This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with red strikethrough and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.
This CRS report provides an overview of the role Congress has played in shaping U.S. policy
toward the conflict in Yemen, with summary tables providing information on various legislative
proposals considered in the 114th, 115th, and 116th114th, 115th, and 116th Congresses. These proposals have reflected a
range of congressional perspectives and priorities, including
The 116thThe 116th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia'
Arabia’s conduct of the war in Yemen, where fighting has continued since March 2015. The war
has exacerbated a humanitarian crisis in Yemen that began in 2011; presently, the World Food
Program reports that 20 million Yemenis face hunger in the absence of sustained food assistance.
The difficulty of accessing certain areas of Yemen has made it hard for governments and aid
agencies to count the war'’s casualties. Data collected by the U.S. and European-funded Armed
Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) suggest that 60,000 Yemenis have been killed since January 2016.
estimates that targeted airstrikes reportedly
killed 8,120 Yemeni civilians from March 2015 to March 2020, out of 12,690 civilians reported
killed overall, and among more than 100,000 Yemenis that have died in the conflict.
The Trump Administration has opposed various congressional proposals, including initiatives to
reject or condition proposed U.S. arms sales or to require an end to U.S. military support to Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen. Many in Congress have condemned the October 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel, and the incident appears to have exacerbated existing congressional concerns about Saudi leaders and the pace, scope, and direction of change in the kingdom's policies.
Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen.
This report does not include Yemen-related Iran sanctions legislation, which is covered in CRS
Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions. For additional information on the war in Yemen and Saudi
Arabia, please see the following CRS products:
CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention.
.
CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations.
.
CRS Insight IN10729, Yemen: Cholera Outbreak.
In March 2015, Saudi Arabia established a coalition of nations (hereinafter referred to as the Saudi-led coalition or the coalition) to engage in military operations in Yemen against the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous president of Yemen, the late Ali Abdullah Saleh.1 During 2014, the United States joined Saudi Arabia in demanding that Houthi forces reverse their unilateral military campaign to occupy the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, but the rapid .
Congressional Research Service
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Congress, the Obama Administration, and Yemen (2015-2016) ..................................................... 2
2015 ........................................................................................................................................... 2
2016 ........................................................................................................................................... 4
Analysis ..................................................................................................................................... 6
Congress, the Trump Administration, and Yemen (2017-2020) ...................................................... 7
2017 ........................................................................................................................................... 7
2018 ......................................................................................................................................... 10
2019 ......................................................................................................................................... 14
2020 (through June 15) ........................................................................................................... 18
Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 20
Tables
Table 1. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 116th Congress............................................ 22
Table 2. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 115th Congress............................................ 34
Table 3. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 114th Congress............................................ 51
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 54
Congressional Research Service
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
Overview
In March 2015, Saudi Arabia established a coalition of nations (hereinafter referred to as the
Saudi-led coalition or the coalition) to engage in military operations in Yemen against the Ansar
Allah/Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous president of Yemen, the late Ali Abdullah
Saleh.1 During 2014, the United States joined Saudi Arabia in demanding that Houthi forces
reverse their unilateral military campaign to occupy the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, but the rapid
onset of hostilities in March 2015 forced the Obama Administration to react quickly.2 At the start
onset of hostilities in March 2015 forced the Obama Administration to react quickly.2 At the start of the Saudi-led intervention on March 25, 2015, the Administration announced that the United
States would provide "“logistical and intelligence support"” to the coalition'’s operations without
taking "“direct military action in Yemen in support of this effort."3”3 Soon thereafter, a joint U.S.-Saudi planning cell was established to coordinate military and intelligence support for the
campaign. At the United Nations Security Council, the United States supported the passage of
Resolution 2216 (April 2015), which, among other things, required member states to impose an
arms embargo against the Houthi-Saleh forces and demanded that the Houthis withdraw from all
areas seized during the current conflict.
Since the March 2015 Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen, Congress has taken an active
On June 9, 2020, President Trump reported to Congress “consistent with” the War Powers
Resolution that,4
A small number of United States military personnel are deployed to Yemen to conduct
operations against al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS. The United States
military continues to work closely with the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and
regional partner forces to degrade the terrorist threat posed by those groups.
United States Armed Forces, in a non-combat role, have also continued to provide military
advice and limited information, logistics, and other support to regional forces combatting
the Houthis in Yemen. Such support does not involve United States Armed Forces in
hostilities with the Houthis for the purposes of the War Powers Resolution.
United States Armed Forces are deployed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to protect United
States forces and interests in the region against hostile action by Iran or supporting groups.
These forces, operating in coordination with the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, provide air and missile defense capabilities and support the operation of United
States fighter aircraft. The total number of United States forces in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia is approximately 3,600.
Since the March 2015 Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen, Congress has taken an active
role in debating and overseeing U.S. policy in the Arabian Peninsula.5role in debating and overseeing U.S. policy in the Arabian Peninsula.4 Members have considered legislative proposals seeking to reduce Yemeni civilian casualties resulting from the coalition's operations; improve deteriorating humanitarian conditions; end restrictions on the flow of goods and humanitarian aid; combat Iranian support for the Houthis; preserve maritime security in the Bab al Mandab Strait; and/or support continued Saudi-led coalition and U.S. efforts to counter Al Qaeda and Islamic State forces in Yemen.
Beyond Yemen, many Members have referred to the conflict as an element of a broader regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and discussed the conflict's implications for the U.S. effort to limit Iran's malign regional influence. Others lawmakers have described the Yemen conflict as indicative of what they perceive as problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship, a concern that deepened after the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel in October 2018. Congress has considered and passed proposals to reject certain U.S. defense sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and to direct an end to U.S. military involvement in military operations related to the anti-Houthi campaign, but has not voted
1
In early December 2017, the Houthi-Saleh alliance unraveled, culminating in the killing of former President Saleh on
December 4, 2017.
2 According to one account, “The Obama administration agreed to support what the Saudis called Operation Decisive
Storm with considerable reluctance, seeing it as an unwinnable proxy war against Iran.” See, “How the War in Yemen
Became a Bloody Stalemate and the Worst Humanitarian Crisis in the World,” New York Times Magazine, October 31,
2018.
3 Statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on the Situation in Yemen, The White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, March 25, 2015.
4 Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of
the Senate, June 9, 2020.
5 Over the last decade, Congress has periodically addressed Yemen-related issues in annual authorization and
appropriations legislation. Before the 2015 Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, Members were mostly focused on
providing security assistance to Yemeni government forces to counter terrorist groups like Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Congressional Research Service
1
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
legislative proposals seeking to reduce Yemeni civilian casualties resulting from the coalition’s
operations; improve deteriorating humanitarian conditions; end restrictions on the flow of goods
and humanitarian aid; combat Iranian support for the Houthis; preserve maritime security in the
Bab al Mandab Strait; improve U.S. efforts to counter Al Qaeda and Islamic State forces in
Yemen; and/or support, condition, or end U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition.
Beyond Yemen, many Members have referred to the conflict as an element of a broader regional
rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and discussed the conflict’s implications for the U.S.
effort to limit Iran’s malign regional influence. Others lawmakers have described the Yemen
conflict as indicative of what they perceive as problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship, a concern
that deepened after the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government
personnel in October 2018. Congress has considered and passed proposals to reject certain U.S.
defense sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and to direct an end to U.S.
military involvement in military operations related to the anti-Houthi campaign, but has not voted
to override presidential vetoes of related legislation.
to override presidential vetoes of related legislation.
Responding to the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen also appears to be reinvigorating some Members'
Members’ interest in strengthening the role of Congress in foreign policy vis-à-vis the executive
branch. Debate in Congress over Yemen has featured bipartisan statements of interest in asserting
the prerogatives of the legislative branch to limit executive branch power, specifically using war
powers legislation and the appropriations and authorization processes to curb U.S. military
involvement in support of coalition operations.
Congressional scrutiny of U.S. policy in Yemen has also led to legislative actual and proposed legislative
changes to global authorities, such as the Department of Defense'’s authority to enter into and use
acquisition and cross servicing agreements with partner militaries.56 The Trump Administration's ’s
invocation of emergency requirements to proceed with proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia and
the UAE, including sales of air-to-ground munitions scrutinized in the context of the Yemen war,
has similarly led some in Congress to propose changes to underlying authorities arms sales authorities
granted to the executive branch.6
2015
Congressional interest in the Yemen conflict has evolved and grown gradually and was not
widespread at the outset of the coalition'’s March 2015 intervention in Yemen.78 In early to mid-2015, congressional interest in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East centered on the Iran nuclear midPeninsula (AQAP); addressing Yemeni detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; overseeing the issuance of visas for
Yemeni nationals traveling to the United States; countering human trafficking in Yemen; and prohibiting U.S.
assistance from being provided to Yemeni security forces which use child soldiers.
6 Section 1271 of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232) modifies 10 USC 2342 to
prohibit the use of such agreements to transfer support or services to third parties and to require annual reporting.
7 Section 1270 of the House-passed version of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 2500, would have
altered the authority granted to the President to determine that an emergency exists which requires waiving
congressional review requirements under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776). Conferees did not include this
provision in the final enacted version of the bill, S. 1790/P.L. 116-92.
8 Though Yemen was not the key focus of congressional interest in the Middle East at the time, congressional
committees did hold oversight hearings. For example, see “Yemen under Attack by Iranian-backed Houthis,”
Congressional Research Service
2
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
2015, congressional interest in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East centered on the Iran nuclear
deal and Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.9
deal and Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.8
Several months after the March 2015 intervention, the Saudi-led coalition had not achieved a
conclusive victory and what modest gains had been made on the ground were offset by mounting
international criticism of growing civilian casualties from coalition air strikes. In Congress,
several lawmakers began to express concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in
Yemen.
”12
By the fall of 2015, as the Obama Administration tried to balance its concern for adhering to the
laws of armed conflict with its support for Gulf partners,1213 lawmakers began to express concern
over U.S. involvement in the coalition'’s intervention by scrutinizing U.S. arms sales to Saudi
Arabia.1314 When the Administration informally notified Congress of a proposed sale of precision
guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia, some Senators sought to delay its formal notification.
After the formal notification in November 2015,1415 Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC)
leaders jointly requested that the Administration notify Congress 30 days prior to associated
shipments, marking the first use of this prior-notification request authority.1516 No related joint resolutions of disapproval on proposed sales of PGMs to the kingdom were introduced, but the
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives,
April 14, 2015; “The U.S. Role and Strategy in the Middle East: Yemen and the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation
Council,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 6, 2015; and “Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen,” Tom Lantos
Human Rights Commission, November 17, 2016.
9 Congress did address Yemen during consideration of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 114-92).
H.R. 1735, the House version of that bill, included Section 1273, a “Sense of Congress on Evacuation of United States
Citizens and Nationals from Yemen.” That provision was excluded from the final version of the Act, which did contain
a provision that prohibited Defense Department funds from being provided to “an entity in Yemen that is controlled by
members of the Houthi movement.”
10 “Saudis Face Mounting Pressure over Civilian Deaths in Yemen Conflict,” New York Times, September 29, 2015.
11 Letter from Representative Debbie Dingell et al to President Barack Obama, October 14, 2015. Available from CRS.
12 “Senate Democrats hold up Arms Sales for Saudi war in Yemen,” Al Monitor, October 7, 2015.
13 “As Saudis bombed Yemen, U.S. worried about Legal Blowback,” Reuters, October 10, 2016.
14 See, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Call by Ben Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor
for Strategic Communications, and Jeff Prescott, Senior Director for the Middle East, NSC, on the Upcoming Visit of
King Salman of Saudi Arabia, September 2, 2015.
15 Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittal No. 15-57, November 16, 2015.
16 The request marked the first time that Congress has invoked an authority it added to the Arms Export Control Act in
December 2014 through an amendment included in the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-276). Section 201
of the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-276) added Section 36(i) to the AECA. Potentially applicable to
any foreign military sale requiring notification pursuant to Section 36(b) of the AECA, the 36(i) mechanism requires
both the chair and ranking member of either of the two committees of jurisdiction (SFRC/HFAC) to jointly request that
the President provide such a “pre-shipment notification” 30 days prior to a shipment. The pre-shipment notification
Congressional Research Service
3
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
resolutions of disapproval on proposed sales of PGMs to the kingdom were introduced, but the
delay and the request for additional notification arguably demonstrated congressional concern.17
2016
delay and the request for additional notification arguably demonstrated congressional concern.16
By the one-year anniversary of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, a more defined opposition17 opposition18
to U.S. support for the coalition had begun to coalesce amid repeated international documentation
of human rights abuses18abuses19 and errant coalition air strikes.1920 In April 2016, legislation was
introduced that sought to place conditions on future proposed sale notifications, previously
approved sales, or transfers of PGMs to Saudi Arabia (Table 3).20).21 Proposed amendments to
FY2017 defense legislation21legislation22 would have added some similar conditions on the use of funds to
implement sales of PGMs or prohibited the transfer of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia.2223 The
PGM amendment was not considered, but the cluster munitions amendment was narrowly
defeated in a June 2016 House floor vote.23
24
In the spring and summer of 2016, the United Nations held multiple rounds of peace talks in
Kuwait aimed at brokering an end to the conflict. From April 2016 to August 2016, the Saudi-led
coalition had largely spared Yemen'’s capital Sanaa from aerial strikes as part of its commitment to the cessation of hostilities. When U.N.-mediated peace talks collapsed in August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition resumed bombing and the war intensified.
During the summer of 2016, the Obama Administration reduced some of the U.S. support for Saudi Arabia's air campaign in Yemen by withdrawing U.S. personnel assigned to a joint U.S.-
would inform Congress that a shipment was about to occur, but would not require or preclude Congress from taking
further action to modify or block the shipment.
17 Although Congress has more than one legislative option it can use to block or modify an arms sale, one option
explicitly set out in law for blocking a proposed arms sale is the use of a joint resolution of disapproval as provided for
in Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). See, CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional
Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
18 In January 2016, Senator Chris Murphy called on the Administration to “suspend supporting Saudi Arabia’s military
campaign in Yemen, at the very least, until we get assurances that this campaign does not distract from the fight against
ISIS and Al Qaeda, and until we make some progress on the Saudi export of Wahhabism. And Congress should not
sign off on any more military sales to Saudi Arabia until similar assures are granted.” See, “Chris Murphy on the Roots
of Radical Extremism,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 29, 2016.
19 In April 2016, the “Saudi Arabia-led coalition” was listed alongside other parties to the conflict in Yemen in the
annex of the annual report of United Nations Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict for attacks that
resulted in the killing and maiming attacks of children in Yemen. In July 2016, then-U.N. Secretary General Ban Kimoon alleged that Saudi Arabia had threatened to reduce its funding for U.N. programs if the coalition was not
removed from the report annex, an allegation that Saudi leaders denied. In August 2016, the Secretary General said,
“After very careful consideration, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition was removed from the annexes, pending the
conclusions of a review. ...I have since received information on measures taken by the coalition to prevent and end
grave violations against children. We will continue our engagement to ensure that concrete measures to protect children
are implemented. But I want to repeat: the content of the report stands.” See, U.N. Blacklists Saudi-led Coalition for
Killing Children in Yemen, Reuters, October 5, 2017.
20 For example, see, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen
O’Brien Statement to the Security Council on Yemen, New York, February 16, 2016, and Press briefing note on
Yemen and Honduras, Spokesperson for the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights: Rupert Colville, Geneva,
Switzerland, March 4, 2016.
In the 114th Congress, see, S.J.Res. 32—A joint resolution to provide limitations on the transfer
of certain United States munitions from the United States to Saudi Arabia and H.J.Res. 90, To
provide limitations on the transfer of certain United States munitions from the United States to
Saudi Arabia.
21
22
In the 114th Congress, see, S. 2943—National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 which became P.L.
114-328.
23 In the 114th Congress, see H.R. 5293—Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2017.
24 See, H.R. 5293, Recorded Vote, June 16, 2016, available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2016/roll327.xml.
Congressional Research Service
4
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
to the cessation of hostilities. When U.N.-mediated peace talks collapsed in August 2016, the
Saudi-led coalition resumed bombing and the war intensified.
During the summer of 2016, the Obama Administration reduced some of the U.S. support for
Saudi Arabia’s air campaign in Yemen by withdrawing U.S. personnel assigned to a joint U.S.Saudi planning cell.25Saudi planning cell.24 Nevertheless, overall U.S.-Saudi cooperation continued and, in August
2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale of M1A2S tanks to Saudi
Arabia. In response, some lawmakers wrote to request that President Obama withdraw the
proposal, citing concerns about Yemen.2526 In September 2016, joint resolutions of disapproval of
the proposed tank sale were introduced in the Senate (S.J.Res. 39) and House (H.J.Res. 98). On
September 21, 2016, the Senate voted to table a motion to discharge the SFRC from further
consideration of S.J.Res. 39 (71-27, Record Vote 145).2627 During debate over the motion, many
Senators argued in favor of continued U.S. support for Saudi Arabia, with Senator Lindsey
Graham remarking "“To those who want to vote today to suspend this aid to Saudi Arabia, people
in Iran will cheer you on."27
”28
In the wake of an October 2016 Saudi air strike on a funeral hall in Sanaa that killed 140 people,
the Obama Administration initiated a review of U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia.2829 Based
on that review, it put a hold on a planned sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi
Arabia and limited intelligence sharing, but maintained counterterrorism cooperation and
refueling for coalition aircraft.29
30
In the final months of the Obama Administration, U.S. Armed Forces briefly exchanged fire with
forces party to the conflict. In October 2016, Houthi-Saleh forces launched anti-ship missiles at
U.S. Navy vessels on patrol off the coast of Yemen. The attacks against the U.S. ships marked the
first time U.S. Armed Forces had come under direct fire in the war. The Obama Administration
responded to the attacks against U.S. naval vessels by directing the Armed Forces to fire cruise
missiles against Houthi-Saleh radar installations. The Obama Administration described the U.S.
strikes as self-defense and indicated that it did not want to deepen its direct involvement in the
conflict.3031 In August and November 2016, then-Secretary of State John Kerry made several
attempts to broker a peace initiative in Oman, but the parties rejected his efforts.
Leahy Law and Saudi-led Coalition Strikes in Yemen
Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, prohibits the furnishing of assistance |
”32
Analysis
By the end of the 114th114th Congress, the war in Yemen was becoming a more significant foreign
policy issue for lawmakers. While a growing number of Members were becoming critical of the
U.S. role in supporting the Saudi-led coalition amid a deteriorating humanitarian situation in
Yemen, more lawmakers still seemed to view the conflict through a regional lens rather than as a
localized affair.3233 Amid significant congressional opposition to the 2015 nuclear agreement with
Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA), some Members described Iran'’s support
for the Houthi movement and the broader conflict in Yemen as an example of Iran'’s malign
regional activities not directly addressed by the JCPOA. When Houthis targeted Gulf state
infrastructure on land and vessels at sea, U.S. officials and nongovernment observers cited their
behavior as evidence of Iran'’s growing capabilities to threaten U.S. and Gulf security.33
34
While some Members described the Yemen conflict primarily a proxy war between the Iran-backedIranbacked Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, others portrayed it as a test of long-standing U.S.
commitments to supporting Saudi Arabian security.3435 Supporters of the relationship, while
acknowledging that Saudi Arabia'’s conduct of the war was at times problematic, argued that to
curtail U.S. arms sales or other defense support to the kingdom would weaken a vital partner that
was under threat from a hostile nonstate actor on its southern border.35
36
Others lawmakers charged that continued U.S. support for the coalition was not improving
coalition behavior but was damaging the U.S. reputation for upholding commitments to
international law and human rights.36 The 114th37 The 114th Congress did not enact legislation to limit U.S.
arms sales to Saudi Arabia, but these years marked the beginning of the broader congressional
debate that has continued.37
38
As the Trump Administration prepared to assume office, human rights organizations and aid
groups were pressing Congress to give more attention to the growing humanitarian crisis in
Yemen. Though the Obama Administration had taken some steps, particularly in late 2016, to
limit U.S.-coalition cooperation and restrict deliveries of PGMs to Saudi Arabia,
nongovernmental groups deemed this insufficient. According to Human Rights Watch, "Whatever “Whatever
conditionality the Obama administration thought it had created—in holding up the transfer of
precision munitions near the tail end of Obama'’s term and suspending cluster munition transfers earlier—ultimately did not have meaningful impact in reining in the continued Saudi-led coalition attacks on civilians."38
From the beginning of his Administration, President Donald Trump signaled strong support for the Saudi-led coalition's operations in Yemen as a bulwark against Iranian regional interference. He initiated a review of U.S. policy toward Yemen, including President Obama's October 2016
“U.S. Support for Saudi Strikes in Yemen Raises War Crime Concerns,” Foreign Policy.com, October 15, 2016.
“Senate tacitly endorses US role in Yemen War,” Al Monitor, September 21, 2016.
34 Congressional Record, November 15, 2016, Pages H6202-H6208.
35 Congressional Record, September 21, 2016, Pages S5921-S5935.
36 See colloquy between Senators Bob Corker and John McCain on Senate floor, September 21, 2016. Congressional
Record, 114th Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 162, No. 143.
37 See remarks by Senator Christopher Murphy and Senator Rand Paul on Senate floor, September 21, 2016.
Congressional Record, 114th Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 162, No. 143.
38 As one analyst described this trend in 2016, “We haven’t seen this much anti-Saudi activity on the Hill in a quarter of
a century.... Criticism of Saudi Arabia has come out of the closet, and I don’t think it’s going to go back in.” “Saudi
Arabia is Facing Unprecedented Scrutiny from Congress,” Washington Post, September 21, 2016.
32
33
Congressional Research Service
6
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
earlier—ultimately did not have meaningful impact in reining in the continued Saudi-led coalition
attacks on civilians.”39
Congress, the Trump Administration, and Yemen
(2017-2020)
2017
From the beginning of his Administration, President Donald Trump signaled strong support for
the Saudi-led coalition’s operations in Yemen as a bulwark against Iranian regional interference.
He initiated a review of U.S. policy toward Yemen, including President Obama’s October 2016
restrictions on U.S. arms sales and intelligence sharing to the coalition.40restrictions on U.S. arms sales and intelligence sharing to the coalition.39 On March 19, 2017, just
before his visit to Saudi Arabia, President Trump notified Congress that he was proceeding with
three proposed direct commercial sales of precision guided munitions technology deferred by the
Obama Administration, subject to congressional review.40
41
In May 2017, the Administration officially notified Congress of its intention to proceed with sales
of precision-guided munitions technologies that the Obama Administration had deferred, while
announcing plans to increase training for Saudi Arabia'’s air force on both targeting and the Law
of Armed Conflict.4142 Congress debated another resolution of disapproval (S.J.Res. 42) of these
proposed PGM sales in June 2017 (see below). After completing the policy review in July 2017,
President Trump directed his Administration "“to focus on ending the war and avoiding a regional
conflict, mitigating the humanitarian crisis, and defending Saudi Arabia'’s territorial integrity and
commerce in the Red Sea."42
”43
As President Trump entered office, the dynamics of the conflict in Yemen were changing, and the
coalition launched a new offensive along Yemen’s 280-mile western coastal plain ultimately
aimed at taking the strategic Houthi-held port city of Hudaydah (Yemen’s highest capacity port).
In early 2017, some Members of Congress responded to the coalition’s gradual advance toward
Hudaydah, coupled with an ongoing deterioration in humanitarian conditions, by imploring the
Administration to improve aid access and negotiate a cease-fire. In March 2017, several House
Members wrote a letter to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson urging him to “use all U.S.
diplomatic tools to help open the Yemeni port of Hodeida [Hudaydah] to international
humanitarian aid organizations.”44 A month later, another group of House Members wrote to
“Obama Officials’ Incomplete Reckoning with Failure on Yemen,” Just Security, November 19, 2018.
“Trump Administration Looks to Resume Saudi Arms Sale Criticized as Endangering Civilians in Yemen,”
Washington Post, March 8, 2017; and, “Trump Administration Weighs Deeper Involvement in Yemen War,”
Washington Post, March 26, 2017.
41 DDTC Transmittals No. DDTC 15-132 (JDAM), No. DDTC 16-011 (FMU-152A/B bomb fuzes), No. DDTC 16-043
(Paveway II & III, Enhanced Paveway II & III, Paveway IV), May 19, 2017.
42 A November 2017 report suggests that Saudi Arabia has agreed to purchase $7 billion in precision munitions from
U.S. companies in agreements that would span a decade. See, “Saudi Arabia Agrees to buy $7 billion in Precision
Munitions from U.S. firms: Sources,” Reuters, November 22, 2017. To date, no new precision-guided munitions
foreign military sales have been formally notified to Congress since the May 2017 notification of three direct
commercial sales of precision guided munitions technology that had been deferred by the Obama Administration.
43 Letter from Department of Defense Acting General Counsel William Castle to Senators Mitch McConnell and Chuck
Schumer, February 27, 2018.
44 “Reps Lieu & Conyers lead 52 Member Letter urging Tillerson to use Diplomacy to reopen Yemen Port,” March 13,
39
40
Congressional Research Service
7
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
President Trump stating that Congress should approve any new U.S. support to the coalition amid
its offensive against Hudaydah.45
U.S. Counterterrorism Policy in Yemen 2015-2019
During both the Obama and Trump Administrations, the United States has sustained counterterrorism operations
At the start of the Trump presidency, the United States markedly increased the tempo of strikes.
In 2018, U.S. officials claimed that one of the most high-value targets in the AQAP organization, bombmaker |
As President Trump entered office, the dynamics of the conflict in Yemen were changing, and the coalition launched a new offensive along Yemen's 280-mile western coastal plain ultimately aimed at taking the strategic Houthi-held port city of Hudaydah (Yemen's highest capacity port). In early 2017, some Members of Congress responded to the coalition's gradual advance toward Hudaydah, coupled with an ongoing deterioration in humanitarian conditions, by imploring the Administration to improve aid access and negotiate a cease-fire. In March 2017, several House Members wrote a letter to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson urging him to "use all U.S. diplomatic tools to help open the Yemeni port of Hodeida [Hudaydah] to international humanitarian aid organizations."45 A month later, another group of House Members wrote to President Trump stating that Congress should approve any new U.S. support to the coalition amid its offensive against Hudaydah.46
Cole
bombing.
On June 13, 2017, the Senate debated another resolution (S.J.Res. 42) to disapprove of three
direct commercial sales of PGMs to Saudi Arabia. During Senate floor consideration over the
motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of
S.J.Res. 42, Members once again weighed various issues, such as the U.S.-Saudi bilateral
relationship, countering Iran, and limiting U.S. involvement in the war in Yemen. Some
lawmakers suggested that U.S. arms sales and military support to the coalition had enabled
alleged violations of international humanitarian law, while others argued that continuing U.S.
support to the coalition improves its effectiveness and helps minimize civilian casualties.
For example, during floor debate, Senator Graham argued that "“If we are worried about collateral
damage in Yemen, I understand the concern. Precision weapons would help that cause, not hurt
it.”48it."47 Senator Murphy responded, saying "“What we are asking for is to hold off on selling these
precision-guided munitions until we get some clear promise—some clear assurance—from the
Saudis that they are going to use these munitions only for military purposes and that they are
going to start taking steps—real steps, tangible steps—to address the humanitarian crisis."48 On ”49 On
June 13, 2017, the Senate voted to reject the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 42 (47-53, Record Vote 143), and a companion
resolution was not taken up in the House (H.J.Res. 102).
).
2017.
45 U.S. Representative Mark Pocan, “Bipartisan Effort: 55 U.S. Representatives Call on Trump to Come to Congress
Before Taking Military Action in Yemen,” April 11, 2017.
46 “2017: A Record Year for US Counterterrorism Strikes,” Long War Journal, Foundation for the Defense of
Democracies, January 3, 2018. See also, U.S. Department of Defense, CENTCOM Officials Provide Update on Recent
Counterterrorism Strikes in Yemen, Dec. 20, 2017.
47 “Trump Administration Is Said to Be Working to Loosen Counterterrorism Rules,” New York Times, March 12,
2017.
48 Congressional Record, June 13, 2017, Issue: Vol. 163, No. 100—Daily Edition.
49 op.cit., Congressional Record.
Congressional Research Service
8
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
Representative Ro Khanna introduced a concurrent resolution (H.Con.Res. 81) pursuant to the
War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) in a bid to end U.S. support for the coalition'’s military
intervention. After consultation between House leaders and supporters of the resolution on a
compromise approach, the House agreed to delay expedited consideration of the resolution until
after the November 2018 election and then adopted a nonbinding alternative (H.Res. 599, 366-30,
1 Present, Roll no. 623).49
50
In his first year in office, President Trump sought to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, counter
Iran, and increase U.S. counterterrorism activity in Yemen, while at the same time his
Administration also took strong positions at times on the need for the coalition to improve
humanitarian access, pursue a settlement to the conflict, and take measures to prevent civilian
casualties.
After a Houthi-fired missile with alleged Iranian origins landed deep inside Saudi Arabia in
November 2017, the coalition instituted a full blockade of all of Yemen'’s ports, including the
main port of Hudaydah, exacerbating the country's humanitarian crisis.5051 The White House issued
four press statements on the conflict between November 8 and December 8, including a statement
on December 6 in which President Trump called on Saudi Arabia to "“completely allow food, fuel,
water, and medicine to reach the Yemeni people who desperately need it. This must be done for
humanitarian reasons immediately."51
”52
On December 20, 2017, the Saudi-led coalition announced that it would end its blockade of
Hudaydah port for a 30-day period and permit the delivery of four U.S.-funded cranes to Yemen
to increase the port's capability to off-load commercial and humanitarian goods.5253 The next day, the White House issued a statement welcoming "Saudi Arabia's announcement of these humanitarian actions in the face of this major conflict."
As the Saudi-led coalition intervention entered its fourth year, some in the Senate proposed use of the War Powers Resolution as a tool for ending U.S. support for the coalition's military
50
Congressional Record, November 13, 2017, Vol. 163, No. 185, Pages H9148-H9155.
On November 4, 2017, a Houthi ballistic missile (with alleged Iranian markings) landed on Saudi soil near King
Khalid international airport in Riyadh. Two days later, the Saudi-led coalition closed all Yemeni ports, including
Hudaydah, which is the primary point of entry for most imported food and humanitarian supplies entering Yemen.
Yemen imports over 90% of its food supply. After the coalition’s imposition of the port’s total closure, food and fuel
prices skyrocketed, leading international aid agencies to warn of impending famine. The total closure of all Yemeni
ports lasted until November 24, 2017, when the Saudi-led coalition announced that it would begin allowing
humanitarian aid to resume entering Hudaydah port—but not commercial shipments of food and fuel. The Saudi-led
coalition argued that the Houthis earn hard currency by taxing fuel imports. Yemen imports 80% of its food from
commercial suppliers rather than from humanitarian sources.
52 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by President Donald J. Trump on Yemen, December 6,
2017. Other statements include the following: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, White House Statement
on Iranian-Supported Missile Attacks Against Saudi Arabia, November 8, 2017; The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Statement from the Press Secretary on the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen, November 24, 2017; The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary Regarding the Violence and Humanitarian
Conditions in Yemen, December 8, 2017.
53 In late 2017, Senators Todd Young and Christopher Murphy placed a hold on the confirmation of the State
Department’s nominee for legal advisor, Jennifer Newstead, until the Administration took certain steps to address the
coalition’s blockade of Yemen. Dan De Luce and Robbie Gramer, “GOP Senator Presses Trump Administration Over
Deadly Saudi Blockade in Yemen,” Foreign Policy, December 4, 2017; and, Dan De Luce, “Trump Nominee Concedes
Saudi Siege of Yemen Could Be Violating U.S. Law,” Foreign Policy, December 19, 2017. On December 14, Senator
Young sent a letter to President Trump thanking the President for his December 6 statement, while asserting that, per
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended (22 U.S. Code §2378-1(a)), the coalition's blockade triggers a
prohibition on U.S. foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia. Newstead was confirmed by the Senate on December 19 after
promising the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to consider evidence of any possible foreign government restriction
of the delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance to Yemen in determining whether to apply statutory prohibitions found
in 22 U.S. Code §2378-1(a). See, Senator Todd Young, Young: Law Triggered by Saudi Arabia's Actions in Yemen,
December 14, 2017, and Newstead response online at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4333104-20171114Young-Newstead-QFRs-Round-3-1.html.
51
Congressional Research Service
9
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
the White House issued a statement welcoming “Saudi Arabia's announcement of these
humanitarian actions in the face of this major conflict.”
2018
As the Saudi-led coalition intervention entered its fourth year, some in the Senate proposed use of
the War Powers Resolution as a tool for ending U.S. support for the coalition’s military
intervention. On February 28, 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced S.J.Res. 54, a joint
resolution to "“direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic
of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress (except for those U.S. forces engaged in
counterterrorism operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces)."53”54 Efforts in the Senate
followed a late 2017 attempt in the House (see Table 2 below), in which a concurrent resolution
directing the President to remove U.S. forces from Yemen was tabled in favor of a House-passed
nonbinding resolution.
Throughout 2018, there was disagreement between Congress and the Trump Administration and
within Congress itself, as to whether U.S. forces assisting the Saudi-led coalition have been
introduced into active or imminent hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution. Some
Members claimed that by providing support to the Saudi-led coalition, U.S. forces have been
introduced into a "“situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated"” based
on the criteria of the War Powers Resolution.5455 The Trump Administration disagreed. In February
2018, the Acting Department of Defense General Counsel wrote to Senate leaders describing the
extent of current U.S. support, and reported that "“the United States provides the KSA [Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia]-led coalition defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling;55 56
certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the
law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties."56
”57
On March 20, 2018, the Senate considered S.J.Res. 54. During floor debate, arguments centered
on a number of issues, ranging from concern over exacerbating Yemen'’s humanitarian crisis to
reasserting the role of Congress in authorizing the use of armed force abroad. After then-Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman Senator Bob Corker promised to propose new legislation and
hold hearings scrutinizing U.S. policy in Yemen, a majority of Senators voted to table a motion to
discharge the Foreign Relations committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 54. Senator Robert Menendez made remarks expressing conditional support for Senator Corker's approach, a . Senator
This followed the late 2017 action in the House (see discussion of (H.Con.Res. 81 and H.Res.
599, above), in which a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove U.S. forces from
Yemen was tabled in favor of a House-passed nonbinding resolution.
54
55
For example, see remarks of Senator Mike Lee on the Senate floor, November 28, 2018. Congressional Record,
115th Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 164, No. 187.
56 In-flight refueling to the militaries of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was conducted pursuant to
the terms of bilateral Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSAs) between the Department of Defense and
the respective ministries of each country. ACSA agreements are governed by 10 USC 2341-2350. The agreements
provide for reciprocal logistical support under a variety of circumstances, and their underlying statutory authority does
not prohibit U.S. support to partner forces engaged in armed conflict. U.S. ACSA agreements with Saudi Arabia and
the UAE provide for the transfer of support to third parties with the prior written consent of both the original provider
and original recipient. The U.S. agreement with Saudi Arabia was signed in May 2016. The executive branch has not
publicly specified what legal authority or agreement provided for refueling support to Saudi aircraft from March 2015
through May 2016.
57 Letter from Department of Defense Acting General Counsel William Castle to Senators Mitch McConnell and Chuck
Schumer, February 27, 2018.
Congressional Research Service
10
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
Robert Menendez made remarks expressing conditional support for Senator Corker’s approach, a
view shared by some other Senators who voted to table the motion.58
view shared by some other Senators who voted to table the motion.57
The Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Yemen a month later. In parallel testimony
before Congress, U.S. defense officials stated that while the United States refueled Saudi aircraft
and provided advice on targeting techniques, CENTCOM did not track coalition aircraft after
they were refueled and did not provide advice on specific targets.5859 Then-Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs Robert S. Karem testified that "It'“It’s correct that we do
not monitor and track all of the Saudi aircraft aloft over Yemen."59”60 During the same hearing, U.S.
officials acknowledged that pressure from Congress has altered how the Administration deals
with the coalition over the Yemen conflict. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
Affairs David Satterfield told Senator Todd Young and the SFRC the following:
Senator, your efforts, the efforts of your colleagues in this body and on this Committee
have been exceedingly helpful in allowing the Administration to send a message from
whole of government regarding the very specific concerns we have over any limitations,
restrictions, constraints on the ability of both humanitarian and commercial goods
specifically to include fuel to have unrestricted and expeditious entry into Yemen. And that
messaging which comes from us, the Executive Branch, also comes from this body is
extremely important.60
61
After the promised hearing, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also proposed new
legislation to place conditions on U.S. assistance to the coalition. In May, the committee reported
S.J.Res. 58 to the Senate; it would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of U.S. funds for
in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that were not conducting
select types of operations if certain certifications cannot be made and maintained.61
62
The Senate Armed Services Committee incorporated the provisions of the SFRC-reported text of
S.J.Res. 58 as Section 1266 of the version of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) that it reported to the Senate on June 5, 2018 (S. 2987). The provision was modified
further and passed by both the House and Senate as Section 1290 of the conference version of the
FY2019 NDAA (H.R. 5515, see textbox below). It was signed into law as P.L. 115-232 in mid-August in midAugust, giving the Administration until mid-September 2018 to make certain certifications. In a
statement accompanying the President'’s signing of P.L. 115-232 into law, President Trump
objected to provisions such as Section 1290, stating the Administration'’s view that such
provisions "“encompass only actions for which such advance certification or notification is feasible and consistent" with "[his] exclusive constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs."62
Senator Menendez said, “Based upon Chairman Corker's commitments to those hearings and future markups and
based upon the totality of the situation, I will vote to table the motion to discharge from the committee because I am not
ready to either abandon our partners that face an existential threat from Iran run amok in Yemen, but my support is not
unconditional, and I will demand responsive actions.” Congressional Record, March 20, 2018, 115th Congress, 2nd
Session, Issue: Vol. 164, No. 48 — Daily Edition.
59 Commander, U.S. Central Command Gen. Joseph Votel, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
March 18, 2018.
60 Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Karem, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 17,
2018.
61 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield, Testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, April 17, 2018.
62 The joint resolution identified several certification criteria, although, reported as amended by the committee, it would
have enabled the Secretary of State to waive the certification requirement for national security purposes if the Secretary
provides an unclassified explanatory justification to the appropriate committees. The joint resolution also would have
required a report on, among other things, U.S. objectives in Yemen and a detailed strategy to accomplish those
objectives.
58
Congressional Research Service
11
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
feasible and consistent” with “[his] exclusive constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief
and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs.”63
As Congress continued to question the role of the United States in supporting coalition operations
in Yemen, the pace and scale of fighting on the ground increased dramatically by the summer of
2018. On June 12, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition launched “Operation Golden Victory,” aimed at
retaking the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah. As coalition forces engaged Houthi militants in and
around Hudaydah, humanitarian organizations warned that if port operation ceased, famine could
become widespread throughout northern Yemen. On June 12, nine Senators wrote a letter to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis saying, “We are
concerned that pending military operations by the UAE and its Yemeni partners will exacerbate
the humanitarian crisis by interrupting delivery of humanitarian aid and damaging critical
infrastructure. We are also deeply concerned that these operations jeopardize prospects for a nearterm political resolution to the conflict.”64
Section 1290 of H.R. 5515
Section 1290 of P.L. 115-232 states that potential restrictions on the use of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling of
|
As Congress continued to question the role of the United States in supporting coalition operations in Yemen, the pace and scale of fighting on the ground increased dramatically by the summer of 2018. On June 12, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition launched "Operation Golden Victory," aimed at retaking the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah. As coalition forces engaged Houthi militants in and around Hudaydah, humanitarian organizations warned that if port operation ceased, famine could become widespread throughout northern Yemen. On June 12, nine Senators wrote a letter to Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis saying, "We are concerned that pending military operations by the UAE and its Yemeni partners will exacerbate the humanitarian crisis by interrupting delivery of humanitarian aid and damaging critical infrastructure. We are also deeply concerned that these operations jeopardize prospects for a near-term political resolution to the conflict."63
Several weeks later, Senator Robert Menendez, the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, placed a hold on a potential U.S. sale of precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In a June 28 letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mattis, Senator Menendez said,
I am not confident that these weapons sales will be utilized strategically as effective leverage to push back on Iran's actions in Yemen, assist our partners in their own self-defense, or drive the parties toward a political settlement that saves lives and mitigates humanitarian suffering.... Even worse, I am concerned that our policies are enabling perpetuation of a conflict that has resulted in the world's worst humanitarian crisis.64
s worst humanitarian crisis.65
63
White House, Statement by President Donald J. Trump on H.R. 5515, August 13, 2018.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ranking Member's Press, Menendez, Corker, Murphy, Young, Colleagues
raise Concerns about Imminent Military Operations at Hudaydah, Yemen, June 12, 2018.
65 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ranking Member's Press, Menendez Demands more Answers from Trump
Admin before letting Arms Sales to United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia move forward, June 28, 2018.
64
Congressional Research Service
12
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
On August 9, the coalition conducted an air strike that hit a bus in a market near Dahyan, Yemen,
in the northern Sa'’ada governorate adjacent to the Saudi border. The strike reportedly killed 51
people, 40 of whom were children. The coalition claimed that its air strike was a "legitimate “legitimate
military operation"” conducted in response to a Houthi missile attack on the Saudi city of Jizan a
day earlier that had killed a Yemeni national in the kingdom. The U.S. State Department called on
the Saudi-led coalition to conduct a "“thorough and transparent investigation into the incident."65
”66
Several Members of Congress wrote to the Administration seeking additional information
regarding U.S. operations in the wake of the August 2018 coalition strike at Dahyan.6667 Several
Senators also submitted an amendment to the FY2019 Defense Department appropriations act (
(H.R. 6157) that would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to support the
Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen until the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing to
Congress that the coalition air campaign "“does not violate the principles of distinction and
proportionality within the rules for the protection of civilians."” The provision did not applywould not have
applied to support for ongoing counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State
in Yemen.
On September 12, Secretary of State Pompeo issued a certification that would allow the use of
FY2019 defense funds to support in-flight refueling of coalition aircraft to continue, per the terms
of Section 1290 (see discussion above) of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA, P.L. 115-232). Some Members of Congress criticized the Administration'’s actions,
asserting that the coalition had not met the act'’s specified benchmarks for avoiding civilian
casualties in Yemen.67
68
On September 26, several House Members introduced H.Con.Res. 138, which sought to direct the
President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities in Yemen, except for Armed Forces
engaged in operations authorized under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, within
30 days unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use has been
enacted into law. In response to a similar initiative in the Senate, the Administration submitted a
detailed argument expressing its view that U.S. forces supporting Saudi-led coalition operations
are not engaged in hostilities in Yemen.
By late 2018, the prospect of widespread famine in Yemen, coupled with international reprobation
over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi officials, had created pressure on the
Administration and the coalition to accelerate moves toward peace talks. On October 30, then-SecretarythenSecretary of Defense Mattis and Secretary of State Pompeo called for all parties to reach a cease-fireceasefire and resume negotiations. On November 9, Secretary Mattis further announced that effective
immediately, the coalition would use its own military capabilities—rather than U.S. capabilities—
to conduct in-flight refueling in support of its operations in Yemen.68
69
Though fighting continued along several fronts, Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-GeneralSecretaryGeneral for Yemen Martin Griffiths brokered a cease-fire on December 13, 2018, centered on the
besieged Red Sea port city of Hudaydah.6970 As part of the U.N.-brokered deal (known as the
Stockholm Agreement), the coalition and the Houthis agreed to redeploy their forces outside
66
State Department Spokesperson Heather Nauert, Press Briefing, August 9, 2018.
“Congress, White House Reaching Breaking Point on Yemen?” Lobe Log, August 16, 2018.
68 Senator Jeanne Shaheen, Statement Following Trump Administration's Certification in Support of Saudi-led
Coalition, September 12, 2018.
69 White House, Statement Of Administration Policy on S.J.Res. 54, November 28, 2018.
70 The full text of the cease-fire agreements are available at https://osesgy.unmissions.org/full-text-stockholmagreement.
67
Congressional Research Service
13
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
Hudaydah city and port.71Hudaydah city and port.70 The United Nations agreed to chair a Redeployment Coordination
Committee (RCC) to monitor the cease-fire and redeployment. The international community
praised the Stockholm Agreement as a first step toward broader de-escalation and a possible road
map to a comprehensive peace settlement.
Also on December 13, 2018, the Senate amended and passed S.J.Res. 54 (56-41), which, among
other things, directed the President to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen, except U.S.
forces engaged in operations directed at Al Qaeda or associated forces. In the House, lawmakers
twice narrowly approved rules containing provisions that made similar resolutions directing the
President to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration (
(H.Res. 1142 and H.Res. 1176).71).72 On December 13, the Senate also passed S.J.Res. 69, which,
among other things, expressesexpressed the sense of the Senate that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Salman is responsible for the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and that there is no
statutory authorization for United States involvement in hostilities in the Yemen civil war.
2019
For the first several months of 2019, implementation of the Stockholm Agreement stalled.
According to Special Envoy Griffiths, "The“the initial timelines were rather ambitious.... We are dealing with a complex situation on the ground."72” and “a
complex situation on the ground” was stalling U.N.-backed efforts.73 The Stockholm Agreement
did not specify which local actors were to assume responsibility for security in Hudaydah after
both parties redeployed.7374 According to reporting by the United Nations, initial implementation of
the Stockholm Agreement has beenwas hindered by an overall lack of trust and a reluctance to make
operational concessions outside of a comprehensive political agreement. On February 17, the
United Nations announced that "“The parties reached an agreement on Phase 11H.R. 2 of the
mutual redeployment of forces"” whereby the Houthis would withdraw from Hudaydah port and
the Saudi-led coalition would move out of the eastern outskirts of Hudaydah city.74
75
At the February 2019 Ministerial to Promote a Future of Peace and Security in the Middle East in
Warsaw, Poland, members of the self-described "quad"“quad” (United States, United Kingdom, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) met to coordinate their policy toward the Yemen conflict.
The quad emphasized the importance of implementing the Stockholm Agreement, the problematic
role Iran plays in arming and financing the Houthis, and the need for additional humanitarian
assistance. The foreign ministers comprising the quad also "“expressed full support for Saudi
Arabia and its legitimate national security concerns and called for an immediate end to such
attacks by Houthi forces and their allies."
”
In February 2019, CNN reported that Saudi Arabia and the UAE had provided U.S. military
equipment (armored vehicles) to local Yemeni units fighting the Houthis in possible violation of
71
On December 6, 2018, the warring parties to the conflict in Yemen convened in Sweden under the auspices of the
United Nations to discuss various de-escalation proposals and a possible road map to a comprehensive peace
settlement. The talks were the first formal negotiations since 2016. After a week of negotiations, all sides agreed to the
Stockholm Agreement, which consists of three components; a cease-fire around the port city of Hudaydah, a prisoner
swap, and a statement of understanding that all sides would form a committee to discuss the war-torn city Taiz.
72 See Section 2 of H.Res. 1176, Providing for consideration of the conference report to accompany the bill () to
provide for the reform and continuation of agricultural and other programs of the Department of Agriculture through
fiscal year 2023, and for other purposes.
73 “U.N. Envoy Urges Yemen Combatants to Withdraw from Lifeline Port,” Reuters, January 28, 2019.
74 “Explainer: What's So Hard About Implementing a Peace Deal in Yemen's Main Port,” Reuters, February 26, 2019.
75 “Yemen's Parties Agree to Start Stalled Troop Withdrawal from Main Port,” Reuters, February 17, 2019.
Congressional Research Service
14
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
end-user foreign military sale or direct commercial sale agreements.76end-user foreign military sale or direct commercial sale agreements.75 The coalition denied these
charges, while the U.S. State Department said that it was "“seeking additional information"” on the
issue. In Senate and House hearings in early February, some Members expressed concern about
end-use monitoring of equipment provided to the coalition.76
77
On February 7, 2019, Senator Robert Menendez, ranking member on the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, introduced S. 398, the Saudi Arabia Accountability and Yemen Act of 2019 (
(Table 1). This bill, which was originally introduced in the 115th115th Congress, would, among other
things, legislatively require an end to in-flight refueling for Saudi-led coalition operations in
Yemen, suspend certain arms sales to the kingdom, sanction persons blocking humanitarian
access in Yemen, and sanction persons supporting the Houthis in Yemen. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee reported the bill to the Senate in July 2019.
In response to reporting by the New York Times on the use of child soldiers by the Saudi-led
coalition, 13 Members of Congress wrote to Secretary Pompeo on February 15, 2019, seeking
information about the accuracy of the reports, and about whether these children havehad been
provided U.S.-made weapons and uniforms. Coalition officials denied the reports. Saudi Arabia
and the UAE were not included on the annual U.S. list of countries using child soldiers, although
the 2019 Trafficking in Persons report detailed continuing concerns about the government of Yemen'
Yemen’s willingness and ability to end child soldier use by its forces and others.77
78
On February 13, 2019, the House passed (248-177) H.J.Res. 37, a joint resolution originally
introduced in the 115th115th Congress (S.J.Res. 54) ") “Directing the removal of United States Armed
Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress." ”
Prior to its passage by the House, the White House issued a State of Administration Policy in
which the Administration argued that "“the premise of the joint resolution is flawed"” because the
United States has provided only "“limited support to member countries of the Saudi-led coalition" ”
and U.S. forces providing such intelligence and logistics support are not engaged in hostilities.
Section 4 of H.J.Res. 37 includes a rule of construction stating that "“Nothing in this joint
resolution may be construed to influence or disrupt any intelligence, counterintelligence, or
investigative activities conducted by, or in conjunction with, the United States Government."
”
The Senate companion resolution to H.J.Res. 37 ( (S.J.Res. 7) was introduced on January 30, 2019,
and passed in the Senate (54-46) on March 13, 2019, and in the House (247-175) on April 4.
President Trump vetoed the resolution on April 16, citing a concern that the resolution would
weaken his constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief, harm bilateral relationships, and
negatively affect efforts to prevent civilian casualties and prevent the spread of terrorist
organizations in the Arabian Peninsula.7879 House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer responded to the
presidential veto message stating that "“the fight is not yet over, and the House will explore further
legislation and conduct rigorous oversight."79 On May 2, 2019, the resolution failed to garner the 67 votes needed to override the veto in the Senate (53-45). Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell reiterated his opposition to what he referred to as the false premises of the bill: "We're not parties to the civil war in Yemen. We're no longer providing air-to-air refueling. More importantly, the measure would make it actually more difficult to prevent the loss of innocent lives."80”80
Nima Elbagir, Salma Abdelaziz, Mohamed Abo El Gheit and Laura Smith-Spark, “Sold to an ally, lost to an enemy,”
CNN.com, February 2019. Available at: https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/02/middleeast/yemen-lost-us-arms/.
77 “Hearing to Receive Testimony on the United States Central Command in Review of the Defense Authorization
Request for Fiscal Year 2020 and the Future Years Defense Program,” Senate Armed Services Committee, February 5,
2019; “Hearing on U.S. Policy in the Arabian Peninsula,” House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 6, 2019.
78 State Department, 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report, June 20, 2019. Yemen is listed as a “Special Case” for the
fourth consecutive year.
79 The White House, “Presidential Veto Message to the Senate to Accompany S.J. Res. 7,” April 16, 2019.
80 “Hoyer Statement on President Trump's Veto of the Bipartisan Yemen War Powers Resolution,” Press Release, April
17, 2019.
76
Congressional Research Service
15
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
On May 2, 2019, the resolution failed to garner the 67 votes needed to override the veto in the
Senate (53-45). Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell reiterated his opposition to what he
referred to as the false premises of the bill: “We’re not parties to the civil war in Yemen. We’re no
longer providing air-to-air refueling. More importantly, the measure would make it actually more
difficult to prevent the loss of innocent lives.”81 Text from the House-passed version of H.J.Res. 37
37 subsequently was added to the House version of the FY2020 Defense appropriations act (Title
X of H.R. 2968) and passed by the House.
, but not included in the final version of the act.
Houthi forces began handing over control of Hudaydah and two other ports on the Red Sea on
May 10, in accordance with the first phase of redeployment laid out in the Stockholm Agreement.
Hadi government officials subsequently questioned the legitimacy of the withdrawal, with the
Information Minister calling it a "“theatrical play"”; Special Envoy Griffiths stated in a briefing to
the U.N. Security Council on May 15 that the Houthis had complied with the withdrawal.81
82
Though mediators had expressed hope that the Stockholm Agreement would lead to broader
peace negotiations, the Houthis have escalated their drone and ballistic missile attacks against Saudi Arabia since May
Arabia during the summer of 2019. The Houthis have called these attacks their "“airport for airport" ”
campaign, stating that the Houthis willthey would target Saudi civilian airports for as long as the Saudi-led
coalition maintains its three-year closure of Sana'’a airport. Since June, theThe Houthis have launched multiple unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) attacks against regional airports in Saudi Arabia (Jizan, Najran, and Abha), forcing
the suspension of flights, damaging runways, and killing several civilians. Iran is believed to be
the original source of UAV technology and knowledge transfer to the Houthis.8283 However, the
Houthis may now be manufacturing their own UAVs. According to Jane'Jane’s Defence, ", “the available
evidence suggests that Ansar Allah is increasingly making use of parts that are commercially
available on the international market to develop new UAV designs."83
”84
On May 24, 2019, the Trump Administration formally notified Congress of immediate foreign
military sales and direct commercial sales of training, equipment, and weapons with a possible
value of more than $8 billion, including sales of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi
Arabia and the UAE, and the gift transfer of PGMs by the UAE to Jordan. Other notified sales
include, among others, F-15 Engines and support for Saudi Arabia and AH-64 equipment, Javelin
Anti-Tank Missiles, and Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missiles for the UAE. In the Administration'
Administration’s justification for the emergency sales to Congress, it described a "rapidly-evolving“rapidlyevolving security situation in the region"” and noted, among others, the threat posed by Iranian-backedIranianbacked Houthis, who have "“publicly threatened to increase operations targeting vital military
targets in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Saudi-Led Coalition positions in
Yemen.”85
Yemen."84
On June 5, 2019, a bipartisan group of seven Senators introduced 22 separate joint resolutions of
disapproval against the sales. One cosponsor, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), expressed in a
statement his concern about "“the precedent these arms sales would set by having the Administration go around legitimate concerns of Congress."85 The Senate adopted all 22 of the measures. Three of the measures focused on proposed sales of air-to-ground munitions were adopted by the House and Senate and vetoed by the President. The United Arab Emirates withdrawal of forces from Yemen may limit further scrutiny of their operations against the Houthis, but Members of Congress may continue to pursue questions about arms transfers to Yemeni partner forces and human rights.
As U.S. and regional tensions with Iran flared in July 2019, the UAE announced plans to withdraw a significant portion of its armed forces from Yemen, and its forces vacated several military bases in Hudaydah and Marib Governorates. The UAE pledged to keep forces in Yemen to counter terrorist groups like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State.
In August, security forces under the command of the Transitional Political Council for the South (STC) seized control of facilities in Aden from the internationally recognized government of Yemen led by President Hadi (who remains in exile in Saudi Arabia), raising questions about the coherence of the Saudi-led coalition. For several years, the STC and Hadi government have been at odds over the inclusion of Yemen's main Sunni Islamist party (Al Islah) in Hadi's government. In the spring of 2017, the UAE supported Yemeni General Aidarous al Zubaidi's formation of the STC after Hadi dismissed him as Aden's governor.
After violence paralyzed Aden in August 2019 and Saudi and Yemeni officials demanded the return of government facilities to the control of pro-Hadi forces, Saudi and UAE leaders met to discuss Yemen's security and issued a joint statement reaffirming "the continuation of all their political, military, relief, and development efforts" and "the need for full commitment to cooperate with the joint committee set up by the Coalition leadership in order to disengage and redeploy forces within the framework of the military effort of the Coalition Forces."86 A Saudi-hosted dialogue process seeks "to address the causes and repercussions of events taking place in some southern provinces."
The 116th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen. Lawmakers potentially could broaden the scope of their oversight activities beyond the current conflict to more fully address the root causes of Yemen's chronic instability. Even if the United States is no longer as active a supporter of coalition military efforts, Yemen has been devastated by years of war and remains the world's "worst humanitarian crisis."87 Experts expect Yemen to require sustained international attention and financial assistance in order to help local actors reach and sustain a political settlement. Thus, Congress may grapple with Yemen-related questions about the conduct of U.S. diplomacy, the provision of U.S. security support, and the investment of U.S. assistance
Marianne Levine, “Senate fails to override Trump's veto on Yemen,” Politico, May 5, 2019.
“Houthi withdrawal from Yemen ports going according to plan: UN,” Al Jazeera, May 12, 2019.
83 In January 2018, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen identified military unmanned aerial vehicles that are of Iranian
origin (Ababil-T/Qasef-1) and were brought into Yemen after the imposition of the targeted 2015 arms embargo. See,
Letter dated 26 January 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen mandated by Security Council resolution 2342
(2017) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/68) [EN/AR].
84 “Ansar Allah “Airport for Airport” Strategy underlines Potential for Re-Escalation of Yemen Conflict, Jane's
Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor, June 21, 2019.
85 Congressional Record, June 4, 2019, pp. S3203-S3209.
81
82
Congressional Research Service
16
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
Administration go around legitimate concerns of Congress.”86 The Senate adopted all 22 of the
measures. Three of the measures focused on proposed sales of air-to-ground munitions were
adopted by the House and Senate and vetoed by the President.
In summer 2019, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) unilaterally withdrew most of its forces from
Yemen. The UAE had been Saudi Arabia’s primary partner in a coalition war against the Houthis.
The UAE’s local partners in southern Yemen, the Transitional Political Council for the South (aka
Southern Transitional Council, STC), attempted to seize more power in Aden from the Hadi
government following the UAE’s withdrawal. Violent confrontations ensued between STC and
pro-Hadi forces. Although Saudi Arabia and the UAE brokered a power-sharing agreement
between Hadi’s supporters and the STC in November 2019, implementation of that deal stalled,
leaving the STC ensconced in the South, the Houthis controlling the north, and the Hadi
government isolated. The United Arab Emirates withdrawal of forces from Yemen may limit
further scrutiny of their operations against the Houthis, but Members of Congress may continue
to pursue questions about arms transfers to Yemeni partner forces and human rights.
Beyond the ground war in Yemen, the Houthis have continued to intermittently launch missile,
rocket, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)87 attacks against Saudi Arabian population centers
and energy infrastructure. After sophisticated air attacks against Saudi Arabian oil fields of
Abqaiq and Khurais in September 2019, attacks widely attributed to Iran but claimed by the
Houthis, the Houthis announced that they would suspend missile and UAV attacks against Saudi
Arabia. Between September and December 2019, Saudi, Yemeni government, and Houthi
representatives engaged in talks aimed at de-escalating the fighting. The talks were accompanied
by several confidence-building measures, such as prisoner exchanges and medical evacuation
flights from Sana’a to Amman, Jordan. However, in January 2020, the Houthis resumed their
UAV and missile attacks against Saudi Arabia (see below).88
Section 1273 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92) codified (for a
two-year period) an existing Department of Defense policy to end in-flight refueling of Saudi-led
coalition aircraft engaged in hostile operations in Yemen. After President Trump signed the Act,
he issued a signing statement arguing that
Several provisions of the Act, including sections 1254, 1273, 1698(a), and 2810, purport
to restrict the President’s authority to manage personnel, materiel, and logistical matters in
the manner the President believes to be necessary or advisable for the successful conduct
of military missions and foreign affairs….My Administration will implement these
provisions consistent with the President’s authority as Commander in Chief...
Other provisions proposed, considered, and adopted in the House during 2019 debate over the
National Defense Authorization Act were not included in the final enacted version, including
provisions that would have prohibited all U.S. support to and participation in the Saudi-led
coalition’s military operations against the Houthis in Yemen and provided for a one-year ban on
Joe Gould, “Graham, Menendez offer action to thwart Trump arms sales to Saudi, UAE and Jordan,” Defense News,
June 5, 2019.
87 According to one analysis, “The Houthis have demonstrated that their UAV technology has greatly improved since
the weapons were first introduced to their military arsenal. No other known non-state armed group (NSAG) across the
Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region and beyond has reached the same level of UAV technological
sophistication.” See, Ludovico Carlino, “Houthis Selecting More UAVs over Ballistic Missiles in Arabian Peninsula
Attacks,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, December 6, 2019.
88 See, Missy Ryan and Kareem Fahim, “Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s rebels were Making Rare Progress in Peace Talks.
Then New Violence Flared,” Washington Post, February 4, 2020.
86
Congressional Research Service
17
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
U.S. sales of precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with
some exceptions (see Table 1 below).
2020 (through June 15)
During winter 2020, amidst the backdrop of fracturing in the anti-Houthi opposition, the Houthis
launched a new offensive into Jawf governorate, where they succeeded in seizing the provincial
capital. By April 2020, the Houthis were in position to threaten Marib governorate, one of the last
Yemeni areas loyal to the Hadi government and where Yemen’s modest oil and gas reserves are
located. The capture of Marib would represent a major gain for the Houthis. Its seizure also could
trigger major internal displacement. According to the International Crisis Group, Marib’s
population has increased from 300,000 before the war to as many as 3 million as of March
2020.89
On March 28, 2020, the Houthis fired missiles at the Saudi capital Riyadh (and elsewhere in the
kingdom), and Saudi air defenses reportedly intercepted the projectiles. The remnants of previous
Houthi ballistic missile attacks against Saudi Arabia have proven to resemble Iran’s Qiam missile,
which itself is a modified short-range Scud missile.90 In February 2020, the USS Normandy
intercepted a small dhow (trading vessel) while on patrol in the Arabian Sea and discovered a
cache of Iranian weapons intended for delivery to Yemen; some of the items seized included
Iranian made copies of a Russian antitank guided missile, Iranian designed and manufactured
surface-to-air missiles, and components for unmanned maritime systems.91
As the COVID-19 pandemic escalated worldwide, United Nations officials called for worldwide
humanitarian cease-fires in various conflict zones in order to respond. On April 8, 2020, Saudi
Arabia unilaterally announced a two-week cease-fire in Yemen and a $500 million pledge of
humanitarian aid. Parties to the conflict subsequently reengaged in ceasefire negotiations under
United Nations auspices, but intense conflict has continued in some areas, including in and
around the northern port of Hudaydah—the country’s lifeline for food and fuel imports—and
along an arc from Ta’izz governorate in the southwest through Bayda, Marib, and Al Jawf
governorates.
According to the Yemen Data Project, a non-governmental organization that compiles public
reporting about the conflict in Yemen, Saudi and coalition airstrikes increased in frequency from
January 2020 to an 18-month high in March, before declining in April and increasing again in
May. Overall civilian casualties in the conflict were highest in 2015, and continue to occur in
connection with indiscriminate fire by Houthi forces, shelling by government of Yemen and allied
local forces, and, to a less frequent extent, Saudi and coalition airstrikes.92
As international frustration over Houthi obstruction of humanitarian assistance mounted, donors
and aid implementers warned that if the Houthis would not abide by the principles of
international humanitarian law and allow for unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance, they
would risk losing aid.93 The Trump Administration has supported international attempts to
“Preventing a Deadly Showdown in Northern Yemen,” International Crisis Group, Briefing 74, March 17, 2020.
Jeremy Binnie and Mohammed Najib, “‘New’ Houthi Missile Appears to be Another Iranian Scud Derivative,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 30, 2020.
91 U.S. Department of Defense, Central Command Holds Defense Department Media Availability, February. 19, 2020.
92 Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) and Yemen Data Project, March 2020.
93 Lisa Barrington, “Aid to Houthi-controlled Yemen to be cut back over risk it can be diverted –sources,” Reuters,
February 6, 2020.
89
90
Congressional Research Service
18
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
pressure the Houthis to abide by international humanitarian law. On March 24, 2020, USAID
initiated a partial suspension of its funding to support humanitarian operations in northern Yemen.
Some Members of Congress have called on the Trump Administration to step up its role in
resolving the standoff between the Houthis and international aid agencies. In February 2020,
several Senators wrote a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo asking him to take a
more active role in "ensuring the unimpeded, accountable, and impartial flow of assistance and
commerce into Yemen."94 A month later, a bipartisan group of House Members demanded that,
concerns about the Houthis notwithstanding, Secretary Pompeo not suspend aid in light of the
COVID-19 pandemic and other humanitarian considerations.95
In May 2020, six Senators wrote a letter to Secretary Pompeo and Acting USAID Administrator
Barsa saying “We recognize the challenge that Houthi obstruction poses to relief efforts in
Yemen…We must ensure that development dollars provided to Yemen actually benefit the people
most in need of help, and do not enrich Houthi forces or their partners, who have regularly
imposed unacceptable constraints on common-sense measures to track and account for funds and
supplies.”96
In late April 2020, the STC declared self-administration in southern Yemen, upending a powersharing agreement between it and the central Yemeni government signed in November 2019 in
Riyadh. Violent clashes followed the STC’s announcement, and the separatist group seized
hundreds of millions in cash from the central bank in Aden.
While Saudi Arabia and the Houthis have been engaged for months in negotiations97 over how to
deescalate their conflict, there is some speculation that the COVID-19 outbreak in the Arabian
Peninsula may provide an opportunity for cooperation.98 International aid organizations have
warned that Yemen is ill-equipped to handle the pandemic. According to one report, 51% of
health facilities are fully functional, and there are limited supplies of personal protective
equipment and few testing sites nationwide.99 At a June 2020 pledging conference hosted by
Saudi Arabia, donors pledged an additional $1.35 billion to support assistance programs in
Yemen, short of the $2.4 billion sought by the United Nations.
In June 2020, a bipartisan group of Senators wrote a letter to Secretary Pompeo seeking his
leadership in resolving the conflict in Yemen, writing “Your interventions were important to
securing past interim agreements. We now believe that sustained, high-level U.S. engagement is
necessary to finally put an end to this devastating civil war.”100
As of June 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic continues to spread throughout Yemen, and
humanitarian workers have accused the Houthis of covering up the extent of the outbreak.101 In
94
Senators Schumer, Menendez, and Reed Letter to U.S. Secretary Mike Pompeo, February 4, 2020.
Bryant Harris, "Intel: Democrats Warn Trump Administration against Cutting Yemen Aid, Al Monitor, March 26,
2020.
96 Cardin, Young Lead Effort to Continue Humanitarian Lifeline for Yemeni Civilians, May 12, 2020.
97 “Saudi, Yemen's Houthis hold 'Indirect Talks' in Oman to End War,” Al Jazeera, November 13, 2019. See also,
Colum Lynch, Lara Seligman, Robbie Gramer, “Can a Young Saudi Prince End the War in Yemen?”
ForeignPolicy.com, November 20, 2019.
98 “Saudi Arabia Looks for an Exit to the War in Yemen,” The Economist, Apr 18th 2020 edition.
99 “COVID-19 Impact on Yemen – Update,” ACAPS, Risk Report, April 8, 2020.
100 Murphy, Young Lead Bipartisan Call for Pompeo to Facilitate Diplomatic Solution to End Yemen War, June 16,
2020.
101 “Rebel threats, secret burials and shuttered hospitals mask spread of Yemen’s epidemic,” Washington Post, June 3,
95
Congressional Research Service
19
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
early June, United Nations Secretary General António Guterres noted that mortality rates from
COVID-19 in Aden are among the highest in the world. Lise Grande, the head of the U.N.’s head
of humanitarian operations in Yemen, said that in the worst case scenario, the death toll from the
COVID-19 pandemic could “exceed the combined toll of war, disease, and hunger over the last
five years (in Yemen).”102
Analysis
The 116th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi
Arabia’s conduct of the war in Yemen. Lawmakers potentially could broaden the scope of their
oversight activities beyond the current conflict to more fully address the root causes of Yemen’s
chronic instability. They also could focus on challenges to the delivery of humanitarian assistance
in light of ongoing conflict and the COVID-19 pandemic. Even if the United States is no longer
as active a supporter of coalition military efforts, Yemen has been devastated by years of war and
remains the world’s “worst humanitarian crisis.”103 Experts expect Yemen to require sustained
international attention and financial assistance in order to help local actors reach and sustain a
political settlement. Thus, Congress may grapple with Yemen-related questions about the conduct
of U.S. diplomacy, the provision of U.S. security support, and the investment of U.S. assistance
and defense funds for years to come.
and defense funds for years to come.
The 115th Congress frequently debated the extent and terms of the United States' involvement in
the ongoing conflict in Yemen. Lawmakers questioned the extent to which successive
Administrations have adhered to existing law related to providing security assistance, including
sales or transfers of defense goods and defense services, while upholding international human
rights standards (e.g., 22 U.S.C. §2754 or 22 U.S.C. §2304). They also enacted new legislation
that would condition or prohibit the use of U.S. funds for some activities related to Yemen and
would extend legislative oversight over the executive branch's policy toward the war in Yemen.
While the House and its Rules Committee voted to make resolutions with respect to war powers
and Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration,88104 the Senate passage of S.J.Res. 54 at the
conclusion of the 115th115th Congress demonstrated stronger congressional opposition to U.S.
involvement in the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen relative to previous years. Over
time, the balance of votes shifted in favor of measures that could be described as critical or
restrictive of U.S. support for Saudi-led coalition operations with regard to arms sales, oversight
measures, and war powers measures.
The 116th
The 116th Congress has continued to express dismay at the humanitarian situation in Yemen and has
some Members have called on relevant parties to implement the Stockholm Agreement and to
establish and maintain a ceasefire. In hearings in both chambers, some Members have raised
concerns about the actions of the Saudi-led coalition, highlighting potential end-use monitoring
violations of U.S. weapons provided to the coalition, civilian casualties from coalition air strikes,
and reports of coalition use of child soldiers. President Trump has vetoed renewed bipartisan
efforts to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen (S.J.Res. 7) and to disapprove of sales of
air-to-ground munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (S.J.Res. 36, , S.J.Res. 37, and ,
2020.
102 Omer Karasapan, “Yemen and COVID-19: The Pandemic Exacts its Devastating Toll,” June 15, 2020.
103 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator in Yemen “Humanitarian
programmes in Yemen forced to shut due to lack of funding,” August 21, 2019.
104 “House Republicans move to block Yemen War-Powers votes for rest of Congress,” The Hill, December 11, 2018.
Congressional Research Service
20
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
and S.J.Res. 38). Both chambers'’ passage of the underlying measures demonstrated continued
congressional opposition to aspects of U.S. policy.
Nevertheless, it remains difficult to identify the locus of congressional consensus about Yemen.
Many in the House and Senate state that they seek to preserve cooperative U.S.-Saudi relations in
broad terms and express concern about Iranian activities in Yemen, while also expressing support
for expanded humanitarian access and efforts to bring the conflict to a close. Some lawmakers
express opposition to the intervention and U.S. involvement on moral grounds, citing errant
coalition air strikes and the prospect of famine and mass displacement. Others argue that the
conflict creates opportunities for Iran and Sunni Islamist extremist groups to expand their
influence and operations in Yemen. Still others also refer to factors not directly related to
conditions in Yemen, such as the mechanisms and authorities used by the executive branch to
support the coalition and/or anger with the Saudi government over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi
and other human rights issues, when discussing continued U.S. support for the intervention.
Recent congressional consideration of Yemen legislation also may be an indication of broader
efforts by Members of Congress to reassert congressional prerogatives toward U.S. foreign policy
and to leverage legislative processes to enhance their effectiveness. Measures to expand oversight
of U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition and U.S. strategy toward Yemen have received broad
bipartisan support, while proponents of other recently considered arms sales and war powers
measures have used legislative mechanisms to ensure prompt and/or privileged consideration of
their proposals.
Although the 116th
Although the 116th Congress has not overridden the President on vetoes of consequential Yemen-relatedYemenrelated measures, the volume and frequency of expressions of congressional opposition and the
passage of measures rejecting aspects of the Administration'’s policy by majorities in both
chambers may constrain the choices available to the White House and governments in Riyadh and
Abu Dhabi. Unilateral escalation of the conflict by the coalition or operations resulting in
increased civilian casualties or harm could generate additional opposition among Members and
might allow Congress to override presidential preferences.
Debate to date suggests that, similarly, escalation attributable to the Houthis, closer overt
coordination between the Houthis and Iran, and/or Houthi rejection of United Nations resolution
efforts could lead some Members to support continued or more expansive U.S. cooperation with
the coalition. The inclusion of Yemen-related provisions directing the end of U.S. support for
coalition operations and constraining related arms sales could become an issue of renewed
executive-legislative dispute during further consideration of annual defense authorization and
appropriations measures for FY2020.
FY2021.
The Yemen conflict began as a localized affair, but has become part of a larger narrative of
regional confrontation between Iran and its proxies on one side and the United States and Gulf
monarchies on the other. This dynamic may be one of the manyremain a central impediments to reaching a political solution to the Yemen conflict. According to one unnamed Saudi official, "The kingdom does not want to be dragged for much longer into war [in Yemen].... But amid all the tension with Iran, Saudi Arabia does not want to look weak or show that it is hurting."89 Adding to the regional dimension of the conflict, in mid-August 2019, a Houthi delegation traveled to Iran and met with Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. After the talks, Khamenei issued a statement saying, "I declare my support for the mujahidah (struggle) of Yemen.... Saudi and UAE and their supporters have committed major crimes in Yemen.... They seek to divide Yemen. This plot should be strongly resisted and a unified, coherent Yemen with sovereign integrity should be endorsed."90 Press reports suggest that the United States may pursue direct talks with Houthi representatives in Oman as a means of encouraging a settlement of the conflict and a return to transition talks.91
solution to the Yemen conflict.
Congressional Research Service
21
Table 1. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 116th Congress
116th Congress
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments offered in the 116th116th Congress through AugustJune 15, 2020
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments
S.Res. 243
Senator Christopher Murphy
15, 2019
|
Bill Number |
Principal Sponsors |
Summary |
Status |
|
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments |
|||
|
Senator Christopher Murphy (D)—Connecticut |
(D)—Connecticut
Resolution requesting information on Saudi Arabia's human rights practices in |
Introduced and referred to | |
S.J. Res. 27-48 |
Senator Robert Menendez |
22 separate resolutions providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed |
Introduced and referred to
S.J.Res. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
See below for further |
|
Senator Robert Menendez (D)—New Jersey |
S.J.Res. 37
CRS-22
Bill Number
S.J.Res. 36
S.J.Res. 37
CRS-23
Principal Sponsors
Senator Robert Menendez
(D)—New Jersey
Senator Robert Menendez
(D)—New Jersey
Summary
A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed
Would disapprove of the
|
Agreed to in the Senate on Passed in the House on
Vetoed by President on
Passage over veto failed in | |
|
Senator Robert Menendez (D)—New Jersey |
A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed export to the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Republic of France of certain defense articles and services. Would disapprove of the proposed transfer of 44,000 GBU-12 Paveway II Kits and the proposed transfer of 16,000 GBU-10 Paveway II Kits. | Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 06/05/2019 Relations on 06/05/2019
Agreed to in the Senate on Passed in the House on
Vetoed by President on
Failed of passage in Senate | |
|
Senator Robert Menendez (D)—New Jersey |
(D)—New Jersey
Summary
Status
A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed export
Would disapprove of the proposed transfer of defense articles, defense services, |
Introduced and referred to
Agreed to in the Senate on Passed in the House on
Vetoed by President on
Passage over veto failed in | |
Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT), | Would direct the President to remove United States Armed Forces from
For purposes of the resolutions
Also would require reporting on risks posed to United States citizens and the
As introduced in the
Amended during Senate consideration on 03/13/2019 to include S.Amdt. 193 | Introduced 01/30/2019
Motion to discharge the
Motion to table S.Amdt. 194 S.Amdt. 193 and S.Amdt.
Agreed to in the Senate with
Passed in the House on
Vetoed by President on
Failed of passage in Senate | |
|
Representative Ro Khanna (D)—California et al |
(D)—California et al
Would direct the President to remove United States Armed Forces from
For purposes of the resolutions
Also would require reporting on risks posed to United States citizens and the
As introduced in the
Amended during House consideration on 02/13/2019 to include H.Amdt. 41 | Introduced 01/30/2019
Reported by the Committee )
Considered under the
H.Amdt. 41 agreed to on
H.Amdt. 42 agreed to on
Passed in the House on | |
Representative Justin Amash | Would direct the President to terminate the use of the United States Armed | Introduced and referred to | |
|
Representative Will Hurd (R)—Texas |
Would condemn human rights violations, violence against civilians, and |
Introduced and referred to | |
CRS-26
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
S.Con.Res. 21
Senator Tom Cotton (R)—
Arkansas
| Would condemn human rights violations, violence against civilians, and |
Introduced and referred to | |
|
Senator Jeff Merkley (D)—Oregon |
Would request a statement under section 502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act |
Introduced and referred to | |
|
Representative Ted Lieu (D)—California, Representative Tom Malinowski (D)—New Jersey, Representative Ted Yoho (R)—Florida |
Would prohibit the use of federal funds to provide for in-flight refueling of Saudi |
Introduced and referred to | |
|
Senator Robert Menendez (D)—New Jersey |
(D)—New Jersey
Revises and reintroduces provisions of S. 3652 from the The bill would require additional reporting on Russia |
Introduced and referred to
Reported by Committee on | |
|
Senators Risch (R-ID), Shaheen (D-NH), Rubio (R-FL), and Coons (D-DE) |
), and Coons (D-DE)
Summary
To review United States Saudi Arabia policy, and for other purposes. Would |
Status
Introduced and referred to | |
Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2019 | |||
H.R. 648
Representative Nita Lowey | Explanatory statement for Division E on State Department and Foreign ”
Statement generally directs the Administration to comply with the directives,
See Table 2 below for relevant comments on Yemen from these referenced | Introduced 01/17/2019
Passed in the House on
Received in the Senate | |
H.J.Res 31/P.L. 1166
Representative Lucille |
Explanatory statement (H.Rept. 116-9) for Division F on State Department and
See Table 2 below for relevant comments on Yemen from these referenced
Division F, Sec. 7041(l) would make funds under the heading Economic Support | Introduced 01/17/2019
Passed in the House on
Conference report H.Rept.
Signed by the President and | |
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2020 | |||
H.R. 2839
Representative Nita Lowey | Sec. 7041(l) would
H.Rept. 116-78 expresses Committee concern over | Introduced 05/20/2019
Reported from the House
Incorporated into
Passed in the House | |
|
National Defense Authorization Act, 2020 |
|||
|
Representatives Kildee (D-MI), Speier (D-CA), Khanna (D-CA), and Malinowski (D-NJ) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 285—would
Section 1270M in House-passed version of |
Adopted by voice vote | |
H.Amdt. 543
H.R. 2500
Representatives Khanna ( | DWA)
House Rules Committee Amendment 339—
Section 1270H in House-passed version of |
Agreed to 07/11/2019 as | |
Representatives Tulsi Gabbard |
House Rules Committee Amendment 377—would Section 1270F in House-passed version of |
Agreed to 07/11/2019 as | |
|
Representatives Ted Lieu (D)—California, David Cicilline (D)—Rhode Island, and Tom Malinowski (D)—New Jersey |
New Jersey
House Rules Committee Amendment 418—
Section 1270N in House-passed version of |
Adopted by voice vote | |
H.Amdt. 544
H.R. 2500
Representatives Malinowski | House Rules Committee Amendment 473—would
Section 1099X in House-passed version of |
Agreed to 07/12/2019 as | |
|
Senator James Inhofe (R)—Oklahoma |
| Saudiled coalition.
As enacted, P.L. 116-92 includes:
Section 1273, which prohibits in-flight refueling to non-United States aircraft that
engage in hostilities in the ongoing civil war in Yemen for a two-year period
following the enactment of this Act, “unless and until a declaration of war or a
specific statutory authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces has
been enacted.” (Originally passed by House as Amendment 256 in H.Rept. 116143.)
Section 1274 requires reports from the Secretary of Defense on civilian casualties
caused by the Saudi-led coalition strikes in Yemen, not later than 90 days after
the enactment of this Act and thereafter annually for two years. (Revised version
of Amendment 221 in H.Rept. 116-143.)
Section 1275 requires monthly reports on expenses incurred for in-flight
refueling of Saudi coalition aircraft conducting missions relating to civil war in
Yemen from March 2015 to November 2018, and the extent to which such
expenses have been reimbursed. (Section 1288 in original Senate-passed version
of S.1790.)
Introduced 06/11/2019
Reported by Committee on )
Agreed to in the Senate with | |
|
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020 |
|||
|
Representative Peter J. Visclosky (D)—Indiana |
|
Source: Congress.gov, Congressional Record, and House Rules Committee.
CRS-33
Reported by the House
Incorporated into .
Passed in the House | |
Table 2. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 115th Congress
115th Congress
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments offered in the 115th Congress
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Resolutions and Stand-alone Legislation
S.Res. 114
Senator Todd Young (R)—
Indiana, and Senator Benjamin
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments offered in the 115th Congress
|
Bill Number |
Principal Sponsors |
Summary |
Status |
|
Resolutions and Stand-alone Legislation |
|||
|
Senator Todd Young (R)—Indiana, and Senator Benjamin Cardin (D)—Maryland |
Cardin (D)—Maryland
Among other things, would have stated the sense of the Senate that the United |
Resolution agreed to in | |
|
Senator Christopher Murphy (D)—Connecticut Representative Ted Lieu (D)—California |
Would have prohibited the transfer to Saudi Arabia of U.S. air-to-ground |
Introduced and referred to
H.J.Res. 104 referred to the | |
Senator Christopher Murphy (D)—Connecticut Representative Justin Amash (R)—Michigan | (R)—Michigan
Would have disapproved of the transfer to Saudi Arabia of defense articles, |
Motion to discharge the | |
|
Representative Karen Bass (D)—California |
(D)—California
Would have required the Secretaries of State and Defense in coordination with |
Referred to the | |
|
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R)—Florida |
(R)—Florida
Would, among other things, have required the President to impose sanctions on |
H.R. 4603 referred to the | |
concerned
H.Con.Res. 81
Representatives Khanna ( |
Would have directed the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities |
Unanimous consent agreed | |
|
Representative Ro Khanna (D)—California |
(D)—California
Would have directed the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers |
Introduced and referred to | |
|
Representative Ro Khanna (D)—California |
(D)—California
Would have directed the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers |
Introduced and referred to | |
|
H.J.Res 142 |
Representative Justin Amash | Would have directed the President to terminate the use of the United States | Introduced and referred to |
|
Representative Ro Khanna (D)—California |
(D)—California
Among other things, expressed the urgent need for a political solution in Yemen |
Unanimous consent that it
Passed in the House on | |
|
Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Senator Mike Lee (R-UT), and Senator Christopher Murphy (D-CT)
|
As introduced, would have directed the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces
As amended and agreed to in the Senate, would have directed the President to
Would have stated that nothing in the resolution was to be construed to
Also would have required reporting on risks posed to United States citizens and |
Motion to table a motion to
Motion to discharge the Motion to proceed to Point of order that Agreed to in the Senate with | |
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
S.Amdt. 4080 to | Senator Todd Young (R)— |
Indiana
Clarified that S.J.Res. 54 would have prohibited United States Armed Forces from | Agreed to in the Senate on |
S.Amdt. 4096 to | Senator John Cornyn (R)— |
Texas
Provided that nothing in S.J.Res. 54 was to be construed to influence or disrupt |
Agreed to in the Senate on |
S.Amdt. 4098 to | Senator Tom Cotton (R)— |
Arkansas
Would have clarified that the requirement in S.J.Res. 54 to remove United States |
Not agreed to in the Senate |
S.Amdt. 4090 to | Senator John Cornyn (R)— |
Texas
To require a report assessing risks posed by ceasing support operations with |
Agreed to in the Senate by |
S.Amdt. 4095 to | Senator John Cornyn (R)— |
Texas
To require a report assessing the increased risk of terrorist attacks in the United |
Agreed to in the Senate by |
S.Amdt. 4097 to | Senator Tom Cotton (R)— |
Arkansas
Would have clarified that the requirement to remove United States Armed | Request for unanimous |
|
Senator Todd Young (R)—Indiana, and Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D)—New Hampshire |
Would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of U.S. funds for in-flight |
Introduced and referred to
Elements incorporated into | |
|
Senators Young (R-IN), Shaheen (D-NH), Collins (R-ME), and Coons (D-DE) |
), and Coons (D-DE)
Would have revised S.J.Res. 55 to add a reduction of civilian harm criterion to | Introduced and referred to
Elements incorporated into | |
|
Senators Corker (R-TN), McConnell (R-KY), Rubio (R-FL), Portman (R-OH), Ernst (R-IA), Boozman (R-AR), Crapo (R-ID), Toomey (R-PA), Gardner (R-CO), Isakson (R-GA), Sanders (I-VT), Kaine (D-VA), and Reed (D-RI) |
(D-VA), and Reed (D-RI)
Stated, inter alia, that the Senate demanded that all parties seek an immediate |
Introduced in the Senate on
Agreed to by voice vote on | |
|
Senator Lindsey Graham (R)—South Carolina |
(R)—South Carolina
Would have stated that the Senate called on the Government of the Kingdom of |
Introduced and referred to | |
|
Representative Dan Newhouse (R)—Washington |
Newhouse (R)—Washington
Provided for consideration of the bill (H.R. 6784) to provide for removal of the House considered this rule with provision in Section 4 stating: ”
H.Con.Res. 138 would have directed the President pursuant to section 5(c) of |
Motion in Rules Committee
Agreed to in the House on | |
|
Representative Dan Newhouse (R)—Washington |
Newhouse (R)—Washington
Provided for consideration of the conference report to accompany the bill (H.R.
House considered this rule with provision in Section 2 stating: | ”
Motion in Rules Committee
Agreed to in the House on | |
|
Senator Tim Kaine (D)—Virginia |
Would have prohibited obligation or expenditure of funds available to the |
Referred to the Senate | |
|
Senator Robert Menendez (D)—New Jersey |
(D)—New Jersey
Would have stated the sense of the Senate on U.S. policy toward Yemen and
Would have required a report describing the causes and consequences of civilian
Would have suspended weapons transfers to Saudi Arabia of items designated
Would have prohibited the use of federal funds to provide in-flight refueling of
Would have required the President to impose property and travel sanctions on
Would have directed the Comptroller General to review U.S. military support to |
Referred to the Senate | |
|
National Defense Authorization Act, 2019 |
|||
H.R. 5515/P.L. 115232
Representative Mac |
Section 1286 (HASC Reported) |
Reported to House on
Conferees removed the Conference report agreed to
Conference report agreed to
Signed by the President and | |
|
Representative Beto O'Rourke (D)—Texas, and Representative Ro Khanna (D)—California |
(D)—California
House Rules Committee Amendment 312— | Submitted on 05/17/2018
Not made in order by Rules | |
Committee
H.R. 5515
Representative Ro Khanna |
House Rules Committee Amendment 323—would have required the | Submitted on 05/17/2018
Not made in order by Rules | |
Committee
H.R. 5515
Representative Ro Khanna |
House Rules Committee Amendment 325 | ” Submitted on 05/17/2018
Not made in order by Rules | |
Committee
CRS-41
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
H.R. 5515/P.L. 115232
| Representative Ro Khanna |
House Rules Committee Amendment 338—requires the Secretary of | Submitted on 05/17/2018
Made in order as
Engrossed in the House on
In conference, an |
|
Representative Ted Lieu (D)—California, and Representative Ted Yoho (R)—Florida |
(R)—Florida
House Rules Committee Amendment 367— | Submitted on 05/17/2018
Not made in order by Rules | |
Committee
H.R. 5515
Representative Rick Nolan |
House Rules Committee Amendment 399—Would have prohibited the | ” Submitted on 05/17/2018
Not made in order by Rules | |
Committee
CRS-42
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
H.R. 5515
Representative Pramila Jayapal |
House Rules Committee Amendment 456— | ” Submitted on 05/17/2018
Not made in order by Rules | |
Committee
H.R. 5515
Representative Mark Pocan |
| Submitted on 05/17/2018
Not made in order by Rules | |
Committee
H.R. 5515
Representative Mark Pocan |
| Submitted on 05/17/2018
Not made in order by Rules | |
Committee
H.R. 5515
Representative Karen Bass |
House Rules Committee Amendment 561 |
Submitted on 05/17/2018
Made in order as Adopted by voice vote as
Engrossed in the House on
In conference, was removed | |
|
Senator James Inhofe (R)—Oklahoma |
|
Status
Reported to Senate on In conference, an
Incorporated as Section | |
Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2019 | |||
Senators Murphy (D-CT), |
Senate Amendment 3793 to Senate Amendment 3695—Would have |
Submitted on 08/20/2018
H.R. 6157
Representative Ro Khanna
| |
|
Representative Ro Khanna (D)—California |
(D)—California
House Rules Committee Amendment 79—Would have prohibited the use |
Not made in order by Rules | |
Committee
H.R. 6157
Representatives Khanna ( |
House Rules Committee Amendment 83—Would have prohibited the use |
Not made in order by Rules | |
Committee
H.Rept. 115-769 on |
House Committee on Appropriations |
Requests a classified report from the Secretary of Defense, no later than 120 |
Reflected in Division A of |
by reference CRS-44 Bill Number Principal Sponsors Summary Status Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2019 | |||
S.Rept. 115-282 on |
Senate Committee on Appropriations |
Noted that 22 million people were in need of assistance in Yemen and 8 million
Urges the Administration to (1) work with all parties involved in the conflict to | Reported to the Senate on |
H.Rept. 115-829 on |
House Committee on Appropriations |
Expresses Committee concern about ”
Report urges the Secretary of State | ”
Reported to the House on |
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 | |||
H.Amdt. 865 to | Representative Dan Lipinski | Would have required an annual report from the Director of National Intelligence |
Approved in House by voice |
|
National Defense Authorization Act, 2018 |
|||
| P.L. 11591
CRS-46
Representative Mac |
Section 1277 (House-passed)—Would have required the President to
Section 1275 (Agreed to in Conference | ”
Engrossed in the House on
The Senate engrossed
In conference, the |
P.L. 115-91
Bill Number
H.R. 2810
| P.L. 11591
CRS-47
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Representative Ted Lieu ( | House Rules Committee Amendment 274—Would have required the Section 1265 (Agreed to in Conference)—Requires the Secretaries of State | ” Submitted on 07/12/2017
Made in order as Adopted by voice vote as
Agreed to in conference
The conference agreement |
| P.L. 11591
Representative Rick Nolan |
House Rules Committee Amendment 159—Would have prohibited the | Submitted on 07/12/2017
Made in order as Adopted by voice vote as
The Senate struck the |
conference
H.R. 2810 | (NDAA)
Representative Ro Khanna |
House Rules Committee Amendment 70—Would have required |
Submitted on 07/12/2017
Not made in order by Rules |
Committee
H.R. 2810 | (NDAA)
Representative Ro Khanna |
House Rules Committee Amendment 71—Would have required an | Submitted on 07/12/2017
Not made in order by Rules |
Committee
H.R. 2810 | (NDAA)
Representatives Khanna ( |
House Rules Committee Amendment 73—Would have prohibited the use |
Submitted on 07/12/2017
Not made in order by Rules |
Committee
H.R. 2810 | (NDAA)
Representative Warren |
House Rules Committee Amendment 386—Would have prohibited the | Submitted on 07/12/2017
Made in order as Adopted by voice vote as |
CRS-48
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
H.R. 2810 | (NDAA)
Representatives Gwen Moore |
House Rules Committee Amendment 188—Would have required the U.S. |
Submitted on 07/12/2017
Not made in order by Rules |
Committee
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)
S.Amdt. 439
| Senator Elizabeth Warren |
Senate Amendment 439—Would have required the Secretary of Defense, in |
Submitted on 07/27/2017 Not considered |
Not considered
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)
S.Amdt. 585
|
Senator Todd Young (R)—Indiana |
|
Submitted on 07/27/2017 Not considered |
Submitted on 07/27/2017
Not considered
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)
S.Amdt. 896
| Senator Christopher Murphy |
|
Submitted on 09/11/2017 Not considered |
Not considered
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)
S.Amdt. 923
| Senator Marco Rubio (R)— |
Florida
Senate Amendment 923 |
Submitted on 09/11/2017 Not considered |
Submitted on 09/11/2017
Not considered
CRS-49
Bill Number
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)
S.Amdt. 1081
Principal Sponsors
| Senators Todd Young (R)—
Indiana, Christopher Murphy |
|
Status
Submitted on 09/14/2017 Not considered |
Not considered
H.R.3219— | |||
H.R. 3219 (FY2018 | H.R.
3354
Representative Rick Nolan |
House Rules Committee Amendment 35—Would have prohibited the use |
Not made in order by Rules |
Committee
H.R. 3219 (FY2018 | H.R.
3354
Representative Warren |
House Rules Committee Amendment 104—Would have prohibited the |
Made in order as Considered as H.Amdt. 268 |
H.R. 3219 (FY2018 | H.R.
3354
Representatives Khanna ( |
House Rules Committee Amendment 13 |
Not made in order by Rules |
Committee
H.R. 3219 (FY2018 | H.R.
3354
Representatives Ro Khanna |
House Rules Committee Amendment 20—Would have prohibited the use |
Not made in order by Rules |
Committee
H.R. 3219 (FY2018 | H.R.
3354
Representatives Amash ( |
House Rules Committee Amendment 44—Would have prohibited the use |
Not made in order by Rules |
Committee
CRS-50
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Consolidated | |||
|
H.R. 3354 ("minibus") |
Appropriations FY2018
H.R. 3354
(“minibus”)
Representative Ro Khanna |
House Rules Committee Amendment 45—Would have reduced funds for | Submitted on 09/12//2017
Not made in order by Rules |
Committee Joint Resolutions of Disapproval on U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia | |||
S.J.Res. 42
H.J.Res 102
Senator Rand Paul, (R)—
Kentucky
Representative Justin Amash, | Would have disapproved of the proposed export to the Government of the | Considered in the Senate on
Motion to discharge | |
Source: Congress.gov, Congressional Record, and House Rules Committee.
Table 3. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 114th Congress
114th Congress
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments offered in the 114th Congress
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Resolutions and Stand-alone Legislation
S.J.Res. 32
Senator Christopher Murphy
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments offered in the 114th Congress
|
Bill Number |
Principal Sponsors |
Summary |
Status |
|
Resolutions and Stand-alone Legislation |
|||
Senator Christopher Murphy (D)—Connecticut (D)—Connecticut
H.J.Res 90
Representative Ted Lieu |
CRS-51
Would have prohibited the transfer to Saudi Arabia of United States air- |
Introduced and referred to
Introduced and referred to | |
Senator Christopher Murphy | A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate on the conflict in Yemen that, | ” Introduced 07/11/2016
Reported to Senate without | |
Senator Ben Cardin (D)—Maryland Senator Bob Corker (R)—Tennessee | Would have required regular reporting on, among other things, Iranian support | S. 3267.
S. 3267
Senator Bob Corker (R)—
Tennessee
Introduced and referred to
Introduced and referred to | |
|
National Defense Authorization Act, 2016 |
|||
|
Representatives John Dingell and John Conyers (D)--Michigan |
House Rules Committee Amendment 103—would have expressed the Sense of
Section 1042 in House engrossed version of H.R. 1735 .
Removed by conferees. Conferees in H.Rept. 114-270 | ”
Made in order as Agreed to by voice vote as | |
| Senator John McCain (R)— |
Arizona
Summary
Status
Section 1209 prohibits, subject to a |
Passed in the House
Agreed to in Senate on |
Author Contact Information
Acknowledgments
CRS interns Carmelina Palmer and Christopher Mellon provided research support for this product.
| 1. |
In early December 2017, the Houthi-Saleh alliance unraveled, culminating in the killing of former President Saleh on December 4, 2017. |
| 2. |
According to one account, "The Obama administration agreed to support what the Saudis called Operation Decisive Storm with considerable reluctance, seeing it as an unwinnable proxy war against Iran." See, "How the War in Yemen Became a Bloody Stalemate and the Worst Humanitarian Crisis in the World," New York Times Magazine, October 31, 2018. |
| 3. |
Statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on the Situation in Yemen, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 25, 2015. |
| 4. |
Over the last decade, Congress has periodically addressed Yemen-related issues in annual authorization and appropriations legislation. Before the 2015 Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, Members were mostly focused on providing security assistance to Yemeni government forces to counter terrorist groups like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); addressing Yemeni detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; overseeing the issuance of visas for Yemeni nationals traveling to the United States; countering human trafficking in Yemen; and prohibiting U.S. assistance from being provided to Yemeni security forces which use child soldiers. |
| 5. |
Section 1271 of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232) modifies 10 USC 2342 to prohibit the use of such agreements to transfer support or services to third parties and to require annual reporting. |
| 6. |
Section 1270 of the House-passed version of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 2500, would alter the authority granted to the President to determine that an emergency exists which requires waiving congressional review requirements under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776). |
| 7. |
Though Yemen was not the key focus of congressional interest in the Middle East at the time, congressional committees did hold oversight hearings. For example, see "Yemen under Attack by Iranian-backed Houthis," Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, April 14, 2015; "The U.S. Role and Strategy in the Middle East: Yemen and the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council," Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 6, 2015; and "Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen," Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, November 17, 2016. |
| 8. |
Congress did address Yemen during consideration of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 114-92). H.R. 1735, the House version of that bill, included Section 1273, a "Sense of Congress on Evacuation of United States Citizens and Nationals from Yemen." That provision was excluded from the final version of the Act, which did contain a provision that prohibited Defense Department funds from being provided to "an entity in Yemen that is controlled by members of the Houthi movement." |
| 9. |
"Saudis Face Mounting Pressure over Civilian Deaths in Yemen Conflict," New York Times, September 29, 2015. |
| 10. |
Letter from Representative Debbie Dingell et al to President Barack Obama, October 14, 2015. Available from CRS. |
| 11. |
"Senate Democrats hold up Arms Sales for Saudi war in Yemen," Al Monitor, October 7, 2015. |
| 12. |
"As Saudis bombed Yemen, U.S. worried about Legal Blowback," Reuters, October 10, 2016. |
| 13. |
See, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Call by Ben Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, and Jeff Prescott, Senior Director for the Middle East, NSC, on the Upcoming Visit of King Salman of Saudi Arabia, September 2, 2015. |
| 14. |
Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittal No. 15-57, November 16, 2015. |
| 15. |
The request marked the first time that Congress has invoked an authority it added to the Arms Export Control Act in December 2014 through an amendment included in the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-276). Section 201 of the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-276) added Section 36(i) to the AECA. Potentially applicable to any foreign military sale requiring notification pursuant to Section 36(b) of the AECA, the 36(i) mechanism requires both the chair and ranking member of either of the two committees of jurisdiction (SFRC/HFAC) to jointly request that the President provide such a "pre-shipment notification" 30 days prior to a shipment. The pre-shipment notification would inform Congress that a shipment was about to occur, but would not require or preclude Congress from taking further action to modify or block the shipment. |
| 16. |
Although Congress has more than one legislative option it can use to block or modify an arms sale, one option explicitly set out in law for blocking a proposed arms sale is the use of a joint resolution of disapproval as provided for in Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). See, CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. |
| 17. |
In January 2016, Senator Chris Murphy called on the Administration to "suspend supporting Saudi Arabia's military campaign in Yemen, at the very least, until we get assurances that this campaign does not distract from the fight against ISIS and Al Qaeda, and until we make some progress on the Saudi export of Wahhabism. And Congress should not sign off on any more military sales to Saudi Arabia until similar assures are granted." See, "Chris Murphy on the Roots of Radical Extremism," Council on Foreign Relations, January 29, 2016. |
| 18. |
In April 2016, the "Saudi Arabia-led coalition" was listed alongside other parties to the conflict in Yemen in the annex of the annual report of United Nations Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict for attacks that resulted in the killing and maiming attacks of children in Yemen. In July 2016, then-U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon alleged that Saudi Arabia had threatened to reduce its funding for U.N. programs if the coalition was not removed from the report annex, an allegation that Saudi leaders denied. In August 2016, the Secretary General said, "After very careful consideration, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition was removed from the annexes, pending the conclusions of a review. ...I have since received information on measures taken by the coalition to prevent and end grave violations against children. We will continue our engagement to ensure that concrete measures to protect children are implemented. But I want to repeat: the content of the report stands." See, U.N. Blacklists Saudi-led Coalition for Killing Children in Yemen, Reuters, October 5, 2017. |
| 19. |
For example, see, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O'Brien Statement to the Security Council on Yemen, New York, February 16, 2016, and Press briefing note on Yemen and Honduras, Spokesperson for the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights: Rupert Colville, Geneva, Switzerland, March 4, 2016. |
| 20. |
In the 114th Congress, see, S.J.Res. 32—A joint resolution to provide limitations on the transfer of certain United States munitions from the United States to Saudi Arabia and H.J.Res. 90, To provide limitations on the transfer of certain United States munitions from the United States to Saudi Arabia. |
| 21. |
In the 114th Congress, see, S. 2943—National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 which became P.L. 114-328. |
| 22. |
In the 114th Congress, see H.R. 5293—Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2017. |
| 23. |
See, H.R. 5293, Recorded Vote, June 16, 2016, available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2016/roll327.xml. |
| 24. |
"U.S. withdraws staff from Saudi Arabia dedicated to Yemen Planning," Reuters, August 19, 2016. |
| 25. |
See Hon. Lieu et al., Letter to President Barack Obama, August 29, 2016. |
| 26. |
Congressional Record, September 21, 2016, pp. S5921-S5935. |
| 27. |
op.cit., Congressional Record. |
| 28. |
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by NSC Spokesperson Ned Price on Yemen, October 8, 2016. |
| 29. |
"U.S. Blocks Arms Sale to Saudi Arabia amid Concerns over Yemen War," New York Times, December 13, 2016. |
| 30. |
Letter from the President—War Powers Resolution, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, October 14, 2016. |
| 31. |
"U.S. Support for Saudi Strikes in Yemen Raises War Crime Concerns," Foreign Policy.com, October 15, 2016. |
| 32. |
"Senate tacitly endorses US role in Yemen War," Al Monitor, September 21, 2016. |
| 33. |
Congressional Record, November 15, 2016, Pages H6202-H6208. |
| 34. |
Congressional Record, September 21, 2016, Pages S5921-S5935. |
| 35. |
See colloquy between Senators Bob Corker and John McCain on Senate floor, September 21, 2016. Congressional Record, 114th Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 162, No. 143. |
| 36. |
See remarks by Senator Christopher Murphy and Senator Rand Paul on Senate floor, September 21, 2016. Congressional Record, 114th Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 162, No. 143. |
| 37. |
As one analyst described this trend in 2016, "We haven't seen this much anti-Saudi activity on the Hill in a quarter of a century.... Criticism of Saudi Arabia has come out of the closet, and I don't think it's going to go back in." "Saudi Arabia is Facing Unprecedented Scrutiny from Congress," Washington Post, September 21, 2016. |
| 38. |
"Obama Officials' Incomplete Reckoning with Failure on Yemen," Just Security, November 19, 2018. |
| 39. |
"Trump Administration Looks to Resume Saudi Arms Sale Criticized as Endangering Civilians in Yemen," Washington Post, March 8, 2017; and, "Trump Administration Weighs Deeper Involvement in Yemen War," Washington Post, March 26, 2017. |
| 40. |
DDTC Transmittals No. DDTC 15-132 (JDAM), No. DDTC 16-011 (FMU-152A/B bomb fuzes), No. DDTC 16-043 (Paveway II & III, Enhanced Paveway II & III, Paveway IV), May 19, 2017. |
| 41. |
A November 2017 report suggests that Saudi Arabia has agreed to purchase $7 billion in precision munitions from U.S. companies in agreements that would span a decade. See, "Saudi Arabia Agrees to buy $7 billion in Precision Munitions from U.S. firms: Sources," Reuters, November 22, 2017. To date, no new precision-guided munitions foreign military sales have been formally notified to Congress since the May 2017 notification of three direct commercial sales of precision guided munitions technology that had been deferred by the Obama Administration. |
| 42. |
Letter from Department of Defense Acting General Counsel William Castle to Senators Mitch McConnell and Chuck Schumer, February 27, 2018. |
| 43. |
"2017: A Record Year for US Counterterrorism Strikes," Long War Journal, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, January 3, 2018. See also, U.S. Department of Defense, CENTCOM Officials Provide Update on Recent Counterterrorism Strikes in Yemen, Dec. 20, 2017. |
| 44. |
"Trump Administration Is Said to Be Working to Loosen Counterterrorism Rules," New York Times, March 12, 2017. |
| 45. |
"Reps Lieu & Conyers lead 52 Member Letter urging Tillerson to use Diplomacy to reopen Yemen Port," March 13, 2017. |
| 46. |
U.S. Representative Mark Pocan, "Bipartisan Effort: 55 U.S. Representatives Call on Trump to Come to Congress Before Taking Military Action in Yemen," April 11, 2017. |
| 47. |
Congressional Record, June 13, 2017, Issue: Vol. 163, No. 100—Daily Edition. |
| 48. |
op.cit., Congressional Record. |
| 49. |
Congressional Record, November 13, 2017, Vol. 163, No. 185, Pages H9148-H9155. |
| 50. |
On November 4, 2017, a Houthi ballistic missile (with alleged Iranian markings) landed on Saudi soil near King Khalid international airport in Riyadh. Two days later, the Saudi-led coalition closed all Yemeni ports, including Hudaydah, which is the primary point of entry for most imported food and humanitarian supplies entering Yemen. Yemen imports over 90% of its food supply. After the coalition's imposition of the port's total closure, food and fuel prices skyrocketed, leading international aid agencies to warn of impending famine. The total closure of all Yemeni ports lasted until November 24, 2017, when the Saudi-led coalition announced that it would begin allowing humanitarian aid to resume entering Hudaydah port—but not commercial shipments of food and fuel. The Saudi-led coalition argued that the Houthis earn hard currency by taxing fuel imports. Yemen imports 80% of its food from commercial suppliers rather than from humanitarian sources. |
| 51. |
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by President Donald J. Trump on Yemen, December 06, 2017. Other statements include the following: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, White House Statement on Iranian-Supported Missile Attacks Against Saudi Arabia, November 8, 2017; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement from the Press Secretary on the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen, November 24, 2017; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary Regarding the Violence and Humanitarian Conditions in Yemen, December 08, 2017. |
| 52. |
In late 2017, Senators Todd Young and Christopher Murphy placed a hold on the confirmation of the State Department's nominee for legal advisor, Jennifer Newstead, until the Administration took certain steps to address the coalition's blockade of Yemen. Dan De Luce and Robbie Gramer, "GOP Senator Presses Trump Administration Over Deadly Saudi Blockade in Yemen," Foreign Policy, December 4, 2017; and, Dan De Luce, "Trump Nominee Concedes Saudi Siege of Yemen Could Be Violating U.S. Law," Foreign Policy, December 19, 2017. On December 14, Senator Young sent a letter to President Trump thanking the President for his December 6 statement, while asserting that, per the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended (22 U.S. Code §2378-1(a)), the coalition's blockade triggers a prohibition on U.S. foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia. Newstead was confirmed by the Senate on December 19 after promising the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to consider evidence of any possible foreign government restriction of the delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance to Yemen in determining whether to apply statutory prohibitions found in 22 U.S. Code §2378-1(a). See, Senator Todd Young, Young: Law Triggered by Saudi Arabia's Actions in Yemen, December 14, 2017, and Newstead response online at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4333104-20171114-Young-Newstead-QFRs-Round-3-1.html. |
| 53. |
This followed the late 2017 action in the House (see discussion of (H.Con.Res. 81 and H.Res. 599, above), in which a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove U.S. forces from Yemen was tabled in favor of a House-passed nonbinding resolution. |
| 54. |
For example, see remarks of Senator Mike Lee on the Senate floor, November 28, 2018. Congressional Record, 115th Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 164, No. 187. |
| 55. |
In-flight refueling to the militaries of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is conducted pursuant to the terms of bilateral Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSAs) between the Department of Defense and the respective ministries of each country. ACSA agreements are governed by 10 USC 2341-2350. The agreements provide for reciprocal logistical support under a variety of circumstances, and their underlying statutory authority does not prohibit U.S. support to partner forces engaged in armed conflict. U.S. ACSA agreements with Saudi Arabia and the UAE provide for the transfer of support to third parties with the prior written consent of both the original provider and original recipient. The U.S. agreement with Saudi Arabia was signed in May 2016. The executive branch has not publicly specified what legal authority or agreement provided for refueling support to Saudi aircraft from March 2015 through May 2016. |
| 56. |
Letter from Department of Defense Acting General Counsel William Castle to Senators Mitch McConnell and Chuck Schumer, February 27, 2018. |
| 57. |
Senator Menendez said, "Based upon Chairman Corker's commitments to those hearings and future markups and based upon the totality of the situation, I will vote to table the motion to discharge from the committee because I am not ready to either abandon our partners that face an existential threat from Iran run amok in Yemen, but my support is not unconditional, and I will demand responsive actions." Congressional Record, March 20, 2018, 115th Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 164, No. 48 — Daily Edition. |
| 58. |
Commander, U.S. Central Command Gen. Joseph Votel, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 18, 2018. |
| 59. |
Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Karem, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 17, 2018. |
| 60. |
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 17, 2018. |
| 61. |
The joint resolution identified several certification criteria, although, reported as amended by the committee, it would have enabled the Secretary of State to waive the certification requirement for national security purposes if the Secretary provides an unclassified explanatory justification to the appropriate committees. The joint resolution also would have required a report on, among other things, U.S. objectives in Yemen and a detailed strategy to accomplish those objectives. |
| 62. |
White House, Statement by President Donald J. Trump on H.R. 5515, August 13, 2018. |
| 63. |
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ranking Member's Press, Menendez, Corker, Murphy, Young, Colleagues raise Concerns about Imminent Military Operations at Hudaydah, Yemen," June 12, 2018. |
| 64. |
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ranking Member's Press, Menendez Demands more Answers from Trump Admin before letting Arms Sales to United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia move forward," June 28, 2018. |
| 65. |
State Department Spokesperson Heather Nauert, Press Briefing, August 9, 2018. |
| 66. |
"Congress, White House Reaching Breaking Point on Yemen?" Lobe Log, August 16, 2018. |
| 67. |
Senator Jeanne Shaheen, Statement Following Trump Administration's Certification in Support of Saudi-led Coalition, September 12, 2018. |
| 68. |
White House, Statement Of Administration Policy on S.J.Res. 54, November 28, 2018. |
| 69. |
The full text of the cease-fire agreements are available at https://osesgy.unmissions.org/full-text-stockholm-agreement. |
| 70. |
On December 6, 2018, the warring parties to the conflict in Yemen convened in Sweden under the auspices of the United Nations to discuss various de-escalation proposals and a possible road map to a comprehensive peace settlement. The talks were the first formal negotiations since 2016. After a week of negotiations, all sides agreed to the Stockholm Agreement, which consists of three components; a cease-fire around the port city of Hudaydah, a prisoner swap, and a statement of understanding that all sides would form a committee to discuss the war-torn city Taiz. |
| 71. |
See Section 2 of H.Res. 1176, Providing for consideration of the conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 2) to provide for the reform and continuation of agricultural and other programs of the Department of Agriculture through fiscal year 2023, and for other purposes. |
| 72. |
"U.N. Envoy Urges Yemen Combatants to Withdraw from Lifeline Port," Reuters, January 28, 2019. |
| 73. |
"Explainer: What's So Hard About Implementing a Peace Deal in Yemen's Main Port," Reuters, February 26, 2019. |
| 74. |
"Yemen's Parties Agree to Start Stalled Troop Withdrawal from Main Port," Reuters, February 17, 2019. |
| 75. |
Nima Elbagir, Salma Abdelaziz, Mohamed Abo El Gheit and Laura Smith-Spark, "Sold to an ally, lost to an enemy," CNN.com, February 2019. Available at: https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/02/middleeast/yemen-lost-us-arms/. |
| 76. |
"Hearing to Receive Testimony on the United States Central Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2020 and the Future Years Defense Program," Senate Armed Services Committee, February 5, 2019; "Hearing on U.S. Policy in the Arabian Peninsula," House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 6, 2019. |
| 77. |
State Department, 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report, June 20, 2019. Yemen is listed as a "Special Case" for the fourth consecutive year. |
| 78. |
The White House, "Presidential Veto Message to the Senate to Accompany S.J. Res. 7," April 16, 2019. |
| 79. |
"Hoyer Statement on President Trump's Veto of the Bipartisan Yemen War Powers Resolution," Press Release, April 17, 2019. |
| 80. |
Marianne Levine, "Senate fails to override Trump's veto on Yemen," Politico, May 5, 2019. |
| 81. |
"Houthi withdrawal from Yemen ports going according to plan: UN," Al Jazeera, May 12, 2019. |
| 82. |
In January 2018, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen identified military unmanned aerial vehicles that are of Iranian origin (Ababil-T/Qasef-1) and were brought into Yemen after the imposition of the targeted 2015 arms embargo. See, Letter dated 26 January 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen mandated by Security Council resolution 2342 (2017) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/68) [EN/AR]. |
| 83. |
"Ansar Allah "Airport for Airport" Strategy underlines Potential for Re-Escalation of Yemen Conflict, Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor, June 21, 2019. |
| 84. |
Congressional Record, June 4, 2019, pp. S3203-S3209. |
| 85. |
Joe Gould, "Graham, Menendez offer action to thwart Trump arms sales to Saudi, UAE and Jordan," Defense News, June 5, 2019. |
| 86. |
UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "UAE, Saudi Arabia reaffirm political, military and relief efforts in Yemen," August 26, 2019. |
| 87. |
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator in Yemen "Humanitarian programmes in Yemen forced to shut due to lack of funding," August 21, 2019. |
| 88. |
"House Republicans move to block Yemen War-Powers votes for rest of Congress," The Hill, December 11, 2018. |
| 89. |
Dion Nissenbaum, "Push for Cease-Fire Stalls in Yemen --- Feud between Iran- allied Houthis and Saudi-led Forces Risks Stoking Regional Conflict," Wall Street Journal, August 7, 2019. |
| 90. |
"Iran's Khamenei meets Yemen Rebels after Blow for Saudi Coalition," Agence France Presse, August 14, 2019. |
| 91. |
Dion Nissenbaum and Warren P. Strobel, "U.S. Plans to Open Direct Talks With Iran-Backed Houthis in Yemen," Wall Street Journal, August 27, 2019. |