Updated November 19, 2019March 25, 2020
Uyghurs in China
Uyghurs (also spelled “Uighurs”) are an ethnic group living
primarily in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR) in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) far
northwest. Uyghurs speak a Turkic language and practice a
moderate form of Sunni Islam. The XUAR, often referred
to simply as Xinjiang (pronounced “SHIN-jyahng”), is a
provincial-level administrative region which comprises
about one-sixth of China’s total land area and borders eight
countries. The region is rich in minerals, produces over
80% of China’s cotton, and has China’s largest coal and
natural gas reserves and a fifth of its oil reserves. Beijing
hopes to promote Xinjiang as a key link inThe
XUAR is a strategic region for the PRC’s Belt
and Road
Initiative, which includes Chinese-backed
infrastructure infrastructure
projects and energy development in
neighboring Central and South Asia.
and South Asia.
Sources: CRS using U.S. Department of State Boundaries; Esri;
Global Administrative Areas; DeLorme; NGA.
All or parts of the area comprising Xinjiang have been
under the political control or influence of Chinese,
Mongols, and Russians for long periods of the region’s
documented history, along with periods of Turkic or
Uyghur rule. Uyghurs played a role in the establishment of
two short-lived East Turkestan Republics in the 1930s and
1940s. The PRC asserted control over Xinjiang in 1949 and
established the XUAR in 1955.
Uyghurs once were the predominant ethnic group in the
XUAR; they now constitute roughly 45% of the region’s
population of 24 million, or around 10.5 million, as many
Han Chinese, the majority ethnic group in China, have
migrated there, particularly to the provincial capital,
Urumqi. Many Uyghurs complain that Hans have benefitted
disproportionately from economic development in Xinjiang.
Human Rights Issues
Since an outbreak of demonstrations and ethnic unrest in
2009, and clashes involving Uyghurs and Xinjiang security
personnel that spiked between 2013 and 2015, PRC leaders
have sought to “stabilize” the XUAR through more
intensive security measures aimed at combatting “terrorism,
separatism and religious extremism.” PRC official data
indicates that criminal arrests in Xinjiang increased from
approximately 14,000 in 2013 to 228,000 in 2017.
Two prominent Uyghurs serving life sentences for state
security crimes are Ilham Tohti (convicted in 2014), a
Uyghur economics professor who had maintained a website
related to Uyghur issues, and Gulmira Imin (convicted in
2010), who had managed a Uyghur language website and
participated in the 2009 demonstrations. In September
2017, former Xinjiang University President Tashpolat
Tiyip, an ethnic Uyghur, was convicted of separatism in a
secret trial and received a death sentence with a two -year
reprieve. His status is unknown.
Source: CRS using U.S. Department of State Boundaries; Esri;
Global Administrative Areas; DeLorme; NGA.
In tandem with a new national religious policy referred to
as as
“Sinicization,” XUAR authorities have instituted
measures measures
to assimilate Uyghurs into Han Chinese society
and reduce
the influences of Uyghur, Islamic, and Arabic
cultures and
languages. The XUAR government enacted a
law in 2017
that prohibits “expressions of extremification,”
and placed
restrictions, often imposed arbitrarily, upon face
veils,
beards and other grooming, the practice of some
traditional traditional
Uyghur customs, and adherence to Islamic
dietary laws
(halal). Thousands of mosques in Xinjiang
reportedly have
been demolished as part of what the
government calls a
“mosque rectification” campaign; others
have been
“Sinicized”—minarets have been taken down,
onion domes
have been replaced by traditional Chinese
roofs, and Islamic motifs and Arabic writings have been
removed.
All or parts of the area comprising Xinjiang have been
under the political control or influence of Chinese,
Mongols, and Russians for long periods of the region’s
documented history, along with periods of Turkic or
Uyghur rule. Uyghurs played a role in the establishment of
two short-lived East Turkestan Republics in the 1930s and
1940s. The PRC asserted control over Xinjiang in 1949 and
established the XUAR in 1955.
China’s new religious policies also have placed greater
restrictions on the Hui, another Muslim minority group in
China who number around 11 million, although these have
been less severe than those placed on the Uyghurs. The Hui
are more geographically dispersed and culturally
assimilated than the Uyghurs, are generally physically
indistinguishable from Hans, and do not speak a nonChinese language.
Uyghurs once were the predominant ethnic group in the
XUAR; they now constitute roughly 45% of the region’s
population of 24 million, or around 10.5 million, as many
Han Chinese, the majority ethnic group in China, have
migrated there, particularly to the provincial capital,
Urumqi. Many Uyghurs complain that Hans have benefitted
disproportionately from economic development in Xinjiang.
Islamic motifs and Arabic writings have been removed.
China’s new religious policies also have placed greater
restrictions on the Hui, another Muslim minority group in
China who number around 11 million, although these have
been less severe than those placed on the Uyghurs. The Hui
are more geographically dispersed and culturally
assimilated than the Uyghurs, are generally physically
indistinguishable from Hans, and do not speak a nonChinese language.
With the apparent strong backing of Communist Party
General Secretary Xi Jinping, beginning in 2016, the new
Communist Party Secretary to the XUAR, former Tibet
Party Secretary Chen Quanguo, stepped up security
measures aimed at the Uyghur population. Such actions
have included the installation of thousands of neighborhood
police kiosks, more intrustiveintrusive monitoring of Internet use,
and the collection of biometric data for identification
purposes. In addition, theThe central government has sent an
estimated one
million officials and state workers from
outside Xinjiang,
mostly ethnic Han, to live temporarily in
the homes of
Uyghurs to assess their loyalty to the
Communist Party.
Human Rights Issues
Since an outbreak of demonstrations and ethnic unrest in
2009 and clashes involving Uyghurs and Xinjiang security
personnel that spiked between 2013 and 2015, PRC leaders
have sought to “stabilize” the XUAR through more
Communist Party.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Uyghurs in China
Mass Internment
According to some estimates, since 2017, Xinjiang
authorities have arbitrarily detained approximately 1.5
million Turkic Muslims, mostly ethnic Uyghurs and a
smaller number of Kazakhs, in “reeducation camps.” PRC
officials describe the Xinjiang facilities as “vocational
education and training centers” where “trainees” study
Chinese, take courses on PRC law, learn job skills, and
undergo “de-extremization” or
and are “cured of ideological
infection.” Some may have
engaged in religious and ethnic
cultural practices that the
government now perceives as
extremist, or as manifesting
“strongly religious” views or
thoughts that could lead to the
spread of religious
extremism or terrorism. Detainees
reportedly are compelled
to renounce many of their Islamic
beliefs and customs and
to undergo self-criticisms.
According to some former
detainees, treatment and
conditions in the camps include
crowded and unsanitary
conditions, forced labor, food deprivation,
beatings, and sexual abuse. Some reeducation centers
reportedly contain factories producing goods for export
sexual abuse.
In July 2019, Xinjiang officials claimed that most detainees
had “returned to society.” SomeMany Uyghurs living abroad,
however, statesay that they still have not heard from missing
relatives in Xinjiang. Some reports indicate that many of
those released from re-education centers are still heavily
monitored and their movements are restricted; many are
required to attend political study classes or have been
assigned to jobs in factories where they are strictly
supervisedOver 400 prominent Uyghur
intellectuals reportedly have been detained or their
whereabouts are unknown. Some detainees have received prison sentences.
Forced and Involuntary Labor
The PRC government, as part of its national “poverty
alleviation” policy, has provided financial incentives for
companies from wealthier provinces to relocate or invest in
manufacturing facilities in poorer, western areas of China,
including the XUAR. According to some reports, this
economic policy has been combined with “stability
maintenance” efforts in Xinjiang, where the government
has begun to move large numbers of Uyghurs into the
formal workforce, particularly into labor intensive textile
and apparel factories. Uyghurs who refuse to accept such
employment may be threatened with detention.
U.S. Responses
Trump Administration officials have openly condemned
PRC forced-assimilation policies and the mass, arbitrary
detention of Uyghurs. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee has held two hearings on human rights issues in
China during the 116th Congress, in which witnesses
provided accounts of the mass internment of Uyghurs. In
October 2019, the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China held a hearing entitled “Forced Labor, Mass
Internment, and Social Control in Xinjiang.”
In January 2019, the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act was
introduced in the Senate and House (S. 178 and H.R. 649).
S. 178 was passed by the Senate on September 11, 2019.
The act would mandate four U.S. agency reports on the
Uyghur human rights situation and urge the Administration
to establish a U.S. Special Coordinator for Xinjiang in the
Department of State, among other provisions. It would urge
the Secretary of State to consider imposing visa and
economic sanctions pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Act
(subtitle F of P.L. 114-328) upon PRC officials responsible
for human rights abuses in Xinjiang. The UIGHUR Act of
2019 (H.R. 1025), introduced in February 2019, would in
part call upon the Administration to engage in international
advocacy in support of Turkic Muslims in China, promote
Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur language programming, and
restrict the export of U.S. technologies that facilitate the
mass detention of Turkic Muslims in China.
On October 1, 2019, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
announced that it had blocked certain shipments of goods
suspected of having been made with forced labor from five
countries, including China, pursuant to Section 307 of the
Tariff Act of 1930. The Chinese goods, sportswear made
for a U.S. company, were suspected of using forced labor
from a Xinjiang reeducation
prison sentences.
Forced and Involuntary Labor
According to some reports, the government has begun to
move large numbers of Uyghurs, including many former
detainees, into textile, apparel, and other labor-intensive
industries in Xinjiang and other PRC provinces. Uyghurs
who refuse to accept such employment may be threatened
with detention. They continue to be heavily monitored
outside of work, and are required to attend political study
classes at night. A study by the Australian Strategic Policy
Institute identified nearly 120 Chinese and foreign
companies, including global brands, that the institute
alleges directly or indirectly benefit from Uyghur labor in
potentially abusive circumstances.
Selected U.S. Responses
Trump Administration officials have openly condemned
PRC forced-assimilation policies and the mass, arbitrary
detention of Uyghurs. On October 1, 2019, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection announced that it had blocked certain
shipments of goods suspected of having been made with
forced labor from five countries, including China, pursuant
to Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The Chinese
goods, sportswear made for a U.S. company, were
suspected of using forced labor from a Xinjiang reeducation
camp.
On October 7, 2019, the U.S. Department of Commerce
announced that it would add 28 PRC entities to the Bureau
of Industry and Security (BIS) “entity list” under the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR), for their connections to
PRC human rights abuses against Uyghur and other Turkic
Muslims in Xinjiang. The action imposes licensing
requirements prior to the sale or transfer of U.S. items to
these entities. On October 9, 2019, the State Department
announced visa restrictions against an unspecified number
of Chinese government and Communist Party officials who
are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, the
detention or abuse of Uighurs or other members of Muslim
minority groups in Xinjiang.Uyghurs or other members of Muslim
minority groups in Xinjiang.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has held two
hearings on human rights issues in China during the 116 th
Congress, in which witnesses provided accounts of the
mass internment of Uyghurs. In October 2019, the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC)
held a hearing entitled “Forced Labor, Mass Internment,
and Social Control in Xinjiang.” In March 2020, the CECC
held a roundtable entitled “Global Supply Chains, Forced
Labor, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region” and
released a report by the same name.
The Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act (S. 178) passed in
the Senate on September 11, 2019, and in the House on
December 3, 2019, with an amendment to the Senate bill.
The act would impose visa and economic sanctions
pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Act (subtitle F of P.L.
114-328) upon PRC officials responsible for human rights
abuses in Xinjiang, and it would enact restrictions on the
U.S. export of items that “provide a critical capability” to
the PRC government “to suppress individual privacy,
freedom, and other basic human rights.” The Uyghur
Forced Labor Prevention Act (S. 3471 and H.R. 6210),
introduced in March 2020, would in part invoke Section
307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and thereby restrict the import
of any “goods, wares, articles and merchandise mined,
produced, or manufactured wholly or in part” in Xinjiang.
Alleged Terrorism
The PRC government has attributed numerous deadly
incidents in the XUAR to the East Turkestan Islamic
Movement (ETIM), which it portrays as a Uyghur separatist
and terrorist group with ties to global terrorist
organizations. The U.S. government designated ETIM as a
terrorist organization under Executive Order 13224 in 2002
(to block terrorist financing) and placed ETIM on the
Terrorist Exclusion List in 2004 (to prevent the entry of
terrorists into the United States). ETIM is not on the
Department of State’s narrower “Foreign Terrorist
Organization” (FTO) list. Roughly 100 Uyghurs from
China entered Islamic State territory during 2013-2014,
according to the New America Foundation.
At its height, ETIM, whose members reportedly spent time
in Afghanistan and Pakistan from the late-1990s to the mid2000s, was a small, loosely organized and poorly financed
group that lacked weapons and had little if any contact with
global jihadist groups, according to some experts. The U.S.
government “identified sufficient evidence” to consider
three violent incidents in China purportedly involving
Uyghurs as terrorist attacks in 2014. The lack of available
information in most other cases has made it difficult to
verify PRC accounts of alleged terrorist activity. The
In 2019,
the Department of State reported that in 2018, there was a lack
lack of independent evidence that ETIM is still active.
Thomas Lum, Specialist in Asian Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IF10281
Uyghurs in China
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10281 · VERSION 1734 · UPDATED