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Libya: Conflict Disrupts U.S.-Backed Transition Plan

Changes from April 8, 2019 to June 26, 2019

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On April 4, 2019, Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) coalition that has controlled eastern Libya with foreign military and financial support since 2014, ordered forces loyal to him to begin a unilateral military operation to secure the capital, Tripoli. Tripoli is the seat of the Government of National Accord (GNA), an interim body recognized by the United States and United Nations (U.N.) Security Council as Libya's legitimate governing entity. In response to the pro-LNA offensive, pro-GNA and other anti-Haftar elements in western Libya have mobilizedLNA movements, GNA Prime Minister-designate Fayez al Serraj mobilized pro-GNA forces. Fighting is ongoing near Tripoli, with reports of airstrikes and mobilization by several militia forces. On April 7, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo stated that the U.S. government opposes Haftar's offensive and urged its "immediate halt." Secretary Pompeo said "forces should return to status quo ante positions," and said, "all involved parties have a responsibility to urgently deescalate the situation."

U.N. Secretary General António Gutteres was in Tripoli as the offensive began, visiting in a show of solidarity for a planned U.N.-sponsored conference among Libyans scheduled to begin on April 14. The conference, endorsed by the U.N. Security Council and facilitated by Gutteres' Special Representative and U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) head Ghassan Salamé, is being convened to produce consensus among Libyan factions on principles to guide the completion of the country's extended post-2011 transition. Specifically, the conference seeks Libyans' endorsement of new interim power sharing and national security arrangements and an agreed schedule for legislative and presidential elections in 2019. Conflict and discord over these issues have disrupted Libya's post-Qadhafi transition since 2011, producing rival governments and empowering local militias.

U.N. and other international efforts to reach consensus among Libyans during 2018 faltered as armed groups competed over strategic territory. LNA military moves in 2018 resulted in the country's major oil producing areas and infrastructure in the center and southwest coming under the effective control of LNA-aligned fighters. The United States and other international actors issued two statements insisting that the LNA not wrest control of oil resources and revenue from the National Oil Corporation and GNA. Nevertheless, the de facto changes in the balance of power on the ground appeared to have strengthened the LNA's hand in negotiations, while generating the renewed sense of international urgency to conclude the transition according to the U.N. plan before wider conflict could erupt. The outbreak of fighting reflects a lack of mutual trust among some key Libyan parties. If fighting continues, decisions by outside actors about whether to coordinate de-escalatory action or provide unilateral support for proxies could prove decisive. Past rounds of prolonged combat in densely populated coastal western Libya have been destructive and have killed and displaced Libyan civilians.

Figure 1. Map of Libya

Source: CRS using ESRI, U.S. government, and United Nations data.

Notes: This map does not necessarily reflect the policies of the U.S. Government with regard to geographic names or boundaries. Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative.

International statements issued since the recent Libyan mobilizations began reflect common perspectives and concerns, emphasizing the risk of escalation and demanding that forces disengage.

  • On April 4, the governments of the United States, France, Italy, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom jointly stated their deep concern about fighting near Gharyan, (Figure 1). The U.S. government and its fellow signatories urged all parties "to immediately de-escalate tensions." The governments jointly affirmed that "our governments oppose any military action in Libya and will hold accountable any Libyan faction that precipitates further civil conflict." The G-7 countries issued a similar statement on April 5. Both statements avoided singling out Haftar and the LNA.
  • U.N. Secretary-General Gutteres called for "calm and restraint," and then flew to eastern Libya for consultations. On departure, he stated with "a heavy heart" his hope for peace. Meeting later that day, the Security Council agreed on a verbal press statement calling on "LNA forces to halt all military movements" and calling "on all forces to de-escalate and halt military activity."
  • Russia's Libya Envoy Lev Dengov told Interfax on April 5 that, "Russia is continuing to support a peace process in Libya," and described calls for mobilization "as provocative and counterproductive." In Egypt on April 6, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said, "we are opposed to attempts to apportion blame unilaterally." On April 7, diplomats reported that Russia had blocked a U.N. Security Council statement that would have singled out Haftar and the LNA in demanding a halt to their operations.

The LNA's moves and counter-mobilizations by the GNA and other western Libyan forces directly challenge the stated preferences of the Security Council and the U.S. government. International powers appear to share a desire to avoid continued violence but also appear to differ on how to defuse the situation and to hold actors accountable. Most statements issued to date have called on all Libyans to deescalate the situation, with some specifically mentioning Haftar and the LNA. The developments in Libya and the evolving postures of other governments pose complex questions for U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress, including:

  • How might military confrontation in western Libya or dramatic changes in governing arrangements affect U.S. counterterrorism operations? According to the U.S. intelligence community, the capabilities of the Libya-based Islamic State affiliate "have been degraded, but it is still capable of conducting attacks on local and Western targets in Libya and possibly elsewhere in the region." IS supporters carried out attacks across Libya in 2018. U.S. forces have partnered with some forces nominally aligned with the GNA, and relocated some forcessouth of Tripoli, but the conflict has devolved into a tactically fluid stalemate in which neither side has a clear military advantage. Both LNA and anti-LNA forces reportedly have received some military supply shipments since May, raising questions with regard to enforcement of the U.N. arms embargo.

    Libyan parties to the conflict have rejected outsiders' calls for an unconditional ceasefire. Some western Libyan parties (including GNA leaders Prime Minister-designate Fayez al Serraj and Deputy Prime Minister-designate Ahmed Maitiq) reject future political engagement with Haftar and insist that the LNA withdraw to status quo ante positions. Armed anti-Haftar groups reportedly further reject the premise that Haftar could have a future national security leadership role, an idea which underpinned pre-April U.N. reconciliation plans. Haftar and the LNA refuse to withdraw and reject calls to replace Haftar as the leader of eastern Libya-based military forces.

    On June 16, GNA Prime Minister-designate Serraj proposed a new political negotiation arrangement and the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections by the end of 2019, echoing elements of the pre-April U.N. plan. Officials of the LNA-backed eastern Libyan government rejected the proposal, vowing that LNA operations will not cease until the LNA militarily controls Tripoli. Key Libyan figures are making their respective cases internationally, apparently seeking to shift the external balance of opinion in a way that might decisively affect the internal balance of power. No major new international initiatives to reach a settlement have been revealed, although key European and Arab leaders continue to mutually consult, and U.S. officials and U.N. Special Representative and U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) head Ghassan Salamé remain engaged with all sides. International powers appear to share a desire to avoid the worst effects of continued fighting but also appear to differ on how to defuse the situation and whether or how to hold actors accountable.

    The U.S. government initially called for the LNA to immediately cease its operations against Tripoli. However, President Trump then personally engaged Haftar and acknowledged Haftar's counterterrorism and energy security efforts. The U.S. government since has reiterated its support for an inclusive political settlement and an end to escalation, while positioning the United States as a neutral arbiter willing to engage with all sides.

    As of June 25, U.N. officials reported that there have been a minimum of 178 civilian casualties, including 41 civilian deaths. The World Health Organization places the overall casualty count since April 4, including combatants, at 739 deaths and 4,407 wounded. More than 93,000 people have been internally displaced by the fighting, with aid agencies estimating that more than 100,000 civilians are in immediate front-line areas, with an additional 400,000 within 1 KM of the front lines. Reports suggest that fuel shortages, bank lines, service interruptions, and crime in and around Tripoli are increasing.

    The LNA's moves and counter-mobilizations by the GNA and other western Libyan forces directly challenge the stated preferences of the Security Council and the U.S. government, posing complex questions for U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress, including:

  • How might developments in western Libya affect U.S. counterterrorism operations? The U.S. intelligence community reports that the capabilities of the Libya-based Islamic State affiliate "have been degraded, but it is still capable of conducting attacks in Libya and possibly elsewhere in the region." IS supporters carried out attacks across Libya in 2018. U.S. forces have partnered with some forces now nominally aligned with the GNA for counterterrorism purposes, but relocated U.S. military personnel from Libya in response to the fighting. Periodic U.S. airstrikes target suspected IS or AQ personnel. Widespread instability or conflict could presumably give IS supporters and other extremists new opportunities. Conflict also may empower and embolden militias now fighting Haftar.
    • What tools do the Administration and Congress have to respond from Libya in response to the fighting. Periodic U.S. airstrikes target suspected IS or AQ personnel. Widespread instability or conflict could presumably give IS supporters and other extremists new opportunities.
  • What tools do the Administration and Congress have to deter further unilateral actions by Libyan parties that may undermine U.S.-supported, U.N.-facilitated transition plans or respond if such actions occur? A U.N. arms embargo and asset freeze is in place, and U.S. executive orders provide for sanctions against those undermining Libya's transition. The Administration could seek to convince the U.N. Security Council to impose sanctions or restrict oil transactions to influence the decisions of Libyan actors. However, apparent differences of opinion and preferred approaches among Russia, the United States, and France may complicate or prevent joint action. Congress could move to require the imposition of U.S. sanctions currently provided for by executive ordernow subject to presidential discretion. Congress has conditionally funded limited U.S. transition support and security assistance programs for Libya since 2011, and is considering FY2020 aid requests. How might fighting and is considering the Trump Administration's request for assistance funds for FY2020.


  • How might military confrontation in western Libya affect Libya's neighbors and Europe? Instability in western Libya has displaced Libyans and threatened the security of Tunisia and Algeria since 2011. National elections are scheduled for October and November 2019 in Tunisia, and Algeria is now undergoing a sensitive political transition. Humanitarian officials are warning that fighting "could potentially result in significant population displacement." Western Libya also hosts areport that displacement is occurring and posing new challenges for Libya's vulnerable foreign migrant population. European security and migration cooperation with western Libya-based actors could be disrupted by continued fighting.
  • How is the United States postured to respond to related contingencies? U.S. diplomatic personnel continue to operate from the Libya External Office (LEO) in Tunis, Tunisia, led by Charge d'Affaires-Ad Interim Peter Bodde (the former U.S. Ambassador to Libya). State Department and USAID personnel operate from LEO Tunis in support of U.S.-funded foreign and humanitarian assistance programs in Libyain support of diplomatic efforts and U.S.-funded foreign and humanitarian assistance programs in Libya. The Senate is considering the nomination of U.S. Ambassador-designate Richard Norland. U.S. AFRICOM identifies containing instability in Libya as one of its six main lines of effort, and works to support diplomatic efforts to reconstitute the Libyan state. Bodde and U.S. AFRICOM Commander General Thomas Waldhauser visited Tripoli in March 2019 in a show of support for the GNA government. AFRICOM and the U.S. military have established liaison relationships with local security actors in several parts of Libya, though, as noted above, AFRICOM has relocated some U.S. military personnel from Libya temporarily.