Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Changes from September 24, 2019 to September 25, 2019

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Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Updated September September 2425, 2019, 2019
(R44533) Jump to Main Text of Report

Brief History
Governance
Human Rights Issues
Freedom of Expression
Women's Rights
Trafficking in Persons and Labor Issues
Religious Freedom
Foreign Policy
Qatar and the Intra-GCC Dispute
Iran
Egypt
Libya
Yemen
Syria, Iraq, and Anti-Islamic State Operations
Lebanon
Israeli-Palestinian Issues/Hamas
Afghanistan/Taliban Office
Other Qatari Relationships and Mediation Efforts
U.S.-Qatar Defense and Security Cooperation
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)
Al Udeid Expansion/Permanent U.S. Basing in Qatar?
U.S. Arms Sales to Qatar
Other Defense Partnerships
France
Turkey
Russia
Counterterrorism Cooperation
Terrorism Financing Issues
Countering Violent Extremism
Economic Issues
U.S.-Qatar Economic Relations
U.S. Assistance

Figures

Figure 1. Qatar at-a-Glance
Figure 2. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure

Tables

Table 1. Senior Leaders of Qatar

Summary

The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional influence separate The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional influence separate
from and independent of Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of the Gulf Cooperation Council from and independent of Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of the Gulf Cooperation Council
~~Kenneth Katzman~~
(GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), an alliance of (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), an alliance of
~~Specialist in Middle~~
six Gulf monarchies. While fostering a close defense and security alliance with the United States, six Gulf monarchies. While fostering a close defense and security alliance with the United States,
~~Eastern Affairs~~
Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts and has, at times, engaged Sunni Islamists, Iran Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts and has, at times, engaged Sunni Islamists, Iran

and Iran-backed groups, and Israeli officials. Qatar has maintained consistent dialogue with Iran and Iran-backed groups, and Israeli officials. Qatar has maintained consistent dialogue with Iran
while also supporting U.S. efforts to limit Iranwhile also supporting U.S. efforts to limit Iran’'s regional influence and U.S. combat against s regional influence and U.S. combat against

major regional terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State organization.major regional terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State organization.
~~Qatar’~~ Qatar's support for regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and its Al Jazeera media network have contributed to a s support for regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and its Al Jazeera media network have contributed to a
backlash against Qatar led by fellow GCC states Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and backlash against Qatar led by fellow GCC states Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and
Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and
transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump Administration has sought, transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump Administration has sought,
unsuccessfully to date, to mediate a resolution of the dispute, hindering U.S. efforts to formalize a unsuccessfully to date, to mediate a resolution of the dispute, hindering U.S. efforts to formalize a “"Middle East Strategic Middle East Strategic
~~Alliance”~~Alliance" of the United States, the GCC, and other Sunni-led countries in the region to counter Iran. Qatar has countered the of the United States, the GCC, and other Sunni-led countries in the region to counter Iran. Qatar has countered the
Saudi-led pressure with new arms buys and deepening relations with Turkey and Iran.Saudi-led pressure with new arms buys and deepening relations with Turkey and Iran.
As do the other GCC leaders, QatarAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar’'s leaders have looked to the United States to guarantee their external security since the s leaders have looked to the United States to guarantee their external security since the
1980s. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly 1980s. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly
addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense
cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts up to 11,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts up to 11,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. These facilities help U.S. forces participate (CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. These facilities help U.S. forces participate
in operations throughout the region. Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In in operations throughout the region. Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In
January 2018, Qatar and the United States inaugurated a January 2018, Qatar and the United States inaugurated a “"Strategic DialogueStrategic Dialogue”" to strengthen the U.S.-Qatar defense to strengthen the U.S.-Qatar defense
partnership. The second session of the dialogue, in January 2019, resulted in a U.S.-Qatar memorandum of understanding to partnership. The second session of the dialogue, in January 2019, resulted in a U.S.-Qatar memorandum of understanding to
expand Al Udeid Air Base to improve and expand accommodation for U.S. military personnel. Qatar signed a broad expand Al Udeid Air Base to improve and expand accommodation for U.S. military personnel. Qatar signed a broad
memorandum of understanding with the United States in 2017 to cooperate against international terrorism—apparently at memorandum of understanding with the United States in 2017 to cooperate against international terrorism—apparently at
least in part to counter accusations that Qatar supports terrorist groups.least in part to counter accusations that Qatar supports terrorist groups.
The voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by QatarThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar’'s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed
from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is the only one of the from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is the only one of the
smaller GCC states that has not yet held elections for a legislative body. U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for smaller GCC states that has not yet held elections for a legislative body. U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for
failing to adhere to international standards of labor rights practices, but credit it for taking steps in 2018 to improve the failing to adhere to international standards of labor rights practices, but credit it for taking steps in 2018 to improve the
conditions for expatriate workers.conditions for expatriate workers.
As are the other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, now As are the other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, now
compounded by the Saudi-led embargo. Qatar is positioned to weather these headwinds because of its small population, compounded by the Saudi-led embargo. Qatar is positioned to weather these headwinds because of its small population,
substantial financial reserves, and reported hospitality for young Qatari and expatriate entrepreneurs. But, Qatar shares with substantial financial reserves, and reported hospitality for young Qatari and expatriate entrepreneurs. But, Qatar shares with
virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon
products. On December 3, 2018, Qatar announced it would withdraw from the OPEC oil cartel in order to focus on its natural products. On December 3, 2018, Qatar announced it would withdraw from the OPEC oil cartel in order to focus on its natural
~~gas export sector.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

~~link to page 28~~ ~~Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy~~

~~Contacts~~
~~Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 24~~

~~Congressional Research Service~~

~~Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy~~

~~Brief History~~
gas export sector.

Brief History

Prior to 1867, Qatar was ruled by the family of the leaders of neighboring Bahrain, the Al Prior to 1867, Qatar was ruled by the family of the leaders of neighboring Bahrain, the Al
Khalifa. That year, an uprising in the territory led the United Kingdom, then the main Western Khalifa. That year, an uprising in the territory led the United Kingdom, then the main Western
power in the Persian Gulf region, to install a leading Qatari family, the Al Thani, to rule over what power in the Persian Gulf region, to install a leading Qatari family, the Al Thani, to rule over what
is now Qatar. The Al Thani family claims descent from the central Arabian tribe of Banu Tamim, is now Qatar. The Al Thani family claims descent from the central Arabian tribe of Banu Tamim,
the tribe to which Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd Al Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, the tribe to which Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd Al Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism,
belonged.belonged.11 Thus, Qatar officially subscribes to Wahhabism, a conservative Islamic tradition that it Thus, Qatar officially subscribes to Wahhabism, a conservative Islamic tradition that it
shares with Saudi Arabia.shares with Saudi Arabia.
In 1916, in the aftermath of World War I and the demise of the Ottoman Empire, Qatar and In 1916, in the aftermath of World War I and the demise of the Ottoman Empire, Qatar and
Britain signed an agreement under which Qatar formally became a British protectorate. In 1971, Britain signed an agreement under which Qatar formally became a British protectorate. In 1971,
after Britain announced it would no longer exercise responsibility for Persian Gulf security, Qatar after Britain announced it would no longer exercise responsibility for Persian Gulf security, Qatar
and Bahrain considered joining with the seven emirates (principalities) that were then called the and Bahrain considered joining with the seven emirates (principalities) that were then called the
“"Trucial StatesTrucial States”" to form the United Arab Emirates. However, Qatar and Bahrain decided to to form the United Arab Emirates. However, Qatar and Bahrain decided to
become independent rather than join that union. The UAE was separately formed in late 1971. become independent rather than join that union. The UAE was separately formed in late 1971.
Qatar adopted its first written constitution in April 1970 and became fully independent on Qatar adopted its first written constitution in April 1970 and became fully independent on
September 1, 1971. The United States opened an embassy in Doha in 1973. The last U.S. September 1, 1971. The United States opened an embassy in Doha in 1973. The last U.S.
Ambassador to Qatar, Dana Shell Smith, resigned from that post in June 2017, reportedly over Ambassador to Qatar, Dana Shell Smith, resigned from that post in June 2017, reportedly over
disagreements with the Trump Administration.disagreements with the Trump Administration.
Table 1. Senior Leaders of Qatar
~~Position~~
~~Leader~~

Position

Leader

Amir (ruler) and Minister of DefenseAmir (ruler) and Minister of Defense
Tamim bin Hamad Al ThaniTamim bin Hamad Al Thani
Deputy Amir and Crown Prince (heir apparent)Deputy Amir and Crown Prince (heir apparent)
~~Abdul ah bin Hamad Al Thani~~

Abdullah bin Hamad Al Thani

Prime Minister and Minister of InteriorPrime Minister and Minister of Interior
~~Abdul ah~~ Abdullah bin Nasir bin Khalifa Al Thani bin Nasir bin Khalifa Al Thani
~~Deputy Prime Minister~~
~~Ahmad bin Abdallah al-Mahmud~~

Deputy Prime Minister

Ahmad bin Abdallah al-Mahmud

Minister of State for Defense AffairsMinister of State for Defense Affairs
Khalid bin Muhammad Al-AttiyahKhalid bin Muhammad Al-Attiyah
~~Minister of Foreign Affairs~~
~~Muhammad bin Abd al-Rahman Al Thani~~
~~Minister of Finance~~
~~Ali Sharif al-Imadi~~
~~Ambassador to the United States~~
~~Mishal bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani~~
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, “Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments.”

~~1 Information in this section is taken from Bernard Haykel. “Qatar and Islamism.” Policy Brief: Norwegian~~
~~Peacebuilding Resource Centre. February 2013.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy~~

~~Figure 1. Qatar at-a-Glance~~

~~Area~~
~~11,586 sq km (slightly smaller than Connecticut)~~
~~People~~
Population: 2.3 mil ion (July 2017 estimate), of which about 90% are expatriates

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Muhammad bin Abd al-Rahman Al Thani

Minister of Finance

Ali Sharif al-Imadi

Ambassador to the United States

Mishal bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments."

Figure 1. Qatar at-a-Glance
Area

11,586 sq km (slightly smaller than Connecticut)

People

Population: 2.3 million (July 2017 estimate), of which about 90% are expatriates
Religions: Muslim 68%, of which about 90% are Sunni; Christian 14%; Hindu 14%; 3% Buddhist; and Muslim 68%, of which about 90% are Sunni; Christian 14%; Hindu 14%; 3% Buddhist; and
1% other. Figures include expatriates.1% other. Figures include expatriates.
Ethnic Groups: Arab 40%; Pakistani 18%; Indian 18%; Iranian 10%; other 14%. Figures include Arab 40%; Pakistani 18%; Indian 18%; Iranian 10%; other 14%. Figures include
expatriates. Virtually all citizens are Arab.expatriates. Virtually all citizens are Arab.
~~Economy~~

Economy
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $341 $341 ~~bil ion~~billion (2017) on purchasing power parity (ppp) basis (2017) on purchasing power parity (ppp) basis
GDP per capita: $125,000 (2017) on ppp basis $125,000 (2017) on ppp basis
Inflation: 1% (2017) 1% (2017)
GDP Growth Rate: 2.5% (2017): 2.5% (2017)
Export Partners: (In descending order) Japan, South Korea, India, China, Singapore, UAE (In descending order) Japan, South Korea, India, China, Singapore, UAE
Import Partners: (In descending order) United States, China, UAE, Germany, Japan, Britain, Italy, (In descending order) United States, China, UAE, Germany, Japan, Britain, Italy,
Saudi Arabia (pre-2017 GCC rift)Saudi Arabia (pre-2017 GCC rift)
~~Oil and Gas~~

Oil and Gas
Oil Exports: Slightly more than 700,000 barrels per day. Negligible amounts to the United States. Slightly more than 700,000 barrels per day. Negligible amounts to the United States.
Producer of condensates (light oil) vital to S. Korean petrochemical industry.Producer of condensates (light oil) vital to S. Korean petrochemical industry.
Natural Gas Exports: Almost 125 Almost 125 ~~bil ion~~billion cubic meters in 2014 cubic meters in 2014
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map borders and cities generated by Hannah Fischer using data from Graphic created by CRS. Map borders and cities generated by Hannah Fischer using data from
Department of State, 2013; Esri, 2013; and Google Maps, 2013. At-a-glance information from CIA, Department of State, 2013; Esri, 2013; and Google Maps, 2013. At-a-glance information from CIA, The World
~~Factbook.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy~~

~~Governance~~
~~Qatar’~~Factbook. Governance Qatar's governing structure approximates that of the other GCC states. The country is led by a s governing structure approximates that of the other GCC states. The country is led by a
hereditary Amir (literally hereditary Amir (literally “"prince,prince,”" but interpreted as but interpreted as ~~“ruler”), Shaykh2~~"ruler"), Shaykh² Tamim bin Hamad Al Tamim bin Hamad Al
Thani. He became ruler in June 2013 when his father, Amir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Thani. He became ruler in June 2013 when his father, Amir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani,
relinquished power voluntarily—an unprecedented move in the modern Gulf. The Amir governs relinquished power voluntarily—an unprecedented move in the modern Gulf. The Amir governs
through a prime minister, who is a member of the Al Thani family, and a cabinet, several of through a prime minister, who is a member of the Al Thani family, and a cabinet, several of
whom are members of the Al Thani or other prominent families. Amir Tamim serves concurrently whom are members of the Al Thani or other prominent families. Amir Tamim serves concurrently
as Minister of Defense, although most of the defense policy functions are performed by the as Minister of Defense, although most of the defense policy functions are performed by the
Minister of State for Defense. In November 2014, Amir Tamim appointed a younger brother, Minister of State for Defense. In November 2014, Amir Tamim appointed a younger brother,
Shaykh Abdullah bin Hamad, to be deputy Amir and the heir apparent. The Prime Minister, Shaykh Abdullah bin Hamad, to be deputy Amir and the heir apparent. The Prime Minister,
Shaykh Abdullah bin Nasir bin Khalifa Al Thani, also serves as Interior Minister.Shaykh Abdullah bin Nasir bin Khalifa Al Thani, also serves as Interior Minister.
There is dissent within the Al Thani family, including from branches linked to former Qatari There is dissent within the Al Thani family, including from branches linked to former Qatari
rulers, but no significant challenge to Tamimrulers, but no significant challenge to Tamim’'s rule is evident. There have been no significant s rule is evident. There have been no significant
protests by Qatari citizens in many years, even though political parties are banned and there are protests by Qatari citizens in many years, even though political parties are banned and there are
no no “"political societiespolitical societies”" that act as the equivalent of parties. Political disagreements in Qatar are that act as the equivalent of parties. Political disagreements in Qatar are
aired mainly in private as part of a process of consensus building in which the leadership tries to aired mainly in private as part of a process of consensus building in which the leadership tries to
balance the interests of the various families and other constituencies.balance the interests of the various families and other constituencies.3
3 Then-Amir Hamad put a revised constitution to a public referendum on April 29, 2003, achieving Then-Amir Hamad put a revised constitution to a public referendum on April 29, 2003, achieving
a 98% vote in favor. Nevertheless, it left in place significant limitations: for example, it affirms a 98% vote in favor. Nevertheless, it left in place significant limitations: for example, it affirms
that Qatar is a hereditary emirate. Some Western experts also criticize Qatarthat Qatar is a hereditary emirate. Some Western experts also criticize Qatar’'s constitution for s constitution for
specifying Islamic law as the main source of legislation.specifying Islamic law as the main source of legislation.44 The constitution stipulates that elections The constitution stipulates that elections
will be held for 30 of the 45 seats of the countrywill be held for 30 of the 45 seats of the country’'s Advisory Council (s Advisory Council (Majlis Ash-Shura), a ), a
national legislative body, but elections have been repeatedly delayed and Qatar is now the only national legislative body, but elections have been repeatedly delayed and Qatar is now the only
GCC state other than Saudi Arabia not to have held elections for any seats in a legislative body. GCC state other than Saudi Arabia not to have held elections for any seats in a legislative body.
The elected Council is to have the ability to remove ministers (two-thirds majority vote), to The elected Council is to have the ability to remove ministers (two-thirds majority vote), to
approve a national budget, and to draft and vote on proposed legislation that can become law approve a national budget, and to draft and vote on proposed legislation that can become law
(two-thirds majority vote and concurrence by the Amir). In 2008, it was agreed that naturalized (two-thirds majority vote and concurrence by the Amir). In 2008, it was agreed that naturalized
Qataris who have been citizens for at least 10 years will be eligible to vote, and those whose Qataris who have been citizens for at least 10 years will be eligible to vote, and those whose
fathers were born in Qatar will be eligible to run. To justify the delay in elections, Qatari officials fathers were born in Qatar will be eligible to run. To justify the delay in elections, Qatari officials
say that elections will invite interference from divisive political currents, factions, and say that elections will invite interference from divisive political currents, factions, and
governments in the region.governments in the region.
The country holds elections for a 29-seat Central Municipal Council, which advises the Minister The country holds elections for a 29-seat Central Municipal Council, which advises the Minister
of Municipality and Urban Affairs on local public services. Elections for the fifth Council (each of Municipality and Urban Affairs on local public services. Elections for the fifth Council (each
serving a four-year term) were held in April 2019. Voter registration and turnout—21,735 voters serving a four-year term) were held in April 2019. Voter registration and turnout—21,735 voters
registered out of an estimate 150,000 eligible voters, and 15,171 of those voted—were lower than registered out of an estimate 150,000 eligible voters, and 15,171 of those voted—were lower than
expected,expected,55 suggesting that citizens viewed the Council as lacking influence. The State Department suggesting that citizens viewed the Council as lacking influence. The State Department
stated that stated that “"observers considered [the municipal council elections] free and fair."⁶ Human Rights Issues⁷ ~~observers considered [the municipal council elections] free and fair.”6~~

~~2 Shaykh is an honorific term.~~
~~3 The Economist. “Qatar: Democracy? That’s for Other Arabs.” June 8, 2013. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-~~
~~east-and-africa/21579063-rumours-change-top-do-not-include-moves-democracy-democracy-thats.~~
~~4 Amy Hawthorne. “Qatar’s New Constitution: Limited Reform from the Top.” August 26, 2008.~~
~~http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=21605.~~
~~5 Department of State. Human Rights Report for 2015: Qatar. p. 13.~~
~~6 https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265728.pdf.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy~~

~~Human Rights Issues7~~
Recent State Department reports identify the most significant human rights problems in the Recent State Department reports identify the most significant human rights problems in the
country as limits on the ability of citizens to choose their government in free and fair elections; country as limits on the ability of citizens to choose their government in free and fair elections;
restrictions on freedoms of assembly and association, including prohibitions on political parties restrictions on freedoms of assembly and association, including prohibitions on political parties
and labor unions; restrictions on the rights of expatriate workers; and criminalization of and labor unions; restrictions on the rights of expatriate workers; and criminalization of
consensual same-sex sexual activity. In July 2019, Qatar withdrew itself from a letter to the U.N. consensual same-sex sexual activity. In July 2019, Qatar withdrew itself from a letter to the U.N.
Human Rights Council, and signed by 37 countries, defending BeijingHuman Rights Council, and signed by 37 countries, defending Beijing’'s policy toward its Uighur s policy toward its Uighur
community, who practice Islam.community, who practice Islam.
A National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) investigates allegations of human rights abuses in A National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) investigates allegations of human rights abuses in
the country. It reportedly operates independently of the government, although it is funded largely the country. It reportedly operates independently of the government, although it is funded largely
by the Qatar Foundation that was founded and is still run by the Amirby the Qatar Foundation that was founded and is still run by the Amir’'s mother, Shaykha Moza. s mother, Shaykha Moza.
Among the NHRCAmong the NHRC’'s functions is to monitor the situation of about 1,000-2,000 stateless residents s functions is to monitor the situation of about 1,000-2,000 stateless residents
(“("bidoons~~”),8~~"),⁸ mostly members of families whose citizenship was revoked decades ago for mostly members of families whose citizenship was revoked decades ago for
criticizing or opposing Qatarcriticizing or opposing Qatar’'s then-leaders. They receive public services but cannot own s then-leaders. They receive public services but cannot own
property or travel freely to other GCC countries. Although the constitution provides for an property or travel freely to other GCC countries. Although the constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, the Amir, based on recommended selections from the Supreme Judicial independent judiciary, the Amir, based on recommended selections from the Supreme Judicial
Council, appoints all judges, who hold their positions at his discretion.Council, appoints all judges, who hold their positions at his discretion.9
9 Freedom of Expression
Despite the absence of open opposition among the citizenry, Qatar has adopted some policies Despite the absence of open opposition among the citizenry, Qatar has adopted some policies
similar to those of the other GCC states since the 2011 similar to those of the other GCC states since the 2011 “"Arab SpringArab Spring”" uprisings. Qatar has uprisings. Qatar has
adopted new laws that restrict freedom of expression and increase penalties for criticizing the adopted new laws that restrict freedom of expression and increase penalties for criticizing the
leadership. In 2014, the government approved a cybercrimes law that provides for up to three leadership. In 2014, the government approved a cybercrimes law that provides for up to three
years in prison for anyone convicted of spreading years in prison for anyone convicted of spreading “"false news.false news.”" A November 2015 law increased A November 2015 law increased
penalties for removing or expressing contempt at the national flag or the GCC flag. In July 2017, penalties for removing or expressing contempt at the national flag or the GCC flag. In July 2017,
the country held a national conference on freedom of expression at which international human the country held a national conference on freedom of expression at which international human
rights organizations were able to criticize the countryrights organizations were able to criticize the country’'s human rights record.s human rights record.10
10 Al Jazeera. The government owns and subsidizes the Al Jazeera satellite television network, The government owns and subsidizes the Al Jazeera satellite television network,
which has evolved into a global media conglomerate that features a wide range of guests from all which has evolved into a global media conglomerate that features a wide range of guests from all
over the region debating controversial issues. The networkover the region debating controversial issues. The network’'s airing of stories critical of some s airing of stories critical of some
Arab leaders has sometimes caused the closure of Al JazeeraArab leaders has sometimes caused the closure of Al Jazeera’'s bureaus or imprisonment of the s bureaus or imprisonment of the
~~network’~~network's journalists. The network has run stories critical of Qatars journalists. The network has run stories critical of Qatar’'s neighbors involved in s neighbors involved in
isolating Qatar (see below), but it also airs stories that criticize the countryisolating Qatar (see below), but it also airs stories that criticize the country’'s human rights s human rights
practices.practices.1111 The State Department quotes The State Department quotes “"some observers and former Al Jazeera employeessome observers and former Al Jazeera employees”" as as
alleging that the government alleging that the government ~~“influences”~~"influences" Al Jazeera content. Some Members of Congress have Al Jazeera content. Some Members of Congress have
asserted that Al Jazeera is an arm of the Qatar government and that its U.S. bureau should be asserted that Al Jazeera is an arm of the Qatar government and that its U.S. bureau should be
~~required to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).~~

~~7 Much of the information in this section is based on: Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights for 2018:~~
~~https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2018&dlid=289226#wrapper.~~
~~8 Bidoon is the Arabic word for “without,” and refers to persons without documentation for their residency in country.~~
~~The Bidoon population is much larger in Kuwait, where that issue has been unresolved for decades.~~
~~9 State Dept human rights report on Qatar for 2017, op. cit.~~
~~10 State Dept. human rights report on Qatar for 2017, op. cit.~~
~~11 “Renewed Calls for Qatar to Address Treatment of Migrant Workers.” Al Jazeera, September 19, 2019.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy~~

~~Qatari Leadership~~

~~Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani~~
required to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).
Qatari Leadership

Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani
Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani was born on June 3, 1980. He is the fourth son of was born on June 3, 1980. He is the fourth son of
the former Amir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, and the ninth Al Thani ruler in Qatar. the former Amir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, and the ninth Al Thani ruler in Qatar.
He was appointed heir apparent in August 2003 when his elder brother, Shaykh He was appointed heir apparent in August 2003 when his elder brother, Shaykh
Jasim, renounced his claim, reportedly based on his fatherJasim, renounced his claim, reportedly based on his father’'s lack of confidence in s lack of confidence in
Shaykh JasimShaykh Jasim’'s ability to lead. Shaykh Tamim became Amir on June 25, 2014, when s ability to lead. Shaykh Tamim became Amir on June 25, 2014, when
Amir Hamad stepped down voluntarily to pave the way for the accession of a new Amir Hamad stepped down voluntarily to pave the way for the accession of a new
generation of leadership. Amir Tamim was educated at Great Britaingeneration of leadership. Amir Tamim was educated at Great Britain’'s Sherbourne s Sherbourne
School and graduated from its Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in 1998, from School and graduated from its Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in 1998, from
which his father graduated in 1971. Concurrently, Amir Tamim heads the Qatari which his father graduated in 1971. Concurrently, Amir Tamim heads the Qatari
Investment Authority, which has Investment Authority, which has ~~bil ions of dol ars~~billions of dollars of investments in Europe, of investments in Europe,
including in Harrodincluding in Harrod’'s department store in London, the United States, and elsewhere. s department store in London, the United States, and elsewhere.
He is reportedly highly popular for resisting Saudi-led pressure in the intra-GCC He is reportedly highly popular for resisting Saudi-led pressure in the intra-GCC
crisis.crisis.

Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani
Amir TamimAmir Tamim’'s father, s father, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, took power in June 1995, took power in June 1995,
when his father, Amir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, was in Europe. In 1972, after when his father, Amir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, was in Europe. In 1972, after
finishing his education in Britain and assuming command of some Qatari military finishing his education in Britain and assuming command of some Qatari military
units, Hamad had helped his father depose his grandfather in a bloodless seizure of units, Hamad had helped his father depose his grandfather in a bloodless seizure of
power while then-Amir Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani was on a hunting trip in Iran.power while then-Amir Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani was on a hunting trip in Iran.
While Shaykh Hamad is no longer QatarWhile Shaykh Hamad is no longer Qatar’'s ruler, he, his wife, and several of their s ruler, he, his wife, and several of their
other children remain key figures in the ruling establishment. Qatari media refer to other children remain key figures in the ruling establishment. Qatari media refer to
Shaykh Hamad as Shaykh Hamad as “"The Father AmirThe Father Amir”" and acknowledge that he has some continuing and acknowledge that he has some continuing
role in many aspects of policy. His favored wife (of three), Shaykha Moza al-Misnad role in many aspects of policy. His favored wife (of three), Shaykha Moza al-Misnad
Al Thani, continues to chair the powerful Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, Al Thani, continues to chair the powerful Qatar Foundation for Education, Science,
and Community Development (QF). The QF runs Dohaand Community Development (QF). The QF runs Doha’'s Education City, where s Education City, where
several Western universities have established branches and which is a large investor several Western universities have established branches and which is a large investor
in the United States and Europe. One daughter (and in the United States and Europe. One daughter (and ~~ful~~ full sister of the current Amir), sister of the current Amir),
Shaykha Mayassa, chairs the Qatar Museums, a major buyer of global artwork. Shaykha Mayassa, chairs the Qatar Museums, a major buyer of global artwork.
Another daughter, Shaykha Hind, is vice chairman of the QF. Both daughters Another daughter, Shaykha Hind, is vice chairman of the QF. Both daughters
graduated from Duke University. Another relative, Hamad bin Jasim Al Thani, graduated from Duke University. Another relative, Hamad bin Jasim Al Thani,
remains active in Qatarremains active in Qatar’'s investment activities and international circles. During Amir s investment activities and international circles. During Amir
~~Hamad’~~Hamad's rule, Shaykh Hamad bin Jasim was Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, and s rule, Shaykh Hamad bin Jasim was Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, and
architect of Qatararchitect of Qatar’'s relatively independent foreign policy. Shaykh Hamads relatively independent foreign policy. Shaykh Hamad’'s father, s father,
former Amir Khalifa bin Hamad, died in October 2016.former Amir Khalifa bin Hamad, died in October 2016.
Sources: http://www.mofa.gov, author conversations with Qatari and U.S. officials.: http://www.mofa.gov, author conversations with Qatari and U.S. officials.

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~~Women’s Rights~~
Women's Rights According to the State Department, social and legal discrimination against women continues, According to the State Department, social and legal discrimination against women continues,
despite the constitutional assertion of equality. No law criminalizes domestic violence, and a despite the constitutional assertion of equality. No law criminalizes domestic violence, and a
national housing law discriminates against women married to noncitizen men and divorced national housing law discriminates against women married to noncitizen men and divorced
women. The laws criminalizes rape. Court testimony by women carries half the weight of that of women. The laws criminalizes rape. Court testimony by women carries half the weight of that of
a man. On the other hand, women in Qatar drive and own property, and constitute about 15% of a man. On the other hand, women in Qatar drive and own property, and constitute about 15% of
business owners and more than a third of the overall workforce, including as professionals.business owners and more than a third of the overall workforce, including as professionals.
Women serve in public office, such as minister of public health, chair of the Qatar Foundation, Women serve in public office, such as minister of public health, chair of the Qatar Foundation,
head of the General Authority for Museums, permanent representative to the United Nations, and head of the General Authority for Museums, permanent representative to the United Nations, and
ambassadors to Croatia and the Holy See. In November 2017, the Amir appointed four women to ambassadors to Croatia and the Holy See. In November 2017, the Amir appointed four women to
the national consultative council for the first time in the bodythe national consultative council for the first time in the body’'s history. However, most of the s history. However, most of the
other small GCC states have more than one female minister.other small GCC states have more than one female minister.
Trafficking in Persons and Labor ~~Issues12~~
Issues¹² The State DepartmentThe State Department’'s Trafficking in Persons report for 2019 maintained Qatars Trafficking in Persons report for 2019 maintained Qatar’'s ranking at Tier s ranking at Tier
2. Qatar was upgraded to that level in the 2018 report, from Tier 2: Watch List, on the basis that 2. Qatar was upgraded to that level in the 2018 report, from Tier 2: Watch List, on the basis that
the government has made significant efforts to comply with the minimum standards for the the government has made significant efforts to comply with the minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking. Qatar enacted a Domestic Worker Law to better protect domestic elimination of trafficking. Qatar enacted a Domestic Worker Law to better protect domestic
workers and, in recent years, it also established a coordinating body to oversee and facilitate anti-workers and, in recent years, it also established a coordinating body to oversee and facilitate anti-
trafficking initiatives and enacting a law that reforms the sponsorship system to significantly trafficking initiatives and enacting a law that reforms the sponsorship system to significantly
reduce vulnerability to forced labor.reduce vulnerability to forced labor.
But Qatar remains a destination country for men and women subjected to forced labor and, to a But Qatar remains a destination country for men and women subjected to forced labor and, to a
much lesser extent, forced prostitution. Female domestic workers are particularly vulnerable to much lesser extent, forced prostitution. Female domestic workers are particularly vulnerable to
trafficking due to their isolation in private residences and lack of protection under Qatari labor trafficking due to their isolation in private residences and lack of protection under Qatari labor
laws. In the course of the January 2018 U.S.-Qatar laws. In the course of the January 2018 U.S.-Qatar “"Strategic Dialogue,Strategic Dialogue,”" the two countries signed the two countries signed
a memorandum of understanding to create a framework to combat trafficking in persons.a memorandum of understanding to create a framework to combat trafficking in persons.
Labor Issues
International scrutiny of QatarInternational scrutiny of Qatar’'s labor practices has increased as Qatari companies have hired s labor practices has increased as Qatari companies have hired
additional engineers, construction workers, and other laborers to prepare for the 2022 FIFA World additional engineers, construction workers, and other laborers to prepare for the 2022 FIFA World
Cup soccer tournament. As outlined in an Amnesty International report of September 2019 (Cup soccer tournament. As outlined in an Amnesty International report of September 2019 (“"All All
Work No Pay: The Struggle of QatarWork No Pay: The Struggle of Qatar’'s Migrant Workers for Justices Migrant Workers for Justice”"), criticism centers on ), criticism centers on
~~workers’~~workers' not being paid for work and a lack of dispute resolution, causing salary delays or not being paid for work and a lack of dispute resolution, causing salary delays or
nonpayment.nonpayment.1313 An investigation by German journalists found continuing violations of labor rights An investigation by German journalists found continuing violations of labor rights
and poor conditions among workers preparing for the 2022 tournament in Qatar, including the and poor conditions among workers preparing for the 2022 tournament in Qatar, including the
deaths of over 100 expatriate workers from Nepal in 2019.deaths of over 100 expatriate workers from Nepal in 2019.1414 Some human rights groups have Some human rights groups have
criticized Qatar for allowing outdoor work (primarily construction) in very hot weather.criticized Qatar for allowing outdoor work (primarily construction) in very hot weather.15
15 Hundreds of expatriate workers demonstrated in Doha in early August to protest poor working Hundreds of expatriate workers demonstrated in Doha in early August to protest poor working
conditions and unpaid and delayed wages. The Qatar government responded to the Amnesty conditions and unpaid and delayed wages. The Qatar government responded to the Amnesty
International report on September 19, 2019, stating thatInternational report on September 19, 2019, stating that~~: “~~ "Many of the cases included in the report ~~Many of the cases included in the report~~

~~12 This section is based on the State Department “Trafficking in Persons” report for 2019.~~
~~https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-trafficking-in-persons-report-2/qatar/~~
~~13 Business and Human Rights Resources Center. May 23, 2018.~~
~~14 Qatar 2022: FIFA admits violation of workers' standards. Deutsche Welle, June 6, 2019.~~
~~https://www.dw.com/en/qatar-2022-fifa-admits-violation-of-workers-standards/a-49078052.~~
~~15 Statement by Human Rights Watch, September 27, 2017.~~
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precede recent legislative amendments—including the establishment of the Committees for the precede recent legislative amendments—including the establishment of the Committees for the
Settlement of Labour Disputes. These have significantly improved the processes and increased Settlement of Labour Disputes. These have significantly improved the processes and increased
the speed for resolving labour disputes.the speed for resolving labour disputes.”
" The State Department assesses QatarThe State Department assesses Qatar’'s labor rights as not adequately protecting the rights of s labor rights as not adequately protecting the rights of
workers to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, or bargain collectively. Qatari workers to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, or bargain collectively. Qatari
law does not prohibit antiunion discrimination or provide for reinstatement of workers fired for law does not prohibit antiunion discrimination or provide for reinstatement of workers fired for
union activity. The single permitted trade union, the General Union of Workers of Qatar, is union activity. The single permitted trade union, the General Union of Workers of Qatar, is
assessed as assessed as “"not functioning.not functioning.”" Yet, the State Department credits the country with taking steps to Yet, the State Department credits the country with taking steps to
protect labor rights, including for expatriate workers. In December 2016, a labor reform went into protect labor rights, including for expatriate workers. In December 2016, a labor reform went into
effect that offers greater protections for foreign workers by changing the effect that offers greater protections for foreign workers by changing the “"kafala”" system system
(sponsorship requirement for foreign workers) to enable employees to switch employers at the (sponsorship requirement for foreign workers) to enable employees to switch employers at the
end of their labor contracts rather than having to leave Qatar when their contracts end. The end of their labor contracts rather than having to leave Qatar when their contracts end. The
government says the government says the kafala system will be abolished entirely at the end of 2019. In 2018, the system will be abolished entirely at the end of 2019. In 2018, the
government established and is funding several housing sites to replace unsafe temporary housing government established and is funding several housing sites to replace unsafe temporary housing
for expatriate workers. The government also has stepped up arrests and prosecutions of for expatriate workers. The government also has stepped up arrests and prosecutions of
individuals for suspected labor law violations, and has increased its cooperation with the individuals for suspected labor law violations, and has increased its cooperation with the
International Labor Organization (ILO) to take in worker complaints and better inform expatriate International Labor Organization (ILO) to take in worker complaints and better inform expatriate
workers of their rights.workers of their rights.
~~Religious Freedom16~~
~~Qatar’~~ Religious Freedom¹⁶ Qatar's constitution stipulates that Islam is the state religion and Islamic law is s constitution stipulates that Islam is the state religion and Islamic law is “"a main source of a main source of
legislation,legislation,”" but Qatari laws incorporate secular legal traditions as well as Islamic law. The law but Qatari laws incorporate secular legal traditions as well as Islamic law. The law
recognizes only Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. The overwhelming majority (as much as 95%) recognizes only Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. The overwhelming majority (as much as 95%)
of Qatari citizens are Sunni Muslims, possibly explaining why there have been no signs of of Qatari citizens are Sunni Muslims, possibly explaining why there have been no signs of
sectarian schisms within the citizenry. The government permits eight registered Christian sectarian schisms within the citizenry. The government permits eight registered Christian
denominations to worship publicly at the Mesaymir Religious Complex (commonly referred to as denominations to worship publicly at the Mesaymir Religious Complex (commonly referred to as
“"Church CityChurch City”"), and it has allowed the Evangelical Churches Alliance of Qatar to build a church. ), and it has allowed the Evangelical Churches Alliance of Qatar to build a church.
The government also allows more than 100 house churches to operate, according to the State The government also allows more than 100 house churches to operate, according to the State
Department report for 2018.Department report for 2018.
Jews and adherents of unrecognized religions—such as Hindus, Buddhists, and BahaJews and adherents of unrecognized religions—such as Hindus, Buddhists, and Baha’'is—are is—are
allowed to worship privately but do not have authorized facilities in which to practice their allowed to worship privately but do not have authorized facilities in which to practice their
religions. Qatari officials state that they are open to considering the creation of dedicated worship religions. Qatari officials state that they are open to considering the creation of dedicated worship
spaces for Hindus, Jews, and Buddhists and that any organized, non-Muslim religious group spaces for Hindus, Jews, and Buddhists and that any organized, non-Muslim religious group
could use the same process as Christians to apply for official registration.could use the same process as Christians to apply for official registration.
Foreign Policy
Qatar uses its financial resources to implement a foreign policy that attempts to protect QatarQatar uses its financial resources to implement a foreign policy that attempts to protect Qatar’s
's interests by influencing a wide range of regional actors. Its policies have enabled Qatar to mediate interests by influencing a wide range of regional actors. Its policies have enabled Qatar to mediate
some regional conflicts and to obtain the freedom of captives held by regional armed groups. Yet, some regional conflicts and to obtain the freedom of captives held by regional armed groups. Yet,
Qatar often backs regional actors at odds with those supported by Saudi Arabia and other GCC Qatar often backs regional actors at odds with those supported by Saudi Arabia and other GCC
states, contributing to a rift within the GCC. As have some of the other GCC states, Qatar has states, contributing to a rift within the GCC. As have some of the other GCC states, Qatar has
shown an increasing willingness to use its own military forces to try to shape the outcome of shown an increasing willingness to use its own military forces to try to shape the outcome of

~~16 This section is based on the State Department report on International Religious Freedom for 2018.~~
~~https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/qatar/~~
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regional conflicts. Regional and bilateral issues constituted the focus of Amir Tamimregional conflicts. Regional and bilateral issues constituted the focus of Amir Tamim’'s meeting s meeting
with President Trump in Washington, with President Trump in Washington, ~~D.C.~~DC, on July 9, 2019. on July 9, 2019. 17
17 Qatar and the Intra-GCC Dispute
A consistent source of friction within the GCC has been QatarA consistent source of friction within the GCC has been Qatar’'s embrace of Muslim Brotherhood s embrace of Muslim Brotherhood
movements, which Qatar argues is a moderate political Islamist movement that can foster movements, which Qatar argues is a moderate political Islamist movement that can foster
regional stability through its participation in the legitimate political process. Saudi Arabia and regional stability through its participation in the legitimate political process. Saudi Arabia and
particularly the UAE see the Brotherhood as a recruiter for the various terrorist groups that particularly the UAE see the Brotherhood as a recruiter for the various terrorist groups that
operate in the region. In 2013-2014, differences over this and other issues widened to the point operate in the region. In 2013-2014, differences over this and other issues widened to the point
where Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Doha in March 2014, where Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Doha in March 2014,
accusing Qatar of supporting accusing Qatar of supporting “"terrorism.terrorism.~~”18~~"¹⁸ The Ambassadors returned in November 2014 in The Ambassadors returned in November 2014 in
exchange for a reported pledge by Qatar to fully implement a November 2013 exchange for a reported pledge by Qatar to fully implement a November 2013 “"Riyadh Riyadh
~~Agreement”~~Agreement" that committed Qatar to noninterference in the affairs of other GCC states and to that committed Qatar to noninterference in the affairs of other GCC states and to
refrain from supporting Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations.refrain from supporting Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations.19
19 These differences erupted again following the May 20-22, 2017, visit of President Donald Trump These differences erupted again following the May 20-22, 2017, visit of President Donald Trump
to Saudi Arabia, during which expressed substantial support for Saudi leaders. On June 5, 2017, to Saudi Arabia, during which expressed substantial support for Saudi leaders. On June 5, 2017,
Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other Muslim countries, severed Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other Muslim countries, severed
diplomatic relations with Qatar, expelled Qatardiplomatic relations with Qatar, expelled Qatar’'s diplomats, recalled their ambassadors, and s diplomats, recalled their ambassadors, and
imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters,
and airspace. They also accused Qatar of supporting terrorist groups and Iran.and airspace. They also accused Qatar of supporting terrorist groups and Iran.
On June 22, 2017, the Saudi-led group presented Qatar with 13 demands,On June 22, 2017, the Saudi-led group presented Qatar with 13 demands,2020 including closing Al including closing Al
Jazeera, severing relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, scaling back relations with Iran, closing Jazeera, severing relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, scaling back relations with Iran, closing
a Turkish military base in Qatar, and paying reparations for its actions. Amir Tamim expressed a Turkish military base in Qatar, and paying reparations for its actions. Amir Tamim expressed
openness to negotiations but said it would not openness to negotiations but said it would not ~~“surrender”~~"surrender" its sovereignty. Qatar argues that it has its sovereignty. Qatar argues that it has
historically given refuge to Islamists from the region, including those who adhere to the historically given refuge to Islamists from the region, including those who adhere to the
~~Brotherhood’~~Brotherhood's traditions, and that it does not want to repress or expel these elements. Reports s traditions, and that it does not want to repress or expel these elements. Reports
quoting U.S. intelligence officials say that the isolation move was based, in part, on UAE hacking quoting U.S. intelligence officials say that the isolation move was based, in part, on UAE hacking
that posted false quotes attributed to Amir Tamim.that posted false quotes attributed to Amir Tamim.2121 In December 2017, Saudi Arabia In December 2017, Saudi Arabia
~~“permanently”~~"permanently" closed its Salwa border crossing into Qatar, and some press reports say that Saudi closed its Salwa border crossing into Qatar, and some press reports say that Saudi
Arabia is contemplating building a canal to physically separate itself from Qatar. QatarArabia is contemplating building a canal to physically separate itself from Qatar. Qatar’'s ample s ample
wealth is enabling it to limit the economic effects of the Saudi-led move, but that the blockade wealth is enabling it to limit the economic effects of the Saudi-led move, but that the blockade
has separated families and caused other social disruptions. Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia fund has separated families and caused other social disruptions. Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia fund
a wide array of U.S.-based representatives and lobbyists to support their respective positions on a wide array of U.S.-based representatives and lobbyists to support their respective positions on
the intra-GCC rift and promote their other interests, and they provide funding to U.S. think-tanks the intra-GCC rift and promote their other interests, and they provide funding to U.S. think-tanks
~~as well.22~~

~~17 White House. Joint Statement from the President of the United States Donald J. Trump and His Highness Sheikh~~
~~Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar. July 9, 2019.~~
~~18 Author conversations with GCC officials. 2013-2015.~~
~~19 Cable News Network released the text of the November 2013 agreement, which was signed between Saudi Arabia,~~
~~Kuwait, and Qatar. The November 2014 agreement was among all the GCC states except Oman.~~
~~20 The list of demands can be found at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/list-of-demands-on-qatar-by-saudi-~~
~~arabia-other-arab-nations/2017/06/23/054913a6-57d0-11e7-840b-512026319da7_story.html?utm_term=~~
~~.5bde2f68b6b1.~~
~~21 “UAE Orchestrated Hacking of Qatari Government Sites, Sparking Regional Upheaval, According to U.S.~~
~~Intelligence Officials.” Washington Post, July 16, 2017.~~
~~22 Various press; Author conversations with a wide array of Gulf officials and experts on the Gulf. 2017-2019.~~
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as well.²² President Trump initially responded to the crisis by echoing the Saudi-led criticism of QatarPresident Trump initially responded to the crisis by echoing the Saudi-led criticism of Qatar’s
's policies, but later sought to settle the rift.policies, but later sought to settle the rift.2323 Then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, working with Then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, working with
Kuwait, conducted Kuwait, conducted “"shuttle diplomacyshuttle diplomacy”" in the region during July 10-13, 2017. President Trump in the region during July 10-13, 2017. President Trump
facilitated a phone call between Amir Tamim and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman on facilitated a phone call between Amir Tamim and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman on
September 9, 2017,September 9, 2017,2424 but the direct dialogue faltered over a dispute about which leader had but the direct dialogue faltered over a dispute about which leader had
initiated the talks. The U.S. envoy who was assigned to work on this issue in August 2017, initiated the talks. The U.S. envoy who was assigned to work on this issue in August 2017,
General (retired) Anthony Zinni, resigned in January 2019.General (retired) Anthony Zinni, resigned in January 2019.
Yet, there are signs that Saudi Arabia and the UAE might welcome resolution of the dispute. Yet, there are signs that Saudi Arabia and the UAE might welcome resolution of the dispute.
Qatari forces and commanders have been participating in GCC Qatari forces and commanders have been participating in GCC “"Gulf ShieldGulf Shield”" military exercises military exercises
and command meetings in Saudi Arabia and other GCC states. Amir Tamim was invited by Saudi and command meetings in Saudi Arabia and other GCC states. Amir Tamim was invited by Saudi
Arabia to the annual GCC summit in Dammam, Saudi Arabia, during December 7-9, 2018, but he Arabia to the annual GCC summit in Dammam, Saudi Arabia, during December 7-9, 2018, but he
did not attend. Qatardid not attend. Qatar’'s Prime Minister attended the GCC and Arab League summit meetings in s Prime Minister attended the GCC and Arab League summit meetings in
Saudi Arabia on May 30, which were arranged to discuss U.S.-Iran and Iran-GCC tensions and Saudi Arabia on May 30, which were arranged to discuss U.S.-Iran and Iran-GCC tensions and
other regional issues.other regional issues.2525 The apparent movement of the UAE closer to the Qatari position on Iran The apparent movement of the UAE closer to the Qatari position on Iran
and on the war in Yemen could also facilitate a resolution of the rift.and on the war in Yemen could also facilitate a resolution of the rift.
And, on July 9, 2019, Jordan, which had recalled its ambassador from Qatar at the start of the blockade, signaled it no longer wanted to isolate Qatar by restoring full diplomatic relations with it.²⁶ The dispute has to date thwarted U.S. efforts to assemble a new The dispute has to date thwarted U.S. efforts to assemble a new “"Middle East Strategic AllianceMiddle East Strategic Alliance”
" to counter Iran and regional terrorist groups. This alliance—to consist of the United States, the to counter Iran and regional terrorist groups. This alliance—to consist of the United States, the
GCC countries, and other Sunni-led states, is reportedly to be formally unveiled at U.S.-GCC GCC countries, and other Sunni-led states, is reportedly to be formally unveiled at U.S.-GCC
summit that has been repeatedly postponed since early 2018 and is not scheduled. The MESA has summit that has been repeatedly postponed since early 2018 and is not scheduled. The MESA has
also been hampered by Egyptalso been hampered by Egypt’'s April 2019 decision to refrain from joining the Alliance. Yet, the s April 2019 decision to refrain from joining the Alliance. Yet, the
State Department convened meetings of relevant Gulf and other Arab officials in September 2019 State Department convened meetings of relevant Gulf and other Arab officials in September 2019
in a continued effort to advance the concept.in a continued effort to advance the concept.26
~~Qatar’~~27 Qatar's disputes with other GCC countries have come despite the resolution in 2011 of a long-s disputes with other GCC countries have come despite the resolution in 2011 of a long-
standing territorial dispute between Qatar and Bahrain, dating back to the standing territorial dispute between Qatar and Bahrain, dating back to the ~~18th~~18^th century, when the century, when the
ruling families of both countries controlled parts of the Arabian peninsula. Qatar and Bahrain ruling families of both countries controlled parts of the Arabian peninsula. Qatar and Bahrain
referred the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1991 after clashes in 1986 in referred the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1991 after clashes in 1986 in
which Qatar landed military personnel on a disputed man-made reef (Fasht al-Dibal). In March which Qatar landed military personnel on a disputed man-made reef (Fasht al-Dibal). In March
2001, the ICJ sided with Bahrain on the central dispute over the Hawar Islands, but with Qatar on 2001, the ICJ sided with Bahrain on the central dispute over the Hawar Islands, but with Qatar on
ownership of the Fasht al-Dibal reef and the town of Zubara on the Qatari mainland, where some ownership of the Fasht al-Dibal reef and the town of Zubara on the Qatari mainland, where some
members of the ruling Al Khalifa family of Bahrain are buried. Two smaller islands, Janan and members of the ruling Al Khalifa family of Bahrain are buried. Two smaller islands, Janan and
Hadd Janan, were awarded to Qatar. Qatar accepted the ruling as binding.Hadd Janan, were awarded to Qatar. Qatar accepted the ruling as binding.
~~Iran~~
Iran Even though the Saudi-led bloc asserts that QatarEven though the Saudi-led bloc asserts that Qatar’'s relations with Iran are close, Qatar has long s relations with Iran are close, Qatar has long
helped counter Iran strategically. Qatar enforced international sanctions against Iran during 2010-helped counter Iran strategically. Qatar enforced international sanctions against Iran during 2010-
2016, and no Qatar-based entity has been designated by the United States as an Iran sanctions 2016, and no Qatar-based entity has been designated by the United States as an Iran sanctions
violator. Qatar withdrew its Ambassador from Tehran in January 2016 in solidarity with Saudi violator. Qatar withdrew its Ambassador from Tehran in January 2016 in solidarity with Saudi
Arabia over the Saudi execution of a dissident Shiite cleric, and Qatar joined the February 2016 Arabia over the Saudi execution of a dissident Shiite cleric, and Qatar joined the February 2016
~~GCC declaration that Lebanese Hezbollah is a terrorist group.~~

~~23 White House Office of the Press Secretary. Readout of President Donald J. Trump’s Call with Amir Sheikh Tameem~~
~~Bin Hamad Al Thani of Qatar. June 7, 2017.~~
~~24 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41209610.~~
~~25 “How the Gulf crisis played out at the Makkah summit.” UAE The National. June 1, 2019.~~
~~26 Author conversation with visiting Qatari official. September 2019.~~
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GCC declaration that Lebanese Hezbollah is a terrorist group. Yet Qatari leaders have always argued that dialogue with Iran is key to reducing regional Yet Qatari leaders have always argued that dialogue with Iran is key to reducing regional
tensions. In February 2010, as Crown Prince, Shaykh Tamim, visited Iran for talks with Iranian tensions. In February 2010, as Crown Prince, Shaykh Tamim, visited Iran for talks with Iranian
leaders, and as Amir, he has maintained direct contact with Iranleaders, and as Amir, he has maintained direct contact with Iran’'s President Hassan Rouhani.s President Hassan Rouhani.27
28 Qatar and Iran have shared a large natural gas field in the Persian Gulf without incident, although Qatar and Iran have shared a large natural gas field in the Persian Gulf without incident, although
some Iranian officials have occasionally accused Qatar of cheating on the arrangement.some Iranian officials have occasionally accused Qatar of cheating on the arrangement.28
29 Apparently perceiving that the June 2017 intra-GCC rift provided an opportunity to divide the Apparently perceiving that the June 2017 intra-GCC rift provided an opportunity to divide the
GCC, Iran has supported Qatar in the dispute and has exported additional foodstuffs to Qatar to GCC, Iran has supported Qatar in the dispute and has exported additional foodstuffs to Qatar to
help it compensate for the cutoff of Saudi food exports. It has permitted Qatar Airways to overfly help it compensate for the cutoff of Saudi food exports. It has permitted Qatar Airways to overfly
its airspace in light of the Saudi, UAE, and Bahraini denial of their airspace. In August 2017, its airspace in light of the Saudi, UAE, and Bahraini denial of their airspace. In August 2017,
Qatar formally restored full diplomatic relations with Iran. Qatar did not directly support the May Qatar formally restored full diplomatic relations with Iran. Qatar did not directly support the May
8, 2018, U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, instead issuing a statement hoping that efforts to 8, 2018, U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, instead issuing a statement hoping that efforts to
~~“denuclearize”~~"denuclearize" the region will not lead to the region will not lead to “"escalation.escalation.~~”29~~"³⁰ Qatar has sought to use its ties to Iran to Qatar has sought to use its ties to Iran to
try to de-escalate the mid-2019 U.S.-Iran tensions in the Gulf. The foreign ministers of Qatar and try to de-escalate the mid-2019 U.S.-Iran tensions in the Gulf. The foreign ministers of Qatar and
Iran exchanged visits in May 2019 reportedly as part of a de-escalation effort.Iran exchanged visits in May 2019 reportedly as part of a de-escalation effort.3031 Qatar Qatar’'s foreign s foreign
ministry also criticized the May 30, 2019ministry also criticized the May 30, 2019, GCC and Arab summit declarations as too GCC and Arab summit declarations as too
confrontational with Iran.confrontational with Iran.3132 Qatar has not joined the U.S.-led maritime security mission intended Qatar has not joined the U.S.-led maritime security mission intended
to deter Iran from further attacks on commercial shipping in the Gulf; that effort has been joined to deter Iran from further attacks on commercial shipping in the Gulf; that effort has been joined
by Bahrain, UAE, and Saudi Arabia.by Bahrain, UAE, and Saudi Arabia.
Saudi official statements also cited QatarSaudi official statements also cited Qatar’'s alleged support for pro-Iranian dissidents in Bahrain s alleged support for pro-Iranian dissidents in Bahrain
as part of the justification for isolating Qatar in June 2017. Contributing to that Saudi perception as part of the justification for isolating Qatar in June 2017. Contributing to that Saudi perception
was Qatarwas Qatar’'s brokering in 2008 of the s brokering in 2008 of the “"Doha AgreementDoha Agreement”" to resolve a political crisis in Lebanon to resolve a political crisis in Lebanon
that led to clashes between Lebanon government forces and Hezbollah. Qatarthat led to clashes between Lebanon government forces and Hezbollah. Qatar’'s role as a mediator s role as a mediator
stemmed, at least in part, from Qatarstemmed, at least in part, from Qatar’'s role in helping reconstruct Lebanon after the 2006 Israel-s role in helping reconstruct Lebanon after the 2006 Israel-
Hezbollah war, and from then-Amir HamadHezbollah war, and from then-Amir Hamad’'s postwar visit to Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon. s postwar visit to Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon.
Further fueling Saudi and UAE suspicions was a 2017 Qatari payment to certain Iraqi Shiite Further fueling Saudi and UAE suspicions was a 2017 Qatari payment to certain Iraqi Shiite
militia factions of several hundred million dollars to release Qatari citizens, including royal militia factions of several hundred million dollars to release Qatari citizens, including royal
family members, who were kidnapped in 2016 while falcon hunting in southern Iraq.family members, who were kidnapped in 2016 while falcon hunting in southern Iraq.32
~~Egypt~~
33 Egypt In Egypt, after the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, a Muslim Brotherhood-In Egypt, after the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, a Muslim Brotherhood-
linked figure, Muhammad Morsi, won presidential elections in 2012. Qatar contributed about $5 linked figure, Muhammad Morsi, won presidential elections in 2012. Qatar contributed about $5
billion in aid,billion in aid,3334 aggravating a split between Qatar and the other GCC states over the Muslim aggravating a split between Qatar and the other GCC states over the Muslim
Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia and the UAE backed MorsiBrotherhood. Saudi Arabia and the UAE backed Morsi’'s ouster by Egypts ouster by Egypt’'s military in 2013. Because of its support for Morsi, Qatar'~~s military in 2013.~~

~~27 Al Arabiya, “Iran, Qatar Seek Improved Relations despite Differences,” June 19, 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/~~
~~en/News/middle-east/2015/06/19/Iran-Qatar-seek-improved-relations-despite-differences-.html.~~
~~28 “Iran, Qatar, Face Off Over North Field, South Pars. Oil and Gas News,” June 6-12, 2016.~~
~~http://www.oilandgasnewsworldwide.com/Article/35647/Iran,_Qatar_face_off_over_North_Field,_South_Pars.~~
~~29 https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/statements/statement-on-the-developments-of-the-iranian-nuclear-deal.~~
~~30 The Latest: Qatar trying to defuse tensions amid Iran crisis. Fox News, May 16, 2019.~~
~~https://www.foxnews.com/world/the-latest-qatar-trying-to-defuse-tensions-amid-iran-crisis.~~
~~31 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/qatar-expresses-reservations-mecca-summit-outcome-~~
~~190602192326096.html.~~
~~32 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/world/middleeast/big-ransom-and-syria-deals-win-release-of-royal-qatari-~~
~~hunters.html.~~
~~33 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final-PDF-English.pdf.~~
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~~Because of its support for Morsi, Qatar’~~s relations with former military leader and now President s relations with former military leader and now President
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have been strained, and Egypt joined the 2017 Saudi-led move against Qatar.Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have been strained, and Egypt joined the 2017 Saudi-led move against Qatar.
~~Libya~~
Libya In Libya, Qatar joined the United States and several GCC and other partner countries in air In Libya, Qatar joined the United States and several GCC and other partner countries in air
operations to help oust Qadhafi in 2011. Subsequently, Qatar has supported Muslim Brotherhood-operations to help oust Qadhafi in 2011. Subsequently, Qatar has supported Muslim Brotherhood-
linked factions in Libya that support the U.N.-backed government in Tripoli. The UAE, Egypt, linked factions in Libya that support the U.N.-backed government in Tripoli. The UAE, Egypt,
and Saudi Arabia support ex-military commander Khalifa Hifter, who has consolidated his control and Saudi Arabia support ex-military commander Khalifa Hifter, who has consolidated his control
of much of Libya over the past four years and is attempting to seize control of Tripoli too.of much of Libya over the past four years and is attempting to seize control of Tripoli too.3435 This This
difference in approaches in Libya among the GCC states contributed to the intra-GCC rift.difference in approaches in Libya among the GCC states contributed to the intra-GCC rift.
~~Yemen~~
Yemen In 2015, Qatar joined the Saudi-led military coalition that is battling Iran-backed Zaidi Shiite In 2015, Qatar joined the Saudi-led military coalition that is battling Iran-backed Zaidi Shiite
Houthi rebels in Yemen, including conducting air strikes against Houthi and allied positions. This Houthi rebels in Yemen, including conducting air strikes against Houthi and allied positions. This
was a departure from Qatarwas a departure from Qatar’'s 2006-2007 failed efforts to mediate between the Houthis and the s 2006-2007 failed efforts to mediate between the Houthis and the
government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who left office in 2012 following an government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who left office in 2012 following an “"Arab SpringArab Spring”-
"-related uprising in Yemen. In September 2015, Qatar deployed about 1,000 military personnel, related uprising in Yemen. In September 2015, Qatar deployed about 1,000 military personnel,
along with armor, to Yemen. The mission of the contingent was to guard the Saudi border from along with armor, to Yemen. The mission of the contingent was to guard the Saudi border from
incursion attempts by the Houthis and their allies. Four Qatar soldiers were killed fighting there. incursion attempts by the Houthis and their allies. Four Qatar soldiers were killed fighting there.
The Qatari Air Force did not participate in the Saudi-led effort by flying air strikes against Houthi The Qatari Air Force did not participate in the Saudi-led effort by flying air strikes against Houthi
positions, according to the Qatar Embassy in Washington positions, according to the Qatar Embassy in Washington ~~D.C.35~~DC.³⁶ As a result of the intra-GCC rift, As a result of the intra-GCC rift,
in mid-2017 Qatar withdrew from the Saudi-led military effort in Yemen.in mid-2017 Qatar withdrew from the Saudi-led military effort in Yemen.
Syria, Iraq, and Anti-Islamic State Operations
In Syria, Qatar provided funds and weaponry to rebels fighting the regime of President Bashar Al In Syria, Qatar provided funds and weaponry to rebels fighting the regime of President Bashar Al
Asad,Asad,3637 including those, such as Ahrar Al Sham, that competed with and sometimes fought anti- including those, such as Ahrar Al Sham, that competed with and sometimes fought anti-
Asad factions supported by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Qatar also built ties to Jabhat al Nusra Asad factions supported by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Qatar also built ties to Jabhat al Nusra
(JAN), an Al Qaeda affiliate that was designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist (JAN), an Al Qaeda affiliate that was designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO).Organization (FTO).3738 Qatari officials assert that their intent was to induce the group to sever its Qatari officials assert that their intent was to induce the group to sever its
ties to Al Qaeda, which it formally did in July 2016. Qatari mediation also obtained the release of ties to Al Qaeda, which it formally did in July 2016. Qatari mediation also obtained the release of
Lebanese and Western prisoners captured by that group. Although Asad regime gains in Syria Lebanese and Western prisoners captured by that group. Although Asad regime gains in Syria
likely render Qatarlikely render Qatar’'s involvement moot, Qatar has not, to date, followed Kuwait or Bahrain in s involvement moot, Qatar has not, to date, followed Kuwait or Bahrain in
reopening its embassy in Damascus.reopening its embassy in Damascus.3839 According to the State Department, Qatar has allowed According to the State Department, Qatar has allowed
20,000 Syrians fleeing the civil war there to retain residency in Qatar.20,000 Syrians fleeing the civil war there to retain residency in Qatar.
Qatar is a member of the U.S.-led coalition combating the Islamic State. In 2014, Qatar flew Qatar is a member of the U.S.-led coalition combating the Islamic State. In 2014, Qatar flew
some airstrikes in Syria against Islamic State positions. However, after several weeks, the some airstrikes in Syria against Islamic State positions. However, after several weeks, the
coalition ceased identifying Qatar as a participant in coalition strikes inside Syria. Neither Qatar coalition ceased identifying Qatar as a participant in coalition strikes inside Syria. Neither Qatar

~~34 U.N. Security Council. Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973~~
~~(2011). March 9, 2016. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/209.~~
~~35 Author conversations with Qatar Embassy personnel. 2019.~~
~~36 Mark Mazzetti and Matt Apuzzo, “U.S. Relies Heavily on Saudi Money to Support Syrian Rebels,” New York Times,~~
~~January 23, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/world/middleeast/us-relies-heavily-on-saudi-money-to-support-~~
~~syrian-rebels.html?_r=0.~~
~~37 Al Jazeera, December 2, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/lebanese-hostages-released-prisoner-swap-~~
~~151201072408599.html.~~
~~38 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/qatar-normalise-relations-syria-foreign-minister-190114080234797.html.~~
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nor any other GCC state participated in coalition air operations inside Iraq. In April 2017, Qatar nor any other GCC state participated in coalition air operations inside Iraq. In April 2017, Qatar
reportedly paid to obtain the release of 26 Qatari ruling family members abducted Iraqi Shia reportedly paid to obtain the release of 26 Qatari ruling family members abducted Iraqi Shia
militiamen while on a hunting trip in southern Iraq in 2015. The Iraqi government said in June militiamen while on a hunting trip in southern Iraq in 2015. The Iraqi government said in June
2017 that it, not Shia fighters, received the ransom.2017 that it, not Shia fighters, received the ransom.
~~Lebanon~~
Lebanon Qatar has sought to exert some influence in Lebanon, possibly as a counterweight to that exerted Qatar has sought to exert some influence in Lebanon, possibly as a counterweight to that exerted
by Saudi Arabia. In January 2019, Amir Tamim was one of the few regional leaders to attend an by Saudi Arabia. In January 2019, Amir Tamim was one of the few regional leaders to attend an
Arab League summit held in Beirut. In late January 2019, Qatar announced a $500 million Arab League summit held in Beirut. In late January 2019, Qatar announced a $500 million
investment in Lebanon government bonds to support that countryinvestment in Lebanon government bonds to support that country’'s ailing economy.s ailing economy.39
40 Israeli-Palestinian Issues/Hamas
Qatar has attempted to play a role in Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations by engaging all parties. Qatar has attempted to play a role in Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations by engaging all parties.
In directly engaging Israel, in 1996, then-Amir Hamad hosted a visit by then-Prime Minister of In directly engaging Israel, in 1996, then-Amir Hamad hosted a visit by then-Prime Minister of
Israel Shimon Peres and allowed Israel to open a formal trade office in Doha—going beyond the Israel Shimon Peres and allowed Israel to open a formal trade office in Doha—going beyond the
~~GCC’~~GCC's dropping in 1998 of the secondary Arab League boycott of Israel. In April 2008, then-s dropping in 1998 of the secondary Arab League boycott of Israel. In April 2008, then-
Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni attended the government-sponsored Doha Forum and met with Amir Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni attended the government-sponsored Doha Forum and met with Amir
Hamad.Hamad.4041 Qatar ordered the Israeli offices in Doha closed in January 2009 at the height of an Qatar ordered the Israeli offices in Doha closed in January 2009 at the height of an
Israel-Hamas conflict and the offices have not formally reopened. Still, small levels of direct Israel-Hamas conflict and the offices have not formally reopened. Still, small levels of direct
Israel-Qatar trade reportedly continue; Israeli exports to Qatar consist mostly of machinery and Israel-Qatar trade reportedly continue; Israeli exports to Qatar consist mostly of machinery and
technology, and imports from Qatar are primarily plastics.technology, and imports from Qatar are primarily plastics.4142 Amir Tamim regularly accuses Israel Amir Tamim regularly accuses Israel
of abuses against the Palestinians and expresses consistent support for Palestinian efforts for full of abuses against the Palestinians and expresses consistent support for Palestinian efforts for full
United Nations membership and recognition, while at the same time backing negotiations United Nations membership and recognition, while at the same time backing negotiations
between the Palestinians and Israel.between the Palestinians and Israel.42
43 Qatar has also engaged the Islamist group Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot that openly Qatar has also engaged the Islamist group Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot that openly
rejects a negotiated settlement with Israel and has exercised de facto control of the Gaza Strip rejects a negotiated settlement with Israel and has exercised de facto control of the Gaza Strip
since 2007. Qatari officials assert that their engagement with Hamas can help broker since 2007. Qatari officials assert that their engagement with Hamas can help broker
reconciliation between Hamas and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA), as well as an overall reconciliation between Hamas and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA), as well as an overall
Israeli-Palestinian peace. U.S. officials have told Members of Congress that QatarIsraeli-Palestinian peace. U.S. officials have told Members of Congress that Qatar’'s leverage over s leverage over
Hamas, which comes in the form of vast financial aid it provides to the people of Gaza, can be Hamas, which comes in the form of vast financial aid it provides to the people of Gaza, can be
helpful to reducing conflict between Hamas and Israel. Qatar has pledged that none of its helpful to reducing conflict between Hamas and Israel. Qatar has pledged that none of its
assistance to the Palestinians—funneled through a assistance to the Palestinians—funneled through a “"Gaza Reconstruction CommitteeGaza Reconstruction Committee" headed by headed by
Qatari official Mohammad Al-Emadi—goes directly to Hamas.Qatari official Mohammad Al-Emadi—goes directly to Hamas.4344 Press reports say that Israeli Press reports say that Israeli
officials have not publicly objected to Qatarofficials have not publicly objected to Qatar’'s Gaza aid, apparently viewing the funds as promoting calm on the Israel-Gaza border.⁴⁵~~s Gaza aid, apparently viewing the funds as~~

~~39 “Making a Levantine Comeback: Qatar Boost Bonds with Lebanon with $500 million investment. Alaraby.co.uk.~~
~~January 21, 2019.~~
~~40 “Qatar and Israel: A Strategic but Complicated Alliance.” Fanack Chronicle of the Middle East and North Africa.~~
~~April 27, 2013.~~
~~41 Ibid.~~
~~42 “Israel Doesn’t Want Peace: Emir.” Qatar The Peninsula, September 29, 2015. http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/~~
~~news/qatar/353598/israel-doesn-t-want-peace-emir.~~
~~43 Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, to Rep. Peter Roskam. November 21,~~
~~2014.~~
~~http://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20160807073259/http:/roskam.house.gov/sites/roskam.house.gov/files/State%20Dept%20~~
~~Response%20to%20Qatar%20Inquiry.pdf.~~
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~~promoting calm on the Israel-Gaza border.44~~ Qatar reportedly asked former Hamas political Qatar reportedly asked former Hamas political
bureau chief Khalid Meshal to leave Qatar after the intra-GCC rift erupted, apparently to bureau chief Khalid Meshal to leave Qatar after the intra-GCC rift erupted, apparently to
accommodate the blockading states. Qataraccommodate the blockading states. Qatar’'s critics assert that Hamas leaders are too often s critics assert that Hamas leaders are too often
featured on Al Jazeera and that Qatarfeatured on Al Jazeera and that Qatar’'s relations with Hamas constitute support for a terrorist s relations with Hamas constitute support for a terrorist
organization. In the organization. In the ~~115th~~115^th Congress, the Palestinian International Terrorism Support Act of 2017 Congress, the Palestinian International Terrorism Support Act of 2017
((H.R. 2712), which was ordered to be reported to the full House on November 15, 2017, appeared H.R. 2712), which was ordered to be reported to the full House on November 15, 2017, appeared
directed at Qatar by sanctioning foreign governments determined to be providing financial or directed at Qatar by sanctioning foreign governments determined to be providing financial or
other material support to Hamas or its leaders. A version of that bill introduced in the other material support to Hamas or its leaders. A version of that bill introduced in the ~~116th~~
116^th Congress, H.R. 1850, does not directly reference Qatar as supporting Hamas and contains Congress, H.R. 1850, does not directly reference Qatar as supporting Hamas and contains
sanctions exceptions if aid to Hamas or related groups is purely humanitarian in nature.sanctions exceptions if aid to Hamas or related groups is purely humanitarian in nature.4546 The bill The bill
passed the House on July 23, 2019passed the House on July 23, 2019, by voice vote. by voice vote.
As have the other Gulf states, Qatar has sought to compensate for a curtailment of U.S. As have the other Gulf states, Qatar has sought to compensate for a curtailment of U.S.
contributions to the U.N. Relief Works Agency (UNRWA). In April 2018, Qatar donated $50 contributions to the U.N. Relief Works Agency (UNRWA). In April 2018, Qatar donated $50
million to that agency. In December 2018, Qatar reached a two-year agreement with UNRWA to million to that agency. In December 2018, Qatar reached a two-year agreement with UNRWA to
donate to that agencydonate to that agency’'s programs in education and health care.s programs in education and health care.
Afghanistan/Taliban Office
Qatari forces did not join any U.S.-led operations inside Afghanistan, but its facilities and forces Qatari forces did not join any U.S.-led operations inside Afghanistan, but its facilities and forces
support U.S. operations there, and Qatar has brokered talks between the United States and Taliban support U.S. operations there, and Qatar has brokered talks between the United States and Taliban
representatives. Unlike Saudi Arabia and UAE, Qatar did not recognize the Taliban as the representatives. Unlike Saudi Arabia and UAE, Qatar did not recognize the Taliban as the
legitimate government of Kabul when the movement ruled during 1996-2001. In June 2013, the legitimate government of Kabul when the movement ruled during 1996-2001. In June 2013, the
Taliban opened a representative office in Qatar, but it violated U.S.-Qatar-Taliban understandings Taliban opened a representative office in Qatar, but it violated U.S.-Qatar-Taliban understandings
by raising a flag of the former Taliban regime on the building and Qatar, at U.S. request, by raising a flag of the former Taliban regime on the building and Qatar, at U.S. request,
immediately closed the office. Taliban officials remained in Qatar, and revived U.S.-Taliban talks immediately closed the office. Taliban officials remained in Qatar, and revived U.S.-Taliban talks
led to the May 31, 2014, exchange of captured U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl for five Taliban led to the May 31, 2014, exchange of captured U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl for five Taliban
figures held by the United States at the prison facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The five were figures held by the United States at the prison facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The five were
banned from traveling outside Qatar until there is an agreed solution that would ensure that they banned from traveling outside Qatar until there is an agreed solution that would ensure that they
could not rejoin the Taliban insurgency. In November 2018, the five joined the Taliban could not rejoin the Taliban insurgency. In November 2018, the five joined the Taliban
representative office in Doha.representative office in Doha.
Qatar permitted the Taliban office in Qatar to formally reopen in 2015.Qatar permitted the Taliban office in Qatar to formally reopen in 2015.4647 Since mid-2018, U.S.- Since mid-2018, U.S.-
Taliban talks, with increasing levels of intensity, have taken place in Doha between Taliban Taliban talks, with increasing levels of intensity, have taken place in Doha between Taliban
negotiators and the U.S. special envoy for Afghanistan, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. The negotiators and the U.S. special envoy for Afghanistan, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. The
diplomatic benefits Qatar might have expected from a U.S.-Taliban deal eroded in August 2019 diplomatic benefits Qatar might have expected from a U.S.-Taliban deal eroded in August 2019
when President Trump called off further talks with the Taliban.when President Trump called off further talks with the Taliban.
Qatar might also have some contacts with the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Qatar might also have some contacts with the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO) that is allied with the Taliban. In January 2016, Qatari mediation Terrorist Organization (FTO) that is allied with the Taliban. In January 2016, Qatari mediation
reportedly caused the Haqqani Network to release a Canadian hostage, Colin Rutherford.reportedly caused the Haqqani Network to release a Canadian hostage, Colin Rutherford.47
48 In January 2018, QatarIn January 2018, Qatar’'s air force completed the first two flights of its C-17 (Globemaster) cargo s air force completed the first two flights of its C-17 (Globemaster) cargo
aircraft to Afghanistan and back. According to then-Defense Secretary Mattis, the flights provided aircraft to Afghanistan and back. According to then-Defense Secretary Mattis, the flights provided
logistical support to the NATO logistical support to the NATO ~~“counterterrorism”~~"counterterrorism" campaign there. Other Qatari Relationships and Mediation Efforts⁴⁹

Somewhat outside the traditional Middle East:

Qatar has played an active role in mediating conflict over Sudan' ~~campaign there.~~

~~44 Neville Teller. “What Do You Make of Qatar?” The Jerusalem Post, September 19, 2019.~~
~~45 “Eliot Engel Weakens Hamas Sanctions Bill After Lobbying from Qatar.” New York Post, September 21, 2019.~~
~~46 Author meeting with Pugwash representatives, June 2015.~~
~~47 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/us/politics/militants-free-american-woman-and-family-held-for-5-years-in-~~
~~afghanistan.html.~~
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~~Other Qatari Relationships and Mediation Efforts48~~
~~Somewhat outside the traditional Middle East:~~
~~ Qatar has played an active role in mediating conflict over Sudan’s Darfur region.~~
s Darfur region. In 2010, Qatar, including through grants and promises of investment, helped In 2010, Qatar, including through grants and promises of investment, helped
broker a series of agreements, collectively known as the Doha Agreements, broker a series of agreements, collectively known as the Doha Agreements,
between the government and various rebel factions. In March 2018, Qatar and between the government and various rebel factions. In March 2018, Qatar and
Sudan signed an agreement to jointly invest $4 billion to develop the Red Sea Sudan signed an agreement to jointly invest $4 billion to develop the Red Sea
port of Suakin off Sudanport of Suakin off Sudan’'s coast. Qatars coast. Qatar’'s influence in Sudan in the aftermath of s influence in Sudan in the aftermath of
the ouster of longtime President Omar Hassan Al Bashir in 2019 is unclear.the ouster of longtime President Omar Hassan Al Bashir in 2019 is unclear.
 Qatar has forged relationships with several countries in Central Asia.Qatar has forged relationships with several countries in Central Asia.4950 Amir Amir
Tamim has exchanged leadership visits with the President of Turkmenistan, Tamim has exchanged leadership visits with the President of Turkmenistan,
Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov in 2016 and 2017. The two countries are major Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov in 2016 and 2017. The two countries are major
world gas suppliers. The leader of Tajikistan, Imamali Rahmonov, visited Doha world gas suppliers. The leader of Tajikistan, Imamali Rahmonov, visited Doha
in February 2017 to reportedly discuss Qatari investment and other joint projects. in February 2017 to reportedly discuss Qatari investment and other joint projects.
Qatar funded a large portion of a $100 million mosque in Dushanbe, which Qatar funded a large portion of a $100 million mosque in Dushanbe, which
purports to be the largest mosque in Central Asia.purports to be the largest mosque in Central Asia.
U.S.-Qatar Defense and Security Cooperation
U.S.-Qatar defense and security relations are long-standing, extensive, and still expanding—a U.S.-Qatar defense and security relations are long-standing, extensive, and still expanding—a
characterization emphasized by senior U.S. officials in the course of the two U.S.-Qatar characterization emphasized by senior U.S. officials in the course of the two U.S.-Qatar
“"Strategic DialogueStrategic Dialogue”" sessions in January 2018 and in January 2019. Senior U.S. officials have sessions in January 2018 and in January 2019. Senior U.S. officials have
praised Qatar as praised Qatar as “"a longtime friend and military partner for peace and stability in the Middle East a longtime friend and military partner for peace and stability in the Middle East
and a supporter of NATOand a supporter of NATO’'s mission in Afghanistan.s mission in Afghanistan.~~”50~~
"⁵¹ The U.S-Qatar defense relationship emerged during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. The six Gulf The U.S-Qatar defense relationship emerged during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. The six Gulf
monarchies formed the GCC in late 1981 and collectively backed Iraq against the threat posed by monarchies formed the GCC in late 1981 and collectively backed Iraq against the threat posed by
Iran in that war, despite their political and ideological differences with IraqIran in that war, despite their political and ideological differences with Iraq’'s Saddam Hussein. In s Saddam Hussein. In
the latter stages of that war, Iran attacked international shipping in the Gulf and some Gulf state the latter stages of that war, Iran attacked international shipping in the Gulf and some Gulf state
oil loading facilities, but none in Qatar.oil loading facilities, but none in Qatar.
After Iraq invaded GCC member Kuwait in August 1990, the GCC participated in the U.S.-led After Iraq invaded GCC member Kuwait in August 1990, the GCC participated in the U.S.-led
military coalition that expelled Iraq from Kuwait in February 1991. In January 1991, Qatari military coalition that expelled Iraq from Kuwait in February 1991. In January 1991, Qatari
armored forces helped coalition troops defeat an Iraqi attack on the Saudi town of Khafji. The armored forces helped coalition troops defeat an Iraqi attack on the Saudi town of Khafji. The
Qatari participation in that war ended U.S.-Qatar strains over QatarQatari participation in that war ended U.S.-Qatar strains over Qatar’'s illicit procurement in the s illicit procurement in the
late 1980s of U.S.-made late 1980s of U.S.-made ~~“Stinger”~~"Stinger" shoulder-held antiaircraft missiles. shoulder-held antiaircraft missiles.5152 U.S.-Qatar defense U.S.-Qatar defense
relations subsequently deepened and the two countries signed a formal defense cooperation relations subsequently deepened and the two countries signed a formal defense cooperation
agreement (DCA). Then-U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Joseph Votel agreement (DCA). Then-U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Joseph Votel
testified on February 27, 2018, that U.S. operations have not been affected by the intra-GCC rift.testified on February 27, 2018, that U.S. operations have not been affected by the intra-GCC rift.

~~48 For more information on Qatar’s mediation efforts, see Sultan Barakat, Brookings Doha Center publication “Qataru~~
~~Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final-PDF-~~
~~English.pdf.~~
~~49 See Natalie Koch. Qatar and Central Asia. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 484, 2017.~~
~~50 Ibid.~~
~~51 Elaine Sciolino. “Qatar Rejects U.S. Demand for Return of Illicit Stingers.” New York Times, June 28, 1988.~~
~~Congress responded to the Qatari Stinger acquisition by enacting a ban on arms sales to Qatar (Section 566(d) of P.L.~~
~~100-461). The ban was repealed by Section 568 of the foreign aid appropriations act for FY1991 (P.L. 101-513).~~
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Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)
The United States and Qatar signed a formal defense cooperation agreement (DCA) on June 23, The United States and Qatar signed a formal defense cooperation agreement (DCA) on June 23,
1992. The DCA was renewed for 10 years, reportedly with some modifications, in December 1992. The DCA was renewed for 10 years, reportedly with some modifications, in December
2013. The text of the pact is classified, but it reportedly addresses U.S. military access to Qatari 2013. The text of the pact is classified, but it reportedly addresses U.S. military access to Qatari
military facilities, prepositioning of U.S. armor and other military equipment, and U.S. training of military facilities, prepositioning of U.S. armor and other military equipment, and U.S. training of
~~Qatar’~~Qatar's military forces.s military forces.52
53 Up to 11,000 U.S. and allied troops are deployed at the various facilities in Qatar, including Al Up to 11,000 U.S. and allied troops are deployed at the various facilities in Qatar, including Al
Udeid Air Base, discussed further below. The U.S. Army component of U.S. Central Command Udeid Air Base, discussed further below. The U.S. Army component of U.S. Central Command
prepositions armor (enough to outfit one brigade) at Camp As Sayliyah outside Doha.prepositions armor (enough to outfit one brigade) at Camp As Sayliyah outside Doha.53 54 U.S. U.S.
armor stationed in Qatar was deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom that removed Saddam Hussein armor stationed in Qatar was deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom that removed Saddam Hussein
from power in Iraq in 2003.from power in Iraq in 2003.
The DCA also reportedly addresses U.S. training of QatarThe DCA also reportedly addresses U.S. training of Qatar’'s military. Qatars military. Qatar’'s force of about s force of about
12,000 is the smallest in the region except for Bahrain. Of that force, about 8,500 are ground 12,000 is the smallest in the region except for Bahrain. Of that force, about 8,500 are ground
forces, 1,800 are naval forces, and 1,500 are air forces. A 2014 law mandates four months (three forces, 1,800 are naval forces, and 1,500 are air forces. A 2014 law mandates four months (three
months for students) of military training for males between the ages of 18 and 35, with a reserve months for students) of military training for males between the ages of 18 and 35, with a reserve
commitment of 10 years (up to age 40). Then-CENTCOM commander General Votelcommitment of 10 years (up to age 40). Then-CENTCOM commander General Votel’'s February s February
2018 testimony stated that Qatar is seeking to expand its military both in size and capacity.2018 testimony stated that Qatar is seeking to expand its military both in size and capacity.
Al Udeid Expansion/Permanent U.S. Basing in Qatar?54
55 About 10,000 are U.S. Air Force personnel based at the large Al Udeid air base southwest of About 10,000 are U.S. Air Force personnel based at the large Al Udeid air base southwest of
Doha, working as part of the Coalition Forward Air Component Command (CFACC).Doha, working as part of the Coalition Forward Air Component Command (CFACC).5556 Al Udeid Al Udeid
Base also hosts the forward headquarters for CENTCOMBase also hosts the forward headquarters for CENTCOM. The U.S. personnel deployed to Qatar The U.S. personnel deployed to Qatar
participate in U.S. operations such as Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State participate in U.S. operations such as Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State
organization and Operation Freedomorganization and Operation Freedom’'s Sentinel in Afghanistan, and they provide a substantial s Sentinel in Afghanistan, and they provide a substantial
capability against Iran. Some of the additional forces sent by the United States to the region in the capability against Iran. Some of the additional forces sent by the United States to the region in the
context of mid-2019 tensions with Iran have been deployed to Qatar, including F-22 combat context of mid-2019 tensions with Iran have been deployed to Qatar, including F-22 combat
aircraft and associated personnel.aircraft and associated personnel.
The January 2018 Strategic Dialogue resulted in a number of U.S.-Qatar announcements of The January 2018 Strategic Dialogue resulted in a number of U.S.-Qatar announcements of
expanded defense and security cooperation, including Qatari offers to fund capital expenditures expanded defense and security cooperation, including Qatari offers to fund capital expenditures
that offer the possibility of an that offer the possibility of an ~~“enduring”~~"enduring" U.S. military presence in Qatar and to discuss the U.S. military presence in Qatar and to discuss the
possibility of possibility of “"permanent [U.S.] basingpermanent [U.S.] basing”" there. To enable an enduring U.S. presence, Qatar is there. To enable an enduring U.S. presence, Qatar is
expanding and enhance Al Udeid over the next two decades—an effort that would facilitate an expanding and enhance Al Udeid over the next two decades—an effort that would facilitate an
enduring U.S. presence there. On July 24, 2018, the U.S. and Qatari military attended a enduring U.S. presence there. On July 24, 2018, the U.S. and Qatari military attended a
groundbreaking ceremony for the Al Udeid expansion, which will include over 200 housing units groundbreaking ceremony for the Al Udeid expansion, which will include over 200 housing units
for families of officers and expansion of the basefor families of officers and expansion of the base’'s ramps and cargo facilities. On January 24, s ramps and cargo facilities. On January 24,
2019, in the course of the second U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue, the Qatar Ministry of Defense 2019, in the course of the second U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue, the Qatar Ministry of Defense
and the U.S. Department of Defense signed a memorandum of understanding that DOD referred and the U.S. Department of Defense signed a memorandum of understanding that DOD referred
to as a to as a “"positive step towards the eventual formalization of Qatarpositive step towards the eventual formalization of Qatar’'s commitment to support sustainment costs and future infrastructure costs at [Al Udeid Air Base]."⁵⁷~~s commitment to support~~

~~52 U.S. Library of Congress. Country Studies: Persian Gulf States. Some provisions of DCA’s with other GCC states~~
~~are discussed in Sami Hajjar, U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. Army War College:~~
~~Strategic Studies Institute), March 2002, p. 27.~~
~~53 See Global Security.org at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-as-sayliyah.htm.~~
~~54 Department of State. Joint Statement of the Inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue. January 30, 2018.~~
~~55 “Biggest U.S. Base in Middle East is Getting Bigger.” Washington Post, August 24, 2019.~~
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~~sustainment costs and future infrastructure costs at [Al Udeid Air Base].”56~~ Qatar has also Qatar has also
extended the Hamad Port to be able to accommodate U.S. Navy operations were there a U.S. extended the Hamad Port to be able to accommodate U.S. Navy operations were there a U.S.
decision to base such operations in Qatar.decision to base such operations in Qatar.57
58 Al Udeid has been steadily expanded and enhanced with Qatari funding (over $8 billion to Al Udeid has been steadily expanded and enhanced with Qatari funding (over $8 billion to
support U.S. and coalition operations at Al Udeid since 2002) and about $450 million in U.S. support U.S. and coalition operations at Al Udeid since 2002) and about $450 million in U.S.
military construction funding since 2003.military construction funding since 2003.5859 Qatar reportedly is providing another $1.8 billion for Qatar reportedly is providing another $1.8 billion for
the Al Udeid expansion plan.the Al Udeid expansion plan.5960 In March 2018, the State Department approved the sale to Qatar of In March 2018, the State Department approved the sale to Qatar of
equipment, with an estimated value of about $200 million, to upgrade the Air Operation Center at equipment, with an estimated value of about $200 million, to upgrade the Air Operation Center at
Al Udeid.Al Udeid.
U.S. Arms Sales to Qatar
QatarQatar’'s forces continue to field mostly French-made equipment, such as the AMX-30 main battle s forces continue to field mostly French-made equipment, such as the AMX-30 main battle
tank, but Qatar is increasingly shifting its weaponry mix to U.S.-made equipment.tank, but Qatar is increasingly shifting its weaponry mix to U.S.-made equipment.6061 According to According to
General VotelGeneral Votel’'s February 27, 2018, testimony, Qatar is currently the second-largest U.S. Foreign s February 27, 2018, testimony, Qatar is currently the second-largest U.S. Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) customer, with $25 billion in new FMS cases. And, Qatar is Military Sales (FMS) customer, with $25 billion in new FMS cases. And, Qatar is “"on trackon track”" to to
surpass $40 billion in the next five years with additional FMS purchases. The joint statement of surpass $40 billion in the next five years with additional FMS purchases. The joint statement of
the U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue in January 2018 said that Qatari FMS purchases had resulted in the U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue in January 2018 said that Qatari FMS purchases had resulted in
over 110,000 American jobs and the sustainment of critical U.S. military capabilities.over 110,000 American jobs and the sustainment of critical U.S. military capabilities.
 Tanks. Qatar Qatar’'s 30 main battle tanks are French-made AMX-30s. In 2015, s 30 main battle tanks are French-made AMX-30s. In 2015,
Germany exported several Germany exported several “"Leopard 2Leopard 2”" tanks to Qatar. Qatar has not purchased tanks to Qatar. Qatar has not purchased
U.S.-made tanks, to date.U.S.-made tanks, to date.
 Combat Aircraft. Qatar currently has only 18 combat aircraft, of which 12 are Qatar currently has only 18 combat aircraft, of which 12 are
French-made Mirage 2000s. To redress that deficiency, in 2013 Qatar requested French-made Mirage 2000s. To redress that deficiency, in 2013 Qatar requested
to buy 72 U.S.-made F-15s. After evaluating the potential sale against the U.S. to buy 72 U.S.-made F-15s. After evaluating the potential sale against the U.S.
commitment to Israelcommitment to Israel~~’s “~~'s "Qualitative Military EdgeQualitative Military Edge”" (QME), on November 17, (QME), on November 17,
2016, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of 2016, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of
the potential sale, which has an estimated value of $21 billion.the potential sale, which has an estimated value of $21 billion.6162 On June 14, On June 14,
2017, the United States and Qatar signed an agreement for a reported 36 of the F-2017, the United States and Qatar signed an agreement for a reported 36 of the F-
15 fighters, which predated then-Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman 15 fighters, which predated then-Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman
Senator Bob CorkerSenator Bob Corker’'s June 26, 2017 announcement that he would not provide s June 26, 2017 announcement that he would not provide
informal concurrence to arms sales to the GCC countries until the intra-GCC rift informal concurrence to arms sales to the GCC countries until the intra-GCC rift
was resolved. That hold was dropped on February 8, 2018. In December 2017, was resolved. That hold was dropped on February 8, 2018. In December 2017,
the Defense Department announced that Qatar would buy the second tranche of the Defense Department announced that Qatar would buy the second tranche of
36 F-15s under the sale agreement. Deliveries of all aircraft are to be completed 36 F-15s under the sale agreement. Deliveries of all aircraft are to be completed
by the end of 2022. Qatar signed a $7 billion agreement in May 2015 to purchase by the end of 2022. Qatar signed a $7 billion agreement in May 2015 to purchase
24 French-made Rafale aircraft,24 French-made Rafale aircraft,6263 and, in September 2017, a and, in September 2017, a “"Statement of Intent"~~Statement of~~

~~56 Department of Defense. “U.S. and Qatar sign MoU Reaffirming Qatar’s Commitment to Supporting U.S. Military~~
~~Activities at Al Udeid Air Base.”~~
~~57 Qatar Defense Attache in Washington, DC, press release, July 24, 2018.~~
~~58 Figures compiled by CRS.~~
~~59 “Biggest U.S. Base in Middle East is Getting Bigger.” Op.cit.~~
~~60 Information on Qatar’s existing military forces and equipment is derived from The International Institute for~~
~~Strategic Studies (IISS). “The Military Balance: 2016.” Chapter 7: The Middle East and North Africa.~~
~~61 DSCA Transmittal Number 16-58. The FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1278 of P.L. 114-92)~~
~~required a DOD briefing for Congress on the sale, including its effect on Israel’s QME.~~
~~62 Tom Hussain. “Is France Positioning Itself for Lead Role in Persian Gulf?” McClatchy, May 1, 2015; “Senators~~
~~Begin Push for Jet Sales to Kuwait, Qatar.” Defense News, January 22, 2016.~~
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~~Intent”~~ with Britain to purchase 24 Typhoon combat aircraft. Dassault began with Britain to purchase 24 Typhoon combat aircraft. Dassault began
delivering on the Rafale order in February 2019.delivering on the Rafale order in February 2019.
~~Attack Helicopters~~ Attack Helicopters. In 2012, the United States sold Qatar AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and . In 2012, the United States sold Qatar AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and
related equipment; UH-60 M Blackhawk helicopters; and MH-60 Seahawk helicopters. The total related equipment; UH-60 M Blackhawk helicopters; and MH-60 Seahawk helicopters. The total
potential value of the sales was estimated at about $6.6 billion. On April 9, 2018, DSCA potential value of the sales was estimated at about $6.6 billion. On April 9, 2018, DSCA
announced that the State Department had approved a sale to Qatar of 5,000 Advanced Precision announced that the State Department had approved a sale to Qatar of 5,000 Advanced Precision
Kill Weapons Systems II Guidance Sections for use on the Apaches, with an estimated value of Kill Weapons Systems II Guidance Sections for use on the Apaches, with an estimated value of
$300 million. On May 9, 2019, DSCA notified Congress of a possible sale of another 24 AH-64E $300 million. On May 9, 2019, DSCA notified Congress of a possible sale of another 24 AH-64E
Apaches and related munitions and night vision gear. The justification is to help Qatar meet its Apaches and related munitions and night vision gear. The justification is to help Qatar meet its
requirements for close air support, armed reconnaissance, and anti-tank warfare missions, in part requirements for close air support, armed reconnaissance, and anti-tank warfare missions, in part
to help defend Qatarto help defend Qatar’'s oil and gas infrastructure platforms. The estimated cost of the potential s oil and gas infrastructure platforms. The estimated cost of the potential
sale is $3 billion. S.J.Res. 26 was introduced on May 14, 2019, to prohibit the sale. On June 12, sale is $3 billion. S.J.Res. 26 was introduced on May 14, 2019, to prohibit the sale. On June 12,
the Administration issued a statement strongly opposing S.J.Res. 26 and stating that if it is the Administration issued a statement strongly opposing S.J.Res. 26 and stating that if it is
adopted, the Presidentadopted, the President’'s advisers would recommend a veto. A motion to discharge the bill on June s advisers would recommend a veto. A motion to discharge the bill on June
13, 201913, 2019, failed 42-57. failed 42-57.
 Short-Range Missile and Rocket Systems. Various suppliers have provided the Various suppliers have provided the
country with short-range missile and rocket systems suited primarily for ground country with short-range missile and rocket systems suited primarily for ground
operations. During 2012-2016, the United States sold Qatar Hellfire air-to-ground operations. During 2012-2016, the United States sold Qatar Hellfire air-to-ground
missiles, Javelin guided missiles, the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket missiles, Javelin guided missiles, the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket
System (HIMARS), the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and the System (HIMARS), the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and the
M31A1 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS). The total potential M31A1 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS). The total potential
value of the sales was estimated at about $665 million. On April 22, 2016, DSCA value of the sales was estimated at about $665 million. On April 22, 2016, DSCA
notified to Congress a potential sale to Qatar of 252 RIM-116C Rolling Airframe notified to Congress a potential sale to Qatar of 252 RIM-116C Rolling Airframe
Tactical Missiles and 2 RIM 116C-2 Rolling Airframe Telemetry Missiles, plus Tactical Missiles and 2 RIM 116C-2 Rolling Airframe Telemetry Missiles, plus
associated equipment and support, with an estimated sale value of $260 million.associated equipment and support, with an estimated sale value of $260 million.63
64 On November 27, 2018, DSCA notified Congress of a State Department approval On November 27, 2018, DSCA notified Congress of a State Department approval
of a commercial sale by Raytheon of 40 National Advanced Surface-to-Air of a commercial sale by Raytheon of 40 National Advanced Surface-to-Air
Missile Systems (Missile Systems (~~NASAMS~~NASAM) at an estimated value of $215 million) at an estimated value of $215 million.
 , and the July 9, 2019, joint Trump-Tamim statement said Qatar had recommitted to that purchase. On July 10, 2019, Raytheon announced that Qatar will be the first country to purchases its Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile—Extended Range (AMRAAM-ER) weapon.⁶⁵ Ballistic Missiles. At its national day parade in Doha in December 2017, the . At its national day parade in Doha in December 2017, the
Qatari military displayed its newly purchased SY 400-BP-12A ballistic missile, Qatari military displayed its newly purchased SY 400-BP-12A ballistic missile,
which has a 120-mile range and is considered suited to a surface attack mission. which has a 120-mile range and is considered suited to a surface attack mission.
The display was widely viewed as an effort to demonstrate to the Saudi-led bloc The display was widely viewed as an effort to demonstrate to the Saudi-led bloc
~~Qatar’~~Qatar's capabilities to resist pressure.s capabilities to resist pressure.64
 66 Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Systems. Qatar has purchased various U.S.-. Qatar has purchased various U.S.-
made BMD systems, consistent with U.S. efforts to promote a coordinated Gulf made BMD systems, consistent with U.S. efforts to promote a coordinated Gulf
missile defense capability against Iranmissile defense capability against Iran’'s missile arsenal. In 2012, the United s missile arsenal. In 2012, the United
States sold Qatar Patriot Configuration 3 (PAC-3, made by Raytheon) fire units States sold Qatar Patriot Configuration 3 (PAC-3, made by Raytheon) fire units
and missiles at an estimated value of nearly $10 billion. Also that year, the and missiles at an estimated value of nearly $10 billion. Also that year, the
United States agreed to sell Qatar the Terminal High Altitude Area Air Defense United States agreed to sell Qatar the Terminal High Altitude Area Air Defense
(THAAD), the most sophisticated ground-based missile defense system the (THAAD), the most sophisticated ground-based missile defense system the
United States has made available for sale.United States has made available for sale.6567 However, because of Qatar However, because of Qatar’'s budget ~~s budget~~

~~63 Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Transmittal Number 16-07.~~
~~64 Why is Qatar Showing Off its New Short-Range Ballistic Missile Arsenal?” Al Arabiya English, December 20, 2017.~~
~~65 Defense Security Cooperation Agency announcement. November 5, 2012. http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/~~
~~qatar-terminal-high-altitude-area-defense-thaad.~~
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difficulties and operational concerns, the THAAD sale has not been finalized.difficulties and operational concerns, the THAAD sale has not been finalized.66
68 In February 2017, Raytheon concluded an agreement to sell Qatar an early In February 2017, Raytheon concluded an agreement to sell Qatar an early
warning radar system to improve the capabilities of its existing missile defense warning radar system to improve the capabilities of its existing missile defense
systems, with an estimated value of $1.1 billion. In December 2017, the Defense systems, with an estimated value of $1.1 billion. In December 2017, the Defense
Department awarded Raytheon a $150 million contract to provide Qatar with Department awarded Raytheon a $150 million contract to provide Qatar with
services and support for its PAC-3 system. The joint statement from the meeting services and support for its PAC-3 system. The joint statement from the meeting
between President Trump and Amir Tamim on July 9, 2019between President Trump and Amir Tamim on July 9, 2019, states that the Qatar states that the Qatar
Ministry of Defense has committed to acquire additional Patriot systemsMinistry of Defense has committed to acquire additional Patriot systems.
 , with an estimated value of about $2 billion. Naval Vessels. In August 2016, DSCA transmitted a proposed sale to Qatar of an In August 2016, DSCA transmitted a proposed sale to Qatar of an
unspecified number of U.S.-made Mk-V fast patrol boats, along with other unspecified number of U.S.-made Mk-V fast patrol boats, along with other
equipment, with a total estimated value of about $124 million. In August 2017, equipment, with a total estimated value of about $124 million. In August 2017,
Qatar finalized a purchase from Italy of four multirole corvette ships, two fast Qatar finalized a purchase from Italy of four multirole corvette ships, two fast
patrol missile ships, and an amphibious logistics ship, with an estimated value of patrol missile ships, and an amphibious logistics ship, with an estimated value of
over $5 billion.over $5 billion.67
69 Other Defense Partnerships
Qatar has also developed relations with NATO under the Qatar has also developed relations with NATO under the “"Istanbul Cooperation InitiativeIstanbul Cooperation Initiative”" (ICI). (ICI).
~~Qatar’~~Qatar's Ambassador to Belgium serves as the interlocutor with NATO, the headquarters of which s Ambassador to Belgium serves as the interlocutor with NATO, the headquarters of which
is based near Brussels. In June 2018, Qataris based near Brussels. In June 2018, Qatar’'s Defense Minister said that his countrys Defense Minister said that his country’'s long-term s long-term
strategic strategic ~~“ambition”~~"ambition" is to join NATO. is to join NATO.68
~~France~~
70 France As noted above, Qatar has historically bought most of its major combat systems from France. On As noted above, Qatar has historically bought most of its major combat systems from France. On
March 28, 2019, French Prime Minister Edouard Phillipe visited Doha and signed with QatarMarch 28, 2019, French Prime Minister Edouard Phillipe visited Doha and signed with Qatar’s
's Defense and Interior Minister five agreements to boost ties. The agreements focused on defense Defense and Interior Minister five agreements to boost ties. The agreements focused on defense
information exchange, cooperation to combat cybercrime, and culture and education.information exchange, cooperation to combat cybercrime, and culture and education.69
~~Turkey~~
~~Qatar’~~71 Turkey Qatar's defense relationship with Turkey has become an element in Qatars defense relationship with Turkey has become an element in Qatar’'s efforts to resist the s efforts to resist the
Saudi-led pressure in the intra-GCC crisis. In 2014, Qatar allowed Turkey—a country that, like Saudi-led pressure in the intra-GCC crisis. In 2014, Qatar allowed Turkey—a country that, like
Qatar, often supports Muslim Brotherhood—to open a military base (Tariq bin Ziyad base) in Qatar, often supports Muslim Brotherhood—to open a military base (Tariq bin Ziyad base) in
Qatar,Qatar,7072 an initiative that might have contributed to Turkey an initiative that might have contributed to Turkey’'s support for Qatar in the June 2017 s support for Qatar in the June 2017
intra-GCC rift. One of the intra-GCC rift. One of the “"13 demands13 demands”" of the Saudi-led bloc has been that Qatar close the of the Saudi-led bloc has been that Qatar close the
Turkish base in Qatar—a demand Qatari officials say will not be met. Turkey has demonstrated Turkish base in Qatar—a demand Qatari officials say will not be met. Turkey has demonstrated
its support for Qatar by sending additional troops there and conducting joint exercises in August its support for Qatar by sending additional troops there and conducting joint exercises in August
2017 and by increasing food exports to replace those previously provided by Saudi Arabia. 2017 and by increasing food exports to replace those previously provided by Saudi Arabia.
~~Turkey further added to its Qatar troop contingent in December 2017.~~

~~66 “Lockheed Says Qatar Budget Woes Could Delay Defense Deal.” Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2016.~~
~~http://www.wsj.com/articles/lockheed-says-qatar-budget-woes-could-delay-defense-deal-1461692108.~~
~~67 “Qatar’s EUR5 Billion Naval Deal with Italy Sees Three Ship Types to Be Delivered.”~~ ~~IHS Jane’s Navy~~
~~International, June 17, 2016.~~
~~68 AFP, June 6, 2018.~~
~~69 Xinhua, March 28, 2019.~~
~~70 Heather Murdock, “Turkey Opens First Mideast Military Base in Qatar,” Voice of America News, May 10, 2016,~~
~~http://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-opens-first-middle-east-military-base-in-qatar/3323653.html.~~
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~~Russia~~
Turkey further added to its Qatar troop contingent in December 2017. Russia Qatar has broadened its relationship with Russia since early 2016 in conjunction with efforts to Qatar has broadened its relationship with Russia since early 2016 in conjunction with efforts to
resolve the conflict in Syria and in recognition of Russiaresolve the conflict in Syria and in recognition of Russia’'s heightened role in the region. One of s heightened role in the region. One of
~~Qatar’~~Qatar's sovereign wealth funds has increased its investments in Russia, particularly in its large s sovereign wealth funds has increased its investments in Russia, particularly in its large
Rosneft energy firm. Amir Tamim has made several visits to Russia, the latest of which was in Rosneft energy firm. Amir Tamim has made several visits to Russia, the latest of which was in
March 2018. During the visit, it was announced that Qatar Airways would buy a 25% stake in the March 2018. During the visit, it was announced that Qatar Airways would buy a 25% stake in the
Vnukovo International Airport, one of MoscowVnukovo International Airport, one of Moscow’'s airports.s airports.
Qatar is also reportedly considering buying the S-400 sophisticated air defense system. However, Qatar is also reportedly considering buying the S-400 sophisticated air defense system. However,
U.S. opposition and the potential for U.S. sanctions for the sale has contributed to QatarU.S. opposition and the potential for U.S. sanctions for the sale has contributed to Qatar’'s lack of s lack of
movement to complete the purchase. Section 231 of the Countering Americamovement to complete the purchase. Section 231 of the Countering America’'s Adversaries s Adversaries
through Sanctions Act (P.L. 115-44) sanctions persons or entities that conduct transactions with through Sanctions Act (P.L. 115-44) sanctions persons or entities that conduct transactions with
~~Russia’~~Russia's defense or intelligence sector. The section mandates the imposition of several sanctions s defense or intelligence sector. The section mandates the imposition of several sanctions
that might include restrictions on certain exports to Qatar, restrictions on Qatari banking activities that might include restrictions on certain exports to Qatar, restrictions on Qatari banking activities
in the United States, restrictions on Qatari acquisition of property in the United States, and a ban in the United States, restrictions on Qatari acquisition of property in the United States, and a ban
on U.S. investments in any Qatari sovereign debt.on U.S. investments in any Qatari sovereign debt.
~~Counterterrorism Cooperation71~~
~~U.S.-Qatar’~~ Counterterrorism Cooperation⁷³ U.S.-Qatar's cooperation against groups that both countries agree are terrorist groups, such as the s cooperation against groups that both countries agree are terrorist groups, such as the
Islamic State organization, is extensive. However, some groups that the United States considers as Islamic State organization, is extensive. However, some groups that the United States considers as
terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, are considered by Qatar to be Arab movements pursuing terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, are considered by Qatar to be Arab movements pursuing
legitimate goals. Perhaps in part as a means to attract U.S. support in the context of the intra-GCC legitimate goals. Perhaps in part as a means to attract U.S. support in the context of the intra-GCC
rift, on July 10, 2017, Qatarrift, on July 10, 2017, Qatar’'s foreign minister and then-Secretary Tillerson signed in Doha a s foreign minister and then-Secretary Tillerson signed in Doha a
Memorandum of Understanding on broad U.S.-Qatar counterterrorism cooperation, including but Memorandum of Understanding on broad U.S.-Qatar counterterrorism cooperation, including but
going beyond just combatting terrorism financing.going beyond just combatting terrorism financing.7274 The United States and Qatar held a The United States and Qatar held a
Counterterrorism Dialogue on November 8, 2017, in which they reaffirmed progress on Counterterrorism Dialogue on November 8, 2017, in which they reaffirmed progress on
implementing the MoU. The joint statement of the January 2018 Strategic Dialogue noted implementing the MoU. The joint statement of the January 2018 Strategic Dialogue noted
“"positive progresspositive progress”" under the July 2017 MoU, and thanked Qatar for its action to counter under the July 2017 MoU, and thanked Qatar for its action to counter
terrorism. The statement also noted the recent conclusion of a memorandum of understanding terrorism. The statement also noted the recent conclusion of a memorandum of understanding
between the U.S. Attorney General and his Qatari counterpart on the fight against terrorism and between the U.S. Attorney General and his Qatari counterpart on the fight against terrorism and
its financing and combating cybercrime.its financing and combating cybercrime.
In an effort to implement the U.S.-Qatar MoU, and perhaps also as a gesture to the blockading In an effort to implement the U.S.-Qatar MoU, and perhaps also as a gesture to the blockading
states, on March 22, 2018, the Qatar Ministry of Interior issued list of 19 individuals and eight states, on March 22, 2018, the Qatar Ministry of Interior issued list of 19 individuals and eight
entities that it considers as entities that it considers as “"terrorists.terrorists.”" The list includes 10 persons who are also are also named The list includes 10 persons who are also are also named
as terrorists by the blockading GCC states.as terrorists by the blockading GCC states.
Qatar participates in the State DepartmentQatar participates in the State Department’'s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program to boost s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program to boost
domestic security capabilities, and it has continued to participate in and host Global domestic security capabilities, and it has continued to participate in and host Global
Counterterrorism Forum events. Under the ATA program, participating countries are provided Counterterrorism Forum events. Under the ATA program, participating countries are provided
with U.S. training and advice on equipment and techniques to prevent terrorists from entering or with U.S. training and advice on equipment and techniques to prevent terrorists from entering or
moving across their borders. However, Qatari agencies such as the State Security Bureau and the moving across their borders. However, Qatari agencies such as the State Security Bureau and the
Ministry of Interior have limited manpower and are reliant on nationals from third countries to fill Ministry of Interior have limited manpower and are reliant on nationals from third countries to fill

~~71 Much of the information in this section is taken from: Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for~~
~~Counterterrorism. “Country Reports on Terrorism: 2017.” It can be accessed at https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/~~
~~282844.htm.~~
~~72 Carol Morello. “Qatar Agrees to Curb Terrorism Financing Under Deal with U.S.” Washington Post, July 11, 2017.~~
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law enforcement positions—a limitation Qatar has tried to address by employing U.S. and other law enforcement positions—a limitation Qatar has tried to address by employing U.S. and other
Western technology.Western technology.73
75 In the past, at least one high-ranking Qatari official provided support to Al Qaeda figures residing In the past, at least one high-ranking Qatari official provided support to Al Qaeda figures residing
in or transiting Qatar, including suspected September 11, 2001, attacks mastermind Khalid in or transiting Qatar, including suspected September 11, 2001, attacks mastermind Khalid
Shaykh Mohammad.Shaykh Mohammad.7476 None of the September 11 hijackers was a Qatari national. None of the September 11 hijackers was a Qatari national.
Terrorism Financing Issues
U.S. officials have stated that Qatar is taking steps to prevent terrorism financing and the U.S. officials have stated that Qatar is taking steps to prevent terrorism financing and the
movement of suspected terrorists into or through Qatar. The country is a member of the Middle movement of suspected terrorists into or through Qatar. The country is a member of the Middle
East North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a regional financial action task East North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a regional financial action task
force that coordinates efforts combatting money laundering and terrorism financing. In 2014, the force that coordinates efforts combatting money laundering and terrorism financing. In 2014, the
Amir approved Law Number 14, the Amir approved Law Number 14, the “"Cybercrime Prevention Law,Cybercrime Prevention Law,”" which criminalized which criminalized
terrorism-linked cyber offenses, and clarified that it is illegal to use an information network to terrorism-linked cyber offenses, and clarified that it is illegal to use an information network to
contact a terrorist organization or raise funds for terrorist groups, or to promote the ideology of contact a terrorist organization or raise funds for terrorist groups, or to promote the ideology of
terrorist organizations. In 2017, the country passed updated terrorism financing legislation.terrorist organizations. In 2017, the country passed updated terrorism financing legislation.
In February 2017, Qatar hosted a meeting of the In February 2017, Qatar hosted a meeting of the “"Egmont GroupEgmont Group”" global working group global working group
consisting of 152 country Financial Intelligence Units. Qatar is also a member of the Terrorist consisting of 152 country Financial Intelligence Units. Qatar is also a member of the Terrorist
Financing Targeting Center (TFTC), a U.S.-GCC initiative announced during President TrumpFinancing Targeting Center (TFTC), a U.S.-GCC initiative announced during President Trump’s
's May 2017 visit to Saudi Arabia. In October 2017, and despite the intra-GCC rift, Qatar joined the May 2017 visit to Saudi Arabia. In October 2017, and despite the intra-GCC rift, Qatar joined the
United States and other TFTC countries in designating terrorists affiliated with Al Qaeda and United States and other TFTC countries in designating terrorists affiliated with Al Qaeda and
ISIS. The State DepartmentISIS. The State Department’'s 2017 report on international terrorism says that, in 2017, Qatar took s 2017 report on international terrorism says that, in 2017, Qatar took
sweeping measures to monitor and restrict the overseas activities of Qatari charities.sweeping measures to monitor and restrict the overseas activities of Qatari charities.
According to the State DepartmentAccording to the State Department’'s report on international terrorism for 2015, entities and s report on international terrorism for 2015, entities and
individuals within Qatar continue to serve as a source of financial support for terrorist and violent individuals within Qatar continue to serve as a source of financial support for terrorist and violent
extremist groups, particularly regional Al Qaextremist groups, particularly regional Al Qa’'ida affiliates such as the Nusrah Front.ida affiliates such as the Nusrah Front.~~”75~~"⁷⁷ The State The State
Department report for 2017 stated: Department report for 2017 stated: “"While the Government of Qatar has made progress on While the Government of Qatar has made progress on
countering the financing of terrorism, terrorist financiers within the country are still able to countering the financing of terrorism, terrorist financiers within the country are still able to
exploit Qatarexploit Qatar’'s informal financial system.s informal financial system.”" The United States has imposed sanctions on several The United States has imposed sanctions on several
persons living in Qatar, including Qatari nationals, for allegedly raising funds or making persons living in Qatar, including Qatari nationals, for allegedly raising funds or making
donations to both Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.donations to both Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.76
78 Countering Violent Extremism
Qatar has hosted workshops on developing plans to counter violent extremism and has Qatar has hosted workshops on developing plans to counter violent extremism and has
participated in similar sessions hosted by the UAEparticipated in similar sessions hosted by the UAE’'s Hedayat Center that focuses on that issue. s Hedayat Center that focuses on that issue.
Also in 2015, Qatar pledged funding to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to help Also in 2015, Qatar pledged funding to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to help
address violent extremism and radicalization among youth and vulnerable populations. Still, address violent extremism and radicalization among youth and vulnerable populations. Still,
reports persist of Qatari clerics giving sharply anti-Western and anti-Semitic sermons in mosques reports persist of Qatari clerics giving sharply anti-Western and anti-Semitic sermons in mosques
and of Qatari personalities, in appearances on Al Jazeera, supporting violent regional movements.and of Qatari personalities, in appearances on Al Jazeera, supporting violent regional movements.

~~73 Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. “Country Reports on Terrorism: 2014.”~~
~~74 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.~~
~~75 State Department report on international terrorism for 2015.~~
~~76 U.S. Department of the Treasury: “Treasury Designated Twelve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitators,” September~~
~~24, 2014; “Treasury Designated Al-Qa’ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen,” December 18, 2013; “Treasury Targets~~
~~Key Al-Qa’ida Funding and Support Network Using Iran as a Critical Transit Point,” July 28, 2011.~~
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~~Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy~~

Economic Issues
Even before the June 2017 intra-GCC rift, Qatar had been wrestling with the fall in world energy Even before the June 2017 intra-GCC rift, Qatar had been wrestling with the fall in world energy
prices since mid-2014—a development that has caused Qatarprices since mid-2014—a development that has caused Qatar’'s economic growth to slow, its s economic growth to slow, its
budget to fall into deficit, and the balance of its sovereign wealth funds to plateau. Oil and gas budget to fall into deficit, and the balance of its sovereign wealth funds to plateau. Oil and gas
reserves have made Qatar the country with the worldreserves have made Qatar the country with the world’'s highest per capita income. Qatar has been s highest per capita income. Qatar has been
a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), along with other a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), along with other
GCC states Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE and other countries, but in 2019, Qatar withdrew GCC states Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE and other countries, but in 2019, Qatar withdrew
from OPEC in order to focus on its more high-priority natural gas exports. Some observers from OPEC in order to focus on its more high-priority natural gas exports. Some observers
attributed the decision, at least in part, to the ongoing intra-GCC rift, insofar as rival Saudi Arabia attributed the decision, at least in part, to the ongoing intra-GCC rift, insofar as rival Saudi Arabia
is considered the dominant actor within OPEC.is considered the dominant actor within OPEC.
The economic impact on Qatar of the June 2017 intra-GCC rift is difficult to discern. About 40% The economic impact on Qatar of the June 2017 intra-GCC rift is difficult to discern. About 40%
of Qatarof Qatar’'s food was imported from Saudi Arabia pre-crisis, and there were reports of runs on s food was imported from Saudi Arabia pre-crisis, and there were reports of runs on
stocks of food when the blockade began. However, the governmentstocks of food when the blockade began. However, the government’'s ample financial resources s ample financial resources
enabled it to quickly arrange substitute sources of goods primarily from Turkey, Iran, and India. enabled it to quickly arrange substitute sources of goods primarily from Turkey, Iran, and India.
The effects on QatarThe effects on Qatar’'s growing international air carrier, Qatar Airways, have been significant s growing international air carrier, Qatar Airways, have been significant
because of the prohibition on its overflying the blockading states. In November 2017, Iran and because of the prohibition on its overflying the blockading states. In November 2017, Iran and
Turkey signed a deal with Qatar to facilitate the mutual transiting of goods.Turkey signed a deal with Qatar to facilitate the mutual transiting of goods.
~~Qatar’~~ Qatar's main sovereign wealth fund, run by the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), as well as s main sovereign wealth fund, run by the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), as well as
funds held by the Central Bank, total about $350 billion, according to Qatarfunds held by the Central Bank, total about $350 billion, according to Qatar’'s Central Bank, s Central Bank,
giving the country a substantial cushion to weather financial demands.giving the country a substantial cushion to weather financial demands.7779 QIA QIA’'s investments s investments
consist of real estate and other relatively illiquid holdings, such as interest in Londonconsist of real estate and other relatively illiquid holdings, such as interest in London’'s Canary s Canary
Wharf project. In May 2016, Qatar offered $9 billion in bonds as a means of raising funds Wharf project. In May 2016, Qatar offered $9 billion in bonds as a means of raising funds
without drawing down its investment holdings.without drawing down its investment holdings.7880 In April 2018, the country raised $12 billion in In April 2018, the country raised $12 billion in
another, larger, bond issue. Qatar also has cut some subsidies to address its budgetary shortfalls.another, larger, bond issue. Qatar also has cut some subsidies to address its budgetary shortfalls.
Oil and gas still account for 92% of QatarOil and gas still account for 92% of Qatar’'s export earnings, and 56% of government revenues.s export earnings, and 56% of government revenues.79
81 Proven oil reserves of about 25 billion barrels are far less than those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Proven oil reserves of about 25 billion barrels are far less than those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,
but enough to enable Qatar to continue its current levels of oil production (about 700,000 barrels but enough to enable Qatar to continue its current levels of oil production (about 700,000 barrels
per day) for over 50 years. Its proven reserves of natural gas exceed 25 trillion cubic meters, per day) for over 50 years. Its proven reserves of natural gas exceed 25 trillion cubic meters,
about 13% of the worldabout 13% of the world’'s total and third largest in the world.s total and third largest in the world.
Qatar is the worldQatar is the world’'s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which is exported from the s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which is exported from the
large Ras Laffan processing site north of Doha. That facility has been built up with U.S.-made large Ras Laffan processing site north of Doha. That facility has been built up with U.S.-made
equipment, much of which was exported with the help of about $1 billion in Export-Import Bank equipment, much of which was exported with the help of about $1 billion in Export-Import Bank
loan guarantees. Qatar is a member and hosts the headquarters of the Gas Exporting Countries loan guarantees. Qatar is a member and hosts the headquarters of the Gas Exporting Countries
Forum (GECF), which is a nascent natural gas cartel and includes Iran and Russia, among other Forum (GECF), which is a nascent natural gas cartel and includes Iran and Russia, among other
~~countries. State-run Qatar Petroleum is a major investor in the emerging U.S. LNG export market,~~
~~with a 70% stake (Exxon-Mobil and Conoco-Phillips are minority stakeholders) in an LNG~~
~~terminal in Texas that is seeking U.S. government approval to expand the facility to the point~~
~~where it can export over 15 million tons of LNG per year.80 In June 2018, Qatar Petroleum bought~~

~~77 Qatar Has $340 Billion in Reserves, Can Withstand ‘Any Kind of Shock,’ Central Bank Says. Istanbul Sabah Online,~~
~~July 10, 2017.~~
~~78 https://finance.yahoo.com/news/saudi-arabia-might-pull-qatar-174900348.html.~~
~~79 CIA,The World Factbook. June 2016. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/~~
~~print_qa.html.~~
~~80 Adam Schreck. “AP Interview: Qatar Energy Minister Wants ‘Fair’ Oil Price.” Associated Press, May 24, 2016.~~
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~~link to page 28~~ ~~Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy~~

countries. In June 2018, Qatar Petroleum bought a 30% state in an Exxon-Mobil-run development of an onshore shale natural gas basin in a 30% state in an Exxon-Mobil-run development of an onshore shale natural gas basin in
Argentina (Vaca Muerta).Argentina (Vaca Muerta).81
82 Qatar is the source of the gas supplies for the Dolphin Gas Project established by the UAE in Qatar is the source of the gas supplies for the Dolphin Gas Project established by the UAE in
1999 and which became operational in 2007. The project involves production and processing of 1999 and which became operational in 2007. The project involves production and processing of
natural gas from Qatarnatural gas from Qatar’'s offshore North Field, which is connected to Irans offshore North Field, which is connected to Iran’'s South Pars Field (see s South Pars Field (see
Figure 2), and transportation of the processed gas by subsea pipeline to the UAE and Oman., and transportation of the processed gas by subsea pipeline to the UAE and Oman.8283 Its Its
gas industry gives Qatar some counter leverage against the Saudi-led group, but Qatar has said it gas industry gives Qatar some counter leverage against the Saudi-led group, but Qatar has said it
will not reduce its gas supplies under existing agreements with other GCC states. Both the UAE will not reduce its gas supplies under existing agreements with other GCC states. Both the UAE
and Qatar have filed complaints at the WTO over their boycotting each otherand Qatar have filed complaints at the WTO over their boycotting each other’'s goods; the United s goods; the United
States reportedly has backed the UAEStates reportedly has backed the UAE’'s arguments that the WTO does not have the authority to s arguments that the WTO does not have the authority to
adjudicate issues of national security.adjudicate issues of national security.83
84 Because prices of hydrocarbon exports have fallen dramatically since mid-2014, in 2016 Qatar Because prices of hydrocarbon exports have fallen dramatically since mid-2014, in 2016 Qatar
ran its first budget deficit (about $13 billion). At the same time, the leadership apparently seeks to ran its first budget deficit (about $13 billion). At the same time, the leadership apparently seeks to
minimize the effect of any cutbacks on Qatari citizens.minimize the effect of any cutbacks on Qatari citizens.8485 Still, if oil prices remain far below their Still, if oil prices remain far below their
2014 levels and the intra-GCC rift continues much further, it is likely that many Qatari citizens 2014 levels and the intra-GCC rift continues much further, it is likely that many Qatari citizens
will be required to seek employment in the private sector, which they generally have shunned in will be required to seek employment in the private sector, which they generally have shunned in
favor of less demanding jobs in the government.favor of less demanding jobs in the government.
The national development strategy from 2011 to 2016 focused on QatarThe national development strategy from 2011 to 2016 focused on Qatar’'s housing, water, roads, s housing, water, roads,
airports, and shipping infrastructure in part to promote economic diversification, as well as to airports, and shipping infrastructure in part to promote economic diversification, as well as to
prepare to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup soccer tournament, investing as much as $200 billion. prepare to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup soccer tournament, investing as much as $200 billion.
In Doha, the result has been a construction boom, which by some reports has outpaced the In Doha, the result has been a construction boom, which by some reports has outpaced the
capacity of the government to manage, and perhaps fund. A metro transportation system is under capacity of the government to manage, and perhaps fund. A metro transportation system is under
construction in Doha.construction in Doha.
U.S.-Qatar Economic Relations
In contrast to the two least wealthy GCC states (Bahrain and Oman), which have free trade In contrast to the two least wealthy GCC states (Bahrain and Oman), which have free trade
agreements with the United States, Qatar and the United States have not negotiated an FTA. agreements with the United States, Qatar and the United States have not negotiated an FTA.
However, in April 2004, the United States and Qatar signed a Trade and Investment Framework However, in April 2004, the United States and Qatar signed a Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA). Qatar has used the benefits of the more limited agreement to undertake large Agreement (TIFA). Qatar has used the benefits of the more limited agreement to undertake large
investments in the United States, including the City Center project in Washington, DC. Also, investments in the United States, including the City Center project in Washington, DC. Also,
several U.S. universities and other institutions, such as Cornell University, Carnegie Mellon several U.S. universities and other institutions, such as Cornell University, Carnegie Mellon
University, Georgetown University, Brookings Institution, and Rand Corporation, have University, Georgetown University, Brookings Institution, and Rand Corporation, have
established branches and offices at the Qatar Foundationestablished branches and offices at the Qatar Foundation’'s Education City outside Doha. In 2005, s Education City outside Doha. In 2005,
Qatar donated $100 million to the victims of Hurricane Katrina. The joint statement of the Qatar donated $100 million to the victims of Hurricane Katrina. The joint statement of the
January 2018 U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue January 2018 U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue ~~“recognized” QIA’~~"recognized" QIA's commitment of $45 billion in s commitment of $45 billion in
future investments in U.S. companies and real estate.future investments in U.S. companies and real estate.
According to the U.S. Census BureauAccording to the U.S. Census Bureau~~’s “~~'s "Foreign Trade StatisticsForeign Trade Statistics”" compilation, in 2016, the compilation, in 2016, the
United States exported $4.9 billion in goods to Qatar in 2016 and imported $1.16 billion worth of United States exported $4.9 billion in goods to Qatar in 2016 and imported $1.16 billion worth of
Qatari goods. U.S. exports to Qatar for 2017 ran about 40% less than the 2016 level, but U.S. Qatari goods. U.S. exports to Qatar for 2017 ran about 40% less than the 2016 level, but U.S.
imports from Qatar were about the same as in 2016. U.S. exports to Qatar rebounded to $4.4 imports from Qatar were about the same as in 2016. U.S. exports to Qatar rebounded to $4.4
~~billion in 2018 and imports were about $1.57 billion. U.S. exports to Qatar consist mainly of~~

~~81 Qatar Taps into Giant Argentinean Shale Reserve. UPI, June 4, 2018.~~
~~82 Dolphin Energy website. http://www.dolphinenergy.com/en/6/about-dolphin-energy/about-us.~~
~~83 “UAE Challenges Qatar at the WTO in Case with National Security Implications.” Inside Trade, February 4, 2019.~~
~~84 Giorgio Cafiero. “Qatar Cuts Spending to Cope with Low Oil Prices.” Middle East Institute, March 1, 2016.~~
~~http://www.mei.edu/content/article/qatar-cuts-spending-cope-low-oil-prices.~~
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~~Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy~~

~~aircraft, machinery, and information technology. U.S. imports from Qatar consist mainly of~~
~~petroleum products, but U.S. imports of Qatar’s crude oil or natural gas have declined to~~
~~negligible levels in recent years, reflecting the significant increase in U.S. domestic production.~~
billion in 2018 and imports were about $1.57 billion. U.S. exports to Qatar consist mainly of aircraft, machinery, and information technology. U.S. imports from Qatar consist mainly of petroleum products, but U.S. imports of Qatar's crude oil or natural gas have declined to negligible levels in recent years, reflecting the significant increase in U.S. domestic production. State-run Qatar Petroleum is a major investor in the emerging U.S. LNG export market, with a 70% stake in an LNG terminal in Texas that is seeking U.S. government approval to expand the facility to the point where it can export over 15 million tons of LNG per year.⁸⁶ The White House statement after the meeting between President Trump and Amir Tamim on July The White House statement after the meeting between President Trump and Amir Tamim on July
9, 20199, 2019, stated that the Chevron-Phillips Chemical Company and Qatar Petroleum had agree to stated that the Chevron-Phillips Chemical Company and Qatar Petroleum had agree to
develop a petrochemical complex in Qatar.develop a petrochemical complex in Qatar.
~~Qatar’~~ Qatar's airline, Qatar Airways, is a major buyer of U.S. commercial aircraft. In October 2016, the s airline, Qatar Airways, is a major buyer of U.S. commercial aircraft. In October 2016, the
airline agreed to purchase from Boeing up to another 100 passenger jets with an estimated value airline agreed to purchase from Boeing up to another 100 passenger jets with an estimated value
of $18 billion—likely about $10 billion if standard industry discounts are applied. The White of $18 billion—likely about $10 billion if standard industry discounts are applied. The White
House announced after the July 9 Trump-Tamim meeting that Qatar Airways would buy (1) five House announced after the July 9 Trump-Tamim meeting that Qatar Airways would buy (1) five
Boeing 777 Freighters; (2) large-cabin aircraft from Gulfstream; and (3) GE jet engines and Boeing 777 Freighters; (2) large-cabin aircraft from Gulfstream; and (3) GE jet engines and
services to power its 787 and 777 aircraft.services to power its 787 and 777 aircraft.85
87 Some U.S. airlines challenge Qatar AirwaysSome U.S. airlines challenge Qatar Airways’' benefits under a U.S.-Qatar benefits under a U.S.-Qatar “"open skiesopen skies”" agreement. agreement.
The U.S. carriers assert that the airlineThe U.S. carriers assert that the airline’'s privileges under that agreement should be revoked s privileges under that agreement should be revoked
because the airlinebecause the airline’'s aircraft purchases are subsidized by Qatars aircraft purchases are subsidized by Qatar’'s government, giving it an unfair s government, giving it an unfair
competitive advantage.competitive advantage.8688 The Obama Administration did not reopen that agreement in response to The Obama Administration did not reopen that agreement in response to
the complaints, nor has the Trump Administration. However, the United States and Qatar reached the complaints, nor has the Trump Administration. However, the United States and Qatar reached
a set of a set of ~~“understandings”~~"understandings" on civil aviation on January 29, 2018, committing Qatar Airways to on civil aviation on January 29, 2018, committing Qatar Airways to
financial transparency and containing some limitations on the airlinefinancial transparency and containing some limitations on the airline’'s ability to pick up s ability to pick up
passengers in Europe for flights to the United States. Some assert that Qatar Airwaypassengers in Europe for flights to the United States. Some assert that Qatar Airway’'s 2018 s 2018
purchase of Air Italy might represent a violation of those limitations.purchase of Air Italy might represent a violation of those limitations.

U.S. Assistance
Qatar, one of the wealthiest states in the world on a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) Qatar, one of the wealthiest states in the world on a per capita gross domestic product (GDP)
basis, receives virtually no U.S. military assistance. At times, small amounts of U.S. aid have basis, receives virtually no U.S. military assistance. At times, small amounts of U.S. aid have
been provided to help Qatar develop capabilities to prevent smuggling of arms and narcotics, and been provided to help Qatar develop capabilities to prevent smuggling of arms and narcotics, and
the movement of terrorists or proliferation-related gear into Qatar or around its waterways. In the movement of terrorists or proliferation-related gear into Qatar or around its waterways. In
FY2015, the United States spent $35,000 on programs in Qatar, of which two-thirds was for FY2015, the United States spent $35,000 on programs in Qatar, of which two-thirds was for
counter-narcotics. In FY2016, the United States spent about $100,000 on programs in Qatar, counter-narcotics. In FY2016, the United States spent about $100,000 on programs in Qatar,
about two-thirds of which was for counter-narcotics programming. In FY2017, the United States about two-thirds of which was for counter-narcotics programming. In FY2017, the United States
provided a total of $78,000 in aid to Qatar, of which $53,000 was for programs to support Qatarprovided a total of $78,000 in aid to Qatar, of which $53,000 was for programs to support Qatar’s
's counter-narcotics capabilities. The remainder was for maternal and other health programs.counter-narcotics capabilities. The remainder was for maternal and other health programs.

~~85 Joint Statement, July 9, 2019, op.cit.~~
~~86 “Open Skies Dispute Between US and Gulf Airlines Escalates.” UAE the National, January 30, 2016.~~
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~~Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy~~

~~Figure 2. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure~~

Source: U.S. Energy Information Agency, as adapted by CRS.

~~Author Information~~

~~Kenneth Katzman~~

~~Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs~~

~~Acknowledgments~~
~~This report acknowledges and adapts analysis and previous CRS reports on Qatar by Christopher M.~~
~~Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

24

~~Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy~~

~~Disclaimer~~
~~This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan~~
~~shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and~~
~~under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other~~
~~than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in~~
~~connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not~~
~~subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in~~
~~its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or~~
~~material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to~~
~~copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.~~

~~Congressional Research Service~~
~~R44533 · VERSION 50 · UPDATED~~
25

Figure 2. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure

Source: U.S. Energy Information Agency, as adapted by CRS.

Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs ([email address scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed])

Acknowledgments

This report acknowledges and adapts analysis and previous CRS reports on Qatar by Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.

Footnotes

Information in this section is taken from Bernard Haykel. "Qatar and Islamism." Policy Brief: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre. February 2013.

Shaykh is an honorific term.

The Economist. "Qatar: Democracy? That's for Other Arabs." June 8, 2013. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21579063-rumours-change-top-do-not-include-moves-democracy-democracy-thats.

Amy Hawthorne. "Qatar's New Constitution: Limited Reform from the Top." August 26, 2008. http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=21605.

Department of State. Human Rights Report for 2015: Qatar. p. 13.

https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265728.pdf.

Much of the information in this section is based on: Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights for 2018: https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2018&dlid=289226#wrapper.

Bidoon is the Arabic word for "without," and refers to persons without documentation for their residency in country. The Bidoon population is much larger in Kuwait, where that issue has been unresolved for decades.

State Dept. human rights report on Qatar for 2017, op. cit.

10.

State Dept. human rights report on Qatar for 2017, op. cit.

11.

"Renewed Calls for Qatar to Address Treatment of Migrant Workers." Al Jazeera, September 19, 2019.

12. This section is based on the State Department "Trafficking in Persons" report for 2019. https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-trafficking-in-persons-report-2/qatar/ 13.

Business and Human Rights Resources Center. May 23, 2018.

14.

Qatar 2022: FIFA admits violation of workers' standards. Deutsche Welle, June 6, 2019. https://www.dw.com/en/qatar-2022-fifa-admits-violation-of-workers-standards/a-49078052.

15.

Statement by Human Rights Watch, September 27, 2017.

16. This section is based on the State Department report on International Religious Freedom for 2018. https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/qatar/ 17.

White House. Joint Statement from the President of the United States Donald J. Trump and His Highness Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar. July 9, 2019.

18.

Author conversations with GCC officials. 2013-2015.

19.

Cable News Network released the text of the November 2013 agreement, which was signed between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar. The November 2014 agreement was among all the GCC states except Oman.

20.

The list of demands can be found at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/list-of-demands-on-qatar-by-saudi-arabia-other-arab-nations/2017/06/23/054913a6-57d0-11e7-840b-512026319da7_story.html?utm_term=.5bde2f68b6b1.

21.

"UAE Orchestrated Hacking of Qatari Government Sites, Sparking Regional Upheaval, According to U.S. Intelligence Officials." Washington Post, July 16, 2017.

22.

Various press; Author conversations with a wide array of Gulf officials and experts on the Gulf. 2017-2019.

23.

White House Office of the Press Secretary. Readout of President Donald J. Trump's Call with Amir Sheikh Tameem Bin Hamad Al Thani of Qatar. June 7, 2017.

24.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41209610.

25.

"How the Gulf crisis played out at the Makkah summit." UAE The National. June 1, 2019.

26.

"Inching Away from Saudi-UAE Axis, Jordan Restores Ties with Qatar." Al Jazeera English, July 9, 2019.

27.

Author conversation with visiting Qatari official. September 2019.

28.

Al Arabiya, "Iran, Qatar Seek Improved Relations despite Differences," June 19, 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/06/19/Iran-Qatar-seek-improved-relations-despite-differences-.html.

29.

"Iran, Qatar, Face Off Over North Field, South Pars. Oil and Gas News," June 6-12, 2016. http://www.oilandgasnewsworldwide.com/Article/35647/Iran,_Qatar_face_off_over_North_Field,_South_Pars.

30.

https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/statements/statement-on-the-developments-of-the-iranian-nuclear-deal.

31.

The Latest: Qatar trying to defuse tensions amid Iran crisis. Fox News, May 16, 2019. https://www.foxnews.com/world/the-latest-qatar-trying-to-defuse-tensions-amid-iran-crisis.

32.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/qatar-expresses-reservations-mecca-summit-outcome-190602192326096.html.

33.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/world/middleeast/big-ransom-and-syria-deals-win-release-of-royal-qatari-hunters.html.

34.

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final-PDF-English.pdf.

35.

U.N. Security Council. Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011). March 9, 2016. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/209.

36.

Author conversations with Qatar Embassy personnel. 2019.

37.

Mark Mazzetti and Matt Apuzzo, "U.S. Relies Heavily on Saudi Money to Support Syrian Rebels," New York Times, January 23, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/world/middleeast/us-relies-heavily-on-saudi-money-to-support-syrian-rebels.html?_r=0.

38.

Al Jazeera, December 2, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/lebanese-hostages-released-prisoner-swap-151201072408599.html.

39.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/qatar-normalise-relations-syria-foreign-minister-190114080234797.html.

40.

"Making a Levantine Comeback: Qatar Boost Bonds with Lebanon with $500 million investment. Alaraby.co.uk. January 21, 2019.

41.

"Qatar and Israel: A Strategic but Complicated Alliance." Fanack Chronicle of the Middle East and North Africa. April 27, 2013.

42.

Ibid.

43.

"Israel Doesn't Want Peace: Emir." Qatar The Peninsula, September 29, 2015. http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/news/qatar/353598/israel-doesn-t-want-peace-emir.

44.

Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, to Rep. Peter Roskam. November 21, 2014. http://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20160807073259/http:/roskam.house.gov/sites/roskam.house.gov/files/State%20Dept%20Response%20to%20Qatar%20Inquiry.pdf.

45.

Neville Teller. "What Do You Make of Qatar?" The Jerusalem Post, September 19, 2019.

46.

"Eliot Engel Weakens Hamas Sanctions Bill After Lobbying from Qatar." New York Post, September 21, 2019.

47.

Author meeting with Pugwash representatives, June 2015.

48.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/us/politics/militants-free-american-woman-and-family-held-for-5-years-in-afghanistan.html.

49.

For more information on Qatar's mediation efforts, see Sultan Barakat, Brookings Doha Center publication "Qataru Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final-PDF-English.pdf.

50.

See Natalie Koch. Qatar and Central Asia. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 484, 2017.

51.

Ibid.

52.

Elaine Sciolino. "Qatar Rejects U.S. Demand for Return of Illicit Stingers." New York Times, June 28, 1988. Congress responded to the Qatari Stinger acquisition by enacting a ban on arms sales to Qatar (Section 566(d) of P.L. 100-461). The ban was repealed by Section 568 of the foreign aid appropriations act for FY1991 (P.L. 101-513).

53.

U.S. Library of Congress. Country Studies: Persian Gulf States. Some provisions of DCA's with other GCC states are discussed in Sami Hajjar, U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute), March 2002, p. 27.

54.

See Global Security.org at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-as-sayliyah.htm.

55.

Department of State. Joint Statement of the Inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue. January 30, 2018.

56.

"Biggest U.S. Base in Middle East is Getting Bigger." Washington Post, August 24, 2019.

57.

Department of Defense. "U.S. and Qatar sign MoU Reaffirming Qatar's Commitment to Supporting U.S. Military Activities at Al Udeid Air Base."

58.

Qatar defense attaché in Washington, DC, press release, July 24, 2018.

59.

Figures compiled by CRS.

60.

"Biggest U.S. Base in Middle East is Getting Bigger." Op.cit.

61.

Information on Qatar's existing military forces and equipment is derived from The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). "The Military Balance: 2016." Chapter 7: The Middle East and North Africa.

62.

DSCA Transmittal Number 16-58. The FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1278 of P.L. 114-92) required a DOD briefing for Congress on the sale, including its effect on Israel's QME.

63.

Tom Hussain. "Is France Positioning Itself for Lead Role in Persian Gulf?" McClatchy, May 1, 2015; "Senators Begin Push for Jet Sales to Kuwait, Qatar." Defense News, January 22, 2016.

64.

Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Transmittal Number 16-07.

65.

Jane's Defence Weekly, July 11, 2019.

66.

Why is Qatar Showing Off its New Short-Range Ballistic Missile Arsenal?" Al Arabiya English, December 20, 2017.

67.

Defense Security Cooperation Agency announcement. November 5, 2012. http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/qatar-terminal-high-altitude-area-defense-thaad.

68.

"Lockheed Says Qatar Budget Woes Could Delay Defense Deal." Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/lockheed-says-qatar-budget-woes-could-delay-defense-deal-1461692108.

69.

"Qatar's EUR5 Billion Naval Deal with Italy Sees Three Ship Types to Be Delivered." IHS Jane's Navy International, June 17, 2016.

70.

AFP, June 6, 2018.

71.

Xinhua, March 28, 2019.

72.

Heather Murdock, "Turkey Opens First Mideast Military Base in Qatar," Voice of America News, May 10, 2016, http://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-opens-first-middle-east-military-base-in-qatar/3323653.html.

73.

Much of the information in this section is taken from: Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. "Country Reports on Terrorism: 2017." It can be accessed at https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/282844.htm.

74.

Carol Morello. "Qatar Agrees to Curb Terrorism Financing Under Deal with U.S." Washington Post, July 11, 2017.

75.

Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. "Country Reports on Terrorism: 2014."

76.

Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.

77.

State Department report on international terrorism for 2015.

78.

U.S. Department of the Treasury: "Treasury Designated Twelve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitators," September 24, 2014; "Treasury Designated Al-Qa'ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen," December 18, 2013; "Treasury Targets Key Al-Qa'ida Funding and Support Network Using Iran as a Critical Transit Point," July 28, 2011.

79.

Qatar Has $340 Billion in Reserves, Can Withstand 'Any Kind of Shock,' Central Bank Says. Istanbul Sabah Online, July 10, 2017.

80.

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/saudi-arabia-might-pull-qatar-174900348.html.

81.

CIA, The World Factbook. June 2016. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_qa.html.

82.

Qatar Taps into Giant Argentinean Shale Reserve. UPI, June 4, 2018.

83.

Dolphin Energy website. http://www.dolphinenergy.com/en/6/about-dolphin-energy/about-us.

84.

"UAE Challenges Qatar at the WTO in Case with National Security Implications." Inside Trade, February 4, 2019.

85.

Giorgio Cafiero. "Qatar Cuts Spending to Cope with Low Oil Prices." Middle East Institute, March 1, 2016. http://www.mei.edu/content/article/qatar-cuts-spending-cope-low-oil-prices.

86.

Adam Schreck. "AP Interview: Qatar Energy Minister Wants 'Fair' Oil Price." Associated Press, May 24, 2016.

87.

Joint Statement, July 9, 2019, op.cit.

88.

"Open Skies Dispute Between US and Gulf Airlines Escalates." UAE the National, January 30, 2016.