May 17Updated September 11, 2019
Venezuela: International Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis
Background
The international community remains divided over how to
respond to the political crisis in Venezuela. The United
States and 54 other countries have formally recognized the
interim government of Juan Guaidó, who Venezuela’s
democratically elected National Assembly named president.
These countries have undertaken a variety of initiatives to
place pressure on
in January 2019. These countries have placed pressure on
authoritarian leader Nicolás Maduro, in
power since 2013,
to leave office and allow and facilitate a political transition. Other
to occur.
Other countries, such as China, Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Russia,
have provided diplomatic, financial, and military
support to
Maduro, and have Maduro and sought to block anti-Maduro actions
within international organizations. A third group of
countries, including Mexico, Norway, Uruguay, and some
Caribbean nations, has remained neutral in the crisis.
These international dynamics appear to have contributed to
a political stalemate in Venezuela, even as conditions
within the country have continued to deterioratedeteriorated. On April
30, a Guaidó-led, U.S.-backed 30, 2019, a
Guaidó-led uprising failed to garner
enough high-level military enough military
support to compel Maduro to
leave office. While some
observers maintain that Maduro is
weak politically, others
fear a prolonged, potentially violent
standoff between the respective supporters of Maduro and
Guaidó. Some observers hope that international action will
coalesce behind talks leading to the convening of free and
fair elections. Both sides have sent envoys to Norway for
exploratory talks on how to resolve the crisis, but actions
taken against the opposition by Maduro could hinder
progress in reaching a political solution.
United Nations (U.N.)
The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) has discussed the
political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, but divisions
within its members have stalled action. Russia, and to a
lesser extent, China, support Maduro. The United States,
and most countries in Europe and the Western Hemisphere,
support Guiadó. Despite that polarization, U.N. agencies
are increasing humanitarian relief within Venezuela after
securing approval in April from Maduro and Guaidó. The
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) are
coordinating efforts to serve the roughly 3.7 million
Venezuelans who had left the country as of March 2019 and
the communities hosting them. The U.N. Human Rights
Council is investigating allegations of crimes against
humanity committed by security forces and armed militias
loyal to Maduro.
Organization of American States (OAS)
The OAS, a regional multilateral organization that includes
all 35 independent countries of the Western Hemisphere
(Cuba currently does not participate), has focused attention
on Venezuela’s political crisis. Since 2016, OAS SecretaryGeneral Luis Almagro has issued a series of reports on the
deteriorating situation in Venezuela, convened special
sessions of the Permanent Council to discuss regional
responses to the crisis, and spoken out against Maduro.
Member states remain divided on how to respond to the
crisis, with countries in the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) particularly reluctant to intervene in
Venezuela’s internal affairs. Many of those countries had
close ties with Venezuela under Maduro’s predecessor, the
late president Hugo Chávez, and, until recently,, standoff. Observers
hope that talks led by Norway, which began in May 2019,
lead to free and fair elections. Those talks have been on
hold, however, since the United States imposed new
sanctions on the Maduro government in August 2019.
Others hope that sanctions lead to fissures in the Maduro
government, which could prompt a political transition.
United Nations
The United Nations (U.N.) Security Council has discussed
the political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, but
divisions among U.N. members have stalled action. Russia
and, to a lesser extent, China support Maduro. The United
States and most countries in Europe and the Western
Hemisphere support Guiadó. Despite that polarization, U.N.
agencies are increasing humanitarian relief in Venezuela
after securing approval in April 2019 from Maduro and
Guaidó. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the
International Organization for Migration are coordinating to
serve some of the roughly 4.3 million Venezuelans who had
left the country as of August 2019 and the communities
hosting them. In July 2019, the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights published a report documenting state
violence against civilians, which has included torture and
extrajudicial killings. On September 9, the High
Commissioner criticized the Maduro government for failing
to implement the report’s recommendations.
Organization of American States
The Organization of American States (OAS), a regional
multilateral organization that includes all 35 independent
countries of the Western Hemisphere (Cuba currently does
not participate), has focused attention on Venezuela’s
political crisis. Since 2016, OAS Secretary-General Luis
Almagro has issued reports on the situation in Venezuela,
convened special sessions of the Permanent Council to
discuss regional responses to the crisis, and spoken out
against Maduro. Member states remain divided on how to
respond to the crisis, with countries in the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) particularly reluctant to intervene
in Venezuela’s internal affairs. Many of those countries had
close ties with Venezuela under Maduro’s predecessor, the
late president Hugo Chávez, and until recently received
significant amounts of subsidized oil from Venezuela. In
2017, Maduro denounced the OAS for meddling in his
country’s domestic affairs and began a two-year process to
withdraw from the organization.
The OAS requires 18 votes to pass a resolution of the
Permanent Council. In June 2018, 19 of 34 member states
passed a resolution stating that the May 2018 presidential
election in Venezuela lacked legitimacy and authorizing
countries to take measures, including sanctions, necessary
to hasten a return to democracy. In January 2019, the same
19 states approved a resolution that refused to recognize the
legitimacy of Maduro’s second term;, called for new
presidential elections;, and urged all member states to adopt
diplomatic, political, economic, and financial measures to
measures to facilitate the prompt restoration of the democratic
order in
Venezuela. After Maduro withdrew his OAS Ambassador,
ambassador, the Permanent Council welcomed the
Venezuelan National
Assembly’s permanent representative
to the OAS on April
9, 2019. Some observers have praised
Secretary-General
Almagro’s activism on Venezuela, which
has included
calling for international intervention in the
country. Others
have asserted that he has sided too closely
with the
opposition, opposition and is unlikely to help broker a diplomatic
diplomatic solution to resolve the current crisis.
Lima Group
In mid-2017, efforts to reach a consensus on how to
at the OAS on
how to respond to the crisis in Venezuela at the OAS appeared to
be stalling. appeared to stall.
On August 8, 2017, 12 Western Hemisphere
countries countries
signed the Lima Accord, a document rejecting
which rejected what it described
as the rupture of democracy and systemic
human rights
violations in Venezuela. The signatory
countries included
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico
, Panama, Paraguay, and
Peru. In 2018, Guyana and St.
Lucia joined the Lima
Group, which did not recognize
Maduro’s May 2018
reelection.
On January 4, 2019, 13 members of the Lima Group
(excluding Mexico) signed a declaration urging President
Maduro not to assume power on January 10, 2019. The
countries resolved to reassess their level of diplomatic
engagement with Venezuela, implement travel bans or
sanctions on Maduro officials (as Canada and Panama
have), suspend military cooperation with Venezuela, and
urge others in the international community to take similar
actions. Under leftist President Andrés Manuel López
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: International Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis
Obrador, Mexico has pledged to remain neutral and is no
longer participatingno longer participates in the Lima Group. El Salvador is
likely to join the Lima Group after Nayib Bukele’s June 1
inauguration
El Salvador and Ecuador currently participate as observers
at Lima Group meetings.
On January 23, 2019, and in subsequent statements,
11 members of the Lima Group have recognized the
Guaidó government and pledged to support a
democratic transition in Venezuela. On February 4,
2019, the Guaidó government joined the Lima Group
and signed its statement calling “for a peaceful
transition … without the use of force.”
The groupLime Group has denounced human rights violations by the
the Maduro government and urged Venezuelan armed forces to
demonstrate their loyalty to Guaidó, but opposed U.S. or
the presence of “security and
intelligence agents from countries” supporting Maduro, but
it also has opposed U.S. or regional military intervention in the crisis. On May 3.
On July 23, 2019,
the Lima Group the goup issued a declaration signed by
12 countries
(not St. Lucia or Guyana but including Venezuela) asking
(including the Guaidó government but not St.
Lucia or Guyana) pledging to coordinate with “relevant
actors,” such as the International Contact Group (see below) to meet to
coordinate efforts and pledging to seek Cuba’s help in
resolving Venezuela’s crisis.
European Union (EU)
The EU
below) and CARICOM, to help resolve the crisis.
European Union
The European Union (EU) has imposed targeted sanctions
on Maduro officials
and adopted an arms embargo against
Venezuela. The EU
Parliament and most member states
have recognized the
Guaidó government (with Norway a notable exception). At
the same time. However, the EU
has opposed military intervention
and “any form of
violence” in the country, most recently in
a statement from April 30 an April 30,
2019, statement. Instead, the EU backed the
formation of an
International Contact Group (ICG).
International Contact Group (ICG)
The EU-backed International Contact Group,ICG, now composed of
several European
countries (France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom) and
Latin American countries (Bolivia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador Ecuador,
Panama, and Uruguay), first convened on February 7,
2019. The group aimed to “establish necessary guarantees
for a credible electoral process, within the earliest time
frame possible”in February 2019. It
aimed to “establish necessary guarantees” for free,
transparent presidential elections and to hasten the delivery
of humanitarian
aid into Venezuela. U.S. officials have expressed
skepticism at the proposal, noting that Maduro has used
past attempts at dialogue (brokered by the Vatican and
others) as a delaying tactic. ICG to Venezuela through dialogue. ICG
supporters maintain the
“necessary guarantees” include
naming a new electoral
council, releasing political
prisoners, and ending all bans on
political parties and candidates.
Since February, the ICG has met twice, most recently on
May 6 and 7 in Costa Rica. At that meeting, also attended
by Chile from the Lima Group and representatives from
CARICOM and the Vatican, the ICG decided to send a
political mission to Caracas and to work with the Lima
Group to hasten a political solution to the crisis. China is
supporting that effort and has pledged to work with the EU
and others for a political settlement to the Venezuela crisis.
Implications for U.S. Policy
The 116th Congress has closely followed developments in
Venezuela, Trump Administration policy responses, and
Since
February, the ICG has met at least three times, including in
June with Lima Group representatives; sent political
missions to Caracas; and supported the dialogue process led
by Norway.
Dialogue Effort Led by Norway
In May 2019, the Norwegian government confirmed it had
been facilitating talks between negotiating teams for
Maduro and Guaidó. The negotiations’ goal has been to
determine the conditions under which free and fair elections
can be held. Points of contention include whether Maduro
will remain in office during the convening of the elections
and whether he can run. Skeptics assert that, as in the past,
Maduro is using negotiations as a delaying tactic. As noted
above, Maduro called off participation in the negotiations
after new U.S. sanctions were announced in August 2019.
international efforts to broker a solution to the crisis.
Congress has held hearings on theVenezuela’s political crisis in
Venezuela
and U.S. policy responses; the humanitarian
crisis in Venezuelacountry’s humanitarian
crisis; the regional migration crisis that
Venezuela’s unrest has wrought throughout Latin America
and the Caribbean
has wrought; the influence of Russia and China in
Venezuela; and the role of CongressCongress’s role in authorizing possible
any use of
U.S. military force in Venezuela. The role of
international international
actors and U.S. coordination with them may
influence influence
congressional consideration of legislative
initiatives to
require, authorize, or constrain certain
Administration Administration
actions regarding Venezuela (e.g., H.R. 920,
H.R. 1477, S.
1025, H.R. 1004, and S.J.Res. 11).
International perspectives, particularly from UNHCR, IOM,
and the Lima Group, may influence oversight of the $213
$333.5 million in U.S. humanitarian assistance dedicated
from FY2017 to FY2019 to to help
support Venezuelans in the
region. They may also inform
also may inform decisions about the amounts
and types of U.S. funds most
needed to support international organizations and U.N.
agencies entities
working insidein Venezuela, both now and in the
future. The
Administration’s proposed FY2020 budget
request asksasked for $9
million in democracy aid through the
Economic Support and Development Fund account and the
and the authority to transfer up to
$500 million to support a
transition or respond to a crisis in
Venezuela. Should
Maduro leave office, the Administration
proposes that such
funds could support international
election observers,
increased humanitarian assistance inside in
Venezuela, and/or
or a potential International Monetary Fund
package.
WhileAlthough there generally has been international support for
U.S. policy toward Venezuela, some U.S. actions have
prompted concern among partners working to resolve the
crisis. Most of these countries have supported U.S. targeted
sanctions on Maduro officials, but some are concerned
about the potential humanitarian impact of U.S. oil
sanctions imposed in January 2019 that seek to prevent
Maduro from benefitting from Venezuela’s oil revenue.
Some countries also have expressed concern about repeated
U.S. threats to use military force in Venezuela despite
opposition from neighboring countries (such as Brazil and
Colombia), the Lima Group, and the European Union. Some are concerned,
however, about the humanitarian impacts of U.S. sanctions
imposed on Venezuela’s state oil company, Petróleos de
Venezuela, S. A. (PdVSA), in January 2019 and sanctions
imposed on the entire Maduro government in August 2019.
Others fear the new sanctions may inhibit progress in the
Norway-led dialogue process. Some countries also have
expressed concern about repeated U.S. threats to use
military force in Venezuela despite opposition from
neighboring countries (such as Brazil and Colombia), the
Lima Group, and the EU.
Threats of U.S. military action have occurred alongside
denunciations of reported Russian and Cuban military
assistance to
Maduro. Some observers caution that the
predict the Trump Administration
could lose support from some
partners because of the U.S.
decision to impose strong
sanctions on Cuba because of its support for Maduro.
Severaland secondary
sanctions on any entities that do business with the Maduro
government or PdVSA. Some U.S. partners on Venezuela
have commercial ties
with Cuba. Many also have with Cuba; others have energy
companies that do business with PdVSA. Many also have
urged the United States to
engage in diplomacy with Russia and prevent the situation
from from
turning into a proxy conflict with Russia for regional and global
influence.
For related information,
global influence.
Implications for U.S. Policy
Also see CRS In Focus IF10230,
Venezuela: Political
Crisis and U.S. Policy; CRS Insight
IN11116, The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance and the Crisis in Venezuela; CRS In Focus
IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Migration Crisis; CRS In
Focus IF10715, IN11163, New U.S.
Sanctions on Venezuela; CRS In Focus IF10715,
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions;
and CRS Report
R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S.
Relations.
The 116th Congress has closely followed developments in
Venezuela, Trump Administration policy responses, and
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: International Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis
IF11216
Disclaimer
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