Updated May 28June 6, 2019
Sudan
On April 11, 2019, Sudan’s military removed President
Omar al Bashir from office after three decades in power.
Four months of near-daily protests across the country had
shaken the government, and in early April, huge crowds
gathered in front of the military’s headquarters in Khartoum
to demand regime change. The protests, triggered by
austerity measures amid an economic crisis, were fueled by
a range of grievances against the ruling National Congress
Party (NCP) and Bashir, who took power in a 1989 coup.
The trajectory of the post-Bashir transition in Sudan is
uncertain. The protests continue as a coalition of opposition
groups and professional unions—the Forces for Freedom
and Change (FFC)—seek to negotiate a transfer of power
from the Transitional Military Council (TMC) that ousted
Bashir to a civilian-led transitional government. The
African Union has voiced support for the democratic
, as the Transitional Military Council (TMC) that
ousted Bashir defies calls for a transfer to civilian rule. The
African Union (AU), which has expressed support for the
democratic aspirations of the Sudanese people and
condemned what it
terms a coup d’état, demanding that the military cede
has demanded that
the TMC cede authority to civilians by June 30. While the TMC and FFC
have reached agreement on some aspects of a transitional
arrangement, in which elections would be held in 2023,
they remain at odds over the role of military leaders in the
interim government. Meanwhile, the TMC has assumed de
facto authority—issuing decrees, replacing various
government officials, and conducting foreign relations.
Sudan’s military has a long history of intervention in
politics (Bashir’s 1989 coup was the country’s fourth).
Military leaders played prominent roles in Bashir’s regime,
and some observers question the TMC’s commitment to
reform. The protest leaders have sought to pursue change
peacefully, but several violent attacks on protesters by
members of the security forces have raised tensions during
the negotiations. While the TMC condemned the attacks
and blamed rogue elements, the incidents fuel concern
about splits in the security forces and about TMC leaders’
intentions. Islamists are also seen as potential spoilersUnder
pressure, the TMC participated in talks with a coalition of
opposition groups and professional unions, the Forces for
Freedom and Change (FFC). They reached agreement on
some aspects of a transitional arrangement, in which
elections would be held in 2022, but remain at odds over
the role of military leaders in an interim government.
Sudan’ pro-democracy protesters have sought to pursue
change through non-violent resistance. They maintained a
large sit-in for almost two months before it was violently
dispersed on June 3. Over 100 people were reportedly killed
in that attack, led by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces
(RSF), which has roots in the notorious Janjaweed militia.
The RSF remains heavily deployed in the capital, and
reports of serious abuses, including rapes, abductions, and
killings have emerged, amidst an internet shutdown.
Sudan’s military has a long history of intervention in
politics (Bashir’s 1989 coup was the country’s fourth).
Military leaders played prominent roles in Bashir’s regime,
and the extent to which the TMC represents a break from
the NCP is debated. Tensions between the military and the
RSF are reportedly rising, increasing fears that fractures
within the security forces could be destabilizing.
With rampant inflation, a foreign currency shortage, and a
heavy debt burden, Sudan needs international support to
stabilize its economy. Its $1.3 billion in debt arrears to the
International Monetary Fund restrict access to international
financing, as does its designation by the United States as a
State Sponsor of Terrorism. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, and Egypt have supported the TMC politically
and financially, and by some accounts may have played a
role in facilitating Bashir’s ouster. The UAE and Saudi
Arabia have offered $3 billion in aid, but economists say it
will only provide short-term relief. The European Union
says it stands ready to assist “as soon as a civilian transition
takes place.” The United States has suspended bilateral
talks on easing sanctions and suggested that it would be
“harder” to support Sudan’s economic development without
a transition to civilian rule
easing sanctions and sought to mobilize support for a
civilian-led transition. Some Members of Congress
have have
called for U.S.increased pressure to ensure a swift transfer of
power to civilians in S.Res. 188 and in correspondence.
Figure 1. Sudan Key Facts
Source: Fact information fromSources: CIA World Factbook and IMF, 2018.
Background
Sudan, when unified (1956-2011), was Africa’s largest
country. In 2011, after decades of fighting often broadly
described as a conflict between the predominately Muslim
“Arab” north and non-Muslim “African” south, Sudan split
in two. The split did not resolve Sudan’s other conflicts;
overlapping struggles between security forces and rebels,
nomadic and farming communities, and among ethnic
groups have caused extensive displacement and suffering.
Northern regimes espousing Islamist ideals have dominated
government for much of Sudan’s post-independence
history, despite its diversity, pressing distant provinces to
conform to the riverine heartland, rather than
accommodating local customs and institutions. Instead of
forging a national identity, these policies exacerbated the
country’s racial, cultural, and religious differences.
Attempts to Arabize and Islamize the south sparked
insurgencies. Groups in other regions also rose up
periodically, citing local grievances. Some in the states of
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile joined the southern
rebels, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
The north-south wars took a heavy toll. In 2005, the
government and the SPLM signed the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA), which enshrined the south’s right
to self-determination after a six-year “interim period.”
Southern Sudanese voted overwhelmingly in January 2011
to secede and achieved independence in July of that year.
South Sudan’s secession was a major financial blow to
Sudan, which lost 75% of its oil production, two-thirds of
export earnings, and over half its fiscal revenues. A bloated
security sector budget, mismanagement, and corruption
have all compounded Sudan’s economic troubles. The
International Monetary Fund assesses that U.S. sanctions
also undermined economic growth. Major U.S. enforcement
actions for sanctions violations in 2014-2015 significantly
reduced Sudan’s access to U.S. dollars and further impeded
its access to international financial markets and institutions.
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Sudan
While disputes remain, relations between Sudan and South
Sudan have improved in recent years. Sudan surprised
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Sudan
many when it mediated a new peace deal between South
Sudan’s warring parties in 2018. The deal, if it holds, would
allow oil production in fields shut by South Sudan’s civil
war to resume, generating needed revenue for both
countries. Rebel activity along the countries’ shared border
complicates the border’s demilitarization, as does the
unresolved status of contested areas, notably Abyei, which
was granted special semi-autonomous status in the CPA.
An official referendum for Abyei residents on whether to
retain their special status in Sudan or join South Sudan was
slated for 2011 but has been delayed indefinitely. The
deployment of the U.N. Interim Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
defused a violent standoff in 2011, but local tensions still
have the potential to spur a larger conflict.
Conflicts
The CPA did not resolve longstanding center-periphery
tensions in Sudan. Successive governments have responded
to the political demands of restive regions more often with
force than reform and have financed local militias to help
counter insurgencies. Those militias have been linked to
indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians.
U.N. experts continue to document violations of an arms
embargo and ban on offensive military overflights
established in Security Council resolution 1591 (2005).
Darfur. Violence continues to plague the Darfur region of
western Sudan, where peace remains elusive. The
government launched a major offensive in early 2016 that
led to mass displacement. Fighting has diminished since
Bashir declared a ceasefire in mid-2016, with some rebels
withdrawing to Libya to regroup. U.N. monitors report that
significant clashes between government forces and one
rebel faction resumed in 2018. Sporadic skirmishes,
intercommunal violence, and attacks on peacekeepers, aid
workers, and civilians persist. Nevertheless, the African
Union-U.N. Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is
withdrawing, with plans for the last troops to leave in 2020.
In 2005, the U.N. Security Council granted the International
Criminal Court jurisdiction over serious crimes committed
in Darfur. The TMC has rejected calls to extradite Bashir to
the Hague, where he is wanted on Darfur-related charges of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The conflict in these
states, often referred to as “the Two Areas,” is driven by
unresolved grievances that date back to the north-south war,
when some local groups joined the SPLM rebellion. The
CPA set out a process by which the two states might
achieve greater autonomy within Sudan, but it stalled and
the conflict reignited in 2011. The Sudanese government
has restricted aid agencies’ access to rebel-held areas.
Humanitarian Situation
Sudan began 2019 with over 5.7 million people in need of
aid, a situation expected to worsen in the lean season midyear. Roughly 1.8 million Darfuris are displaced internally,
and Chad hosts over 330,000 Darfuri refugees. IDP
estimates for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile vary; South
Sudan and Ethiopia host over 300,000 refugees from those
areas. Over 30,000 people are displaced in Abyei. Sudan
hosts over 900,000 refugees, most from South Sudan.
Sudan’s Foreign Relations
Strategically positioned on the Red Sea, Sudan’s political
trajectory is of interest to an array of foreign actors. Egypt’s
engagement is driven by domestic political considerations
and its concerns about the flow of the Nile. Sudan’s former
ties with Iran and links to the Muslim Brotherhood under
Bashir strained its relations with key Arab Gulf countries,
which are important sources of investment. In 2014,
struggling with the loss of oil revenue and under mounting
pressure from Saudi Arabia, Sudan severed relations with
Tehran. It joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen in 2015,
reportedly deploying as many as 14,000 troops, some
underage, in return for Gulf aid. Bashir’s refusal to cut ties
with Qatar was a source of tension with the Saudis and
Emiratis. Sudanese officials worked to repair relations with
the United States, but Bashir also engaged Russia, already a
top weapons source, seeking to expand cooperation and
offering to host Russian naval facilities. Russian security
contractors have been increasingly active there.
U.S. Policy and Foreign Assistance
U.S. relations with Sudan have been turbulent for three
decades. The United States restricted aid after the 1989
coup, and in subsequent years imposed a range of sanctions
through Executive Orders and congressional measures.
Restrictions on U.S. engagement are based on Sudan’s debt
arrears, links to international terrorism, and pervasive
human rights violations. The State Department has
designated Sudan as a Country of Particular Concern under
the International Religious Freedom Act.
Sudan has long sought relief from U.S. sanctions. The
Obama Administration moved to ease them in January 2017
as part of a bilateral reengagement effort, after determining
Sudan had taken positive steps on five “tracks”: enhancing
counterterrorism cooperation; ceasing hostilities in conflict
zones; improving humanitarian access; ending negative
interference in South Sudan; and addressing the threat of a
regional armed group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).
In October 2017, the Trump Administration reported that
Sudan had sustained positive actions on the five tracks and
permanently revoked certain sanctions. Others remain in
place, and in November 2018, despite reports of backsliding
on some tracks, the Administration announced “Phase II” of
the bilateral engagement framework. Under Phase II, the
Administration would consider rescinding Sudan’s 1993
State Sponsor of Terrorism designation if the country met
the statutory criteria and made further progress on the
original tracks and other areas of longstanding U.S.
concern, including human rights, religious freedom,
outstanding terrorism-related claims, and Sudan’s relations
with North Korea. The United States has suspended Phase
II discussions as it calls for a civilian-led transition.
Development aid for Sudan is extremely limited, and debt
relief is restricted by Congress in annual appropriations.
The State Department requested $1.5 million in
nonemergency aid for FY2020, to support civil society and
consensus-building. The United States has provided over
$378 million in humanitarian aid in FY2018-FY2019.
Lauren Ploch Blanchard,
IF10182
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Sudan
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