27, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL34391 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program Summary The Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program is a program to acquire three new heavy polar icebreakers, to be followed years from now by the acquisition of up to three new medium polar icebreakers. The Coast Guard estimates the total procurement costs of the three heavy polar icebreakers as $1,039 million (i.e., about $1.0 billion) for the first ship, $792 million for the second ship, and $788 million for the third ship, for a combined estimated cost of $2,619 million (i.e., about $2.6 billion). Within those figures, the shipbuilder'’s portion of the total procurement cost is $746 million for the first ship, $544 million for the second ship, and $535 million for the third ship, for a combined estimated shipbuilder'’s cost of $1,825 million (i.e., about $1.8 billion).

On April 23, 2019, the Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office for the PSC program awarded a $745.9 million fixed-price, incentive-firm contract for the detail design and construction (DD&C) of the first PSC to VT Halter Marine of Pascagoula, MS, a shipyard owned by Singapore Technologies (ST) Engineering. VT Halter was the leader of one of three industry teams that competed for the DD&C contract. The first PSC is scheduled to begin construction in 2021 and be delivered in 2024, though the DD&C contract includes financial incentives for earlier delivery.

The DD&C contract includes options for building the second and third PSCs. If these options are exercised, the total value of the contract would increase to $1,942.8 million (i.e., about $1.9 billion). The figures of $745.9 million and $1,942.8 million cover only the shipbuilder'’s costs; they do not include the cost of government-furnished equipment (GFE), which is equipment for the ships that the government purchases and then provides to the shipbuilder for incorporation into the ship, or government program-management costs. When GFE and government program-managementprogrammanagement costs are included, the total estimated procurement cost of the first PSC is between $925 million and $940 million, and the total estimated procurement cost of the three-ship PSC program is about $2.95 billion.

The PSC program has received a total of $1,034.6 million (i.e., about $1.0 billion) in procurement funding through FY2019, including $300 million provided through the Navy'’s shipbuilding account in FY2017 and FY2018. The Coast Guard'’s proposed FY2020 budget requests $35 million in procurement funding for the PSC program, which is enough to cover the PSC program' program’s FY2020 government program-management costs. The Coast Guard'’s FY2019 budget submission had projected that a total of $125 million in procurement funding would be requested for the PSC program in FY2020.

The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently consists of one heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star, and one medium polar icebreaker, HealyHealy. In addition to Polar Star, the Coast Guard has a second heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Sea. . Polar SeaSea, however, suffered an engine casualty in June 2010 and has been nonoperational since then. Polar Star and Polar Sea entered service in 1976 and 1978, respectively, and are now well beyond their originally intended 30-year service lives. The Coast Guard is using Polar Sea as a source of spare parts for keeping Polar Star operational.

operational. Issues for Congress for the PSC program include, inter alia, whether to approve, reject, or modify the Coast Guard'’s FY2020 procurement funding request for the program; whether to use a contract with options or a block buy contract to procure the ships; whether to continue providing at least some of the procurement funding for the PSC program through the Navy'’s shipbuilding account; technical, schedule, and cost risk in the PSC program; and whether to procure heavy and medium polar icebreakers to a common basic design.

The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Administration's FY2020 procurement funding request for the PSC program, and, more generally, whether to approve, reject, or modify the Coast Guard's overall plan for procuring new polar icebreakers. Congress's decisions on this issue could affect Coast Guard funding requirements, the Coast Guard's ability Congressional Research Service Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Missions of U.S. Polar Icebreakers ........................................................................................... 1 Statutory Duties and Missions ............................................................................................ 1 Multiple Missions (Not Just Icebreaking) ........................................................................... 2 Polar (Not Just Arctic) Operations ...................................................................................... 2 Current U.S. Polar Icebreakers.................................................................................................. 3 Required Numbers of U.S. Polar Icebreakers ........................................................................... 3 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) Program .................................................................. 4 Overview ............................................................................................................................. 4 Program Name .................................................................................................................... 4 Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office (IPO) ......................................................... 4 Parent Design Approach ..................................................................................................... 4 Program Schedule ............................................................................................................... 4 Procurement Cost ................................................................................................................ 4 Program Funding ................................................................................................................ 5 Contract Award ................................................................................................................... 5 Ship Design ......................................................................................................................... 6 Home Port ......................................................................................................................... 10 Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 10 FY2020 Funding ..................................................................................................................... 10 Contract with Options vs. Block Buy Contract ........................................................................ 11 Funding Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers through Navy’s Shipbuilding Account .................... 12 Technical, Schedule, and Cost Risk for PSC Program ............................................................ 14 Common Design for Heavy and Medium Polar Icebreakers .................................................. 15 Short-Term Bridge to One or More New Polar Icebreakers ................................................... 18 Overview: Two Basic Options .......................................................................................... 18 Coast Guard Plan is to Further Extend Life of Polar Star ................................................ 18 Another Option: Chartering an Icebreaker........................................................................ 20 Legislative Activity for FY2020.................................................................................................... 23 Summary of Appropriation Action on FY2020 Funding Request ........................................... 23 FY2020 DHS Appropriations Act (H.R. 3931/S. 2582) .......................................................... 24 House ................................................................................................................................ 24 Senate ................................................................................................................................ 25 Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2019 (H.R. 3409/S. 2297) ................................................ 26 House ................................................................................................................................ 26 Senate ................................................................................................................................ 27 Figures Figure 1. Rendering of VT Halter Design for PSC ......................................................................... 6 Figure 2. Rendering of VT Halter Design for PSC ......................................................................... 7 Figure 3. Rendering of VT Halter Design for PSC ......................................................................... 8 Figure 4. Rendering of SDC Concept Design for Polarstern II ...................................................... 9 Figure 5. Aiviq ............................................................................................................................... 21 Congressional Research Service Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program Figure A-1. Polar Star and Polar Sea ........................................................................................... 29 Figure A-2. Polar Sea .................................................................................................................... 30 Figure A-3. Healy .......................................................................................................................... 31 Figure A-4. Nathaniel B. Palmer ................................................................................................... 32 Figure A-5. Laurence M. Gould .................................................................................................... 33 Figure A-6. Sikuliaq ...................................................................................................................... 34 Figure E-1. Great Lakes Icebreaker Mackinaw ............................................................................. 62 Tables Table 1. Estimated PSC Procurement Costs .................................................................................... 5 Table 2. Summary of Congressional Appropriations Action on FY2030 Funding Request .......... 24 Table A-1. Coast Guard and NSF Polar Ships ............................................................................... 35 Table B-1. Major Icebreakers of the World as of May 1, 2017 ..................................................... 39 Table C-1. Funding for Acquisition of New Polar Icebreaker Under FY2013-FY2020 Budget Submissions ................................................................................................................... 53 Table C-2. Funding in Procurement, Construction, and Improvements (PC&I) Account in FY2013-FY2020 Budgets .......................................................................................................... 54 Appendixes Appendix A. Current U.S. Polar Icebreakers and Polar Research Ships ....................................... 29 Appendix B. Required Numbers of U.S. Polar Icebreakers .......................................................... 36 Appendix C. PSC Program Funding ............................................................................................. 53 Appendix D. Funding Level in PC&I Account ............................................................................. 58 Appendix E. Great Lakes Icebreakers ........................................................................................... 62 Contacts Author Information........................................................................................................................ 66 Congressional Research Service Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program Introduction This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program—the Coast Guard’s program for acquiring new polar icebreakers. The PSC program has received a total of $1,034.6 million (i.e., about $1.0 billion) in procurement funding through FY2019. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2020 budget requests $35 million in procurement funding for the PSC program, which is enough to cover FY2020 programmanagement costs. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Administration’s FY2020 procurement funding request for the PSC program, and, more generally, whether to approve, reject, or modify the Coast Guard’s overall plan for procuring new polar icebreakers. Congress’s decisions on this issue could affect Coast Guard funding requirements, the Coast Guard’s ability to perform its polar missions, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. to perform its polar missions, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.

For a brief discussion of the Coast Guard'’s Great Lakes icebreakers, see Appendix E. A separate CRS report covers acquisition of general-purpose cutters for the Coast Guard.¹1 Another CRS report provides an overview of various issues relating to the Arctic.²

Background

2 Background Missions of U.S. Polar Icebreakers

Statutory Duties and Missions

The permanent statute that sets forth the Coast Guard'’s primary duties—14 U.S.C. 102—states that among other things, the Coast Guard shall (emphasis added) "“develop, establish, maintain, and operate, with due regard to the requirements of national defense, aids to maritime navigation, icebreaking facilities, and rescue facilities for the promotion of safety on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,"” and "“pursuant to international agreements, develop, establish, maintain, and operate icebreaking facilities on, under, and over waters other than the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States...."³

”3 In addition, Section 888(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (H.R. 5005//P.L. 107-296 of November 25, 2002)—the law that established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and transferred the Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation to DHS—sets forth 11 specific missions for the Coast Guard (often referred to as the Coast Guard'’s 11 statutory missions), including the mission of "“ice operations."⁴

”4 1 CRS Report R42567, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. CRS Report R41153, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ronald O'Rourke. 3 14 U.S.C. 102(4) and 102(5), respectively. This statute was previously 14 U.S.C. 2; it was renumbered as 14 U.S.C. 102 by Section 103 of the Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 (S. 140/P.L. 115-282 of December 4, 2018). (Title I of P.L. 115-282, consisting of Sections 101-124, specified a general reorganization of Title 14.) 4 The 11 missions set forth in Section 888(a) are marine safety; search and rescue; aids to navigation; living marine resources (fisheries law enforcement); marine environmental protection; ice operations; ports, waterways and coastal security; drug interdiction; migrant interdiction; defense readiness; other law enforcement. 2 Congressional Research Service 1 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program Multiple Missions (Not Just Icebreaking) Multiple Missions (Not Just Icebreaking)

The Coast Guard'’s polar icebreakers do not simply break ice—they are multimission cutters⁵ that cutters5 that conduct a variety of other operations that are conducted in lower-latitude waters by the Coast Guard' Guard’s general-purpose cutters. U.S. polar ice operations conducted in large part by the Coast Guard' Guard’s polar icebreakers support 9 of the Coast Guard'’s 11 statutory missions.⁶6 The roles of U.S. polar icebreakers can be summarized as follows:

•      conducting and supporting scientific research in the Arctic and Antarctic;
• defending U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic by helping to maintain a U.S. presence in U.S. territorial waters in the region;
• defending other U.S. interests in polar regions, including economic interests in waters that are within the U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ) north of Alaska;
• monitoring sea traffic in the Arctic, including ships bound for the United States; and
• and conducting other typical Coast Guard missions (such as search and rescue, law enforcement, and protection of marine resources) in Arctic waters, including U.S. territorial waters north of Alaska.⁷

7 Polar (Not Just Arctic) Operations

The Coast Guard'’s large icebreakers are called polar icebreakers rather than Arctic icebreakers because they perform missions in both the Arctic and Antarctic. Operations to support National Science Foundation (NSF) research activities in both polar regions account for a significant portion of U.S. polar icebreaker operations.

Supporting NSF research in the Antarctic focuses on performing an annual mission, called Operation Deep Freeze (ODF), to break through Antarctic sea ice so as to reach and resupply McMurdo Station, the large U.S. Antarctic research station located on the shore of McMurdo Sound, near the Ross Ice Shelf. The Coast Guard states that Polar Star, the Coast Guard'’s only currently operational heavy polar icebreaker, "“spends the [northern hemisphere] winter [i.e., the southern hemisphere summer] breaking ice near Antarctica in order to refuel and resupply McMurdo Station. When the mission is complete, the Polar Star returns to dry dock [in Seattle] in order to complete critical maintenance and prepare it for the next ODF mission. Once out of dry dock, it'’s back to Antarctica, and the cycle repeats itself."⁸”8 In terms of the maximum thickness of the ice to be broken, the annual McMurdo resupply mission generally poses the greatest icebreaking challenge for U.S. polar icebreakers, though Arctic ice can frequently pose its own significant icebreaking challenges for U.S. polar icebreakers. The Coast Guard'’s medium 5 Cutters are commissioned Coast Guard vessels greater than 65 feet in length. For a list of the 11 missions, see footnote 4. The two statutory missions not supported by polar ice operations are illegal drug interdiction and undocumented migrant interdiction. (Department of Homeland Security, Polar Icebreaking Recapitalization Project Mission Need Statement, Version 1.0, approved by DHS June 28, 2013, p. 10.) 7 This passage, beginning with “The roles of...,” originated in an earlier iteration of this CRS report and was later transferred by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) with minor changes to Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard[:]Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements Are Ongoing, but More Communication about Agency Planning Efforts Would Be Beneficial, GAO-10-870, September 2010, p. 53. 8 NyxoLyno Cangemi, “Coast Guard Icebreaker Crew Completes Second Arctic Mission; U.S. Interests in Arctic Domain Depends [sic] on Fleet Recapitalization,” DVIDS (Defense Visual Information Distribution System), October 19, 2018. 6 Congressional Research Service 2 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program polar icebreaker, Healypolar icebreaker, Healy, spends most of its operational time in the Arctic supporting NSF research activities and performing other operations.

Although polar ice is diminishing due to climate change, observers generally expect that this development will not eliminate the need for U.S. polar icebreakers, and in some respects might increase mission demands for them. Even with the diminishment of polar ice, there are still significant ice-covered areas in the polar regions, and diminishment of polar ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial ship, cruise ship, and naval surface ship operations, as well as increased exploration for oil and other resources, in the Arctic—activities that could require increased levels of support from polar icebreakers, particularly since waters described as "ice free"“ice free” can actually still have some amount of ice.⁹9 Changing ice conditions in Antarctic waters have made the McMurdo resupply mission more challenging since 2000.¹⁰

10 The Coast Guard'’s strategy document for the Arctic region, released on May 21, 2013, states that " “The United States must have adequate icebreaking capability to support research that advances fundamental understanding of the region and its evolution,"” and that "“The Nation must also make a strategic investment in icebreaking capability to enable access to the high latitudes over the long-term."¹¹

”11 Current U.S. Polar Icebreakers

The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently consists of one heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star, and one medium polar icebreaker, HealyHealy. In addition to Polar Star, the Coast Guard has a second heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Sea. . Polar Sea, however, suffered an engine casualty in June 2010 and has been nonoperational since then.

Polar Star Polar Star and Polar Sea entered service in 1976 and 1978, respectively, and are now well beyond their originally intended 30-year service lives. The Coast Guard in recent years has invested millions of dollars to overhaul, repair, and extend the service life of Polar Star, but as a result of its advancing age, the ship'’s material condition has nevertheless become increasingly fragile, if not precarious. During its annual deployments to McMurdo Station in Antarctica, shipboard equipment frequently breaks, and shipboard fires sometimes occur.¹²12 Replacements for many of the ship'’s components are no longer commercially available. To help keep Polar Star operational, the Coast Guard is using Polar Sea as a source of replacement parts.

For additional background information on current U.S. polar icebreakers and polar research ships, see Appendix A.

. Required Numbers of U.S. Polar Icebreakers

For background information on required numbers of U.S. polar icebreakers, see Appendix B.

. 9 For more on changes in the Arctic due to diminishment of Arctic ice, see CRS Report R41153, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ronald O'Rourke. 10 National Research Council, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World, An Assessment of U.S. Needs, Washington, 2007, pp. 6-7, 14, 63. 11 United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy, Washington, May 2013, p. 35; accessed May 24, 2013, at http://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/CG_Arctic_Strategy.pdf. 12 See, for example, Richard Read, “Meet the Neglected 43-Year-Old Stepchild of the U.S. Military-Industrial Complex,” Los Angeles Times, August 2, 2019; Melody Schreiber, “The Only Working US Heavy Icebreaker Catches Fire Returning from Antarctica,” Arctic Today, March 2, 2019; Calvin Biesecker, “Fire Breaks Out On Coast Guard’s Aging, and Only, Heavy Icebreaker,” Defense Daily, March 1, 2019. Congressional Research Service 3 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) Program

Overview

Program Overview The PSC program was initiated in the Coast Guard'’s FY2013 budget submission, and envisages the acquisition of three new heavy polar icebreakers, to be followed years from now by the acquisition of up to three new medium polar icebreakers. The Coast Guard wants to begin construction of the first new heavy polar icebreaker in 2021 and have it enter service in 2024.

Program Name

Program Name The PSC program was previously known as the polar icebreaker (PIB) program. Changing the program' program’s name to the PSC program is intended to call attention to the fact that the Coast Guard's ’s polar icebreakers perform a variety of missions relating to national security, not just icebreaking.¹³13 Although it is now called the PSC program, many observers, as a matter of convenience, may continue to refer to it as the polar icebreaker program.

Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office (IPO)

The PSC program is managed by a Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office (IPO). A key aim in establishing the IPO was to permit the Navy to share its ship-procurement best practices with the Coast Guard so as to help the Coast Guard reduce the time and cost needed to design and procure the PSCs.

Parent Design Approach

The PSC program is using the parent design approach, meaning that the design of the PSC will be based on an existing icebreaker design. A key aim in using the parent design approach is to reduce cost, schedule, and technical risk in the PSC program.

Program Schedule

Program Schedule The PSC program'’s schedule calls for delivering the three PSCs at 12-month intervals, at the end of the third quarters of FY2024, FY2025, and FY2026, respectively.

Procurement Cost

Procurement Cost As shown in Table 1, the Coast Guard estimates the total procurement costs of the three heavy polar icebreakers as $1,039 million (i.e., about $1.0 billion) for the first ship, $792 million for the second ship, and $788 million for the third ship, for a combined estimated cost of $2,619 million (i.e., about $2.6 billion). As also shown in Table 1, within those figures, the shipbuilder'’s portion of the total procurement cost is $746 million for the first ship, $544 million for the second ship, and $535 million for the third ship, for a combined estimated shipbuilder'’s cost of $1,825 million (i.e., about $1.8 billion). The shipbuilder'’s contract-award cost for the first ship is $745.9 million, with options for the second and third ships that, if exercised, would increase the total value of the contract to $1,942.8 million (i.e., about $1.9 billion).

Program Funding

Program Funding The PSC program received about $359.6 million in procurement funding through FY2018, including $300 million provided through the Navy'’s shipbuilding account (which is part of DOD' DOD’s budget) and $59.6 million provided through the Coast Guard'’s procurement account (which is part of the Department of Homeland Security'’s [DHS'’s] budget). The FY2019 DHS Appropriations Act (Division A of H.J.Res. 31//P.L. 116-6 of February 15, 2019) provided an additional $675 million for the PSC program through the Coast Guard'’s procurement account, including $20 million for the procurement of long leadtime materials (LLTM) for the second ship in the program. The PSC program has thus received a total of $1,034.6 million (i.e., about $1.0 billion) in procurement funding through FY2019. The Coast Guard'’s proposed FY2020 budget requests $35 million in procurement funding for the PSC program, which is enough to cover the PSC program'’s FY2020 government program-management costs. As shown in Table C-2, the Coast Guard'’s FY2019 budget submission had projected that a total of $125 million in procurement funding would be requested for the PSC program in FY2020.

For additional background information on funding for the PSC program, see Appendix C.

Contract Award

Appendix C. Contract Award On April 23, 2019, the Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office for the PSC program awarded a $745.9 million fixed-price, incentive-firm contract for the detail design and construction (DD&C) of the first PSC to VT Halter Marine of Pascagoula, MS, a shipyard owned by Singapore Technologies (ST) Engineering. VT Halter was the leader of one of three industry teams that competed for the DD&C contract; the other two bidders reportedly were Bollinger Congressional Research Service 5 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program Shipyards of Lockport, Louisiana, and a partnership between Philly Shipyard of Philadelphia and Fincantieri/Marinette Marine, of Marinette, WI.¹⁴

14 The first PSC is scheduled to begin construction in 2021 and be delivered in 2024, though the DD&C contract includes financial incentives for earlier delivery. The DD&C contract includes options for building the second and third PSCs. If these options are exercised, the total value of the contract would increase to $1,942.8 million (i.e., about $1.9 billion).¹⁵15 The figures of $745.9 million and $1,942.8 million cover the shipbuilder'’s costs; they do not include the cost of government-furnished equipment (GFE), which is equipment for the ships that the government purchases and then provides to the shipbuilder for incorporation into the ship, or government program-management costs.

Ship Design

Ship Design Figure 1, , Figure 2, and Figure 3 show three renderings of VT Halter'’s design for the PSC. An April 25, 2019, press report states that "“the Coast Guard and Navy said VT Halter Marine's winning design for the new Polar Security Cutter (PSC) '‘meets or exceeds all threshold requirements' requirements’ in the ship specification"” for the PSC program.¹⁶

16 Figure 1. Rendering of VT Halter Design for PSC

Source: Illustration accompanying Sam LaGrone, "“UPDATED: VT Halter Marine to Build New Coast Guard Icebreaker,"” USNI News, April 23, 2019, updated April 24, 2019. The caption to the illustration states "An artist'“An artist’s rendering of VT Halter Marine'’s winning bid for the U.S. Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter. VT Halter Marine image used with permission."

” “Mississippi Shipyard Gets $746M Contract for Icebreaker,” Associated Press, April 23, 2019. See Naval Sea Systems Command, “Polar Security Cutter Contract Awarded to Recapitalize Nation’s Arctic Capabilities,” April 23, 2019; Department of Defense, “Contracts for April 23, 2019” (Release No. CR-076-19); Sam LaGrone, “VT Halter Marine to Build New Coast Guard Icebreaker,” USNI News, April 23, 2019; Maria Armental, “U.S. Orders First heavy Icebreaking Vessel in Decades, as Rivals Expand Arctic Presence,” Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2019; “Mississippi Shipyard Gets $746M Contract for Icebreaker,” Associated Press, April 23, 2019. 16 Rich Abott, “Polar Icebreaker Winner Meets Threshold Requirements, Has Incentives For Early Delivery,” Defense Daily, April 25, 2019. 14 15 Congressional Research Service 6 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program Figure 2. Rendering of VT Halter Design for PSC Figure 2. Rendering of VT Halter Design for PSC

Source: Illustration posted by Robert A. Socha, Senior Vice President, VT Halter Marine, accessed May 6, 2019, at https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6526621529113976832.

. A May 7, 2019, press release from VT Halter about its design for the PSC (which VT Halter updated on May 29 to provide a corrected figure for the design'’s full load displacement) stated the following:

VT Halter Marine is teamed with Technology Associates, Inc. [TAI] as the ship designer and, for over two years, has participated in the U.S. Coast Guard'’s Heavy Polar Icebreaker Industry Study. The ship design is an evolution from the mature "”Polar Stern II"” [German icebreaker] currently in design and construction; the team has worked rigorously to demonstrate its maturity and reliability. During the study, TAI incrementally adjusted the design and conducted a series of five ship model tank tests to optimize the design. The vessels are 460 feet in length with a beam of 88 feet overall, a full load displacement of approximately 22,900 long tons at delivery. The propulsion will be diesel electric at over 45,200 horse power and readily capable of breaking ice between six to eight feet thick. The vessel will accommodate 186 personnel comfortably for an extended endurance of 90 days.

In addition to TAI, VT Halter Marine has teamed with ABB/Trident Marine for its Azipod propulsion system,¹⁷17 Raytheon for command and control systems integration, Caterpillar for the main engines, Jamestown Metal Marine for joiner package, and Bronswerk for the HVAC system. The program is scheduled to bring an additional 900 skilled craftsman and staff to the Mississippi-based shipyard.¹⁸

18 The German icebreaker design referred to in VT Halter'’s press release, Polar Stern II (also spelled Polarstern II),¹⁹),19 is being built as the replacement for PolarsternPolarstern, Germany'’s current polar research and supply icebreaker. A May 9, 2019, press report stated that Polarstern II

was designed by Germany'Polarstern II 17 ABB is ASEA Brown Boveri, a multinational corporation headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland, that is, among other things, a leading maker of electric-drive propulsion systems for ships. (ASEA is an acronym for Allmänna Svenska Elektriska Aktiebolaget [i.e., General Swedish Electrical Limited Company], which merged with Brown, Boveri & Cie [BBC] in 1988 to create ABB.) Azipod is ABB’s term for its azimuthing (i.e., swiveling) podded propulsors. 18 VT Halter press release, “VT Halter Marine Awarded the USCG Polar Security Cutter,” May 7, 2019, updated May 29, accessed June 12, 2019, at http://vthm.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Press-Release_USCG-PSC_SingaporeExchange-FINAL_updatedMay29.pdf. The original (May 7) version of the press release stated that the design’s full load displacement at delivery would be approximately 33,000 tons. 19 Polarstern is the German word for Polar Star—coincidentally, the same name as the U.S. Coast Guard’s operational heavy polar icebreaker. Congressional Research Service 7 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program was designed by Germany’s Ship Design & Consult (SDC) 20s Ship Design & Consult (SDC)²⁰ and is being built by German shipbuilder HDW.²¹

21 VT Halter'’s teammates on the PSC include ship designer Technology Associates, Inc. (TAI), which has been involved in the design for over two years and has made "“a lot of modifications" modifications” in a number of areas to meet Coast Guard requirements, [Ronald Baczkowski, president and CEO of VT Halter Marine] said. The team went through six design spirals to refine the design and the major modifications include changes in the hull form to enhance the ship'’s icebreaking capabilities and keep the ice clear from the propulsors and sensors, habitability improvements for comfort particularly in open water, easier access to different areas of the ship, and maintenance and endurance capabilities….

Raytheon [RTN] is the integrator for C5I capabilities²² 22 on the ship and the main engines will be supplied by Caterpillar [CAT]. Switzerland-based ABB and Netherlands-based Trident are supplying the Azipod propulsion system, Florida-based Jamestown Metal Marine is supplying the joiner package, and Netherlands-based Bronswerk the heating, ventilation and cooling system.²³

23 Figure 3. Rendering of VT Halter Design for PSC

Source: VT Halter press release, "“VT Halter Marine Awarded the USCG Polar Security Cutter,"” May 7, 2019, accessed May 8, 2019, at http://www.vthm.com/public/files/20190507.pdf.

. Figure 4 shows a rendering of the SDC'’s concept design for Polarstern II.

. SDC states that its concept design for Polarstern II has a length of 133 meters (about 436.4 feet) long, a beam of 27 meters (about 88.6 feet), and a draft of 10.5 meters (about 34.4 feet), but does not provide the design'’s displacement.²⁴24 A briefing on a preliminary version of the ship'’s design 20 SDC Ship Design & Consult GmbH is based on Hamburg, Germany. Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) is a part of Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems GmbH, based in Kiel, Germany. (Source: Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems, accessed May 9, 2019, at https://www.thyssenkrupp-marinesystems.com/en/.) 22 C5I stands for command, control, communications, computers, collaboration, and intelligence. 23 Calvin Biesecker, “Long-Lead Funding In FY '20 For Second Polar Security Cutter Would Help With Planning, Shipbuilder Says,” Defense Daily, May 9, 2019. Abbreviations for firm names in brackets as in original. 24 SDC Ship Design & Consult GmbH, design SDC2187, 133m Research Vessel, accessed May 9, 2019, at 21 Congressional Research Service 8 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program stated that the design at that point was somewhat larger, with a length of 145 meters (about 476 feet), a beam of 27.3 meters (about 89.6 feet), a draft of about 11 meters (about 36.1 feet), and a displacement (including payload) of about 26,000 tons.²⁵25 These figures suggest that SDC's ’s somewhat smaller concept design for Polarstern II might have a displacement (including payload) of something less than 26,000 tons, and perhaps closer to 23,000 tons.

Figure 4. Rendering of SDC Concept Design for Polarstern II

Polarstern II Source: SDC Ship Design & Consult GmbH, design SDC2187, 133m Research Vessel, accessed May 9, 2019, at http://www.shipdesign.de/html/index.php?navi=3&navi2=80&navi3=115. The image is enlarged at http://www.shipdesign.de/html/detail.php?id=396.

. VT Halter'’s 22,900-ton design for the PSC is considerably larger than the Coast Guard'’s current polar icebreakers. As shown in tons Table A-1, the Coast Guard'’s largest polar icebreaker, Healy, Healy, is 420 feet long and has a full load displacement of 16,000 tons. VT Halter'’s 460-foot design for the PSC is 40 feet longer than HealyHealy, and its 22,900-ton displacement is about 43% greater than Healy's.

Healy’s. The horsepower generated by the propulsion plant in VT Halter'’s design ("“over 45,200"”) is roughly one-quarter less than the 60,000 shaft horsepower of the propulsion plant in the Coast Guard' http://www.shipdesign.de/html/index.php?navi=3&navi2=80&navi3=115. 25 Briefing entitled “Shipboard Polar Research, 32 Years Polarstern and the requirement for Polarstern II,” accessed May 8, 2019, at http://www.ervogroup.eu/np4/np4/%7B$clientServletPath%7D/?newsId=43&fileName=Pr_sentation_Markterkundung_09.09.14_fin.p df. The briefing is undated but includes a statement on one of its slides that refers in the past tense to an event that took place in January 2016. Congressional Research Service 9 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program Guard’s heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star. A shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, however, VT Halter' Halter’s design includes a centerline shafted propeller flanked by two azimuthing (i.e., swiveling) podded propulsors—an arrangement that, along with other modern icebreaker hull design features, is expected to give VT Halter'’s design a capability for breaking ice comparable to that of Polar Star. A May 8, 2019, press report states the following:

" “We picked the most modern icebreaker that was on the market, soon to be production-levelproductionlevel design that roughly met the Coast Guard'’s requirements, and we took it and modified it,"” Baczkowski said.

" “It has a contoured shape. The shape of the hull does the icebreaking. Instead of being a mass breaking ice, this actually slices the ice. The shape of the hull pushed the broken ice aside, so it doesn'’t interfere with your propulsion systems, with your instrumentation that's ’s on the other side of the ship."

” The design of the cutter is optimized for seakeeping to support the long voyage from its homeport in Washington state to as far away as the Antarctic, he said.

"It' “It’s an optimum design between icebreaking and seakeeping."

"” “With the propulsors, with one fixed and two steerable, we were able to optimize the seakeeping capability so when you'’re going on long transits from Washington to Antarctica the crew is not beat to a pulp or heavily fatigued because of the stability characteristics in open water."²⁶

Home Port

”26 Home Port On June 17, 2019, the Coast Guard announced that it intends to homeport its PSCs at Seattle, WA, where the Coast Guard'’s current polar icebreakers are homeported.²⁷

Issues for Congress

FY2020 Funding

27 Issues for Congress FY2020 Funding One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Coast Guard'’s FY2020 procurement funding request for the PSC program. In considering this issue, Congress may consider, among other things, whether the Coast Guard has accurately priced the work it is proposing to do each year in the program, and whether the procurement of the second and/or third PSCs should be deferred or accelerated.

As noted earlier, the $35 million in procurement funding that the Coast Guard has requested for the PSC program for FY2020 is enough to cover the program'’s FY2020 government program-managementprogrammanagement costs. As shown in Table C-2, the Coast Guard'’s FY2019 budget submission had projected that a total of $125 million in procurement funding would be requested for the PSC program in FY2020, suggesting that the Coast Guard had projected requesting, beyond the $35 million, another $90 million or so for other costs, such as procurement of long leadtime materials (LLTM) for the second PSC. An April 15, 2019, press report states the following:

The Coast Guard'’s fiscal year 2020 budget request of $35 million for its new heavy icebreaker is insufficient for the purchase of long-lead time materials to maintain the Sam LaGrone, “VT Halter Marine Details Coast Guard Icebreaker Bid,” USNI News, May 8, 2019. See, for example, Ben Werner, “Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter Will Be Homeported in Seattle,” USNI News, June 17, 2019; Navy Times Staff, “Coast Guard Picks Homeport for New Icebreaker Fleet,” Navy Times, June 17, 2019. 26 27 Congressional Research Service 10 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program program schedule, Rep. Lou Correa (D-Calif.) said April 9th in his opening remarks at a House Homeland Security Transportation and Maritime Security Subcommittee hearing with the heads of the Coast Guard and Transportation Security Administration. Correa, chairman of the subcommittee, was referring to the advance purchase of materials for the second Polar Security Cutter (PSC). The Coast Guard is expected to award a contract for the detailed design and construction of the first PSC within a month and already has the funding. House staffers say the Coast Guard has told them it needs $100 million for long-leadlonglead materials for the second PSC or the ship'’s schedule will be a risk.²⁸

28 Funding the procurement of LLTM for both the second and third PSCs in FY2020 might enable improved production economies of scale for that LLTM, which could reduce at the margin the procurement cost of the second and third PSCs.

Contract with Options vs. Block Buy Contract

Another potential issue for Congress is whether to use a contract with options or a block buy contract to acquire the ships. As noted earlier, the baseline plan for the PSC program calls for acquiring ships using a contract with options, but Coast Guard and Navy officials are open to the idea of instead using a block buy contract to acquire the ships, and have requested information on this possibility as part of the request for proposals (RFP) for the PSC program that was released on March 2, 2018. Section 311 of the Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 (S. 140/S. 140/P.L. 115-282 of December 4, 2018) provides permanent authority for the Coast Guard to use block buy contracting with economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases (i.e., up-front batch purchases) of components in its major acquisition programs. The authority is now codified at 14 U.S.C. 1137.

Although a contract with options covers multiple years, it operates more like a form of annual contracting, and it does not generate the kinds of savings that are possible with a block buy contract. Compared to a contract with options, a block buy contract would reduce the government' government’s flexibility regarding whether and when to acquire the second and third ships, and what design to build them to,²⁹29 and in return reduce the combined acquisition cost of the ships covered by the contract. The Navy has used block buy contracts to reduce procurement costs of Virginia-class attack submarines and (in more recent years) Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) and John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers.³⁰30 CRS estimates that compared to costs using a contract with options, using a block buy contract that included economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases (i.e., up-front batch purchases) of materials and components for three heavy polar icebreakers would reduce the combined acquisition cost of the three ships by upwards of 7%, which could equate to “Icebreaker Concerns,” Defense Daily, April 15, 2019. Stated more fully, from a congressional perspective, trade-offs in using block buy contracting include the following: -- reduced congressional control over year-to-year spending, and tying the hands of future Congresses; -- reduced flexibility for making changes in Coast Guard acquisition programs in response to unforeseen changes in strategic or budgetary circumstances (which can cause any needed funding reductions to fall more heavily on acquisition programs not covered by multiyear contracts); -- a potential need to shift funding from later fiscal years to earlier fiscal years to fund economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases (i.e., up-front batch purchases) of components; -- the risk of having to make penalty payments to shipbuilders if multiyear contracts need to be terminated due to unavailability of funds needed to the continue the contracts; and -- the risk that materials and components purchased for ships to be acquired in future years might go to waste if those ships are not eventually acquired. 30 See CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; and CRS Report R43546, Navy John Lewis (TAO-205) Class Oiler Shipbuilding Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 28 29 Congressional Research Service 11 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program reduce the combined acquisition cost of the three ships by upwards of 7%, which could equate to a savings of upwards of $150 million. a savings of upwards of $150 million.

A congressionally mandated July 2017 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) report on acquisition and operation of polar icebreakers states the following (emphasis as in original):

3. Recommendation: USCG should follow an acquisition strategy that includes block buy contracting with a fixed price incentive fee contract and take other measures to ensure best value for investment of public funds.

Icebreaker design and construction costs can be clearly defined, and a fixed price incentive fee construction contract is the most reliable mechanism for controlling costs for a program of this complexity. This technique is widely used by the U.S. Navy. To help ensure best long-term value, the criteria for evaluating shipyard proposals should incorporate explicitly defined lifecycle cost metrics....

A block buy authority for this program will need to contain specific language for economic order quantity purchases for materials, advanced design, and construction activities. A block buy contracting program with economic order quantity purchases enables series construction, motivates competitive bidding, and allows for volume purchase and for the timely acquisition of material with long lead times. It would enable continuous production, give the program the maximum benefit from the learning curve, and thus reduce labor hours on subsequent vessels....

If advantage is taken of learning and quantity discounts available through the recommended block buy contracting acquisition strategy, the average cost per heavy icebreaker is approximately $791 million, on the basis of the acquisition of four ships.³¹

31 Funding Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers through Navy's Shipbuilding Account

’s Shipbuilding Account Another potential issue for Congress is whether to continue providing at least some of the procurement funding for the PSC program through the Navy'’s shipbuilding account, known formally as the Shipbuilding and Conversion Navy (SCN) appropriation account. A May 2018 GAO report states that agreements between DHS, the Coast Guard, and the Navy that were made following the establishment of the Coast Guard-Navy integrated program office for the PSC program "“state that the program'’s contracting actions could be funded by either USCG or Navy appropriations, and the source of the appropriations will award the contract."³²”32 As noted earlier, of the $300 million of the procurement funding that has provided for the PSC program was provided through the SCN account—$150 million in FY2017, and another $150 million in FY2018.

Although providing funding for Coast Guard ships through the SCN account creates some complexity in tracking and executing funding for Coast Guard ship acquisition, and can raise a question as to whether that funding would otherwise go toward the acquisition of Navy ships, it has been used in the past for funding Coast Guard ships other than heavy polar icebreakers:

• Healy 31 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Division on Earth and Life Studies and Transportation Research Board, Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: Fulfilling the Nation’s Needs, Letter Report, with cover letter dated July 11, 2017, pp. 14, 15. 32 Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security Acquisitions[:] Leveraging Programs’ Results Could Further DHS’s Progress to Improve Portfolio Management, GAO-18-339SP, May 2018, p. 86. Congressional Research Service 12 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program   Healy was funded largely (about 89%) through the SCN account.33 was funded largely (about 89%) through the SCN account.³³
• Thirty-three of the Coast Guard'’s 49 Island-class 110-foot patrol boats (i.e., about 67% of the boats) were procured under a Navy contract. The contract was for the construction of 21 of the boats, and included FY1990 SCN funds and prior year DOD nonexpiring funding. During the construction phase of the contract, the Navy exercised options under the contract for the construction 12 additional boats using FY1990 SCN funding.³⁴

34 Subsections (a), (b), and (c) of Section 122 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act ( (H.R. 2810//P.L. 115-91 of December 12, 2017) state the following:

SEC. 122. Icebreaker vessel.

(a) Authority to procure one polar-class heavy icebreaker.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be procured for the Coast Guard one polar-classpolarclass heavy icebreaker vessel.

(2) CONDITION FOR OUT-YEAR CONTRACT PAYMENTS.—A contract entered into under paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the contract for a fiscal year after fiscal year 2018 is subject to the availability of appropriations or funds for that purpose for such later fiscal year.

(b) Limitation on availability of funds for procurement of icebreaker vessels.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for the Department of Defense for any fiscal year that are unobligated as of the date of the enactment of this Act may be obligated or expended for the procurement of an icebreaker vessel other than the one polar-class heavy icebreaker vessel authorized to be procured under subsection (a)(1).

(c) Contracting authority.—

(1) COAST GUARD.—If funds are appropriated to the department in which the Coast Guard is operating to carry out subsection (a)(1), the head of contracting activity for the Coast Guard shall be responsible for contracting actions carried out using such funds.

(2) NAVY.—If funds are appropriated to the Department of Defense to carry out subsection (a)(1), the head of contracting activity for the Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command shall be responsible for contracting actions carried out using such funds.

(3) INTERAGENCY ACQUISITION.—Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the head of contracting activity for the Coast Guard or head of contracting activity for the Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command (as the case may be) may authorize interagency acquisitions The somewhat complicated funding history for the ship is as follows: The Coast Guard’s proposed FY1990 budget requested $244 million for the acquisition of an icebreaker. The FY1990 DOD appropriations act (H.R. 3072/P.L. 101165 of November 21, 1989) provided $329 million for the ship in the SCN account. (See pages 77 and 78 of H.Rept. 101-345 of November 13, 1989.) This figure was then reduced by $4.2 million by a sequester carried out under the Balanced Budget And Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (H.J.Res. 372/P.L. 99-177 of December 12, 1985). Another $50 million was rescinded by the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Assistance, Food Stamps, Unemployment Compensation Administration, and Other Urgent Needs, and Transfers, and Reducing Funds Budgeted for Military Spending Act of 1990 (H.R. 4404/P.L. 101-302 of May 25, 1990). An additional $59 million for the ship was then appropriated in the FY1992 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2521/P.L. 102-172 of November 26, 1991). Also, an additional $40.4 million in procurement funding for the ship was provided through a series of annual appropriations in the Coast Guard’s Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements (AC&I) account (as it was known prior to FY2019) from FY1988 through FY2001. The resulting net funding for the ship was thus $374.2 million, of which $333.8 million, or 89.2%, was DOD funding, and $40.4 million, or 10.8%, was Coast Guard procurement funding. (Source: Undated Coast Guard information paper provided to CRS by Coast Guard legislative liaison office, March 3, 2016.) 34 Source: Navy information paper dated August 15, 2017, provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on August 23, 2017. 33 Congressional Research Service 13 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program (3) INTERAGENCY ACQUISITION.—Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the head of contracting activity for the Coast Guard or head of contracting activity for the Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command (as the case may be) may authorize interagency acquisitions that are within the authority of such head of contracting activity. 35 that are within the authority of such head of contracting activity.³⁵

Regarding Section 122, the conference report (H.Rept. 115-404 of November 9, 2017) on H.R. 2810/H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91 states the following:

Icebreaker vessel (sec. 122)

The House bill contained provisions (sec. 122, 123, and 1012) that would authorize the Secretary of the Navy to act as a general agent for the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating and enter into a contract for icebreaker vessels; prohibit funds for the Department of Defense from being used for the procurement of an icebreaker vessel; and amend section 2218 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize funds associated with the National Defense Sealift Fund for the construction of icebreaker vessels.

The Senate amendment contained a similar provision (sec. 1048).

The Senate recedes with an amendment that would authorize one polar-class heavy icebreaker vessel, prohibit funds for the Department of Defense from being used for the procurement of an icebreaker vessel other than this one polar-class heavy icebreaker vessel, clarify contracting authorities, and require a Comptroller General report.

The conferees recognize the national importance of recapitalizing the U.S. icebreaker fleet and the extraordinary circumstances that necessitated use of Department of Defense funding to procure the first polar-class heavy icebreaker, as partially provided in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2017. Accordingly, the conferees support the authorization of this icebreaker in this Act.

The conferees note the Undersecretary of Management in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) serves as the Acquisition Decision Authority for the Polar Icebreaker Program and that this program is governed in accordance with DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102–01 and Instruction 102–01–001.

The conferees believe maintaining clear lines of authority, responsibility, accountability, and resources with the Secretary and Acquisition Decision Authority of the department in which the U.S. Coast Guard is operating are essential to delivering icebreakers on cost and schedule.

Accordingly, the conferees believe the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the Undersecretary of Management in the DHS should be the officials provided with authorities and resources related to the Polar Icebreaker Program.

Therefore, the conferees expect subsequent icebreakers to be authorized by the congressional committees with jurisdiction over the Coast Guard and funded using Coast Guard appropriations. (Pages 765-766)

Technical, Schedule, and Cost Risk for PSC Program

Another potential issue for Congress concerns technical, schedule, and cost risk in the PSC program. A September 2018 GAO report on the PSC program states that the Coast Guard

did not have a sound business case in March 2018, when it established the cost, schedule, and performance baselines for its heavy polar icebreaker acquisition program, because of risks in four key areas:

Design. 35 Section 122 also includes a subsection (d) that requires a GAO report assessing the cost of, and schedule for, the procurement of new icebreakers. Congressional Research Service 14 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program Design. The Coast Guard set program baselines before conducting a preliminary design review, which puts the program at risk of having an unstable design, thereby increasing the program' program’s cost and schedule risks. While setting baselines without a preliminary design review is consistent with DHS'’s current acquisition policy, it is inconsistent with acquisition best practices. Based on GAO'’s prior recommendation, DHS is currently evaluating its policy to better align technical reviews and acquisition decisions.

Technology. The Coast Guard intends to use proven technologies for the program, but did not conduct a technology readiness assessment to determine the maturity of key technologies prior to setting baselines. Coast Guard officials indicated such an assessment was not necessary because the technologies the program plans to employ have been proven on other icebreaker ships. However, according to best practices, such technologies can still pose risks when applied to a different program or operational environment, as in this case. Without such an assessment, the program'’s technical risk is underrepresented.

Cost. The lifecycle cost estimate that informed the program'’s $9.8 billion cost baseline substantially met GAO'’s best practices for being comprehensive, well-documented, and accurate, but only partially met best practices for being credible. The cost estimate did not quantify the range of possible costs over the entire life of the program. As a result, the cost estimate was not fully reliable and may underestimate the total funding needed for the program.

Schedule. The Coast Guard'’s planned delivery dates were not informed by a realistic assessment of shipbuilding activities, but rather driven by the potential gap in icebreaking capabilities once the Coast Guard'’s only operating heavy polar icebreaker—the Polar Star—reaches the end of its service life....

GAO' GAO’s analysis of selected lead ships for other shipbuilding programs found the icebreaker program' program’s estimated construction time of 3 years is optimistic. As a result, the Coast Guard is at risk of not delivering the icebreakers when promised and the potential gap in icebreaking capabilities could widen.³⁶

36 Common Design for Heavy and Medium Polar Icebreakers

Another potential issue for Congress is whether to procure heavy and medium polar icebreakers to a common basic design. As noted earlier, the DHS polar icebreaker mission need statement (MNS) states that "“current requirements and future projections ... indicate the Coast Guard will need to expand its icebreaking capacity, potentially requiring a fleet of up to six icebreakers (3 heavy and 3 medium) to adequately meet mission demands in the high latitudes...."” Consistent with this statement, the Coast Guard envisages procuring up to three new medium icebreakers after it procures three new heavy polar icebreakers. The question is whether to develop a separate design for the medium polar icebreakers, or instead build the medium polar icebreakers to the same basic design as the heavy polar icebreakers.

A congressionally mandated July 2017 report from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) on the acquisition and operation of polar icebreakers concluded that notional operational requirements for new medium polar icebreakers would result in ships that would not be too different in size from new heavy polar icebreakers. (As shown in Table A-1, the Coast Guard'’s current medium polar icebreaker, HealyHealy, is actually somewhat larger than the Coast Guard'’s heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star.) Given what it concluded as the probable similarity in size between future U.S. heavy and medium polar icebreakers, the NASEM report recommended building a single medium polar icebreaker to the same common design as 36 Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard Acquisitions[:] Polar Icebreaker Program Needs to Address Risks before Committing Resources, GAO-18-600, summary page. Congressional Research Service 15 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program three new heavy polar icebreakers. This approach, the report concluded, would reduce the cost of the medium icebreaker by avoiding the cost of developing a new design and by making the medium polar icebreaker the fourth ship on an existing production learning curve rather than the first ship on a new production learning curve. The NASEM report stated the following (emphasis as in original):

2. Recommendation: The United States Congress should fund the construction of four polar icebreakers of common design that would be owned and operated by the United States Coast Guard (USCG).

The current Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Mission Need Statement... contemplates a combination of medium and heavy icebreakers. The committee's ’s recommendation is for a single class of polar icebreaker with heavy icebreaking capability. Proceeding with a single class means that only one design will be needed, which will provide cost savings. The committee has found that the fourth heavy icebreaker could be built for a lower cost than the lead ship of a medium icebreaker class....

The DHS Mission Need Statement contemplated a total fleet of "potentially"“potentially” up to six ships of two classes—three heavy and three medium icebreakers. Details appear in the High Latitude Mission Analysis Report. The Mission Need Statement indicated that to fulfill its statutory missions, USCG required three heavy and three medium icebreakers; each vessel would have a single crew and would homeport in Seattle. The committee'’s analysis indicated that four heavy icebreakers will meet the statutory mission needs gap identified by DHS for the lowest cost....

4. Finding: In developing its independent concept designs and cost estimates, the committee determined that the costs estimated by USCG for the heavy icebreaker are reasonable. However, the committee believes that the costs of medium icebreakers identified in the High Latitude Mission Analysis Report are significantly underestimated underestimated.... ....

Although USCG has not yet developed the operational requirements document for a medium polar icebreaker, the committee was able to apply the known principal characteristics of the USCG Cutter Healy to estimate the scope of work and cost of a similar medium icebreaker. The committee estimates that a first-of-class medium icebreaker will cost approximately $786 million. The fourth ship of the heavy icebreaker series is estimated to cost $692 million. Designing a medium-class polar icebreaker in a second shipyard would incur the estimated engineering, design, and planning costs of $126 million and would forgo learning from the first three ships; the learning curve would be restarted with the first medium design. Costs of building the fourth heavy icebreaker would be less than the costs of designing and building a first-of-class medium icebreaker....

6. Recommendation: USCG should ensure that the common polar icebreaker design is science-ready and that one of the ships has full science capability.

All four proposed ships would be designed as "“science-ready,"” which will be more cost-effectivecosteffective when one of the four ships—most likely the fourth—is made fully science capable. Including science readiness in the common polar icebreaker design is the most cost-effective way of fulfilling both the USCG'’s polar missions and the nation'’s scientific research polar icebreaker needs.... The incremental costs of a science-ready design for each of the four ships ($10 million to $20 million per ship) and of full science capability for one of the ships at the initial build (an additional $20 million to $30 million) are less than the independent design and build cost of a dedicated research medium icebreaker.... In briefings at its first meeting, the committee learned that the National Science Foundation and other agencies do not have budgets to support full-time heavy icebreaker access or the incremental cost of design, even though their science programs may require this capability. Given the small incremental cost, the committee believes that the science capability cited above should be included in the acquisition costs.

Congressional Research Service 16 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program Science-ready design includes critical elements that cannot be retrofitted cost-effectively into an existing ship and that should be incorporated in the initial design and build. Among these elements are structural supports, appropriate interior and exterior spaces, flexible accommodation spaces that can embark up to 50 science personnel, a hull design that accommodates multiple transducers and minimizes bubble sweep while optimizing icebreaking capability, machinery arrangements and noise dampening to mitigate interference with sonar transducers, and weight and stability latitudes to allow installation of scientific equipment. Such a design will enable any of the ships to be retrofitted for full science capability in the future, if necessary....

Within the time frame of the recommended build sequence, the United States will require a science-capable polar icebreaker to replace the science capabilities of the HealyHealy upon her retirement. To fulfill this need, one of the heavy polar icebreakers would be procured at the initial build with fullfull science capability; the ability to fulfill other USCG missions would be retained. The ship would be outfitted with oceanographic overboarding equipment and instrumentation and facilities comparable with those of modern oceanographic research vessels. Some basic scientific capability, such as hydrographic mapping sonar, should be acquired at the time of the build of each ship so that environmental data that are essential in fulfilling USCG polar missions can be collected.³⁷

37 If policymakers decide to procure a second new medium polar icebreaker or a third new medium polar icebreaker, the same general approach recommended by the NASEM report could be followed—a second medium polar icebreaker and third medium polar icebreaker could be built to the same common design used for the three new heavy polar icebreakers and the first new medium polar icebreaker.

An April 12, 2018, press report states the following:

As the Coast Guard prepares to review industry bids for a new heavy polar icebreaker, the service is keeping its options open for the right number and mix of polar icebreakers it will need in the future, Adm. Paul Zukunft, the [then-]commandant of the Coast Guard, said on Wednesday [April 11].

The Coast Guard'’s program of record is for three heavy and three medium polar icebreakers but Zukunft said the "“jury is still out"” whether that will remain so. Right now, the service is aiming toward building three new heavy icebreakers, but it might make sense just to keep building these ships, he told reporters at a Defense Writers Group breakfast in Washington, D.C.

Zukunft said that "“when you start looking at the business case after you build three, and then you need to look at what is the economy of scale when you start building heavy icebreakers, and would it be less expensive to continue to build heavies and not mediums." ” He added that the heavy icebreakers provide more capability, and if the price is "affordable" “affordable” and in "“the same range"” as building medium icebreakers, then "“maybe you end up with one class of heavy icebreakers."

” Building only one class of ships has a number of advantages in terms of maintenance, crew familiarity, configuration management, and more, he said. A decision on what the future icebreaker fleet will consist of is "“still probably several years out .... but that'’s one option that we want to keep open going forward,"” Zukunft said.³⁸

38 37 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Division on Earth and Life Studies and Transportation Research Board, Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: Fulfilling the Nation’s Needs, Letter Report, with cover letter dated July 11, 2017, pp. 2, 4-6. 38 Calvin Biesecker, “Coast Guard Leaving Options Open For Future Polar Icebreaker Fleet Type,” Defense Daily, April 12, 2018. Ellipse as in original. Congressional Research Service 17 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program Short-Term Bridge to One or More New Polar Icebreakers Short-Term Bridge to One or More New Polar Icebreakers

Overview: Two Basic Options

As mentioned earlier, a new heavy polar icebreaker that begins construction in FY2019 might enter service in 2023, while Polar Star was refurbished and reentered service in December 2012 for an intended period of 7 to 10 years—a period that will end between December 2019 and December 2022.³⁹39 Consequently, another potential issue for Congress concerns how to bridge a potential gap in time between the end of Polar Star's ’s current intended service life and the entry into service of one or more new heavy polar icebreakers.

As testified by CRS on July 21, 2016,⁴⁰40 there are at least two options for bridging this time period: One would be to further extend the service life of Polar Star. The other would be to charter (i.e., lease) one or more other icebreakers (perhaps foreign-owned ones), if such ships are available for charter and have capabilities for performing missions performed by U.S. heavy polar icebreakers. The United States has used both of these approaches in the past to mitigate polar icebreaking capacity gaps.⁴¹

41 Coast Guard Plan is to Further Extend Life of Polar Star

The Coast Guard plans to pursue the first of the two options outlined above—further extend the service life of Polar Star—and has requested funding in its FY2019 budget for service life extension work on Polar Star. A September 25, 2017, GAO report on polar icebreakers states the following:

While the Coast Guard considered various options to bridge this potential heavy icebreaker gap, in a January 2017 study the Coast Guard reported that it was planning for a limited service life extension of the Polar Star to keep it operational until fiscal year 2025, at an initial cost estimate of $75 million. However, the Coast Guard has not completed a formal cost estimate for this effort and we have previously reported that the $75 million estimate may be unrealistic....

The Coast Guard'’s Capital Investment Plan for fiscal years 2018-2022 includes $60 million of a planned $75 million for polar icebreaker sustainment, which officials reported as being the rough estimate for the Polar Star'’s limited service life extension. Coast Guard officials stated that the $75 million rough estimate is based on the cost of the Polar Star's prior 7-10 year service life extension which was completed in fiscal year 2013. However, in July 2017 we reported that the Coast Guard has not completed a cost estimate for this effort, and that the $75 million estimate may be unrealistic based on the assumptions the Coast Guard used, such as continuing to use parts from the Polar Sea as has been done in previous The September 25, 2017, GAO report on polar icebreakers states the following: “According to Coast Guard planning documents, the Polar Star’s useful service life will end between fiscal years 2020 and 2023.” (Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard: Status of Polar Icebreaking Fleet Capability and Recapitalization Plan, GAO-17698R, September 25, 2017, p. 6. 40 See CRS Testimony TE10012, Coast Guard Arctic Implementation Capabilities, by Ronald O'Rourke. 41 Regarding the first option, the Coast Guard, in addition to the work done to extend the service life of Polar Star by an additional 7 to 10 years, also mitigated a polar icebreaking capacity gap in the 1970s by putting two of its older Wind-class icebreakers through a vessel rehabilitation and modernization (VRAM) program. (See National Research Council, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs, Washington, 2007, p. 55. See also Donald L. Canney, “Icebreakers and the U.S. Coast Guard,” accessed June 28, 2016, at http://www.uscg.mil/history/ webcutters/Icebreakers.asp.) Regarding the second option, since 2005, the National Science Foundation (NSF) has occasionally chartered foreign polar icebreakers—specifically, the Russian icebreakers Krasin and Vladimir Ignatyuk, and the Swedish icebreaker Oden—to help perform icebreaking missions in polar waters. (Regarding the charters of Krasin and Oden, see National Research Council, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs, Washington, 2007, pp. 6, 14, 63, 80, 97, 111, and U.S. Coast Guard Research & Development Center and ABS Consulting, Polar Icebreaker Options, Paths Forward to Accomplish U.S. Coast Guard Missions and Contribute to Mission Critical National Science Needs, May 17, 2011, pp. 9, 14.) 39 Congressional Research Service 18 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program stated that the $75 million rough estimate is based on the cost of the Polar Star’s prior 710 year service life extension which was completed in fiscal year 2013. However, in July 2017 we reported that the Coast Guard has not completed a cost estimate for this effort, and that the $75 million estimate may be unrealistic based on the assumptions the Coast Guard used, such as continuing to use parts from the Polar Sea as has been done in previous maintenance events.42 maintenance events.⁴²

A July 2018 GAO report states the following:

The Coast Guard is planning a SLEP on the Polar Star to keep it operational until the first and second new heavy polar icebreakers are delivered (planned for 2023 and 2025, according to current acquisition plans) in order to bridge a potential operational gap. This approach would allow the Coast Guard to operate a minimum of two heavy icebreakers once the first polar icebreaker is delivered. The approach would also provide the Coast Guard with a self-rescue capability—the ability for one icebreaker to rescue the other if it became incapacitated while performing icebreaking operations.

The Coast Guard'’s plan to conduct the Polar Star SLEP during its existing annual depot-leveldepotlevel maintenance periods may not be feasible given the amount of maintenance already required on the cutter. The Polar Star'’s mission capable rating has been decreasing in recent years and reached a low point of 29 percent—well below the target of 41 percent—from October 2016 to September 2017. Based on mission capable data, we found this is mostly due to additional time spent in depot-level maintenance, which has increased in recent years from about 6 months in 2015 to more than 8 months in 2017.

Additionally, the Polar Star has required extensions of about 3 months for its annual dry dock periods—the period of time when a cutter is removed from the water so that maintenance can be conducted—in 2016 and 2017 to complete required maintenance activities. These dry docks were originally planned to last between 2-1/2 months and 4 months. These extensions also compressed the amount of time that the crew had to prepare for its annual mission to Antarctica, which, according to members of the Polar Star crew, placed a large stress on the crew, risked the quality of work, and reduced or eliminated the crews' crews’ planned rest and personal preparation for their roughly 4-month deployment. Based on our analysis, these delays and extensions are likely to continue as the cutter ages. According to Coast Guard officials, the Polar Star'’s SLEP work will be conducted during the annual dry dock periods by adding an additional 1 or 2 months to the annual dry docks. However, if the work is unable to be completed during this time frame, it could force the Coast Guard to miss its commitment to conduct the annual Antarctica mission. Coast Guard maintenance officials stated that until the Polar Star completes the SLEP, its repairs will likely continue to get more expensive and time consuming. We will continue to monitor the Polar Star'’s SLEP through our annual review of DHS programs.

As we found in July 2017, the Polar Star SLEP effort has a rough order cost estimate of $75 million, which is based on the reactivation work completed in 2013.41 However, this estimate may be unrealistic based on assumptions the Coast Guard used, such as that it would continue to use parts from the Coast Guard'’s other heavy polar icebreaker, the Polar Sea, which has been inactive since 2010.42 The Coast Guard'’s recent assessment of the Polar Star'’s material condition—the physical condition of the cutter, which includes the hull structure, habitability, major equipment systems, and spare parts availability—was completed in January 2018.43 The material assessment stated that many of the available parts from the Polar Sea have already been removed and installed on the Polar Star. As a result of the finite parts available from the Polar Sea, the Coast Guard may have to acquire new parts for the Polar Star that could increase the $75 million SLEP estimate. The Polar Star' Star’s recent material assessment will form the basis to determine which systems will be 42 Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard: Status of Polar Icebreaking Fleet Capability and Recapitalization Plan, GAO-17-698R, September 25, 2017, pp. 3, 8. Congressional Research Service 19 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program overhauled during the SLEP and for a more detailed cost estimate. The Coast Guard expects the program to reach the obtain phase of the acquisition life cycle by December 2019, at which time the Polar Star could reach the end of its current useful service life (currently projected to be between 2020 to 2023). This timeline contains risk that the Polar Star could be rendered inoperable before the cutter is able to undergo a SLEP.⁴³

43 Another Option: Chartering an Icebreaker

Overview The feasibility of the second of the two options outlined above—charter (i.e., lease) one or more other icebreakers—would depend on whether an icebreaker was available for charter at the time of the year when the United States would need it to perform desired missions in the Arctic or Antarctic. Foreign polar icebreakers are used by their own countries for icebreaking operations, and may not always be available for charter when the United States might want to use them. If an icebreaker were available for charter, the potential cost effectiveness of this option would then depend on the cost of the charter, the ability of the ship to perform U.S. polar icebreaker missions, and how these costs and capabilities compare to the option of extending the service life of Polar Star.

Polar Star. The Coast Guard stated in July 2016 that

NSF leased the icebreaker KRASIN from Russia from 2005-2006, ODEN from the Swedish government from 2007-2010, and VLADIMIR IGNATYUK from Russia in 2012 to support the McMurdo resupply mission. All leases were time charters, and crews were supplied with the leases. As a contingency measure, NSF obtained assurances of assistance from other vessels in the area, such as the Chinese flagged [icebreaking] vessel XUE LONG, in the event they encountered difficulty. They also hired icebreaker captains with previous McMurdo experience to supplement the crew. NSF acquired these leases through a RFP process, and had no assurances that icebreakers would be available to perform the mission, or what price would be quoted.

This process came with risks, as there was no way to gauge icebreaker availability until NSF received responses to their RFP. Additionally, a foreign-flagged commercial or state vessel can become unavailable for a variety of environmental and political reasons. For example, the Swedish government abruptly terminated their contract during the spring/summer of 2011, and NSF was left without a platform to conduct its mission. NSF requested support from CGC [Coast Guard cutter] HEALY, but it was employed in the Arctic. NSF ultimately leased the Russian icebreaker VLADIMIR IGNATYUK. After that incident, NSF decided to utilize CGC POLAR STAR to support the McMurdo mission, which it has been doing since 2013.⁴⁴

44 Aiviq Being Offered for Lease

One ship that is being offered for lease to the Coast Guard as an interim polar icebreaker is Aiviq (Aiviq (Figure 5), an Arctic oil-exploration support ship owned by Edison Chouest Offshore (ECO). The 361-foot-long ship was ordered in 2009, completed in 2012, and chartered by Royal Dutch Shell to support that company'’s effort (now ended) to explore for oil in Arctic waters.⁴⁵

Figure 5. Aiviq

Source: "Arctic Supply Vessel Aiviq,"45 43 Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard Acquisitions[:] Actions Needed to Address Longstanding Portfolio Management Challenges, GAO-18-454, July 2018, pp. 29-31. 44 Source: Email from Guard Office of Congressional Affairs to CRS, July 8, 2016. 45 See for example, “More Sparks Fly in Canada Shipbuilding Controversy,” Marine Log, March 18, 2016; Pierre Leblanc, “An Out-of-the-Blue Icebreaker Opportunity,” Maritime Executive, January 2, 2018. Congressional Research Service 20 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program Figure 5. Aiviq Source: “Arctic Supply Vessel Aiviq,” accessed September 14, 2017, at http://www.mascoat.com/arctic-supply-vesselsupplyvessel-aiviq1.html. Following Shell’-aiviq1.html.

Following Shell's decision to end that effort, alternative uses for AiviqAiviq have been sought. The ship has been modified to serve as a polar icebreaker, and it is being offered to the Coast Guard for lease as an interim polar icebreaker. It reportedly has also been offered for use as an icebreaker to the Canadian government.

The possibility of leasing AiviqAiviq as an interim polar icebreaker has been discussed at certain recent hearings about the Coast Guard. For example, at a July 25, 2017, hearing on Coast Guard capabilities before the Coast Guard and Maritime transportation subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, the following exchange occurred:

REPRESENTATIVE DON YOUNG (continuing):

Have you looked at, Admiral, I know this has been an ongoing battle with me and the Coast Guard over the years, the other possibility of getting an ice breaker into the arena quicker than having one constructed like leasing from another outfit? You know, I've been talking about this a long time. Have you analyzed this again?

I know the last time we had a study, it was 1980. That's a long time ago. So is there a way we can put metal on the water, especially for the new shipping through and the—and the cruise ships, because that Healy is old, and—is—have you looked at that at all?

ADMIRAL PAUL ZUKUNFT, [THEN-]COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD:

We have. In fact, one potential vendor, we'’ve had multiple interactions. They have a platform that has yet to complete ice trials. We—we would not want to lease something they can't demonstrate its ability to actually operate in the ice that—that Healy sees. Healy was actually beset in ice for 36 hours last year, so it's not ice free up there, and that's a medium ice breaker. This particular platform doesn'’t have the capability of Healy.

Congressional Research Service 21 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program But we would at least want to make sure that ice trials were completed. That we could actually be a good steward of taxpayer dollars, so at least a platform that would meet our requirements. So we'’ve had multiple interactions, the last one was probably in May, and the issue of ice trials is still on the table right now.⁴⁶

46 Later in the same hearing, the following exchange occurred:

REPRESENATIVE DUNCAN HUNTER, CHAIRMAN:

Going back to Mr. Young's question. too, about leasing. You said you—you'’re—you're ’re waiting for—I'’m—I'’m guessing money for ice trials. That's what you said.

ZUKUNFT: No real dollars have been negotiated in any of this. So...

HUNTER: But in—in real terms, you'’re only paying for gas? I mean what—what does it cost to do ice trials. It'’s gas, right? You're not going to hire more Coast Guardsmen to come in and— and do it. I mean so that'’s a figure—your—your overhead'’s fixed. So what is the cost to— to go do ice trials with the (inaudible)?

ZUKUNFT: That would really be for the...

HUNTER: The ice—once again the only...

ZUKUNFT: ... vendor to decide.

HUNTER: ... existing U.S. made ice breaker in America.

ZUKUNFT: Yeah. So this—this is a ship that is built with direct drive diesel. Ice breakers are typically diesel electric, which means the generators push the shaft, and they absorb that shock load every time you collide with ice.

A reduction gear, fixed gear is going to that—that gear box is going to absorb all that shock. So if you're going to do ice trials, there's a likelihood you might have to replace a reduction gear. There might be real hidden costs of doing ice trials. So if I'm a vendor, I might want to protect myself from some of that risk.

Now I'm not the vendor but those would be some of my thoughts of, OK, if you're really serious about this and I do ice trials and now I've just caused X number of dollars that I am now going to have to fit. And oh, by the way, you're not going to lease it because it didn't meet your requirements. I think those are some of the issues that we still have to negotiate.⁴⁷

47 At a June 14, 2016, hearing on Coast Guard mission needs and resource allocation before the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, the following exchange occurred:

REPRESENTATIVE HUNTER (Chairman):

46 47 Source: Transcript of hearing. Source: Transcript of hearing. Congressional Research Service 22 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program How do you plan on—on filling the capability gap until you get a heavy icebreaker, which is 10 years at the least based on the best projections of Congress and everybody working together? You still haven't answered that one.

ADMIRAL MICHEL:

Well, right—the alternatives now, since we'll provide the answer to that, and it's probably going to be either a rolling recapitalization of the Polar Star or to try to bring—let Polar StarPolar Star taper off and then try to bring Polar Sea back on and bridge out to the new icebreaker.

I do not know which one at this point, which path we would want to take. I'm not aware of any other—we've looked out there for vessels to lease for heavy icebreaking capabilities. There's nothing out there on planet earth that you can lease in the heavy icebreaking area. So that's kind of where we are, sir.

HUNTER: Was it the—the Finns that came into my office?

(UNKNOWN) Mm-hmm. HUNTER: Can't remember whether we had the Norwegians or the Finns. I mean, they—have you— you've obviously looked at that, right?

MICHEL: Yes. As a matter of fact I—I traveled to Sweden and Finland...

HUNTER: Yeah. MICHEL: ... and talked to them. And they do not have heavy icebreaking capability that will meet the needs as in the FedBizOpps. As a matter of fact, in—when I'm talking FedBizOpps [I mean] there's a technical package that the Coast Guard put out for our [new] heavy icebreaker [i.e., the one that the Obama Administration wanted to begin building in 2020].

It kind of lays out our basic requirements including the long pole in the tent which is the icebreaking requirement, which is six foot minimum at three knots, desirable eight-foot minimum at three knots and then 21 feet backing and ramming.

When I talked to the shipbuilders over there, they said there is not a vessel like that that currently exists that will meet those requirements in the—in the FedBizOpps technical package. So you'd have to build a vessel like that. And that's the type of vessel that we're looking for.⁴⁸

48 Legislative Activity for FY2020

Summary of Appropriation Action on FY2020 Funding Request

The Coast Guard'’s proposed FY2020 budget requests $35 million in Coast Guard procurement funding for the PSC program. Table 2 summarizes congressional appropriation action on the program' program’s FY2019 funding request.

FY2020 DHS Appropriations Act (H.R. 3931)

House

/S. 2582) House The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 116-180 of July 24, 2019) on H.R. 3931H.R. 3931, recommended the funding levels shown in the HAC column of Table 2. . H.Rept. 116-180 states the following:

Ice Breaking Vessels.—The Committee recognizes that Polar icebreakers are essential to securing the nation'’s security and economic interests in the polar regions. The Committee was pleased that the Coast Guard recently awarded a contract for the first Polar Security Cutter (PSC) with funding appropriated in fiscal year 2019 and looks forward to updates on the execution of the contract to inform the planning for the next phase of the program. The recommendation includes $135,000,000 for this program, $100,000,000 above the request, for long lead time materials for a second PSC.

The Committee notes that $10,000,000 has been appropriated in prior fiscal years for survey and design of a Great Lakes Icebreaker. The Committee encourages the Coast Guard to explore whether the acquisition of medium icebreakers that are at least as capable as USCGC MACKINAW could fulfill mission requirements in both the polar regions and the Great Lakes. (Page 43)

The committee'’s draft report also states the following (emphasis added):

Asset Acquisition Report.— The Commandant is directed to provide to the Committee, not later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, a report that examines the number and type of Coast Guard assets required to meet the Service'’s current and foreseeable needs in accordance with its statutory missions. The report shall include, but not be limited to, an assessment of the required number and types of cutters and aircraft for current and planned asset acquisitions. The report shall also specifically address regional mission requirements in the Western Hemisphere, including the Polar regions; support provided to Combatant Commanders; and trends in illicit activity and illegal migration. (Page 41)

Congressional Research Service 24 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program Senate The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 116-125 of September 26, 2019) on S. 2582, recommended the funding levels shown in the SAC column of Table 2. S.Rept. 116-125 states: Polar Ice Breaking Vessel.—The Committee recognizes the value of heavy polar icebreakers in promoting the national security and economic interests of the United States in the Arctic and Antarctic regions and recommends the requested amount of $35,000,000 to maintain the acquisition schedule for a new class of heavy polar icebreakers, followed by the acquisition of three medium polar icebreakers. The funds are provided for long lead materials in the design and construction phase for the second Polar Security Cutter [PSC]. The recommendation will allow the Coast Guard to maintain the accelerated acquisition schedule for a new class of heavy polar icebreakers that was established in fiscal year 2019. Polar Star.—The recommendation includes $15,000,000 to carry out a service life extension program [SLEP] for the POLAR STAR to extend its service life as the Coast Guard continues to modernize its icebreaking fleet. (Pages 71-72) S.Rept. 116-125 also states: Full-Funding Policy.—The Committee again directs an exception to the administration’s current acquisition policy that requires the Coast Guard to attain the total acquisition cost for a vessel, including long lead time materials [LLTM], production costs, and postproduction costs, before a production contract can be awarded. This policy has the potential to make shipbuilding less efficient, to force delayed obligation of production funds, and to require post-production funds far in advance of when they will be used. The Department should position itself to acquire vessels in the most efficient manner within the guidelines of strict governance measures. The Committee expects the administration to adopt a similar policy for the acquisition of the Offshore Patrol Cutter [OPC] and heavy polar icebreaker. (Page 70) S.Rept. 116-125 also states: Domestic Content.—To the maximum extent practicable, the Coast Guard is directed to utilize components that are manufactured in the United States when contracting for new vessels. Such components include: auxiliary equipment, such as pumps for shipboard services; propulsion equipment, including engines, reduction gears, and propellers; shipboard cranes; and spreaders for shipboard cranes. (Page 70) S.Rept. 116-125 also states: Great Lakes Icebreaking Capacity.—The Committee is concerned that the Coast Guard cannot provide adequate icebreaking capacity on the Great Lakes, consequently affecting the regional and national economies and the safety of maritime commerce. To enhance icebreaking capacity on the Great Lakes, the Committee provides $5,000,000 for the Coast Guard to formally charter and establish a major acquisition program office within 180 days of the date of enactment of this act. Such office shall be tasked with implementing an acquisition plan to procure a Great Lakes icebreaker that is at least as capable as USCGC MACKINAW (WLBB–30). Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this act, the Coast Guard shall submit to the Committee the acquisition plan, schedule, and funding requirements for procurement of such Great Lakes icebreaker. (Page 70) Congressional Research Service 25 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2019 (H.R. 3409//S. 2297) House S. 2297)

House

Section 411 of H.R. 3409 as reported (amended) on July 23, 2019, by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (H.Rept. 116-172; text of report not posted on Congress.gov as of July 25, 2019) states the following:

SEC. 411. Polar security cutter acquisition report.

Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall submit a report to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure and Armed Services of the House of Representatives, and the Committees on Commerce, Science and Transportation and Armed Services of the Senate on—

(1) the extent to which specifications, key drawings, and detail design for the Polar Security Cutter are complete before the start of construction;

(2) the extent to which Polar Security Cutter hulls numbers one, two, and three are science ready; and

(3) what actions will be taken to ensure that Polar Security Cutter hull number four is science capable, as described in the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine' Medicine’s Committee on Polar Icebreaker Cost Assessment letter report entitled " “Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: Fulfilling the Nation'’s Needs"” and dated July 11, 2017.

Section 412 of H.R. 3409 as reported (amended) states the following:

SEC. 412. Sense of the Congress on the need for a new Great Lakes icebreaker.

(a) Findings.—The Congress finds the following:

(1) The Great Lakes shipping industry is crucial to the American economy, including the U.S. manufacturing base, providing important economic and national security benefits.

(2) A recent study found that the Great Lakes shipping industry supports 237,000 jobs and tens of billions of dollars in economic activity.

(3) United States Coast Guard icebreaking capacity is crucial to full utilization of the Great Lakes shipping system, as during the winter icebreaking season up to 15 percent of annual cargo loads are delivered and many industries would have to reduce their production if Coast Guard icebreaking services were not provided.

(4) Six of the Coast Guard'’s nine icebreaking cutters in the Great Lakes are more than 30 years old and are frequently inoperable during the winter icebreaking season, including those that have completed a recent service life extension program.

(5) During the previous 10 winters, Coast Guard Great Lakes icebreaking cutters have been inoperable for an average of 65 cutter-days during the winter icebreaking season, with this annual lost capability exceeding 100 cutter-days, with a high of 246 cutter-days during the winter of 2017–2018.

(6) The 2019 ice season provides further proof that current Coast Guard icebreaking capacity is inadequate for the needs of the Great Lakes shipping industry, as only six of the nine icebreaking cutters are operational and millions of tons of cargo was not loaded or was delayed due to inadequate Coast Guard icebreaking assets during a historically average winter for Great Lakes ice coverage.

(7) The Congress has authorized the Coast Guard to acquire a new Great Lakes icebreaker as capable as Coast Guard Cutter MACKINAW (WLBB–30), the most capable Great Congressional Research Service 26 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program Lakes icebreaker, and $10 million has been appropriated to fund the design and initial acquisition work for this icebreaker.

(8) The Coast Guard has not initiated a new acquisition program for this Great Lakes icebreaker.

(b) Sense of the Congress.—It is the sense of the Congress of the United States that a new Coast Guard icebreaker as capable as Coast Guard Cutter MACKINAW (WLBB–30) is needed on the Great Lakes and the Coast Guard should acquire this icebreaker as soon as possible.

Senate

Senate On July 31, 2019, the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee ordered S. 2297 to be reported with an amendment favorably. In S. 2297 as introduced on July 25, 2019, Section 105Section 105 states the following:

SEC. 105. Procurement authority for polar security cutters.

(a) In general.—For fiscal year 2020 and each fiscal year thereafter, the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating shall enter into one or more contracts for the procurement of not fewer than three heavy polar security cutters and three medium polar security cutters and the associated equipment for such polar security cutters.

(b) Funding.—Of the amounts made available for fiscal years 2020 and 2021 by this Act, not less than $745,000,000 shall be available for each heavy polar security cutter authorized to be procured in such fiscal years.

(c) Prohibition on contracts or use of funds for development of common hull design.— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating may not enter into any contract for, and no funds shall be obligated or expended on, the development of a common hull design for medium polar security cutters and Great Lakes icebreakers.

Section 403 Section 403 of S. 2297 as introduced states the following (emphasis added):

SEC. 403. Unmanned maritime systems.

(a) Assessment.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commandant shall regularly assess available unmanned maritime systems for potential use to support missions of the Coast Guard.

(2) CONSULTATION.—The Commandant shall make the assessment required under paragraph (1) after consultation with the Department of Defense, other Federal agencies, the academic sector, and developers and manufacturers of unmanned maritime systems.

(b) Report.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and biennially thereafter, the Commandant shall submit to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives a report on the actual and potential effects of the use of available unmanned maritime systems on the mission effectiveness of the Coast Guard.

(2) CONTENTS.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) An inventory of available unmanned maritime systems used by the Coast Guard, an overview of such usage, and a discussion of the mission effectiveness of such systems, including any benefits realized or risks or negative aspects of such usage.

Congressional Research Service 27 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program (B) A prioritized list of Coast Guard mission requirements that could be met with additional unmanned maritime systems, and the estimated costs of acquiring and operating such systems. This list should take into consideration interoperability with the current and future fleet of National Security Cutters, Fast Response Cutters, Offshore Patrol Cutters, Polar Polar Security Cutters, and in-service legacy cutters such as the 270-foot, 210-foot, and 225-foot225foot Buoy Tenders.

(c) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) UNMANNED MARITIME SYSTEM.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The term "“unmanned maritime system"” means a remotely operated or autonomous vehicle that—

(i) is produced by the commercial sector;

(ii) is designed to travel in the air, on or under the ocean surface, on land, or any combination thereof; and

(iii) functions without an on-board human presence.

(B) INCLUSIONS.—The term "“unmanned maritime system"” includes—

(i) associated components, such as control and communications, data transmission, and processing systems;

(ii) an unmanned undersea vehicle;

(iii) an unmanned surface vehicle;

(iv) an unmanned aerial vehicle;

(v) an autonomous underwater vehicle;

(vi) an autonomous surface vehicle; and

(vii) an autonomous aerial vehicle.

(2) AVAILABLE UNMANNED MARITIME SYSTEMS.—The term "available “available unmanned maritime systems"” includes unmanned maritime systems that can be purchased commercially or are available to the Coast Guard in coordination with the Department of Defense or other Federal agency.

Appendix A. Congressional Research Service 28 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program Appendix A. Current U.S. Polar Icebreakers and Polar Research Ships

This appendix provides background information on current U.S. polar icebreakers and polar research ships.

Three Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers

Two Heavy Polar Icebreakers—Polar Star and Polar Sea

Polar Star (WAGB-10) and Polar Sea (WAGB-11),⁴⁹49 sister ships built to the same general design ( (Figure A-1 and Figure A-2), were acquired in the early 1970s as replacements for earlier U.S. icebreakers. They were designed for 30-year service lives, and were built by Lockheed Shipbuilding of Seattle, WA, a division of Lockheed that also built ships for the U.S. Navy, but which exited the shipbuilding business in the late 1980s.