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Successive Administrations have used sanctions extensively to try to change Iran's behavior. Sanctions have had a substantial effect on Iran's economy but little, if any, observable effect on Iran's conventional defense programs or regional malign activities. During 2012-2015, when the global community was relatively united in pressuring Iran, Iran's economy shrank as its crude oil exports fell by more than 50%, and Iran had limited ability to utilize its $120 billion in assets held abroad.
The 2015 multilateral nuclear accord (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) provided Iran broad relief through the waiving of relevant sanctions, revocation of relevant executive orders (E.O.s), and the lifting of U.N. and EU sanctions. Remaining in place were a general ban on U.S. trade with Iran and U.S. sanctions on Iran's support for regional governments and armed factions, its human rights abuses, its efforts to acquire missile and advanced conventional weapons capabilities, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which enshrined the JCPOA, nonbinding U.N. restrictions on Iran's development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and a binding ban on its importation or exportation of arms remain in place for several years.
JCPOA sanctions relief enabled Iran to increase its oil exports to nearly pre-sanctions levels, regain access to foreign exchange reserve funds and reintegrate into the international financial system, achieve about 7% yearly economic growth (2016-17), attract foreign investment, and buy new passenger aircraft. The sanctions relief contributed to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's reelection in the May 19, 2017, vote. However, the economic rebound did not prevent sporadic unrest from erupting in December 2017. And, Iran has provided support for regional armed factions, developed ballistic missiles, and expanded its conventional weapons development programs during periods when international sanctions were in force, when they were suspended, and after U.S. sanctions were reimposed in late 2018.
The Trump Administration has made sanctions central to efforts to apply "maximum pressure" on Iran's regime. On May 8, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would no longer participate in the JCPOA and U.S. secondary sanctions were reimposed by November 6, 2018. The reinstatement of U.S. sanctions has driven Iran's economy into recession as major companies exit the Iranian economy rather than risk being penalized by the United States. Iran's oil exports have decreased significantly, the value of Iran's currency has declined sharply, and unrest has continued, although not to the point where the regime is threatened. But, the European Union and other countries are trying to keep the economic benefits of the JCPOA flowing to Iran in order to persuade Iran to remain in the accord. To that end, in January 2019 the European countries created a trading mechanism (Special Purpose Vehicle) that presumably can increase trade with Iran by circumventing U.S. secondary sanctions. On November 5, 2018, the Administration granted 180-day "Significant Reduction Exceptions" (SREs) to eight countries—enabling them to import Iranian oil without penalty as long as they continue to reduce purchases of Iranian oil. On April 22, 2019, the Administration announced it would not renew any SREs when they expire on May 2, 2019, instead seeking to drive Iran's oil exports as close to zero as possible. On May 3, 2019, the Administration ended some waivers for foreign governments to provide technical assistance to some JCPOA-permitted aspects of Iran's nuclear program. The economic difficulties and other U.S. pressure measures have prompted Iran to cease performing some of the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA.
See also CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit, by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by Dianne E. Rennack.
Overview and Objectives
Sanctions have been a significant component of U.S. Iran policy since Iran'’s 1979 Islamic
Revolution that toppled the Shah of Iran, a U.S. ally. In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. sanctions were
intended to try to compel Iran to cease supporting acts of terrorism and to limit Iran'’s strategic
power in the Middle East more generally. After the mid-2000s, U.S. and international sanctions
focused largely on ensuring that Iran'’s nuclear program is for purely civilian uses. During 2010-201520102015, the international community cooperated closely with a U.S.-led and U.N.-authorized
sanctions regime in pursuit of the goal of persuading Iran to agree to limits to its nuclear program.
Still, sanctions against Iran have multiple objectives and address multiple perceived threats from
Iran simultaneously.
This report analyzes U.S. and international sanctions against Iran. CRS has no way to
independently corroborate whether any individual or other entity might be in violation of U.S. or
international sanctions against Iran. The report tracks "implementation"“implementation” of the various U.S. laws
and executive orders as designations and imposition of sanctions. Some sanctions require the
blocking of U.S.-based property of sanctioned entities. CRS has not obtained information from
the executive branch indicating that such property has been blocked, and it is possible that
sanctioned entities do not have any U.S. assets that could be blocked.
The sections below are grouped by function, in the chronological order in which these themes
have emerged.1
U.S. sanctions on Iran were first imposed during the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981, in the
form of executive orders issued by President Jimmy Carter blocking nearly all Iranian assets held
in the United States. These included E.O. 12170 of November 14, 1979, blocking all Iranian
government property in the United States, and E.O 12205 (April 7, 1980) and E.O. 12211 (April
17, 1980) banning virtually all U.S. trade with Iran. The latter two orders were issued just prior to
the failed April 24-25, 1980, U.S. effort to rescue the U.S. Embassy hostages held by Iran.
President Jimmy Carter also broke diplomatic relations with Iran on April 7, 1980. The trade-relatedtraderelated orders (12205 and 12211) were revoked by Executive Order 12282 of January 19, 1981,
following the "“Algiers Accords"” that resolved the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis. Iranian assets still
frozen are analyzed below.
The Accords established a "“U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal"” at the Hague that continues to arbitrate
cases resulting from the 1980 break in relations and freezing of some of Iran'’s assets. All of the
4,700 private U.S. claims against Iran were resolved in the first 20 years of the Tribunal, resulting
in $2.5 billion in awards to U.S. nationals and firms.
On November 13, 2012, the Administration published in the Federal Register (Volume 77, Number 219) “Policy
Guidance” explaining how it implements many of the sanctions, and in particular defining what products and chemicals
constitute “petroleum,” “petroleum products,” and “petrochemical products” that are used in the laws and executive
orders discussed below. See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-11-13/pdf/2012-27642.pdf.
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The major government-to-government cases involved Iranian claims for compensation for
hundreds of foreign military sales (FMS) cases that were halted in concert with the rift in U.S.-Iran relations when the Shah'’s government fell in 1979. In 1991, the George H. W. Bush
Administration paid $278 million from the Treasury Department Judgment Fund to settle FMS
cases involving weapons Iran had received but which were in the United States undergoing repair
and impounded when the Shah fell.
On January 17, 2016, (the day after the JCPOA took effect), the United States announced it had
settled with Iran for FMS cases involving weaponry the Shah was paying for but that was not
completed and delivered to Iran when the Shah fell. The Shah'’s government had deposited its
payments into a DOD-managed "“Iran FMS Trust Fund,"” and, after 1990, the Fund had a balance
of about $400 million. In 1990, $200 million was paid from the Fund to Iran to settle some FMS
cases. Under the 2016 settlement, the United States sent Iran the $400 million balance in the
Fund, plus $1.3 billion in accrued interest, paid from the Department of the Treasury's "Judgment Fund."’s “Judgment
Fund.” In order not to violate U.S. regulations barring direct U.S. dollar transfers to Iranian
banks, the funds were remitted to Iran in late January and early February 2016 in foreign hard
currency from the central banks of the Netherlands and of Switzerland. Some remaining claims
involving the FMS program with Iran remain under arbitration at the Tribunal.
Iranian assets in the United States are blocked under several provisions, including Executive
Order 13599 of February 2010. The United States did not unblock any of these assets as a
consequence of the JCPOA.
There are a total of about $46 billion in court awards that have been made to victims of Iranian
terrorism. These include the families of the 241 U.S. soldiers killed in the October 23, 1983,
2
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/tar2010.pdf.
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bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. U.S. funds equivalent to the $400 million balance
in the DOD account (see above) have been used to pay a small portion of these judgments. The
Algiers Accords apparently precluded compensation for the 52 U.S. diplomats held hostage by
Iran from November 1979 until January 1981. The FY2016 Consolidated Appropriation (Section
404 of P.L. 114-113) set up a mechanism for paying damages to the U.S. embassy hostages and
other victims of state-sponsored terrorism using settlement payments paid by various banks for
concealing Iran-related transactions, and proceeds from other Iranian frozen assets.
In April 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court determined the Central Bank assets, discussed above,
could be used to pay the terrorism judgments, and the proceeds from the sale of the frozen real
estate assets mentioned above will likely be distributed to victims of Iranian terrorism as well.3 3
On the other hand, in March 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that U.S. victims of an Iran-sponsoredIransponsored terrorist attack could not seize a collection of Persian antiquities on loan to a
University of Chicago museum to satisfy a court judgment against Iran.
Other past financial disputes include the errant U.S. shoot-down on July 3, 1988, of an Iranian
Airbus passenger jet (Iran Air flight 655), for which the United States paid Iran $61.8 million in
compensation ($300,000 per wage-earning victim, $150,000 per non-wage earner) for the 248
Iranians killed. The United States did not compensate Iran for the airplane itself, although
officials involved in the negotiations told CRS in November 2012 that the United States later
arranged to provide a substitute used aircraft to Iran.
For more detail on the use of Iranian assets to compensate victims of Iranian terrorism, see CRS
Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea and
CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10104, It Belongs in a Museum: Sovereign Immunity Shields Iranian
Antiquities Even When It Does Not Protect Iran, by Stephen P. Mulligan.
Executive Order 13599, issued February 5, 2012, directs the blocking of U.S.-based assets of
entities determined to be "“owned or controlled by the Iranian government."” The order was issued
to implement Section 1245 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81) that
imposed secondary U.S. sanctions on Iran'’s Central Bank. The order requires that any U.S.-based
assets of the Central Bank of Iran, or of any Iranian government-controlled entity, be blocked by
U.S. banks. The order goes beyond the regulations issued pursuant to the 1995 imposition of the
U.S. trade ban with Iran, in which U.S. banks are required to refuse such transactions but to return
funds to Iran. Even before the issuance of the rder, and in order to implement the ban on U.S.
trade with Iran (see below) successive Administrations had designated many entities as "“owned or
controlled by the Government of Iran."
”
Numerous designations have been made under Executive Order 13599, including the June 4,
2013, naming of 38 entities (mostly oil, petrochemical, and investment companies) that are
components of an Iranian entity called the "“Execution of Imam Khomeini'’s Order"” (EIKO).4 4
“U.S. Court Reverses Record Forfeiture Order over Iran Assets.” Associated Press. July 21, 2016.
http://global.factiva.com/hp/printsavews.aspx?pp=Print&hc=Publication; and Department of Treasury announcement
of June 4, 2013.
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EIKO was characterized by the Department of the Treasury as an Iranian leadership entity that
controls "“massive off-the-books investments."
”
Implementation of the U.S. JCPOA Withdrawal.Withdrawal. To implement the JCPOA, many 13599-designated13599designated entities specified in the JCPOA (Attachment 3) were "delisted"“delisted” from U.S. secondary
sanctions (no longer considered "“Specially Designated Nationals,"” SDNs), and referred to as "
“designees blocked solely pursuant to E.O 13599."5”5 That characterization permitted foreign
entities to conduct transactions with the listed entities without U.S. sanctions penalty but
continued to bar U.S. persons (or foreign entities owned or controlled by a U.S. person) from
conducting transactions with these entities. In concert with the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA,
virtually all of the 13599-designated entities that were delisted as SDNs were relisted as SDNs on
November 5, 2018.6
6
Civilian Nuclear Entity Exception. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), and 23 of its
subsidiaries, were relisted under E.O. 13599 but they were not relisted as entities subject to
secondary sanctions (SDNs) under E.O. 13382. This listing decision was made in order to
facilitate continued IAEA and EU and other country engagement with Iran'’s civilian nuclear
program under the JCPOA.77 The May 2019 ending of some waivers for nuclear technical
assistance to Iran modified this stance somewhat (see subhead on waivers and exceptions under
the JCPOA, below).
Most of the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis sanctions were lifted upon release of the hostages in 1981.
The United States began imposing sanctions against Iran again in the mid-1980s for its support
for regional groups committing acts of terrorism. The Secretary of State designated Iran a "state “state
sponsor of terrorism"” on January 23, 1984, following the October 23, 1983, bombing of the U.S.
Marine barracks in Lebanon by elements that established Lebanese Hezbollah. This designation
triggers substantial sanctions on any nation so designated.
None of the laws or executive ordersorders in this section were waived or revoked to implement the
JCPOA. No entities discussed in this section were "delisted" “delisted” from sanctions under the JCPOA.
The U.S. naming of Iran as a "“state sponsor of terrorism"”—commonly referred to as Iran's ’s
inclusion on the U.S. "“terrorism list"”—triggers several sanctions. The designation is made under
the authority of Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72, as amended),
sanctioning countries determined to have provided repeated support for acts of international
terrorism. The sanctions triggered by Iran'’s state sponsor of terrorism designation are as follows:
The terrorism list designation, and other U.S. sanctions laws barring assistance to Iran, do not bar
U.S. disaster aid. The United States donated $125,000, through relief agencies, to help victims of
two earthquakes in Iran (February and May 1997); $350,000 worth of aid to the victims of a June
22, 2002, earthquake; and $5.7 million in assistance for victims of the December 2003 earthquake
in Bam, Iran, which killed 40,000. The U.S. military flew 68,000 kilograms of supplies to Bam.
Congressional Research Service 5 Iran Sanctions Requirements for Removal from Terrorism List
Terminating the sanctions triggered by Iran
If the country
If the |
Section 330 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (P.L. 104-132) added a
Section 40A to the Arms Export Control Act that prohibits the sale or licensing of U.S. defense
articles and services to any country designated (by each May 15) as "“not cooperating fully with
U.S. anti-terrorism efforts."” The President can waive the provision upon determination that a
defense sale to a designated country is "“important to the national interests"” of the United States.
Every May since the enactment of this law, Iran has been designated as a country that is "“not fully cooperating"
cooperating” with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. However, the effect of the designation is largely
mooted by the many other authorities that prohibit U.S. defense sales to Iran.
Executive Order 13324 (September 23, 2001) mandates the freezing of the U.S.-based assets of
and a ban on U.S. transactions with entities determined by the Administration to be supporting
international terrorism. This order was issued two weeks after the September 11, 2001, attacks on
the United States, under the authority of the IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act, the U.N.
Participation Act of 1945, and Section 301 of the U.S. Code, initially targeting Al Qaeda.
E.O. 13224 is not specific to Iran and does not explicitly target Iranian arms exports to
movements, governments, or groups in the Middle East region. However, successive
Administrations have used the order—and the orders discussed immediately below—to sanction
such Iranian activity by designating persons or entities that are involved in the delivery or receipt
of such weapons shipments. Some persons and entities that have been sanctioned for such activity
have been cited for supporting groups such as the Afghan Taliban organization and the Houthi
rebels in Yemen, which are not named as terrorist groups by the United States.
Section 105 of the Countering America'’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-4411544, signed on August 2, 2017), mandates the imposition of E.O. 13324 penalties on the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its officials, agents, and affiliates by October 30, 2017
(90 days after enactment). The IRGC was named as a terrorism-supporting entity under E.O
13224 within that deadline. The Treasury Department made the designation of the IRGC as a
terrorism-supporting entity under that E.O. on October 13, 2017.
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Implementation
No entities designated under E.O. 13224 were delisted to implement the JCPOA. Numerous Iran-relatedIranrelated entities, including members of Iran-allied organizations such as Lebanese Hezbollah and
Iraqi Shia militias, have been designated under the order since JCPOA implementation, as shown
in the tables at the end of this report.
Sanctions similar to those of E.O. 13224 are imposed on Iranian and Iran-linked entities through
the State Department authority under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(8.U.S.C. 1189) to designate an entity as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). In addition to
the sanctions of E.O. 13224, any U.S. person (or person under U.S. jurisdiction) who "knowingly “knowingly
provides material support or resources to an FTO, or attempts or conspires to do so"” is subject to
fine or up to 20 years in prison. A bank that commits such a violation is subject to fines.
Implementation: The following organizations have been designated as FTOs for acts of terrorism
on behalf of Iran or are organizations assessed as funded and supported by Iran:
Some sanctions have been imposed to try to curtail Iran'’s destabilizing influence in the region.
In 1995, the Clinton Administration expanded U.S. sanctions against Iran by issuing Executive
Order 12959 (May 6, 1995) banning U.S. trade with and investment in Iran. The order was issued
under the authority primarily of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.),99 which gives the President wide powers to regulate commerce with a foreign
country when a "”state of emergency"” is declared in relations with that country. E.O. 12959
superseded Executive Order 12957 (March 15, 1995) barring U.S. investment in Iran'’s energy
sector, which accompanied President Clinton'’s declaration of a "“state of emergency"” with respect
to Iran. Subsequently, E.O 13059 (August 19, 1997) added a prohibition on U.S. companies' ’
knowingly exporting goods to a third country for incorporation into products destined for Iran.
Each March since 1995, the U.S. Administration has renewed the "“state of emergency"” with
respect to Iran. IEEPA gives the President the authority to alter regulations to license transactions
with Iran—regulations enumerated in Section 560 of the Code of Federal Regulations (Iranian
Transactions Regulations, ITRs).
9
The executive order was issued not only under the authority of IEEPA but also the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.; §505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa9) and §301 of Title 3, United States Code.
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Section 103 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(CISADA, P.L. 111-195) codified the trade ban and reinstated the full ban on imports that had
earlier been relaxed by April 2000 regulations. That relaxation allowed importation into the
United States of Iranian nuts, fruit products (such as pomegranate juice), carpets, and caviar. U.S.
imports from Iran after that time were negligible.1010 Section 101 of the Iran Freedom Support Act (
(P.L. 109-293) separately codified the ban on U.S. investment in Iran, but gives the President the
authority to terminate this sanction with presidential notification to Congress of such decision 15
days in advance (or 3 days in advance if there are "“exigent circumstances").
In accordance with the JCPOA, the ITRs were relaxed to allow U.S. importation of the Iranian
luxury goods discussed above (carpets, caviar, nuts, etc.), but not to permit general U.S.-Iran
trade. U.S. regulations were also altered to permit the sale of commercial aircraft to Iranian
airlines that are not designated for sanctions. The modifications were made in the Departments of
State and of the Treasury guidance issued on Implementation Day and since.1111 In concert with the
May 8, 2018, U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, the easing of the regulations to allow for
importation of Iranian carpets and other luxury goods was reversed on August 6, 2018.
The following provisions apply to the U.S. trade ban on Iran as specified in regulations (Iran
Transaction Regulations, ITRs) written pursuant to the executive orders and laws discussed above
and enumerated in regulations administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of
the Department of the Treasury.
The ITRs do not ban subsidiaries of U.S. firms from dealing with Iran, as long as the subsidiary is not "controlled"
not “controlled” by the parent company. Most foreign subsidiaries are legally considered foreign
persons subject to the laws of the country in which the subsidiaries are incorporated. Section 218
of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syrian Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA, P.L. 112-158) holds "controlled"
15
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https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20161222.aspx?platform=hootsuite.
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/gl_food_exports.pdf.
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“controlled” foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to the same standards as U.S. parent firms,
defining a controlled subsidiary as (1) one that is more than 50% owned by the U.S. parent; (2)
one in which the parent firm holds a majority on the Board of Directors of the subsidiary; or (3)
one in which the parent firm directs the operations of the subsidiary. There is no waiver provision.
JCPOA Regulations and Reversal. To implement the JCPOA, the United States licensed "controlled"
“controlled” foreign subsidiaries to conduct transactions with Iran that are permissible under
JCPOA (almost all forms of civilian trade). The Obama Administration asserted that the President
has authority under IEEPA to license transactions with Iran, the ITRSHRA notwithstanding. This
was implemented with the Treasury Department'’s issuance of "“General License H: Authorizing
Certain Transactions Relating to Foreign Entities Owned or Controlled by a United States
Person."17”17 With the Trump Administration reimposition of sanctions, the licensing policy ("
(“Statement of Licensing Policy,"” SLP) returned to pre-JCPOA status on November 5, 2018.
Waiver Authority |
In 1996, Congress and the executive branch began a long process of pressuring Iran'’s vital energy
sector in order to deny Iran the financial resources to support terrorist organizations and other
armed factions or to further its nuclear and WMD programs. Iran'’s oil sector is as old as the
petroleum industry itself (early 20th20th century), and Iran'’s onshore oil fields are in need of
substantial investment. Iran has 136.3 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the third largest after
Saudi Arabia and Canada. Iran has large natural gas resources (940 trillion cubic feet), exceeded
only by Russia. However, Iran'’s gas export sector is still emerging—most of Iran'’s gas is injected
into its oil fields to boost their production. The energy sector still generates about 20% of Iran's ’s
GDP and as much as 30% of government revenue.
This sections includes sanctions triggers under the Act that were added by laws enacted
subsequent to the original version.
The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) has been a pivotal component of U.S. sanctions against Iran's ’s
energy sector. Since its enactment in 1996, ISA'’s provisions have been expanded and extended to
other Iranian industries. ISA sought to thwart Iran'’s 1995 opening of the sector to foreign
17
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/implement_guide_jcpoa.pdf.
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investment in late 1995 through a "“buy-back"” program in which foreign firms gradually recoup
their investments as oil and gas is produced. It was first enacted as the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act (ILSA, P.L. 104-172, signed on August 5, 1996) but was later retitled the Iran Sanctions Act
after it terminated with respect to Libya in 2006. ISA was the first major "“extra-territorial sanction"
sanction” on Iran—a sanction that authorizes U.S. penalties against third country firms.
ISA consists of a number of "triggers"“triggers”—transactions with Iran that would be considered
violations of ISA and could cause a firm or entity to be sanctioned under ISA'’s provisions. The
triggers, as added by amendments over time, are detailed below:
The core trigger of ISA when first enacted was a requirement that the President sanction
companies (entities, persons) that make an "investment"18“investment”18 of more than $20 million19million19 in one year
in Iran'’s energy sector.2020 The definition of "investment"“investment” in ISA (§14 [9]) includes not only equity
and royalty arrangements but any contract that includes "“responsibility for the development of
petroleum resources"” of Iran. The definition includes additions to existing investment (added by
P.L. 107-24) and pipelines to or through Iran and contracts to lead the construction, upgrading, or
expansions of energy projects (added by CISADA).
This provision of ISA was not waived under the JCPOA.
The Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293, signed September 30, 2006) added Section 5(b)(1)
of ISA, subjecting to ISA sanctions firms or persons determined to have sold to Iran (1) "
“chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies"” or (2) "“destabilizing numbers
and types"” of advanced conventional weapons. Sanctions can be applied if the exporter knew (or
had cause to know) that the end-user of the item was Iran. The definitions do not specifically
include ballistic or cruise missiles, but those weapons could be considered "“related technologies" ”
or, potentially, a "“destabilizing number and type"” of advanced conventional weapon.
The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA, P.L. 112-158, signed August
10, 2012) created Section 5(b)(2) of ISA subjecting to sanctions entities determined by the
Administration to participate in a joint venture with Iran relating to the mining, production, or
transportation of uranium.
Implementation: No ISA sanctions have been imposed on any entities under these provisions.
Section 102(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(CISADA, P.L. 111-195, signed July 1, 2010) amended Section 5 of ISA to exploit Iran's ’s
dependency on imported gasoline (40% dependency at that time). It followed legislation such as
P.L. 111-85 that prohibited the use of U.S. funds to fill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve with
products from firms that sell gasoline to Iran; and P.L. 111-117 that denied Ex-Im Bank credits to
any firm that sold gasoline or related equipment to Iran. The section subjects the following to
sanctions:
Petrochemicals Production
Section 201 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRSHA, P.L.
112-158, signed August 10, 2012) codified an Executive Order, 13590 (November 21, 2011), by
adding Section 5(a)(5 and 6) to ISA sanctioning firms that
Section 201 of the ITRSHRA amends ISA by sanctioning entities the Administration determines
Separate provisions of the ITRSHR Act—which do not amend ISA——require the application of
ISA sanctions (5 out of the 12 sanctions on the ISA sanctions menu) on any entity that
Implementation
Implementation. Section 312 of ITRSHRA required an Administration determination, within 45
days of enactment (by September 24, 2012) whether NIOC and NITC are IRGC agents or
affiliates. The determination would subject financial transactions with NIOC and NITC to
sanctions under CISADA (prohibition on opening U.S.-based accounts). On September 24, 2012,
the Department of the Treasury determined that NIOC and NITC are affiliates of the IRGC. On
November 8, 2012, the Department of the Treasury named NIOC as a proliferation entity under
Executive Order 13382—a designation that, in accordance with Section 104 of CISADA, bars
any foreign bank determined to have dealt directly with NIOC (including with a NIOC bank
account in a foreign country) from opening or maintaining a U.S.-based account.
Sanctions on dealings with NIOC and NITC were waived in accordance with the interim nuclear
deal and the JCPOA, and designations of these entities under Executive Order 13382 were
rescinded in accordance with the JCPOA. These entities were "relisted"“relisted” again on November 5,
2018.
Status: Revoked (by E.O. 13716) but waswas put back into effect by E.O. 13846 of August 6, 2018
Executive Order 13622 (July 30, 2012) imposed specified sanctions on the ISA sanctions menu,
and bars banks from the U.S. financial system, for the following activities (EE.O. 13622 diddid not
amend ISA itself):
A definition of what chemicals and products are considered “petroleum products” for the purposes of the order are in
the policy guidance issued November 13, 2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-11-13/pdf/2012-27642.pdf.
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E.O. 13622 also blocked U.S.-based property of entities determined to have
E.O. 13622 sanctions do not apply if the parent country of the entity has received an oil
importation exception under Section 1245 of P.L. 112-81, discussed below. An exception also is
provided for projects that bring gas from Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey, if such project was
initiated prior to the issuance of the order.
In the original version of ISA, there was no firm requirement, and no time limit, for the
Administration to investigate potential violations and determine that a firm has violated ISA's ’s
provisions. The Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293, signed September 30, 2006) added a
provision calling for, but not requiring, a 180-day time limit for a violation determination.23 23
CISADA (Section 102[g][5]) mandated that the Administration begin an investigation of potential
ISA violations when there is "“credible information"” about a potential violation, and made
mandatory the 180-day time limit for a determination of violation.
The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (P.L. 112-158) defines the "credible information"“credible
information” needed to begin an investigation of a violation to include a corporate announcement
or corporate filing to its shareholders that it has undertaken transactions with Iran that are
potentially sanctionable under ISA. It also says the President maymay (not mandatory) use as credible
information reports from the Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Research
Service. In addition, Section 219 of ITRSHRA requires that an investigation of an ISA violation
begin if a company reports in its filings to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that it
has knowingly engaged in activities that would violate ISA (or Section 104 of CISADA or
transactions with entities designated under E.O 13224 or 13382, see below).
ISA Sanctions Menu
Once a firm is determined to be a violator, the original version of ISA required the imposition of
1. denial of Export-Import Bank loans, credits, or credit guarantees for U.S. exports to the sanctioned entity 2. denial of licenses for the U.S. export of military or militarily useful technology to the entity (original ISA) 3. denial of U.S. bank loans exceeding $10 million in one year to the entity (original ISA)
4. if the entity is a financial institution, a prohibition on its service as a primary dealer in U.S. government bonds; 5. prohibition on U.S. government procurement from the entity (original ISA) 6. prohibitions in transactions in foreign exchange by the entity (added by CISADA) 7. prohibition on any credit or payments between the entity and any U.S. financial institution (added by CISADA)
8. prohibition of the sanctioned entity from acquiring, holding, using, or trading any U.S.-based property which the
9. restriction on imports from the sanctioned entity, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic
10. a ban on a U.S. person from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a
11. exclusion from the United States of corporate officers or controlling shareholders of a sanctioned firm (added
12. imposition of any of the ISA sanctions on principal offices of a sanctioned firm (added by ITRSHRA).
Mandatory Sanction: Prohibition on Contracts with the U.S. Government CISADA (§102[b]) added a requirement
Executive Order 13574 of May 23, 2011 and E.O. 13628 of October 9, 2012 |
Oversight
Several mechanisms for Congress to oversee whether the Administration is investigating ISA
violations were added by ITRSHRA. Section 223 of that law required a Government
Accountability Office report, within 120 days of enactment, and another such report a year later,
on companies that have undertaken specified activities with Iran that might constitute violations
of ISA. Section 224 amended a reporting requirement in Section 110(b) of CISADA by requiring
an Administration report to Congress every 180 days on investment in Iran'’s energy sector, joint
ventures with Iran, and estimates of Iran'’s imports and exports of petroleum products. The GAO
reports have been issued; there is no information available on whether the required
Administration reports have been issued as well.
The sections below provide information on how some key ISA provisions have been interpreted
and implemented.
ISA'
ISA’s definition of "investment"“investment” that is subject to sanctions has been consistently interpreted by
successive Administrations to include construction of energy pipelines to or through Iran. Such
pipelines are deemed to help Iran develop its petroleum (oil and natural gas) sector. This
interpretation was reinforced by amendments to ISA in CISADA, which specifically included in
the definition of petroleum resources "“products used to construct or maintain pipelines used to
transport oil or liquefied natural gas."” In March 2012, then-Secretary of State Clinton made clear
Congressional Research Service
17
Iran Sanctions
that the Obama Administration interprets the provision to be applicable from the beginning of
pipeline construction.24
/Shipments
ISA does not sanction purchasing crude oil from Iran, but other laws, such as the Iran Freedom
and Counterproliferation Act (IFCA, discussed below) and executive orders, do.
No U.S. sanction
requires any country or person to actually seize, intercept, inspect on the high seas, or impound
any Iranian ship suspected of carrying oil or other cargo subject to sanctions.
However, as discussed further elsewhere in this paper, as of August 2019, the Trump
Administration has begun using various terrorism-related provisions to some Iranian oil
shipments. The Administration has argued that the shipments were organized by and for the
benefit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). On September 4, 2019, the Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) updated its sanctions guidance to state
that “bunkering services” (port operational support) for Iranian oil shipments could subject firms
and individuals involved in such support to U.S. sanctions.
Application to Purchases from Iran of Natural Gas
ISA and other laws, such as IFCA, exclude from sanction purchases of natural gas from Iran or
natural gas transactions with Iran. However: construction of gas pipelinespipelines involving Iran is
subject to ISA sanctions.
The effective dates of U.S. sanctions laws and orders exclude long-standing joint natural gas
projects that involve some Iranian firms—particularly the Shah Deniz natural gas field and
related pipelines in the Caspian Sea. These projects involve a consortium in which Iran'’s Naftiran
Intertrade Company (NICO) holds a passive 10% share, and includes BP, Azerbaijan'’s natural gas
firm SOCAR, Russia'’s Lukoil, and other firms. NICO was sanctioned under ISA and other
provisions (until JCPOA Implementation Day), but an OFAC factsheet of November 28, 2012,
stated that the Shah Deniz consortium, as a whole, is not determined to be "“a person owned or
controlled by"” the government of Iran and transactions with the consortium are permissible.
The original version of ISA did not apply to the development by Iran of a liquefied natural gas
(LNG) export capability. Iran has no LNG export terminals, in part because the technology for
such terminals is patented by U.S. firms and unavailable for sale to Iran. CISADA specifically
included LNG in the ISA definition of petroleum resources and therefore made subject to
sanctions LNG investment in Iran, supply of LNG tankers to Iran, and construction of pipelines
linking to Iran.
The definitions of investment and other activity that can be sanctioned under ISA include
financing for investment in Iran'’s energy sector, or for sales of gasoline and refinery-related
24
http://dawn.com/2012/03/01/tough-us-warning-on-iran-gas-pipeline/.
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18
Iran Sanctions
equipment and services. Therefore, banks and other financial institutions that assist energy
investment and refining and gasoline procurement activities could be sanctioned under ISA.
However, the definitions of financial institutions are interpreted not to apply to official credit
guarantee agencies—such as France'’s COFACE and Germany'’s Hermes. These credit guarantee
agencies are arms of their parent governments, and ISA does not provide for sanctioning
governments or their agencies.
Entities sanctioned under the executive orders or laws cited in this section are listed in the tables
at the end of this report. As noted, some of the orders cited provide for blocking U.S.-based assets
of the entities designated for sanctions. OFAC has not announced the blocking of any U.S.-based
property of the sanctioned entities, likely indicating that those entities sanctioned do not have a
presence in the United States.
Congressional Research Service 19 Iran Sanctions ISA Waiver, Exemptions, and Sunset Provisions
The President can waive ISA sanctions in several ways—general, country-specific, or company-specific.
General Waiver. Under Section 4(c)(1)(a), the President can waive (for six months at a time) the requirement to Country-Specific Waiver. Under Section 4(c)(1)(B), the President can waive ISA sanctions (for 12 months at a time)
Company-Specific Waiver. Under Section 9(c), the President can waive ISA sanctions (for one year at a time) on any
Once ISA snaps back into effect, some governments reportedly might seek the country-specific or country-specific
ISA (§5[f]) also contains several exceptions such that the President is not required to impose sanctions that
Under a provision added by CISADA (§102[g][5]), ISA provides a means—a so-called Administration Termination Process and Requirements
The Administration can immediately terminate all ISA provisions if the Administration certifies that Iran:
(1) has ceased its efforts to acquire WMD; (2) has been removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; 25
This termination provision, and the sunset provision discussed below
Sunset and Other Expiration Provisions
ISA was scheduled to sunset on December 31, 2016, as provided for by CISADA. This followed prior sunset
P.L. 107-24 also required an Administration report on ISA |
In 2011, Congress sought to reduce Iran'’s exportation of oil by imposing sanctions on the
mechanisms that importers use to pay Iran for oil. The Obama Administration asserted that such
legislation could lead to a rise in oil prices and harm U.S. relations with Iran'’s oil customers, and
President Obama, in his signing statement on the bill, indicated he would implement the provision
so as not to damage U.S. relations with partner countries.
The law imposed penalties on transactions with Iran'’s Central Bank. Section 1245 of the FY2012
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 112-81, signed on December 31, 2011):
The Obama and Trump Administration have implemented the FY2012 NDAA with an eye toward balancing the global oil market with the intended effects on Iran's economy and behavior. The table below on
The Obama Administration used the FY2012 NDAA to pressure Iran without causing economic
difficulty to U.S. allies, other Iran policy partners, or the global oil market. The table below on
major Iranian oil customers indicates cuts made by major customers compared to 2011.
The January 2016 waivers issued to implement the JCPOA suspended the requirement for a
country to cut oil purchases from Iran in order to maintain their exceptions, and Iran'’s historic oil
customers quickly resumed buying Iranian oil. The provision went back into effect on November
5, 2018.2727 On June 26, 2018, a senior State Department official, in a background briefing, stated
that department officials, in meetings with officials of countries that import Iranian oil, were
urging these countries to cease buying Iranian oil entirely, but Administration officials later
indicated that requests for exceptions would be evaluated based on the ease of substituting for
Iranian oil, country-specific needs, and the need for global oil market stability.
Iran’s oil exports subsequent to the
SRE expirations is depicted in the table below.
Department of State. Background Briefing on President Trump’s Decision to Withdraw from the JCPOA. May 8,
2018.
28 https://www.state.gov/decision-on-imports-of-iranian-oil/.
27
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Iran Sanctions
Waiver and Termination Provisions
The law provides for the President to waive the sanctions for 120 days, renewable for successive 120-day periods,
This provision was waived to implement the JPA (to allow Iran Waivers to Implement the JCPOA
The provision (Section 1245(d)(5)) was waived on January 18, 2017, just before the Obama Administration left office. |
The ability of Iran to repatriate hard currency—U.S. dollars are the primary form of payment for
oil—to its Central Bank was impeded by a provision of the ITRSHRA which went into effect on
February 6, 2013 (180 days after enactment). Section 504 of the ITRSHRA amended Section
1245 of the FY2012 NDAA (adding "“clause ii"” to Paragraph D[1]) by requiring that any funds
paid to Iran as a result of exempted transactions (oil purchases, for example) be credited to an
account located in the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign bank making the
transaction.
This provision essentially prevents Iran from repatriating to its Central Bank any hard currency
Iran held in foreign banks around the world. Most of Iran'’s funds held abroad are in banks located
in Iran'’s main oil customers. The provision largely compels Iran to buy the products of the oil
customer countries. Some press reports refer to this arrangement as an "“escrow account,"” but
State Department officials describe the arrangement as "restricted" accounts.
“restricted” accounts.
Waiver for Bank Account Restriction
The waiver provision that applies to the sanctions imposed under the FY2012 NDAA (P.L. 112-81) applies to this
To implement the JPA, a waiver was issued under P.L. 112-81 (Section 212 and 213) to allow Iran to receive some Waivers to Implement the JCPOA
Sections 212(d)(10 and 2134(b)(1) of ITRSHRA |
Congressional Research Service 23 Iran Sanctions Table 1. Iran Crude Oil Sales
(average daily volumes, in barrels per day)
Country/Bloc
2011
JPA period
average
(2014-2016)
European Union
(particularly
Italy, Spain,
Greece)
600,000
negligible
520,000 +
100,000
0
China
550,000
410,000
700,000
838,000
230,000
Japan
325,000
190,000
133,000
0
0
India
320,000
190,000
620,000
354,000
0
South Korea
230,000
130,000
100,000
0
0
Turkey
200,000
120,000
200,000
161,000
0
South Africa
80,000
negligible
negligible
0
0
Other Asia
(Malaysia, Sri
Lanka,
Indonesia)
90,000
negligible
negligible
Taiwan
35,000
10,000
67,000
0
0
Singapore
20,000
negligible
negligible
33,000
0
0
negligible
33,000
96.000
0
55,000
negligible
100,000
21,000
65,000
2.5
1.06
2.45
1.60
0.295
Syria
Other/Unknown
(Iraq and UAE
swaps, other)
Total (mbd)
At U.S.
JCPOA Exit
(May ‘18)
At SRE
Determination
(Oct. ‘18)
July 2019
(post-SRE
termination)
0
Sources: Bloomberg News, Reuters and other press articles. Information on actual Iranian exports is often
preliminary, incomplete, and inaccurate, and this table therefore contains figures from at least one month prior.
Figures might not reflect actual deliveries due to reported activities by Iran and various oil customers to conceal
purchases or avoid tracking of oil tankers. Figures do not include purchases of condensates, which are light
petroleum liquids that are associated with oil and natural gas production. South Korea was a large customer for
Iranian condensates and, as of August 2018, it cut its purchases of that product from Iran to zero.
Note: mbd = million barrels per day.
(average daily volumes, in barrels per day)
Country/Bloc |
2011 |
JPA period average (2014-2016) |
|
|
June 2019 (post-SRE termination) |
European Union (particularly Italy, Spain, Greece) |
600,000 |
negligible |
520,000 + |
100,000 |
0 |
China |
550,000 |
410,000 |
700,000 |
838,000 |
133,000 |
Japan |
325,000 |
190,000 |
133,000 |
0 |
0 |
India |
320,000 |
190,000 |
620,000 |
354,000 |
0 |
South Korea |
230,000 |
130,000 |
100,000 |
0 |
0 |
Turkey |
200,000 |
120,000 |
200,000 |
161,000 |
67,000 |
South Africa |
80,000 |
negligible |
negligible |
0 |
0 |
Other Asia (Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia) |
90,000 |
negligible |
negligible |
0 |
|
Taiwan |
35,000 |
10,000 |
67,000 |
0 |
0 |
Singapore |
20,000 |
negligible |
negligible |
33,000 |
0 |
Syria |
0 |
negligible |
33,000 |
96.000 |
0 |
Other/Unknown (Iraq and UAE swaps, other) |
55,000 |
negligible |
100,000 |
21,000 |
133,000 |
Total (mbd) |
2.5 |
1.06 |
2.45 |
1.60 |
0.33 |
Sources: Bloomberg News, Reuters and other press articles. Information on actual Iranian exports is often preliminary, incomplete, and inaccurate, and this table therefore contains figures from at least one month prior. Figures might not reflect actual deliveries due to reported activities by Iran and various oil customers to conceal purchases or avoid tracking of oil tankers. Figures do not include purchases of condensates, which are light petroleum liquids that are associated with oil and natural gas production. South Korea is a large customer for Iranian condensates, and as of August 2018 it had cut its purchases of that product from Iran to zero.
Note: mbd = million barrels per day.
Sanctions on Auto Production and Minerals Sectors
Successive Administrations have expanded sanctions, primarily by executive order, on several
significant nonoil industries and sectors of Iran'’s economy. The targeted sectors include Iran's ’s
automotive production sector, which is Iran'’s second-largest industry (after energy), and its
mineral exports, which account for about 10% of Iran'’s export earnings.
JCPOA Status: Revoked (by E.O 13716) but most provisions below went back into effect under under
E.O. 13846 of August 6, 2018.
.
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Iran Sanctions
Executive Order 13645 of June 3, 2013 (effective July 1, 2013), as superseded by 13846 of August 6, 2018:
On May 8, 2019, President Trump issued Executive Order 13871 sanctioning transactions with Iran'
Iran’s key minerals and industrial commodities. The White House announcement stated that Iran
earns 10% of its total export revenues from sales of the minerals and metals sanctioned under the
order.2929 The order does the following:
Several laws and executive orders seek to bar Iran from obtaining U.S. or other technology that
can be used for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Sanctions on Iran'’s exportation
of arms are discussed in the sections above on sanctions for Iran'’s support for terrorist groups.
The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (Title XIV of the FY1993 National Defense
Authorization Act, P.L. 102-484, signed in October 1992) imposes a number of sanctions on
foreign entities that supply Iran with WMD technology or "“destabilizing numbers and types of
advanced conventional weapons."30
”30
Advanced conventional weapons are defined as
(1) such long-range precision-guided munitions, fuel air explosives, cruise missiles, low
observability aircraft, other radar evading aircraft, advanced military aircraft, military satellites,
electromagnetic weapons, and laser weapons as the President determines destabilize the military
balance or enhance the offensive capabilities in destabilizing ways;
(2) such advanced command, control, and communications systems, electronic warfare systems,
or intelligence collections systems as the President determines destabilize the military balance or
enhance offensive capabilities in destabilizing ways; and
(3) such other items or systems as the President may, by regulation, determine necessary for the
purposes of this title.
The definition is generally understood to include technology used to develop ballistic missiles.
Sanctions to be imposedimposed: Sanctions imposed on violating entities include
If the violator is determined to be a foreign country, sanctions to be imposed are
Section 1603 of the act amended an earlier law, the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586G(a)
of P.L. 101-513), to provide for a "“presumption of denial"” for all dual use exports to Iran
(including computer software).
Implementation
A number of entities were sanctioned under the act in the 1990s, as shown in the tables at the end
of this paper. None of the designations remain active, because the sanctions have limited duration.
Waiver
30
The act originally only applied to advanced conventional weapons. The extension to WMD, defined as chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons-related technology was added by the FY1996 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
104-106).
Congressional Research Service
26
Iran Sanctions
Waiver
Section 1606 of the act provides a presidential waiver for its provisions, and for sanctions imposed pursuant to the |
Another law reinforces the authority of the President to sanction governments that provide aid or
sell arms to Iran (and other terrorism list countries). Under Sections 620G and 620H of the
Foreign Assistance Act, as added by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(Sections 325 and 326 of P.L. 104-132), the President is required to withhold foreign aid from any
country that provides to a terrorism list country financial assistance or arms. Waiver authority is
provided. Section 321 of that act also makes it a criminal offense for U.S. persons to conduct
financial transactions with terrorism list governments.
Implementation
No foreign assistance cuts or other penalties under this law have been announced.
As noted above, Section 5(b)(1) of ISA subjects to ISA sanctions firms or persons determined to
have sold to Iran (1) technology useful for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or (2) "
“destabilizing numbers and types"” of advanced conventional weapons. This, and Section 5(b)(2)
pertaining to joint ventures to mine uranium, are the only provisions of ISA that were not waived
to implement the JCPOA.
Implementation
Implementation. As noted earlier, no sanctions under this section have been imposed.
The Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178, signed in March 2000) is now called the Iran-North
Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) after amendments applying its provisions to North
Korea and to Syria. It authorizes sanctions—for two years unless renewed—on foreign persons persons
(individuals or corporations, not governments) that are determined in a report by the
Administration to have assisted Iran'’s WMD programs. Sanctions imposed include (1) a
prohibition on U.S. exportation of arms and dual use items to the sanctioned entity; and (2) a ban
on U.S. government procurement and of imports to the United States from the sanctioned entity
under Executive Order 12938 (of November 14, 1994). INKSNA also banned U.S. extraordinary
payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency in connection with the international space
station unless the President certified that the agency had not transferred any WMD or missile
technology to Iran within the year prior.31
31
31
The provision contains certain exceptions to ensure the safety of astronauts, but it nonetheless threatened to limit
U.S. access to the international space station after April 2006, when Russia started charging the United States for
transportation on its Soyuz spacecraft. Legislation in the 109th Congress (S. 1713, P.L. 109-112) amended the provision
in order to facilitate continued U.S. access and extended INA sanctions provisions to Syria.
Congressional Research Service
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Iran Sanctions
Implementation
Entities that have been sanctioned under this law are listed in the tables at the end of the report.
Designations more than two years old are no longer active. The JCPOA required the United States
to suspend INKSNA sanctions against "“the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and
services for nuclear activities contemplated in the JCPOA,"” but no INKSNA sanctions were
altered during that time.
Waiver and Termination
Section 4 gives the President the authority to not impose sanctions if the President justifies that decision to
Termination of this law would require congressional action. |
“Delisted”
Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005) allows the President to block the assets of proliferators of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters under the authority granted by the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and Section 301 of Title 3, United States Code.
.
Implementation
The numerous Iranian or Iran-related entities sanctioned under the order for are listed in the tables
at the end of this report. Entities delisted and which were to be delisted in accordance with the
JCPOA (in October 2023) are in italics and boldface type, respectively. Virtually all entities
delisted to implement the JCPOA were relisted on November 5, 2018.
)
The CAATSA law, signed on August 2, 2017, mandates sanctions on arms sales to Iran and on
entities that "“materially contribute"” to Iran'’s ballistic missile program.
Implementation
The CAATSA provisions have been implemented through additional designations for sanctions
(SDNs) under the executive orders referenced in CAATSA, primarily E.O. 13382.
Congressional Research Service 29 Iran Sanctions Sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Numerous sanctions target Iran
|
Some past foreign aid appropriations have withheld U.S. assistance to the Russian Federation
unless it terminates technical assistance to Iran'’s nuclear and ballistic missiles programs. The
Congressional Research Service
30
Iran Sanctions
provision applied to the fiscal year for which foreign aid is appropriated. Because U.S. aid to
Russia generally has not gone to the Russian government, little or no funding was withheld as a
result of the provision. The JCPOA makes no reference to any U.S. commitments to waive this
sanction or to request that Congress not enact such a provision.
”
Title III of CISADA established authorities to sanction countries that allow U.S. technology that
Iran could use in its nuclear and WMD programs to be re-exported or diverted to Iran. Section
303 of CISADA authorizes the President to designate a country as a "“Destination of Diversion Concern"
Concern” if that country allows substantial diversion of goods, services, or technologies
characterized in Section 302 of that law to Iranian end-users or Iranian intermediaries. The
technologies specified include any goods that could contribute to Iran'’s nuclear or WMD
programs, as well as goods listed on various U.S. controlled-technology lists such as the
Commerce Control List or Munitions List. For any country designated as a country of diversion
concern, there would be prohibition of denial for licenses of U.S. exports to that country of the
goods that were being re-exported or diverted to Iran.
Implementation
Implementation: To date, no country has been designated a "“Country of Diversion Concern." ”
Some countries adopted or enforced anti-proliferation laws apparently to avoid designation.
Waiver and Termination
Waiver: The President may waive sanctions on countries designated as of Diversion Concern for 12 months, and
Termination: The designation terminates on the date the President certifies to Congress that the country has |
U.S. efforts to shut Iran out of the international banking system were a key component of the
2010-2016 international sanctions regime.
, now superseded by other sanctions
During 2006-2016, the Department of the Treasury used long-standing authorities to persuade
foreign banks to cease dealing with Iran, in part by briefing them on Iran'’s use of the international
financial system to fund terrorist groups and acquire weapons-related technology. According to a
GAO report of February 2013, the Department of the Treasury made overtures to 145 banks in 60
countries, including several visits to banks and officials in the UAE, and convinced at least 80
foreign banks to cease handling financial transactions with Iranian banks. Upon implementation
of the JCPOA, the Treasury Department largely dropped this initiative, and instead largely sought
to encourage foreign banks to conduct normal transactions with Iran.
There is no blanket ban on foreign banks or persons paying Iran for goods using U.S. dollars. But,
U.S. regulations (ITRs, C.F.R. Section 560.516) ban Iran from direct access to the U.S. financial
system. The regulations allow U.S. banks to send funds (including U.S. dollars) to Iran for
allowed (licensed) transactions. However, the U.S. dollars cannot be directly transferred to an
Iranian bank, but must instead be channeled through an intermediary financial institution, such as
a European bank. Section 560.510 specifically allows for U.S. payments to Iran to settle or pay
judgments to Iran, such as those reached in connection with the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal,
discussed above. However, the prohibition on dealing directly with Iranian banks still applies.
On November 6, 2008, the Department of the Treasury broadened restrictions on Iran'’s access to
the U.S. financial system by barring U.S. banks from handling any transactions with foreign
banks that are handling transactions on behalf of an Iranian bank ("“U-turn transactions").32”).32 This
means a foreign bank or person that pays Iran for goods in U.S. dollars cannot access the U.S.
financial system (through a U.S. correspondent account, which most foreign banks have) to
acquire dollars for any transaction involving Iran. This ban remained in effect under the JCPOA
implementation, and Iran argued that these U.S. restrictions deter European and other banks from
reentering the Iran market, as discussed later in this report.
Recent Developments
Then-Treasury Secretary Lew in March and April 2016 suggested the Obama Administration was
considering licensing transactions by foreign (non-Iranian) clearinghouses to acquire dollars that
might facilitate transactions with Iran, without providing Iran with dollars directly.3333 However,
doing so was not required by the JCPOA and the Administration declined to take that step.
Instead, the Obama Administration encouraged bankers to reenter the Iran market without fear of
being sanctioned. The Trump Administration has not, at any time, expressed support for allowing
Iran greater access to dollars. The reimposition of U.S. sanctions has further reduced the
willingness and ability of foreign firms to use dollars in transactions with Iran.
The Department of the Treasury and other U.S. authorities have announced financial settlements
with various banks that violated U.S. regulations in transactions related to Iran (and other
countries such as Sudan, Syria, and Cuba). The amounts were reportedly determined, at least in
part, by the value, number, and duration of illicit transactions conducted, and the strength of the
evidence collected by U.S. regulators.3434 (As noted above, the FY2016 Consolidated
Appropriation, P.L. 114-113, provided for use of the proceeds of the settlements above to pay
compensation to victims of Iranian terrorism.)
32
For text of the OFAC ruling barring U-Turn transactions, see https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/
Documents/fr73_66541.pdf.
33 See Katherine Bauer. “Potential U.S. Clarification of Financial Sanctions Regulations.” April 5, 2016.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/potential-u.s.-clarification-of-financial-sanctions-regulations.
34 Analyst conversations with U.S. banking and sanctions experts. 2010-2015.
Congressional Research Service
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Iran Sanctions
Table 2. Major Settlements/Fines Paid by Banks for Violations
Bank
Date
Amount
Paid
Violation
UBS (Switzerland)
2004
$100 million
Unauthorized movement of U.S. dollars to
Iran and others
ABN Amro (Netherlands)
December 2005
$80 million
Failing to fully report financial transactions
compensation to victims of Iranian terrorism.)
Bank |
Date |
Amount Paid |
Violation |
UBS (Switzerland) |
2004 |
$100 million |
Unauthorized movement of U.S. dollars to Iran and others |
ABN Amro (Netherlands) |
December 2005 |
$80 million |
Failing to fully report financial transactions involving Bank Melli |
Credit Suisse (Switzerland) |
December 2009 |
$536 million |
involving Bank Melli
Credit Suisse (Switzerland)
December 2009
$536 million
Illicitly processing Iranian transactions with |
ING (Netherlands) |
June 2012 |
$619 million |
Concealing movement of billions of dollars |
Standard Chartered (UK) |
August 2012 |
$340 million |
Settlement paid to New York State for processing transactions on behalf of Iran |
Clearstream (Luxembourg) |
January 2014 |
$152 million |
Helping Iran evade U.S. banking restrictions |
Bank of Moscow (Russia) |
January 2014 |
$9.5 million |
processing transactions on behalf of Iran
Clearstream (Luxembourg)
January 2014
$152 million
Helping Iran evade U.S. banking restrictions
Bank of Moscow (Russia)
January 2014
$9.5 million
Illicitly allowing Bank Melli to access the U.S. |
BNP Paribas |
June 2014 |
$9 billion |
Amount forfeited for helping Iran (and |
Standard Chartered (UK) |
April 2019 |
$639 million |
Standard Chartered (UK)
April 2019
$639 million
Dubai branch of Standard Chartered |
Unicredit AG (Germany, |
April 2019 |
$1.3 billion |
For illicitly processing transactions through |
Source: Various press reports.
The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) was a key
piece of legislation intended to limit Iran'’s access to the international financial system and to
reduce the ability of Iran'’s import-export community (referred to in Iran as the "bazaar merchants" or "bazaaris"“bazaar
merchants” or “bazaaris”) from obtaining "“letters of credit"” (trade financing) to buy or sell
goods. The Department of the Treasury determines what is a "significant"“significant” financial transaction.
CISADA'
CISADA’s key provision—Section 104—requires the Secretary of the Treasury to forbid U.S.
banks from opening new "“correspondent accounts"” or "“payable-through accounts"” (or force the
cancellation of existing such accounts) for35
In addition: Section 1244(d) of the Iran Freedom and Counterproliferation Act, IFCA, applies the
CISADA sanctions to any foreign bank that does business with Iran'’s enery, shipping, and
shipbuilding sectors, including with NIOC, NITC, and IRISL. The provision was not an
amendment to CISADA itself. The provision was waived to implement the JCPOA, but was
reinstated to full implementation as of November 5, 2018.
Implementation
Some sanctions have been imposed under Section 104 of CISADA. On July 31, 2012, the United
States sanctioned the Bank of Kunlun in China and the Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq under Section
104 of CISADA. On May 17, 2013, the Department of the Treasury lifted sanctions on Elaf
Islamic Bank in Iraq, asserting that the bank had reduced its exposure to the Iranian financial
sector and stopped providing services to the Export Development Bank of Iran.
Waiver and Termination
Under Section 401(a) of CISADA, the Section 104 sanctions provisions would terminate 30 days after the
The Secretary of the Treasury may waive sanctions under Section 104, with the waiver taking effect 30 days after
As noted, Section 104 was not waived to implement the JCPOA, but many entities with which transactions would |
On November 21, 2011, the Obama Administration identified Iran as a "“jurisdiction of primary
money laundering concern"36”36 under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act (31 U.S.C. 5318A), based
on a determination that Iran'’s financial system, including the Central Bank, constitutes a threat to
governments or financial institutions that do business with Iran'’s banks. The designation imposed
36
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1367.aspx.
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Iran Sanctions
additional requirements on U.S. banks to ensure against improper Iranian access to the U.S.
financial system.
In October 2018, the Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN)
issued a warning to U.S. banks to guard against likely Iranian efforts to evade U.S. financial
sanctions. Earlier, in January 1, 2013, OFAC issued an Advisory to highlight Iran'’s use of hawalas
hawalas (traditional informal banking and money exchanges) in the Middle East and South Asia
region to circumvent U.S. financial sanctions. Because the involvement of an Iranian client is
often opaque, banks have sometimes inadvertently processed hawalahawala transactions involving
Iranians.
FATF
The Administration has stated that its regulations on Iran with respect to money laundering and
terrorism financing are intended, in part, to implement the recommendations of the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF)—a multilateral standard-setting body for anti-money laundering and
combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). In 2016, the FATF characterized Iran as a "
“high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdiction"” with respect to AMF/CFT issues.3737 On June 24,
2016, the FATF welcomed an "“Action Plan"” filed by Iran to address its strategic AML/CFT
deficiencies and decided to suspend, for one year, "countermeasures"“countermeasures”—mostly voluntary
recommendations of increased due diligence with respect to Iran transactions—pending an
assessment of Iran'’s implementation of its Action Plan. The FATF continued the suspension of
countermeasures in 2017 and February 2018.38
38
On October 19, 2018, the FATF stated that Iran had not completed legislation to adopt
international standards. On February 22, 2019, the FATF stated that countermeasures remained
suspended but that "“If by June 2019, Iran does not enact the remaining legislation in line with
FATF Standards, then the FATF will require increased supervisory examination for branches and
subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran."
”
In June 2019, the FATF stated that Iran still had not adequately criminalizedcriminalized terrorist financing,
including by removing the exemption for designated groups "“attempting to end foreign
occupation, colonialism and racism"; identified and frozen”; identified and frozen terrorist assets in line with the relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions; or ensured; or ensured an adequate and enforceable customer
due diligence regime. The FATF continuedcontinued the suspension of counter-measures, but called on but called on
members to require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial
institutions based in Iran, in line with the February 2019 Public Statement.39
Section 220 of the ITRSHRA required reports on electronic payments systems, such as the
Brussels-based SWIFT (Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications), that do
business with Iran. That law also authorizes—but neither it nor any other U.S. law or executive
order mandates—sanctions against SWIFT or against electronic payments systems. Still, many
transactions with Iran are subject to U.S. sanctions, no matter the payment mechanism.
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 (H.R. 4310, , P.L. 112-239, signed January 2,
2013)—Subtitle D, The Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA), sanctions a wide
swath of Iran'’s economy, touching several sectors. Its provisions on Iran'’s human rights record
are discussed in the section on "“Measures to Sanction Human Rights Abuses and Promote Civil Society."
Several sections of IFCA impose ISA sanctions on entities determined to have engaged in
specified transactions below. (The provisions The provisions apply ISA sanctions but do not amend ISA.).
Implementation
On August 29, 2014, the State Department sanctioned UAE-based Goldentex FZE in accordance
with IFCA for providing support to Iran'’s shipping sector. It was "delisted"“delisted” from sanctions on
Implementation Day of the JCPOA.
On October 16, 2018, OFAC designated as terrorism-related entities several Iranian industrial
companies on the grounds that they provide the Basij securitysecurity force with revenue to support its
operations in the Middle East. The designations, pursuant to E.O. 13224, mean that foreign firms
that transact business with these Iranian industrial firms could be subject to U.S. sanctions under
IFCA. The industrial firms—which were not previously designated and were therefore not "relisted"
“relisted” as SDNs on November 5, 2018, were Technotar Engineering Company; Iran Tractor
Manufacturing Company; Iran'’s Zinc Mines Development Company and several related zinc
producers; and Esfahan Mobarakeh Steel Company, the largest steel producer in the Middle East.
Waiver and Termination
Sections 1244 and 1245 of IFCA provide for a waiver of sanctions for 180 days, renewable for 180-day periods, if |
Executive Order 13608 of May 1, 2012, gives the Department of the Treasury the ability to
identify and sanction (cutting them off from the U.S. market) foreign persons who help Iran (or
Syria) evade U.S. and multilateral sanctions.
Several persons and entities have been designated for sanctions, as shown in the tables at the end
of the report.
The Trump Administration appears to be making increasing use of executive orders issued during
the Obama Administration to sanction Iranian entities determined to be engaged in malicious
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Iran Sanctions
cyberactivities or in transnational crime. Iranian entities have attacked, or attempted to attack,
using cyberactivity, infrastructure in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. Iran'’s ability
to conduct cyberattacks appears to be growing. Separately, the Justice Department has prosecuted
Iranian entities for such activity. The section below discusses Executive Order 13694 on
malicious cyberactivities and Executive Order 13581 on transnational crime.
Executive Order 13694 (April 1, 2015) blocks U.S.-based property of foreign entities determined
to have engaged in cyber-enabled activities that (1) harm or compromise the provision of services
by computers or computer networks supporting in the critical infrastructure sector; (2)
compromise critical infrastructure; (3) disrupt computers or computer networks; or (4) cause
misappropriation of funds, trade secrets, personal identifiers, or financial information for financial
advantage or gain.
Executive Order 13581 (July 25, 2011) blocks the U.S.-based property of entities determined (1)
to be a foreign person that constitutes a significant transnational criminal organization; (2) to have
materially assisted any person sanctioned under this order; or (3) to be owned or controlled by or
to have acted on behalf of a person sanctioned under the order.
Iran-related entities sanctioned under the orders are listed in the tables at the end of this report.
Some U.S. laws require or call for divestment of shares of firms that conduct certain transactions
with Iran. A divestment-promotion provision was contained in CISADA, providing a "safe harbor"“safe
harbor” for investment managers who sell shares of firms that invest in Iran'’s energy sector at
levels that would trigger U.S. sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act. As noted above, Section
219 of the ITRSHRA of 2012 requires companies to reports to the Securities and Exchange
Commission whether they or any corporate affiliate has engaged in any transactions with Iran that
could trigger sanctions under ISA, CISADA, and E.O 13382 and 13224.
Implementation
Implementation: Numerous states have adopted laws, regulations, and policies to divest from—or
avoid state government business with—foreign companies that conduct certain transactions with
Iran. The JCPOA requires the United States to work with state and local governments to ensure
that state-level sanctions do not conflict with the sanctions relief provided by the federal
government under the JCPOA. Most states that have adopted Iran sanctions continue to enforce
those measures.
”40
A trend in U.S. policy and legislation since the June 12, 2009, election-related uprising in Iran has
been to support the ability of the domestic opposition in Iran to communicate and to sanction
Iranian officials that commit human rights abuses. Sanctions on the IRGC represent one facet of
that trend because the IRGC is a key suppressive instrument. Individuals and entities designated
under the executive orders and provisions discussed below are listed in the tables at the end of
this report. For those provisions that ban visas to enter the United States, the State Department
interprets the provisions to apply to all members of the designated entity.41
Some laws and Administration action focus on expanding internet freedom in Iran or preventing
the Iranian government from using the internet to identify opponents. Subtitle D of the FY2010
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84), called the "VOICE"“VOICE” (Victims of Iranian Censorship)
Act, contained several provisions to increase U.S. broadcasting to Iran and to identify (in a report
to be submitted 180 days after enactment) companies that are selling Iran technology equipment
that it can use to suppress or monitor the internet usage of Iranians. The act authorized funds to
document Iranian human rights abuses since the June 2009 Iranian presidential election. Section
1241 required an Administration report by January 31, 2010, on U.S. enforcement of sanctions
against Iran and the effect of those sanctions on Iran.
/Promote Civil Society
Some legislation has sought to sanction regime officials involved in suppressing the domestic
opposition in Iran or in human rights abuses more generally. Much of this legislation centers on
amendments to Section 105 of CISADA.
The Trump Administration has imposed sanctions on some members of Iran'’s civilian leadership.
The Administration has named some Iranian officials as SDNs under various executive orders, as
shown in the table at the end of the report. As noted throughout, any Iranian official that is named
an SDN is subject to a freezing of their U.S.-based property and there are secondary sanctions
(noted throughout) on third parties that deal with those entities. Section 103(b)(3) of CISADA
also provides for the freezing of assets of any "“family member or associate acting for on behalf of
the person"” that is named as an SDN.
On June 24, 2019, in the context of heightened U.S.-Iran tensions, President Trump issued
Executive Order 13876, targeting the assets of Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'’i and his top
associates. Still, the degree to which Khamene'i'’i’s or his associates'’ assets intersect with the
global financial or commercial community is likely modest, making the effect of the order
probably limited. The order
U.N. sanctions on Iran, enacted by the Security Council under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter,4545 applied to all U.N. member states. During 2006-2008, three U.N. Security
Council resolutions—1737, 1747, and 1803—imposed sanctions on Iran'’s nuclear program and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) infrastructure. Resolution 1929, adopted on June 9, 2010,
was key for its assertion that major sectors of the Iranian economy support Iran'’s nuclear
program—giving U.N. member states authorization to sanction civilian sectors of Iran's economy. It also imposed strict limitations on Iran's development of ballistic missiles and imports and exports of arms.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 of July 20, 2015
The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA did not change the status of Resolution 2231.
Until August 2019, U.N. and International Atomic Energy Agency reports sinceafter the JCPOA began
implementation have stated that Iran iswas complying with its nuclear obligations under the JCPOA.
That assessment was corroborated by U.S. intelligence leaders in January 29, 2019, testimony
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.46
46 Modest violations that Iran has undertaken
as of mid-2019, which Iran asserts is because it is not getting the benefits of sanctions relief in
light of Trump Administration policy, have been noted in IAEA reports as of August 2019.
U.N. reports on Iranian compliance with Resolution 223147223147 have noted assertions by several U.N.
Security Council members, including the United States, that Iranian missile tests have been
inconsistent with the Resolution. U.S. officials have called some of Iran'’s launches of its
Khorramshahr missile as violations of the Resolution. The reports required by Resolution 2231,
as well as those required by other Resolutions pertaining to various regional crises, such as that in
Yemen, also note apparent violations of the Resolution 2231 restrictions on Iran'’s exportation of
arms. The Security Council is responsible for prescribing penalties on Iran for violations, and no
U.N. Security Council actions have been taken against Iran for these violations to date.
46
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/congressional-testimonies/item/1947-statement-for-the-record-worldwidethreat-assessment-of-the-us-intelligence-community.
47 The report is reprinted in, Iran Watch, at http://www.iranwatch.org/library/multilateral-organizations/united-nations/
un-secretary-general/third-report-secretary-general-implementation-security-council-resolution-2231.
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Iran Sanctions
U.N. List of Sanctioned Entities
Under Paragraph 6(c) of Annex B of Resolution 2231, entities sanctioned by the previous Iran-relatedIranrelated Resolutions would continue to be sanctioned for up to eight years from Adoption Day (until October 2023). An attachment to the Annex listed 36 entities for which this restriction would no longer apply (entities "delisted") as of Implementation Day. Most of the entities immediately delisted were persons and entities connected to permitted aspects of Iran'until Transition Day (October 2023—eight
years from Adoption Day). One notable person for which U.N. sanctions will end on Transition
Day is IRGC-QF commander Qasem Soleimani. However, some entities (named in an attachment
to the Annex) were immediately “delisted” on Implementation Day—mostly persons and entities
connected to permitted aspects of Iran’s nuclear program and its civilian economy. According to
press reports, two entities not on the attachment list, Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International
PLC, also were delisted on Implementation Day by separate Security Council action.4848 Paragraph
6(c) provides for the Security Council to be able to delist a listed entity at any time, as well as to
add new entities to the sanctions list. Delisted entities are in italics in the table of U.N.-listed
sanctioned entities at the end of the report.
Table 3. Summary of Provisions of U.N. Resolutions on Iran Nuclear Program
(1737, 1747, 1803, 1929, and 2231)
Resolution 2231 superseded all the previous Iran resolutions
Resolution 1737 required Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, to suspend construction of the heavy-water |
Assets frozen of Iranian persons and entities named in annexes to the resolutions, and countries required to ban |
Transfer to Iran of nuclear, missile, and dual use items to Iran prohibited, except for use in light-water reactors |
Resolution 1747 prohibited Iran from exporting arms. Resolution 2231 requires Iran to obtain Security Council |
Resolution 1929 prohibited Iran from investing abroad in uranium mining, related nuclear technologies or nuclear |
1929 mandated that countries not export major combat systems to Iran, but did not bar sales of missiles that are |
1929 called for restraint on transactions with Iranian banks, particularly Bank Melli and Bank Saderat. |
Resolution called for |
Resolution 1929 called on countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran |
|
to
be more effective.
Source: Text of U.N. Security Council resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, 1929, and 2231. http://www.un.org.
The following sections discuss sanctions relief provided under the November 2013 interim
nuclear agreement (JPA) and, particularly, the JCPOA.
U.S. officials said that the JPA provided "“limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible"” easing of
international sanctions. Under the JPA (in effect January 20, 2014-January 16, 2016)49
Under the JCPOA, sanctions relief occurred at Implementation Day (January 16, 2016), following
IAEA certification that Iran had completed stipulated core nuclear tasks. U.S. secondary sanctions
were waived or terminated, but most sanctions on direct U.S.-Iran trade. The secondary sanctions
eased during JCPOA implementation included52:52 (1) sanctions that limited Iran'’s exportation of
oil and sanction foreign sales to Iran of gasoline and energy sector equipment, and which limit
foreign investment in Iran'’s energy sector; (2) financial sector sanctions; and (3) sanctions on Iran'
Iran’s auto sector and trading in the rial. rial. The EU lifted its ban on purchases of oil and gas from
Iran; and Iranian banks were readmitted to the SWIFT electronic payments system. All U.N.
sanctions were lifted.
49
The Administration sanctions suspensions and waivers are detailed at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/220049.htm.
Daniel Fineren, “Iran Nuclear Deal Shipping Insurance Element May Help Oil Sales,” Reuters, November 24, 2013.
51 White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Republic of
Iran’s Nuclear Program,” November 23, 2013.
52 http://iranmatters.belfercenter.org/blog/translation-iranian-factsheet-nuclear-negotiations; and author conversations
with a wide range of Administration officials, think tank, and other experts, in Washington, DC, 2015.
50
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45
Iran Sanctions
All of the U.S. sanctions that were eased went back into effect by November 5, 2018, in
accordance with the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. The Administration has stated that the
purpose of reimposing the sanctions is to deny Iran the revenue with which to conduct regional
malign activities and advance its missile, nuclear, and conventional weapons programs.
The sanctions that went back into effect on August 7, 2018 (90-day wind-down period), were on
The sanctions that went back into effect on November 5, 2018, were on
JCPOA53
The laws below were waived to implement the JCPOA.
Even though it has reimposed all U.S. sanctions on Iran, the Trump Administration has issued
some exceptions that are provided for under the various U.S. sanctions laws:
The JCPOA did not commit the United States to suspend U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism or
human rights abuses, on foreign arms sales to Iran or sales of proliferation-sensitive technology
such as ballistic missile technology, or on U.S.-Iran direct trade (with the selected exceptions
discussed above). The sanctions below remained in place during JCPOA implementation:
Sanctions might have been reimposed by congressional action in accordance with President Trump'
Trump’s withholding of certification of Iranian compliance with the JCPOA, under the Iran
Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17). Certification was withheld in October
2017 and January and April of 2018, but Congress did not act to reimpose sanctions that were
suspended.57
57
The JCPOA (paragraph 36 and 37) contains a mechanism for the "“snap back"” of U.N. sanctions if
Iran does not satisfactorily resolve a compliance dispute. According to the JCPOA (and
Resolution 2231), the United States (or any veto-wielding member of the U.N. Security Council)
would have been able to block a U.N. Security Council resolution that would continue the lifting
of U.N. sanctions despite Iran'’s refusal to resolve the dispute. In that case "“... the provisions of
the old U.N. Security Council resolutions would be reimposed, unless the U.N. Security Council
decides otherwise."” The United States is no longer a participant in the JCPOA, and the snap-back mechanisms of the JCPOA can only
55
The JCPA does commit the United States to terminate sanctions with respect to some entities designated for
sanctions under INKSNA.
56 https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/jcpoa_faqs.pdf.
57 For more information on this option, see CRS Report R44942, U.S. Decision to Cease Implementing the Iran
Nuclear Agreement, by Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr, and Valerie Heitshusen.
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Iran Sanctions
mechanisms of the JCPOA can be formally initiated by current participants through the Joint
Commission, on which the United States no longer sits.
Compliance58
During 2010-2016, converging international views on Iran ’s expanding nuclear program
produced global consensus to pressure Iran through sanctions. In addition to asserting that the international community needed to ensure that Iran did not develop a nuclear weapon, some countries joined the sanctions regime toSome countries asserted that
imposing global sanctions would head off unwanted U.S. or other military action against Iran. Others cooperated,
whereas others cooperated with sanctions primarily in order to preserve their close relationships
with the United States. All the JCPOA parties publicly opposed the U.S. decision to exit the
JCPOA and have sought to stay engaged in the Iran market in order to continue to provide the JCPOA'’s economic benefits to Iran. This section assesses international cooperation and compliance with U.S. sanctions.
A A
comparison between U.S., U.N., and EU sanctions against Iran is contained in Table A-1 below.
Broader issues of Iran'’s foreign relations can be found in CRS Report R44017, Iran'Iran’s Foreign
and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman.
After the passage of Resolution 1929 in June 2010, European Union (EU) sanctions on Iran
became nearly as extensive as those of the United States. This contrasted with the 1990s, when
the EU countries refused to join the 1995 U.S. trade and investment ban on Iran and agreed to
reschedule $16 billion in Iranian debt bilaterally. In July 2002, Iran’s Islamic regime tapped
tapped international capital markets for the first time since the Islamic revolution, selling $500 million in bonds to European banks
and, during 2002-2005, there were negotiations between the EU and Iran on a "“Trade and
Cooperation Agreement"” (TCA) that would have lowered the tariffs or increased quotas forbenefitted Iranian exports to the EU countries.59
59
Under the JCPOA, EU sanctions that were imposed in 2012, were lifted, including the following:
The following EU sanctions remained in place:
The EU countries have not reimposed sanctions on Iran and instead have sought to preserve the
JCPOA by maintaining economic relations with Iran. However, to avoid risk to their positions in
the large U.S. market, many large European firms have ceased Iran-related transactions or exited
the Iran market entirely, as discussed below.60
The EU countries have undertaken several steps in an attempt to persuade Iran to continue to adhere to the JCPOA, On August 6, 2018, a 1996 EU "blocking statute" and Credit Line Proposal
The EU countries continue to try to preserve the JCPOA in the face of the Trump
Administration’s maximum pressure policy on Iran. On August 6, 2018, a 1996 EU “blocking
statute” that seeks to protect EU firms from reimposed U.S. sanctions took effect. In September
2018, EU countries announced a small amountsamount ($20 million) of development assistance to Iran, apparently in order to demonstrate that the EU is making good faith efforts to provide Iran the economic benefits of the JCPOA.
The EU subsequently adopted a mechanism under which EU countries could continue to trade with Iran with relative immunity from U.S. sanctions. On September 25,.
To try to circumvent U.S. sanctions, in September 2018, Germany, France, and Britain, joined by
Russia and China, as well as Iran, endorsed the creation of a "“special purpose vehicle"” (SPV)—an entity that that
would facilitate trade with Iran by avoiding dollar-denominated transactions or other exposure to
the U.S. market. In a January 31, 2019, joint statement, France, Britain, and Germany announced
the formal registration of the SPV, formally termednamed the “Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges ”
(INSTEX). It is based in France, with German governance, and financial support from the three
governments. It is toIts initial focus on the is the non-sanctionable sectors most essential to Iran, including
medicines, medical devices, and food, and perhaps eventually provide a platform for non-European countries to trade with Iran in oil and other products.63 The operation of INSTEX depended on Iran setting up a counterparty vehicle in Europe and, inbut it might eventually expand to oil and other products.63
In April 2019, Iran set up that counterparty as the "the required counterparty—the “Special Trade and Finance Instrument" ”
(STFI).
Senior U.S. officials(STFI).
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo denounced the EU plan as counterproductive, and Vice President Mike Pence, in mid-February 2019, criticized INSTEX as an outright attempt to undermine U.S. sanctions
against Iran. Indicative of U.S. pressure on the EU not to begin INSTEX operations, on May 7,
2019, Treasury Department Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Sigal
Mandelker said that INSTEX is unlikely to fulfill EU pledges to prevent INSTEX from being
used by Iran to launder money or fund terrorism. Mandelker's statement included an implicit threat to potentially sanction INSTEX or its counterparties. The U.S. concerns about INSTEX might be a
product, at least in part, of the alleged involvement of some U.S.-sanctioned Iranian banks in Iran'
Iran’s STFI, and U.S. officials reportedly are considering sanctioning this Iranian entity.64 As of early July 2019, INSTEX has not processed any transactions, despite EU expressions of willingness to lend funds to the vehicle to facilitate transactions. Senior Iranian officials have criticized INSTEX as ineffective and failing to satisfy Iranian demands to receive the economic benefits of the JCPOA.
While attempting to preserve civilian economic engagement with Iran, the European countries
have sought to support U.S. efforts to counter Iran'’s terrorism and proliferation activities.
The management of the Brussels-based Swift electronic payments system has sought to balance
financial risks with the policies of the EU governments. In March 2012, SWIFT acceded to an EU
request to expel 14 EU-sanctioned Iranian banks.6566 Some Iranian banks were still able to conduct
electronic transactions with the European Central Bank via the "“Target II"” system. Even though
the EU has not reimposed sanctions on Iran in concert with the Trump Administration, SWIFT's ’s
board is independent and, in order to avoid risk of U.S. penalties, in late 2018, the system again
disconnected the Iranian banks that were "relisted"“relisted” for U.S. sanctions.
Russia and China, two permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and parties to the
JCPOA, historically have imposed only those sanctions required by Security Council resolutions.
Both governments opposed the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA.
Russia
Increasingly close politically primarily on the issue of the conflict in Syria, Iran and Russia have
discussed expanding energy and trade cooperation, but there is little hard data on major economic engagementimplementation
of any agreements. The two countries reportedly agreed on broad energy development deals
during President Putin'’s visit to Tehran in late October 2017, with an estimated investment value
of up to $30 billion,66 but implementation is uncertain. In December 2018, Iran signed a free trade deal with the Russia-led "
“Eurasian Economic Union,"” suggesting Russian intent to potentially circumvent U.S. sanctions
on Iran.
Russia has reportedly offered Iranian ships access to its ports to deliver oil as a means of
avoiding U.S. efforts to sanction Iranian oil sales.67
In April 2015, Russia lifted its own restriction on delivering the S-300 air defense system that it
sold Iran in 2007 but refused to deliver after Resolution 1929 was adopted—even though that
65
Trump Administration cool to French plan for $15 billion Iranian credit line: officials. Reuters, September 4, 2019;
Press briefing by Ambassador Brian Hook. September 4, 2019.
66 Avi Jorish, “Despite Sanctions, Iran’s Money Flow Continues,” Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2013.
67 Crimea Invites Iran to Use Its Ports as a U.S. Sanctions Workaround – Official. Moscow Times, September 2, 2019.
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Resolution technically did not bar supply of that defensive system. In April 2016, Russia began
delivering the five S-300 batteries. Iran'’s Defense Minister visited Russia in February 2016 to
discuss possible future purchases of major combat systems. No sales have been announced.
, presumably to be consummated after
the U.N. arms import ban on Iran expires in October 2020.
China
China is a major factor in the effectiveness of any sanctions regime on Iran because China is Iran'
remains Iran’s largest oil customer. During 2012-2016, China was instrumental in reducing Iran's ’s
total oil exports because it cut its buys from Iran to about 435,000 barrels per day from its 2011
average of 600,000 barrels per day. The State Department asserted that, because China was the
largest buyer of Iranian oil, percentage cuts by China had a large impact in reducing Iran'’s oil
sales by volume and China merited an SRE. After sanctions were lifted in early 2016, China
increased its purchases of Iranian oil to, or even beyond, 2011 levels. Several Chinese energy firms that invested in Iran's energy sector put those projects on hold in 2012, but resumed or considered resuming work after sanctions were eased in 2016.
beyond 2011 levels. Iran’s automotive sector obtains a
significant proportion of its parts from China, including from China-based Geelran and Chery
companies.
Since the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, China has reduced its oil imports from Iran, but it
remains the largest single buyer (see Table 1). The Administration gave China a SRE sanctions exception on November 5, 2018, in part to recognize import reductions but also possibly to avoid further complicating U.S. relations with China. However, China reportedly is continuing
exception on November 5, 2018. China continues to import at least some Iranian oil despite the
ending of the SRE as of May 2, 2019, in large part on the expectation that the Trump
Administration will be hesitant to impose actual sanctions on Chinese banks for continuing to
engage with Iran on oil payments. However, on July 23, 2019, the Administration did sanction
(under IFCA) a small Chinese firm, Zhuhai Zhenrong Company Ltd., for buying oil from Iran. 68
Prior to the expiration of the SREs, China had stockpiled 20 million barrels of Iranian oil at its
Dalian port.67
China's President Xi ,69 and importation of that oil might avoid customs checkpoints and not be counted in
major oil industry assessments of China imports of Iranian oil.
China also remains a large investor in Iran. Several Chinese energy firms that invested in Iran’s
energy sector put those projects on hold in 2012, but resumed work after sanctions were eased in
2016 and continued that work despite the reimposition of U.S. sanctions. China’s President Xi
Jinping visited Iran and other Middle East countries in the immediate aftermath of the JCPOA,
and he has stated that Iran is a vital link in an effort to extend its economic influence westward
through its "“One Belt, One Road"” initiative. Chinese firms and entrepreneurs are integrating Iran
into this vision by modernizing Iran'’s rail and other infrastructure, particularly where that
infrastructure links to that of neighboring countries, including the Sultanate of Oman, funded by
loans from China.70 In August 2019, Iran and China expanded their 2016 25 year deal for China
investments in Iran to total: $280 billion to be invested in Iran’s oil, gas, and petrochemical
sectors, and $120 billion in upgrading Iran’s transport and manufacturing infrastructure.71
However, U.S. sanctions complicate Iran-China economic ties. China’s Kunlun Bank—an
affiliate of China’s energy company CNPC and which was sanctioned under CISADA in 2012 as
the main channel for money flows between the two countries—reportedly stopped accepting Euro
“The United States to Impose Sanctions on Chinese Firm Zhuhai Zhenrong Company Limited for Purchasing Oil
from Iran. Department of State. July 22, 2019.
69 “Boxed In: $1 billion of Iranian Crude Sits at China’s Dalian Port. Reuters. May 1, 2019.
70 Thomas Erdbrink. “China’s Push to Link East and West Puts Iran at ‘Center of Everything.’” New York Times, July
25, 2017.
71 China and Iran Flesh Out Strategic Partnership. Petroleum Economist, September 3, 2019.
68
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loans from China.68 Iran's place in this initiative offers China's government and firms incentive to avoid cooperating with U.S. sanctions.
However, U.S. sanctions complicate Iran-China economic ties. Iran's automotive sector obtains a significant proportion of its parts from China, including from China-based Geelran and Chery companies, and Iran's overall economic downturn and inability to obtain trade financing affects its ability to purchase parts in bulk. China's Kunlun Bank—an affiliate of China's energy company CNPC and which was sanctioned under CISADA in 2012 as the main channel for money flows between the two countries—reportedly stopped accepting Euro and then China currency-denominated payments from Iran in November 2018.69 Existing Iranian and then China currency-denominated payments from Iran in November 2018.72 Existing Iranian
accounts at the bank presumably can still be used to pay for Iranian imports from China. Iran is
reluctant to tap; an Iran-China hard currency escrow account, with an estimated value of about
$20 billion, to pay for China'’s infrastructure projects in Iran, such as the long Niayesh Tunnel.
In April 2018, the Commerce Department (Bureau of Industry and Security, BIS, which
administers Export Administration Regulations) issued a denial of export privileges action against
China-based ZTE Corporation and its affiliates. The action was taken on the grounds that ZTE
did not uphold the terms of March 2017 settlement agreement with BIS over ZTE'’s shipment of
prohibited U.S. telecommunications technology to Iran (and North Korea). On March 27, 2019,
OFAC announced a $1.9 million settlement with a Chinese subsidiary of the U.S. Black and
Decker tool company for unauthorized exports of tools and parts to Iran.70
During 2010-2016, Japan and South Korea enforced sanctions on Iran similar to those imposed
by the United States and the EU. Both countries cut imports of Iranian oil sharply after 2011, and
banks in the two countries restricted Iran'’s ability to repatriate the foreign exchange assets Iran
held in their banks. From 2016-2018, both countries increased importation of Iranian oil, and Iran
was able to access funds in banks in both countries.
Both countries—and their companies—have historically been unwilling to undertake transactions
with Iran that could violate U.S. sanctions, and firms in both countries have been complying with reimposed U.S. sanctions. South Korea, in particular, sought Administration concurrence to continue to import Iranian condensates (a petroleum product sometimes considered as crude oil), on which South Korea dependsexited the Iran
market. Both countries reduced their Iranian oil purchases to zero in October 2018 and both
countries received SRE sanctions exceptions on November 5. In early 2019, Japan imported some
Japan resumed some Iranian oil importation in early 2019, and South Korea has been purchasingpurchased about 200,000 barrels per day of Iranian condensates. Both countries are widely assessed as likely to cease energy transactions with Iran entirely as a result of the Administration's decision to end SREs as of May 2, 2019, and South Korea is
of Iranian condensates. Upon expiration of its SRE in May 2019, South Korea sought, but was
denied, Administration concurrence to continue to import Iranian condensates (a petroleum
product sometimes considered as crude oil), on which South Korea depends. South Korea is
replacing Iranian condensates supplies with those of Qatar and Australia.
Japan exports to Iran significant amounts of chemical and rubber products, as well as consumer
electronics. South Korean firms have been active in energy infrastructure construction in Iran,
and its exports to Iran are mainly iron, steel, consumer electronics, and appliances—meaning that
South Korea could be affected significantly by the May 2019 executive order sanctioning
transactions with Iran'’s minerals and metals sector.
The following firms have announced their postures following the U.S. exit from the JCPOA:
North Korea, like Iran, has been subject to significant international sanctions. North Korea has
never pledged to abide by international sanctions against Iran, and it reportedly cooperates with
Iran on a wide range of WMD-related ventures, particularly the development of ballistic missiles.
A portion of the oil that China buys from Iran (and from other suppliers) is reportedly sent to
North Korea, but it is not known if North Korea buys any Iranian oil directly. The potential for
North Korea to try to buy Iranian oil illicitly increased in the wake of the adoption in September
2017 of U.N. Security Council sanctions that limit North Korea'’s importation of oil, but there are
no publicly known indications that it is doing so. While serving as Iran'’s president in 1989, the
current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene'’i, visited North Korea. North Korea's then-titular’s thentitular head of state Kim Yong Nam attended President Rouhani'’s second inauguration in August 2017, and during his visit signed signed
various technical cooperation agreements of unspecified scope.72
Taiwan has generally been a small buyer of Iranian oil. It resumed imports of Iranian oil after
sanctions were eased in 2016. Taiwan received an SRE as of November 5, 2018, but has bought
no Iranian oil since late 2018.
Singapore has been a small buyer of Iranian oil. It has not bought any Iranian oil since U.S.
sanctions went back into effect in 2018.
South Asia
India
India cites U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iran as justification for its stances on trade with Iran. During 2011-201620112016, with U.N. sanctions in force on Iran, India'’s private sector assessed Iran as a "controversial market"“controversial
market”—a term describing reputational and financial risk. India'’s central bank ceased using a
Tehran-based regional body, the Asian Clearing Union, to handle transactions with Iran, and the
two countries agreed to settle half of India'’s oil buys from Iran in India'’s currency, the rupee. Iran
used the rupee accounts to buy India'’s wheat, pharmaceuticals, rice, sugar, soybeans, auto parts,
and other products.
India reduced its imports of Iranian oil substantially after 2011, in the process incurring
significant costs to retrofit refineries that were handling Iranian crude. However, after sanctions
were eased in 2016, India'’s oil imports from Iran increased to as much as 800,000 bpd in July
2018—well above 2011 levels. Indian firms resumed work that had been ended or slowed during
2012-2016. India also paid Iran the $6.5 billion it owed for oil purchased during 2012-2016.73
India'76
74
Author conversations with South Korean officials. 2019.
https://www.thedailybeast.com/north-koreas-deadly-partnership-with-iran.
76 “India Seeks to Pay $6.5 Billion to Iran for Oil Imports.” Economic Times of India. May 16, 2016.
75
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India’s cooperation with reimposed U.S. sanctions since 2018 is mixed, in part because no U.N.
sanctions have been reimposed.74In77In June 2018, the two countries again agreed to use rupee
accounts for their bilateral trade. India received the SRE exception on November 5, 2018. Because some Indian banks do not have or seek a presence in the United StatesAfter India’s SRE, last granted in November 2018, expired in
May 2019, it was widely expected that India and Iran willwould work out alternative payment
arrangements under which India will continue importing at least some Iranian oil despite the end of the SRE. Indian officials
said in May 2019 that India would comply with U.S. sanctions and find alternative suppliers, and India'
India’s import of Iranian oil have been zero since the end of April 2019.
In 2015, India and Iran agreed that India would help develop Iran'’s Chahbahar port that would
enable India to trade with Afghanistan unimpeded by Pakistan. With sanctions lifted, the project
no longer entails risk to Indian firms involved. In May 2016, Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi visited Iran and signed an agreement to invest $500 million to develop the port and related
infrastructure. As noted above, the Administration has utilized the "“Afghanistan reconstruction" ”
exception under Section 1244(f) of IFCA to allow for firms to continue developing it.
Construction at the port is proceeding, but India reportedly has reduced the pace and scope of
construction work on the port in light of the complications that U.S. sanctions place on
conducting business with Iran.75
78
Pakistan
One test of Pakistan'’s compliance with sanctions was a pipeline project that would carry Iranian
gas to Pakistan—a project that U.S. officials on several occasions stated would be subject to ISA
sanctions. Despite that threat, agreement on the $7 billion project was finalized on June 12, 2010,
and construction was formally inaugurated in a ceremony attended by the Presidents of both
countries on March 11, 2013. In line with an agreed completion date of mid-2014, Iran reportedly completed the pipeline on its side of the border. China'
China’s announcement in April 2015 of a $3 billion investment in the project seemed to remove
financial hurdles to the line'’s completion, and the JCPOA removed sanctions impediments to the
project.7679 However, during President Hassan Rouhani'’s visit to Pakistan in March 2016, Pakistan
still did not commit to complete the line, and observers note that there are few indications of
progress on the project. In 2009, India dissociated itself from the project over concerns about the
security of the pipeline, the location at which the gas would be transferred to India, pricing of the
gas, and tariffs.
Iran has substantial economic relations with Turkey and the countries of the South Caucasus.
Turkey
During periods when U.S. sanctions did not apply, Turkey bought about 40% of its oil from Iran.
Turkey reduced purchases of Iranian oil during 2012-2016, but its buys returned to 2011 levels
after sanctions on Iran were eased in 2016. Turkey received an SRE sanctions exemption on
November 5, 2018, and its officials strongly indicated in April 2019 that Turkey expected to
receive another SRE as of the May 2, 2019, expiration. Turkey'’s insistence on being allowed to
buy Iranian oil without fear of U.S. penalty—as well as its overall dependence on Iranian oil—might
underpin a reported decision by Turkey to continue buying at least some Iranian oil despite the expiration of the SRE exception.
.
77
CRS conversations with Indian officials and U.S. experts on India. 2017-18.
https://thewire.in/diplomacy/chabahar-us-iran-ties-india.
79 Asia Times, March 21, 2014, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/SOU-02-210314.html.
78
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Turkey, which buys about 6% of its total gas imports from Iran, is Iran'’s main gas customer via a
pipeline built in 1997, which at first was used for a swap arrangement under which gas from
Turkmenistan was exported to Turkey. Direct Iranian gas exports to Turkey through the line
began in 2001, but no ISA sanctions were imposed on the grounds that the gas supplies were
crucial to Turkey'’s energy security. Prior to the October 2012 EU ban on gas purchases from Iran,
this pipeline was a conduit for Iranian gas exports to Europe (primarily Bulgaria and Greece).
Pre-JCPOA, in response to press reports that Turkey'’s Halkbank was settling Turkey'’s payments
to Iran for energy with gold, U.S. officials testified on May 15, 2013, that the gold going from
Turkey to Iran consists mainly of Iranian private citizens'’ purchases of Turkish gold to hedge
against the value of the rialrial. A U.S. criminal case involved a dual Turkish-Iranian gold dealer,
Reza Zarrab, arrested in the United States in 2016 for allegedly violating U.S. sanctions
prohibiting helping Iran deal in precious metals. In November 2016, the U.S. Attorney for New York'
York’s Southern District indicted several individuals for using money services businesses in
Turkey and in the UAE for conspiring to conceal from U.S. banks transactions on behalf of and
for the benefit of sanctioned Iranian entities, including Mahan Air.7780 On January 6, 2014, the
Commerce Department blocked a Turkey-based firm (3K Aviation Consulting and Logistics)
from re-exporting two U.S.-made jet engines to Iran'’s Pouya Airline.78
The rich energy reserves of the Caspian Sea create challenges for U.S. efforts to deny Iran
financial resources. The Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations cited potential ISA
sanctions to deter oil pipeline routes involving Iran—thereby successfully promoting an the
alternate route from Azerbaijan (Baku) to Turkey (Ceyhan), which became operational in 2005.
Section 6 of Executive Order 13622 exempts from sanctions any pipelines that bring gas from
Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey.
Agreements reached in 2018 between Russia and the Caspian Sea states on the legal division of
the sea could spawn new energy development in the Caspian. Iran'’s energy firms will
undoubtedly become partners in eventual joint ventures to develop the Caspian's resources, and Iran's involvement in such projects will require the Administration to determine whether to impose sanctions.
’s resources.
Iran and Azerbaijan have in recent years tried to downplay political differences for joint economic
benefit, and they have been discussing joint energy and infrastructure projects among themselves
and with other powers, including Russia. Iran and Armenia—Azerbaijan'’s adversary—have long
enjoyed extensive economic relations: Armenia is Iran'’s largest gas customer, after Turkey. In
May 2009, Iran and Armenia inaugurated a natural gas pipeline between the two, built by
Gazprom of Russia. No determination of ISA sanctions was issued. Armenia has said its banking
controls are strong and that Iran is unable to process transactions illicitly through Armenia's banks.79’s
banks.82 However, observers in the South Caucasus assert that Iran has used Armenian banks
operating in the Armenia-occupied Nagorno-Karabakh territory to circumvent international
financial sanctions.80
83
80
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-united-states-attorney-announces-superseding-indictment-chargingturkish-and.
81 “US Acts to Block Turkish Firm from Sending GE Engines to Iran,” Reuters, January 6, 2014.
82 Louis Charbonneau, “Iran Looks to Armenia to Skirt Banking Sanctions,” Reuters, August 21, 2012.
83 Information provided to the author by regional observers. October 2013.
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Persian Gulf States and Iraq84
The Gulf Cooperation Council states (GCC: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and
Oman) are oil exporters and close allies of the United States. As Iranian oil exports decreased
after 2012, the Gulf states supplied the global oil market with additional oil. Since the U.S. exit
from the JCPOA, U.S. officials have worked with Gulf oil exporters to ensure that the global oil
market is well supplied even as Iranian oil exports fall. And the State Department'’s SRE
announcement on April 22, 2019, indicated that the Administration is looking to Saudi Arabia and
the UAE, in particular, to keep the global oil market well supplied after SREs end on May 2,
2019. Still, in order not to antagonize Iran, the Gulf countries maintain relatively normal trade
with Iran. Some Gulf-based shipping companies, such as United Arab Shipping Company
reportedly continued to pay port loading fees to such sanctioned IRGC-controlled port operators
as Tidewater.82
85
The UAE has attracted U.S. scrutiny because of the large presence of Iranian firms there, and
several UAE-based firms have been sanctioned, as noted in the tables at the end of the report.
U.S. officials praised the UAE'’s March 1, 2012, ban on transactions with Iran by Dubai-based
Noor Islamic Bank, which Iran reportedly used to process oil payments. Some Iranian gas
condensates (120,000 barrels per day) were imported by Emirates National Oil Company
(ENOC) and refined mostly into jet fuel. Subsequent to the May 8, 2018, U.S. exit from the
JCPOA, ENOC officials said they were trying to find alternative supplies of the hydrocarbon
products it buys from Iran.86 The Wall Street Journal reported on September 8, 2019 that the UAE
had recently taken delivery of some Iranian oil and that some of Iran’s petrochemical sales have
been routed through the UAE.87
Iran and several of the Gulf states have had discussions on various energy and related projects,
but few have materialized because of broad regional disputes between Iran and the Gulf states.
products it buys from Iran.83
Iran and several of the Gulf states have had discussions on various energy and related projects, but few have materialized because of broad regional disputes between Iran and the Gulf states. Kuwait and Iran have held talks on the construction of a 350-mile pipeline that would bring Iranian gas to Kuwait, but the project does not appear to be materializing. Bahrain's discussions of purchasing Iranian gas have floundered over sharp political differences.84 Qatar and Iran share the large gas field in the Gulf waters between them, and their economic
relations have become closer in light of the isolation of Qatar by three of its GCC neighbors, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain. The only GCC state that has moved forward with economic joint ventures with Iran is Oman, particularly in the development of Oman's priority project to expand its port at Al Duqm port, which Oman and Iran envision as a major hub for regional trade.
Omani banks, some
Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain.
Iran and Oman have active economic relations. Iran and Oman have an active joint venture to
expand Oman’s Al Duqm port, which is envisioned as a major hub for regional trade. Among the
projects that have not materialized are a Kuwait-Iran 350-mile pipeline that would bring Iranian
gas to Kuwait, and venture under which Bahrain would purchase Iranian gas. Omani banks, some
of which operate in Iran, were used to implement some of the financial arrangements of the JPA
and JCPOA.8588 As a consequence, a total of $5.7 billion in Iranian funds had built up in Oman's ’s
Bank Muscat by the time of implementation of the JCPOA in January 2016. In its efforts to easily
access these funds, Iran obtained from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the
Treasury Department a February 2016 special license to convert the funds (held as Omani rials) to
dollars as a means of easily converting the funds into Euros. Iran ultimately used a different mechanism to access the funds as hard currency, but the special license issuance resulted in a May 2018 review by the majority of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation to
84
The CRS Report RL32048, Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options, by Kenneth Katzman, discusses the
relations between Iran and other Middle Eastern states.
85 Mark Wallace, “Closing U.S. Ports to Iran-Tainted Shipping. Op-ed,” Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2013.
86 Some Top Oil Buyers Are Thinking about Shunning Iran Oil, op. cit.
87 As U.S. Cracks Down on Iran’s Oil Sales, It Calls out an Ally. Wall Street Journal, September 8, 2019.
88 Omani banks had a waiver from U.S. sanctions laws to permit transferring those funds to Iran’s Central Bank, in
accordance with Section 1245(d)(5) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (P.L. 112-81). For
text of the waiver, see a June 17, 2015, letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield to
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker, containing text of the “determination of waiver.”
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mechanism to access the funds as hard currency, but the special license issuance resulted in a
May 2018 review by the majority of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation to
assess whether that license was consistent with U.S. regulations.89
Iraq
Iraq’assess whether that license was consistent with U.S. regulations.86
Iraq's attempts to remain close to its influential neighbor, Iran, have complicated Iraq'’s efforts to
rebuild its economy yet avoid running afoul of the United States and U.S. sanctions on Iran. As
noted above, in 2012, the United States sanctioned an Iraqi bank that was a key channel for Iraqi
payments to Iran, but lifted those sanctions when the bank reduced that business. Iraq presented
the United States with a sanctions-related dilemma in July 2013, when it signed an agreement
with Iran to buy 850 million cubic feet per day of natural gas through a joint pipeline that enters
Iraq at Diyala province and would supply several power plants. No sanctions were imposed on
the arrangement, which was agreed while applicable sanctions were in effect. In May 2015, the
Treasury Department sanctioned Iraq'’s Al Naser Airlines for helping Mahan Air (sanctioned
entity) acquire nine aircraft.87
90
The Trump Administration reportedly is seeking to accommodate Iraq'’s need for Iranian
electricity supplies and other economic interactions. The Administration has given Iraq waiver
permission—apparently under Section 1247 of IFCA—to buy the Iranian natural gas that runs Iraq'
Iraq’s power plants. That section provides for waivers of up to 180 days, but press reports
indicate that the Administration has limited the waiver period to 90-day increments.8891 Iranian
arms exports to Shia militias in Iraq remain prohibited by Resolution 2231, but no U.N. sanctions
on that activity have been imposed to date. As of October 2018, Iraq reportedly has discontinued
crude oil swaps with Iran—about 50,000 barrels per day—in which Iranian oil flowed to the
Kirkuk refinery and Iran supplied oil to Iraq'’s terminals in the Persian Gulf.
Iran has extensive economic relations with both Syria and Lebanon, countries where Iran asserts
that core interests are at stake. The compliance of Syrian or Lebanese banks and other institutions
with international sanctions against Iran was limited even during 2012-2015. Iran reportedly uses
banks in Lebanon to skirt financial sanctions, according to a wide range of observers, and these
banks are among the conduits for Iran to provide financial assistance to Hezbollah as well as to
the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad.
In January 2017, Iran and Syria signed a series of economic agreements giving Iranian firms
increased access to Syria'’s mining, agriculture, and telecommunications sectors, as well as
management of a Syrian port.8992 In July, UK authorities diverted an Iranian tanker delivering oil to
Syria, which constituted a violation of EU sanctions on Syria but was not a violation of any EU
sanctions on Iran.
The ship reportedly delivered the oil to Syria in early September after its
release by Gibraltar in late August.
“Obama Misled Congress, Tried and Failed to Give Iran Secret Access to US Banks Before the Deal.” Business
Insider, June 6, 2018; Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate. Majority Report. “Review of U.S.
Treasury Department’s License to Convert Iranian Assets Using the U.S. Financial System.” May 2018.
90 Eli Lak, “Iran Sanctions Collapsing Already,” Bloomberg News, May 11, 2015.
91 “U.S. Grants Iraq Sanctions Relief in Bid to Boost Business Deals,” Wall Street Journal, December 21, 2018.
92 Iran Signs Phone, Gas Deals with Syria. Agence France Presse, January 17, 2017.
89
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World Bank and WTO
The United States representative to international financial institutions is required to vote against
international lending, but that vote, although weighted, is not sufficient to block international
lending. No new international financial institution loans have been approved to Iran since 2005,
including under the World Bank's "’s “Global Environmental Facility"” (GEF) that had slated more
than $7.5 million in loans for Iran to dispose of harmful chemicals.9093 Any new loans are unlikely
given the reimposition of all U.S. sanctions in 2018 and U.S. opposition to them for Iran.
Earlier, in 1993, the United States voted its 16.5% share of the World Bank against loans to Iran
of $460 million for electricity, health, and irrigation projects, but the loans were approved. To
block that lending, the FY1994-FY1996 foreign aid appropriations (P.L. 103-87, , P.L. 103-306, ,
and P.L. 104-107) cut the amount appropriated for the U.S. contribution to the bank by the
amount of those loans, contributing to a temporary halt in new bank lending to Iran. But, in May
2000, the United States'’ allies outvoted the United States to approve $232 million in loans for
health and sewage projects. During April 2003-May 2005, a total of $725 million in loans were
approved for environmental management, housing reform, water and sanitation projects, and land
management projects, in addition to $400 million in loans for earthquake relief.
WTO Accession
An issue related to sanctions is Iran'’s request to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Iran
began accession talks in 2006 after the George W. Bush Administration dropped its objection to Iran'
Iran’s application as part of an effort to incentivize Iran to reach an interim nuclear agreement.
The lifting of sanctions presumably paves the way for talks to accelerate, but the accession
process generally takes many years. Accession generally takes place by consensus of existing
WTO members. Iran'’s accession might be complicated by the requirement that existing members
trade with other members; as noted above, the U.S. ban on trade with Iran remains in force. The
Trump Administration does not advocate Iran'’s admission to that convention.
The question "“are sanctions on Iran 'working'?" ‘working’?”—a question Secretary of State Pompeo
answered in the affirmative in August 201994—can be assessed based on an analysis of the goals
of the sanctions. The following sections assess the effectiveness of Iran sanctions according to a
number of criteria.
The international sanctions regime of 2011-2016 is widely credited with increasing Iran's ’s
willingness to accept the JCPOA'’s restraints on Iran'’s nuclear program. Hassan Rouhani was
elected president of Iran in June 2013 in part because of his stated commitment to achieving an
easing of sanctions and ending Iran'’s international isolation. Still, the long-term effects of
sanctions are uncertain: the intelligence community assesses that it "“does not know"” whether Iran
plans to eventually develop a nuclear weapon.91
The Trump Administration asserts that its campaign of "maximum pressure" on Iran, 95
Barbara Slavin, “Obama Administration Holds Up Environmental Grants to Iran,” Al Monitor, June 23, 2014.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTcZg13i-2Q
95 “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.” Testimony before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence. May 11, 2017. This language was not contained in the 2018 version of the testimony.
93
94
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The Trump Administration asserts that its campaign of “maximum pressure” on Iran,
implemented mainly through sanctions, will cause Iran negotiate a revised JCPOA that would
cover not only Iran'’s nuclear program but also its missile program and its regional malign
activities. However, Iran has rejected newnot entered into such negotiations with the United States, to date, despite the significant pressure on Iran's economy that is analyzed below.
.
Sanctions in force during 2011-2016 did not prevent Iran from advancing its nuclear program.
And, even though U.S. and EU sanctions remained on Iran'’s missile programs after the JCPOA
was implemented, U.S. intelligence officials have testified that Iran continues to expand the scale,
reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile arsenal. Still, Iran'’s nuclear and missile programs
might have advanced faster were sanctions not imposed.92
96
Sanctions have prevented Iran from buying significant amounts of major combat systems since
the early 1990s, although Iran has acquired some defensive systems that were not specifically
banned by Resolution 2231. Russia delivered the S-300 air defense system in April 2016. And, Iran'
Iran’s indigenous arms industry has grown over the past two decades.9397 U.S. intelligence directors
testified in January 2019 that Iran continues to field increasingly lethal weapons systems,
including more advanced naval mines and ballistic missiles, small submarines, armed UAVs
(unmanned aerial vehicles), coastal defense cruise missile batteries, attack craft, and anti-ship
ballistic missiles.94
Neither the imposition, lifting, nor reimposition of strict sanctions has appeared to affect Iran's ’s
regional behavior. Iran intervened extensively in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen during the 2011-2016
period when sanctions had a significant adverse effect on Iran'’s economy. Iran has remained
engaged in these regional conflicts since sanctions were eased in early 2016, including delivering
weapons to pro-Iranian parties in these conflicts.
Some recent reports indicate that sanctions on Iran are adversely affecting Hezbollah'’s finances to
the point where the party has had to appeal for donations, cut expenses, request donations, and
delay or reduce payments to its fighters.9599 An alternate explanation is that Iran is adjusting its
expenditures in the Syria conflict to the reduced activity on the battlefield there. Administration
officials assert that the apparent Hezbollah financial difficulties is evidence that its "maximum pressure"“maximum
pressure” campaign on Iran is working.96
The100
In explaining its decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, the Trump Administration has asserted that
the easing of sanctions during 2016-18 caused Iran to expand its regional activities. President
Trump stated that Iran'’s defense budget had increased 40% during that time. He stated on August
6, 2018, that "“Since the deal [JCPOA] was reached, Iran'’s aggression has only increased. The
regime has used the windfall of newly accessible funds it received under the JCPOA to build
nuclear-capable missiles, fund terrorism, and fuel conflict across the Middle East and beyond.... The re-imposition
The reimposition of nuclear-related sanctions through today'’s actions further intensifies pressure
on Tehran to change its conduct."97”101 However, it can be argued that Iran'’s regional activities were
96
Speech by National Security Adviser Tom Donilon at the Brookings Institution, November 22, 2011.
Department of Defense, Annual Report of Military Power of Iran, April 2012.
98 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, January 29, 2019.
99 “Sanctions on Iran are Hitting Hezbollah,” Washington Post, May 19, 2019.
100 Testimony of Ambassador Brian Hook before the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International
Terrorism of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. June 19, 2019.
101 Statement from the President on the Reimposition of United States Sanctions with Respect to Iran. August 6, 2018.
97
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not facilitated by the easing of sanctions but rather by the opportunities to expand its influence
that were provided by Iran by the region'’s conflicts.
Oversight. In terms of congressional oversight, a provision of the FY2016 Consolidated
Appropriation (P.L. 114-113) required an Administration report to Congress on how Iran has used
the financial benefits of sanctions relief. And, a provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review
Act (P.L. 114-17) requires that a semiannual report on Iran'’s compliance with the JCPOA include
information on any Iranian use of funds to support acts of terrorism.
No U.S. Administration, including the Trump Administration,
Political Effects
No U.S. Administration has asserted that the objective of U.S. sanctions on Iran is to bring about
the change of Iran'’s regime. ButHowever, sanctions, by allmany accounts, contributed todid contribute to some
political change in Iran by fostering the election and reelection of the relatively moderate Rouhani
as Iran'’s president. Many Iranians welcomed the JCPOA in 2015 because of its promise of relief from sanctions, undoubtedly contributing to Supreme Leader Khamene'i's acceptance of the deal
from sanctions. The Trump Administration'’s reimposition of JCPOA sanctions and addition of
new sanctions have arguably undermined Iran'’s moderate leaders, including Rouhani,
contributing to Iran'’s decision in mid-2019 to undertake selected violations of the JCPOA. There
is no indication that Rouhani'’s position is threatened, but IRGC and other hardliners, who control
domestic security and the judiciary, have criticized Rouhani for remaining in the JCPOA despite
the U.S. exit. In February 2019, apparently under pressure from hardliners, Foreign Minister
Mohammad Javad Zarif announced his resignation, but Rouhani—apparently as a challenge to
the hardliners—did not accept the resignation and reinstated him.
Some assert that the sanctions are sustaining the periodic unrest that has erupted in Iran since late
2017. In 2018 and thus far in 2019, labor strikes and unrest among women protesting the strict
public dress code have continued, although not at a level that appears to threaten the regime.
Other protests occurred over flooding in the southwest in March-April 2019, but again not to the
level where the regime was threatened. Still, some protesters complain that the country'’s money
is being spent on regional interventions rather than on the domestic economy.
Economic Effects
The U.S. sanctions enacted since 2011, when fully implemented, take a substantial toll on Iran's economy.
Iran had some success mitigating the economic effect of sanctions.
Export
Export Diversification. Over the past 10 years, Iran has promoted sales of nonoil
products such as minerals, cement, urea fertilizer, and other agricultural and basic
industrial goods. Such "nonoil"“non-oil” exports now generate much of the revenue that
funds Iran'’s imports.106109 This diversification might have been a factor in the
Trump Administration decision in May 2019 to sanction Iran'’s mineral and
metals sector. Iran also has promoted the sale of high value oil products such as
petrochemicals, earning about $4.7 billion in revenue from that sourcethem by 2016.107
110
Reallocation of Investment Funds and Import Substitution. Sanctions compelled
some Iranian manufacturers to increase domestic production of some goods as
substitutes for imports. This trend has been hailed by Iranian economists and
Supreme Leader Khamene'’i, who supports building a "“resistance economy"” that
is less dependent on imports and foreign investment.
Partial Privatization/IRGC in the Economy. Over the past few years. Since 2010, portions of Iran's state-owned’s stateowned enterprises have been transferred to the control of quasi-governmental
entities, including cleric-fun foundations (bonyadsbonyads), holding companies, or
investment groups. Based on data from the Iranian Privatization Organization,
there are about 120 such entities that account for a significant proportion of Iran'
Iran’s GDP.108111 Although estimates vary widely, the IRGC'’s corporate affiliates
are commonly assessed as controlling at least 20% of Iran'’s economy, although
there is little available information on the degree of IRGC-affiliated ownership
stakes.109112 Rouhani has sought to push the IRGC out of Iran'’s economy through
divestment, but with mixedlimited success.
108
Radio Farda, op. cit.
Testimony of Patrick Clawson before the Senate Banking Committee. January 21, 2015.
110 “Iran Reaps Less Cash from Eased Sanctions Than Predicted,” op. cit.
111 Kevan Harris, “Iran’s Political Economy Under and After the Sanctions,” Washington Post blogs, April 23, 2015.
112 https://www.thenational.ae/world/us-sanctions-on-revolutionary-guards-causes-iran-investment-rethink-1.733028.
109
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Subsidy Reductions. President Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) reduced generous
subsidies while temporarily compensating families with small cash payments.
success.
Subsidy Reductions. In 2007, the Ahmadinejad government began trying to wean the population off of generous subsidies by compensating families with cash payments of about $40 per month. Gasoline prices were raised to levels similar to those in other regional countries,
and far above the subsidized price of 40 cents per gallon. Rouhani has continued
to reduce subsidies, including by raising gasoline and staple food prices further
and limiting the cash payments to only those families who could claim financial hardshippoor families. Rouhani also has improved
collections of taxes and of price increases for electricity and natural gas
utilities.110
113
Import Restrictions/Currency Controls.. To conserve hard currency, Iran has at
times reduced the supply of hard currency to importers of luxury goods, such as
cars or cellphones, in order to maintain hard currency supplies to importers of
essential goods. These restrictions eased after sanctions were lifted in 2016 but
were reimposed in 2018 to deal with economic unrest and the falling value of the rial.
![]() |
rial. Figure 1. Economic Indicators Sources: IMF 2019, U.S. Energy Information Administration, OPEC. |
The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) was enacted in large part to reduce Iran'’s oil and gas production
capacity over the longer term by denying Iran the outside technology and investment to maintain
or increase production. U.S. officials estimated in 2011 that Iran had lost $60 billion in
investment in the sector as numerous major firms pulled out of Iran. Iran says it needs $130
billion-$145 billion in new investment by 2020 to keep oil production capacity from falling.111 114
Further development of the large South Pars gas field alone requires $100 billion.112 115 Table B-1 at
the end of this report discusses various Iranian oil and gas fields and the fate of post-1999
investments in them.
During 2012-2016, there was little development activity at Iran'’s various oil and gas development
sites, as energy firms sought to avoid sanctions. Some foreign investors resold their equity stakes
to Iranian companies. However, the Iranian firms are not as technically capable as the
international firms that have withdrawn. The lifting of sanctions in 2016 lured at least some
foreign investors back into the sector, encouraged by Iran'’s more generous investment terms
under a concept called the "“Iran Petroleum Contract."” That contract gives investing companies
the rights to a set percentage of Iran'’s oil reserves for 20-25 years.113116 Iran signed a number of new
agreements with international energy firms since mid-2016 but, as noted, major energy firms have
begun to divest in response to the U.S. exit from the JCPOA.
Sanctions relief also opened opportunities for Iran to resume developing its gas sector. Iran has
been using its gas development primarily to reinject into its oil fields rather than to export,
although Iran exports about 3.6 trillion cubic feet of gas, primarily to Turkey and Armenia.
Sanctions have rendered Iran unable to develop a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export business. It
was reported in March 2017 that the Philippine National Oil Company is seeking to build a 2-million2million-ton LNG plant in Iran, suggesting that patent issues do not necessarily preclude Iran from
pursuing LNG.
With respect to gasoline, the enactment of the CISADA law targeting sales of gasoline to Iran had
a measurable effect. Several suppliers stopped selling gasoline to Iran once enactment appeared
likely, and others ceased supplying Iran after enactment. Gasoline deliveries to Iran fell from
about 120,000 barrels per day before CISADA to about 30,000 barrels per day immediately
thereafter, although importation later increased to about 50,000 barrels per day. Iran expanded
several of its refineries and, in 2017, Iranian officials said Iran had become largely self-sufficient
in gasoline production.
It is difficult to draw any direct relationship between sanctions and Iran'’s human rights practices.
Recent human rights reports by the State Department and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Iran's ’s
human rights practices assess that there has been only modest improvement in Iran'’s practices in
recent years, particularly relaxation of enforcement of the public dress code for women. The
altered policies cannot necessarily be attributed to sanctions pressure or sanctions relief, although
some might argue that sanctions-induced economic dissatisfaction has emboldened Iranians to
protest and to compel the government to relax some restrictions.
114
Khajehpour presentation at CSIS, op. cit.
“Iran Faces Steep Climb to Join Gas Superpowers by 2017,” International Oil Daily, April 29, 2014.
116 Thomas Erdbrink. “New Iran Battle Brews over Foreign Oil Titans.” New York Times, February 1, 2016.
115
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Since at least 2012, foreign firms have generally refrained from selling the Iranian government
equipment to monitor or censor social media use. Such firms include German
telecommunications firm Siemens, Chinese internet infrastructure firm Huawei, and South
African firm MTN Group. In October 2012, Eutelsat, a significant provider of satellite service to Iran'
Iran’s state broadcasting establishment, ended that relationship after the EU sanctioned the then
head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Ezzatollah Zarghami. However, the
regime retains the ability to monitor and censor social media use.
Humanitarian Effects
During 2012-2016, sanctions produced significant humanitarian-related effects, particularly in
limiting the population'’s ability to obtain expensive Western-made medicines, such as
chemotherapy drugs. Some of the scarcity was caused by banks'’ refusal to finance such sales,
even though doing so was not subject to any sanctions. Some observers say the Iranian
government exaggerated reports of medicine shortages to generate opposition to the sanctions.
Other accounts say that Iranians, particularly those with connections to the government, took
advantage of medicine shortages by cornering the import market for key medicines. These
shortages resurfaced in 2018 following the reimposition of sanctions by the Trump
Administration. For example, reports indicate that the reimposition of U.S. sanctions may be
inhibiting the flow of humanitarian goods to the Iranian people and reportedly contributing to
shortages in medicine to treat ailments such as multiple sclerosis and cancer.114117 Other reports
indicate that Cargill, Bunge, and other global food traders have halted supplying Iran because of
the absence of trade financing.115118 And, Iranian officials and some international relief groups have
complained that U.S. sanctions inhibited the ability to provide relief to flooding victims in
southwestern Iran in March-April 2019.
EU officials have called on the United States to produce a "“white list"” that would "“give clear
guidelines about what channels European banks and companies should follow to conduct
legitimate [humanitarian] transactions with Iran without fear of future penalties."116”119 Iranian
officials have also accused U.S. sanctions of hampering international relief efforts for victims of
vast areas of flooding in southwestern Iran in the spring of 2019.
Other reports say that pollution in Tehran and other big cities is made worse by sanctions because
Iran produces gasoline itself with methods that cause more impurities than imported gasoline. As
noted above, Iran'’s efforts to deal with environmental hazards and problems might be hindered
by denial of World Bank lending for that purpose.
In the aviation sector, some Iranian pilots complained publicly that U.S. sanctions caused Iran's ’s
passenger airline fleet to deteriorate to the point of jeopardizing safety. Since the U.S. trade ban
was imposed in 1995, 1,700 passengers and crew of Iranian aircraft have been killed in air
accidents, although it is not clear how many of the crashes, if any, were due to difficultly in
acquiring U.S. spare parts.117
120
117
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/fresh-sanctions-on-iran-are-already-choking-off-medicineimports-economists-say/2018/11/17/c94ce574-e763-11e8-8449-1ff263609a31_story.html;
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-21/trump-s-sanctions-are-proving-a-bitter-pill-for-iran-s-sick;
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2018/1029/In-Iran-US-sanctions-are-being-felt-with-harshermeasures-to-come.
118 “Global Traders Halt New Iran Food Deals as U.S. Sanctions Bite.” Reuters, December 21, 2018.
119 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/02/iran-sanctions-us-european-humanitarian-supplies.
120 Thomas Erdbink, “Iran’s Aging Airliner Fleet Seen As Faltering Under U.S. Sanctions,” July 14, 2012.
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Air Safety
Sanctions relief ameliorated at least some of the humanitarian difficulties discussed above. In the
aviation sector, several sales of passenger aircraft have been announced, and licensed by the
Department of the Treasury, since Implementation Day. However, as noted, the licenses are being
revoked and deliveries will not proceed beyond November 2018.
JCPOA oversight and implications, and broader issues of Iran'’s behavior have been the subject of
legislation.
114th Congress
The JCPOA states that as long as Iran fully complies with the JCPOA, the sanctions that were
suspended or lifted shall not be reimposed on other bases. The Obama Administration adhered to
that provision, but stipulated that some new sanctions that seek to limit Iran'’s military power, its
human rights abuses, or its support for militant groups would not necessarily violate the JCPOA.
)
The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (INARA, P.L. 114-17) provided for a 30- or 60-day60day congressional review period after which Congress could pass legislation to approve or to
disapprove of the JCPOA, or do nothing. No such legislation of disapproval was enacted.
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Iran Sanctions
There are several certification and reporting requirements under INARA, although most of them
no longer apply as a result of the Trump Administration withdrawal:
The FY2016 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 114-113) contained a provision amending the Visa
Waiver Program to require a visa to visit the United States for any person who has visited Iraq,
Syria, or any terrorism list country (Iran and Sudan are the two aside from Syria still listed) in the
previous five years. Iran argued that the provision represented a violation of at least the spirit of
the JCPOA by potentially deterring European businessmen from visiting Iran. The Obama
Administration issued a letter to Iran stating it would implement the provision in such a way as
not to not impinge on sanctions relief, and allowances for Iranian students studying in the United
States were made in the implementing regulations. Another provision of that law requires an
Administration report to Congress on how Iran has used the benefits of sanctions relief.
President Trump has issued and amended executive orders that, in general, prohibit Iranian
citizens (as well as citizens from several other countries) from entering the United States.
The 114th
The 114th Congress acted to prevent ISA from expiring in its entirety on December 31, 2016. The
Iran Sanctions Extension Act (H.R. 6297), which extended ISA until December 31, 2026, without
any other changes, passed the House on November 15 by a vote of 419-1 and then passed the
Senate by 99-0. President Obama allowed the bill to become law without signing it (P.L. 114-277114277), even though the Administration considered it unnecessary because the President retains
ample authority to reimpose sanctions on Iran. Iranian leaders called the extension a breach of the
JCPOA,118121 but the JCPOA's "’s “Joint Commission"” did not determine it breached the JCPOA.
The conference report on the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 114-328) )
contained a provision (Section 1226) requiring a quarterly report to Congress on Iran'’s missile
launches the imposition of U.S. sanctions with respect to Iran'’s ballistic missile launches until
December 31, 2019. The conference report on the FY2018 NDAA (P.L. 115-91) extended that
reporting requirement until December 31, 2022. The report is to include efforts to sanction
entities or individuals that assist those missile launches.
Even before the Trump Administration pulled the United States out of the JCPOA, Congress
acted on or considered additional Iran sanctions legislation. The following Iran sanctions
legislation was enacted or considered in the 115th Congress.
)
S. 722, which initially contained only Iran-related sanctions, was reported out by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on May 25, 2017. After incorporating an amendment adding
sanctions on Russia, the bill was passed by the Senate on June 15, 2017, by a vote of 98-2. A
companion measure, H.R. 3203, was introduced in the House that was virtually identical to the
engrossed Senate version of S. 722. Following a reported agreement among House and Senate
leaders, H.R. 3364, with additional sanctions provisions related to North Korea, passed both
chambers by overwhelming margins. President Trump signed it into law on August 2, 2017 (P.L.
115-44), accompanied by a signing statement expressing reservations about the degree to which
provisions pertaining to Russia might conflict with the President'’s constitutional authority.
Overall, CAATSA did not appear to conflict with the JCPOA insofar as it did not reimpose U.S.
secondary sanctions on Iran'’s civilian economic sectors, and the JCPOA did not require the
United States to refrain from imposing additional sanctions on Iranian proliferation, human rights
abuses, terrorism, or the IRGC. Section 108 of CAATSA requires an Administration review of all
designated entities to assess whether such entities are contributing to Iran'’s ballistic missile
program or contributing to Iranian support for international terrorism.
116th Congress
Because the Trump Administration has exited the JCPOA, there is increased potential for the 116th
116th Congress to consider legislation that sanctions those Iranian economic sectors that could not
be sanctioned under the JCPOA. The following have been introduced:
Sanctions124
There are a number of other possible sanctions that might receive consideration—either in a
global or multilateral framework. These possibilities are analyzed in CRS In Focus IF10801,
Possible Additional Sanctions on Iran, by Kenneth Katzman.
124
See CRS In Focus IF10801, Possible Additional Sanctions on Iran, by Kenneth Katzman.
Appendix A.
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Appendix A. U.S., U.N., EU and Allied Country
Sanctions (Pre-JCPOA)
Table A-1. Comparison Between U.S., U.N., and EU and Allied Country Sanctions
(Prior to Implementation Day)
U.S. Sanctions
U.N. Sanctions
EU and Other Allied
Countries
(Prior to Implementation Day)
U.S. Sanctions |
U.N. Sanctions |
EU and Other Allied Countries |
General Observation: Most |
As of 2010, U.N. sanctions were
Post-JCPOA: Resolution 2231 is the |
EU closely aligned its sanctions Japan, South Korean, and China |
Ban on U.S. Trade with | U.N. sanctions did not at any time | No comprehensive EU ban on
Japan and South Korea did not ban |
Sanctions on |
No U.N. equivalent existed. |
With certain exceptions, the EU
Japanese and South Korean |
Ban on Foreign Assistance:
U.S. foreign assistance to Iran—
other than purely humanitarian | ). No U.N. equivalent |
EU measures of July 27, 2010,
Japan and South Korea measures |
Ban on Arms Exports to Iran:
Iran is ineligible for U.S. arms |
As per Resolution 1929 (paragraph | EU sanctions include a postJCPOA.
No similar Japan and South Korean |
Restriction on Exports to Iran ”:
Primarily under §6(j) of the Export |
U.N. resolutions on Iran banned the |
EU banned the sales of dual use postJCPOA.
Japan and S. Korea have announced |
Sanctions Against Lending to Under §1621 of the International |
Resolution 1747 (oper. paragraph 7) |
The July 27, 2010, measures
Japan and South Korea banned |
Sanctions Against
Several laws and regulations provide |
Resolution 1737 (oper. paragraph |
The EU measures imposed July 27,
Japan and South Korea froze assets |
Ban on Transactions
Executive Order 13224 bans |
No direct equivalent, but Resolution |
No direct equivalent, but many of
Japan and S. Korea did not impose |
Human Rights Sanctions:
Iran.
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U.S. Sanctions
U.N. Sanctions
EU and Other Allied
Countries
Human Rights Sanctions:
CISADA provides for a prohibition |
No U.N. sanctions were imposed on | EU sanctions include 87 named
Japan and South Korea have |
Restrictions on Iranian
Under Executive Order 13382, the |
Resolution 1803 and 1929 authorize
These resolutions no longer apply. |
The EU measures announced July
Japan and South Korean measures |
Banking Sanctions:
During 2006-2011, several Iranian
CISADA prohibits banking
FY2012 Defense Authorization (P.L. | No direct equivalent
However, two Iranian banks were |
The EU froze Iran Central Bank
Brussels-based SWIFT expelled Japan and South Korea took similar |
Ballistic Missiles: U.S. |
Resolution 1929 (paragraph 9) | EU measures on July 27, 2010, |
Appendix B.
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Appendix B. Post-1999 Major Investments
in Iran’s Energy Sector
Table B-1. Post-1999 Major Investments in Iran’s Energy Sector
Date
Field/Project
Company(ies)/Status
(If Known)
Value
Output/
Goal
Feb. 1999
Post-1999 Major Investments in Iran's Energy Sector
Date |
Field/Project |
Company(ies)/Status (If Known) |
Value |
|
Feb. 1999 |
Doroud (oil) Doroud (oil)
Total and ENI exempted from sanctions |
Total (France)/ENI (Italy)
$1 billion
205,000 bpd
Apr. 1999
Dec./May
2016
|
$1 billion |
205,000 bpd |
Apr. 1999 Dec./May 2016 |
Balal (oil) Balal (oil) Initial development completed in 2004
Dec. 2016: Thailand PTTEP signed agreement
May 2016: KOGAS signed a memorandum of |
Total/ Bow Valley Thailand PTTEP KOGAS (South Korea) |
$300 million |
40,000 bpd |
Nov. 1999 |
Soroush and Nowruz (oil) Soroush and Nowruz (oil)
Royal Dutch exempted from sanctions because |
Royal Dutch Shell |
$800 million |
190,000 bpd |
Apr. 2000 |
Anaran bloc (oil) Anaran bloc (oil)
Lukoil and Statoil invested in 2000 but | Lukoil (Russia) and Statoil |
$105 million |
65,000 |
Jul. 2000 |
South Pars Phases 4 and 5 (gas) 4 and 5 (gas)
On stream as of 2005. ENI exempted from |
ENI |
$1.9 billion |
ENI
$1.9 billion
2 billion cu. |
Mar. 2001 |
Caspian Sea oil exploration—construction |
GVA Consultants (Sweden) |
$225 million |
NA |
Jun. 2001 |
GVA Consultants (Sweden)
$225 million
NA
Jun. 2001
Darkhovin (oil)
ENI exited in 2013 and doing so enabled the |
ENI Field in production |
$1 billion |
100,000 bpd |
May 2002 |
Masjid-e-Soleyman (oil) |
Masjid-e-Soleyman (oil)
Sheer Energy |
$80 million |
25,000 bpd |
Sept. 2002 |
South Pars Phases 9 and 10 (gas) On stream as of early 2009 |
On stream as of early 2009
GS Engineering and |
$1.6 billion |
2 billion cfd |
Oct. 2002 |
South Pars Phases 6, 7, and 8 Field began producing late 2008; operational |
Statoil (Norway) |
$750 million |
3 billion cfd |
Statoil (Norway)
$750 million
3 billion cfd
Jan. 2004
Dec. 2016 | Dec. 2016
Azadegan (oil) Oct. 2010: original investor Inpex sold its stake and was exempted from ISA investigation. China National Petroleum Corp. took a majority stake in the fields in 2009 but Iran cancelled the contracts in 2014 for nonperformance Dec. 2016: Royal Dutch Shell and Petronas signed a MoU to assess S. Azadegan and possibly take the project over. |
Inpex (Japan) CNPC (China) Royal Dutch Shell/Petronas (Malaysia) |
$200 million (Inpex stake); China $2.5 billion |
260,000 bpd, of which 80,000 is from N. Azadegan. |
Jan. 2004 |
Tusan Block Oil found in block in Feb. 2009, but not in commercial quantity, according to the firm. |
Petrobras (Brazil) |
$178 million |
|
Oct. 2004
|
Yadavaran (oil) In 2014, Iran says Sinopec has "experienced problems with regards to progress" on the field, which also extends into Iraq. December 2016: Royal Dutch Shell signed MoU to assess taking over developing the field. |
|
$2 billion |
300,000 bpd |
2005 |
Saveh bloc (oil) Saveh bloc (oil)
GAO report, cited below
PTT (Thailand)
Jun. 2006
|
PTT (Thailand) |
||
Jun. 2006 |
Garmsar bloc (oil) Garmsar bloc (oil) Deal finalized in June 2009
|
Sinopec (China) |
$20 million |
|
Jul. 2006 |
.) Sinopec (China) $20 million Jul. 2006 Arak Refinery expansion
(GAO reports; Fimco FZE Machinery website; | Itemid=78.)
Sinopec (China); JGC |
$959 million (major initial expansion; extent of Hyundai work unknown) |
Expansion to produce 250,000 bpd |
Sept. 2006 |
unknown) Expansion to produce 250,000 bpd Sept. 2006 Khorramabad block (oil)
Seismic data gathered, but no production is |
Norsk Hydro and Statoil |
$49 million |
no estimates |
Dec. 2006 |
|
China National Offshore |
$16 billion |
3.6 billion cfd |
Feb. 2007 |
LNG Tanks at Tombak Port LNG Tanks at Tombak Port
Contract to build three LNG tanks at Tombak,
(May not constitute |
Daelim (S. Korea) |
$320 million |
200,000 ton capacity |
Feb. 2007 |
South Pars Phases 13 and 14 Deadline to finalize (May 2009) not met; firms submitted revised proposals to Iran in June 2009. State Department said on September 30, 2010, that Royal Dutch Shell and Repsol will not pursue this project any further. |
Repsol will not pursue this project any further.
Royal Dutch Shell, Repsol |
$4.3 billion |
|
Mar. 2007 |
Esfahan refinery upgrade |
Daelim (S. Korea) |
NA |
|
Jul. 2007 |
and 24
Pipeline to transport Iranian gas to Turkey, and |
Turkish Petroleum |
$12. billion |
2 billion cfd |
Dec. 2007 |
Contract modified but reaffirmed December | Petrofield Subsidiary of SKS |
$15 billion |
3.4 billion cfd of gas/250,000 bpd of oil |
2007 |
bpd of oil 2007 Jofeir Field (oil)
GAO report cited below. Belarusneft, a | Belarusneft (Belarus) under
No production to date
$500 million
40,000 bpd
2008
|
$500 million |
40,000 bpd |
2008 |
Dayyer Bloc (Persian Gulf, offshore, oil)
GAO reports.
Edison (Italy)
$44 million
PGNiG (Polish Oil and Gas
Company, Poland), divested
to Iranian firms in 2011
$2 billion
Lavan field (offshore natural gas)
Mar. 2008
|
Edison (Italy) |
$44 million |
|
Feb. 2008 |
Lavan field (offshore natural gas) | PGNiG (Polish Oil and Gas Company, Poland), divested to Iranian firms in 2011 |
$2 billion |
|
Mar. 2008 |
Danan Field (on-shore oil)
|
Petro Vietnam Exploration | ||
Apr. 2008 |
Iran's Kish Gas Field Includes pipeline from Iran to Oman. |
Includes pipeline from Iran to Oman.
Oman (cofinancing of |
$7 billion |
1 billion cfd |
Apr. 2008 |
Moghan 2 (onshore oil and gas, Ardebil | INA (Croatia), but firm |
$40-$140 million |
|
2008 |
Kermanshah petrochemical plant (new construction) construction)
GAO reports.
Uhde (Germany)
Jun. 2008
Resalat Oilfield
|
Uhde (Germany) |
300,000 metric tons/yr |
|
Jun. 2008 |
Resalat Oilfield Status of work unclear. |
Status of work unclear.
Amona (Malaysia). Joined in |
$1.5 billion |
47,000 bpd |
Jan. 2009 |
Bushehr Polymer Plants Bushehr Polymer Plants
Production of polyethelene at two polymer |
Sasol (South Africa), but |
Capacity is 1 million tons per year. |
|
Mar. 2009 |
Phase 12 South Pars (gas)—Incl. LNG |
Indian firms: Oil and Natural |
$8 billion |
20 million tonnes of LNG annually by 2012 |
Aug. 2009 |
Abadan refinery Upgrade and expansion; building a new refinery |
Sinopec |
Sinopec
Up to $6 | |
Oct. 2009 |
South Pars Gas Field—Phases 6-8, Gas
CRS conversation with Embassy of S. Korea in
Contract signed but then abrogated by S. | G and S Engineering and |
$1.4 billion |
|
Nov. 2009 |
South Pars Phase 12—Part 2 and Part 3
| Print/?id=110308.)
Daelim (S. Korea)—Part 2; |
$4 billion ($2 | |
Feb. 2010/July 2017 |
South Pars Phase 11 South Pars Phase 11
Project originally awarded to CNPC in 2010, |
Total SA (France) and CNPC (China), with Iran Petropars |
$4.7 billion |
|
2011 |
became operator.
CNPC (China), with Iran
Petropars
$4.7 billion
2011
Azar Gas Field
Iran cancelled Gazprom |
Gazprom (Russia) |
||
Dec. 2011 |
Zagheh Oil Field Zagheh Oil Field
Preliminary deal signed December 2011
Tatneft (Russia)
Jul. 2016
|
Tatneft (Russia) |
$1 billion |
55,000 barrels per day |
Jul. 2016 |
Aban Oil Field Aban Oil Field Zarubezhneft signed a MoU to assess the field. |
Zarubezhneft (Russia) |
||
Jul. 2016 |
Zarubezhneft (Russia) Jul. 2016 Paydar Garb Oil Field Zarubezhneft signed a MoU to assess the field. |
Zarubezhneft (Russia) |
||
Nov. 2016 |
Zarubezhneft (Russia) Nov. 2016 Parsi and Rag E-Sefid Schlumberger signed a MoU to assess the fields. |
Schlumberger (France) |
||
Nov. 2016 |
Schlumberger (France) Nov. 2016 South Pars Phase 11
Total has announced it will divest in response |
Total SA (France)/CNPC |
$4.8 billion |
1.8 billion cu ft/day |
Nov. 2016 |
Sumar Oil Field Sumar Oil Field
Polish Oil and Gas Company (PGNiG) signed a |
PGNiG (Poland) |
||
Nov. 2016 |
Karanj
PGNiG (Poland)
Nov. 2016
Karanj
International Pergas Consortium signed a MoU |
Pergas (consortium of 15 | ||
Dec. 2016 |
Changuleh Oil Field Changuleh Oil Field
Companies signed MoU |
Gazprom (Russia), PTTEP | ||
Dec. 2016 |
Kish Gas Field Kish Gas Field
Royal Dutch Shell signed MoU to assess the |
Royal Dutch Shell |
||
Dec. 2016 |
field
Royal Dutch Shell
Congressional Research Service
Output/
Goal
$1 billion
55,000
barrels per
day
$4.8 billion
1.8 billion cu
ft/day
80
Iran Sanctions
Date
Field/Project
Company(ies)/Status
(If Known)
Dec. 2016
Chesmekosh Gas Field
Gazprom signed MoU to assess the field |
Gazprom (Russia) and | ||
Mar. 2017 |
Shadegan Oil Field Shadegan Oil Field
Khuzestan province (southern Iran). Currently |
Tatneft (Russia) |
500,000 bpd max. |
Tatneft (Russia)
Value
Output/
Goal
500,000 bpd
max.
Sources: Various oil and gas journals, as well as CRS conversations with some U.S. and company officials. Some
information comes from various GAO reports, the latest of which was January 13, 2015 (GAO-15-258R).
Notes:
Notes: CRS has no mandate, authority, or means to determine violations of the Iran Sanctions Act, and no way
to confirm the status of any of the reported investments. The investments are private agreements between Iran
and the firms involved, which are not required to reveal the terms of their arrangements. Reported $20 million+
investments in oil and gas fields, refinery upgrades, and major project leadership are included in this table.
Responsibility for a project to develop Iran'’s energy sector is part of ISA investment definition.
Appendix C.
Congressional Research Service
81
Iran Sanctions
Appendix C. Entities Sanctioned Under U.N.
Resolutions and EU Decisions
Table C-1. Entities Sanctioned Under U.N. Resolutions and EU Decisions
Persons listed are identified by the positions they held when designated; some have since changed. For U.S. executive order, names in italics are entities and individuals that were delisted to implement the JCPOA. Entities in boldface were to be delisted on Transition Day (October 2023). However, all delisted entities will be relisted on November 5, 2018, and no entities will be delisted.
U.N. Security Council Resolutions
| ||||||
| ||||||
| ||||||
Entities/Persons Added by Resolution 1747 (resolution no longer active) | ||||||
| ||||||
Congressional Research Service 82 Iran Sanctions Entities Added by Resolution 1803 (resolution no longer active) | ||||||
Requires that countries report when the following persons enter or transit their territories:
Travel banned for five Iranians sanctioned under Resolutions 1737 and 1747.
Adds entities to the sanctions list:
| ||||||
Entities Added by Resolution 1929 (resolution no longer active) | ||||||
Over 40 entities added; makes mandatory a previously nonbinding travel ban on most named Iranians of previous resolutions.
The following Revolutionary Guard affiliated firms (several are subsidiaries of Khatam ol-Anbiya, the main Guard construction
- Sepanir
The following entities owned or controlled by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL): Irano Hind Shipping | ||||||
.
European Union | ||||||
Terrorism-related |
||||||
Hamid Abdollahi |
||||||
Iran Designations Terrorism-related Hamid Abdollahi Manssor Arbabsiar—for alleged plot to assassinate Saudi Ambassador in Washington | ||||||
Assadollah Asadi—for alleged terrorist plot in Europe | ||||||
Hashemi Moghadam—for alleged terrorist plot in Europe | ||||||
Congressional Research Service 83 Iran Sanctions Abdul Reza Shahlai—for alleged plot to assassinate Saudi Ambassador in Washington | ||||||
Gholam Ali Shakuri—for alleged plot to assassinate Saudi Ambassador in Washington | ||||||
Qasem Soleimani—IRGC-QF commander |
||||||
Directorate for Internal Security of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security |
||||||
Hamas |
||||||
Hezbollah Military Wing |
||||||
Palestinian Islamic Jihad |
||||||
Human-Rights Related |
||||||
Qasem Soleimani—IRGC-QF commander
Directorate for Internal Security of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security
Hamas
Hezbollah Military Wing
Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Human-Rights Related
87 persons, mostly IRGC, Basij, Law Enforcement Forces commanders, as well as security militia chiefs such as Hossein
The full list is at link: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/ |
Appendix D.
from=EN
Congressional Research Service
84
Iran Sanctions
Appendix D. Entities Sanctioned under U.S. Laws
and Executive Orders
For U.S. executive order, names in italics are entities and individuals that were delisted to
implement the JCPOA. Under the JCPOA, entities in boldface were to be delisted on Transition
Day (October 2023). However, because of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, all
delisted entities were relisted on November 5, 2018, and no entities are currently planned to be
delisted.
Table D-1. Entities Designated Under U.S. Executive Order 13382 (Proliferation
(many designations coincide with EU and UN designations)
Entity
Date Named
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Entity |
Date Named |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (Iran) |
June 2005, September 2007 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (Iran) June 2005, September 2007 Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (Iran) |
June 2005, | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). AEOI and 23 subsidaries remain delisted for secondary |
June 2005 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
June 2005
Novin Energy Company (Iran) and Mesbah Energy Company |
January 2006 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
(Iran)
January 2006
Four Chinese entities: Beijing Alite Technologies, LIMMT Economic and Trading Company, China |
June 2006 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
June 2006
Sanam Industrial Group (Iran) and Ya Mahdi Industries Group (Iran)
July 2006
Bank Sepah (Iran)
January 2007
Kalaye Electic Company
February 2007
Defense Industries Organization (Iran)
March 2007
|
July 2006 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Bank Sepah (Iran) |
January 2007 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Kalaye Electic Company |
February 2007 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Defense Industries Organization (Iran) |
March 2007 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Pars Trash (Iran, nuclear program), Farayand Technique (Iran, nuclear program), Fajr Industries |
June 2007 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
June 2007 Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) (Iran); Korea Mining and Development Corp. (N. Korea). |
September 2007 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
September 2007
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics; |
October 21, 2007 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
October 21, 2007
Individuals: Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar (AIO, Iran missile official, see above under Resolution |
October 21, 2007 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
October 21, 2007 Future Bank (Bahrain-based but allegedly controlled by Bank Melli) |
March 12, 2008 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
March 12, 2008
Congressional Research Service
85
Iran Sanctions
Entity
Date Named
Yahya Rahim Safavi (former IRGC Commander in Chief); Mohsen Fakrizadeh-Mahabadi (senior |
July 8, 2008 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Karaj Nuclear Research Center; Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center (NFRPC); |
August 12, 2008 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
August 12, 2008
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and 18 affiliates, including Val Fajr 8 |
September 10, 2008 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
IRISL Malta
September 10,
2008
Firms affiliated to the Ministry of Defense, including Armament Industries Group; Farasakht |
September 17, 2008 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
September 17,
2008
Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI). Provides financial services to Iran |
October 22, 2008 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
October 22, 2008
Assa Corporation (alleged front for Bank Melli involved in managing property in New York City on |
December 17, 2008 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
11 Entities Tied to Bank Melli: Bank Melli Iran Investment (BMIIC); |
March 3, 2009 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
IRGC General Rostam Qasemi, head of Khatem ol-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (main IRGC |
February 10, 2010 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
- Rah Sahel and Sepanir Oil and Gas Engineering (for ties to Khatem ol-Anibya IRGC construction - Mohammad Ali Jafari—IRGC Commander-in-Chief since September 2007
- Mohammad Reza Naqdi—Head of the IRGC - Ahmad Vahedi—Defense Minister
- Naval Defense Missile Industry Group (SAIG, controlled by the Aircraft Industries Org that
- Five front companies for IRISL: Hafiz Darya Shipping Co.; Soroush Sarzamin Asatir Ship Management .
Also identified on June 16 were 27 vessels linked to IRISKL and 71 new names of already designated
Several Iranian entities were also designated as owned or controlled by Iran for purposes of the |
June 16, 2010 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
June 16, 2010
Europaisch-Iranische Handelsbank (EIH) for providing financial services to Bank Sepah, Mellat, EDBI, |
September 7, 2010 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Pearl Energy Company (formed by First East Export Bank, a subsidiary of Bank Mellat, Pearl Energy |
November 30, 2010 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Mohammad Haji Pajand.
November 30,
2010
Bonyad (foundation) Taavon Sepah, for providing services to the IRGC; Ansar Bank (for providing |
December 21, 2010 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Bank of Industry and Mine (BIM) |
May 17, 2011 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
December 21, 2010 Bank of Industry and Mine (BIM) May 17, 2011 Tidewater Middle East Company; Iran Air; Mehr-e Eqtesad Iranian Investment Co. |
June 23, 2011 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
June 23, 2011
For proscribed nuclear activities, including centrifuge development and heavy water research: By .
By Treasury—Javad Rahiqi |
November 21, 2011 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
; Simatic
Development Co
November 21,
2011
Iran Maritime Industrial Company SADRA (owned by IRGC engineering firm Khatem-ol-Anbiya, has |
March 28, 2012 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
March 28, 2012
Electronic Components Industries Co. (ECI) and Information Systems Iran (ISIRAN); Advanced |
July 12, 2012 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
National Iranian Oil Company; Tehran Gostaresh, company owned by Bonyad Taavon Sepah; Imam |
November 8, 2012 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
November 8,
2012
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) chief Fereidoun Abbasi Davani |
December 13, 2012 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
December 13,
2012
SAD Import Export Company (also designated by U.N. Sanctions Committee a few days earlier for |
December 21, 2012 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
December 21,
2012
Babak Morteza Zanjani—chairmen of Sorinet Group that Iran uses to finance oil sales abroad; |
April 11, 2013 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Iranian-Venezuelan Bi-National Bank (IVBB), for activities on behalf of the Export Development Bank |
May 9, 2013 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
For supporting Iran Air, the IRGC, and NIOC: Aban Air |
May 23, 2013 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
May 23, 2013 Bukovnya AE (Ukraine) for leasing aircraft to Iran Air. |
May 31, 2013 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
May 31, 2013
Several Iranian firms and persons: Eyvaz Technic Manufacturing Company; The Exploration |
December 12, 2013 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
December 12,
2013
Ali Canko (Turkey) and Tiva Sanat Group, for procuring IRGC-Navy fast boats; |
February 6, 2014 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
February 6, 2014
Karl Lee (aka Li Fangwei) and 8 China-based front companies: Sinotech Industry Co. Ltd.; MTTO |
April 29, 2014 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
April 29, 2014
By State: Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (nuclear research); Nuclear
By Treasury: Mohammad Javad Imarad and Arman Imanirad (for acting on behalf of |
April 29, 2014
(by both State | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
11 ballistic missile-related entities: Mabrooka Trading Co LLC (UAE); Hossein | January 17, 2016 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
January 17, 2016
Two Iranian entities subordinate to SHIG: Shahid Nuri Industries and Shahid Movahed Industries. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
17 ballistic missile-related Entities. Abdollah Asgharzadeh Network (for supporting SHIG): | February 3, 2017 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Congressional Research Service
February 3, 2017
88
Iran Sanctions
Entity
Date Named
Ballistic missile-related entities. Rahim Ahmadi (linked to Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group); Morteza | May 17, 2017 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| July 18, 2017 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Missile entities related to Iran Simorgh space launch on July 27: six subordinate entities to | July 28, 2017 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| October 13, 2017 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
October 13, 2017
Five ballistic missile entities (owned or controlled by Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, SBIG) : Shahid | January 4, 2018 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
January 4, 2018
Green Wave Telecommunications (Malaysia) and Morteza Razavi (for supporting Fanamoj, |
January 12, 2018 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
January 12, 2018
Sayyed Mohammad Ali Haddadnezhad Tehrani, for supporting the IRGC Research and |
May 22, 2018 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
May 22, 2018
Bank Tejarat (for providing servides to support Bank Sepah); Trade Capital Bank (Belarus); Morteza |
November 5, 2018 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
November 5,
2018
31 individuals/entities connected to Iran |
March 22, 2019 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Petrochemicals Network: Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (PGPIC), for | June 7, 2019 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Determinations and Sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Entity
Date Named
Total SA (France); Gazprom (Russia); and Petronas (Malaysia)—$2 billion project to develop South Pars gas |
May 18, 1998 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
.
May 18, 1998
Naftiran Intertrade Co. (NICO), Iran and Switzerland. Sanctioned for activities to develop Iran |
Sept. 30, 2010 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Sept. 30, 2010
Total (France); Statoil (Norway); ENI (Italy); and Royal Dutch Shell.
Exempted under ISA |
Sept. 30, 2010 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Sept. 30, 2010
Inpex (Japan)
Exempted under the Special rule for divesting its remaining 10% stake in Azadegan oil field |
Nov. 17, 2010 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
.
Nov. 17, 2010
Belarusneft (Belarus, subsidiary of Belneftekhim) Sanctioned for $500 million contract with NICO (see |
March 29, 2011 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Sanctions remain.
March 29, 2011
Petrochemical Commercial Company International (PCCI) of Bailiwick of Jersey and Iran; Royal Oyster
May 24, 2011
Congressional Research Service
93
Iran Sanctions
Entity
Date Named
Sanctioned under CISADA amendment to ISA imposing sanctions for selling gasoline to Iran or helping Iran |
May 24, 2011 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Zhuhai Zhenrong Co. (China); Kuo Oil Pte Ltd. (Singapore); FAL Oil Co. (UAE)
Sanctioned for brokering sales or making sales to Iran of gasoline. Sanctions lifted under JCPOA |
January 12, 2012 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
.
January 12, 2012
Sytrol (Syria), for sales of gasoline to Iran. |
August 12, 2012 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Sanctions remain.
August 12, 2012
Dr. Dimitris Cambis; Impire Shipping; Kish Protection and Indemnity (Iran); and Bimeh Markasi-Central
Sanctioned under ISA provision on owning vessels that transport Iranian oil or providing insurance for the |
March 14, 2013 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
March 14, 2013
Tanker Pacific; SAMAMA; and Allvale Maritime
Sanctions lifted. Special rule applied after |
April 12, 2013 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
April 12, 2013
Ferland Co. Ltd. (Cyprus and Ukraine)
Sanctioned for cooperating with National Iranian Tanker Co. to illicitly sell Iranian crude oil. Sanctions lifted |
May 31, 2013 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Dettin SPA Italy-based company sanctioned for providing goods and services to Iran |
August 29, 2014 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
August 29, 2014
Table D-4. Entities Sanctioned Under the Iran North Korea Syria Nonproliferation
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Entity Date Named Baltic State Technical University and Glavkosmos, both of Russia. (both designations revoked in 2010) |
July 30, 1998 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
July 30, 1998
D. Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology of Russia and Moscow Aviation Institute (both removed |
January 8, 1999 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Changgwang Sinyong Corp. (North Korea) |
January 2, 2001 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Changgwang Sinyong Corp. (North Korea) and Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import-Export |
June 14, 2001 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Three entities from China for proliferation to Iran |
January 16, 2002 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Armen Sargsian and Lizen Open Joint Stock Co. (Armenia); Cuanta SA and Mikhail Pavlovich Vladov |
May 9, 2002 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Norinco (China). For alleged missile technology sale to Iran. |
May 2003 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Taiwan Foreign Trade General Corporation (Taiwan) |
July 4, 2003 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
May 9, 2002
Norinco (China). For alleged missile technology sale to Iran.
May 2003
Taiwan Foreign Trade General Corporation (Taiwan)
July 4, 2003
Tula Instrument Design Bureau (Russia). For alleged sales of laser-guided artillery shells to Iran. (Also |
September 17, 2003 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
September 17,
2003
Congressional Research Service
94
Iran Sanctions
Entity
Date Named
13 entities from Russia, China, Belarus, Macedonia, North Korea, UAE, and Taiwan. |
April 1, 2004 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
April 1, 2004
14 entities from China, North Korea, Belarus, India (two nuclear scientists, Dr. Surendar and Dr. Y.S.R. |
September 23, 2004 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
September 23,
2004
14 entities, mostly from China, for supplying of Iran |
December 2004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Nine entities, including from China (Norinco, Hondu Aviation, Dalian Sunny Industries, Zibo Chemet |
December 23, 2005 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
December 23,
2005
Two Indian chemical companies (Balaji Amines and Prachi Poly Products); two Russian firms |
July 28, 2006 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Abu Hamadi (Iraq); Aerospace Logistics Services (Mexico); Al Zargaa Optical and Electronics (Sudan); |
December 28, 2006 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
December 28,
2006
Rosobornexport, Tula Design, and Komna Design Office of Machine Building, and Alexei Safonov (Russia); |
January 2007 (see | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
14 entities, including Lebanese Hezbollah. Some were penalized for transactions with Syria. Among the new |
April 17, 2007 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
April 17, 2007
China Xinshidai Co.; China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Corp.; Huazhong CNC (China); IRGC; |
October 23, 2008 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
BelTechExport (Belarus); Dalian Sunny Industries (China); Defense Industries Organization (Iran); Karl Lee; |
July 14, 2010 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
16 entities: Belarus: Belarusian Optical Mechanical Association; Beltech Export; China: Karl Lee; Dalian |
May 23, 2011 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
May 23, 2011
Belvneshpromservice (Belarus); Dalian Sunny Industries (China); Defense Industries Organization (Iran); Karl |
December 20, 2011 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
December 20,
2011
Al Zargaa Engineering Complex (Sudan); BST Technology and Trade Co. (China); China Precision Machinery |
February 5, 2013 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Al Zargaa Engineering Complex (Sudan); Belvneshpromservice (Belarus); HSC Mic NPO Mashinostroyenia |
December 19, | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
BST Technology and Trade Co. (China); Dalian Sunny Industries (China); Li Fang Wei (China); Tianjin |
August 28, 2015 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
August 28, 2015
Asaib Ahl Haq (Iraqi Shiite militia); Katai | June 28, 2016
Sanctions still | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
11 entities sanctions for transfers of sensitive items to Iran |
March 21, 2017 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Entities Designated under the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (all designations have expired or were lifted) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Entity
Date Named
Mohammad al-Khatib (Jordan); Protech Consultants Private (India) |
December 13, 2003 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
December 13,
2003
China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Corp. (China); China Machinery and Equipment |
July 9, 2002 |
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July 9, 2002
Table D-6. Entities Designated as Threats to Iraqi Stability under Executive Order | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Iranians Designated Under Executive Order 13553 on Human Rights Abusers (September 29, 2010) Abusers (September 29, 2010)
These persons are named in a semiannual report to Congress, required under CISADA. Virtually all of the | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Iranian Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13572 for Repression | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Revolutionary Guard—Qods Force (IRGC-QF) |
April 29, 2011 |
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Congressional Research Service
Date Named
April 29, 2011
97
Iran Sanctions
Entity
Date Named
Qasem Soleimani (Qods Force Commander); Mohsen Chizari (Commander of Qods Force |
May 18, 2011 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) |
February 16, 2012 |
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Iranian Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13606 (GHRAVITY, April 23, 2012)) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS); IRGC (Guard Cyber Defense Command); Law |
April 23, 2012 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
IRGC Electronic Warfare and Cyber Defense Organization |
January 12, 2018 |
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Hanista Programming Group. For operating technology that monitors or tracks computers |
May 30, 2018 |
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Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13608 Targeting Sanctions Evaders (May 1, 2012) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Ferland Company Ltd. for helping NITC deceptively sell Iranian crude oil |
May 31, 2013 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
May 31, 2013
Three persons based in the Republic of Georgia: Pourya Nayebi, Houshang Hosseinpour, and
|
February 6, 2014 |
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February 6, 2014
Evren Kayakiran (Turkey) for directing employees to provide U.S. products and services to Iran |
February 7, 2019 |
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February 7, 2019
Table D-9. Entities Named as Iranian Government Entities Under Executive Order
Hundreds of entities—many of which are names and numbers of individual ships and aircraft—were | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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November 5, 2018
Congressional Research Service
99
Iran Sanctions
Table D-10. Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13622 for Oil and All italicized entities were delisted during U.S. JCPOA implementation | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Entities Designated as Human Rights Abusers or Limiting Free | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Entities Designated under E.O. I3645 on Auto production, Rial Trading, All entities were delisted (and are italicized) and the order was revoked to implement the JCPOA | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Author Contact Information
Acknowledgments
The author wishes to acknowledge that Sarah Manning, Research Associate, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Trade Division, contributed research to this report.
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
Congressional Research Service
RS20871 · VERSION 297 · UPDATED
102
Trade Division, contributed research to this report.
1. |
On November 13, 2012, the Administration published in the Federal Register (Volume 77, Number 219) "Policy Guidance" explaining how it implements many of the sanctions, and in particular defining what products and chemicals constitute "petroleum," "petroleum products," and "petrochemical products" that are used in the laws and executive orders discussed below. See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-11-13/pdf/2012-27642.pdf. |
2. |
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/tar2010.pdf. |
3. |
"U.S. Court Reverses Record Forfeiture Order over Iran Assets." Associated Press. July 21, 2016. |
4. |
http://global.factiva.com/hp/printsavews.aspx?pp=Print&hc=Publication; and Department of Treasury announcement of June 4, 2013. |
5. |
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20181105_names.aspx. |
6. |
For a full list of entities designated under E.O. 13599, go to the following link: https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/13599/13599list.pdf. |
7. |
U.S. diplomatic "non-paper" provided to CRS. |
8. |
"Exclusive: U.S. Carves out Exceptions for Foreigners Dealing with Revolutionary Guards." Reuters, April 21, 2019. |
9. |
The executive order was issued not only under the authority of IEEPA but also the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.; §505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9) and §301 of Title 3, United States Code. |
10. |
Imports were mainly of artwork for exhibitions around the United States, which are counted as imports even though the works return to Iran after the exhibitions conclude. |
11. |
The text of the guidance is at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/implement_guide_jcpoa.pdf. |
12. |
Shipping insurers granted the waiver include Assuranceforeningen Skuld, Skuld Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, Ltd. (Bermuda), Gard P and I Ltd. (Bermuda), Assuranceforeningen Gard, the Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited, The North of England Protecting and Indemnity Association Ltd., the Shipowners' Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association (Luxembourg), the Standard Club Ltd., the Standard Club Europe Ltd., The Standard Club Asia, the Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd. (Bermuda), the Swedish Club, United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship Assurance Association Ltd. (Bermuda), United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship Association Ltd. (Europe), and the West of England Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association (Luxembourg). |
13. |
Reuters, February 21, 2014; "Exclusive: Boeing Says Gets U.S. License to Sell Spare Parts to Iran," Reuters, April 4, 2014. |
14. | |
15. |
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/gl_food_exports.pdf. |
16. |
The information in this bullet is taken from Jo Becker, "With U.S. Leave, Companies Skirt Iran Sanctions," New York Times, December 24, 2010. |
17. |
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/implement_guide_jcpoa.pdf. |
18. |
As amended by CISADA (P.L. 111-195), these definitions include pipelines to or through Iran, as well as contracts to lead the construction, upgrading, or expansions of energy projects. CISADA also changes the definition of investment to eliminate the exemption from sanctions for sales of energy-related equipment to Iran, if such sales are structured as investments or ongoing profit-earning ventures. |
19. |
Under §4(d) of the original act, for Iran, the threshold dropped to $20 million, from $40 million, one year after enactment, when U.S. allies did not join a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran. P.L. 111-195 explicitly sets the threshold investment level at $20 million. For Libya, the threshold was $40 million, and transactions subject to sanctions included export to Libya of technology banned by Pan Am 103-related Security Council Resolutions 748 (March 31, 1992) and 883 (November 11, 1993). |
20. |
The original ISA definition of energy sector included oil and natural gas, and CISADA added to that definition liquefied natural gas (LNG), oil or LNG tankers, and products to make or transport pipelines that transport oil or LNG. |
21. |
A definition of chemicals and products considered "petrochemical products" is found in a Policy Guidance statement. See Federal Register, November 13, 2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-11-13/pdf/2012-27642.pdf. |
22. |
A definition of what chemicals and products are considered "petroleum products" for the purposes of the order are in the policy guidance issued November 13, 2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-11-13/pdf/2012-27642.pdf. |
23. |
Other ISA amendments under that law included recommending against U.S. nuclear agreements with countries that supply nuclear technology to Iran and expanding provisions of the USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56) to curb money-laundering for use to further WMD programs. |
24. |
|
25. |
This termination requirement added by P.L. 109-293 formally removed Libya from the act. Application of the act to Libya terminated on April 23, 2004, with a determination that Libya had fulfilled U.N. requirements. |
26. |
Text of letter from Senators Mark Kirk and Robert Menendez to Secretary Geithner, January 19, 2012. |
27. |
Department of State. Background Briefing on President Trump's Decision to Withdraw from the JCPOA. May 8, 2018. |
28. | |
29. |
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-donald-j-trump-regarding-imposing-sanctions-respect-iron-steel-aluminum-copper-sectors-iran/. |
30. |
The act originally only applied to advanced conventional weapons. The extension to WMD, defined as chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons-related technology was added by the FY1996 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-106). |
31. |
The provision contains certain exceptions to ensure the safety of astronauts, but it nonetheless threatened to limit U.S. access to the international space station after April 2006, when Russia started charging the United States for transportation on its Soyuz spacecraft. Legislation in the 109th Congress (S. 1713, P.L. 109-112) amended the provision in order to facilitate continued U.S. access and extended INA sanctions provisions to Syria. |
32. |
For text of the OFAC ruling barring U-Turn transactions, see https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/fr73_66541.pdf. |
33. |
See Katherine Bauer. "Potential U.S. Clarification of Financial Sanctions Regulations." April 5, 2016. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/potential-u.s.-clarification-of-financial-sanctions-regulations. |
34. |
Analyst conversations with U.S. banking and sanctions experts. 2010-2015. |
35. |
Foreign banks that do not have operations in the United States typically establish correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts with U.S. banks as a means of accessing the U.S. financial system. |
36. |
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1367.aspx. |
37. | |
38. | |
39. |
June 2019 FATF statement is at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/d-i/iran/documents/public-statement-june-2019.html. |
40. |
Sections 5-7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628 which have to do primarily with Iran's energy sector, were revoked, but the remaining sections, which concern human rights issues, remain in place. |
41. |
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, Treasury Sanctions Iranian Security Forces for Human Rights Abuses, June 9, 2011. |
42. |
Christopher Rhoads, "Iran's Web Spying Aided by Western Technology," Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2009. |
43. |
Fact Sheet: Treasury Issues Interpretive Guidance and Statement of Licensing Policy on Internet Freedom in Iran, March 20, 2012. |
44. | |
45. |
Security Council resolutions that reference Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter represent actions taken with respect to threats to international peace and acts of aggression. Article 41 of that Chapter, in general, provides for enforcement of the resolution in question through economic and diplomatic sanctions, but not through military action. |
46. | |
47. |
The report is reprinted in, Iran Watch, at http://www.iranwatch.org/library/multilateral-organizations/united-nations/un-secretary-general/third-report-secretary-general-implementation-security-council-resolution-2231. |
48. | |
49. |
The Administration sanctions suspensions and waivers are detailed at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/220049.htm. |
50. |
Daniel Fineren, "Iran Nuclear Deal Shipping Insurance Element May Help Oil Sales," Reuters, November 24, 2013. |
51. |
White House Office of the Press Secretary. "Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program," November 23, 2013. |
52. |
http://iranmatters.belfercenter.org/blog/translation-iranian-factsheet-nuclear-negotiations; and author conversations with a wide range of Administration officials, think tank, and other experts, in Washington, DC, 2015. |
53. |
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/full-text-iran-deal-120080.html. |
54. |
For more information on these Executive Orders and their provisions, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by Dianne E. Rennack. |
55. |
The JCPA does commit the United States to terminate sanctions with respect to some entities designated for sanctions under INKSNA. |
56. |
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/jcpoa_faqs.pdf. |
57. |
For more information on this option, see CRS Report R44942, U.S. Decision to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement, by Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr, and Valerie Heitshusen. |
58. |
Note: CRS has no mandate or capability to "judge" compliance of any country with U.S. or other sanctions against Iran. This section is intended to analyze some major trends in third country cooperation with U.S. sanctions. |
59. |
During the active period of talks, which began in December 2002, there were working groups focused not only on the TCA terms and proliferation issues but also on Iran's human rights record, Iran's efforts to derail the Middle East peace process, Iranian-sponsored terrorism, counter-narcotics, refugees, migration issues, and the Iranian opposition PMOI. |
60. |
"Iran Nuclear Deal: The EU's Billion-Dollar Deals at Risk," BBC News, May 11, 2018. |
61. |
Germany's Central Bank Imposes Rule to Stop Cash Delivery to Tehran. Jerusalem Post, August 6, 2018. |
62. |
"U.S. Grants BP, Serica License to Run Iran-Owned North Sea Field." Reuters, October 9, 2018. |
63. | |
64. | |
65. |
Avi Jorish, "Despite Sanctions, Iran's Money Flow Continues," Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2013. |
66. |
https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-visits-tehran-talks-syria-nuclear-deal-133507932.html. |
67. |
"Boxed In: $1 billion of Iranian Crude Sits at China's Dalian Port. Reuters. May 1, 2019. |
68. |
Thomas Erdbrink. "China's Push to Link East and West Puts Iran at 'Center of Everything.'" New York Times, July 25, 2017. |
69. |
"As U.S. Sanctions Loom, China's Bank of Kunlun to Stop Receiving Iran Payments—Sources." Reuters, October 23, 2018. |
70. |
OFAC Crystallizes Expectations for Sanctions Compliance. April 1, 2019. |
71. |
Author conversations with South Korean officials. 2019. |
72. |
https://www.thedailybeast.com/north-koreas-deadly-partnership-with-iran. |
73. |
"India Seeks to Pay $6.5 Billion to Iran for Oil Imports." Economic Times of India. May 16, 2016. |
74. |
CRS conversations with Indian officials and U.S. experts on India. 2017-18. |
75. |
https://thewire.in/diplomacy/chabahar-us-iran-ties-india. |
76. |
Asia Times, March 21, 2014, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/SOU-02-210314.html. |
77. | |
78. |
"US Acts to Block Turkish Firm from Sending GE Engines to Iran," Reuters, January 6, 2014. |
79. |
Louis Charbonneau, "Iran Looks to Armenia to Skirt Banking Sanctions," Reuters, August 21, 2012. |
80. |
Information provided to the author by regional observers. October 2013. |
81. |
The CRS Report RL32048, Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options, by Kenneth Katzman, discusses the relations between Iran and other Middle Eastern states. |
82. |
Mark Wallace, "Closing U.S. Ports to Iran-Tainted Shipping. Op-ed," Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2013. |
83. |
Some Top Oil Buyers Are Thinking about Shunning Iran Oil, op. cit. |
84. |
http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.php?newsid=NDQ0OTY1NTU4; http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8901181055. |
85. |
Omani banks had a waiver from U.S. sanctions laws to permit transferring those funds to Iran's Central Bank, in accordance with Section 1245(d)(5) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (P.L. 112-81). For text of the waiver, see a June 17, 2015, letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker, containing text of the "determination of waiver." |
86. |
"Obama Misled Congress, Tried and Failed to Give Iran Secret Access to US Banks Before the Deal." Business Insider, June 6, 2018; Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate. Majority Report. "Review of U.S. Treasury Department's License to Convert Iranian Assets Using the U.S. Financial System." May 2018. |
87. |
Eli Lak, "Iran Sanctions Collapsing Already," Bloomberg News, May 11, 2015. |
88. |
"U.S. Grants Iraq Sanctions Relief in Bid to Boost Business Deals," Wall Street Journal, December 21, 2018. |
89. |
Iran Signs Phone, Gas Deals with Syria. Agence France Presse, January 17, 2017. |
90. |
Barbara Slavin, "Obama Administration Holds Up Environmental Grants to Iran," Al Monitor, June 23, 2014. |
91. |
"Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community." Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. May 11, 2017. This language was not contained in the 2018 version of the testimony. |
92. |
Speech by National Security Adviser Tom Donilon at the Brookings Institution, November 22, 2011. |
93. |
Department of Defense, Annual Report of Military Power of Iran, April 2012. |
94. |
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, January 29, 2019. |
95. |
"Sanctions on Iran are Hitting Hezbollah," Washington Post, May 19, 2019. |
96. |
Testimony of Ambassador Brian Hook before the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. June 19, 2019. |
97. |
Statement from the President on the Reimposition of United States Sanctions with Respect to Iran. August 6, 2018. |
98. |
Department of the Treasury. Remarks of Secretary Jacob J. Lew at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy 30th Anniversary Gala. April 29, 2015. |
99. |
"Foreign Investors Flock to Iran as U.S. Firms Watch on the Sidelines." Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2017. |
100. |
Forecast Says Sharp Drop in Iran's Economic Growth Rate. Radio Farda, September 2, 2018. |
101. |
CRS conversation with Department of the Treasury officials. July 2015. |
102. |
ABC News, June 17, 2019. |
103. |
"A Year after Iran Deal, Oil Flows but the Money's Stuck," op. cit. |
104. |
https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi. Administration Factsheet, April 2019. |
105. |
Radio Farda, op. cit. |
106. |
Testimony of Patrick Clawson before the Senate Banking Committee. January 21, 2015. |
107. |
"Iran Reaps Less Cash from Eased Sanctions Than Predicted," op. cit. |
108. |
Kevan Harris, "Iran's Political Economy Under and After the Sanctions," Washington Post blogs, April 23, 2015. |
109. | |
110. |
Patrick Clawson testimony, January 21, 2015, op. cit. |
111. |
Khajehpour presentation at CSIS, op. cit. |
112. |
"Iran Faces Steep Climb to Join Gas Superpowers by 2017," International Oil Daily, April 29, 2014. |
113. |
Thomas Erdbrink. "New Iran Battle Brews over Foreign Oil Titans." New York Times, February 1, 2016. |
114. |
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/fresh-sanctions-on-iran-are-already-choking-off-medicine-imports-economists-say/2018/11/17/c94ce574-e763-11e8-8449-1ff263609a31_story.html; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-21/trump-s-sanctions-are-proving-a-bitter-pill-for-iran-s-sick; https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2018/1029/In-Iran-US-sanctions-are-being-felt-with-harsher-measures-to-come. |
115. |
"Global Traders Halt New Iran Food Deals as U.S. Sanctions Bite." Reuters, December 21, 2018. |
116. |
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/02/iran-sanctions-us-european-humanitarian-supplies. |
117. |
Thomas Erdbink, "Iran's Aging Airliner Fleet Seen As Faltering Under U.S. Sanctions," July 14, 2012. |
118. |
An Iranian letter to the U.N. Security Council submitted July 20, 2015, indicates Iran's view that "reintroduction or reimposition, including through extension, of the sanctions and restrictive measures will constitute significant nonperformance which would relieve Iran from its commitments in whole or in part." Iran Letter to the President of the U.N. Security Council, July 20, 2015, (S/2015/550). |
119. |
For more information on the issue of judgments for victims of Iranian terrorism, see CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea. |
120. |
Author conversations with experts in Washington, DC, November, 2017, and various press reports. |
121. |
See CRS In Focus IF10801, Possible Additional Sanctions on Iran, by Kenneth Katzman. |