stabilize post-Taliban Afghanistan and post-Saddam Iraq.help in efforts to try to stabilize post-Taliban Afghanistan and post-Saddam Iraq.2730 The The
Administration rebuffed a reported May 2003 Iranian overture, transmitted by the Swiss Administration rebuffed a reported May 2003 Iranian overture, transmitted by the Swiss
Ambassador to Iran, for an agreement on Ambassador to Iran, for an agreement on al all major issues of mutual concern (“grand bargain” major issues of mutual concern (“grand bargain”
proposal).proposal).2831 State Department officials disputed that the proposal was fully vetted within Iran’s State Department officials disputed that the proposal was fully vetted within Iran’s
leadership. The Administrationleadership. The Administration aided victims of the December 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran, aided victims of the December 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran,
including through U.S. military deliveries into Iran. including through U.S. military deliveries into Iran.
As Iran’s nuclear program advanced, the Administration worked with several European countries As Iran’s nuclear program advanced, the Administration worked with several European countries
to persuade Iran to agree to limit its nuclear program. President Bush’s January 20, 2005, second to persuade Iran to agree to limit its nuclear program. President Bush’s January 20, 2005, second
inaugural address and his January 31, 2006, State of the Union message stated that the United inaugural address and his January 31, 2006, State of the Union message stated that the United
States would be a close States would be a close ~~al y~~ally of a “free and democratic” Iran—phrasing that suggested support for of a “free and democratic” Iran—phrasing that suggested support for
regime change.regime change.29
32 Obama Administration: Pressure, Engagement, and the JCPOA
President Obama asserted that there was an opportunity to persuade Iran to limit its nuclear President Obama asserted that there was an opportunity to persuade Iran to limit its nuclear
program through diplomacy and to program through diplomacy and to ~~potential y~~potentially improve U.S.-Iran relations more broadly. The improve U.S.-Iran relations more broadly. The
approach emerged in President Obama’s first message to the Iranian people on the occasion of approach emerged in President Obama’s first message to the Iranian people on the occasion of

~~25 Speech by NSC~~ Nowruz (Persian New Year, March 21, 2009), in which he stated that the United States “is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran, and the international community.”33 He referred to Iran as “The Islamic Republic of Iran,” appearing to reject a policy of regime change. The Administration reportedly also loosened restrictions on U.S. diplomats’ meeting with their Iranian 28 Speech by NSC Senior Director for Near Eastern Affairs Martin Indyk, to the Soref Symposium ofSenior Director for Near Eastern Affairs Martin Indyk, to the Soref Symposium of the Washington the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy. “Institute for Near East Policy. “ ~~T he~~The Clinton Administration Clinton Administration'’s Approach to the Middle Easts Approach to the Middle East .” 1993..” 1993.
~~26 T ext~~ 29 Text of President Bush of President Bush'’s 2002 State of the Union Address.s 2002 State of the Union Address. Washington Post, January 29, 2002. , January 29, 2002.
2730 Robin Wright, “U.S. In ‘Useful’ Robin Wright, “U.S. In ‘Useful’ ~~T alks~~Talks with Iran,” with Iran,” Los Angeles Times, May 13, 2003. , May 13, 2003.
~~28 “Bush T eam Snubbed `Grand Bargain' on Iran'~~31 “Bush Team Snubbed `Grand Bargain’ on Iran’s Atomic Work in 2003s Atomic Work in 2003 .” .” Bloomberg, December 10, 2007. , December 10, 2007.
2932 “Strategy on Iran Stirs New “Strategy on Iran Stirs New Debate at White House,” Debate at White House,” New York Times, June, June ~~16, 2007.~~
16, 2007. 33 “Barack Obama offers Iran ‘new beginning’ with video message.” The Guardian, March 20, 2009. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options

~~Nowruz (Persian New Year, March 21, 2009), in which he stated that the United States “is now~~
~~committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing~~
~~constructive ties among the United States, Iran, and the international community.”30 He referred~~
~~to Iran as “The Islamic Republic of Iran,” appearing to reject a policy of regime change. The~~
~~Administration reportedly also loosened restrictions on U.S. diplomats’ meeting with their Iranian~~
counterparts at international meetings. President Obama said that he exchanged several letters counterparts at international meetings. President Obama said that he exchanged several letters
with Supreme Leader Khamene’i, expressing an intent to engage Iran. with Supreme Leader Khamene’i, expressing an intent to engage Iran.
In 2009, Iran’s crackdown on the Green Movement uprising and its refusal to immediately accept In 2009, Iran’s crackdown on the Green Movement uprising and its refusal to immediately accept
limits on its nuclear program contributed to an Administration shift to a “two track” strategy: limits on its nuclear program contributed to an Administration shift to a “two track” strategy:
stronger economic pressure coupled with offers of sanctions relief if Iran accepted nuclear stronger economic pressure coupled with offers of sanctions relief if Iran accepted nuclear
program limitations. International sanctions imposed on Iran during 2010-2013 received broad program limitations. International sanctions imposed on Iran during 2010-2013 received broad
international cooperation and caused significant economic difficulty in Iran. In early 2013, the international cooperation and caused significant economic difficulty in Iran. In early 2013, the
Administration began direct but unpublicized talks with Iranian officials in the Sultanate of Oman Administration began direct but unpublicized talks with Iranian officials in the Sultanate of Oman
on a nuclear accord.on a nuclear accord.3134 Apparently seeking to capitalize on the election of Rouhani in June 2013, Apparently seeking to capitalize on the election of Rouhani in June 2013,
President Obama’s September 24, 2013, U.N. General Assembly speech confirmed an exchange President Obama’s September 24, 2013, U.N. General Assembly speech confirmed an exchange
of letters with Rouhani stating U.S. of letters with Rouhani stating U.S. ~~wil ingness~~willingness to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully and that to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully and that
the United States “[is] not seeking regime change.”the United States “[is] not seeking regime change.”3235 The two presidents spoke by phone on The two presidents spoke by phone on
September 27, 2013—the first U.S.-Iran contact at that level since Iran’s revolution. September 27, 2013—the first U.S.-Iran contact at that level since Iran’s revolution.
After the JCPOA was finalized in July 2015, the United States and Iran held bilateral meetings at After the JCPOA was finalized in July 2015, the United States and Iran held bilateral meetings at
the margins of the margins of al all nuclear talks and in other settings, covering bilateral issues. President Obama nuclear talks and in other settings, covering bilateral issues. President Obama
expressed hope that the JCPOA would “usher[] in a new era in U.S.-Iranian relations,”expressed hope that the JCPOA would “usher[] in a new era in U.S.-Iranian relations,”3336 while at while at
the same time asserting that the JCPOA benefitted U.S. national security on its own merits. the same time asserting that the JCPOA benefitted U.S. national security on its own merits. ~~Stil~~ Still, a , a
broad warming of U.S.-Iran relations was elusive.broad warming of U.S.-Iran relations was elusive.
 Coinciding with Implementation Day of the JCPOA (January 16, 2016), dual  Coinciding with Implementation Day of the JCPOA (January 16, 2016), dual
Iranian-American citizens held by Iran were released and a long-standing Iranian Iranian-American citizens held by Iran were released and a long-standing Iranian
claim for funds paid for undelivered military equipment from the Shah’s era was claim for funds paid for undelivered military equipment from the Shah’s era was
settled—resulting in $1.7 settled—resulting in $1.7 ~~bil ion~~ billion in cash payments (euros, Swiss francs, and other in cash payments (euros, Swiss francs, and other
non-U.S. hard currencies) to Iran—$400 non-U.S. hard currencies) to Iran—$400 ~~mil ion~~million for the original DOD monies for the original DOD monies
and $1.3 and $1.3 ~~bil ion~~ billion for an arbitrated amount of interest. Administration officials for an arbitrated amount of interest. Administration officials
asserted that the nuclear diplomacy provided an opportunity to resolve these asserted that the nuclear diplomacy provided an opportunity to resolve these
outstanding issues, but some Members of Congress criticized the simultaneity of outstanding issues, but some Members of Congress criticized the simultaneity of
the financial settlement as paying “ransom” to Iran. Obama Administration the financial settlement as paying “ransom” to Iran. Obama Administration
officials asserted that it was long assumed that the United States was liable for officials asserted that it was long assumed that the United States was liable for
the Iranian funds paid for the undelivered military equipment and that the amount the Iranian funds paid for the undelivered military equipment and that the amount
of interest agreed was likely less than what Iran might have been awarded by the of interest agreed was likely less than what Iran might have been awarded by the
U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal. Iran subsequently jailed several other dual nationals U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal. Iran subsequently jailed several other dual nationals
(see box below). (see box below).
 Iran did not discontinue any of its support to  Iran did not discontinue any of its support to ~~al ies~~allies and proxies in the region, its and proxies in the region, its
~~chal enges~~challenges to U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf, or its to U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf, or its ~~bal istic~~ballistic missile tests. missile tests.
Iranian arms exports were banned by Resolution 2231 that endorsed the JCPOA, Iranian arms exports were banned by Resolution 2231 that endorsed the JCPOA,
and the Resolution and the Resolution ~~cal ed~~called on Iran not to develop missiles capable of carrying a on Iran not to develop missiles capable of carrying a
nuclear payload. The Obama Administration termed the missile tests “defiant of” nuclear payload. The Obama Administration termed the missile tests “defiant of”
or “inconsistent with” Resolution 2231. or “inconsistent with” Resolution 2231.

~~30 “Barack Obama offers Iran 'new beginning' with video message.” The Guardian, March 20, 2009.~~
31  There was no expansion of diplomatic representation, such as the posting of U.S. nationals to staff the U.S. interests section in Tehran, nor did then-Secretary of State Kerry visit Iran. However, in January 2016, Kerry worked with Zarif to achieve the rapid release of 10 U.S. Navy personnel who the IRGC took into 34 “Inside the secret US-Iran diplomacy that sealed nuke deal.” “Inside the secret US-Iran diplomacy that sealed nuke deal.” Al Monitor, August, August 11, 2015. 11, 2015.
3235 Remarks by President Obama in Address Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 24, 2013.to the United Nations General Assembly, September 24, 2013.
33 36 Roger Cohen. “U.S. Embassy, Roger Cohen. “U.S. Embassy, ~~T ehran~~Tehran.” .” New York Times, April 8, 2015. , April 8, 2015.
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~~ There was no expansion of diplomatic representation, such as the posting of U.S.~~
~~nationals to staff the U.S. interests section in Tehran, nor did then-Secretary of~~
~~State Kerry visit Iran. However, in January 2016, Kerry worked with Zarif to~~
~~achieve the rapid release of 10 U.S. Navy personnel who the IRGC took into~~
custody when their two riverine crafts strayed into what Iran considers its custody when their two riverine crafts strayed into what Iran considers its
territorial waters. territorial waters.
 Iranian officials argued that new U.S. visa requirements in the FY2016  Iranian officials argued that new U.S. visa requirements in the FY2016
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113) would cause European Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113) would cause European
businessmen to hesitate to travel to Iran and thereby limit Iran’s economic businessmen to hesitate to travel to Iran and thereby limit Iran’s economic
reintegration. Then-Secretary of State Kerry wrote to Foreign Minister Zarif on reintegration. Then-Secretary of State Kerry wrote to Foreign Minister Zarif on
December 19, 2015, that the United States would implement the provision so as December 19, 2015, that the United States would implement the provision so as
to avoid interfering with “legitimate business interests of Iran.” to avoid interfering with “legitimate business interests of Iran.”
Trump Administration: JCPOA Exit and “Maximum Pressure”
The Trump Administration shifted U.S. policy sharply from that of its predecessor by abrogating The Trump Administration shifted U.S. policy sharply from that of its predecessor by abrogating
the JCPOA and applying “maximum pressure,” through U.S. sanctions on Iran’s economy, to: (1) the JCPOA and applying “maximum pressure,” through U.S. sanctions on Iran’s economy, to: (1)
compel it to renegotiate the JCPOA to address the broad range of U.S. concerns and (2) deny Iran compel it to renegotiate the JCPOA to address the broad range of U.S. concerns and (2) deny Iran
the revenue to continue to develop its strategic capabilities or intervene throughout the region. the revenue to continue to develop its strategic capabilities or intervene throughout the region.
Some Administration statements have also suggested the policy hopes to create enough economic Some Administration statements have also suggested the policy hopes to create enough economic
difficulties to stoke unrest in Iran, possibly to the point where the regime collapses.difficulties to stoke unrest in Iran, possibly to the point where the regime collapses. 3437 As U.S.- As U.S.-
Iran tensions that increased in mid-2019 turned to hostilities in late 2019 and early 2020, U.S. Iran tensions that increased in mid-2019 turned to hostilities in late 2019 and early 2020, U.S.
officials articulated that deterring Iranian provocative actions, in part through a buildup of U.S. officials articulated that deterring Iranian provocative actions, in part through a buildup of U.S.
forces in the region, was a component of U.S. policy as forces in the region, was a component of U.S. policy as ~~wel .~~
well.  Citing Iran’s arming of the Houthis in Yemen, on February 1, 2017, then-  Citing Iran’s arming of the Houthis in Yemen, on February 1, 2017, then-
National Security Adviser Michael Flynn stated that Iran was “ National Security Adviser Michael Flynn stated that Iran was “~~official y on~~
officially on notice” about its regional behavior. In Aprilnotice” about its regional behavior. In April 2017, the Administration announced 2017, the Administration announced
a six-month Iran policy review, arguing that the JCPOA “only delays [Iran’s] a six-month Iran policy review, arguing that the JCPOA “only delays [Iran’s]
goal of becoming a nuclear state” and had failed to limitgoal of becoming a nuclear state” and had failed to limit Iran’s regional Iran’s regional
influence.influence.
 During his May 2017, visit to the region and first international trip after taking  During his May 2017, visit to the region and first international trip after taking
office, President Trump told Arab leaders in Saudi Arabia that “Until office, President Trump told Arab leaders in Saudi Arabia that “Until the Iranian the Iranian
regime is regime is ~~wil ing~~ willing to be a partner for peace, to be a partner for peace, al all nations of conscience must work nations of conscience must work
together to isolate Iran….”together to isolate Iran….”
 On October 13, 2017, President Trump, citing the policy review, stated that he  On October 13, 2017, President Trump, citing the policy review, stated that he
would not certify Iranian JCPOA compliance (under the Iran Nuclear Agreement would not certify Iranian JCPOA compliance (under the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act, INARA, P.L. 114-17), and that the United States would only stay in Review Act, INARA, P.L. 114-17), and that the United States would only stay in
the accord if Congress and U.S. the accord if Congress and U.S. ~~al ies~~allies (1) address the expiration of JCPOA (1) address the expiration of JCPOA
nuclear restrictions, (2) curb Iran’s nuclear restrictions, (2) curb Iran’s ~~bal istic~~ballistic missile program, and (3) counter missile program, and (3) counter
Iran’s regional activities. The denial of certification triggered a 60-day period for Iran’s regional activities. The denial of certification triggered a 60-day period for
Congress to take legislative action under expedited procedures to re-impose those Congress to take legislative action under expedited procedures to re-impose those
sanctions that were lifted. Congress did not take action. sanctions that were lifted. Congress did not take action.

~~34 Mike Pompeo Supporting Iranian Voices Address. Reagan Library and Foundation. July 22, 2018.~~

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 On January 12, 2018, the President announced that he would not continue to  On January 12, 2018, the President announced that he would not continue to
waive JCPOA-related Iran sanctions at the next expiration deadline (May 12) waive JCPOA-related Iran sanctions at the next expiration deadline (May 12)
unless the JCPOA’s weaknesses were addressed by Congress and the Europeans. unless the JCPOA’s weaknesses were addressed by Congress and the Europeans.
37 Mike Pompeo Supporting Iranian Voices Address. Reagan Library and Foundation. July 22, 2018. Congressional Research Service 23 Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options Withdrawal from the JCPOA and Subsequent Pressure Efforts
On May 8, 2018, following visits to the United States by the leaders of France and Germany On May 8, 2018, following visits to the United States by the leaders of France and Germany
arguing for the United States to remain in the JCPOA, President Trump announced that the arguing for the United States to remain in the JCPOA, President Trump announced that the
United States would withdraw from the JCPOA and reimpose United States would withdraw from the JCPOA and reimpose al all U.S. secondary sanctions by U.S. secondary sanctions by
November 4, 2018.November 4, 2018.3538 Since then, the Administration has taken additional Since then, the Administration has taken additional steps to apply steps to apply
“maximum pressure” on Iran’s economy and regime. “maximum pressure” on Iran’s economy and regime.
  U.S. Demands Articulated. On May 21, 2018, in his first speech as Secretary of On May 21, 2018, in his first speech as Secretary of
State, Michael Pompeo articulated 12 requirements that Iran must meet in a State, Michael Pompeo articulated 12 requirements that Iran must meet in a
revised JCPOA and to achieve normalized relations with the United States. Most revised JCPOA and to achieve normalized relations with the United States. Most
of the requirements focused on cessation of Iranian support for its of the requirements focused on cessation of Iranian support for its ~~al ies~~allies and and
proxies, including in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen.proxies, including in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen.36
39  On July 23, 2018, following threats by Rouhani and other Iranian leaders to cut  On July 23, 2018, following threats by Rouhani and other Iranian leaders to cut
off the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf if Iran’s oil exports are prevented by off the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf if Iran’s oil exports are prevented by
sanctions, President Trump posted the following threat on Twitter: “To Iranian sanctions, President Trump posted the following threat on Twitter: “To Iranian
President Rouhani: NEVER, EVER THREATEN THE UNITED STATES President Rouhani: NEVER, EVER THREATEN THE UNITED STATES
AGAIN OR YOU WILL SUFFER CONSEQUENCES THE LIKES OF WHICH AGAIN OR YOU WILL SUFFER CONSEQUENCES THE LIKES OF WHICH
FEW THROUGHOUTFEW THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAVEHISTORY HAVE EVER SUFFERED BEFORE. WE EVER SUFFERED BEFORE. WE
ARE NO LONGER A COUNTRYARE NO LONGER A COUNTRY THAT WILL STAND FOR YOUR THAT WILL STAND FOR YOUR
DEMENTED WORDS OF VIOLENCE & DEATH. BE CAUTIOUS!” DEMENTED WORDS OF VIOLENCE & DEATH. BE CAUTIOUS!”
  Iran Action Group Created. On August 16, 2018, Secretary Pompeo announced On August 16, 2018, Secretary Pompeo announced
the creation of an “Iran Action Group” responsible for coordinating the State the creation of an “Iran Action Group” responsible for coordinating the State
Department’s Iran-related activities. The group is headed by Brian Hook, the Department’s Iran-related activities. The group is headed by Brian Hook, the
State Department “Special Representative for Iran.” In September 2018, the State Department “Special Representative for Iran.” In September 2018, the
group issued its “Outlaw Regime” report on Iran, referenced earlier.group issued its “Outlaw Regime” report on Iran, referenced earlier.
  U.S.-Iran Treaty of Amity Abrogated. On October 3, 2018, the Administration . On October 3, 2018, the Administration
abrogated the 1955 U.S.-Iran “Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and abrogated the 1955 U.S.-Iran “Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
Consular Rights.” Iran’s legal representatives had cited the treaty to earn a Consular Rights.” Iran’s legal representatives had cited the treaty to earn a
favorable October 2, 2018 International Court of Justice ruling that the United favorable October 2, 2018 International Court of Justice ruling that the United
States reverse some sanctions on Iran. The Administration argued that the treaty, States reverse some sanctions on Iran. The Administration argued that the treaty,
which provides for freedom of commerce between the two countries and which provides for freedom of commerce between the two countries and
unfettered diplomatic exchange, has long been mooted by post-1979 unfettered diplomatic exchange, has long been mooted by post-1979
developments in U.S.-Iran relations. The treaty also provides for compensation to developments in U.S.-Iran relations. The treaty also provides for compensation to
Iran for steps that would now constitute enforcement of U.S. sanctions on Iran, Iran for steps that would now constitute enforcement of U.S. sanctions on Iran,
such as seizure of Iranian assets in the United States. The abrogation of the treaty such as seizure of Iranian assets in the United States. The abrogation of the treaty
did not affect the status of the interests sections in each others’ countries.did not affect the status of the interests sections in each others’ countries.
 Seeking to persuade U.S. partners to adopt U.S. policy toward Iran, the  Seeking to persuade U.S. partners to adopt U.S. policy toward Iran, the
Administration organized a ministerial meeting in Warsaw, Poland, during Administration organized a ministerial meeting in Warsaw, Poland, during
February 13-14, 2019, focused particularly on countering the threat posed by February 13-14, 2019, focused particularly on countering the threat posed by
Iran. The meeting spawned follow-up meetings of the “Warsaw Process,” focused Iran. The meeting spawned follow-up meetings of the “Warsaw Process,” focused
on Gulf maritime security as on Gulf maritime security as ~~wel~~ well as broader Middle East issues such as women’s as broader Middle East issues such as women’s

35rights in the region. Whereas the effort produced some, selected partner cooperation on some Iran-related security issues, the Warsaw Process has not 38 White House, Statement by the President on the JCPOA, May 8, 2018. White House, Statement by the President on the JCPOA, May 8, 2018.
3639 Statement by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at the Heritage Foundation, May 21, 2018. Statement by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at the Heritage Foundation, May 21, 2018.
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options

~~rights in the region. Whereas the effort produced some, selected partner~~
~~cooperation on some Iran-related security issues, the Warsaw Process has not~~
caused a broad shift among partner countries to supporting the U.S. policy of caused a broad shift among partner countries to supporting the U.S. policy of
maximum pressure on Iran.maximum pressure on Iran. 3740
  IRGC Named an FTO. On April 8, 2019, the Administration designated the IRGC On April 8, 2019, the Administration designated the IRGC
as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), blaming it for involvement in multiple as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), blaming it for involvement in multiple
past acts of Iran-backed terrorism and anti-U.S. actions.past acts of Iran-backed terrorism and anti-U.S. actions.3841
  Oil Purchase Sanctions Exceptions Ended. On April 22, 2019, the Administration . On April 22, 2019, the Administration
announced it would no longer provide exceptions to countries that pledged to announced it would no longer provide exceptions to countries that pledged to
reduce their purchases of Iranian oil under the FY2012 National Defense reduce their purchases of Iranian oil under the FY2012 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81).Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81).39
42  In May 2019, U.S.-Iran tensions escalated significantly and steadily, culminating  In May 2019, U.S.-Iran tensions escalated significantly and steadily, culminating
in U.S.-Iran direct military conflict—particularly in U.S.-Iran direct military conflict—particularly ~~fol owing~~following a September 14, a September 14,
2019, attack, attributed to Iran, on Saudi critical energy infrastructure. In the 2019, attack, attributed to Iran, on Saudi critical energy infrastructure. In the
aftermath of the January 3, 2020, U.S. strike that aftermath of the January 3, 2020, U.S. strike that ~~kil ed~~killed IRGC-QF commander IRGC-QF commander
Qasem Soleimani and the January 8, 2020, Iranian missile retaliationQasem Soleimani and the January 8, 2020, Iranian missile retaliation on an Iraqi on an Iraqi
base housing U.S. forces, the Administration has continued to impose sanctions base housing U.S. forces, the Administration has continued to impose sanctions
on Iranian entities and additional sectors of Iran’s economy. Administration on Iranian entities and additional sectors of Iran’s economy. Administration
officials also have deployed additionalofficials also have deployed additional forces and equipment to the region. Senior forces and equipment to the region. Senior
officials, including Secretary Pompeo, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, and officials, including Secretary Pompeo, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, and
National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien, have explained the decision to strike National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien, have explained the decision to strike
Soleimani and the U.S. force buildup as efforts to “restore deterrence” against Soleimani and the U.S. force buildup as efforts to “restore deterrence” against
further Iranian provocative actions.further Iranian provocative actions.4043 President Trump has also continued to President Trump has also continued to
express express ~~wil ingness~~willingness to meet with Iranian leaders without preconditions to to meet with Iranian leaders without preconditions to
negotiate a revised nuclear agreement as previously outlined.negotiate a revised nuclear agreement as previously outlined.
 In February 2020, the Administration offered Iran humanitarian assistance to help  In February 2020, the Administration offered Iran humanitarian assistance to help
it deal with the COVID-19 outbreak. Iran publicly refused any U.S. aid. it deal with the COVID-19 outbreak. Iran publicly refused any U.S. aid.
  ~~In April 2020, several~~Throughout 2020, Trump Administration officials, including Secretary Pompeo, Administration officials, including Secretary Pompeo,
stated that the United States would exercise stated that the United States would exercise ~~al available~~ all available diplomatic options at the diplomatic options at the
U.N. Security Council to extend the ban on arms transfers to and from Iran that, U.N. Security Council to extend the ban on arms transfers to and from Iran that,
under Resolution 2231,under Resolution 2231, iswas scheduled to expire on October 18, 2020.44 On August 20, 2020, Secretary Pompeo delivered to the U.N. Security Council president a formal complaint that Iran has breached the JCPOA and that all U.N. sanctions should snap back.45 Thirteen of the 15 Security Council members stated, in writing, that the United States does not have standing to implement the snapback because it no longer participates in the JCPOA, and the Security Council presidency refused to advance the U.S. sanctions snapback request. U.S. officials announced that, as of 8 PM on September 19 (30 days after the U.S. complaint was filed),46 all U.N. sanctions were back in effect. The U.N. Security 40 See CRS In Focus ~~to expire on October 18, 2020. Some of these options~~
~~might include use of provisions in 2231 to end the JCPOA entirely.41~~

~~37 See CRS In Focus~~ IF11132, IF11132, Coalition-Building Against Iran, by Kenneth Katzman. , by Kenneth Katzman.
~~38 See CRS~~ 41 See CRS Insight IN11093, Insight IN11093, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Named a Terrorist Organization , by Kenneth Katzman. , by Kenneth Katzman.
~~39 See: CRS~~ 42 See CRS Insight IN11108, Insight IN11108, Iran Oil Sanctions Exceptions Ended, by Kenneth Katzman. , by Kenneth Katzman.
4043 Secretary of State Michael Pompeo. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo. ~~T he~~The Restoration of Deterrence: Restoration of Deterrence: ~~T he~~The Iranian Example. Hoover Institution, Iranian Example. Hoover Institution,
January 13, 2020. January 13, 2020.
~~41 See: CRS~~ 44 See CRS In FocusIn Focus IF11429, IF11429, U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers and Sanctions Snapback, by Kenneth Katzman. 45 “Pompeo urges United Nations to restore sanctions against Iran.” PBS Newshour, August 20, 2020. 46 U.S. Department of State, “Briefing With Special Representative for Iran and Venezuela Elliott Abrams on Developments in Iran and Venezuela,” September 16, 2020. Congressional Research Service 25 Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options Council and the U.N. Secretary General stated that the U.S. snapback trigger was not supported by the Council as a whole47 and would not be implemented. The ban is deemed by these organs to have expired as scheduled on October 18, 2020. Trump Administration officials stated that they would impose sanctions on any country or entity that sells arms to Iran.  Administration officials have said they will continue imposing sanctions on Iran until the end of the presidential term on January 20, 2021.  The presumptive winner of the 2020 U.S. election, former Vice President Joseph Biden has articulated the view that current policy has not succeeded and that, if elected President, he would return to the Obama Administration approach to Iran, including a resumption of U.S. participation in the JCPOA.48 He stated, in his September 13, 2020 editorial cited above: “…I will offer Tehran a credible path back to diplomacy. If Iran returns to strict compliance with the nuclear deal, the United States would rejoin the agreement as a starting point for follow-on negotiations. With our allies, we will work to strengthen and extend the nuclear deal's provisions, while also addressing other issues of concern... I will also take steps to make sure US sanctions do not hinder Iran's fight against Covid-19…We will continue to push back against Iran's destabilizing activities, which threaten our friends and partners in the region…We will continue to use targeted sanctions against Iran's human rights abuses, its support for terrorism and ballistic missile program.” 47 Joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, September 20, 2020. 48 Joseph Biden. “There's a smarter way to be tough on Iran.” CNN, September 13, 2020. Congressional Research Service 26 Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options ~~, by Kenneth Katzman.~~
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Detentions of U.S. Nationals and Dual Nationals
Iran does not recognize any dual nationality and detained dual nationals are not given help from foreign diplomats. Iran does not recognize any dual nationality and detained dual nationals are not given help from foreign diplomats.
As of May 2020, Iran holds four U.S.As of May 2020, Iran holds four U.S. citizens on national security charges but press reports indicate that the citizens on national security charges but press reports indicate that the
United States and Iran might be negotiating a prisoner swap, United States and Iran might be negotiating a prisoner swap, ~~potential y~~potentially including Michael White (see below). including Michael White (see below).
Recent Past Detentions
2007-11: Iranian-American academic Haleh Esfandiari was imprisoned 2007-11: Iranian-American academic Haleh Esfandiari was imprisoned for severalfor several months in 2007 and Iranian-American ~~months in 2007 for al egations~~
~~that her employer, the Woodrow Wilson Center, was involved in democracy promotion efforts in Iran. Iranian~~
~~American~~ journalist Roxanna Saberi was imprisonedjournalist Roxanna Saberi was imprisoned for five months in 2009for five months in 2009 ~~for expired press credentials; and~~
~~hikers~~ . U.S. hikers Sara Shourd, Shane Bauer, and Josh Fattal were detained in August 2009 after crossing into Iran from Sara Shourd, Shane Bauer, and Josh Fattal were detained in August 2009 after crossing into Iran from
northern Iraq. northern Iraq. ~~The hikers’r~~ Their 2010-2011 releases were brokered2010-2011 releases were brokered by Oman. by Oman.
January 16, 2016 JCPOA-related swap: ReleasedJanuary 16, 2016 JCPOA-related swap: Released by Iran - formerby Iran - former U.S. Marine AmirU.S. Marine Amir ~~Hekmati, arrested in 2011;~~
Hekmati; Reverend Saeed Abedini,Reverend Saeed Abedini, a Christian convert of Iranian origina Christian convert of Iranian origin ~~imprisoned since December 2012~~; ; Washington Post
journalist Jason Rezaianjournalist Jason Rezaian~~, detained in July 2014~~; Nosratol ah “Fred” Khosravi-Roodsari,; Nosratol ah “Fred” Khosravi-Roodsari, who remained in Iran after who remained in Iran after
his release; and U.S. citizen Matthew Trevithickhis release; and U.S. citizen Matthew Trevithick~~, jailed in 2015~~. The United States . The United States ~~released~~ released 7 Iranian 7 Iranian
Americans/IraniansAmericans/Iranians ~~imprisoned~~ imprisoned in the United States on sanctions violations.in the United States on sanctions violations.
SeptemberSeptember 2015. Nizar Zakka, a permanent U.S. resident and Lebanon national, was detained. Released2015. Nizar Zakka, a permanent U.S. resident and Lebanon national, was detained. Released June 2019. June 2019.
July 2016. Reza “Robin” Shahini was detained for crimesJuly 2016. Reza “Robin” Shahini was detained for crimes against the Islamicagainst the Islamic ~~Republic, and sentenced to 18 years in~~
~~prison. He was released on bail in late March 2017 and later left Iran~~ Republic. Released in March 2017. .
In July 2017, Iranian judiciary officialsIn July 2017, Iranian judiciary officials announced that Xiyue Wang, a U.S.announced that Xiyue Wang, a U.S. graduate student at Princeton University graduate student at Princeton University
who was researchingwho was researching Iranian history,Iranian history, was sentenced to 10 years in prison for spying for the United States. Iran was sentenced to 10 years in prison for spying for the United States. Iran
releasedreleased him on Decemberhim on December 7, 2019, simultaneous with a U.S. release7, 2019, simultaneous with a U.S. release of an Iranian scientist (Massoud Soleimani) of an Iranian scientist (Massoud Soleimani)
held on charges of violating U.S. sanctions on Iran. held on charges of violating U.S. sanctions on Iran.
U.S. and U.S.-Iran Dual Nationals Still In Custody or Missing
 
Robert Levinson, Robert Levinson, a formera former FBI agent, went missing after a visit to Kish Island in 2007 to meetFBI agent, went missing after a visit to Kish Island in 2007 to meet an Iranian an Iranian
contact. In Novembercontact. In November 2019, hopes were2019, hopes were raised for Levinson’sraised for Levinson’s fate when the United Nations Workingfate when the United Nations Working Group Group
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances said that Iran had acknowledged it has a court case “open” on on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances said that Iran had acknowledged it has a court case “open” on
Levinson.Levinson. However,However, in March 2020, U.S. officialsin March 2020, U.S. officials reportedly told the familyreportedly told the family that they had substantial that they had substantial
indications that Levinson had passed away at someindications that Levinson had passed away at some point in the priorpoint in the prior few months.few months.
 
In November 2015, Iran arrested U.S.-Iran national Siamak Namazi, a business consultant, and it detained his In November 2015, Iran arrested U.S.-Iran national Siamak Namazi, a business consultant, and it detained his
father, Baquer Namazi, in February 2016. In October 2016, they were sentenced to 10 years in prison.father, Baquer Namazi, in February 2016. In October 2016, they were sentenced to 10 years in prison.
 
July 2016: Karan Vafadari, a U.S.-Iran national, was arrested, along with his wife, U.S. July 2016: Karan Vafadari, a U.S.-Iran national, was arrested, along with his wife, U.S. permanent resident permanent resident
Afarin Niasari. The art Afarin Niasari. The art ~~gal ery~~gallery owners, owners, who are Zoroastrians,who are Zoroastrians, were sentenced in January 2018 to 27 years in were sentenced in January 2018 to 27 years in
jail for “engaging in corruption and depravity,” referringjail for “engaging in corruption and depravity,” referring ~~to al egedly~~ to allegedly serving alcohol at their home. serving alcohol at their home.
 
January 2018: Mohrad Tahbaz, a U.S.-British-Iranian national, was arrested along with seven members January 2018: Mohrad Tahbaz, a U.S.-British-Iranian national, was arrested along with seven members of the of the
Persian Heritage WildlifePersian Heritage Wildlife Foundation. His col eague,Foundation. His col eague, Canadian-Iranian national Kavous Seyed-Emami,Canadian-Iranian national Kavous Seyed-Emami, died in died in
custody a few weekscustody a few weeks after his arrest under unexplained circumstances.after his arrest under unexplained circumstances.
 
January 2019: Iran confirmed January 2019: Iran confirmed it was holding U.S. national Michael White, arrestedit was holding U.S. national Michael White, arrested in July 2018. in July 2018.

Non-U.S. Dual Nationals.. May 2011: British-Iranian dual national KamalMay 2011: British-Iranian dual national Kamal Foroughi was sentenced to eight years Foroughi was sentenced to eight years
in prison in 2013 for unspecified charges.in prison in 2013 for unspecified charges. ~~April~~ April 2016: U.K.-Iran dual national Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe and 2016: U.K.-Iran dual national Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe and
Canadian-Iranian dual national Homa Hoodfar wereCanadian-Iranian dual national Homa Hoodfar were arrested; Hoodfar was releasedarrested; Hoodfar was released in Septemberin September 2016. Ratcliffe 2016. Ratcliffe
was furloughed to house arrest in Iran in March 2020 to avoid coronavirus infection.was furloughed to house arrest in Iran in March 2020 to avoid coronavirus infection. April 2016: French-Iranian April 2016: French-Iranian
Nazak Afshar was sentenced to six yearsNazak Afshar was sentenced to six years but releasedbut released on bail. Abdolrasoul Dorri-Esfahani,on bail. Abdolrasoul Dorri-Esfahani, a formera former ~~member~~ member of of
Iran’s nuclear negotiating team focused on financial issues,Iran’s nuclear negotiating team focused on financial issues, was jailedwas jailed for spying for British for spying for British ~~intel igence.~~ intelligence. March 2018: March 2018:
British-Iran national Shahabeddin Mansouri-Kermani,British-Iran national Shahabeddin Mansouri-Kermani, a banker, was sentenced for spying. May 2018: Iran-British a banker, was sentenced for spying. May 2018: Iran-British
national Mahan Abedin, who works for the British Council, and Iranian national Aras Amiri,national Mahan Abedin, who works for the British Council, and Iranian national Aras Amiri, a student, were a student, were
detained. Decemberdetained. December 2018: Iran detained Iranian-Australian national Meimanat Hosseini-Chavoshi2018: Iran detained Iranian-Australian national Meimanat Hosseini-Chavoshi for “infiltrating for “infiltrating
Iranian institutions.” February 24, 2019: French businesswoman Iranian institutions.” February 24, 2019: French businesswoman ~~Nel y Erin -Cambervel e,~~ Nelly Erin-Cambervelle, who was arrested who was arrested
October 2018 for “unauthorized entry,” was released.October 2018 for “unauthorized entry,” was released. July 15, 2019: France-Iran dual national Fariba Adelkhah, an July 15, 2019: France-Iran dual national Fariba Adelkhah, an
anthropologist, and her col eague, French national Roland Marchel,anthropologist, and her col eague, French national Roland Marchel, have been imprisonedhave been imprisoned since mid-2019. An Australian academic, Kylie Moore-Gilbert, was arrested in late 2018 and was released in November 2020 in reported exchange for three Iranians held by Thailand for an alleged bombing plot against Israeli diplomats there, which failed. Source: Various press reports. Congressional Research Service 27 Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options Policy Elements and Options ~~since mid-2019. An~~
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26

~~Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options~~

~~Australian academic, Kylie Moore-Gilbert, has been held since late 2018 and two Australian bloggers were~~
~~released in October 2019 after 10 weeks in jail.~~
Source: Various press reports.
~~Policy Elements and Options~~
As have its predecessors, the Trump Administration has not publicly taken any policy option “off As have its predecessors, the Trump Administration has not publicly taken any policy option “off
the table.” Some options, such as sanctions, are being emphasized, while others are being the table.” Some options, such as sanctions, are being emphasized, while others are being
considered to varying degrees. considered to varying degrees.
Engagement and Improved Bilateral Relations
Successive Administrations have debated the degree to which to pursue engagement with Iran, Successive Administrations have debated the degree to which to pursue engagement with Iran,
either for limited purposes or to achieve a dramatic change in U.S.-Iran relations. President either for limited purposes or to achieve a dramatic change in U.S.-Iran relations. President
Trump has publicly welcomed engagement with Iran’s leaders, and the Administration has set Trump has publicly welcomed engagement with Iran’s leaders, and the Administration has set
extensive conditions for a significant improvement in U.S.-Iran relations as articulated by extensive conditions for a significant improvement in U.S.-Iran relations as articulated by
Secretary of State Pompeo, in his May 21, 2018, speech referenced above. Many of the stipulated Secretary of State Pompeo, in his May 21, 2018, speech referenced above. Many of the stipulated
conditions would affect the core principles of Iran’s revolution and national security policies and conditions would affect the core principles of Iran’s revolution and national security policies and
are unlikelyare unlikely to be met by Iran. to be met by Iran.
Several apparent overtures by both countries to negotiate directly have not come to fruition. In Several apparent overtures by both countries to negotiate directly have not come to fruition. In
December 2018, President Rouhani stated that the United States directly requested negotiations December 2018, President Rouhani stated that the United States directly requested negotiations
with Iran on eight occasions in 2017, and “indirectly” requested negotiations on three occasions with Iran on eight occasions in 2017, and “indirectly” requested negotiations on three occasions
in 2018. He said that Iran rebuffed these overtures.in 2018. He said that Iran rebuffed these overtures.4249 In May 2019, President Trump apparently In May 2019, President Trump apparently
sought to de-escalate tensions with Iran by restating his interest in direct talks, stating the sought to de-escalate tensions with Iran by restating his interest in direct talks, stating the
following on May 9, 2019: following on May 9, 2019:
What they [Iranian leaders] should be doing is calling me up, sitting down; we can make a What they [Iranian leaders] should be doing is calling me up, sitting down; we can make a
deal, a fair deal ... but they should call, and if they do, we’re open to talk to them.deal, a fair deal ... but they should call, and if they do, we’re open to talk to them.
~~The President restated an interest in talks with Iran on a revised nuclear deal in a statement in the~~
~~immediate aftermath of the Iranian retaliatory strike on Ayn Al Asad base in Iraq on January 8,~~
~~2020.43~~
Administration officials also Administration officials also ~~have welcomed some of the mediation efforts, including by Japan,~~
~~some of the Gulf states, and several European countries~~welcomed some mediation efforts to defuse the tension. France reportedly sought, at the G-& . France reportedly sought, at the G-&
summit in Biarritz in August 2019 and then at the September 2019 General Assembly meetings, summit in Biarritz in August 2019 and then at the September 2019 General Assembly meetings,
to orchestrate a meeting between President Trump and Iranian president Rouhani. No meeting or to orchestrate a meeting between President Trump and Iranian president Rouhani. No meeting or
direct contact between the two presidents occurred.direct contact between the two presidents occurred. ~~On July 31, 2019, the Administration imposed~~
~~U.S. sanctions on Zarif, asserting that he is not a decision-maker but instead mostly a mouthpiece~~
~~for the regime, a move that might potential y complicate efforts to organize direct U.S.-Iran talks.~~
~~Rouhani has since stated on several occasions that Iran wil~~ President Trump restated an interest in talks with Iran on a revised nuclear deal in a statement in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian retaliatory strike on Ayn Al Asad base in Iraq on January 8, 2020.50 However, throughout 2020, Rouhani and other Iranian officials have insisted that they would not negotiate with the Trump not negotiate with the Trump
Administration unless it first eases sanctions that were reimposed when the Administration exited Administration unless it first eases sanctions that were reimposed when the Administration exited
~~the JCPOA.~~

~~42 “Rouhani: US made 11 attempts to negotiate with Iran in last two years.” Middle East Monitor, December 4, 2018.~~
~~43 White House. Remarks by President T rump on Iran. January 8, 2020.~~
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27

~~Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options~~
the JCPOA. As discussed above, the presumptive winner of the 2020 election, former Vice President Joseph Biden, has indicated an intent to negotiate with Iran and to ease U.S. sanctions if Iran meets stipulated conditions. Iran has demanded that a new U.S. administration ease sanctions immediately after taking office on January 20, 2020. The outcome of Iran’s 2021 presidential election might affect the prospects for renewed U.S.-Iran talks.
Military Action
Successive Administrations have sought to support U.S. policy with a capability, and implicit or Successive Administrations have sought to support U.S. policy with a capability, and implicit or
explicit threat, to use military force against Iran. Prior to the JCPOA, supporters of military action explicit threat, to use military force against Iran. Prior to the JCPOA, supporters of military action
against Iran’s nuclear program argued that such action could set back Iran’s nuclear program against Iran’s nuclear program argued that such action could set back Iran’s nuclear program
~~substantial y.44~~ 49 “Rouhani: US made 11 attempts to negotiate with Iran in last two years.” Middle East Monitor, December 4, 2018. 50 White House. Remarks by President Trump on Iran. January 8, 2020. Congressional Research Service 28 Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options substantially.51 A U.S. ground invasion to remove Iran’s regime apparently has not been A U.S. ground invasion to remove Iran’s regime apparently has not been
considered at any time, reportedly even at the height of recent U.S.-Iran tensions.considered at any time, reportedly even at the height of recent U.S.-Iran tensions.
The Obama Administration The Obama Administration repeatedly stated that “repeatedly stated that “al all options are on the table” to prevent Iran options are on the table” to prevent Iran
from acquiring a nuclear weapon.from acquiring a nuclear weapon.4552 However, the Obama Administration asserted that military However, the Obama Administration asserted that military
action would set back Iran’s nuclear advancement with far less certainty or duration than would a action would set back Iran’s nuclear advancement with far less certainty or duration than would a
nuclear agreement, and that Iranian retaliationnuclear agreement, and that Iranian retaliation ~~could potential y~~ could potentially escalate and expand throughout escalate and expand throughout
the region, reduce Iran’s regional isolation, strengthen Iran’s regime the region, reduce Iran’s regional isolation, strengthen Iran’s regime ~~domestical y~~domestically, and raise oil , and raise oil
prices.prices.4653 After the JCPOA was finalized, President Obama reiterated the availability After the JCPOA was finalized, President Obama reiterated the availability of this option of this option
should Iran violate the agreement,should Iran violate the agreement,~~47attack~~54attack or prepared to attack U.S. or prepared to attack U.S. ~~al ies~~allies, or interrupt the free , or interrupt the free
flow of oil or shipping in the Gulf or elsewhere. flow of oil or shipping in the Gulf or elsewhere.
The Trump Administration has similarly stated that “ The Trump Administration has similarly stated that “al all options are open.” In 2019 and 2020, options are open.” In 2019 and 2020,
President Trump has threatened and undertaken some military action against Iran in response to President Trump has threatened and undertaken some military action against Iran in response to
potential Iranian actions, most notable of which was the January 3, 2020, strike that potential Iranian actions, most notable of which was the January 3, 2020, strike that ~~kil ed~~killed IRGC- IRGC-
QF commander Soleimani. As recently as March 2020, the United States has struck Iran-backed QF commander Soleimani. As recently as March 2020, the United States has struck Iran-backed
~~militias~~ militias in Iraq that have attacked U.S. forces there and caused U.S. military deaths. in Iraq that have attacked U.S. forces there and caused U.S. military deaths.
President Trump and his advisors, including in a January 2020 speech at Stanford’s Hoover President Trump and his advisors, including in a January 2020 speech at Stanford’s Hoover
Institution by Secretary Pompeo, stated that one of the rationales for the Soleimani strike was to Institution by Secretary Pompeo, stated that one of the rationales for the Soleimani strike was to
restore deterrence against Iran that had apparently eroded from the U.S. refusal to respond to restore deterrence against Iran that had apparently eroded from the U.S. refusal to respond to
Iran’s prior provocations.Iran’s prior provocations.4855 President Trump has signaled, in part by not responding to Iran’s President Trump has signaled, in part by not responding to Iran’s
retaliatory strike on Ayn Al Asad base in Iraq, that the Administration does not want continuing retaliatory strike on Ayn Al Asad base in Iraq, that the Administration does not want continuing
conflict with Iran.conflict with Iran.49
~~At the same time, the Administration has assembled a smal coalition of Gulf and other al ied~~56 In November 2020, President Trump reportedly discussed military options with his advisers in apparent response to reports that Iran was expanding its uranium enrichment activities.57 The November 2020 assassination in Iran of Iran’s leading nuclear weapons scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, allegedly by Israeli agents,58 might have represented an alternative to military action against Iran’s program by Israel or the United States. At the same time, the Administration has assembled a small coalition of Gulf and other allied
states to conduct Gulf maritime security operations to deter further Iranian attacks, inaugurated in states to conduct Gulf maritime security operations to deter further Iranian attacks, inaugurated in
November 2019 as the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC). In the context of U.S.-November 2019 as the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC). In the context of U.S.-
Iran tensions, see CRS Report R45795, Iran tensions, see CRS Report R45795, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, by , by
Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton Thomas, cited above. Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton Thomas, cited above.
~~The United States has not initiated military action against Iranian or Iran-backed forces in Syria,~~
~~the Administration has publicly supported Israel’s frequent strikes on Iranian and Hezbollah~~

44 51 Joby Warrick, “Iran: Underground Sites Joby Warrick, “Iran: Underground Sites Vulnerable,Vulnerable, Experts Say,” Experts Say,” Washington Post, March 1, 2012. For an extended , March 1, 2012. For an extended
discussiondiscussion of U.S.of U.S. air strike options on Iran, see Rogers,air strike options on Iran, see Rogers, Paul, Paul, Iran: Consequences of a War,, Oxford Research Group, Oxford Research Group,
February 2006. February 2006.
45 52 Jeffrey Goldberg, Jeffrey Goldberg, “Obama to Iran and Israel: ‘As President of the United States, I Don’t Bluff’,” “Obama to Iran and Israel: ‘As President of the United States, I Don’t Bluff’,” The Atlantic, March , March
2, 2012. 2, 2012.
4653 “Panetta: Military Strike Would Delay Iranian Nuclear Project by No More “Panetta: Military Strike Would Delay Iranian Nuclear Project by No More ~~T han T wo~~Than Two Years.” Years.” Haaretz, December 3, December 3,
2011. 2011.
47 54 Speech by President Obama at American University. August Speech by President Obama at American University. August 7, 2015. President Obama Interview with CNN’s Fareed 7, 2015. President Obama Interview with CNN’s Fareed
Zakaria. Broadcast on AugustZakaria. Broadcast on August 9, 2015. 9, 2015.
4855 Secretary of State Pompeo. “The Restoration of Deterrence: The Iranian Example.” Hoover Institution, January Secretary of State Pompeo. “The Restoration of Deterrence: The Iranian Example.” Hoover Institution, January ~~1 3~~13, ,
2020. Pompeo says killing of Suleimani2020. Pompeo says killing of Suleimani is part of is part of ~~'bigger strategy'~~‘bigger strategy’ to deter US to deter US foes. foes. ~~T he~~The Guardian, Guardian, January 13, 2020. January 13, 2020.
4956 Mark Landler, Maggie Mark Landler, Maggie Haberman and Eric Schmitt, “Haberman and Eric Schmitt, “~~T rump T ells~~Trump Tells Pentagon Chief he Does not Want War with Iran,” Pentagon Chief he Does not Want War with Iran,”
New York ~~Tim es~~~~, May 16, 2019.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

28Times, May 16, 2019. 57 “Trump Sought Options for Attacking Iran to Stop Its Growing Nuclear Program.” New York Times, November 16, 2020. 58 “US official says Israel was behind assassination of Iranian scientist.” CNN, December 2, 2020. Congressional Research Service 29

Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options

The United States has not initiated military action against Iranian or Iran-backed forces in Syria, the Administration has publicly supported Israel’s frequent strikes on Iranian and Hezbollah infrastructure there. The U.S. Navy has conducted operations to interdict Iranian weapons infrastructure there. The U.S. Navy has conducted operations to interdict Iranian weapons
shipments to the Houthi rebels in Yemen.shipments to the Houthi rebels in Yemen. 50

~~Current~~ 59 Iran Policy Objectives and Actions
Administration ~~Characterization~~ Characterization of the Problem:: Iran’s regimeIran’s regime poses a broad threat to U.S.poses a broad threat to U.S. ~~interests and~~
~~al ies because it~~ interests. It
 
conducts malign activities conducts malign activities throughout the region by supporting pro-Iranian governmentsthroughout the region by supporting pro-Iranian governments and armed factions, and armed factions,
 
supports terrorist supports terrorist groups and acts of international terrorism, groups and acts of international terrorism,
 
continues to harbor ambitions continues to harbor ambitions to develop a nuclear weapon, to develop a nuclear weapon,
 
is developing nuclear-capable is developing nuclear-capable ~~bal istic missiles~~ ballistic missiles in defiance of U.N. Resolution 2231, in defiance of U.N. Resolution 2231,
 
conducts il icit conducts il icit financial activitiesfinancial activities and cyberattacks, and cyberattacks,
 
represses represses the aspirations of Iran’s people and misusesthe aspirations of Iran’s people and misuses and steals Iran’s national wealth, and and steals Iran’s national wealth, and
 
detains U.S. nationals, U.S. dual-nationals, and dual-nationals of other countries. detains U.S. nationals, U.S. dual-nationals, and dual-nationals of other countries.

Stated Policy: To place maximum: To place maximum ~~pressure~~ pressure through U.S. sanctions to compelthrough U.S. sanctions to compel Iran to change its behavior. Iran to change its behavior.
 
To use economic sanctions to deny Iran the revenue to carry out malign activities, To use economic sanctions to deny Iran the revenue to carry out malign activities, to build up its military to build up its military
capacity, or develop its nuclear program and weapons of masscapacity, or develop its nuclear program and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs.destruction (WMD) programs.
To counter Iran’s regional malign activities To counter Iran’s regional malign activities and deter Iranian provocative action by and deter Iranian provocative action by
 
maintaining a robust U.S. military maintaining a robust U.S. military presence in the region, including about 35,000 U.S. forcespresence in the region, including about 35,000 U.S. forces deployed in deployed in
Persian Gulf state militaryPersian Gulf state military ~~facilities~~ facilities such as Alsuch as Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the Naval Support Activity facility in Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the Naval Support Activity facility in
Bahrain, Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE, and Camp Arifjan in Kuwait; Bahrain, Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE, and Camp Arifjan in Kuwait;
 
building the capacity of partner governments and supporting their actions against Iran’s malign activities; building the capacity of partner governments and supporting their actions against Iran’s malign activities;
 
providing sophisticated rocket and missile providing sophisticated rocket and missile defense to Israel; and defense to Israel; and
 
providing counterterrorism providing counterterrorism assistance to partner governments throughout the region.assistance to partner governments throughout the region.

Conditions for Policy Change: To welcomeTo welcome a reviseda revised nuclear deal and normalization of U.S. relationsnuclear deal and normalization of U.S. relations with Iran with Iran
if Iran meetsif Iran meets stipulated demands including stipulated demands including
 
dismantling dismantling al all nuclear infrastructure, nuclear infrastructure,
 
ending development of nuclear-capable ending development of nuclear-capable ~~bal istic~~ballistic missiles, missiles,
 
ending support to terrorist ending support to terrorist groups and regionalgroups and regional armed factions, including Afghan Taliban, armed factions, including Afghan Taliban,
 
completely completely withdrawing its forces and militiaswithdrawing its forces and militias from Syria, and from Syria, and
 
releasing releasing al all U.S. citizens and dual nationals. U.S. citizens and dual nationals.
President Trump has stated a wil ingness President Trump has stated a wil ingness to meetto meet Iran’s President Rouhani without preconditions. Iran’s President Rouhani without preconditions.

Possible Unstated Policy Objective: To use Iran’s economic problems: To use Iran’s economic problems to stoke economicto stoke economic and political unrest and political unrest
that could lead to political change in Iran. that could lead to political change in Iran.
 
U.S. officials U.S. officials have consistently stated support for the Iranian people to have “a government they deserve.”have consistently stated support for the Iranian people to have “a government they deserve.”
 
U.S. reports U.S. reports and statements consistently accuse Iranian leadersand statements consistently accuse Iranian leaders of a wide range of abuses.of a wide range of abuses.

~~50 For detailed~~ Sources: State Department “Outlaw Regime: Iran’s Destructive Activities” report, 2020; Secretary of State Michael Pompeo speech at the Heritage Foundation, May 21, 2018, various other Administration statements. 59 For detailed information on U.S. military activity in the region that is, in whole or in part, directed against Iran and information on U.S. military activity in the region that is, in whole or in part, directed against Iran and
Iranian allies, seeIranian allies, see: CRS CRS Report R44017, Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report , by Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report
R45795, R45795, U.S.-Iran Conflict and ~~Im plications~~Implications for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton , by Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton
~~T homas~~Thomas, and CRS, and CRS Report R46148, Report R46148, U.S. Killing of Qasem ~~Soleim ani~~ Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions, coordinated by , coordinated by
Clayton Clayton ~~T homas. T he~~Thomas. The latter CRS report covers issues of authorization for U.S. use latter CRS report covers issues of authorization for U.S. use of force and warof force and war powers issues.powers issues.
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Sources: State Department “Outlaw Regime: Iran’s Destructive Activities” report; Secretary of State Michael
~~Pompeo speech at the Heritage Foundation, May 21, 2018, various other Administration statements.~~
Economic Sanctions
The reimposition of The reimposition of al all U.S. sanctions forms the cornerstone of the Administration’s maximum U.S. sanctions forms the cornerstone of the Administration’s maximum
pressure policy. The table below summarizes sanctions that have been used against Iran. pressure policy. The table below summarizes sanctions that have been used against Iran.
Table 3. Summary of U.S. Sanctions Against Iran
Ban on U.S. Trade With and Investment in Iran. Executive Order 12959 (May 6, 1995) bans almost Executive Order 12959 (May 6, 1995) bans almost al all U.S. U.S.
trade with and investment in Iran. P.L. 111-195 (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment trade with and investment in Iran. P.L. 111-195 (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act, CISADA) codifies the trade ban.Act, CISADA) codifies the trade ban.

Energy and other Sector Sanctions. The Iran Sanctions Act (P.L. 104-172), as amended, authorizes the The Iran Sanctions Act (P.L. 104-172), as amended, authorizes the
impositionimposition of five out of a menu of 12 sanctions on firmsof five out of a menu of 12 sanctions on firms ~~that:~~ that invest in Iran’s energy sector; invest in Iran’s energy sector; ~~sel~~ sell Iran gasoline to Iran gasoline to
Iran; Iran; ~~sel~~ sell energy equipment to Iran; transport oil from Iran; engage in an energy joint venture with Iran outside energy equipment to Iran; transport oil from Iran; engage in an energy joint venture with Iran outside
Iran; or buy Iran’s sovereignIran; or buy Iran’s sovereign debt. Another law—P.L. 112-239—sanctions most foreign dealings with Iran’s energy, debt. Another law—P.L. 112-239—sanctions most foreign dealings with Iran’s energy,
shipping, and shipbuilding sector,shipping, and shipbuilding sector, ~~as wel~~ as well as the sale of certain itemsas the sale of certain items for Iranian industrial processesfor Iranian industrial processes and the and the
transfer to Iran of precious metals (often a form of payment for oil or gas). Sanctions against other Iranian transfer to Iran of precious metals (often a form of payment for oil or gas). Sanctions against other Iranian
industries and commodity exports were imposedindustries and commodity exports were imposed in 2019 and 2020. in 2019 and 2020.

Sanctions On Iran’s Central Bank/Banking System. Section 1245 of the FY2012 National Defense Act (P.L. Section 1245 of the FY2012 National Defense Act (P.L.
112-81) prevents foreign banks that do business with Iran’s Central Bank from112-81) prevents foreign banks that do business with Iran’s Central Bank from opening U.S. accounts unless the opening U.S. accounts unless the
parent countries of the banks earn an exemption by “significantly reducing” their purchases of Iranian oil.parent countries of the banks earn an exemption by “significantly reducing” their purchases of Iranian oil. Another Another
law, the Comprehensivelaw, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and DivestmentIran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (P.L. 111-195, CISADA) bans U.S. Act (P.L. 111-195, CISADA) bans U.S.
accounts for banks that do business with sanctioned entities.accounts for banks that do business with sanctioned entities. The Department of the Treasury in November 2011 The Department of the Treasury in November 2011
declared Iran’s financial system an entity of primarydeclared Iran’s financial system an entity of primary money laundering concern. In September 2019, the money laundering concern. In September 2019, the
AdministrationAdministration designated the Central Bank as a terrorismdesignated the Central Bank as a terrorism entity under Executive Orderentity under Executive Order 13224.13224.

Terrorism Sanctions.. Iran’s designation by the SecretaryIran’s designation by the Secretary of State as a “state sponsor of terrorism”of State as a “state sponsor of terrorism” ~~triggers~~ triggers (1) a (1) a
ban on the provision of U.S. foreign assistance to Iran under Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act; (2) a ban ban on the provision of U.S. foreign assistance to Iran under Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act; (2) a ban
on arms exports to Iran under Section 40 of the Armson arms exports to Iran under Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 95-92, as amended); (3) under Export Control Act (P.L. 95-92, as amended); (3) under
Section 6(j) of the Export AdministrationSection 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (P.L. 96-72, as amended), a significant restriction—amendedAct (P.L. 96-72, as amended), a significant restriction—amended by other by other
laws to a “presumption of denial”—on U.S. exports to Iran of itemslaws to a “presumption of denial”—on U.S. exports to Iran of items that could have militarythat could have military applications; (4) under applications; (4) under
Section 327 of the Anti-TerrorismSection 327 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (P.L. 104-132), a requirement that U.S. and Effective Death Penalty Act (P.L. 104-132), a requirement that U.S.
representativesrepresentatives to international financial institutions vote against international loans to terrorismto international financial institutions vote against international loans to terrorism list states. list states.
Executive Order 13224 (September 23, 2001) authorizes a ban on U.S.Executive Order 13224 (September 23, 2001) authorizes a ban on U.S. transactions with entities determinedtransactions with entities determined to be to be
supporting international terrorism.supporting international terrorism. The OrderThe Order is not specific to Iran. is not specific to Iran.

Sanctions Against Foreign Suppliers of Arms or Weapons of Mass Destruction Technology. Several laws Several laws
sanction supplies of arms or militarilysanction supplies of arms or militarily useful technology to Iran. They includeuseful technology to Iran. They include: The Iran-Syria-North Korea The Iran-Syria-North Korea
Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178, March 14, 2000, as amended); The Iran-Iraq ArmsNonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178, March 14, 2000, as amended); The Iran-Iraq Arms ~~Nonproliferation~~ Nonproliferation Act (P.L. Act (P.L.
102-484, October 23, 1992, as amended); Executive Order102-484, October 23, 1992, as amended); Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005); and the Countering America’s 13382 (June 28, 2005); and the Countering America’s
AdversariesAdversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA,through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44). Numerous Iranian and third country entities,P.L. 115-44). Numerous Iranian and third country entities, including including
the IRGC itself,the IRGC itself, have been designated under these authorities.have been designated under these authorities.

Sanctions Against Human Rights Abuses, Internet Monitoring, and Regional Activities. Various laws and Various laws and
Executive OrdersExecutive Orders (including CISADA,(including CISADA, E.O 13553) impose sanctions on named Iranian human rights abusers,E.O 13553) impose sanctions on named Iranian human rights abusers, on on
firmsfirms that that ~~sel~~ sell equipment Iran can use to monitor the internet usage of citizens or employ against demonstrators equipment Iran can use to monitor the internet usage of citizens or employ against demonstrators
and on Iranian persons or entities that suppress human rights in Syria or contribute to destabilizing Iraqand on Iranian persons or entities that suppress human rights in Syria or contribute to destabilizing Iraq . Remains . Remains
in force.in force.
Source: CRS. For extensive analysis of U.S. and international sanctions against Iran, see: CRS. For extensive analysis of U.S. and international sanctions against Iran, see CRS Report RS20871, CRS Report RS20871,
Iran Sanctions,, by Kenneth Katzman. by Kenneth Katzman.
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Regime Change
One recurring U.S. policy question has been whether the United States should support efforts to One recurring U.S. policy question has been whether the United States should support efforts to
overthrow Iran’s leadership. Khamene’i and other Iranian figures note that the Unitedoverthrow Iran’s leadership. Khamene’i and other Iranian figures note that the United States States
provided funding to anti-regime groups, mainly pro-monarchists, during the 1980s.provided funding to anti-regime groups, mainly pro-monarchists, during the 1980s.5160 Over the Over the
past two decades, each successive Administration has stated that the United States does not seek past two decades, each successive Administration has stated that the United States does not seek
to change Iran’s regime, although to change Iran’s regime, although al all recent Administrations have criticized Iran’s regime for recent Administrations have criticized Iran’s regime for
human rights abuses and expressed support for democracy in Iran. Several Administrations have human rights abuses and expressed support for democracy in Iran. Several Administrations have
publicly supported Iranian demonstrators agitating for more rights.publicly supported Iranian demonstrators agitating for more rights. 52
61 Trump Administration officials have repeatedly stated that U.S. policy is to change Iran’s Trump Administration officials have repeatedly stated that U.S. policy is to change Iran’s
behavior and prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, not to change its regime.behavior and prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, not to change its regime.5362 However, However,
some statements by Administration officials, in particular Secretary Pompeo’s speech to Iranian some statements by Administration officials, in particular Secretary Pompeo’s speech to Iranian
Americans at the Reagan Library on July 22, 2018, have suggested support for regime change. In Americans at the Reagan Library on July 22, 2018, have suggested support for regime change. In
his speech on May 21, 2017, in Saudi Arabia, President Trump stated that his Administration is his speech on May 21, 2017, in Saudi Arabia, President Trump stated that his Administration is
hoping that Iran’s government hoping that Iran’s government ~~wil~~ will change to one that the Administration considers “just and change to one that the Administration considers “just and
righteous.” In testimony before two congressional committees in June 2017, then-Secretary of righteous.” In testimony before two congressional committees in June 2017, then-Secretary of
State Rex State Rex ~~Til erson~~Tillerson said the Administration supports a “philosophy of regime change” for Iran said the Administration supports a “philosophy of regime change” for Iran
(Senate Appropriations Committee) and that the Administration would “work toward support of (Senate Appropriations Committee) and that the Administration would “work toward support of
those elements inside of Iran that would lead to a peaceful transition of that government” (House those elements inside of Iran that would lead to a peaceful transition of that government” (House
Foreign Affairs Committee). In his October 13, 2017, policy announcement on Iran, President Foreign Affairs Committee). In his October 13, 2017, policy announcement on Iran, President
Trump stated thatTrump stated that
we we stand instand in total solidaritytotal solidarity with thewith the Iranian regime’s longest-sufferingIranian regime’s longest-suffering victims: its own victims: its own
people. The citizens of Iran have paid a heavy price for the violence and extremism of their people. The citizens of Iran have paid a heavy price for the violence and extremism of their
leaders. The Iranian people long to—and they just are longing, to reclaim their country’s leaders. The Iranian people long to—and they just are longing, to reclaim their country’s
proud history, its culture, its civilization, its cooperation with its neighbors. proud history, its culture, its civilization, its cooperation with its neighbors.
Subsequently, President Trump issued statements of support for the December 2017-January 2018 Subsequently, President Trump issued statements of support for the December 2017-January 2018
protests in Iran on Twitter and in other formats. In his May 8, 2018, announcement of a U.S. protests in Iran on Twitter and in other formats. In his May 8, 2018, announcement of a U.S.
withdrawal from the JCPOA, President Trump stated withdrawal from the JCPOA, President Trump stated
Finally, Finally, ~~I want to deliver a message to the long-suffering people of Iran. The people~~ I want to deliver a message to the long-suffering people of Iran. The people of of
America stand with you.... But the future of Iran belongs to its people. They are the rightful America stand with you.... But the future of Iran belongs to its people. They are the rightful
heirs to a rich culture and an ancient land, and they deserve a nation that does justice to heirs to a rich culture and an ancient land, and they deserve a nation that does justice to
their dreams, honor to their history and glory to God. their dreams, honor to their history and glory to God.
In the Reagan Library speech mentioned above, Secretary Pompeo recited a litany of Iranian In the Reagan Library speech mentioned above, Secretary Pompeo recited a litany of Iranian
regime human rights abuses and governmental corruption that regime human rights abuses and governmental corruption that ~~cal ed~~called into question its legitimacy into question its legitimacy
and, in several passages and answers to questions, clearly expressed the hope that the Iranian and, in several passages and answers to questions, clearly expressed the hope that the Iranian
people people ~~wil~~ will oust the current regime. The Secretary stated that “I have a message for the people of oust the current regime. The Secretary stated that “I have a message for the people of
Iran. The United States hears you; the United States supports you; the United States is with you.” Iran. The United States hears you; the United States supports you; the United States is with you.”
Also in that speech, Secretary Pompeo’s announced that the Broadcasting Board of Governors is Also in that speech, Secretary Pompeo’s announced that the Broadcasting Board of Governors is
launching a new full-time Persian-language service for television, radio, digital, and social media launching a new full-time Persian-language service for television, radio, digital, and social media
to help “ordinary Iranians inside of Iran and around the globe can know that America stands with to help “ordinary Iranians inside of Iran and around the globe can know that America stands with

~~51 CRS~~ 60 CRS conversations with U.S. officials responsible for Iran policy. 1980-1990. After a period of suspension of such conversations with U.S. officials responsible for Iran policy. 1980-1990. After a period of suspension of such
assistance, in 1995, the Clinton Administration accepted a House-Senate conference agreement to include $18assistance, in 1995, the Clinton Administration accepted a House-Senate conference agreement to include $18 -$20 -$20
million in fundingmillion in funding authority for covert operations against Iran in the FY1996 Intelligence Authorization Act (authority for covert operations against Iran in the FY1996 Intelligence Authorization Act ( H.R. H.R.
1655), according to a 1655), according to a Washington Post report of December 22, 1995. report of December 22, 1995. ~~T he~~The Clinton Administration reportedly focused Clinton Administration reportedly focused
the covert aid on changing the regime’s behavior, rather than its overthrow. the covert aid on changing the regime’s behavior, rather than its overthrow.
5261 White House, “Remarks of President Obama Marking Nowruz,” White House, “Remarks of President Obama Marking Nowruz,” March 20, 2011. March 20, 2011.
5362 Pompeo speech at the Reagan Library, July Pompeo speech at the Reagan Library, July 22, 2018, op. cit. 22, 2018, op. cit.
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them.” Secretary Pompeo held a them.” Secretary Pompeo held a ~~wel~~ well-publicized meeting with diaspora and dissident Iranians at -publicized meeting with diaspora and dissident Iranians at
the State Department on December 19, 2019. His remarks to the gathering returned to themes the State Department on December 19, 2019. His remarks to the gathering returned to themes
similar to those expressed at the Reagan Library, particularly in criticism of the regime’s similar to those expressed at the Reagan Library, particularly in criticism of the regime’s
suppression of dissent. The Secretary stated at the meeting that U.S. officials had received 36,000 suppression of dissent. The Secretary stated at the meeting that U.S. officials had received 36,000
pieces of information in response to a solicitation for Iranians to report to the United States on pieces of information in response to a solicitation for Iranians to report to the United States on
examples of regime human rights abuses.examples of regime human rights abuses.5463
Yet, President Trump has repeatedly ruled out a policy of regime change. During his May 2019 Yet, President Trump has repeatedly ruled out a policy of regime change. During his May 2019
visit to Japan, President Trump, statedvisit to Japan, President Trump, stated:
These are great people—has a chance to be a great country with the same leadership. We These are great people—has a chance to be a great country with the same leadership. We
are not looking for regime change. I just want to make that clear. We’re looking for no are not looking for regime change. I just want to make that clear. We’re looking for no
nuclear weapons.nuclear weapons.5564
At times, some in Congress have at times advocated a regime change policy. In the 111th At times, some in Congress have at times advocated a regime change policy. In the 111th
Congress, one Congress, one ~~bil~~ bill said that it should be U.S. policy to promote the overthrow of the regime (the said that it should be U.S. policy to promote the overthrow of the regime (the
~~Iran Democratic Transition Act, S. 3008).~~Iran Democratic Transition Act, S. 3008). 63 Secretary of State Michael Pompeo. Human Rights and the Iranian Regime. December 19, 2019. 64 Noah Bierman, “Trump Pushes Off War Talk on Iran, Says ‘Regime Change’ is not Goal,” Los Angeles Times, May 27, 2019. Congressional Research Service 33 Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options
The Shah’s Son, Student Activists, and Other Prominent Dissidents

SomeSome Iranians abroad, including in the United States, want to replace the regimeIranians abroad, including in the United States, want to replace the regime with a constitutional with a constitutional ~~mon archy~~monarchy
led by Reza Pahlavi, the U.S.-based son of the late formerled by Reza Pahlavi, the U.S.-based son of the late former Shah and a U.S.-trained combat pilot. The Shah’s son, Shah and a U.S.-trained combat pilot. The Shah’s son,
born in 1960, appears born in 1960, appears ~~periodical y~~ periodically in broadcasts to Iran from Iranian exile-run stations in California,in broadcasts to Iran from Iranian exile-run stations in California, ~~as wel~~ as well as in as in
other Iran-oriented media.other Iran-oriented media. Pahlavi has always retained some support fromPahlavi has always retained some support from the olderthe older generations in Iran, but he has generations in Iran, but he has
tried to broaden his fol owingtried to broaden his fol owing by denying he seeksby denying he seeks to restoreto restore the monarchy. Since 2011, he has increasingly the monarchy. Since 2011, he has increasingly
worked with younger opposition figures,worked with younger opposition figures, perhaps in part to respond to criticsperhaps in part to respond to critics who assess him as relativelywho assess him as relatively inactive inactive
against the regime.against the regime. Iranian leadersIranian leaders often blames the Shah’s son, as often blames the Shah’s son, as ~~wel~~ well as the rival People’sas the rival People’s Mojahedin Mojahedin
Organization of Iran (see box below) for instigating unrest when demonstrations take place. In AprilOrganization of Iran (see box below) for instigating unrest when demonstrations take place. In April 2018, a 2018, a
discovery in Tehran of a mumifieddiscovery in Tehran of a mumified body was possibly that of his grandfather, Reza Shah, who ruled from 1925body was possibly that of his grandfather, Reza Shah, who ruled from 1925 --
1941 and is remembered1941 and is remembered fondly by some Iranians for instituting law and order.fondly by some Iranians for instituting law and order.

Student dissident groups composed of Student dissident groups composed of ~~wel~~ well-educated, Westernized-educated, Westernized urban youth have been the backbone of the urban youth have been the backbone of the
Iranian opposition. The Office of Consolidation of UnityIranian opposition. The Office of Consolidation of Unity is the student group that led the 1999 riots but which is the student group that led the 1999 riots but which
later became control ed by regimelater became control ed by regime loyalists.loyalists. An offshoot, the Confederation of Iranian Students (CIS), led by U.S.-An offshoot, the Confederation of Iranian Students (CIS), led by U.S.-
based Amirbased Amir Abbas Fakhravar, believesAbbas Fakhravar, believes in regimein regime ~~replacement~~ replacement and in 2013 formed a “National Iran Congress” that and in 2013 formed a “National Iran Congress” that
has drafted a U.S.-style,has drafted a U.S.-style, secular constitution for a future republic of Iran. Cofounder Arzhang Davoodi has been in secular constitution for a future republic of Iran. Cofounder Arzhang Davoodi has been in
prison since 2002. A 2014 death sentence has not been implementedprison since 2002. A 2014 death sentence has not been implemented to date. Someto date. Some of these dissidents have used of these dissidents have used
news channels on the Telegramnews channels on the Telegram ~~messaging~~ messaging network, one of which was network, one of which was ~~cal ed~~called Amadnews, to agitage against the Amadnews, to agitage against the
regime.regime. In October 2019, the founder of Amadnews,In October 2019, the founder of Amadnews, Ruhol ah Zam, was lured from his base in France to Najaf, Ruhol ah Zam, was lured from his base in France to Najaf,
Iraq, where he was captured by the IRGC-QF and brought to Iran. Iraq, where he was captured by the IRGC-QF and brought to Iran.
He has been sentenced to death.
Other dissidents, someOther dissidents, some in Iran, others in exile (including in the United States), have criticized the regimein Iran, others in exile (including in the United States), have criticized the regime for for
decades. They includedecades. They include: journalist Akbar Ganji, who left Iran in 2006 after serving 6 years in prison for journalist Akbar Ganji, who left Iran in 2006 after serving 6 years in prison for ~~al eging~~alleging high- high-
levellevel involvement in the 100 murdersinvolvement in the 100 murders of Iranian dissident of Iranian dissident ~~intel ectuals~~intellectuals; former; former Culture Minister Ataol ah Culture Minister Ataol ah
Mohajerani; U.S.-based Fatemah Haghighatjoo; and religionMohajerani; U.S.-based Fatemah Haghighatjoo; and religion scholar Abdolkarimscholar Abdolkarim Soroush. Soroush.

SomeSome ~~wel~~ well-known dissidents have been incarcerated -known dissidents have been incarcerated ~~periodical y~~ periodically or continuously since 2010, including famed or continuously since 2010, including famed
blogger Hosseinblogger Hossein Derakshan. The elderlyDerakshan. The elderly leader of the Iran Freedomleader of the Iran Freedom Movement,Movement, Ibrahim YazdiIbrahim Yazdi, was released was released from from
prison in Aprilprison in April 2011 after resigning as the movement’s2011 after resigning as the movement’s leader.leader. Human rights lawyerHuman rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh was released Nasrin Sotoudeh was released
from prison in Septemberfrom prison in September 2013, but has been jailed2013, but has been jailed again since June 2018 for representing women who protested again since June 2018 for representing women who protested

~~54 Secretary of State Michael Pompeo. Human Rights and the Iranian Regime. December 19, 2019.~~
~~55 Noah Bierman, “T rump Pushes Off War T alk on Iran, Says ‘Regime Change’ is not Goal,” Los Angeles Times, May~~
~~27, 2019.~~
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against compulsory hijab. In 2019, she was sentenced to 33 years in prison.against compulsory hijab. In 2019, she was sentenced to 33 years in prison. In May 2015, the regimeIn May 2015, the regime arrestedarrested
Narges Mohammadi, a Narges Mohammadi, a ~~wel~~ well-known activist against regime-known activist against regime executions. executions.

Sources:Sources: CRS periodic conversations with Iranian exiles,CRS periodic conversations with Iranian exiles, and various press.and various press.
Democracy Promotion and Internet Freedom Efforts
Successive Administrations and Congresses have sought to promote political evolution in Iran Successive Administrations and Congresses have sought to promote political evolution in Iran
through “democracy promotion” programs and sanctions on Iranian human rights abuses. through “democracy promotion” programs and sanctions on Iranian human rights abuses.
LegislationLegislation authorizing democracy promotion in Iran was enacted in the 109th Congress. The Iran authorizing democracy promotion in Iran was enacted in the 109th Congress. The Iran
Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293, signed September 30, 2006) authorized funds (no specific Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293, signed September 30, 2006) authorized funds (no specific
dollar amount) for Iran democracy promotion.dollar amount) for Iran democracy promotion.5665 Several laws and Executive Orders issued since Several laws and Executive Orders issued since
2010 are intended to promote 2010 are intended to promote ~~Internet~~internet freedom, and U.S.-Iran trade regulations were amended in freedom, and U.S.-Iran trade regulations were amended in
2011-12 to 2011-12 to ~~al ow~~allow for the sale to Iranians of consumer electronics and software that help them for the sale to Iranians of consumer electronics and software that help them
communicate. Then-Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman testified on October 14, 2011, that communicate. Then-Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman testified on October 14, 2011, that
some of the democracy promotion funding for Iran was used to train Iranians to use technologies some of the democracy promotion funding for Iran was used to train Iranians to use technologies
that circumvent regime censorship of the that circumvent regime censorship of the ~~Internet.~~internet. 65 This legislation was a modification of H.R. 282, which passed the House on April 26, 2006, by a vote of 397-21, and S. 333, which was introduced in the Senate. Congressional Research Service 34 Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options
Many have argued that U.S. funding for such programs is counterproductive because the support Many have argued that U.S. funding for such programs is counterproductive because the support
has caused Iran to use the support as a justification to accuse the civil society activists of has caused Iran to use the support as a justification to accuse the civil society activists of
disloyalty. Some civil society activists have refused to participate in U.S.-funded programs, disloyalty. Some civil society activists have refused to participate in U.S.-funded programs,
fearing arrest. The Obama Administration altered Iran democracy promotion programs somewhat fearing arrest. The Obama Administration altered Iran democracy promotion programs somewhat
toward working with Iranians inside Iran who are organized around apolitical issues such as toward working with Iranians inside Iran who are organized around apolitical issues such as
health, education, science, and the environment.health, education, science, and the environment.5766 The State Department, which often uses The State Department, which often uses
appropriated funds to support prodemocracy programs run by organizations based in the United appropriated funds to support prodemocracy programs run by organizations based in the United
States and in Europe, refuses to name grantees for security reasons. The funds shown below have States and in Europe, refuses to name grantees for security reasons. The funds shown below have
been obligated through the State Department bureaus of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, been obligated through the State Department bureaus of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
and of Near Eastern Affairs, in partnership with USAID. Some of the funds have also been used and of Near Eastern Affairs, in partnership with USAID. Some of the funds have also been used
for cultural exchanges, public diplomacy, and broadcasting to Iran. A further indication of the for cultural exchanges, public diplomacy, and broadcasting to Iran. A further indication of the
sensitivity of specifying the use of the funds is that, since FY2010, funds have been provided for sensitivity of specifying the use of the funds is that, since FY2010, funds have been provided for
Iran civil society/democracy promotion as part of a broader “Near East Regional Democracy Iran civil society/democracy promotion as part of a broader “Near East Regional Democracy
programs” (NERD).programs” (NERD).
Iran asserts that funding democracy promotion represents a violation of the 1981 “Algiers Iran asserts that funding democracy promotion represents a violation of the 1981 “Algiers
Accords” that settled the Iran hostage crisis and provide for noninterference in each other’s Accords” that settled the Iran hostage crisis and provide for noninterference in each other’s
internal affairs. The George W. Bush Administration asserted that open funding of Iranian internal affairs. The George W. Bush Administration asserted that open funding of Iranian
prodemocracy activists (see below) was a stated effort to change regime behavior, not to prodemocracy activists (see below) was a stated effort to change regime behavior, not to
overthrow the regime, although some saw the Bush Administration’s efforts as a cover to achieve overthrow the regime, although some saw the Bush Administration’s efforts as a cover to achieve
a regime change objective. a regime change objective.
Broadcasting/Public ~~Diplomacy~~ Diplomacy Issues
Another part of the democracy promotion effort has been the development of Iran-specific U.S. Another part of the democracy promotion effort has been the development of Iran-specific U.S.
broadcasting services to Iran. Radio broadcasting services to Iran. Radio Farda (“tomorrow,” in Farsi) began under Radio Free (“tomorrow,” in Farsi) began under Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), in partnership with the Voice of America (VOA), in 2002. The Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), in partnership with the Voice of America (VOA), in 2002. The
service was established as a successor to a service was established as a successor to a ~~smal er~~smaller Iran broadcasting effort begun with an initial Iran broadcasting effort begun with an initial
$4 $4 ~~mil ion~~ million from the FY1998 Commerce/State/Justice appropriation (P.L. 105-119). It was to be from the FY1998 Commerce/State/Justice appropriation (P.L. 105-119). It was to be

~~56 T his legislation was a modification of H.R. 282, which passed the House on April 26, 2006, by a vote of 397-21, and~~
~~S. 333, which was introduced in the Senate.~~
~~57 CRS conversation with U.S. officials of the “Iran Office” of the U.S. Consulate in Dubai, Octo ber 2009.~~
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33

~~Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options~~

~~cal ed~~called Radio Free Iran but was never Radio Free Iran but was never ~~formal y~~formally given that name by RFE/RL. Based in Prague, given that name by RFE/RL. Based in Prague,
Radio Radio Farda broadcasts 24 hours/day, and its budget is over $11 broadcasts 24 hours/day, and its budget is over $11 ~~mil ion~~million per year. The service is per year. The service is
expanding into television as expanding into television as ~~wel~~ well, according to officials at the U.S. Agency for Global Media. , according to officials at the U.S. Agency for Global Media.
No U.S. assistance has been provided to Iranian exile-run stations. No U.S. assistance has been provided to Iranian exile-run stations.58
67 VOA Persian Service/VOA365. The VOA established a Persian-language service to Iran in July The VOA established a Persian-language service to Iran in July
2003. It consists of radio broadcasting; television; and internet. In 2019, it was revised as 2003. It consists of radio broadcasting; television; and internet. In 2019, it was revised as
VOA365, and is led by the VOA in partnership with RFE/RL Radio Farda. The service broadcasts VOA365, and is led by the VOA in partnership with RFE/RL Radio Farda. The service broadcasts
nine hours per day and, as of 2019, is ramping up to 11 hours per day of broadcasting. The service nine hours per day and, as of 2019, is ramping up to 11 hours per day of broadcasting. The service
broadcasts into Iran hard news as broadcasts into Iran hard news as ~~wel~~ well as U.S. television programs (“soft programming”) licensed as U.S. television programs (“soft programming”) licensed
for rebroadcast to Iran. The service has been criticized by Iranian exiles in the United States for for rebroadcast to Iran. The service has been criticized by Iranian exiles in the United States for
failing to forthrightly confront the regime’s messaging, although USAGM officials say such failing to forthrightly confront the regime’s messaging, although USAGM officials say such ~~cal s~~
calls would be ineffective and not necessarily consistent with the VOA’s mission. The costs for the would be ineffective and not necessarily consistent with the VOA’s mission. The costs for the
service are about $20 millionservice are about $20 million per year. 66 CRS conversation with U.S. officials of the “Iran Office” of the U.S. Consulate in Dubai, October 2009. 67 The~~per year.~~

~~58 T he~~ conference report on the FY2006 regular foreign aid conference report on the FY2006 regular foreign aid appropriations stated the sense of Congress that such appropriations stated the sense of Congress that such
support should besupport should be considered. considered.
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Table 4. Iran Democracy Promotion Funding
FY2004 FY2004
Foreign operations appropriation (P.L. 108-199) earmarked $1.5 mil ion Foreign operations appropriation (P.L. 108-199) earmarked $1.5 mil ion for “educational, for “educational,
humanitarian and non-governmental organizations and individuals inside Iran to support the humanitarian and non-governmental organizations and individuals inside Iran to support the
advancement of democracy and human rights in Iran.” The State Department Bureau of Democracy advancement of democracy and human rights in Iran.” The State Department Bureau of Democracy
and Labor (DRL) gave $1 mil ionand Labor (DRL) gave $1 mil ion to a unit of Yale University,to a unit of Yale University, and $500,000 to National Endowment and $500,000 to National Endowment
for Democracy.for Democracy.
FY2005 FY2005
$3 mil ion $3 mil ion ~~from~~ from FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) for democracy promotion.FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) for democracy promotion. Priority Priority
areas: political areas: political party development,party development, media,media, labor rights, civillabor rights, civil society promotion,society promotion, and human rights. and human rights.
FY2006 FY2006
$11.15 mil ion $11.15 mil ion for democracy promotionfor democracy promotion from regular FY2006 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 109-from regular FY2006 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 109-
102). $4.15 mil ion 102). $4.15 mil ion ~~administered~~ administered by DRL and $7 mil ionby DRL and $7 mil ion for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.
FY2006 FY2006
Total of $66.1 mil ion Total of $66.1 mil ion (of $75 mil ion(of $75 mil ion requested) from FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234): $20 requested) from FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234): $20
supp. supp.
mil ion mil ion for democracy promotion; $5 mil ionfor democracy promotion; $5 mil ion for public diplomacy directed at the Iranian population; for public diplomacy directed at the Iranian population;
$5 mil ion$5 mil ion for cultural exchanges; and $36.1 mil ionfor cultural exchanges; and $36.1 mil ion for Voice of America-TVfor Voice of America-TV and “Radio and “Radio Farda” ”
broadcasting. Broadcasting funds are provided through the Broadcasting Board of Governors.broadcasting. Broadcasting funds are provided through the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
FY2007 FY2007
FY2007 continuing resolution FY2007 continuing resolution provided $6.55 mil ionprovided $6.55 mil ion for Iran (and Syria) to be administeredfor Iran (and Syria) to be administered through through
DRL. $3.04 mil ion DRL. $3.04 mil ion was used for Iran. No funds werewas used for Iran. No funds were requested. requested.
FY2008 FY2008
$60 mil ion $60 mil ion (of $75 mil ion(of $75 mil ion requested) is contained in Consolidated Appropriation (H.R. 2764, P.L. requested) is contained in Consolidated Appropriation (H.R. 2764, P.L.
110-161), of which, according to the conference report, $21.6 mil ion 110-161), of which, according to the conference report, $21.6 mil ion is ESF for prodemocracy is ESF for prodemocracy
programs,programs, including nonviolent efforts to oppose Iran’s meddling in other countries. $7.9 mil ionincluding nonviolent efforts to oppose Iran’s meddling in other countries. $7.9 mil ion is is
from a “Democracyfrom a “Democracy Fund” for use by DRL. The appropriation also ful y funded additional $33.6 Fund” for use by DRL. The appropriation also ful y funded additional $33.6
mil ionmil ion requested for Iran broadcasting: $20 mil ionrequested for Iran broadcasting: $20 mil ion for VOA Persian service;for VOA Persian service; $8.1 mil ion$8.1 mil ion for Radio for Radio
Farda; and $5.5 mil ionFarda; and $5.5 mil ion for exchanges with Iran. for exchanges with Iran.
FY2009 FY2009
Request was for $65 mil ion Request was for $65 mil ion in ESF “to support the aspirations of the Iranian people for a in ESF “to support the aspirations of the Iranian people for a
democratic and open society by promoting civil democratic and open society by promoting civil society, civic participation, media freedom,society, civic participation, media freedom, and and
freedomfreedom of information.” H.R. 1105 (P.L. 111-8) provides $25 mil ionof information.” H.R. 1105 (P.L. 111-8) provides $25 mil ion for democracy promotion for democracy promotion
programs in the region, including in Iran. programs in the region, including in Iran.
FY2010 FY2010
$40 mil ion $40 mil ion requested and used for Near East Regional Democracyrequested and used for Near East Regional Democracy programming.programming. Programs to Programs to
promote human rights, civil society, promote human rights, civil society, and public diplomacy in Iran constitute a significant use of these and public diplomacy in Iran constitute a significant use of these
region-wide funds. region-wide funds.
FY2011 FY2011
$40 mil ion $40 mil ion requested and wilrequested and wil be used for Near East Regional Democracybe used for Near East Regional Democracy programs.programs. Programming Programming
for Iran with these funds to be similar for Iran with these funds to be similar to FY2010. to FY2010.
FY2012 FY2012
$35 mil ion $35 mil ion for Near East Regional Democracyfor Near East Regional Democracy (NERD), and Iran-related use similar(NERD), and Iran-related use similar to FY2010 and to FY2010 and
FY2011. FY2011.
FY2013 FY2013
$30 mil ion $30 mil ion for NERD, with Iran use similarfor NERD, with Iran use similar to prior two fiscal years.to prior two fiscal years. About $583,000 was obligated About $583,000 was obligated
for Iran democracy for Iran democracy promotion. promotion.
FY2014 FY2014
$30 mil ion $30 mil ion for NERD. About $1 mil ionfor NERD. About $1 mil ion was obligated for Iran democracy promotion. was obligated for Iran democracy promotion.
FY2015 FY2015
$30 mil ion $30 mil ion for NERD. About $675,000 was obligated for Iran democracy promotion for NERD. About $675,000 was obligated for Iran democracy promotion
FY2016 FY2016
$32 mil ion $32 mil ion for NERD, About $900,000 was obligated for Iran democracy promotion.for NERD, About $900,000 was obligated for Iran democracy promotion.
FY2017 FY2017
$32 mil ion $32 mil ion for NERD, with Iran use likelyfor NERD, with Iran use likely ~~similar~~ similar to priorto prior years.years.
FY2018 FY2018
$42 mil ion $42 mil ion for NERD, with Iran use likelyfor NERD, with Iran use likely ~~similar~~ similar to priorto prior years.years.
FY2019 FY2019
$15 mil ion $15 mil ion for NERD, with Iran use likelyfor NERD, with Iran use likely ~~similar~~ similar to priorto prior years years
FY2020 FY2020
$40 mil ion $40 mil ion requested for NERD, with Iran use likelyrequested for NERD, with Iran use likely ~~similar~~ similar to prior years to prior years
FY2021 FY2021
NERD included in $84.5 mil ion NERD included in $84.5 mil ion for State Near Eastern Affairsfor State Near Eastern Affairs regional request. regional request.
Sources: Information provided by State Department and reviewed Information provided by State Department and reviewed by Department’sby Department’s Iran Office, Iran Office,
February 1, 2010; State Department CongressionalFebruary 1, 2010; State Department Congressional Budget Justifications; USAID Explorer database.Budget Justifications; USAID Explorer database.
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Ethnicity- and Sect-Based Armed Groups

Sunni Armed Opposition: Jundullah/Jaysh al-Adl
~~Jundul ah~~ Jundullah is composed of Sunni Muslimscomposed of Sunni Muslims ~~primarily~~ primarily from the Baluchistan region bordering Pakistan. The region is from the Baluchistan region bordering Pakistan. The region is
inhabited by membersinhabited by members of the Baluch minorityof the Baluch minority and is far lessand is far less developed than other parts of Iran. On the grounds developed than other parts of Iran. On the grounds
that that ~~Jundul ah~~ Jundullah has attacked civilianshas attacked civilians in the course of violent attacks in Iran, the State Department in the course of violent attacks in Iran, the State Department ~~formal y~~ formally named it named it
an FTO on Novemberan FTO on November 4, 2010. 4, 2010. ~~Jundul ah~~ Jundullah has conducted several attacks on Iranian security and civilian officials, has conducted several attacks on Iranian security and civilian officials,
including a May 2009 bombing of a mosque in Zahedan and the October 2009including a May 2009 bombing of a mosque in Zahedan and the October 2009 kil ing of five IRGC commanderskil ing of five IRGC commanders in in
Sistan va Baluchistan Province. The regimeSistan va Baluchistan Province. The regime claimed a victory against the group in February 2010 with the capture claimed a victory against the group in February 2010 with the capture
of its top leader, Abdolmalekof its top leader, Abdolmalek Rigi. The regimeRigi. The regime executed him in June 2010, but the group retaliated in July 2010 executed him in June 2010, but the group retaliated in July 2010
with a Zahedan bombing that kil edwith a Zahedan bombing that kil ed 28 persons,28 persons, including someincluding some IRGC personnel.IRGC personnel. The group was responsibleThe group was responsible for a for a
DecemberDecember 15, 2010, bombing at a mosque in Chahbahar that kil ed15, 2010, bombing at a mosque in Chahbahar that kil ed 38. The group changes its name to Jaysh al-Adl 38. The group changes its name to Jaysh al-Adl
in 2012, and the 2010 FTO designation applies to that name as wel . in 2012, and the 2010 FTO designation applies to that name as wel .

Kurdish Armed Groups
One armedOne armed Kurdish group operating out of Iraq is the FreeKurdish group operating out of Iraq is the Free Life Party, known by its acronym PJAK. Its leaderLife Party, known by its acronym PJAK. Its leader is is
believedbelieved to be Abdul Rahman to be Abdul Rahman ~~Haj i~~ Hajji Ahmadi, born in 1941, who is a citizen of Germany and lives in that country. Ahmadi, born in 1941, who is a citizen of Germany and lives in that country.
Many PJAK fighters reportedly are women. PJAK was designated by the Department of the Treasury in early Many PJAK fighters reportedly are women. PJAK was designated by the Department of the Treasury in early
February 2009 as a terrorismFebruary 2009 as a terrorism supporting entity under Executive Ordersupporting entity under Executive Order 13224, although the designation statement 13224, although the designation statement
indicated the decision was based mainly on PJAK’s association with the Turkishindicated the decision was based mainly on PJAK’s association with the Turkish Kurdish opposition group Kongra Kurdish opposition group Kongra
Gel,Gel, also known as the PKK. Five Kurds executed by Iran’s regimealso known as the PKK. Five Kurds executed by Iran’s regime in May 2010 were in May 2010 were ~~al eged members~~ alleged members of PJAK. of PJAK.

In July 2016, the Kurdistan DemocraticIn July 2016, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I) announced a resumption of “armed struggle” against Party of Iran (KDP-I) announced a resumption of “armed struggle” against
the regime,the regime, which had been suspended for 25 years, fol owingwhich had been suspended for 25 years, fol owing clashes with the IRGC that left severalclashes with the IRGC that left several dead on both dead on both
sides.sides. KDP-I fighters involved in the clashes reportedly had entered Iran from Kurdish-control edKDP-I fighters involved in the clashes reportedly had entered Iran from Kurdish-control ed ~~territory~~ territory in Iraq. in Iraq.
The Kurds who were recruited by the IslamicThe Kurds who were recruited by the Islamic State for the June 2017 attacks in Tehran, discussed above, did not State for the June 2017 attacks in Tehran, discussed above, did not
have clear affiliations with the established Kurdish armed groups discussed above. In late September 2018, Iran have clear affiliations with the established Kurdish armed groups discussed above. In late September 2018, Iran
fired fired ~~bal istic missiles~~ ballistic missiles at a base of the KDP-I in northern Iraq. at a base of the KDP-I in northern Iraq.

Arab Oppositionists/Ahwazi Arabs
Another militant group, the Another militant group, the Ahwazi Arabs, operates in the largely, operates in the largely Arab-inhabited areas of southwest Iran. Relatively Arab-inhabited areas of southwest Iran. Relatively
inactive overinactive over the past few years, and the regimethe past few years, and the regime continues to execute captured memberscontinues to execute captured members of the of the ~~organ ization~~organization. The . The
group purportedly was responsiblegroup purportedly was responsible for a Septemberfor a September 22, 2018, attack on a military22, 2018, attack on a military parade in the city of Ahwaz, parade in the city of Ahwaz,
which kil edwhich kil ed 25 persons,25 persons, mostly IRGC personnel.mostly IRGC personnel. Iran accused not only the Ahwazi Arabs but also Saudi Arabia, Iran accused not only the Ahwazi Arabs but also Saudi Arabia,
the Islamic State organization, and the United States for supporting that attack. On October 1, 2018, Iran the Islamic State organization, and the United States for supporting that attack. On October 1, 2018, Iran
retaliated for the assault by launching retaliated for the assault by launching ~~bal istic missiles~~ ballistic missiles at suspected Islamicat suspected Islamic State positions inside Syria.State positions inside Syria.

Sources:Sources: State Dept. TerroristState Dept. Terrorist Designations of Balochistan Liberation ArmyDesignations of Balochistan Liberation Army and Husain Aliand Husain Ali Hazzima and Hazzima and
AmendmentsAmendments to the Terroristto the Terrorist ~~Designations of Jundal ah~~ Designations of Jundallah, July 2, 2019. Various press., July 2, 2019. Various press.
State Department Public Diplomacy Efforts
The State Department has sought outreach to the Iranian population. In May 2003, the State The State Department has sought outreach to the Iranian population. In May 2003, the State
Department added a Persian-language website to its list of foreign-language websites. In February Department added a Persian-language website to its list of foreign-language websites. In February
2011, the State Department began Persian-language Twitter feeds. Since 2006, the State 2011, the State Department began Persian-language Twitter feeds. Since 2006, the State
Department has added staff to the several U.S. diplomatic missions in the countries around Iran Department has added staff to the several U.S. diplomatic missions in the countries around Iran
with Persian-speaking diplomats. The Iran unit at the U.S. Consulate in Dubai has been enlarged with Persian-speaking diplomats. The Iran unit at the U.S. Consulate in Dubai has been enlarged
significantly into a “regional presence” office, and “Iran-watcher” positions have been added over significantly into a “regional presence” office, and “Iran-watcher” positions have been added over
the past ten years to U.S. diplomatic facilities in Baku, Azerbaijan; Istanbul, Turkey; Frankfurt, the past ten years to U.S. diplomatic facilities in Baku, Azerbaijan; Istanbul, Turkey; Frankfurt,
Germany; London; and Ashkabad, Turkmenistan, Germany; London; and Ashkabad, Turkmenistan, al all of which have large expatriate Iranian of which have large expatriate Iranian
populations and/or proximity to Iran.populations and/or proximity to Iran.59

5968 68 Farah Stockman, “‘Long Struggle’ Farah Stockman, “‘Long Struggle’ With Iran Seen Ahead,” With Iran Seen Ahead,” Boston Globe, March 9, 2006. , March 9, 2006.
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options

People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK, PMOI)/National Council of
Resistance of Iran (NCRI)
The best-known exiled opposition group is the People’s The best-known exiled opposition group is the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as
the Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MEK). It is the main organization within the National Council of Resistance the Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MEK). It is the main organization within the National Council of Resistance
of Iran (NCRI), which claimsof Iran (NCRI), which claims to be a parliament-in-exile.to be a parliament-in-exile. The PMOI was formedThe PMOI was formed in 1965 by university students in 1965 by university students
opposed to the Shah of Iran. It has been widely characterized as blending several left-leaning ideologiesopposed to the Shah of Iran. It has been widely characterized as blending several left-leaning ideologies with Islam, with Islam,
but it advocates universalbut it advocates universal suffrage, a non-nuclear Iran, and abolition of use Sharia law in Iran. The group suffrage, a non-nuclear Iran, and abolition of use Sharia law in Iran. The group ~~al ied~~allied with with
pro-Khomeinipro-Khomeini forces during the Islamic revolution,forces during the Islamic revolution, but was forced into exilebut was forced into exile after unsuccessful y rising up against after unsuccessful y rising up against
the Khomeinithe Khomeini ~~regime~~ regime in mid-1981. Tens of thousands of its membersin mid-1981. Tens of thousands of its members have since been executed, including those have since been executed, including those
massacredmassacred in prison in 1988. The PMOI was led until 1989 by spouses Maryam and Massoud Rajavi, the formerin prison in 1988. The PMOI was led until 1989 by spouses Maryam and Massoud Rajavi, the former of of
which has been NCRI President-electwhich has been NCRI President-elect since 1992. Mrs. Rajavi is based in France and the whereabouts of Massoud since 1992. Mrs. Rajavi is based in France and the whereabouts of Massoud
Rajavi are unknown. The PMOI elects a Secretary-GeneralRajavi are unknown. The PMOI elects a Secretary-General ~~every~~ every two years. two years.

The State Department designated the PMOI as an FTO in October 1997, during a time when the Clinton The State Department designated the PMOI as an FTO in October 1997, during a time when the Clinton
AdministrationAdministration was trying to forge dialogue with President Khatemi.was trying to forge dialogue with President Khatemi. In August 2003, the Department of the In August 2003, the Department of the
Treasury ordered the NCRI’s offices in the United States closed.Treasury ordered the NCRI’s offices in the United States closed. The FTO designation was based on State The FTO designation was based on State
Department assertion that the membersDepartment assertion that the members of the PMOI were responsibleof the PMOI were responsible for the kil ingfor the kil ing of seven American military of seven American military
personnel and contract adviserspersonnel and contract advisers to the formerto the former Shah during 1973-1976; and bombings at U.S. government and U.S. Shah during 1973-1976; and bombings at U.S. government and U.S.
corporate offices in Tehran to protest the 1972 visits to Iran of President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger. corporate offices in Tehran to protest the 1972 visits to Iran of President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger.
The reports also listed as terrorismThe reports also listed as terrorism ~~several~~ several attacks by the group against regimeattacks by the group against regime targets (including 1981 bombings targets (including 1981 bombings
that kil edthat kil ed high-ranking officials), attacks on Iranian government facilities,high-ranking officials), attacks on Iranian government facilities, and attacks on Iranian security officials. and attacks on Iranian security officials.
The group has denied involvementThe group has denied involvement in the attacks. The group’s in the attacks. The group’s ~~al iance~~alliance with Iraq‘s Saddam Hussein with Iraq‘s Saddam Hussein contributed to contributed to
the designation, even though Saddam was a U.S. the designation, even though Saddam was a U.S. ~~al y~~ ally when the group moved to Iraq in 1987.when the group moved to Iraq in 1987.

In 2012, fol owing a court In 2012, fol owing a court ~~chal enge~~challenge by the group, a U.S. by the group, a U.S. Appeals Court gave the State Department until October Appeals Court gave the State Department until October
1, 2012, to decide on the FTO designation, without prescribing1, 2012, to decide on the FTO designation, without prescribing an outcome. On Septemberan outcome. On September 28, 2012, maintaining 28, 2012, maintaining
there had not been confirmed acts of PMOI terrorismthere had not been confirmed acts of PMOI terrorism for morefor more than a decade and that it had cooperated on the than a decade and that it had cooperated on the
Camp Ashraf issue (below), the group was removedCamp Ashraf issue (below), the group was removed from the FTO list and was “de-listed” from its designation as from the FTO list and was “de-listed” from its designation as
a terrorista terrorist group under Executive Order 13224. The group has also been credited for exposing Iranian nuclear group under Executive Order 13224. The group has also been credited for exposing Iranian nuclear
sites and other proliferation-relatedsites and other proliferation-related locations and actions. The State Department has been meeting with the MEK locations and actions. The State Department has been meeting with the MEK
since its removalsince its removal from the FTO list,from the FTO list, including in Iraq. The NCRI reopened its offices in Washington, DC, in April including in Iraq. The NCRI reopened its offices in Washington, DC, in April
2013. The regime2013. The regime blamed the group for instigating someblamed the group for instigating some of the protests that took place in Novemberof the protests that took place in November 2019. 2019.

WhereasWhereas it is not possible to independently assessit is not possible to independently assess the extent of the PMOI’s fol owing in Iran, regimethe extent of the PMOI’s fol owing in Iran, regime officials often officials often
blame the PMOI for stoking unrest in Iran, suggesting regimeblame the PMOI for stoking unrest in Iran, suggesting regime nervousness about the group’s nervousness about the group’s ~~sup port~~support level level within within
Iran and degree of organization. In May 2019, Iranian Iran and degree of organization. In May 2019, Iranian ~~intel igence~~ intelligence officials arrestedofficials arrested many membersmany members of PMOI of PMOI
“resistance “resistance ~~cel s”~~ cells” that have been formed in Iran to carry out opposition activities.that have been formed in Iran to carry out opposition activities. One indication of the regime’s One indication of the regime’s
fear of the group was a June 2018 plot, orchestrated by an Iranian diplomat in Vienna, Austria and foiled by fear of the group was a June 2018 plot, orchestrated by an Iranian diplomat in Vienna, Austria and foiled by
European security organizations, to bomb a PMOI European security organizations, to bomb a PMOI ~~ral y~~ rally in France.in France.

Camp Ashraf Issue
During Operation Iraqi FreedomDuring Operation Iraqi Freedom (March 2003), U.S. forces in Iraq required(March 2003), U.S. forces in Iraq required 3,400 PMOI elements3,400 PMOI elements in Iraq to in Iraq to
consolidated at Camp Ashraf, near the border with Iran, and to place its weaponry in storage,consolidated at Camp Ashraf, near the border with Iran, and to place its weaponry in storage, guarded by U.S. and guarded by U.S. and
Iraqi personnel.Iraqi personnel. In July 2004, the United States granted the Ashraf detainees “protected persons” status under the In July 2004, the United States granted the Ashraf detainees “protected persons” status under the
4th Geneva Convention, although that designation lapsed when Iraq resumed4th Geneva Convention, although that designation lapsed when Iraq resumed ful sovereignty in June 2004. The ful sovereignty in June 2004. The
Iraqi government’sIraqi government’s pledges to adhere to pledges to adhere to al all international obligations with respect to the PMOI in Iraq came into international obligations with respect to the PMOI in Iraq came into
question on severalquestion on several occasions when pro-Iranian militiasoccasions when pro-Iranian militias and Iraqi forces used force against the PMOI residentsand Iraqi forces used force against the PMOI residents of of
Camp Ashraf and, after 2012, against their new location at Camp Liberty,Camp Ashraf and, after 2012, against their new location at Camp Liberty, near Baghdad’s main airport.near Baghdad’s main airport. The The
FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 114-92) FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 114-92) ~~cal ed~~called for “prompt and appropriate steps” to promote for “prompt and appropriate steps” to promote
the protection of camp residents.the protection of camp residents. In SeptemberIn September 2016, the last remaining2016, the last remaining residents of Camp Liberty were resettled residents of Camp Liberty were resettled
in Albania and there are no morein Albania and there are no more PMOI activists living openly in Iraq. Fearing that the PMOI might organize PMOI activists living openly in Iraq. Fearing that the PMOI might organize
protests there, regimeprotests there, regime agents attempted to bomb the group’s Nowruz (Persian New Year) celebration in March agents attempted to bomb the group’s Nowruz (Persian New Year) celebration in March
2018. The plot was foiled by Albanian law enforcement and the Albanian government 2018. The plot was foiled by Albanian law enforcement and the Albanian government ~~expel ed~~ expelled Iran’s Ambassador.Iran’s Ambassador.
Sources: Various press reports: Various press reports and CRS conversations with NCR-I representativesand CRS conversations with NCR-I representatives and experts. and experts.

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Figure 1. Structure of the Iranian Government

Source: CRS. CRS.
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options

Figure 2. Map of Iran

Source: Map boundaries from WikimediaMap boundaries from Wikimedia Commons,Commons, 2007. Graphic: CRS. 2007. Graphic: CRS.

Author Information

Kenneth Katzman Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Acknowledgments
The author wishes to acknowledge the research contribution of Sarah Manning, Research Associate, CRS The author wishes to acknowledge the research contribution of Sarah Manning, Research Associate, CRS
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, in the preparation of this report.Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, in the preparation of this report.
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Disclaimer
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