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Since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has struggled to overcome its centuries-long legacy of authoritarianism, disrespect for human rights, extreme poverty, and underdevelopment. Widespread corruption remains an impediment to changing that legacy. Despite significant progress in improving governance, democratic institutions remain weak and stability fragile. Poverty remains massive and deep, and economic disparity wide. In proximity to the United States, and with a chronically unstable political environment and fragile economy, Haiti has been an ongoing policy issue for the United States. Many in the U.S. Congress view Haiti's stability with concern and have shown a commitment to improving conditions in the country through continued support for U.S. foreign aid.
continued support for U.S. foreign aid.
Haiti has experienced growing instability during the administration of President Jovenel Moïse. Unrest,
with unrest, high rates of inflation, and resurgent gang violence have characterized Moïse's term. The . The government’s failure to hold
elections in October 2019 resulted in the terms of most of the Haitian legislature expiring on
January 13, 2020, without officials elected to succeed them. Moïse is now ruling by decree. The
judiciary is conducting ongoing investigations into Moïse'’s possible involvement in money laundering, irregular loan arrangements, and embezzlementvarious
corrupt activities, which the president denies. Haitian Senate and Superior Court of Auditors
investigations allege embezzlement and fraud by current and former Haitian officials managing
$2 billion in loans from Venezuela'’s PetroCaribe discounted oil program.
Moïse'
Moïse’s decision in mid-2018 to end oil subsidies, which would increase prices dramatically,
sparked massive protests. Government instability has heightened since May 2019, when a report
alleged Moïse had embezzled millions of dollars. Mass demonstrations have continued, calling
for an end to corruption, provision of government services, and Moïse'’s resignation.
Haiti occupies the western third of the island of Hispaniola, which it shares with the Dominican
Republic, ands resignation.
In the face of increasing ungovernability, a high-level Organization of American States delegation traveled to Haiti in June 2019 to facilitate dialogue to reduce political tensions. Some opposition elements refuse to negotiate with the government, however. To date, the parliament has refused to ratify Moïse's nominee for prime minister, Jean-Michel Lapin, leaving Haiti without a fully functioning government. Tensions may rise around parliamentary elections, scheduled for October 2019.
Haiti, which shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic, occupying the western third of the island, is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Almost 60% of the country'’s 10
million people live in poverty, and almost a quarter of them live in extreme poverty. Haiti is still
recovering from the devastating 2010 earthquake, as well as Hurricane Matthew in 2016. The
latter worsened a process begun by a two-year drought, destroying Haiti's food supply and creating a humanitarian disaster. Haiti also continues to battle a cholera epidemic inadvertently introduced by United Nations peacekeepers in 2010. Nonetheless, according to the State Department, Haiti is transitioning from a post-disaster era to one of reconstruction and long-term development.
much of Haiti’s food supply.
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) helped restore order from 2004
to October 2017 but was criticized for sexual abuse by some of its forces and for introducing cholera to the country. The U.N. maintains it has diplomatic immunity, but after years of international pressure said it had a "moral responsibility" to the epidemic's victims. The U.N. announced a $400 million plan to fight cholera in Haiti and its intention to support cholera victims; neither program has been fully funded or implemented. MINUSTAH was succeeded by a
cholera to the country, which Haiti continues to battle. A smaller peacekeeping mission, the U.N.
Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), which has focusedsucceeded it, focusing on rule of law,
development of the Haitian National Police (HNP) force, and human rights. In October 2019, a
political mission,, the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), is scheduled to replacereplaced MINUJUSTH
to help Haiti plan and carry out elections and reinforce the HNP through training on human rights,
among other duties.
Since MINUSTAH'’s departure, the HNP have had primary responsibility for
domestic security. Moïse reinstituted the army, raising concerns about the potential for the army
to engage in internal repression, as it hadhas in the past.
According to the State Department, U.S. policy toward Haiti is “designed to foster the institutions
and infrastructure needednecessary to achieve strong democratic foundations and meaningful poverty
reduction through sustainable development.” The Trump Administration has requested $128.2
million for Haiti in FY2021. requested $145.5 million for aid to Haiti for FY2020.
The Administration planned to terminate Temporary Protected Status
(TPS) for Haitians as of July 22, 2019. Two U.S. courts issued preliminary injunctions against the
decision, however, so TPS designation for Haiti remains in effect pending further court orders.
Haiti at a Glance Population: 10.9 million (2017; World Bank) Land area: 27,560 square kilometers (slightly smaller than Maryland; CIA) GDP: $9.5 billion (2018, current U.S. dollars; IMF) GDP per capita income: $857 (2018, current U.S. dollars; IMF) Life expectancy: 63 (2017; World Bank) Leadership: President Jovenel Moïse; Prime Minister Jean Michel Lapin; Supreme Court Chief Justice Jules Cantave Sources: World Bank; U.S. Department of State; Central Intelligence Agency, International Monetary Fund |
Haiti inaugurated Jovenel Moïse as president on February 7, 2017, marking a return to constitutional order after having been without an elected president from February 2016 to February 2017 due to delayed elections and political gridlock. Moïse, a political newcomer and member of the Bald Head Party (PHTK, former President Michel Martelly's [2011-2016] party), won the November 2016 elections with almost 56% of the vote. Voter turnout was 21%. Runoff elections for some parliamentary and local elections were completed in January 2017. Although PHTK has the most seats of any party in the legislature, with 31 of 119 in the Chamber of Deputies and 11 of 30 in the Senate, no single party has a majority. PHTK has to rely on alliances to enact legislation and fulfill its policy agenda.
Among the challenges Haiti faces are ongoing recovery from the 2010 earthquake and 2016's Hurricane Matthew, a cholera epidemic, stalled economic growth, and a highly polarized political climate. Other obstacles Moïse faces during his five-year term include a weak mandate due to a relatively low voter turnout and ongoing social unrest due to continued poverty, lack of job opportunities, and growing public calls for an end to corruption. Moïse arrived under the shadow of an ongoing Haitian government investigation into his possible involvement in money laundering and irregular loan arrangements, which Moïse denies. In May 2019, Haiti's Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes alleged that Moïse and other officials embezzled millions of dollars. The court's report alleges that the Martelly administration contracted a company then led by Moïse to carry out infrastructure projects that it
The Administration expressed concern about the Haitian president ruling by decree, and urged the
Haitian government to set a firm date for overdue elections.
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Contents
Political Background ....................................................................................................................... 1
Economic Background .................................................................................................................... 4
Security: U.N. Missions, Haitian Police, and Revival of the Haitian Army .................................... 6
U.N. Missions............................................................................................................................ 6
Haitian National Police ............................................................................................................. 7
Revived Haitian Armed Forces ................................................................................................. 8
Corruption and Efforts to Address It ............................................................................................... 9
Concerns over Haitians and People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic .................... 10
U.S. Relations with Haiti ................................................................................................................11
U.S. Assistance .........................................................................................................................11
Counternarcotics ..................................................................................................................... 14
Immigration ............................................................................................................................. 15
Temporary Protected Status .............................................................................................. 15
The Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program ........................................................... 16
Human Rights.......................................................................................................................... 17
Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 19
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Haiti ..................................................................................................................... 2
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Haiti, FY2011-FY2020 ...................................................................... 13
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 19
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Political Background1
Haiti inaugurated Jovenel Moïse as president on February 7, 2017, marking a return to
constitutional order after having been without an elected president from February 2016 to
February 2017 due to delayed elections and political gridlock. Moïse, a political newcomer and
member of the Bald Head Party (PHTK, former President Michel Martelly’s [2011-2016] party),
won the November 2016 elections with almost 56% of the vote. Voter turnout was 21%. During
Moïse’s administration, Haiti has experienced growing political and social unrest, high rates of
inflation, and resurgent gang violence. As political gridlock continued, the government did not
organize parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2019. Consequently, as of mid-January
2020, there is no functioning legislature, and
Moïse is ruling by decree.
Haiti at a Glance
Among the challenges Haiti faces are ongoing
Population: 10.9 million (2017; World Bank)
recovery from the 2010 earthquake and 2016’s
Land area: 27,560 square kilometers (slightly
Hurricane Matthew, a cholera epidemic, stalled
smaller than Maryland; CIA)
economic growth, and a highly polarized political
GDP: $9.5 billion (2018, current U.S. dollars; IMF)
climate. Other obstacles Moïse faces during his
GDP per capita income: $857 (2018, current
five-year term include a weak mandate due to a
U.S. dollars; IMF)
relatively low voter turnout and ongoing social
unrest due to continued poverty, lack of job
Life expectancy: 63 (2017; World Bank)
opportunities, and growing public calls for an end
Leadership: President Jovenel Moïse; Prime
to corruption. Moïse arrived under the shadow of
Minister Jean Michel Lapin; Supreme Court Chief
an ongoing Haitian government investigation into
Justice Jules Cantave
his possible involvement in money laundering and
Sources: World Bank; U.S. Department of State;
irregular loan arrangements, which Moïse denies.
Central Intelligence Agency, International
Monetary Fund
In May 2019, Haiti’s Superior Court of Auditors
and Administrative Disputes alleged that Moïse
and other officials embezzled millions of dollars. The court’s report alleges that the Martelly
administration contracted a company then led by Moïse to carry out infrastructure projects that it
never completed. Moïse and the company deny the allegations.
Moïse’never completed. Moïse and the company deny the allegations.
Moïse's strategy to increase government revenues sparked widespread protests in 2017 and 2018.
The legislature approved the policy agenda presented by Moïse'’s first prime minister, Dr. Jack
Guy Lafontant, which focused on reviving the agricultural sector, rolling out a comprehensive
national health care insurance system, bringing alternative energy to Haiti, and repairing
infrastructure. Other items on the policy agenda included redeveloping the capital, Port-au-Prince,
including the presidential palace and other government buildings that were destroyed during the
2010 earthquake. The government took a step toward funding these objectives in May 2017 by
ending government fuel subsidies, thereby increasing fuel prices by at least 20%, but freeing up
resources for other programs.22 In September 2017, the legislature approved the president'’s budget
for 2018, which included several tax increases for revenue generation.
![]() |
Source: Map Resources; adapted by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). |
1
For further background on Haiti, and information on relations with the United States, also see CRS Report R42559,
Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns, by Maureen Taft-Morales, and CRS
In Focus IF10440, Haiti Declares Winner of Presidential Election After Delays, by Maureen Taft-Morales.
2 “In Brief: Haiti, Dominican Republic, St Kitts & Nevis, Guatemala,” LatinNews, May 15, 2017.
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Figure 1. Map of Haiti
Source: Map Resources; adapted by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).
The public greeted these tax increases with violent street protests. Workers conducted strikes for
higher wages, especially in the textile-manufacturing sector. National and local transportation
unions held strikes in September and October, leading the president to withdraw certain transport-relatedtransportrelated tax increases he had proposed. In November 2017, hundreds protested government
corruption and the remobilization of the army, demanding that the government direct funds
toward public needs such as health and education instead. By the end of 2017, street protests had
become a fixture of Moïse'’s administration.
As official reports of corruption were released and inflation rose, public dissatisfaction
intensified. The Haitian Senate'’s Special Commission of Investigation issued a 656-page report in
November 2017 detailing alleged embezzlement and fraud by current and former Haitian officials
managing $2 billion in loans from Venezuela'’s PetroCaribe discounted oil program from 2008 to
2016. Public pressure reportedly led Moïse to fire two high-ranking officials in his government
for their involvement in the scandal.
When the government proposed another plan to raise fuel prices significantly—some by as much
as 51%—in July 2018, two days of violent protests ensued, causing at least two deaths. Prime
Minister Lafontant resigned and was replaced by Jean-Henry Céant. Riots shut down much of the country'
country’s cities for 11 days in February 2019, as citizens demanded better living conditions and Moise'
Moïse’s resignation. The legislature passed a vote of no confidence against Céant in March 2019,
saying he had failed to improve living conditions during his six months in office.3
On April 9, 2019, President Moise nominated Jean-Michel Lapin as his third prime minister in just over two years. Some lawmakers in the opposition ransacked the Senate on May 30 to prevent a confirmation vote for the third time. As of June 30, the parliament had still refused to ratify the appointment of Lapin or his Cabinet, leaving Haiti without a fully functioning government. A ratification vote does not appear imminent.
The United Nations ended its 13-year-long United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in October 2017. A smaller mission, the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), succeeded it, focusing on strengthening judicial institutions and protecting human rights. On October 16, 2019, the U.N. is scheduled to transition from peacekeeping missions to a political mission, the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), which is to provide election and other technical support. (See "Security: U.N. Missions, Haitian Police, and Revival of the Haitian Army" below.)
Some observers are concerned that the peacekeeping mission is leaving just before Haitian parliamentary elections for one-third of the Senate are scheduled to be held, on October 27, 2019. Elections are often volatile in Haiti. The next presidential elections are due in 2021 (presidents may not seek consecutive reelection). Some opposition groups calling for Moïse's resignation may call for early elections. Organizing elections often has proven difficult in Haiti, leading to long delays, periods without an elected legislature or president, and heightened political tensions.
The Organization of American States (OAS) sent a high-level delegation to Haiti on June 19, 2019, in response to a request from the Haitian government, to help facilitate a national dialogue. The delegation reportedly told Moïse that he was not governing and needed to do so, that those seeking the president's ouster needed to defeat him "at the ballot box," and that the delegation was not going to ask Moïse to resign.4 Moïse reportedly agreed to the delegation's proposal to establish an OAS-sanctioned commission of international financial experts to help Haitian government auditors determine how much money people stole from the PetroCaribe fund and who should be prosecuted for doing so.5
Given Moïse's lack of experience, government capacity, and public support, political unrest is likely to continue. Some analysts, such as the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), expect Moïse to serve out the remainder of his term, which ends in 2022, while noting that political risk is high and early elections cannot be ruled out.6 Others, such as IHS Global Insight, see the reports of corruption against Moïse, and his growing 3
3
“Lapin confirmed as Haiti’s new prime minister,” Agence France Presse (AFP), April 9, 2019.
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Haiti’s elected officials have exacerbated the ongoing instability by not forming a government,
and they are running out of constitutional means for doing so. The president, who is elected
directly by popular elections, is head of state and appoints the prime minister, chosen from the
majority party in the National Assembly. The prime minister serves as head of government. The
first two prime ministers under Moïse resigned. The Haitian legislature did not confirm the
president’s subsequent two nominees for prime minister: Jean-Michel Lapin was nominated in
March 2019, and Fritz-William Michel in July 2019. Some legislators actively prevented votes on
those nominations by absenting themselves to prevent a quorum or with other tactics. In one
instance, four opposition senators ransacked the Senate chamber, ending a third attempt to ratify
the government.4 Nevertheless, a legislative motion to impeach the president did not pass.
Because the legislature also did not pass an elections law, parliamentary elections scheduled for
October 2019 have been postponed indefinitely.
The Organization of American States (OAS) sent a high-level delegation to Haiti on June 19,
2019, in response to a request from the Haitian government, to help facilitate a national dialogue.
The delegation reportedly told Moïse that he was not governing and needed to do so, that those
seeking the president’s ouster needed to defeat him “at the ballot box,” and that the delegation
was not going to ask Moïse to resign.5 Moïse reportedly agreed to the delegation’s proposal to
establish an OAS-sanctioned commission of international financial experts to help Haitian
government auditors determine how much money people stole from the PetroCaribe fund and
who should be prosecuted for doing so.6
Mass demonstrations have continued to call for an end to corruption, provision of government
services, and Moïse’s resignation. Between September and November 2019, more than 42 people
died, and hundreds were injured in Haitian demonstrations.7 According to the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Haitian security forces killed 19 people; armed individuals or
unknown perpetrators killed the others.8
Moïse has said it would be irresponsible of him to resign, and that he will not do so.9 He has
called repeatedly for dialogue with the opposition.
Moïse is now ruling by decree. As of January 13, 2020, the terms of the entire lower Chamber of
Deputies and two-thirds of the Senate expired (as did the terms of all local government posts),
without newly elected officials to take their places. Consequently, the parliament will not be able
to function unless President Moïse calls the legislature back into session, or Haitian officials
negotiate a political agreement to allow legislators to extend their terms. Previously, when the
legislature’s terms expired in January 2015 because the government had not held elections, thenPresident Michel Martelly ruled by decree for over a year, outside of constitutional norms.
4Jacqueline
Charles, “Haitian senators ransack Parliament in failed effort to ratify a new government,” Miami Herald,
May 30, 2019.
5 Jacqueline Charles, “OAS tells Haiti opposition to back off—and tells president to start governing,” Miami Herald,
June 19, 2019.
6 Ibid.
7 “IMF says Haiti crisis in Unprecedented,” CE NAFTA, November 25, 2019.
8 Marta Hurtado, “Press Briefing note on Haiti unrest,” Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
November 1, 2019.
9 Evens Sanon, “Haiti President Breaks Silence, Says Will Not Resign,” Associated Press, October 15, 2019.
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If President Moïse were to resign, or be forced from office, the Haitian Constitution calls for the
legislature to meet within 60 days to elect a new provisional president for the remainder of his
term. Currently, there is no functioning legislature.
The U.N., the OAS, and the Vatican facilitated a political conference January 29-31, 2020, aimed
at ending the crisis. The talks focused on four key elements: defining the criteria for the formation
of a new government; developing a plan for reform; creating a constitutional revision process;
and setting an electoral calendar.10 The participants, including Moïse, political parties, and civil
society and private-sector actors, did not reach an agreement for resolving Haiti’s political and
institutional crises. Negotiations resumed February 5, and efforts are continuing.
The Trump Administration supports the efforts to break the political impasse, but also states that,
“while constitutional reforms are necessary and welcome, they must not become a pretext to
delay elections.”11
Elections are often volatile in Haiti. The next presidential elections are due in 2021 (presidents
may not seek consecutive reelection). Some opposition groups calling for Moïse’s resignation are
calling for early elections. As evidenced by the current situation, organizing elections often has
proven difficult in Haiti, leading to long delays, periods without an elected legislature or
president, and heightened political tensions.
Given Moïse’s lack of experience, government capacity, and public support, political unrest is
likely to continue. Some analysts, such as the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), expect Moïse to
serve out the remainder of his term, which ends in 2022, while noting that his administration will
continue to face pressure from public protests over worsening socioeconomic conditions.12
Others, such as IHS Global Insight, see the reports of corruption against Moïse, and his growing
isolation, as increasing the possibility of him being ousted in the coming months.13
Following an hours-long exchange of gunfire between protesting police officers and soldiers in
army headquarters on February 23, 2020 (see “Human Rights” below), some analysts are
concerned that tensions could lead to a fragmentation of security forces or an armed uprising if
the government does not fulfill its promise to improve working conditions and pay for the police
force.14
Economic Background15
isolation, as increasing the possibility of him being ousted in the coming months.7
According to the Haitian Constitution (article 149), if the president resigns or is dismissed, the Council of Ministers, under the presidency of the prime minister, exercises executive power until another president is elected within 120 days. As mentioned earlier, however, neither the prime minister nor a Cabinet are currently confirmed. If the presidency becomes vacant during the fourth or fifth year of a term (Moïse is in his third year of office), the National Assembly is to meet within 60 days to elect a provisional president to complete the remainder of the term.
Plagued by chronic political instability and frequent natural disasters, Haiti is the poorest country
in the Western Hemisphere, and one of the poorest countries in the world. Haiti'’s poverty is
massive and deep. Almost 60% of the population lives under the national poverty line of $2.41
per day. More than 24% liveAlmost a quarter of the population lives under the national extreme poverty line of $1.23 per day. In addition, Haiti continues to recover from the 2010 earthquake that devastated the capital of Port-au-Prince, whose original estimated economic damage was $8 billion to $14 billion.9 In October 2016, Hurricane Matthew, which the World Bank characterized as the most devastating disaster since the earthquake, caused damage estimated to equal 32% of Haiti's gross domestic product (GDP). The agricultural, livestock, and fishing sectors suffered losses of about $600 million. A two-year drought, compounded by Hurricane Matthew, has largely destroyed Haiti's food supply, creating a humanitarian disaster. More than 96% of Haiti's 11 million people are at risk from natural disasters, and
United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary General, S/2020/123, “United Nations Integrated Office in
Haiti,” February 13, 2020, p. 3.
11 U.S. Mission to the U.N., “Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on the Situation in Haiti, Ambassador Cherith
Norman-Chalet, ” New York, New York, February 20, 2020.
12 EIU, “Country Report: Haiti,” generated February 10, 2020, pp. 2, 8.
13 Carla Selman, “Haitian president’s mention in court corruption report raises ousting chances, power vacuum over
coming months highly likely,” IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, June 21, 2019.
14 Carla Selman, “Haitian police and army gunfire exchange indicates potential fragmentation of security forces, raising
civil war risks,” IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, February 26, 2020.
15 Data in this section are from World Bank, “Haiti Overview,” and “Data” at https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/
haiti, accessed February 10, 2020, unless stated otherwise.
10
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per day. In addition, Haiti continues to recover from the 2010 earthquake that devastated the
capital of Port-au-Prince, whose original estimated economic damage was $8 billion to $14
billion.16 In October 2016, Hurricane Matthew, which the World Bank characterized as the most
devastating disaster since the earthquake, caused damage estimated to equal 32% of Haiti’s gross
domestic product (GDP). The agricultural, livestock, and fishing sectors suffered losses of about
$600 million. A two-year drought, compounded by Hurricane Matthew, largely destroyed Haiti’s
food supply. More than 96% of Haiti’s 11 million people are at risk from natural disasters, and
Haiti is one of the most exposed countries in the world to climate change.17
Haiti is one of the most exposed countries in the world to climate change.10
Haiti has few resources to tackle these challenges. Few people or businesses pay taxes, according
to the World Bank, and the state provides limited services.1118 Haitians rely heavily on remittances
from Haitians living abroad to supplement their incomes; the World Bank estimated remittances
to Haiti were almostover $3 billion for 2018, constituting about 31%almost one-third of Haiti'’s GDP.1219 Widespread
corruption depletes funds intended for government institutions and public services. A Haitian
Senate investigation alleged that government officials had mismanaged almost $2 billion dollars
between 2008 and 2016 (see "“Human Rights"” below). As noted above, in May 2019, Haiti's ’s
Superior Court of Auditors alleged that Moïse and other officials embezzled millions of dollars.
The government was supposed to have used those funds for improving infrastructure, including
restoring ministry buildings destroyed by the 2010 earthquake, and health and education
programs for Haiti'’s poor.
Nonetheless, according to the State Department, Haiti has made long-term development progress
over the past 10 years.20 For example, basic health indicators improved significantly, most
notably achieving zero laboratory-confirmed cases of cholera for the last nine months of 2019.
The State Department also reported that with U.S. and other international support, Haiti had
created 27,000 jobs through programs to improve private sector competitiveness, and another
14,000 jobs at the Caracol Industrial Park in northern Haiti.
Political gridlock is hampering furthers poor.
Political gridlock can hamper economic development efforts, however, and contributing
and contribute to government instability. The legislature has not passed a 2019 budget or, since the removal of Prime Minister Céant in March 2019, confirmed multiple did not pass a 2019/2020 budget or confirm multiple
executive branch appointments before it lapsed. Without a budget, a confirmed prime minister, or
a Cabinet, pending agreements with donors have not movedcould not move forward, and experts grow
increasingly concerned that policy cannot be effectively developed or implemented. For example, until the Cabinet is sworn in and a budget approved,
a three-year, $229 million loan with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that the government
secured in March 2019 expired without being approved.21
Public frustration with economic woes has contributed greatly to ongoing demonstrations, some
of which have become violent. In addition to low economic growth and the government’s failure
to address corruption adequately, year-end consumer price inflation was 17% for 2019, one of the
highest rates in the region; the Haitian gourde depreciated highly over 2019; fuel supply is low
16
Eduardo A. Cavallo, Andrew Powell, and Oscar Becerra, Estimating the Direct Economic Damage of the Earthquake
in Haiti, Inter-American Development Bank, February 11, 2010.
17 World Bank, “Towards a New Road Map for Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in Haiti: New Country Partnership
Strategy for Haiti 2015-2019,” Infographic, September 29, 2015.
18 Ibid.
19 World Bank, “Personal remittances, received (current US$)—Haiti,” and “Personal remittances, received (% of
GDP)—Haiti,” Data, accessed February 10, 2020.
20 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Haiti,” Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, January 6, 2020.
21 EIU, “Country Report: Haiti,” generated February 10, 2020, p. 8.
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while prices are high; and public investment is limited.22 Furthermore, the protests themselves
disrupt and diminish economic activity.
The EIU reports a decline of 0.8% in economic growth in 2019 and predicts economic growth of
less than 1% in 2020. In the short term, President Moïse announced emergency policy measures
to address state corruption and improve the quality of public spending. In the long term, however,
the EIU also states that Haitian institutional weaknesses will inhibit greater economic growth and
continue to limit the government’s ability to address economic structural deficiencies.23
Security: U.N. Missions, Haitian Police, and Revival
secured in March 2019 cannot be approved.13
Nonetheless, according to the State Department, Haiti has made the transition from a post disaster era to one of reconstruction and long-term development.14 The EIU reports a 1.5% economic growth rate in 2018, and forecasts a modest increase to an average 1.8% growth in 2019 and 2020. In the short term, President Moïse announced emergency policy measures to address state corruption and improve the quality of public spending. In the long term, however, the EIU also states that Haitian institutional weaknesses will inhibit greater economic growth and continue to limit the government's ability to address economic structural deficiencies.15
Public frustration with economic woes has contributed greatly to ongoing demonstrations, some of which have become violent. In addition to low economic growth and the government's failure to address corruption adequately, consumer price inflation is currently estimated to be 17%, one of the highest rates in the region; the Haitian gourde depreciated by almost 7% in the first quarter of 2019; fuel supply is low while prices are high; and public investment is very weak.16 Furthermore, the protests themselves disrupt and diminish economic activity.
of the Haitian Army
Congress has expressed concern over citizen security in Haiti, which has struggled since 1986 to
establish a democratic government. Congress has supported various U.N. missions in Haiti and
the professionalization and strengthening of the Haitian National Police (HNP) and other
elements of the country'’s judicial system to improve security conditions.
U.N. Missions
MINUSTAH, a peacekeeping mission that was in Haiti for 13 years, was established to help
restore and maintain order after the collapse of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's ’s
government in 2004. The U.N. began reducing MINUSTAH'’s troops in 2012 and closed the
mission in October 2017. The U.N. Security Council provided for a smaller follow-on mission to
succeed MINUSTAH, the U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH). That mission is scheduled to conclude
mission concluded in October 2019, and a special political mission, the United Nations Integrated
Office in Haiti (BINUH), is to succeed it.
succeeded it, for an initial one-year period.
The 2017 resolution ending MINUSTAH cited Haiti'’s peaceful completion of a long-delayed
electoral process and return to constitutional order in February 2017 as a major milestone toward
stabilization. The Security Council also commended the mission for supporting the political
process, professionalizing the police, and maintaining a secure and stable environment in Haiti.17
Many Haitians and other observers criticized MINUSTAH for its role in introducing cholera to
Haiti and for allegations of sexual abuse by some of its forces. Prior to the 2010 earthquake, Haiti
had no cases of cholera for at least a century. According to multiple scientific reports,
MINUSTAH peacekeepers inadvertently introduced the disease in the country. Vulnerability to
disasters—due to a lack of immunity, overcrowded living conditions, environmental degradation,
poor construction standards, dysfunctional or insufficient sewage and sanitation systems, and
political instability in Haiti—has facilitated the rapid spread of the disease and the largest cholera
outbreak in the world.
24
In August 2016, after years of criticism and demands that the U.N. take full responsibility for
introducing the disease to Haiti, then-U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon said that the U.N.
had a "“moral responsibility"” to the epidemic'’s victims and announced a new program to support
them, although the U.N. continues to claim diplomatic immunity. Advocates for cholera victims
EIU, “Country Report: Haiti,” generated February 10, 2020, pp. 12-13.
EIU, “Country Report: Haiti,” generated June 24, 2019, p. 2.
24 For further information, also see CRS In Focus IF10502, Haiti: Cholera, the United Nations, and Hurricane
Matthew, by Maureen Taft-Morales and Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.
22
23
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say that the U.N. did not consult victims regarding compensation.1825 The U.N.'’s $400 million
cholera plan still has not been fully funded or implemented. As of November 2018February 6, 2020, international
donors had pledged only $17.720.5 million to the fund.19
26
Charges of sexual abuse by MINUSTAH personnel also fueled anti-MINUSTAH sentiment. The
U.N. has a zero-tolerance policy toward sexual abuse and exploitation. The U.N. returns alleged
perpetrators to their home country for punishment. The U.N. substantiated 4243 of 8284 alleged sexual
abuse and exploitation cases among MINUSTAH personnel; seven cases are pending.20
MINUSTAH'one case is pending.27
MINUSTAH’s successor mission shifted focus from stabilization to institutional strengthening
and development. MINUJUSTH focuses on rule of law, development of the HNP, and human
rights, "“to support the Government of Haiti in consolidating the stabilization gains and ensuring
their sustainability."” MINUJUSTH began operations in October 2017, deploying police units in
five political departments (similar to states), plus up to 295 individual police officers.
MINUJUSTH established a zero-tolerance policy toward sexual exploitation and abuse that
included training, raising awareness, and enforcement. There were no allegations of sexual
exploitation and abuse by MINUJUSTH police officers and staff in 2018.21
With the support of MINUSTAH, MINUJUSTH and U.S. and other international assistance, the HNP became increasingly professional and have now taken on responsibility for domestic security. New police commissariats built in areas previously not served by police have given more Haitians access to security services. Currently, the police force has 14,000-15,000 officers. Its goal is to have 16,000 officers. Some observers remain concerned, however, that the Haitian police force remains below international standards for the size of its population and is underfunded. While acknowledging the increased ability of the HNP, some observers also wonder whether the force will be able to maintain security and stability without the backup of international forces.
In what proved to be a very controversial move, former President Michel Martelly (2011-2016) began reviving the Haitian army, after a 22-year absence. The former army allegedly committed gross violations of human rights over decades, according to numerous reports by the State Department, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Amnesty International, and others. It also carried out numerous coups. After returning to office following one of those coups, former President Aristide disbanded the army in 1995. Martelly sent recruits to Ecuador for training. President Moïse has continued to implement Martelly's plan and began recruiting 28
BINUH’s mandate is to advise the government of Haiti on strengthening political stability and
good governance through support for an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue, and to protect
and promote human rights. More specifically, the U.N. Security Council’s resolution on BINUH
directs it to help Haiti plan and carry out elections; reinforce the HNP through training on human
rights and responding to gang and sexual and gender-based violence; develop an inclusive
approach with all social sectors to reduce inter-communal violence (particularly gang violence);
address human rights abuses and violations and comply with international human rights
obligations; improve administration of Haitian prison facilities; and strengthen the justice sector
through adoption and implementation of key legislation.29 The mission is run by a Special
Representative and includes a U.N. Police Commissioner, up to 30 police and corrections
advisers, and about 80 to 100 personnel.
Haitian National Police
With the support of MINUSTAH, MINUJUSTH and U.S. and other international assistance since
its creation in 1995, the HNP have become increasingly professional and have now taken on
responsibility for domestic security. New police commissariats built in areas previously not
served by police have given more Haitians access to security services. Currently, the police force
has 14,000-15,000 officers. It is unlikely to meet its goal of having 18,000 officers by December
2021, according to the U.N., unless the government provides significant additional funding.30 The
Jacqueline Charles, “On Eve of High-Level U.N. Haiti Visit, Trump Continues to Say ‘No’ to Cholera Request,”
Miami Herald, November 2, 2017.
26 “Funding Status—UN Haiti Cholera Response MPTF,” table, February 6, 2020, at “UN Haiti Cholera Response
Multi-Partner Trust Fund Fact Sheet,” http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/CLH00.
27 Conduct in UN Field Missions, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,” accessed February 6, 2020, at
https://conduct.unmissions.org/sea-investigations.
28 U.S. Department of State, “Haiti 2018 Human Rights Report,” in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
2018, March 2019.
29 Edith M. Lederer, “UN votes to establish political mission in Haiti,” Associated Press, June 25, 2019.
30 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary General, S/2020/123, “United Nations Integrated Office in
Haiti,” February 13, 2020, p. 8.
25
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Haitian police force remains below international standards for the size of the country’s population
and is underfunded.
While acknowledging the increased ability of the HNP to plan and execute security operations
without the backup of international forces, some observers also have raised serious concerns
about police involvement in and failure to respond to some violent events. A recent U.N. report
said the HNP conducted 20 antigang operations in the 2019 holiday season alone, arresting 62
suspected gang leaders and members.31 The police operated under difficult conditions, with at
least 1,341 demonstrations, roadblocks and barricades from September through November, some
of which included heavily armed civilians. The U.N. Secretary General stated, “The resolve of the
national police to manage public safety throughout the country, notwithstanding the challenging
context, attests to its increasing capabilities and professionalization.” Nonetheless, the Secretary
General also reported that three active police officers allegedly participated in an attack by a
criminal gang on the Bel Air neighborhood of the capital in early November 2019, and that the
HNP failed to intervene. Both the Haitian judicial branch and the HNP Inspector General are
investigating the case.
In 2020 the police have been seeking the right to unionize, seeking better working conditions and
better pay. Some police officers have reportedly led protests that have turned violent.32 Six
officers were reportedly fired over their efforts to unionize. On February 23, men who reportedly
said they were off-duty police officers marched with hundreds of supporters to the national
palace, across from which is the army headquarters.33 The police and soldiers exchanged gunfire
for several hours. At least three police officers and one soldier were wounded.
(For further discussion of the Haitian police, see “Human Rights,” below.)
Revived Haitian Armed Forces
In what proved to be a very controversial move, former President Michel Martelly (2011-2016)
began reviving the Haitian army, after a 22-year absence. The former army allegedly committed
gross violations of human rights over decades, according to numerous reports by the State
Department, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Amnesty International,
and others. It also carried out numerous coups. After returning to office following one of those
coups, former President Aristide disbanded the army in 1995. Martelly sent recruits to Ecuador
for training. President Moïse has continued to implement Martelly’s plan and began recruiting
500 additional soldiers in July 2017.34
500 additional soldiers in July 2017.22
The Haitian government says the army will be different this time and will focus on patrolling the
border with the Dominican Republic, combating smuggling, and executing recovery efforts after
natural disasters. Many observers, including many Members of Congress, remain concerned
about the potential use of the army for internal repression. Moïse appointed six former soldiers to
head the command, all of whom the United States had sanctioned for supporting the military coup
that overthrew former President Aristide.2335 Many members of the international community,
31Statements
in this paragraph from United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary General, S/2020/123,
“United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti,” February 13, 2020, pp. 5, 9.
32 See Evens Sanon and Michael Weissenstein, “Police burn cars, lawyer’s office in Haiti protest,” The Canadian
Press, February 20, 2020.
33 See Evens Sanon and Michael Weissenstein, “Haiti police exchange fire with troops near national palace,”
Associated Press, February 23, 2020.
34 Amelie Baron, “Haiti’s Army Reborn 20 Years After It Was Demobilized,” AFP, July 18, 2017.
35 Jacqueline Charles, “Haiti has a New Army with much of the Old Leadership. Some in the U.S. Aren’t Happy,”
Miami Herald, updated April 3, 2018.
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Haiti’s Political and Economic Conditions
including the United States, have said that Haiti should focus on strengthening its police force
instead. Congress, through the FY2020 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-94),
prohibited the provision of appropriated funds for assistance to the armed forces of Haiti.
Corruption and Efforts to Address It
High levels of corruption have plagued Haiti for much of its history. President Moïse came to
office under investigation for corruption. Over the past couple of years, public protests have
included demands for the government to do more to combat corruption.
In recent years, some Haitian institutions have made progress investigating government
corruption. In November 2017, the Haitian Senate’s Special Commission of Investigation issued a
600-page report detailing alleged embezzlement and fraud by current and former Haitian officials
managing $2 billion in loans from Venezuela’s PetroCaribe discounted oil program, from 2008 to
2016. The benefits of those low interest loans were supposed to go toward social programs and
economic development. Also in 2017, Haiti’s Central Unit of Financial Intelligence prepared an
investigative report that implicated Moïse in money laundering. In May 2019, Haiti’s Superior
Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes alleged that Moïse and other officials embezzled
millions of dollars. Former President Michel Martelly’s administration (2011-2016) allegedly
contracted and paid a company led by Moïse to carry out infrastructure projects that it never
completed.36 Moïse denies the allegations against him.37
While Moise has taken some steps to address corruption, observers say he has also made
investigations more difficult. Moïse fired two high-ranking officials in his administration for their
involvement in the PetroCaribe scandal. Nevertheless, at a public Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights hearing on corruption in Haiti, witnesses said that the Moïse administration has
weakened state and judicial institutions responsible for anticorruption efforts.38 For example, the
former investigating magistrate and head of the Central Unit of Financial Intelligence (UCREF),
said that Moïse fired him, one year into his three-year term, following his office’s writing of the
report implicating the president.39 Furthermore, an attorney with an international human rights
lawyers’ organization described threats and attacks against people calling for government
accountability, including attacks on journalists, threats against judges on the Court of Auditors,
and police killings of protesters.40
The State Department reported that the Haitian government rarely took steps to prosecute
government and law enforcement officials accused of committing abuses and that corruption and
a lack of judicial oversight severely hampered the judiciary. The judicial branch investigated
several corruption cases, but none of them resulted in prosecutions in 2018. The government fired
21 assistant prosecutors because of allegations of corruption. According to the Human Rights
Jacqueline Charles, “Haiti president accused of embezzlement scheme in government audit of Venezuela aid
money,” Miami Herald, June 4, 2019.
37 “Accused by judges, Haitian president denies corruption allegations,” AFP, June 12, 2019.
38 Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, “Hearing Before Regional Human
Rights Body Leads to Request for Site Visit to Haiti,” October 4, 2019, p. 2.
39 Ibid, and Samuel Maxime, “Haiti’s Anti-Corruption Chief Abruptly Fired, 1 Year into 3-Year Term,” Haiti Sentinel,
July 9, 2017.
40 Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, op. cit, p. 2.
36
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Haiti’s Political and Economic Conditions
report, “the perception of corruption remained widespread in all branches of government and at
all levels,” yet no Haitian government has prosecuted a high-level official for corruption.41
Haiti’s 2009-2019 national anticorruption strategy ended, and the government has not developed
a new national anticorruption strategy to replace it.
Concerns over Haitians and People of Haitian
Many members of the international community, including the United States, have said that Haiti should focus on strengthening its police force instead.
The U.N. Security Council's resolution on BINUH directs it to help Haiti plan and carry out elections; reinforce the HNP through training on human rights and responding to gang and sexual and gender-based violence; develop an inclusive approach with all social sectors to reduce inter-communal violence (particularly gang violence); address human rights abuses and violations and comply with international human rights obligations; improve administration of Haitian prison facilities; and strengthen the justice sector through adoption and implementation of key legislation.24 BINUH is to commence on October 16, 2019. The mission is to be run by a Special Representative and will include a U.N. Police Commissioner, up to 30 police and corrections advisers, and about 80 to 100 personnel.
Descent in the Dominican Republic
Relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, which share the island of Hispaniola (see Figure 1
Figure 1), have been strained throughout their history. New tensions arose after a 2013 court
ruling in the Dominican Republic stripped Dominicans of Haitian descent of their citizenship,
applied retroactively to 1929, essentially rendering them stateless.
The Dominican government said it was trying to normalize a complicated immigration system.
Nevertheless, U.N. and OAS agencies, foreign leaders, and human rights groups challenged the decision'
decision’s legitimacy, concerned that it violates international human rights obligations to which
the Dominican Republic is party. The IACHR concluded that the Constitutional Court'’s ruling "
“implies an arbitrary deprivation of nationality"” and "“has a discriminatory effect, given that it
primarily impacts Dominicans of Haitian descent."25
”42
The Dominican government established a "“regularization of foreigners"” plan in 2013. The plan
required all foreigners, immigrants, and descendants of immigrants born between 1929 and 2007
to register, after which they could obtain temporary residence or possibly confirm their eligibility
for naturalization. Out of almost 290,000 people who applied, about 240,000 qualified for legal
status.2643 The Dominican government said it would help rectify the immigration status of people
who missed registration deadlines. Nonetheless, thousands of people have difficulty obtaining
documents demonstrating they were born in the Dominican Republic because for decades,
Dominican officials have denied birth certificates and other documents to many Dominican-born
people of, or perceived to be of, Haitian descent.
After the June 2015 registration deadline passed, the Dominican government authorized its
officials to expel forcibly individuals of Haitian descent who lacked the new documentation.
From July 2015 to September 17, 2017, according to the U.N. migration agency, the International
Organization for Migration (IOM), 58,271 people were officially deported, and 37,942 claimed to
have been deported. Over 4,000 presumed unaccompanied and separated children crossed the
border into Haiti.2744 A naturalization law developed a process to revalidate Dominican citizenship
for 55,000 people whose Dominican identity documents the government had invalidated, and to
allow them to register their children as citizens as well. After four years, less than half of those
people had received new documents.2845 The regularization of foreigners plan ended in August
U.S. Department of State, “Haiti 2018 Human Rights Report,” in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
2018, March 2019, p. 17.
42 Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “IACHR Wraps Up Visit to the
Dominican Republic,” press release, December 2013.
43 CRS In Focus IF10407, Dominican Republic, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
44 IOM Haiti, “Border Monitoring Sitrep,” September 28, 2017 (latest report available as of June 27, 2019).
45 CRS In Focus IF10407, Dominican Republic, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
41
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Haiti’s Political and Economic Conditions
2018. According to Human Rights Watch, more than 200,000 people of Haitian descent remained
in the Dominican Republic without valid documents and at risk of deportation.29
46
In May 2017, Haiti and the Dominican Republic revived the Joint Bilateral Commission to
address security, border, and migration issues. The commission was inactive while Haiti was
dealing with its earlier electoral problems. Tensions over these issues remain.
On April 23, 2019, the IACHR found that the Dominican Republic has not complied with the
court over the past four years, affecting the rights of Haitian-descended people seeking
Dominican nationality.3047 It also stated that the Dominican Republic failed to send legal
representatives to an early 2019 public hearing, becoming one of only two countries (the other
being Nicaragua) to do so in the history of the court.
According to the State Department, U.S. policy toward Haiti is "“designed to foster the institutions
and infrastructure necessary to achieve strong democratic foundations and meaningful poverty
reduction through sustainable development."31”48 Policy priorities include support for economic
growth and poverty reduction, including through bilateral trade and investment to promote job
creation; improved health care and food security; promoting respect for human rights;
strengthening democratic institutions; and strengthening the HNP so that the country can provide
its own security and work more effectively with U.S. agencies to combat international crime.
Tensions between the two rose over the Trump Administration'’s decision to end Temporary
Protected Status (TPS; see "Immigration"“Immigration” section below) for about 60,000 Haitians as of July
2019. Two U.S. courts issued temporary injunctions against implementing the decision.
Secretary
of State Mike Pompeo expressed concern about the president ruling by decree, and urged the
Haitian government to set a firm date for overdue elections.49
U.S. Assistance50
Because Haiti is the poorest country in the hemisphere, and because of its proximity to the United
States, Haiti has received high levels of U.S. assistance for many years. In recent years, it has
been the second-largest recipient of U.S. aid in the region, after Colombia. In 2010, the year the
earthquake hit Haiti, U.S. aid reached a peak of $505 million in base funding, plus $908 million
in a FY2010 supplemental. Aid to Haiti has been declining steadily over the past 10 years. (See Table 1
Table 1 for U.S. aid to Haiti from FY2011FY2012 through the FY2020FY2021 request.)
The Trump Administration's request for FY2020 aid to Haiti totals $145.5 million, a 15% reduction from FY2019's request. It requests $25.5 million for the Economic Support and Development Fund; $90 million for the State Department-administered part of the Global Health Programs account (GHP); $21.7 million for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-administered part of the GHP; $255,000 for International Military Education and Training (IMET); and $8 million for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE).
The House-passed FY2020 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations measure, Division D of the minibus H.R. 2740 (which references the report, H.Rept. 116-78, to the House Appropriations Committee-reported SFOPS bill, H.R. 2839) would place several restrictions on aid to Haiti. Under the bill, no funds could be obligated or expended for aid for Haiti except through regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations, and no funds could be used to provide aid to the Haitian Armed Forces. The bill recommends $51 million in Development Assistance (DA) for long-term development programs in Haiti. The referenced report says that "not more than $45 million" may be made available for DA and Economic Support Funds, although that limit may be exceeded for food security and global health programs.
The bill would withhold aid for the central government of Haiti unless the Secretary of State certifies and reports that Haiti is strengthening the rule of law through certain steps such as transparently selecting judges based on merit, and implementing reforms to increase transparency and accountability; combating corruption including by implementing the 2014 anti-corruption law and prosecuting corrupt officials; increasing government revenues and expenditures on public services; and resolving commercial disputes between U.S. entities and the government of Haiti.
The House Committee on Appropriations said in its report that it was "greatly concerned" by civil unrest in Haiti, and expected the Secretary of State and USAID Administrator to support dialogue aimed at resolving the political crisis, and ensuring that the upcoming elections are transparent and inclusive. The committee also encouraged providing technical support for thorough and independent investigations into allegations of corruption and human rights.
Addressing other concerns, the committee also encouraged USAID to consider strategies that work with local governments to assess areas of potential economic growth, and urged the Secretary of State to work with the Haitian and Dominican Republic governments to develop a
The Trump Administration has requested $128.2 million for Haiti in FY2021. If enacted, U.S.
assistance to Haiti would decline by nearly 34% compared to the estimated $193.8 million
provided in FY2019.
The FY2020 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-94) contains several provisions
related to Haiti, including that aid may be provided to Haiti only through the regular notification
procedures. Under the act, Economic Support Funds for Haiti may not be made available for
assistance for the central Government of Haiti unless the Secretary of State certifies and reports to
Human Rights Watch, “Haiti,” in World Report 2019.
Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Haiti, generated on June 24, 2019, p. 15.
48 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Haiti,” Fact Sheet, January 6, 2020.
49 U.S. Mission Haiti, “Secretary of State Mike Pompeo Election Message,” January 24, 2020.
50 Budget figures from U.S. Department of State, FY2018 Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs.
46
47
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the Committees on Appropriations that the government is taking effective steps to strengthen the
rule of law, combat corruption, increase government revenues, and resolve commercial disputes.
The act provides a budget authority of $51 million in Development Assistance, including $8.5
million for reforestation. The act appropriates $10 million in International Narcotics Control and
Law Enforcement funds for prison assistance in Haiti, prioritizing improvements to meet basic
sanitation, medical, nutritional, and safety needs at the National Penitentiary. The act also
prohibits the provision of appropriated funds for assistance to the armed forces of Haiti. The
House Committee on Appropriations said in its report (H.Rept. 116-78, to the House
Appropriations Committee-reported SFOPS bill, H.R. 2839) that it was “greatly concerned” by
civil unrest in Haiti, and expected the Secretary of State and USAID Administrator to support
dialogue aimed at resolving the political crisis, and ensuring that the upcoming elections are
transparent and inclusive. The committee also encouraged providing technical support for
thorough and independent investigations into allegations of corruption and human rights abuses.
Addressing other concerns, the committee also encouraged USAID to consider strategies that
work with local governments to assess areas of potential economic growth, and urged the
Secretary of State to work with the Haitian and Dominican Republic governments to develop a
strategy for enhancing border security.
Congressional Research Service
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strategy for enhancing border security.
($ in thousands) |
FY2011 Actual |
FY2012 Actual |
FY2013 Actual |
FY2014 Actual |
FY2015 Actual |
FY2016 Actual |
FY2017 Actual |
FY2018 Actual |
FY2019 Request |
FY2020 Request |
||||||||||
TOTAL |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| ||||||||||
Economic Support Fund |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
— |
— |
||||||||||
Development Assistance |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
— |
— |
||||||||||
Economic Support and Development Fund |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
39,000 |
25,500 |
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(45,000) |
|
n/a |
n/a |
||||||||||
Foreign Military Financing |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
— |
— |
||||||||||
Global Health Programs—State |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
100,000 |
90,000 |
||||||||||
Global Health Programs—USAID |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
23,200 |
21,700 |
||||||||||
International Military Education and Training |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
255 |
255 |
||||||||||
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
8,000 |
8,000 |
||||||||||
P.L. 480 Title II |
|
|
|
|
|
5,668 |
|
|
0 |
0 |
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ), Fiscal Year 2013, Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional Perspectives, p. 798 (FY2011); CBJ, Fiscal Year 2014, Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional Perspectives, p. 667 (FY2012); CBJ, Fiscal Year 2015, Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional Perspectives, p. 666 (FY2013); CBJ, Fiscal Year 2016, Foreign Operations, Appendix 3, p. 411 (FY2014), CBJ, Fiscal Year 2017, Foreign Operations, Appendix 3, p. 434 (FY2015); CBJ, Fiscal Year 2018, Foreign Assistance Supplementary Tables, p. 91 (FY2016); CBJ, Fiscal Year 2019, Foreign Operations Appendix 2, p. 486 (FY2017), Request by Account and Fiscal Year; CBJ, Fiscal Year 2020, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, p. 520 (FY2018, FY2019, FY2020).
Note: "n/a" signifies not applicable.
Haiti is a transit point for cocaine from South America and marijuana from Jamaica headed to U.S. and other markets, according to the Department of State's 2019 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Haiti does not produce a significant amount of illicit drugs for export. Although some cannabis is grown for local consumption, the country's subsistence-level economy means that most people cannot afford drugs, so domestic drug use is not widespread. Criminal gangs in Haiti are involved in international drug trafficking.
Criminal gangs in Haiti are involved in international drug trafficking.
The Haitian government has committed to combating drug trafficking, and has taken steps to
follow through on that pledge. The HNP has increased staffing of its counternarcotics unit
(Bureau for the Fight Against Narcotics Trafficking, or BLTS), which conducted several
successful investigations and interdiction operations against drug trafficking organizations in
2018.
Nonetheless, according to the State Department, Haiti remains unable to secure its borders against
illicit drug traffic, and drug and cash seizures decreased in 2018. The land border with the
Dominican Republic is basically uncontrolled, although the HNP formed a border police unit to
begin to control some border crossings. The underequipped Haitian Coast Guard has minimal
ability to patrol Haiti'’s 1,100 miles of coastline and seven international ports. Furthermore, Haiti'
Haiti’s judicial system remains extremely weak, limiting its ability to prosecute drug traffickers
or money launderers.
In terms of money laundering and financial crimes, the State Department notes, "“while Haiti itself
is not a major financial center, regional narcotics and money laundering enterprises utilize Haitian
couriers.... Much of the drug trafficking in Haiti, and related money laundering, has a connection
to the United States."
”
A significant example of successful cooperation between the two countries'’ law enforcement
forces was the extradition of former coup leader Guy Philippe to the United States in January
2017. HNP officers arrested Philippe and transferred custody to the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration. Philippe, who led a coup that overthrew then-President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in
2004, admitted in a U.S. court that he accepted $1.5 million to $3.5 million from drug smugglers
while he was police commander of a Haitian coastal city from 1999 to 2003.3452 Philippe was
sentenced to nine years in prison.
Haiti passed an anti-corruptionanticorruption law in 2014, but the government has not yet implemented it
effectively. According to the State Department, obstacles in 2018 included "“frequent changes in
leadership, fear of reprisal at the working level, rumored intervention from the Executive, and the
failure of judges to follow through by investigating, scheduling, and referring cases to
prosecutors."
”
Similarly, Haiti amended an anti-money laundering law in 2017 that strengthened its regulatory
framework, but, according to the State Department, undermined the independence and
effectiveness of its Central Financial Intelligence Unit by moving it under the control of the
executive branch. Haiti made no prosecutions or convictions for money laundering in 2017 or 2018.
2018.
This section draws from U.S. Department of State, “Haiti,” in 2019 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR), Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, pp. 177-180; and “Haiti” in Volume II: Money Laundering and
Financial Crimes, March 2019, pp. 108-109.
52 Marcos Martinez, “Former Haiti Rebel Gets 9 Years in Prison in US Drug Case,” Associated Press, June 21, 2017.
51
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Immigration
Haitians began migrating to the United States in larger numbers after the collapse of the 29-year
Duvalier dictatorship in 1986. Recurrent political instability and violence, endemic poverty, and
natural disasters have contributed to the continued flow of migrants from Haiti. About 5,000
Haitians lived in the United States in 1960.35 In 201753 In 2018, the number was almost 680,000.36 A slight majority (51%) of over 687,000.54 Half of
foreign-born Haitians living in the United States in 20172018 entered the country before 2000; 27% 24%
arrived from 2000 to 2009, and 2225% arrived from 2010 through 2017.372018.55 As of 2017, 592018, 61% of the
foreign-born Haitians residing in the United States were naturalized citizens. Haitians constitute
1.5% of the foreign-born population in the United States.
Following the 2010 earthquake, the United States granted TPS for 18 months to Haitians living in
the United States at the time of the disaster. TPS provides temporary lawful statusprotection from removal and
work authorization to foreign nationals in the United States from countries experiencing armed
conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary circumstances that prevent their safe return. Then-DepartmentThenDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano extended TPS regularly,
and expanded it to include eligible Haitians who arrived in the United States up to one year after
the earthquake. On May 22, 2017, then-DHS Secretary John Kelly extended TPS for Haitians for
an additional 6 months—rather than the usual 18 months—from July 2017 through January 2018,
saying that TPS recipients should use that time to obtain the necessary papers and make
arrangements to return to Haiti. He added that the Haitian government should prepare to receive "
“all current TPS recipients"” and indicated that Haiti'’s recovery progress "“may not warrant further
TPS extension past January 2018."38”57 There are an estimated 56,20955,338 Haitians with TPS living in
the United States.39
58
President Moïse responded in the press, "“[I]t is out of the question that they will be sending back
60,000 Haitians."40”59 In October 2017, the Haitian government formally requested that the Trump
Administration extend TPS for Haitians for another 18 months. Later that month, then-Secretary
of State Rex Tillerson wrote then-acting DHS Secretary Elaine Duke that the conditions in Haiti
that led to Haitians initially being granted TPS no longer justified their continuation in a protected
status.4160 On November 20, 2017, DHS announced that TPS for Haitians would permanently terminate on July
22, 2019, giving Haitians with the status 18 months to return to Haiti or seek another legal status. In October 2018, however, a U.S. district court issued a preliminary injunction blocking implementation and enforcement of the order. In April 2019, another district court also issued an injunction against the termination order. The TPS designation for Haiti remains in effect pending
Jennifer Schulz and Jeanne Batalova, “Haitian Immigrants in the United States,” Migration Information Source,
August 2, 2017.
54 U.S. Census Bureau, 2018 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, “Selected Population Profile in the
United States, Haiti” accessed February 27, 2020, at https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?t=701%20-%20Haiti&tid=
ACSSPP1Y2018.S0201&hidePreview=true&vintage=2018.
55 Ibid.
56 U.S. Census Bureau, “Table B05006: Place of Birth for the Foreign-Born Population in the United States,” 2018
American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates Detailed Tables, at https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=b050&tid=
ACSDT1Y2018.B05006&vintage=2018.
57 Department of Homeland Security, “Secretary Kelly’s Statement on the Limited Extension of Haiti’s Designation for
Temporary Protected Status,” May 22, 2017.
58 USCIS data as cited in CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues, by Jill H.
Wilson.
59 Jacqueline Charles, “After Canceling with TPS Families, Haitian President Tells Recipients to ‘Calm Down,’” Miami
Herald, June 17, 2017.
60 “Tillerson: Central Americans, Haitians No Longer Need Protected Status,” Washington Post, November 3, 2017.
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In October 2018, however, a U.S. district court issued a preliminary injunction blocking
implementation and enforcement of the order. In April 2019, another district court also issued an
injunction against the termination order. The TPS designation for Haiti remains in effect pending
further court orders.61
further court orders.42
Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that the potential return of tens of thousands
of Haitians, and the loss of remittances from Haitians working in the United States, could
heighten instability in Haiti. Haitians sent aboutover $3 billion in remittances to Haiti in 2018,
constituting the equivalent of almost 3133% of Haiti'’s GDP.62 Other Members, and some business
and labor organizations, have expressed concern that removal of tens of thousands of Haitians
will be detrimental to local U.S. economies. In February 2020 several Members of Congress
called on the State Department’s Inspector General to investigate the extent to which the Trump
Administration included electoral considerations in the decision to terminate TPS for Haitians and
some Central American nationalities.63
s GDP.43 Another U.S. immigration program, the Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program (see below), states that allowing Haitians in the United States to work and send remittances to Haiti "supports broader U.S. goals for Haiti's long-term reconstruction and development."44 Other Members, and some business and labor organizations, have expressed concern that removal of tens of thousands of Haitians will be detrimental to local U.S. economies.
Members have introduced a range of bills related to TPS. Some would create a new protected
status that would last for six years rather than rely on the DHS Secretary to redesignate it every 6-18618 months, or provide a path to permanent residency for TPS holders. Others would limit the
program, by transferring country designation authority from DHS to Congress, making
unauthorized foreign nationals and members of criminal gangs ineligible, or making TPS holders
subject to detention and expedited removal.45
Through the DHS'’s Haitian Family Reunification Parole (HFRP) Program, eligible U.S. citizens
and lawful permanent residents canhave been able to apply for parole for certain family members
residing in Haiti. DHS created the program to promote family unity and to “support broader U.S.
goals for Haiti’s long-term reconstruction and development by allowing the beneficiaries of the
HFRP Program to work in the United States and contribute to Haiti through their remittances.”65
The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) within DHS is terminating the program
in response to President Trump’s Executive Order on Border Security and Immigration
Enforcement Improvements.66
family members residing in Haiti who have already been scheduled to receive U.S. entry visas within two years. The HFRP Program began in December 2014 to expedite family reunification and to support U.S.
development and reconstruction goals in Haiti by allowing HFRP parolees to work in the United
States and send remittances back to Haiti.4667 DHS warned Haitians against trying to enter the United States illegally, stating that only people living in Haiti would be eligible to participate in
USCIS, “Temporary Protected Status Designated Country: Haiti,” May 13, 2019. See also, CRS Legal Sidebar
LSB10215, Federal District Court Enjoins the Department of Homeland Security from Terminating Temporary
Protected Status, by Hillel R. Smith.
62 World Bank Remittances Data at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?locations=HT, and
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=HT, accessed February 20, 2020.
63 Congressional Hispanic Caucus, “Congressional Leaders Demand Watchdog Investigate Trump Administration
Decision to Terminate TPS,” press release, February 4, 2020.
64 For further background information on TPS, see CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and
Current Issues, by Jill H. Wilson.
65 USCIS, “The Haitian Family Reunification Parole (HFRP) Program,” updated February 21, 2018, accessed February
20, 2020, at https://www.uscis.gov/HFRP.
66 USCIS, “USCIS to End Certain Categorical Parole Programs,” news release, August 2, 2019.
67 USCIS, “The Haitian Family Reunification Parole (HFRP) Program,” updated February 21, 2018, accessed June 25,
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United States illegally, stating that only people living in Haiti would be eligible to participate in
the reunification program.68the reunification program.47 Potential beneficiaries in Haiti cannot apply for themselves. The
sponsoring family members in the United States, or "“petitioner,"” must wait for the Department of State'
State’s National Visa Center to invite them to apply for the program.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigrations Services (USCIS) within DHS anticipates conducting 5,000 HFRP program interviews per year.
Between March 2015 and June 2016, the State Department'’s National Visa Center issued 12,534
invitations to apply for HFRP covering 23,993 possible beneficiaries. 48 As of December 31, 2018, USCIS reported that of 10,507 69 As of September 30,
2019, according to USCIS, no invitations to apply were issued after June 2016, and of 10,524
applications accepted, it had denied 2,177202, approved 8,295302, and had 20 cases pending.
Human Rights
, and had 35 pending.
According to the State Department'’s most recent Human Rights Report, Haiti'’s human rights
issues included allegations of unlawful killings and excessive use of force by police; "arbitrary “arbitrary
detention; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; a judiciary subject to corruption and
outside influence; physical attacks on journalists; widespread corruption and impunity; and
human trafficking, including forced labor.”70
According to the State Department’s latest human rights report, there were isolated reports of
unlawful killings by police, some of which resulted in administrative sanctions, including
dismissal, but not criminal proceedings. Amnesty International verified excess use of force by
police during 2019 antigovernment protests, including the deaths of some protesters.71 The State
Department also reported that the HNP took steps to impose discipline on officers who committed
abuses or fraud, and the HNP’s Inspector General strengthened accountability measures,
including responding to complaints lodged on a 24-hour hotline for the public to report police
corruption or misconduct and recommending disciplinary actions. Some human rights groups
complain about the lack of a tracking mechanism once the cases are referred to the HNP director
general. Police officers have been killed in protests as well. In 2019, 42 officers were killed.
Complaining of working for months without pay, under difficult conditions, police officers have
called for the right to unionize.72
High numbers of arbitrary arrests and pretrial detentions drive prison overcrowding: 73% of
detainees awaited trial as of May 2019, and prisons operate at 365% occupancy rate.73 Prisons
lack basic services and sanitation. From January to October 2018, 100 to 120 people died in
2019, at https://www.uscis.gov/HFRP.
68 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “DHS to Implement Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program,”
October 17, 2014; and Erick Eckholm, “Obama Administration to Expedite Reunification for Some Haitians,” New
York Times, October 17, 2014.
69 USCIS, “Number of I-131 Travel Document Applications for the Haitian Family Reunification Parole (HFRP)
Program as of September 30, 2019,” accessed February 20, 2020, at https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/
Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/Family-Based/
HFRP_performancedata_fy2019_qtr4.pdf.
70 U.S. Department of State, “Haiti 2018 Human Rights Report,” in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
2018, March 2019, p. 1.
71 Amnesty International, “Haiti: Amnesty International verifies evidence of excessive use of force against protesters,”
October 31, 2019.
72 Haitian Times, “Haiti Police call for Right to Unionize,” November 18, 2019.
73 Human Rights Watch, “Haiti: Events of 2019,” World Report 2020, January 8, 2020.
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detention, most from starvation, tuberculosis, or other communicable diseases, according to the
State Department.74
Two U.N. offices raised concerns about the alleged involvement of state agents in a planned
attack on La Saline, Port-au-Prince in November 2018 in which at least 26 people were killed.75
The attack was reportedly executed in retaliation for the neighborhood’s involvement in the
anticorruption movement; Haiti’s Central Directorate of Judicial Police reported the complicity of
two senior government officials, who, after further protests, the Moïse administration removed
from office.76
Haitian journalists operate under difficult circumstances. According to Reporters without Borders,
they “suffer from a cruel lack of financial resources, an absence of institutional support, and
difficulty in accessing information.”77 Some reporters suffer threats and violence; in 2019 one
suffered a gunshot wound, and another was shot dead.
Numerous domestic and international reports describe corruption in all branches and all levels of
the Haitian government. As discussed above, Haitian Senate and court investigators alleged
embezzlement and fraud involving billions of dollars by current and former Haitian officials,
including President Moïse.
Many observers believe a top human rights priority in Haiti is to eradicate illiteracy, as part of the
right to education. Approximately one of every two Haitians aged 15 and above is illiterate.78 At
least 350,000 children and youth do not attend primary or secondary school, in part because 85%
of schools are privately run, and their school fees are often beyond what low-income families can
afford. Schools were closed for prolonged periods during the unrest of 2018-2019.
The ongoing political gridlock is contributing to spreading violation of the right to a standard of
living adequate for one’s health and well-being. The gridlock, along with sustained protests and
violence, has led to shortages of food, fuel, water, and medical supplies, according to the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).79 The disruptions have
made it difficult for humanitarian organizations to deliver aid. According to OCHA, food
insecurity in Haiti’s rural areas increased by 15% in 2019.
Reopened investigations into alleged corruption, gross violations of human rights and crimes
against humanity committed during the 1971-1986 dictatorship of the late Jean-Claude Duvalier
by his collaborators remained pending, according to Human Rights Watch’s 2019 report.80
74
U.S. Department of State, 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Haiti, March 13, 2019.
OHCHR, OHCHR public reports on Haiti, “MINUJUSTH and OHCHR release a report on the violent events of 13
and 14 November in La Saline,” Information Note, June 21, 2019.
76 Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, “Human Rights Groups Petition IACHR to Protect Survivors of La
Saline Massacre,” August 14, 2019; and Human Rights Watch, “Haiti: Events of 2019,” World Report 2020, January 8,
2020.
77 Reporters Without Borders, “Haiti,” accessed January 28, 2020.
78 Human Rights Watch, “Haiti,” in World Report 2019.
79 Alice Zhang, “Haiti Hunger Crisis 2019: What You Need to Know and How to Help,” Reliefweb, OCHA Services,
November 19, 2019.
80 Human Rights Watch, “Haiti,” in World Report 2019.
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Human Trafficking81
Haiti is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to
forced labor and sex trafficking. According to the State Department’s 2019 Trafficking in Persons
Report, most of Haiti’s trafficking cases involve children in domestic servitude, known as
“restaveks,” from the French for “to stay with.” Most frequently, poor families place children
with better-off families with an expectation that the host family will house, feed, and educate their
children. Instead, many are kept in slave-like conditions, are physically and sexually abused, and
do not go to school. The State Department cites a joint Haitian government-international
organization report that found that one in four children do not live with their biological parents,
and about 286,000 children under age 15 work in domestic servitude.
Other groups vulnerable to trafficking include children exploited in other forms of labor;
internally displaced people; migrants going to or returning from the United States and other
countries; and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, and Intersex (LGBTI) youth.
The State Department classified Haiti as a Tier 2 Watch List country—meaning the country’s
government does not fully comply with the minimum standards of the U.S. Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000 (Division A of P.L. 106-386) for the elimination of trafficking but is
making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with those standards. The Haitian
government investigated, prosecuted, and convicted more traffickers than in the previous year,
passed a 2017-2022 national action plan, closed several abusive orphanages, and increased
antitrafficking law enforcement training. The government did not prosecute officials recently
alleged to be complicit in trafficking. The Haitian government also, according to the State
Department, did not allocate sufficient funding for its antitrafficking efforts or victim services and
did little to combat child domestic servitude.
Author Information
Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
81
U.S. Department of State, “Haiti,” in Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2019.
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Haiti’s Political and Economic Conditions
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
Congressional Research Service
R45034 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED
20
human trafficking, including forced labor."49
Reopened investigations into alleged corruption and gross violations of human rights committed during the 1971-1986 dictatorship of the late Jean-Claude Duvalier by his collaborators remained pending as of November 2018.50
While some observers hoped that an elected government would pave the way for improved respect for human rights and improved governance, others note that the legislature is divided and President Moïse came to office under investigation for corruption. Moïse reportedly fired the head of the country's anti-corruption agency, the Financial Control and Intelligence Unit (UCREF), one year into the head's three-year term.51 As discussed earlier, Haitian Senate and court investigators alleged embezzlement and fraud involving billions of dollars by current and former Haitian officials, including President Moïse.
The State Department reported that the Haitian government rarely took steps to prosecute government and law enforcement officials accused of committing abuses and that corruption and a lack of judicial oversight severely hampered the judiciary. The judicial branch investigated several corruption cases, but none of them resulted in prosecutions in 2018. The government fired 21 assistant prosecutors because of allegations of corruption. According to the Human Rights report, "the perception of corruption remained widespread in all branches of government and at all levels," yet no Haitian government has prosecuted a high-level official for corruption.52
Since July 2018, Haiti has experienced a prolonged period of unrest, including demonstrations against corruption. Some demonstrations "provoked aggressive law enforcement responses," according to the State Department, but "police generally responded to these protests in a professional and effective manner." Nonetheless, the National Human Rights Defense Network called for an official investigation into a violent incident in La Saline in November. The group alleges that at least 59 people were killed and that HNP and other officials were involved.53 Resurgent gang activity also has contributed to violence and instability.
Many observers believe a top human rights priority in Haiti is to eradicate illiteracy. Approximately one of every two Haitians age 15 and above is illiterate.54 At least 350,000 children and youth do not attend primary or secondary school, in part because 85% of schools are privately run, and their school fees are often beyond what low-income families can afford.
Haiti is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking. According to the State Department's 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report, most of Haiti's trafficking cases involve children in domestic servitude, known as "restaveks," from the French for "to stay with." Most frequently, poor families place children in such situations with an expectation that their children will be housed, fed, and educated. Instead, many are kept in slave-like conditions, are physically and sexually abused, and do not go to school. The State Department cites a joint Haitian government-international organization report that found that one in four children do not live with their biological parents, and about 286,000 children under age 15 work in domestic servitude.
The State Department classified Haiti as a Tier 2 Watch List country—meaning the country's government does not fully comply with the minimum standards of the U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (Division A of P.L. 106-386) for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with those standards. The Haitian government investigated, prosecuted, and convicted more traffickers than in the previous year, passed a 2017-2022 national action plan, closed several abusive orphanages, and increased anti-trafficking law enforcement training. The government did not prosecute officials recently alleged to be complicit in trafficking. The Haitian government also, according to the State Department, did not allocate sufficient funding for its anti-trafficking efforts or victim services and did little to combat child domestic servitude.
Author Contact Information
1. |
For further background on Haiti, and information on relations with the United States, also see CRS Report R42559, Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns, by Maureen Taft-Morales, and CRS In Focus IF10440, Haiti Declares Winner of Presidential Election After Delays, by Maureen Taft-Morales. |
2. |
"In Brief: Haiti, Dominican Republic, St Kitts & Nevis, Guatemala," LatinNews, May 15, 2017. |
3. |
"Lapin confirmed as Haiti's new prime minister," Agence France Presse (AFP), April 9, 2019. |
4. |
Jacqueline Charles, "OAS tells Haiti opposition to back off—and tells president to start governing," Miami Herald, June 19, 2019. |
5. |
Ibid. |
6. |
EIU, "Country Report: Haiti," generated June 24, 2019, p.9. |
7. |
Carla Selman, "Haitian president's mention in court corruption report raises ousting chances, power vacuum over coming months highly likely," IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, June 21, 2019. |
8. |
Data in this section are from World Bank, "Haiti Overview," April 5, 2019, at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview, accessed June 26, 2019, unless stated otherwise. |
9. |
Eduardo A. Cavallo, Andrew Powell, and Oscar Becerra, Estimating the Direct Economic Damage of the Earthquake in Haiti, Inter-American Development Bank, February 11, 2010. |
10. |
World Bank, "Towards a New Road Map for Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in Haiti: New Country Partnership Strategy for Haiti 2015-2019," Infographic, September 29, 2015. |
11. |
Ibid. |
12. |
World Bank, "Remittance Inflows April 2019," Migration and Remittances Data, accessed June 26, 2019. |
13. |
EIU, "Country Report: Haiti," generated June 24, 2019, p.9. |
14. |
U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Relations with Haiti," Fact Sheet, March 16, 2019. |
15. |
EIU, "Country Report: Haiti," generated June 24, 2019, p.2. |
16. |
EIU, "Country Report: Haiti," generated June 24, 2019, pp. 2-3, 8-9. |
17. |
For further information, also see CRS In Focus IF10502, Haiti: Cholera, the United Nations, and Hurricane Matthew, by Maureen Taft-Morales and Tiaji Salaam-Blyther. |
18. |
Jacqueline Charles, "On Eve of High-Level U.N. Haiti Visit, Trump Continues to Say 'No' to Cholera Request," Miami Herald, November 2, 2017. |
19. |
Human Rights Watch, "Haiti," in World Report 2019. |
20. |
Conduct in UN Field Missions, "Sexual Exploitation and Abuse," accessed June 25, 2019, at https://conduct.unmissions.org/sea-investigations. |
21. |
U.S. Department of State, "Haiti 2018 Human Rights Report," in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018, March 2019. |
22. |
Amelie Baron, "Haiti's Army Reborn 20 Years After It Was Demobilized," AFP, July 18, 2017. |
23. |
Jacqueline Charles, "Haiti has a New Army with much of the Old Leadership. Some in the U.S. Aren't Happy," Miami Herald, updated April 3, 2018. |
24. |
Edith M. Lederer, "UN votes to establish political mission in Haiti," The Associated Press, June 25 2019. |
25. |
Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, "IACHR Wraps Up Visit to the Dominican Republic," press release, December 2013. |
26. |
CRS In Focus IF10407, Dominican Republic, by Clare Ribando Seelke. |
27. |
IOM Haiti, "Border Monitoring Sitrep," September 28, 2017 (latest report available as of June 27, 2019). |
28. |
CRS In Focus IF10407, Dominican Republic, by Clare Ribando Seelke. |
29. |
Human Rights Watch, "Haiti," in World Report 2019. |
30. |
Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Haiti, generated on June 24, 2019, p. 15. |
31. |
U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Relations with Haiti," Fact Sheet, March 16, 2019. |
32. |
Budget figures from U.S. Department of State, FY2018 Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. |
33. |
This section draws from: U.S. Department of State, "Haiti," in 2019 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, pp. 177-180; and "Haiti" in Volume II: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, March 2019, pp. 108-109. |
34. |
Marcos Martinez, "Former Haiti Rebel Gets 9 Years in Prison in US Drug Case," Associated Press, June 21, 2017. |
35. |
Jennifer Schulz and Jeanne Batalova, "Haitian Immigrants in the United States," Migration Information Source, August 2, 2017. |
36. |
U.S. Census Bureau, "2017 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates," accessed June 25, 2019, at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_16_1YR_B05006&prodType=table. |
37. |
U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey (ACS) 2017 data, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml, accessed June 25, 2019. |
38. |
Department of Homeland Security, "Secretary Kelly's Statement on the Limited Extension of Haiti's Designation for Temporary Protected Status," May 22, 2017. |
39. |
USCIS data as cited in CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues, by Jill H. Wilson. |
40. |
Jacqueline Charles, "After Canceling with TPS Families, Haitian President Tells Recipients to 'Calm Down,'" Miami Herald, June 17, 2017. |
41. |
"Tillerson: Central Americans, Haitians No Longer Need Protected Status," Washington Post, November 3, 2017. |
42. |
USCIS, "Temporary Protected Status Designated Country: Haiti," May 13, 2019. |
43. |
World Bank Migration and Remittances Data at http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data, accessed June 25, 2019. |
44. |
USCIS, "The Haitian Family Reunification Parole (HFRP) Program," updated February 21, 2018, accessed June 25, 2019, at https://www.uscis.gov/HFRP. |
45. |
For further background information on TPS, see CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues, by Jill H. Wilson. |
46. |
USCIS, "The Haitian Family Reunification Parole (HFRP) Program," updated February 21, 2018, accessed June 25, 2019, at https://www.uscis.gov/HFRP. |
47. |
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "DHS to Implement Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program," October 17, 2014; and Erick Eckholm, "Obama Administration to Expedite Reunification for Some Haitians," New York Times, October 17, 2014. |
48. |
USCIS, "Number of I-131 Travel Document Applications for the Haitian Family Reunification Parole (HFRP) Program as of December 31, 2018," December 31, 2018. |
49. |
U.S. Department of State, "Haiti 2018 Human Rights Report," in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018, March 2019, p. 1. |
50. |
Human Rights Watch, "Haiti," in World Report 2019. |
51. |
Samuel Maxime, "Haiti's Anti-Corruption Chief Abruptly Fired, 1 Year into 3-Year Term," Haiti Sentinel, July 9, 2017. |
52. |
U.S. Department of State, "Haiti 2018 Human Rights Report," in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018, March 2019, p. 17. |
53. |
Human Rights Watch, "Haiti," in World Report 2019. |
54. |
Human Rights Watch, "Haiti," in World Report 2019. |
55. |
U.S. Department of State, "Haiti," in Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2019. |