May 31Updated November 20, 2019
Israel and the Palestinians: Chronology of a Two-State Solution
The idea of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict developed gradually in the years after Israel
captured the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the 1967 ArabIsraeli war. This product highlights the evolution of this
idea. In 2002, U.S. policy became explicitly supportive of
creating a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Since then,
unsuccessful negotiating efforts and other developments
have led many observers to doubt the viability of a twostate solution. These doubts have grown during the Trump
Administration amid speculation that the plan the
Administration has pledged to release may use economic
measures to elicit Palestinian concessions on core issues of
dispute with Israelis (security, borders, settlements,
Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees), without specifically
calling for an independent Palestinian state.
From U.N. Security Council Resolution
242 to Oslo Process (1967-1995)
Shortly after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the U.N. Security
Council adopted Resolution 242, which supported future
negotiations involving the Israeli return of captured
territories in exchange for peace with Arab states (the
“land-for-peace” principle). The U.S.-brokered 1978 Camp
David Accords between Israel and Egypt had provisions
addressing Palestinian aspirations for self-rule. The
Accords anticipated transitional Palestinian autonomy in the
West Bank and Gaza accompanied by Israeli-Palestinian
peace negotiations.
Initially, the prevailing U.S. and Israeli view was that
autonomy would not necessarily lead to statehood. Yet,
U.S. officials began more seriously contemplating that
peace talks could lead to a Palestinian state after Yasser
Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signaled
its willingness to negotiate with Israel in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. That timeframe coincided with the first
Palestinian intifada (or uprising), which raised widespread
concern in Israel that political control over the West Bank
and Gaza was unsustainable. Political space opened for a
diplomatic process anticipating territorially contiguous
Israeli and Palestinian states that would share close
commercial ties, opening the way to the Oslo agreements of
1993-1995 (see timeline below) and the accompanying
peace process.
1967
Arab-Israeli war: Israel captures West Bank (including
East Jerusalem) from Jordan, Golan Heights from
Syria, and Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242
1978
Camp David Accords
1979
Israel-Egypt peace treaty
1981
Israel unilaterally applies civilian law to the Golan
Heights, effectively annexing it; U.N. Security Council
Resolution 297 holds Israeli action to be invalid
1982
Israel finalizes return of Sinai Peninsula to Egypt
1987
First Palestinian intifada begins
1988
PLO under Yasser Arafat agrees to consider a
solution focused on Palestinian claims to the West
Bank and Gaza, not all of historic Palestine; Jordan
gives up its claims to the West Bank to the PLO
1991
Following the Gulf War, the United States seeks to
helphelps start
Arab-Israeli (including Israeli-Palestinian)
peace talks at
the Madrid Conference
1993
Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles (Oslo Accord)
signed in Washington, DC
1994
Palestinian Authority (PA) created via Gaza-Jericho
Agreement signed by Israel and the PLO in Egypt
Israel-Jordan peace treaty
1995
Israel-PLO Interim Agreement on the West Bank and
Gaza Strip (Oslo II) signed in Egypt to formalize areas
of limited PA rule,; final-status negotiating period
begins
Assassination of Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin
Negotiations Amid Changing Political
Realities (1995-2014)
After the initial Oslo process ended in 2000 without a peace
agreement, Israeli public opinion grew wary of diplomatic
compromise, especially with a second intifada and attacks
inside Israel from the West Bank and Gaza. Israel’s
emphasis on security measures grew—focused both on
protection (building walls and fences) and prevention
(expanding Israeli military and intelligence operations in
the West Bank and around Gaza)—and contributed to
Palestinian economic difficulties. Additionally, the numbers
of Israeli settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem had
steadily increased over time, making the prospect of cleanly
separating Israeli and Palestinian populations more
complicated and politically charged.
The principle of a two-state solution mediated by the
United States and supported by neighboring Arab states was
the basis for subsequent rounds of Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations in 2007-2008 and 2013-2014. This was the
case despite the post-2000 changes mentioned above, the
emergence of other global and regional powers, and
heightened political unrest in surrounding Arab states. Both
rounds of negotiations ended without an agreement, leading
Israel and the Palestinians to pursue leverage over each
other on the ground (sometimes violently) and through
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Israel and the Palestinians: Chronology of a Two-State Solution
international politics and trade. Meanwhile, domestic
pressure mounted on Israeli and Palestinian leaders to
consider alternatives to a negotiated solution. Some Israelis
have advocated partial annexation of Israeli-controlled
areas in the West Bank, and some Palestinians have sought
one state with equal rights for Israelis and Palestinians.
Some observers have contemplated that a conflict-ending
agreement might not happen, thus leaving the parties
stalemated and the Palestinians with few political rights.
2000
Camp David summit fails to reach Israel-PLO finalstatus agreement
Second Palestinian intifada begins
President Bill Clinton issues parameters for bridging
gaps in Israel-PLO final-status positions
2002
Saudi Arabia proposes Arab Peace Initiative, setting
conditions for Arab-Israeli peace related to territory,
Palestinian statehood, Jerusalem, and Palestinian
refugees; Arab League adopts it
Iranian regional influence, and then using those improved
ties to encourage Arab states to persuade the Palestinians to
hazard difficult compromises.
The Trump Administration reportedly has sought support
from Arab states to keep Palestinians open to a U.S.-led
process, despite U.S. actions that the PLO strongly opposes
(see timeline below) and the possibility of a peace plan that
may not contemplate Palestinian statehood. However, it is
unclear if Arab states are willing and able to influence
Palestinian diplomatic positions decisively. To date, the
PLO response to the Administration has been to cease
diplomatic contacts, search for other international actors to
counterbalance or supplant the United States in its
traditional mediator’s role, and warn that the Palestinian
Authority (PA) in the West Bank might stop coordinating
on security with Israel or even disband itself.
2015
Congress enacts Bipartisan Congressional Trade
Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (P.L. 11426), which contains a provision seeking to protect
Israel from punitive economic measures, including in
settlements; State Department issues statement
saying that the provision’s application to settlements
runs counter to longstanding U.S. policy
2016
Congress enacts Trade Facilitation and Trade
Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125), with a
provision similar to the one enacted in P.L. 114-26;
President Obama issues a signing statement saying
that the provision’s application to settlements is not
in line with U.S. policy
Saudi Arabia proposes Arab Peace Initiative, setting
conditions for Arab-Israeli peace related to territory,
Palestinian statehood, Jerusalem, and Palestinian
refugees; Arab League adopts it
President George W. Bush makes a two-state
solution official U.S. policy in connection with efforts
to end Israeli-Palestinian violence and promote PA
reform efforts through Roadmap for Peace
2004
2004
those improved ties to encourage Arab states to persuade
the Palestinians to hazard difficult compromises.
President Bush sends letter to Israeli Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon implying that Israel would probably keep
some West Bank settlements in a peace agreement
PLO Chairman/PA President Yasser Arafat dies and
Mahmoud Abbas succeeds him
United States abstains in vote on U.N. Security
Council Resolution 2334, which holds that Israeli
settlements are contrary to international law
2005
Israel withdraws troops and settlers from Gaza Strip
2006
Hamas wins PA legislative elections held in West
Bank and Gaza, and forms PA cabinet; U.S. support
for PA limited to President Mahmoud Abbas
2017
2007
After armed clash with PA/Fatah forces, Hamas gains
control of Gaza Strip; Abbas appoints new PA cabinet
for West Bank
President Trump recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s
capital; PLO/PA cuts off diplomatic contacts with
United States
2018
20072008
Bush Administration facilitates the Annapolis talks
between Israel and the PLO; no agreement reached
2009
Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu states
conditional willingness to accept a Palestinian state
2011
Unrest breaks out across Arab world, including Syria
United States opens embassy to Israel in Jerusalem,
substantially reduces bilateral aid for the Palestinians,
ends contributions for U.N. Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA), and mandates the closure of the PLO
office in Washington, DC
2011
Unrest breaks out across Arab world, including Syria
2019
United States ends bilateral aid for the Palestinians
and merges the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem
into the U.S. embassy to Israel
Palestinians unsuccessfully apply for U.N.
membership; successfully join U.N. Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
20132014
Obama Administration facilitates Israel-PLO talks; no
agreement reached
Questions About Preserving the Peace
Process (2014-Present)
In this environment, the United States and a number of
international actors apparently downgraded their goal from
reaching a peace agreement imminently to preserving the
peace process until conditions for talks were more
favorable. Reflecting this objective, U.S. officials
reportedly have explored an approach—starting during the
Obama Administration— aimed at bringing
Israel closer to
Arab states because of their common concerns about
United States abstains in vote on U.N. Security
Council Resolution 2334, which holds that Israeli
settlements are contrary to international law
concerns about Iranian regional influence, and then using
Secretary of State John Kerry proposes six principles
for future Israel-PLO negotiations toward a two-state
solution
2017
President Trump recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s
capital; PLO/PA cuts off diplomatic contacts with
United States
2018
United States opens embassy to Israel in Jerusalem,
substantially reduces bilateral aid for the Palestinians
and ends contributions for U.N. Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA), and mandates the closure of the PLO
office in Washington, DC
2019
United States ends bilateral aid for the Palestinians
and merges the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem
into the U.S. embassy to Israel
President Trump recognizes Golan Heights as a part
of Israel
Before Israeli elections in April, Prime Minister
Netanyahu states his intent to start annexing parts of
the West Bank if he forms the next government solution
President Trump recognizes Golan Heights as a part
of Israel
Prime Minister Netanyahu states his intent to start
annexing West Bank areas if he forms the next
government
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announces, as a
contrast with some past Administrations’ statements
or legal findings, that Israeli West Bank settlements
are “not per se inconsistent with international law”
Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IF11237
Israel and the Palestinians: Chronology of a Two-State Solution
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