El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations July 1, 2020 Congress has had significant interest in El Salvador, a small smal Central American nation that has had a large percentage of its population living in the United States since the country' Clare Ribando Seelke country’s civil conflict (1980-1992). During the 1980s, the U.S. government spent billions Specialist in Latin bil ions of dollars supporting the Salvadoran government'’s counterinsurgency efforts American Affairs against the leftist Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). The United States later supported a 1992 peace accord that ended the conflict and transformed the FMLN into a political party. Despite periodic tensions, the United States worked with two consecutive FMLN administrations (2009-2019), but. As bilateral efforts werehave been unable to prevent significant outflows of migrants from the country.

irregular emigration from El Salvador, the Trump Administration has focused relations with President Nayib Bukele on migration-related issues. Domestic Situation Domestic Situation

On June 1, 2019, Nayib Bukele, a 37-year-old businessman and former mayor of San Salvador, took office for a five-year presidential term. Bukele won 53% of the vote in the February 2019 election, standing for the Grand Alliance Al iance for National Unity (GANA) party. Elected on an anticorruption platform, Bukele is the first president in 30 years to be elected without the backing of the conservative National Republic Alliance Al iance (ARENA) or the FMLN parties. Bukele succeeded Salvador Sánchez Cerén (FMLN), who presided over a period of moderate economic growth (averaging 2.3%), ongoing security challengeschal enges, and political polarization.

President Bukele has promised to reduce crime and attract investment, but his lack of support in the National Assembly (GANA has 11 of 84 seats) has led to several executive-legislative clashes. Homicides continued to trend downward during his first year in office (to a rate of 36 per 100,000), but extortion rates rose. El Salvador’s economy grew 2.4% in 2019 but is expected to decline by 5.4% this year due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Bukele has remained popular, but his government’s refusal to abide by legislative and Supreme Court decisions and his harsh COVID-19 quarantine have received significant international criticism. U.S. Policy Since FY2016, Congress has appropriated nearly $3.1 bil ion, at least $411 mil ion of which has been al ocated to El Salvador, through the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America to address the underlying drivers of migration. In March 2019, the Administration suspended most foreign aid to El Salvador (and to Guatemala and Honduras) after criticizing the government’s failure to address irregular migration. After signing several migration-related agreements with the Bukele government in 2019, the Administration informed Congress that it intends to release some suspended assistance and provide smal amounts of new targeted aid for El Salvador. U.S. funds aim to deter migration, support President Bukele’s security strategy, and respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. The FY2021 budget does not specify a funding amount for El Salvador but asks for $377 mil ion for the Central American region. In addition to scaled-back U.S. assistance, shifts in U.S. immigration policies have tested bilateral relations. The Administration’Assembly (GANA has 11 of 84 seats) could present challenges. Bukele has proposed infrastructure projects that could help the country take better advantage of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR); critics question how these projects will be financed. Bukele has criticized repressive governments in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Honduras. During a July 2019 visit with Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, President Bukele vowed to improve relations with the United States by working bilaterally to address gangs, drugs, and immigration and seeking investment rather than U.S. assistance.

Future U.S. engagement in El Salvador is uncertain, however, as the Administration announced in March 2019 that it intended to end foreign assistance programs in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras due to continued unauthorized U.S.-bound migration. In June 2019, the Administration identified FY2017 and FY2018 bilateral and regional funds subject to withholding or reprogramming. It is unclear how funds appropriated for FY2019 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) and FY2020 funds may be affected. Bilateral relations also have been tested by shifts in U.S. immigration policies, including the Trump Administration's decision to rescind the temporary protected status (TPS) designation that has shielded up to s decision to rescind the temporary protected status (TPS) designation that has shielded up to 250,000 Salvadorans from removal since 2001 is a major concern for the Bukele government. A House-passed bill, bil , H.R. 6, would allowal ow certain TPS designees to apply for permanent resident status.

A small The 116th Congress has considered various measures affecting U.S. policy toward El Salvador. In December 2019, Congress enacted the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), which provides $519.9 mil ion for Central America, including at least $73 mil ion for El Salvador. Several other measures Congress may consider would expand in-country refugee processing in the Northern Triangle (H.R. 2347 and H.R. 3731) and authorize foreign assistance for certain activities in Central America (H.R. 2615, H.R. 2836, H.R. 3524, S. 1445, and S. 1781). See also CRS Report R44812, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer. Congressional Research Service link to page 5 link to page 5 link to page 5 link to page 7 link to page 9 link to page 11 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 18 link to page 18 link to page 19 link to page 21 link to page 21 link to page 23 link to page 24 link to page 24 link to page 25 link to page 25 link to page 25 link to page 26 link to page 27 link to page 29 link to page 29 link to page 30 link to page 30 link to page 31 link to page 32 link to page 32 link to page 33 link to page 6 link to page 10 link to page 26 link to page 22 link to page 34 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 Politics and Governance ................................................................................................... 1 Postconflict Era of ARENA and FMLN Rule ................................................................. 1 Bukele Administration................................................................................................ 3 Security Conditions ......................................................................................................... 5 Criminal Justice System ............................................................................................. 7 Bukele’s Security Plan ............................................................................................... 9 Economic and Social Conditions................................................................................ 10 Human Rights .............................................................................................................. 14 Recent Human Rights Violations................................................................................ 14 Confronting Past Human Rights Violations .................................................................. 15 U.S. Relations .............................................................................................................. 17 U.S. Foreign Assistance ............................................................................................ 17 Suspension of Assistance ..................................................................................... 19 FY2020 Appropriations and FY2021 Budget Request .............................................. 20 COVID-19 Assistance and Humanitarian Aid for Tropical Storm Amanda................... 20 Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Investment Compact ............................... 21 Migration Issues ...................................................................................................... 21 Recent Migration Flows ...................................................................................... 21 Human Trafficking and Alien Smuggling ............................................................... 22 Removals, Temporary Protected Status, and Deferred Action for Child Arrivals ........... 23 Asylum Processing Capacity in El Salvador and the U.S.-El Salvador Asylum Cooperation Agreement .................................................................................... 25 Security Cooperation................................................................................................ 26 Counternarcotics ................................................................................................ 26 Gangs and Citizen Security .................................................................................. 27 Trade Relations ....................................................................................................... 28 Human Rights Cases: Former Salvadoran Officials Tried in the United States ................... 28 Outlook.................................................................................................................. 29 Figures Figure 1. Map of El Salvador and Key Country Data ............................................................ 2 Figure 2. Homicide Rate in El Salvador: 2004-2019 ............................................................. 6 Figure 3. U.S. Apprehensions of Salvadoran Nationals: FY2009-FY2020 (May)..................... 22 Tables Table 1. U.S. Assistance to El Salvador: FY2016-FY2021 ................................................... 18 Contacts Author Information ....................................................................................................... 30 Congressional Research Service El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations Congressional Research Service link to page 6 link to page 21 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations Introduction A smal , densely populated Central American country that has deep historical, familial, and economic ties to the United States, El Salvador has been a focus of sustained congressional interest (seesee Figure 1 for a map andand key country data).¹1 After a troubled history of authoritarian rule and a civil war (1980-1992), El Salvador has established a multiparty democracy, albeit with significant challengeschal enges, particularly related to insecurity.²2 A 1992 peace accord ended the war and assimilated the leftist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillaguerril a movement into the political process as a political party. The conservative Nationalist Republican Alliance Al iance (ARENA) ruled until 2009, before ceding power to two consecutive FMLN administrations. With both the FMLN and ARENA tarnished by revelations of corruption by former presidents, Salvadorans elected Nayib Bukele, an outsider who took office on June 1, 2019.³

3 President Bukele, a businessman and former mayor of San Salvador, left the FMLN and captured a first-round victory standing for the Grand AllianceAl iance for National Unity (GANA) party in February 2019 presidential elections.⁴4 Born in 1981, Bukele is the first president of El Salvador from a generation that did not come of age politically political y during the civil conflict in which more than 70,000 Salvadorans died.5 Bukele has battled with the legislature (where GANA holds 11 of 84 seats) and the Supreme Court over funds he sought for his security plan and his aggressive enforcement of a Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) quarantine. Although he remains popular, Bukele’s critics are concerned about his authoritarian tendencies and lack of respect for other branches of government.670,000 Salvadorans died.⁵ Buoyed by popular support, Bukele has a strong mandate to address the serious governance, security, and economic challenges that have fueled emigration from El Salvador.⁶ In contrast to the FMLN, President Bukele has adopted a pro- United States agenda and pledged to stop irregular migration (see “United States agenda, which he highlighted during a July 21, 2019, visit with U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo (see "U.S. Relations,"U.S. Relations,” below). below).⁷ Bukele's power is likely to be constrained, however, by GANA's limited representation (11 of 84 seats) in the legislature.

This report examines political, economic, security, and human rights conditions in El Salvador. It then analyzes selected issues in U.S.-Salvadoran relations that have been of particular interest to Congress, including foreign assistance, migration, security cooperation in addressing gangs and counternarcotics issues, human rights, and trade.

Politics and Governance

Postconflict Era of ARENA and FMLN Rule

Polarization between the FMLN, a party formed by former guerillasgueril as, and ARENA, a party aligned with the military, has been the primary dynamic in Salvadoran politics since the civil conflict. From 1994 to 2008, successive ARENA governments sought to rebuild democracy and 1 For historical background on El Salvador, see Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, El Salvador: A Country Study, ed. Richard Haggerty (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1990). 2 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002); Diana Villiers Negroponte, Seeking Peace in El Salvador: The Struggle to Reconstruct a Nation at the End of the Cold War (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 3 Nelson Renteria and Noe T orres, “Outsider wins El Salvador Presidency, Breaking two-party System,” Reuters, February 3, 2019. 4 Charles T . Call, The Significance of Nayib Bukele’s Surprising Election as President of El Salvador, Brookings Institution, February 5, 2019. 5 United Nations Commission on the T ruth for El Salvador, From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador: Report of the Com m ission on the Truth for El Salvador, 1993. 6 “Hungry House: Nayib Bukele’s Power Grab in El Salvador,” The Economist, May 6, 2020. Congressional Research Service 1 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations From 1994 to 2008, successive ARENA governments sought to rebuild democracy and implement market-friendly economic reforms. ARENA proved to be a reliable U.S. allyal y but did not effectively address inequality, violence, andor corruption. Development indicators generally general y improved, but natural disasters, including earthquakes in 2001 and periodic hurricanes, hindered progress. Moreover, despite ARENA'’s probusiness policies, economic growth averaged 2.4% over the postwar years in which it governed.⁸

7 Figure 1. Map of El Salvador and Key Country Data

and El Salvador’s Central Bank data downloaded from Trade Data Monitor (TDM). The attorney general'’s office has brought cases against the two most recent ARENA presidents. Francisco Flores (1999-2004) passed away in January 2016 while awaiting trial for allegedly al egedly embezzling donations from Taiwan destined for earthquake relief. In August 2018, former president Anthony ("Tony"“Tony”) Saca (2004-2009) pled guilty to charges of money laundering and 7 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2019. Congressional Research Service 2 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations embezzlement of some $300 mil ionembezzlement of some $300 million. Saca, who started the GANA party in 2010 after being expelled expel ed from ARENA, is now serving a 10-year prison sentence.

From 2009 to 2014, Mauricio Funes Mauricio Funes (2009-2014), a former journalist, served as El Salvador'’s first FMLN president. Funes remained popular throughout his term, asand his government reduced poverty and inequality (see "Economic and Social Conditions"). The government expanded crime prevention programs and community policing, but it also supported and then later disavowed a failed gang truce as it struggled to reduce gang-related violence (see "Security Conditions," below).⁹ gang truce.8 In 2016, the attorney general'’s office began investigating Funes for al egedlyfor allegedly embezzling more than $350 million mil ion in public funds. He received political asylum in Nicaragua in 2016 Nicaragua, but Salvadoran officials have since sought to have him extradited.¹⁰

sought his extradition.9 Salvador Sánchez Cerén (2014-2019), a former guerrillaguerril a commander, failed to implement most of his his inaugural pledges to boost social and infrastructure spending due, in part, to El Salvador'’s severe fiscal constraints and his party'’s lack of a congressional majority. Many observers maintain that Sánchez Cerén, who faced health challenges, did not demonstrate strong leadership. During his term, El Salvador continued to contend with difficult security conditions despite reductions in homicides since 2015, low investment, and polarization between the executive and the ARENA-led National Assembly.10 Aggressive anti-gangAssembly.¹¹ Aggressive antigang efforts led to extrajudicial killings kil ings by security forces.¹²11 The FMLN performed poorly in March 2018 legislative elections. In May 2019, only 15% of Salvadorans polled said that Sanchez Cerén had governed well.¹³

Under Sánchez Cerén, El Salvador continued to strengthen its ties with Cuba and Venezuela and abandoned long-standing ties with Taiwan to establish diplomatic relations with China. Illicit Il icit funds reportedly flowed from Venezuela'’s state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) to its Salvadoran subsidiary (Alba Petróleos) and some FMLN politicians, which raised U.S. concerns and resulted in U.S. sanctions on the company.¹⁴12 The Trump Administration criticized the Salvadoran government'government’s August 2018 decision to abandon relations with Taiwan in favor of China, particularly for the "“non-transparent"” way in which the decision took place.¹⁵

13 Bukele Administration On February 3, 2019, Nayib Bukele, standing for the GANA party, won 53% of the vote, wel ahead of Carlos Cal eja (ARENA-led coalition), with 31.8%, and Hugo Mártinez (FMLN), with 14.4%. Bukele’s first-round victory occurred amid relatively low voter turnout (44.7%) during an electoral process observed by the Organization of American States (OAS) and deemed free and fair.14 The scale of Bukele’s victory demonstrated voters’ dissatisfaction with both major parties. Bukele led the presidential race from start to finish, despite releasing few specific policy proposals until late in the campaign and opting not to attend debates. In 2017, the FMLN expel ed 8 “T raducing El Salvador’s T ruce,” The Economist, August 26, 2017. 9 Nelson Renteria, “El Salvador’s top Court Approves Extradition Request for ex-President Funes,” Reuters, March 21, 2019. In October 2018, the attorney general’s office issued another arrest warrant for Funes on charges of involvement in a massive corruption scheme involving contractors, his family, and the former attorney general . 10 According to the State Department, investors “ generally perceived [the Sánchez Cerén government] as unsuccessful at improving the investment climate.” U.S. Department of State, 2019 Investment Clim ate Statem ents: El Salvador, July 11, 2019. 11 Anna-Catherine Brigida, “El Salvador’s T ough Policing Isn’t What it Looks Like,” Foreign Policy, July 6, 2019. 12 Douglas Farah and Caitlyn Yates, Maduro’s Last Stand, National Defense University and IBI Consultants, May 2019; Per U.S. T reasury Department guidance, sanctions on Venezuela’s stat e oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.(PdVSA), announced in January 2019 also apply to any subsidiaries in which the company (PdVSA) has a 50% or greater interest. See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/licensing_guidance.pdf. Héctor Silva Ávalos, “ PDVSA Subsidiaries in Central America Slapped With Sanctions,” InSight Crime, March 13, 2019. 13 T he White House, “Statement by t he Press Secretary on El Salvador,” August 23, 2018. 14 Organization of American States (OAS), “OAS Electoral Observation Mission Celebrates Peaceful Election in El Salvador,” February 4, 2019. Congressional Research Service 3 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations Bukele Administration

Bukele led the presidential race from start to finish, despite releasing few specific policy proposals until late in the campaign and opting not to attend debates. In 2017, the FMLN expelled Bukele from the party for criticizing its leadership. Bukele tried to create his own political party, but El Salvador'’s electoral court did not approve the new party'’s registration in time to appear on the ballot the bal ot for the 2019 election. He then became GANA'’s presidential candidate.

As a candidate, Bukele communicated directly with potential voters using social media rather than relying on a party apparatus. He focused on addressing voters'’ concerns about corruption, unemployment, and crime. Bukele pledged to use his experience as a businessman and as a mayor to attract investment, address the underlying causes of the gang phenomenon, and give Salvadorans hope so that they could envision a future in their country rather than emigratingunauthorized emigration would decline. Despite GANA'’s reputation for corruption, Bukele ran on an anticorruption campaign and calledcal ed for the establishment of an international international anticorruption commission in El Salvador similar to the U.N.-sponsored International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG).15 His Nayib Bukele opposition to efforts by the National Born in San Salvador in 1981, Nayib Bukele is the son of the Assembly to shield civil conflict-era late Armando Bukele Kattán, a prominent businessperson of human rights abusers from prosecution Palestinian descent who backed the FMLN financial y won domestic and international praise beginning in the early 1990s. Bukele graduated high school in from human rights groups.16 the late 1990s and began working in family businesses started by his father, including a public relations firm that represented Upon taking office, Bukele appointed a the FMLN. Bukele was elected mayor of Nuevo Cuscatlán cabinet composed of individuals from a (2012-2015) and San Salvador (2015-2018) for the FMLN. As variety of parties. Vice President Felix mayor, he revitalized the historic center of San Salvador and engaged at-risk youth in violence-prevention programs. Ul oa isImpunity in Guatemala (CICIG).¹⁷ His opposition to efforts by the National Assembly to shield civil conflict-era human rights abusers from prosecution won praise from some domestic and international civil society groups.¹⁸

Upon taking office, Bukele appointed a cabinet composed of individuals from a variety of parties that is equally balanced by gender. Vice President Felix Ulloa, a lawyer who has worked with many international institutions on rule-of-law and election issues, has taken the lead on international issues, including efforts to implement an international anticorruption commission.¹⁹. Foreign Minister Alexandra Hill Hil formerly worked at the Organization of American StatesOAS. Bukele appointed a navy captain as defense minister and promoted six colonels to run the army while pushing several army generals into retirement.²⁰17 Bukele'’s minister of justice and security is a close political ally, andal y; his police chief is a career officer who most recently oversaw specialized units, including one implicated in extrajudicial killings kil ings of gang suspects.²¹ He18 Bukele kept the same finance minister as the previous government and selectedand chose an economy minister who used to work with the Inter-American Development Bank. Analysts predict these selections signal continuity for investors and a desire to seek support from multilateral institutions.²²

Since taking office, Other ministers (agricultural and head of the ports) are lifelong friends of Bukele who reportedly lack experience.19 Critics maintain Bukele has largely relied on his brothers for advice.20 President Bukele has governed much as he campaigned, including using social media to make policy declarations and to pressure legislators to back his policy proposals. Although he has outlined and secured some legislative support for his security plans, he has yet to present his economic proposals.²³ Bukele is seeking private investment to fund many infrastructure projects, including a new airport and railway line, included in his national development plan, Plan Cuscatlán.²⁴ He is also seeking support from the Organization of American States and the United Nations to fulfill his pledge to create a commission against corruption despite skepticism from the private sector about what it sees as "international interventionism without control or supervision."²⁵

President Bukele has shifted El Salvador'declarations, purge government officials, attack his opponents, and pressure legislators to back his policies.21 Bukele’s supporters have praised these moves, viewing them as needed steps to remove corruption and nepotism. Critics have expressed concerns about statements he has made and actions he has taken to discredit and block access to journalists and human rights groups 15 Melissa Vida, “Why T ackling Corruption Could Also Reduce Violence in El Salvador,” World Politics Review, June 19, 2019; Charles T . Call, International Anti-Im punity Missions in Guatem ala and Honduras: What Lessons for El Salavdor? American University, June 2019. 16 Due Process of Law Foundation, Three Years After the Annulment of the Amnesty Law, July 8, 2019. 17 “El Salvador: Changing of the Guard,” Latin America Weekly Report, June 20, 2019. 18 Héctor Silva Ávalos, “El Salvador Flirts with ‘Mano Dura’ Security Policies Again,” Insight Crime, June 21, 2019. 19 “Hungry House: Nayib Bukele’s Power Grab in El Salvador,” The Economist, May 6, 2020. 20 Ibid. 21 Patrick J. McDonnell, Alexander Renderos, “ Is El Salvador’s Millennial President a Reformer or an Autocrat?” Los Angeles Tim es, February 28, 2020. Congressional Research Service 4 link to page 10 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations critical of his actions.22 His use of the military to intimidate the legislature in February 2020 and to detain reported violators of a strict COVID-19 quarantine have prompted rebukes by El Salvador’s Supreme Court and international condemnation.23 Although Bukele may struggle to secure legislative support for his security plan and infrastructure proposals (discussed below) this year, some predict his popularity (92.5% in May 2020) wil help GANA pick up seats in the February 2021 legislative elections.24 President Bukele has shifted El Salvador’s foreign policy into closer alignment with the United States and asked the United States for "“investments and great relations"” rather than just foreign assistance.²⁹ assistance.25 He has criticized repression in Venezuela and Nicaragua, a significant departure from the prior government'’s position, while also condemning the erosion of democracy in Honduras. Bukele took responsibility for the June 2019 deaths of two Salvadoran migrants who drowned while trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border rather than criticizing U.S. immigration policies.³⁰

During the campaign he had pledged to reassess the Sánchez Cerén government's August 201826 Bukele’s decision to abandon relations with Taiwan in favor of China. He recently announced, however, that for now, El Salvador's relations with China are "confirmed and fully established."³¹

maintain relations with China established by his predecessor was likely driven by a need for foreign investment, but it remains a concern for U.S. policymakers.27 Security Conditions Security Conditions

El Salvador has been dealing with escalating homicides and generalized crime committed by gangs, drug traffickers, and other criminal groups for more than a decadetwo decades. In 2015, El Salvador posted a homicide rate of 104 per 100,000 people—the highest in the world. Although the homicide rate has decreased by almost 5065% since then to 5036 per 100,000, it remains high by global standards (seesee Figure 2).³²28 In contrast to other Central Americanneighboring countries, El Salvador'’s municipalities with high levels of violence have varied significantly over time and are located all al over the country.29 22 Committee to Protect Journalists, “El Salvador Bans 2 Investigative Outlets from Press Conferences at Presidential Residence,” September 11, 2019; U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Justification Regarding Ce rtification Under Section 7045 (a) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020 (Div. G, P.L. 116-94), May 18, 2020. Hereinafter: U.S. Department of State, May 18, 2020. 23 U.S. Department of State, May 18, 2020. 24 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Report: El Salvador, generated June 23, 2020; Edwin Segura, “Bukele Cierre su Primer Año con Alta Aprobación,” La Prensa Gráfica, May 20, 2020. 25 Nayib Bukele, “Nayib Bukele: El Salvador Doesn’t Want to Lose More People to the U.S.,” Washington Post, July 23, 2019. 26 Kirk Semple, “‘It Is Our Fault’: El Salvador’s President T akes Blame for Migrant Deaths in Rio Grande,’ New York Tim es, July 1, 2019. 27 Ernesto Londoño, “To Influence El Salvador, China Dangled Money. T he U.S. Made T hreats.” New York Times, September 21, 2019. 28 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), over the country.³³

Figure 2. Homicide Rate in El Salvador: 2003-2018

Sources: Data for 2003-2017 are from U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Study on Homicide, 2019; Chris Dalby and Camilo Carranza, “InSight Crime’s 2018 Homicide Round-up,” InSight Crime, January 22, 2019. 29 Mario Herrera, Homicides in Central America: Towards a Better Understanding of Territorial Trends, Causes, and Dynam ics, Woodrow Wilson Center’s Latin America Program, April 20 19. Congressional Research Service 5 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 2. Homicide Rate in El Salvador: 2004-2019 Sources: Graphic by CRS using United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Victims of Intentional Homicide, 1990-2018,” at https://dataunodc.un.org/content/data/homicide/homicide-rate; U.S. State Department, El Salvador 2020 Crime & Safety Report, Overseas Security Advisory Council, March 31, 2020, for 2019 data , 2019; 2018 data are from El Salvador's police.

In recent years, those homicides have included targeted killingskil ings of security forces by gangs, extrajudicial killings kil ings of gang suspects by police, and among the world'’s highest rates of femicide (killing (kil ing of a woman or girl, often committed by a man, because of her gender).³⁴ In addition to the more than 3,300 homicides committed in 2018, the attorney general's office received more than 3,000 reports of disappeared persons from January through October 2018. Many of the disappeared are never found but are suspected dead.³⁵

30 The 2018 kil ing of a prominent journalist, Karla Turcios, by her partner prompted the declaration of a national emergency and captured international attention.31 In recent years, deportees have become targets of violence, with at least 70 deportees murdered between 2013 and 2018.32 El Salvador has the highest concentration of gang members per capita in Central America. As a result, gangs arehave been responsible for a higher percentage of homicides there than in neighboring countries.33 Although President Bukele has attributed declining homicides to his military-led security policies, some analysts posit that gangs have deliberately decided to reduce violence in the territories they control to facilitate extortion and drug distribution (their primary sources of revenue).34 Gangs general y have not had a major role in transnational drug trafficking.35 They have carried out periodic violence to demonstrate their power to the government, including attacks in April 2020 that resulted in more than 60 deaths in four days.36 Some fear that Bukele’s response to that violence, which included authorizing the use of lethal 30 International Crisis Group, El Salvador’s Politics of Perpetual Violence, Report No. 64, December 2017; Anna-Catherine Brigida, “El Salvador’s T ough Policing Isn’t What it Looks Like,” Foreign Policy, July 6, 2019. 31 Anastasia Moloney, “High-Profile El Salvador Femicide Case Exposes Deadly Gender Violence,” Reuters, January 21, 2020. 32 Anna-Catherine Brigida, “Kicked Out of the U.S., Salvadoran Deportees Are Struggling Simply to Stay Alive,” World Politics Review, Oct ober 9, 2018. 33 International Crisis Group, Life Under Gang Rule in El Salvador, November 26, 2018. 34 Asmann and O’Reilly, January 2020; T he Global Initiative Against T ransnational Organized Crime/InSight Crime, A Crim inal Culture: Extortion in Central Am erica, May 2019. 35 Steve Dudley and Héctor Silva, “ MS13 in the Americas: How the World’s Most Notorious Gang Defies Logic, Resists Destruction,” InSight Crim e and the Center for Latin American & Latino Studies at American University, February 2018. 36 Marcos Alemán, “ El Salvador’s Jail Crackdown on Gang Members Could Backfire,” AP, April 29, 2020. Congressional Research Service 6 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations force against gangs and pushing gang inmates into crowded prisons with rival gangs, may prompt more gang clashes with security forces and hurt the country’s international image.37 neighboring countries.³⁶ A government-facilitated truce between the country's major gangs (the MS-13 or Mara Salvatrucha and the 18^th Street gang) that unraveled in 2014 may have strengthened the gangs' internal cohesion.³⁷ Gangs have been involved in a range of other criminal activities, including extortion, with individuals and businesses paying an amount equivalent to 1.7% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) annually in extortion fees.³⁸ Although gangs engage in local drug distribution, they generally do not have a major role in transnational drug trafficking or human smuggling.³⁹ Deportees have become targets for extortion and violence, with at least 70 deportees murdered between 2013 and 2018.⁴⁰

Finklea. Gang-related violence has fueled most internal displacement in El Salvador, but violence perpetrated by security forces (police and military) also has been a factor.38 In 2019internal displacement and irregular emigration. In August 2016, El Salvador's civil roundtable against forced displacement attributed more than 85% of internal displacement to gang activity. In 2018, El Salvador recorded 246,000 newly internally displaced persons454,000 new internal y displaced persons (IDPs) due to conflict, the most of any country in Latin America that experienced displacement linked to conflict and violence.39 In January 2020, the Bukele government enacted a law to deal with internal displacement that was praised by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations, but then the government reportedly cut the 2020 budget for assistance to victims of violence.40 in Latin America that experienced displacement linked to conflict and violence.⁴¹ The government recently has acknowledged the phenomenon but struggled to address the needs of those fleeing violence. A 2018 study found that the probability that an individual intends to migrate is 10-15 percentage points higher for Salvadorans who have been victims of multiple crimes than for those who have not.⁴² (For more information on gang-related human rights abuses, as well as extrajudicial killings of gang suspects by security forces, see "Recent Human Rights Violations" section, below.)

Criminal Justice System

Criminal Justice System El Salvador has a long history of weak institutions and corruption, with successive presidents and legislatures allocatingal ocating insufficient funding to criminal justice institutions. With a majority of the national civilian policeNational Civilian Police (PNC) budget devoted to salaries, historicallyhistorical y there has been limited funding available for investing in training and equipment. The PNC has deficient wages, training, and infrastructure. It also has lacked a merit-based promotion system. Corruption, weak investigatory capacity, and an inability to prosecute officers accused of corruption and human rights abuses have hindered performance. A lack of confidence in the police has led many companies and citizens to use private security firms and the government to deploy soldiers to perform public 37 Mary Beth Sheridan and Anna-Catherine Brigida, “Photos Show El Salvador’s Crackdown on Imprisoned Gang Members,” Washington Post, April 28, 2020. 38 Cristosal, Signs of a Crisis: Forced Internal Displacement as a Result of Violence in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, 2018, June 12, 2019. 39 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019, available at https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement -data. 40 UNHCR, “UNHCR Welcomes new law in El Salvador to Help People Internally Displaced by Violence,” January 10, 2020; CRS interview with Cristosal, May 19, 2020. Congressional Research Service 7 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations security functions. President Bukele has increased police salaries and sought, but did not receive, legislative approval of a loan to provide new equipment for police and soldiers.41 The State Department maintained in 2019 that “impunity persisted despite government steps to dismiss and prosecute” some officials who had committed abuses, partial y due to corruption in the judiciary.42 Whereas some judges and courts in El Salvador have issued significant decisions, particularly in opening civil-war era cases of human rights abuses, others have proven subject to corruption. From January to August 2019, the Supreme Court heard cases against 110 judges accused of various irregularities, including collusion with criminal groups.43 At President Bukele’s direction, auditors have been examining the “reserved spending account” that Bukele’s predecessors used to divert public funds for their own priorities.44 Observers praised the probity section of the Supreme Court’s efforts to identify public officials who may have used their positions for il icit enrichment and the anti-corruption work of prosecutors under former Attorney General Douglas Meléndez (2016-2018).45citizens to use private security firms and the government to deploy soldiers to perform public security functions. President Bukele hopes to increase police salaries; he has redirected some funds to purchase new uniforms for the PNC and to support police (and military forces) carrying out his security strategy (see "Bukele's Security Plan," below).⁴³

Until the tenure of Attorney General Douglas Meléndez (2016-2018), a lack of political will and capacity to address corruption had fostered the embezzlement of state funds and corruption in public contracts. Under Meléndez, Salvadoran prosecutors, with U.S. support, brought corruption cases against the past three Salvadoran presidents and a former attorney general Luis Mártinez.⁴⁸. Together, those presidents are estimated to have stolen more than $750 mil ion.46 Meléndez faced death threats throughout his term. Anti-corruption cases have continued, albeit slowly, under Attorney General Raul Melara, a lawyer unanimously selected by the National Assembly in December 2018 to replace Meléndez (who could have served a second term). Melara is a lawyer with ties to ARENA more than $750 million. After some early setbacks,⁴⁹ the attorney general's office convicted police officers for aggravated homicides and for participating in a death squad, former president Saca for corruption, and a key gang truce mediator for extortion in 2018. Meléndez also issued new arrest warrants against former president Funes, former attorney general Mártinez, businessperson Enrique Raíz, and others for alleged involvement in a massive corruption scheme.⁵⁰ Meléndez faced death threats throughout his term.

In December 2018, the National Assembly unanimously voted to replace Douglas Meléndez (who could have served a second term) with Raul Melara, a lawyer with ties to ARENA who had no who had no experience in criminal prosecution. Under Melara, prosecutors have raided the offices of Alba Petróleos, a subsidiary of Venezuela'’s state oil company that is facing U.S. sanctions.⁵¹ In recent interviews, Melara has suggested that resolving cases involving forced disappearances will be one of his priorities and stated that although his office is open to receiving international assistance, prosecutors will continue their work with or without an international commission.⁵² He and President Bukele continue to seek Funes's extradition even though he has become a Nicaraguan citizen.⁵³ Nevertheless, some are concerned that Melara's deputy attorney general has been accused of corruption by witnesses in the case against former attorney general Mártinez.⁵⁴

Delays in the judicial process and massive arrests carried out during past antigang sweeps made facing U.S. sanctions in May 2019, but have yet to indict anyone from the company or anyone who received funds from it (a group that includes Bukele).47 Melara appears to have acquiesced to President Bukele’s limited vision for the International Commission Against Impunity in El Salvador (CICIES), a campaign promise Bukele fulfil ed through an agreement with the OAS in September 2019.48 Thus far, CICIES has a very limited staff and budget, and its mandate has been limited to providing technical support to Salvadoran prosecutors. Civic organizations have complained that CICIES is not empowered, as CICIG in Guatemala was, to initiate investigations and prosecutions or push for legislative reforms.49 The attorney general’s office also has announced it wil investigate COVID-19 spending for irregularities.50 41 “El Salvador Standoff Deepens over Loan for Security Forces,” AP, February 9, 2020. 42 U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practice for 2019: El Salvador, March 2020. Hereinafter: U.S. Department of State, Hum an Rights, 2020. 43 U.S. Department of State, Human Rights, 2020. 44 U.S. Department of State, May 18, 2020. 45 Several high-profile cases prepared by the probidity section had yet to be approved to move forward by the Supreme Court. T hose included former FMLN and GANA legislators, as well as former Vice President Oscar Ortiz. U.S. Department of State, Hum an Rights, 2020. 46 Felipe Puerta, “El Salvador AG’s Office Escalates Efforts Against Corruption,” InSight Crime, October 17, 2018. 47 Héctor Silva Ávalos, “El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele T ainted by Money Laundering Allegations,” InSight Crime, September 24, 2019. CRS interview with Héctor Silva, June 19, 2020. 48 Due Process of Law Foundation, From Hope to Skepticism: The International Commission Against Impunity in El Salvador (CICIES), April 1, 2020. 49 Paola Nagovitch, “Nayib Bukele’s First Year in Office,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas, May 28, 2020. 50 “Fiscalía Investigará Compras y Contrataciones en Emergencia,” La Prensa Gráfica, June 28, 2020. Congressional Research Service 8 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations Delays in the judicial process and massive arrests carried out during anti-gang sweeps made under mano dura (heavy-handed)under mano dura (heavy-handed)⁵⁶ policing efforts have resulted in severe prison overcrowding. 51 According to the U.S. State Department, prison capacity has increased in recent years, but facilities remained 215% overcrowded as of August 2018.⁵⁷at 141% of occupancy as of September 2019.52 In addition to building new facilities, the government has channeled more prisoners into rehabilitation and job training programs, some of which have received U.S. support. Nevertheless, many human rights groups maintain that sanitation and access to medical services have worsened since the government adopted more restrictive prison conditions for gang inmates began in 2016. Bukele’s Security Plan In June 2019, President Bukele launched the first phase (Preparation) of what he said would be a seven-phase Territorial Control plan. A year later, he has publicly announced only three of those seven phases, and the enforcement of a strict national quarantine in response to the COVID-19 pandemic has dominated government efforts and public attention.53 The Bukele government disbanded the council that the prior government used to discuss security issues with civil society and the private sector, but its security plan otherwise appears to resemble the focused, municipal- level efforts of the prior FMLN government’s Safe El Salvador Plan.54 The first phase of the plan involved deploying police and military forces into 17 high-crime communities and on public transportation and declaring a state of emergency in 28 prisons. The state of emergency tightened the “extraordinary measures” already implemented in the prisons to include preventing visitors, blocking communications networks in and around prisons, and transferring inmates to more secure facilities.55 The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights has raised concerns about the measures’ impact on inmates’ rights and health.56 President Bukele received legislative approval of a $90 mil ion loan to implement the second phase of his security plan, Opportunity. This phase has sought to unite the efforts of government agencies, nonprofits, and donors to provide opportunities for youth to work, study, and engage in cultural and sports activities as alternatives to gangs. It also includes programs aimed at reinserting youth who are former inmates into society through their participation in penitentiary farms or public works projects. For years, Salvadoran presidents have deployed thousands of military troops to support the police, but observers have been particularly concerned about President Bukele’s use of the military. Bukele has tasked thousands of members of the armed forces with supporting his 51 Mano dura approaches have involved incarcerating large numbers of youth (often with tattoos) for illicit association and increasing sentences for gang membership and gang-related crimes. A m ano dura law passed by El Salvador’s Congress in 2003 was subsequently declared unconstitutional but was followed by a super m ano dura package of reforms in July 2004. T hese reforms enhanced police power to search an d arrest suspected gang members and stiffened penalties for convicted gang members, although they provided some protections for minors. For background, see Sonja Wolf, Mano Dura: the Politics of Gang Control in El Salvador (Austin, T X: University of T exas Press, 2017). 52 U.S. Department of State, Human Rights, 2020. 53 Paola Nagovitch, “Explainer: Nayib Bukele’s T erritorial Control Plan,” Americas Quarterly, February 13, 2020. 54 Roberto Valencia, “La Fase 2 del Plan Control T erritorial es Parecida a lo que Planteaba el Plan El Salvador Seguro,” El Faro, November 1, 2019. 55 “Extraordinary measures,” which began as a temporary measure in 2016 but became permanent through legislation passed in 2018 enable the movement of gang leaders to maximum -security prisons, cutting off cell phone service around prisons and restricting visitors to those facilities. 56 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), “IACHR Presents its Preliminary Observations Following its in loco Visit to El Salvador,” press release No. 335/19, December 27, 2019. Congressional Research Service 9 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations security plan. In August 2019, Bukele announced phase three (Modernization) of his plan, which has not yet been implemented. In February 2020, the National Assembly refused to approve a $109 mil ion loan to equip the police and military, even after Bukele had those forces surround the legislative palace—a move the Supreme Court and international observers rebuked.57 Bukele has also defied a Supreme Court order to stop using security forces to detain those accused of violating a national quarantine and force them to stay in “containment centers.”58 in 2016.

Secure El Salvador Plan; "Extraordinary Measures" in Prisons

Bukele's Security Plan

Military Involvement in Public Security Efforts

Economic and Social Conditions

Although El Salvador facesEconomic and Social Conditions El Salvador has faced significant economic challenges, the country has made some progress in recent years at tackling weaknesses in its economy that may be exacerbated by the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (see the text box “COVID-19 in El Salvador”). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), El Salvador posted an economic growth rate of 2.5% in 20182019. The IMF predictsinitial y predicted similar growth of about 2.5% this year but later revised its forecast to a contraction of 5.4%, due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.59 similar growth of about 2.5% this year.⁶⁶ Record remittances, which were equivalent to 21% of GDP in 2018, low oil prices, and a growing U.S. economy have helped El Salvador's economic performance.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, natural disasters, including flooding in 2017 and a drought in 2018, have hindered agricultural output.

Economists have identified a lack of public and private investment in the economy as a primary reason for El Salvador'’s moderate growth rates. According to El Salvador'’s Central Bank, net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) stood at $849 millionmil ion in 2018, with a total stock of $9.7 bil ion$9.7 billion. Experts maintain El Salvador needs to attract more than $1.2 billion annuallybil ion annual y in order to bolster growth.⁶⁸60 Despite El Salvador'’s relatively low inflation and stable, dollarized economy, FDI in El Salvador has been lower than the average among Central American countries for several years. Low levels of FDI have been attributed to the country'’s political polarization, complicated regulations and bureaucracy, security challenges (including violence and extortion), and ineffective justice system (discussed in "Criminal Justice System," above).⁶⁹

Until 2017, El Salvador'chal enges, and ineffective justice system.61 El Salvador’s executive and legislature have often clashed over how to respond to the country's ’s social and infrastructure needs and significant financing gaps. The government has often swapped short-term debt for longer-term debt rather than implement unpopular fiscal reforms. The legislature has been reluctant to approve multilateral financing requests from the executive branchbranch for social programs. In addition, long-standing government practices that preceded but continued under FMLN rule—including cash payments to officials, and a shielded presidential spending account, and diversion of government funds——have exacerbated fiscal woes.

Since 2017, the IMF has credited the Salvadoran government with taking steps to improve the country'country’s fiscal situation and implementing "progrowth reforms."⁷⁰“pro-growth reforms.”62 A 2017 pension reform helped ease the financial burden on that system by raising both employee and employer contributionscontributions; the IMF urges a complementary reform to raise the retirement age and better target benefits. The IMF also credits a fiscal responsibility law with helping rationalize public spending and reduce the country's public debt. Now that Bukele has taken public spending. After President Bukele took office, IMF officials are urgingurged him to secureback a broader fiscal pact that could include excise taxes on luxury goods, better targeted social programs, a property tax, and/or a reduction in the size of some public sector agencies.⁷¹

In its most recent Ease of Doing Business reports, the World Bank has agencies.63 As part of a COVID-related emergency 57 WOLA, Political Crisis in El Salvador Should be Solved Through Dialogue, Not Through Power Plays and Military Deploym ents, February 10, 2020. 58 Marcos Aleman and Christopher Sherman, “El Salvador Quarantine Centers Become Points of Contagion,” AP, May 17, 2020. 59 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2019; World Economic Outlook Database, April 2020. 60 United Nations, 2019 World Investment Report. “El Salvador: Bukele’s Economic Challenge,” Latin News Caribbean & Central Am erica report, June 2019. 61 U.S. Department of State, Investment Climate Report for 2019. July 11, 2019. 62 IMF, El Salvador: 2018 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 18/151, June 2018. 63 IMF, El Salvador: Staff Report for the 2019 Article IV Consultation , May 7, 2019. Congressional Research Service 10 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations program with the IMF (discussed below), the government has pledged to reduce its fiscal deficit in 2021-2023, necessitating a balance of tax increases and austerity measures.64 In recent Ease of Doing Business reports, the World Bank has also credited El Salvador with credited El Salvador with implementing reforms to ease the process for businesses to obtain permits for new construction and pay taxes online, to increase access to electricity, and to speed up border crossings. El Salvador moved up 22 spots to 73^rd out of the Nevertheless, El Salvador fel from 73 of 190 countries ranked in 2018 to 85 in the 2019 report and 91 in the 2020 edition, as other countries reported more progress.65 The State Department has cited the country’s “190 countries ranked in 2018 before falling to 85^th in the 2019 report (still the seventh-highest ranking received by a Latin American or Caribbean country).⁷² Nevertheless, the State Department cites the country's "discretionary application of laws/regulations, lengthy and unpredictable permitting procedures, and customs delays," as continuing to hinder” as hindering the business environment.⁷³ President Bukele has vowed to change that, arguing that an improved business climate should help him66 Upon taking office, President Bukele vowed to improve the business climate and create 100,000 jobs a year as compared to with the fewer than 10,000 a year created during the Sánchez Cerén governmentjobs created annual y during Sánchez Cerén’s term. Each year, the country needs would need to create roughlysome 50,000 jobs just to keep up with the growing labor force.⁷⁴

67 Insecurity and corruption are among the primary barriers to growth in El Salvador. A 2017 study by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) estimated the costs of crime and violence in El Salvador could reach 5.9% of GDP.⁷⁵68 In the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report for 2019, El Salvador ranked last out of 140 countries evaluated in the World Economic Forum's 2018 estimates of business costs due to crime and violence.⁷⁶ Crimes against small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which employ 55% of El Salvador'141 countries evaluated for estimates of business costs due to organized crime and high homicide rates. Its overal ranking its overal ranking stood at 103rd.69 Crimes against smal - and medium-sized enterprises, which employ 55% of El Salvador’s labor s labor force, are of particular concern. According to estimates by the National Council of Small Enterprises cited by the IMF, some 90% of SMEs were extorted in 2017.

According to a study by El Salvador'’s INCAE business school, corruption increases has increased transaction costs and reduces the efficiency and reduced the effectiveness of the state.⁷⁷70 As an example, prosecutors recently in 2019, prosecutors charged former president Funes with paying a company over $100 millionmil ion for a hydroelectric plant that it never completed in a region where access to water is vital.⁷⁸71 In addition to raising the costs of public works projects, corruption has limitedreduced resources available to respond to natural disasters and other challengeschal enges. As previously mentioned, Presidentformer president Francisco Flores (ARENA, 1999-2004) allegedlyal egedly embezzled donations destined for earthquake relief.

Although progress in developing infrastructure, facilitating trade, and easing some regulations has occurred, another barrier to growth in El Salvador continues to be a lack of competitiveness in export sectors. El Salvador's labor force lacks A lack of competitiveness in export sectors has continued to restrict growth. El Salvador’s labor force has lacked adequate education and vocational training to align with labor force needs, including English-language skills.⁷⁹skil s.72 In addition, the country has had logistical and physical infrastructure deficiencies, including no direct access to Caribbean ports. El Salvador's small ’s smal size and high levels of informality (percentage of businesses that do not pay taxes, provide benefits to employees, or register with the government) have also reduced its competitiveness. Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, Bukele had received loans and foreign cooperation (including through the Mil ennium Chal enge Cooperation) to fund infrastructure projects. Selected 64 “El Salvador: Bukele Announces More Coronavirus Stimulus Measures,” May 19, 2020. 65 World Bank, Ease of Doing Business: Reforming to Create Jobs, 2018; Ease of Doing Business: T raining for Reform, 2019; Doing Business 2020, at https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings. 66 U.S. Department of State, Investment Climate Report, July 11, 2019. 67 “El Salvador: Bukele’s Economic Challenge,” Latin News Caribbean & Central America report, June 2019. 68 Laura Jaitman, The Costs of Crime and Violence: New Evidence and Insights in Latin America and the Caribbean , International Development Bank, 2017. 69 World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2019. 70 INCAE, Corrupcion en América Latina y sus Soluciones Potenciales, February 20, 2019. 71 David Marroquín and Xiomara Alfaro, “Fiscalía Presenta Nuevos Cargos Contra Expresidente Funes por Desviar Fondos para presa El Chaparral y Divulgar Información confidencial,” El Salvador.com, January 4, 2019. 72 U.S. Department of State, Country Strategy: El Salvador, August 2018. Congressional Research Service 11 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations initiatives included a new Pacific railway line, a doubling in the capacity of the Acajutla port, and an upgrade of the cargo terminal at the international airport.73 Bukele has supported public-private partnerships. He has sought international investment for those infrastructure projects, as wel as a tourism hub cal ed “Surf City.”74 During a state visit to China in December 2019, Bukele received pledges that China would support several infrastructure projects (including a new stadium and water treatment plant), but details of those pledges were not publicly announced.75 Social development indicators in El Salvador have beenemployees, or register with the government) are widely considered key factors in its reduced competitiveness.

Social development indicators in El Salvador generally are better than in neighboring Honduras and Guatemala, yet challengeschal enges exist, particularly in rural regions. Under successive FMLN Administrations, poverty dropped from 50.1% in 2009 to 44.5% in 2014 to 26.3% in 2018; extreme poverty dropped from 17.1% to 11.7% to 5.7%.⁸¹76 Income inequality has also declined due to growth in the income of the poorest 20% of the population aided by remittances.⁸²

77 According to World Bank data, most social development indicators in El Salvador improved from 2010 to 2017, but some health and education indicators worsened.⁸³78 The mortality rate for children under the age of five fell fel from 19 per 1,000 live births in 2010 to 15 per 1,000 in 2017. By 2017, skilledskil ed health professionals attended nearly all al births in El Salvador and the percentage of children underweight for their age fell fel to 5%. Despite this progress, immunization rates for children under the age of two fell fel to 85% (from 92% in 2010) and primary school completion rates declined to 85% (from 92% in 2010). Per-capita spending on social programs is has been higher in El Salvador than in neighboring Guatemala and Honduras, but still much but lower than the regional average for Latin America.⁸⁴79 Gang-related intimidation and insecurity and teen pregnancies have contributed to poor youth attendance in school.80 El Salvador has had the highest percentage of youth aged 15-24 who are not employed, in school, or in vocational training (28.4%) in Central America.81 According to the 2019 World Risk Index, El Salvador has been among the 20 countries in the world most at risk from natural disasters, due to frequent exposure and weak response capacity.82 The Central American Dry Corridor, which encompasses 58% of El Salvador, 38% of Guatemala, and 21% of Honduras, is extremely susceptible to irregular rainfal . and teen pregnancies are two primary reasons why only about half of eligible Salvadoran youth attend 7^th-9^th grades; of these, only half complete secondary school.⁸⁵ According to data from the International Labour Organization (ILO), El Salvador has the highest percentage of youth aged 15-24 who are not employed, in school, or in vocational training (28.4%) of any country in Central America.⁸⁶

Food insecurity, often caused by drought or other natural disasters (such as earthquakes and hurricanes), has become a major social issue and driver of emigration from El Salvador.⁸⁷ Although family members who are left behind eventually may benefit from 83 As an example, the World Food Program estimated that more than 330,000 Salvadorans are facing food insecurity due to the combined impact of Tropical Storm Amanda and COVID-19.84 Although some families may benefit from 73 “How Is El Salvador Advancing Its Infrastructure Projects?” Bnamericas, October 7, 2019. 74 María Eugenia Brizuela de Ávila and Domingo Sadurní, Nayib Bukele’s First Six Months, Atlantic Council, August 2019. T he lack of roads and sewage treatment facilities in the coastal region of El Salvador are barriers to tourism that the government aims to address. 75 “El Salvador to Get Major Chinese Infra Investments,” Bnamericas, December 4, 2019. 76 Data are available at U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, https://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALST AT /estadisticasIndicadores.asp?idioma=i 77 T he World Bank, “El Salvador: Overview,” updated April 4, 2019. 78 T he data are available at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=SLV. 79 Bartenstein and McDonald, op. cit. 80 USAID El Salvador, “Education Fact Sheet,” at https://www.usaid.gov/el-salvador/education. 81 Data are from the International Labour Organization (ILO), ILOSTAT, accessed in June 2019. 82 Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft and the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (IFHV), World Risk Index, 2019. 83 Nina Lakhani, “Living Without Water: the Crisis Pushing People out of El Salvador,” The Guardian, July 30, 2019. 84 World Food Program, “ T ropical Storm Amanda Severely Impacts Food Security of 340,000 Salvadorans,” June 9, Congressional Research Service 12 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations remittances sent by relatives living abroad, they are often saddled with debts owed to smugglers, an increased work burden (especiallyespecial y in agriculture), and emotional trauma.⁸⁸ Additionally, 85 Additional y, households that receive remittances from relatives in the United States are often better able to deal with food insecurity and natural disasters, but observers maintain that they have been targets for extortion by gangs and corrupt police.⁸⁹

Human Rights

Violence and human rights abuses have been prevalent for much of El Salvador's modern history. Salvadoran authorities are just beginning to investigate mass atrocities committed during the civil war (1980-1992), however, since the Supreme Court did not overturn a 1993 amnesty law until July 2016.⁹⁰ Prior to Bukele'86 COVID-19 in El Salvador The COVID-19 pandemic has tested El Salvador’s public health infrastructure. In 2019, the Global Health Security Index ranked El Salvador roughly average (65 of 195 countries ranked) and in the top third of Latin American countries (9 of 33 countries ranked) with respect to its preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks. El Salvador ranked highest in the strength of its laboratory and surveil ance systems, average in the strength of its health system and ability to respond to outbreaks, and lowest in its ability to prevent outbreaks. Before El Salvador confirmed its first case of COVID-19 in March 2020, the legislature declared a state of emergency, which President Bukele has twice extended by decree, al owing the government to impose a series of measures intended to slow the spread of the virus. Those measures include closing the international borders to most foreigners, shuttering schools and canceling large gatherings, and requiring a 30-day quarantine for returning citizens. Initial y praised for his government’s quick response, Bukele has subsequently received significant criticism from Human Rights Watch and others for his authoritarian approach to the pandemic, which has included ignoring several Supreme Court rulings and laws. President Bukele has used security forces to enforce a harsh quarantine and curfew measures that restricted freedom of movement, stifled information about the virus, and sought to silence critics of his COVID-19 response. Human rights groups have asserted that there have been thousands of arbitrary detentions among the roughly 14,000 people placed in “containment centers,” some for violating quarantine measures. The centers are reportedly crowded and unhygienic; COVID-19 outbreaks have occurred in some of them. As of June 28, 2020, El Salvador had confirmed 6,183 cases of COVID-19 and recorded 164 deaths. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has forecast an economic contraction of 5.4% in 2020, due to the combined impact of the quarantine on output and a recession in the United States—El Salvador’s top export market and source of investment, tourism, and remittances. Although President Bukele secured legislative approval of more than $3 bil ion in relief funds, largely in the form of multilateral loans, to address the economic impact of COVID-19, legislative-executive relations have remained strained over oversight of those funds and the reopening of the economy. Funds that have been approved aim to provide support for municipalities and to cover government spending; help smal - and medium-sized enterprises pay wages and support the self-employed, and provide food for nearly 2 mil ion families. The first COVID-related corruption scandal emerged after the government reportedly purchased masks at inflated prices from a company owned by a public official from Bukele’s party; the official has since been dismissed. The U.S. Agency for International Development has provided $6.6 mil ion worth of assistance to help El Salvador respond to the health, humanitarian, and economic effects of the pandemic. El Salvador has also received support from international financial institutions, including a $20 mil ion loan from the World Bank, $389 mil ion of financing from the IMF, and a $250 loan from the International Development Bank, among other financing and support. Sources: Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, Nuclear Threat Initiative, and Economist Intel igence Unit, Global Health Security Index, 2019; Whitney Eulich, “In El Salvador, Quick COVID-19 Response Fuels Fears of an Iron Fist,” Christian Science Monitor, March 16, 2016; Human Rights Watch, El Salvador: Broad Powers Limit Accountability, June 9, 2020; IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2020; EIU, “El Salvador: Bukele Announces More Coronavirus Stimulus Measures,” May 19, 2020; “El Salvador: First Irregularities Linked to Pandemic Procurement, Latin News Weekly Report, June 25, 2020; U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Government Support to El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” June 11, 2020; IDB, “IDB Approves Loan to Address the COVID-19 Pandemic in El Salvador,” May 28, 2020. 2020. 85 World Food Program et al., Food Security and Migration, August 2017. 86 International Crisis Group, El Salvador’s Politics of Perpetual Violence, December 2017. Congressional Research Service 13 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations Human Rights Violence and human rights abuses have been prevalent for much of El Salvador’s modern history. Since the Supreme Court did not overturn a 1993 amnesty law until July 2016, Salvadoran authorities have relatively recently begun to investigate mass atrocities committed during the civil war (1980-1992).87 Prior to Bukele’s inauguration, the National Assembly had been considering the enactment of a new amnesty law—a move opposed by Bukele, U.N. officials, and others— which would have provided impunity for past crimes, including emblematic cases such as El Mozote (a massacre in which U.S.-trained military forces killedkil ed almost 1,000 civilians).⁹¹

88 In February 2020, Bukele vetoed another similar piece of legislation.89 In addition to past crimes, many of the most serious human rights abuses in El Salvador today arehave related to gender and intrafamilial violence, gangs and criminal groups, and the excessive use of force by security forces. Some of the tactics security forces employed in atrocities committed in the 1980s, such as sexual violence, continue to be used against women and children today. The Salvadoran government'’s ability to address these challengeschal enges has been hindered by resource constraints, political polarization, and corruption.

Recent Human Rights Violations

Since the end of the civil war, El Salvador has had a relatively free press and civil society. Nevertheless, journalists and some nongovernmental organizations focused on transparency have been harassed for reporting on corruption, police abuses, gangs, and drug trafficking.⁹² Human rights defenders have also suffered extortion and attacks, including Karla Avelar, a transgender advocate who reportedly received death threats in 2017.⁹³

90 As previously discussed, international organizations have expressed concern about a deterioration in freedom of the press in El Salvador under President Bukele.91 Employees of a Human Rights Observatory created at the Central American University (UCA) to monitor and analyze data on recent human rights violations have reported harassment in retaliation for their work.92 Indigenous rights and land conflicts have not been as common in El Salvador as in neighboring countries, likely because only 0.2% of the population identified as Amerindian in 2007 (the most recent year available). Although a 2014 constitutional amendment recognized indigenous rights, no laws ensurehave ensured that indigenous people benefit from natural resource development that occurs on land historicallyhistorical y held by indigenous communities. StillStil , land rights advocates have praised El Salvador'’s decision to ban all al metal mining to protect communities'’ water sources.⁹⁴

93 Women, children, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) people have often arebeen targets of gang violence.⁹⁵94 Gang initiations for men and women differ. Whereas men are subject to a beating, women often arehave differed. 87 Jason Motlagh, “Inside El Salvador’s Battle with Violence, P overty, and U.S. Policy,” National Geographic, March 2019. 88 Nelson Renteria, “El Salvador Wartime Parties Suspend Controversial Amnesty Bill,” Reuters, May 23, 2019. For background on El Mozote, see https://www.cristosal.org/el-mozote. 89 Marcos Alemán, “ El Salvador reconciliation law vetoed over impunity fears,” AP, February 29, 2020. 90 Committee to Protect Journalists, “El Salvador: Online Att acks and T hreats Against Salvadoran Investigative News Site,” July 25, 2019. 91 U.S. Department of State, May 18, 2020. 92 Ibid. 93 Sarah Sheets, “ El Salvador’s Mining Ban: Land Rights, Development, and Democracy in Latin America,” May 2, 2017. 94 KIND, Neither Security nor Justice: Sexual and Gender-based Violence and Gang Violence in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatem ala, May 4, 2017. Congressional Research Service 14 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations Whereas men may be subject to a beating, women often may be forced to have sex with various gang members. Female gang members toleratehave tolerated infidelity from their partners, but women may be murdered if they are unfaithful. Non-gang-affiliated women and girls have been murdered as a result of turf battles, jealousy, and revenge. Those who have refused to help gangs or reported crimes are particularly vulnerable, as are those who are related to, or have collaborated with, the police. Harassment by gangs has led thousands of youth to abandon school, including some 39,000 in 2016.⁹⁶. In August 2017, prosecutors from a newly established specialized unit of the attorney general'’s office filed charges against eight gang members for murdering three transgender people.

Gang-related violence ishas been part of a broader spectrum of violence in El Salvador that often affects women and children. Child abuse and spousal rape arehave been major problems. According to a 2015 study, For years, El Salvador hadhas had one of the highest raterates of femicide (killingkil ing of women) in the world. 95 Femicides have been linked to domestic disputes, gangs, and other crimes such as human trafficking; they resulted in the deaths of some 551 women in 2017.⁹⁷96 A 2019 survey of Salvadoran women deported from the United States found that violence, often gender-related, was the second-most frequent reason cited for having migrated to the United States.⁹⁸ There is97 El Salvador has had a total ban on abortion, even in the case of rape or incest, and women in El Salvador have been imprisoned after suffering miscarriages that authorities have deemed illegal abortions.⁹⁹

il egal abortions.98 Human rights groups and journalists have warned the Salvadoran government that its aggressive antiganganti-gang policies have exacerbated human rights abuses committed by underpaid and illil -trained security forces, some of which the State Department and U.N. entities have documented.¹⁰⁰ In June 2017, authorities arrested 4 police and 10 soldiers suspected of involvement in some 36 murders that occurred between 2014 and 2016.¹⁰¹ In August 2017, reporters released evidence of death squads operating within the police. In 2017, Salvadoran officials downplayed those developments in cases before the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights. In 2018, El Salvador's attorney general secured convictions for four police officers for aggravated homicide and six others for participating in a death squad; critics maintain that much more progress needs to be made in reducing impunity for crimes committed by security forces.

99 In 2018, El Salvador’s attorney general secured convictions for four police officers for aggravated homicide of gang suspects and six others for participating in a death squad. Critics maintain that much more progress needs to be made in reducing impunity for crimes committed by police and military forces. As an example, five officers accused of committing an extrajudicial kil ing wel -documented by investigative journalists at a farm in 2015 have been acquitted twice despite forensic evidence and witness testimonies against them.100 Experts have expressed concern that these types of kil ings may increase now that President Bukele has authorized kil ings of gang members for “self-defense” by security forces and the subjection of gang inmates to abuses.101 Confronting Past Human Rights Violations Confronting Past Human Rights Violations

In 2013, 20 years after a U.N. Commission released its report on the war in El Salvador, Amnesty International issued a statement lamenting that the perpetrators of crimes identified in that report 95 Small Arms Survey, A Gendered Analysis of Violent Deaths, Research Note 63, November 2016; Sophie Huttner, “El Salvador’s Femicide Crisis,” The Yale Review of International Studies, Winter 2019. 96 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: El Salvador, 2018. 97 David Bernal, “El Salvador: Inseguridad es la Segunda Razón por la que Emigran las Mujer es,” La Prensa Gráfica, March 8, 2019. 98 Rhodri Davies, “T he ‘Vicious Cycle’ Driving T een Pregnancy in El Salvador,” Al Jazeera, July 22, 2019. 99 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: El Salvador, 2018; OHCHR, “El Salvador End of Mission Statement of the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,” February 5, 2018. 100 Daniel Alarcón, “T he Executioners of El Salvador,” New Yorker, August 4, 2015; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Hum an Rights Practices: El Salvador, 2020. 101 Parker Asmann, “Coronavirus May Be Providing Cover for Police Abuses in El Salvador,” InSight Crime, May 14, 2020; Eric L. Olson, “Bukele’s COVID-19 Response Is Undermining the Rule of Law in El Salvador,” World Politics Review, May 14, 2020. Congressional Research Service 15 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations International issued a statement lamenting that the perpetrators of crimes identified in that report had not been brought to justice in El Salvador and that survivors had not received reparations.¹⁰² 102 In October 2013, then-President Funes signed a decree creating a program to provide reparations to the victims of the armed conflict. It is unclear how much funding has been budgeted for that program and how many people it has assisted thus far.

In September 2017, then-President Sánchez Cerén launched a commission to help people find out what happened to their family members who disappeared.¹⁰³ The commission includes two members proposed by families of the missing and103 The commission, which received $1 mil ion in U.S. support in FY2020, is modeled after the government-sponsored national search commission that has located children who went missing during the conflict. In order for the commission to be successful, it is likely to need access toCritical to the commission’s success may be its ability to access Salvadoran military records and some classified U.S. documents from the period of the conflict so that information collected from the testimonies of survivors and witnesses can be corroborated.

. After the Supreme Court overturned the 1993 Amnesty Law in July 2016, then-Attorney General Meléndez created a small smal group of prosecutors to investigate past crimes. It has received technical assistance funded by USAID and implemented by experts from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.¹⁰⁴104 The group is providinghas provided complementary assistance to civil society organizations engaged in investigating historic crimes and carrying out transitional justice programs. In 2017, a Salvadoran judge ordered the case of the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero reopened. In October 2018, the judge issued a warrant for the arrest of a former military officer suspected of carrying out the killingkil ing whose whereabouts are unknown.¹⁰⁵105 The case against the intel ectual the intellectual authors of the 1989 murders of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter also has been reopened but is proceeding slowly.¹⁰⁶

has proceeded slowly.106 Private human rights attorneys have reopened the emblematic case against 17 surviving military officers charged with involvement in the El Mozote massacre carried out by an elite Salvadoran army battalion in December 1981 in Morazán that resulted in almost 1,000 deaths.¹⁰⁷ 107 Investigators have encountered difficulties, with the military refusing to turn over its historical records on its operations in that region.¹⁰⁸ Still108 Stil , the case ishas been before a provincial criminal court whose judge expanded the case to include additional crimes of torture, forced displacement, and forced disappearance in July 2019.¹⁰⁹

Some remain skeptical109 Some observers have expressed skepticism that this and other emblematic cases will wil be solved. Parties on both the left and the right feelhave felt vulnerable to political or legal attack about abuses that took place during the war and might prefer that the crimes of the past remain unexamined. Shortly after the El Mozote case was reopened against former military officers, a private party filed a case against President Sánchez Cerén and several others for alleged kidnappings that occurred in the late 1980s.¹¹⁰ Despite President Bukele's opposition, the National Assembly, which is still dominated by ARENA and the FMLN, could again try to replace the 1993 amnesty law with a newer version.

Despite President Bukele’s opposition, the National Assembly, which is stil dominated by ARENA and the FMLN, have twice sought to replace the 1993 amnesty law (as required by a 102 Amnesty International, “El Salvador: No Justice 20 Years on from UN T ruth Commission,” press release, March 15, 2013. 103 T his paragraph draws from Geoff T hale, “ T racking El Salvador’s Progress in Historic Human Rights Cases,” WOLA, October 27, 2017. 104 See “Rights and Dignity Project” on USAID/El Salvador, Country Fact Sheet, July 2019. 105 Nelson Rentería, “El Salvador Issues Arrest Order for Archbishop Romero’s Killer,” Reuters, October 23, 2018. 106 T im Muth, “Jesuit Murders Legal Update,” El Salvador Perspectives, April 12, 2018. 107 Elisabeth Malkin, “Survivors of Massacre Ask: ‘Why Did T hey Have to Kill T hose Children?’” New York Times, May 26, 2018. For historical background, see Mark Danner, “T he T ruth of El Mozote,” The New Yorker, December 6, 1993. 108 Cristosal, “Attorney General’s Office Must Investigate What Munguía Payés [Minister of Defense] Did to Declare T hat Information on El Mozote Is Non-Existent,” October 16, 2017. 109 Marcos Alemán, “El Salvador Judge Gives new Charges for El Mozote Massacre,” Washington Post, July 18, 2019. Congressional Research Service 16 link to page 29 link to page 29 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations Supreme Court order) with a law promising reconciliation but aimed at protecting immunity from prosecution. U.S. Relations U.S. Relations

U.S. relations with El Salvador remained cordial during the Sánchez Cerén government (2014-2019) and are poised to strengthenhave strengthened under the Bukele administration. As president-elect, Nayib Bukele promised to improve El Salvador'’s image abroad to attract investment; tackle crime, unemployment, and other root causes of migration; and bringalign his country’s foreign policy into alignment with the United States. Bukele reiterated those pledges and his desire to repair a bilateral relationshiprelations with the United States that, in his view, had "eroded" “eroded” under FMLN rule during a July 21, 2019, joint press conference in San Salvador with Secretary of State Pompeo.¹¹¹110 Rather than criticizing U.S. immigration policies or foreign assistance cutbacks, aid cuts, President Bukele aimssaid he aimed to bolster bilateral efforts to tackle crime andirregular migration and crime and to attract U.S. investment. Nevertheless, migrationMigration could remain an irritant in bilateral relations, given the difficulty of reducing migrant flows in the short term and Bukele's intention to advocate for Salvadoran migrants in the United States.

Congress playshowever, given Bukele’s intention to advocate for Salvadoran migrants in the United States and the potential for his government to receive U.S. pressure to implement the Asylum Cooperation Agreement (ACA) signed in 2019 (See “Asylum Processing Capacity in El Salvador and the U.S.-El Salvador Asylum Cooperation Agreement” below).111 Congress has played a key role in appropriating bilateral and regional aid to El Salvador, overseeing implementation of U.S. assistance programs, and establishing and overseeing U.S. immigration policy, including the future of temporary protected status (TPS) for Salvadorans.¹¹²112 In May 2020, Members of Congress sent a letter to President Bukele urging him not to take actions to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic that could “jeopardize the human rights of the Salvadoran people.”113 Congress is likely to monitor how the Salvadoran government is or is not improvingmoves to improve the investment climate in El Salvador, dealing with gangs, preventingaddress gangs while respecting human rights, prevent emigration, and combatingcombat corruption.

U.S. Foreign Assistance

U.S. assistance to El Salvador ishas been guided by the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which iswas designed to promote economic prosperity, strengthen governance, and improve security throughout the region.114 Congress appropriated more than $3.1 bil ion to support implementation of the strategy from FY2016 to FY2020, including at least $411 mil ion for El Salvador, either as bilateral assistance or through the Central American Regional Security 110 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo and Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele at a Press Availability,” July 21, 2019. 111 Section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) INA authorizes the executive branch to enter into “bilateral or multilateral agreement[s] for the removal of asylum seekers to third countries. Such agreements are typically known as “safe third country agreements” (ST CAs). In 2019, the Department o f Homeland Security (DHS) started negotiating and/or implementing agreements with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, which allow DHS to transfer some asylum seekers to those countries instead of evaluating their claims for asylum in the United States. DHS has opted to refer to these “Safe T hird Country Agreements” (ST CAs) with the Northern T riangle Countries as “Asylum Cooperative Agreements” (ACAs). 112 See CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues, by Jill H. Wilson; CRS Report R46419, Im m igration Legislation and Issues in the 116th Congress, coordinated by Andorra Bruno. 113 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, “ Engel & Sires Urge Salvadoran President to Respect Democratic Norms,” April 29, 2020. 114 T his section draws from CRS Report R44812, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer. Congressional Research Service 17 link to page 22 link to page 23 link to page 23 link to page 23 link to page 23 link to page 23 link to page 23 link to page 23 link to page 23 link to page 23 link to page 23 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations Initiative (CARSI) (seeimprove security throughout the region.¹¹³ The Obama Administration launched the strategy following a surge in apprehensions of unaccompanied migrant children from Central America along the southwestern border in 2014. Congress has appropriated nearly $2.6 billion to support implementation of the strategy from FY2016 to FY2018, including at least $410 million for El Salvador, either as bilateral assistance or through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) (see Table 1). From FY2016 to FY2018, this assistance was. This assistance has been subject to two sets of conditions in an attempt to bolster political will wil in the region and improve the effectiveness of U.S. programs. For FY2019 and FY2020, the assistance was subject to one set of conditions that included selected criteria drawn from the two prior sets of conditions from FY2016 to FY2018.115 In March 2019, the Trump Administration suspended most foreign assistance to El Salvador (as wel as to Guatemala and Honduras) due to continued unauthorized migration.116 Prior to the Trump Administration’s aid suspension, U.S. foreign assistance hadeffectiveness of U.S. programs.¹¹⁴ Much of the assistance appropriated in FY2018 may never be delivered, however, due to the Trump Administration's decision to end most foreign assistance programs to the Northern Triangle countries of Central America—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (see "Suspension of Assistance," below).

U.S. assistance has supported a range supported a range of development efforts in El Salvador. In recent years, bilateral assistance has funded programs to improve the quality of the education systemBilateral assistance funded programs to improve educational and vocational opportunities for at-risk youth, facilitate economic reforms, boost private-sector productivity, strengthen the rule of law, support civil society, and promote human rights protection and government accountability. El Salvador also has and promote government accountability and transparency.117 El Salvador also received assistance through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) to support justice sector reform, including support for the attorney general’s office, police unit vetting, border and port security, anti-gang efforts, drug interdiction, human rights monitoring and protection efforts, and violence prevention programs.118 Table 1. U.S. Assistance to El Salvador: FY2016-FY2021 (appropriations in mil ions of current dol ars) FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021 Foreign Assistance Account FY2016 (est.)a (est.)b (est.)c (enacted)d (request)e Bilateral Aid, Subtotal 67.9 72.8 13.0 16.4 72.7 0.0 Development Assistance 65.0 70.0 3.3 16.4 70.0 0.0 International Military Education and 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.0 0.8 0.0 Training Foreign Military Financing 1.9 1.9 9.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 Central America Regional 73.4 70.2 16.8 11.1 NA NA Security Initiative (CARSI), Subtotal Economic Support Fund 35.5 28.5 2,0 11.1 NA NA International Narcotics Control and 37.9 41.7 14.8 NA NA NA Law Enforcement Total 141.3 143.0a 29.8b 27.5c 72.7d NAe Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2018-FY2021; the explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-94; U.S. Department of State, CN 18-101, May 18, 2018; USAID, 115 As an example, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94) required the Secretary of State to certify that the government of El Salvador was meeting nine criteria prior to the disbursement of 50% of the funds to the central government. The conditions include combating corruption and impunity; implementing reforms, poli cies, and programs to increase transparency and strengthen public institutions, protecting the rights of civil society, opposition political parties, and the independence of the media; providing effective and accountable law enforcement and security for it s citizens, and upholding due process of law, among others. T he State Department issued the required report on May 18, 2020 despite expressing some concerns about the Bukele government’s “use of the National Civilian Police and armed soldiers to pressure and intimidate El Salvador’s legislature to approve funding.” U.S. Department of State, “ Memorandum of Justification Regarding Certification Under Section 7045 (a) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020 (Div. G, P.L. 116-94),” May 18, 2020. 116 Morgan Ortagus, Department Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing,” June 17, 2019. 117 See, for example, USAID, USAID/El Salvador Country Fact Sheet, July 2018, 118 See, as an example, USAID, CN #134, June 22, 2018; U.S. Department of State, CN 18-101, May 9, 2018. Congressional Research Service 18 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations CN #134, June 22, 2018; USAID, CN #192, August 16, 2019; CN 19 -277, August 19, 2019; USAID, CN #197, August 27, 2019; USAID, CN# 189, June 3, 2020; USAID, CN #190, June 3, 2020. Notes: CARSI = Central America Regional Security Initiative; NA = Not available. El Salvador receives additional assistance from other U.S. agencies, such as the Inter-American Foundation and the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense (DOD) provides security cooperation to train and equip the Salvadoran defense ministry in border and maritime interdiction capabilities with its 10 U.S.C. §333 appropriations. a. The Trump Administration withheld some assistance appropriated for El Salvador in FY2017, b. Congress appropriated $57.7 mil ion of bilateral aid for El Salvador in FY2018 and the State Department and USAID initial y al ocated an additional $33.6 mil ion of CARSI assistance to El Salvador. In 2019, however, the Trump Administration reprogrammed much of that aid to other countries. c. Congress appropriated most foreign assistance for Central America as regional funding in FY2019, giving the State Department flexibility in al ocating the resources. These are preliminary al ocations. d. Like previous years, Congress appropriated CARSI aid for the entire Central American region in FY2020. Al ocations for El Salvador are not yet available. e. The Trump Administration is requesting $376.9 mil ion for Central America in FY2021, but did not request any bilateral assistance for El Salvador. El Salvador could receive funds requested through regional accounts. Suspension of Assistance (CARSI) to support justice sector reform, police unit vetting, border security, antigang efforts, and violence prevention programs, among other measures.

FY2019 Appropriations Legislation

Suspension of Assistance and FY2020 Appropriations

In March 2019, the Trump Administration announced its intention to end foreign aid to the Northern Triangle due to the continued northward flow of migrants and asylum-seekers from the region. This announcement prompted a thorough review of U.S. assistance programs to Northern Triangle countries. Following that review, the State Department continued to fund programs implemented by the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security aimed at helping the Salvadoran government counter transnational crime and improve border security as wel as vetted units working with U.S. law enforcement agencies.119 By June 2019, however, the Administration had suspended or reprogrammed to other countries and priorities the vast majority of development assistance for El Salvador and the other Northern Triangle countries. Due to that decision, many development projects administered by USAID ended early or were scaled back dramatical y. The Trump Administration asserted that it would not lift the aid suspension until the Salvadoran government took concrete actions to reduce the number of migrants arriving at the U.S. border.120 region. The Sánchez Cerén government expressed concerningconcern regarding the potential aid cuts, noting that joint security efforts had resulted in significant progress over the past three years.¹¹⁶121 President Bukele has refrained from publicly criticizing the decision, maintaining that his government is more interested in investment than "“handouts.”122 In 2019, President Bukele signed an ACA agreement with the Department of Homeland Security, along with arrangements formalizing a border security cooperation program and a biometric data-sharing program.123 After those agreements had been signed, the Administration announced it would begin to restore some targeted aid to El Salvador (as wel as Guatemala and Honduras). 119 U.S. Department of State, “ Estimated FY2017 and 2018 Levels for Northern T riangle Assistance,” document provided to Congress, June 2019. 120 Morgan Ortagus, Department Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing,” June 17, 2019. 121 Kevin Sieff, “U.S. Officials Said Aid to El Salvador Helped Slow Migration. Now T rump is Cancelling It,” Washington Post, April 1, 2019. 122 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo and Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele at a Press Availability,” July 21, 2019. 123 U.S. DHS, “Fact Sheet: DHS Agreements with Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras,” October 28, 2019. Congressional Research Service 19 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations As of June 12, 2020, the Administration had informed Congress of its intention to release more than $705 mil ion of new and previously suspended assistance for programs intended to deter migration, advance U.S. national security interests, implement the ACA, respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, and address other health and humanitarian needs. That total includes roughly $177.8 mil ion for El Salvador.124 FY2020 Appropriations and FY2021 Budget Request The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), states that the Administration should provide “not less than” $519.8 mil ion in assistance for Central America (including $72.7 mil ion for El Salvador) but provides flexibility for reprogramming assistance within that region. The act also states that the Administration should provide “not less than” $527.6 mil ion appropriated in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) for Central America. The Administration’s FY2021 budget proposal does not request any foreign aid specifical y for El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras.125 The Administration has requested nearly $377 mil ion for the Central American region, however, some of which could be al ocated to the Northern Triangle countries. The Administration asserts that any assistance is dependent on the Northern Triangle governments continuing to take action to stem migration to the United States.126 COVID-19 Assistance and Humanitarian Aid for Tropical Storm Amanda The U.S. government has provided humanitarian and emergency food assistance to help respond to Tropical Storm Amanda (June 2020) and health and other assistance to support the Salvadoran government’s efforts to address the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic crisis it has wrought. Humanitarian funding has been drawn primarily from the global humanitarian accounts in annual Department of State/Foreign Operations appropriations legislation. As of June 2020, USAID has provided $3.1 mil ion in emergency shelter materials, hygiene kits, and food assistance to help the Salvadoran government and relief agencies supported the more than 150,000 people affected by the storm.127 Separately, the U.S. government has provided $6.6 mil ion to help address the COVID-19 pandemic: $2 mil ion for risk communications, water, hygiene, and sanitation; $2.6 mil ion in health assistance; and $2 mil ion to provide access to credit and jobs.128 This assistance is being provided in addition to donations, including 250 portable ventilators, mentoring and advice provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and food aid and hygiene kits provided for returned migrants implemented by the International Organization for Migration. 124 T he El Salvador assistance by fiscal year is $31.2 million (FY2017), $1 million (FY2018), $122.4 million (FY2019), and $23.2 million (FY2020). U.S. Department of State, “State Department and USAID Migration Related Assistance Programming,” document provided to Congress, November 2019; and “ Assistance to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras by Goal, Bureau, and Program,” document provided to Congress, June 2020. 125 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Program s, Fiscal Year 2021, February 10, 2020. 126 U.S. Department of State, FY2021 budget briefing document, provided to CRS, February 2020. 127 USAID, “USAID Provides Humanitarian Assistance for People Affected by T ropical Storm Amanda in El Salvador,” June 18, 2020. 128 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Government Support to El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” June 11, 2020. Congressional Research Service 20 link to page 26 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations handouts."¹¹⁷

Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Investment Compact

Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Investment Compact El Salvador signed a second $277 million compactmil ion compact with the United States on September 30, 2014, to focus on improving transportation infrastructure, employment opportunities, and the investment climate. The Salvadoran government committed to match that contribution with $88 million mil ion in complementary investments. In response to some lingering concerns expressed by Mil ennium Chal enge Corporation board members, the Salvadoran government designed a Priority Action Plan that was then agreed to by both governments to be completed prior to the compact's signing. The action plan required the Salvadoran government to (1) appoint a director and deputy director to a newly established financial crimes investigation unit in the police; (2) approve an asset forfeiture law; (3) approve reformed anti-money-laundering legislation that meets international standards; (4) approve reforms to the country's public-private partnership law to make it attractive to investors; and (5) issue a revised decree on how corn and bean seed are procured that is consistent with CAFTA-DR. The fifth condition was subsequently removed. The compact entered into force in September 2015.¹²⁰

compact’s signing. The compact entered into force in September 2015 and is scheduled to end in September 2020. The MCC has conducted ongoing monitoring and evaluation, which is reported on a quarterly basis.129 Key compact projects include the following:

•  Investment Climate Project ($42 ($40.7 million MCC funds/$50 million Salvadoran funds): seeks to help the government develop and implement regulatory improvements and to better partner with private investors to build infrastructure and provide public services.
•  Human Capital Project ($100.74 million MCC funds/$15 million Salvadoran funds): supports funds) to support full-day schooling; reforms to the policies and operations that govern teacher training and student assessment; and a new technical, vocational, education, and training system that is aligned with labor market demands.
•  Logistical Infrastructure Project ($109 ($105.6 million MCC funds/$15.7 million Salvadoran funds): will to widen the part of El Salvador'’s coastal highway that connects the airport and the ports of La Unión and Acajutla and improve border crossing facilities into Honduras at El Amatil o. Migration Issues Migration has beencrossing facilities into Honduras at El Amatillo. The project is estimated to benefit more than 170,000 people.

Department of Defense Assistance

Migration Issues

Migration is a major issue in U.S. relations with El Salvador. As of 2017, some 1.4 million mil ion people born in El Salvador resided in the United States, and an estimated 600,000 of them (50%) were in the country without authorization.¹²² In 2018130 In 2019, remittances sent from Salvadorans abroad were equivalent to 21% of El Salvador'’s GDP, according to the World Bank.¹²³131 Recent unauthorized migration from El Salvador has been fueled by a combination of poverty, natural disasters, poor security conditions, and a desire for family reunification.¹²⁴

132 Recent Migration Flows

The number of migrants and asylum-seekers arriving at the U.S. border from El Salvador has fluctuated in recent years, with a record number of Salvadorans apprehended during the first nine months ofin FY2019 after two years of declining apprehensions (see Figure 3). Despite the increase in arrivals from El Salvador in FY2019, Salvadorans have accounted for only 13.8% of the 511,000 apprehensions of migrants from Northern Triangle countries during the first nine months in 2019. Although on a smaller scale than migrants from Honduras and Guatemala, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has apprehended see Figure 3). Although on a smal er scale than migrants from Honduras and Guatemala, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has apprehended 129 T he most recent report is available here: https://assets.mcc.gov/content/uploads/El-Salvador-II-Results-FY20_Q2.pdf. 130 U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 American Community Survey, accessed July 2019; Jeffrey S. Passel and D’vera Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Im m igrant Total Dips to Lowest Level in a Decade, Pew Research Center, November 27, 2018. 131 See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.T RF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS. 132 Cecilia Menjívar and Andrea Gómez Cervantes, El Salvador: Civil War, Natural Disasters, and Gang Violence Drive Migration, Migration Information Source, August 29, 2018. Congressional Research Service 21 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations increasing numbers of family units from El Salvador, many of whom are seeking humanitarian protection. These increases have occurred despite bilateral efforts to combat human trafficking and alien smuggling, campaigns to warn potential migrants about the dangers of the journey, and Trump Administration policy changes to tighten migrant access to the asylum system.

In 2018, U.S. and Salvadoran officials cited reductions in crime rates as a major reason why illegal il egal emigration from El Salvador to the United States declined from FY2016 to FY2018.¹²⁵ 133 Although the number of single adults and unaccompanied children apprehended has remained lower in FY2019 than in FY2016, the number of family units who were apprehended exceeded 44,100 during the first nine months of56,897 during FY2019 as compared to 27,144 for all al of FY2016. of FY2016.

Figure 3. U.S. Apprehensions of Salvadoran Nationals: FY2009-FY2019

Sources: CRS presentation ofFY2020 (May) Sources: Graphic by CRS using data from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "U.S. Border Patrol Nationwide Apprehensions by Citizenship and Sector in FY2007-FY2018;" and "U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector Fiscal Year 2019," press release, July 10, 2019. Customs and Border Patrol, “U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions,” press releases, at https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration/usbp-sw-border-apprehensions. Notes: Unaccompanied children = children under 18 years of age old without a parent or legal guardian at the time of apprehension. Family units = total number of individuals (children under 18 years of ageold, parents, or legal guardians) apprehended with a family member. FY2019 includes the first nine months of the fiscal year (October 2018-June 2019).

Human Trafficking and Alien Smuggling

Removals, Temporary Protected Status, and Deferred Action for Child Arrivals

Security Cooperation

Counternarcotics

Gangs

Trade Relations

Human Rights Cases: Former Salvadoran Officials Tried in the United States

• In February 2012, an immigration judge ruled that former Salvadoran Defense Minister Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova could be removed (deported) from the United States based on his role ordering the torture of Salvadoran citizens, the 1980 killings of four American churchwomen, and the 1981 killings of land reformers. That decision was upheld in March 2015, and Vides Casanova was deported to El Salvador on April 8, 2015.
• In September 2012, Colonel Inocente Orlando Montano, one of the officials named by a Spanish judge as responsible for the aforementioned Jesuit murders, pled guilty to immigration fraud. Montano had hidden his military past when applying for TPS in the United States. He was sentenced to 21 months in prison. In August 2017, a federal judge approved a lower court ruling that Orlando Montano could be extradited to Spain to face charges for his role in the 1989 killing of six Jesuit priests, most of whom were Spanish. The extradition took place in November 2017; he remains in a Spanish prison.
• In February 2014, a federal judge determined that a former Salvadoran defense minister, General José Guillermo García, could be removed based on his role in brutal human rights violations. The judge ruled that he "assisted or otherwise participated" in 11 violent incidents, including the 1980 killing of Archbishop Óscar Arnulfo Romero. He was deported to El Salvador in January 2016.
• In February 2017, the U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Texas filed a civil lawsuit against Arnoldo Antonio Vasquez, a Salvadoran who misrepresented his past in order to obtain U.S. citizenship. According to an investigation conducted by ICE, Vasquez failed to acknowledge his involvement as a military officer in the extrajudicial killing of 10 civilians in San Sebastian, El Salvador, in 1988.¹⁶⁰ Both the prosecution and the defendant have submitted their written arguments, but the judge has not yet ruled on this case.

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