Updated April 26December 17, 2019
The Palestinians: Overview and Key Issues for U.S. Policy
The Palestinians and their ongoing disputes and interactions
with Israel raise significant issues for U.S. policy. U.S.Palestinian tensions have risen in connection with Trump
Administration actions on Israeli-Palestinian matters such
as Jerusalem and aid (see “Key U.S. Policy Issues” below).
The Palestinians are an Arab people whose origins are in
present-day Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip
(Gaza). Fatah, an Arab nationalist faction, is the driving
force within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
which represents Palestinians internationally. The Sunni
Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist
organization) has not accepted PLO recognition of Israel
and constitutes the main opposition to Fatah.
Of the approximately 12.4 million Palestinians worldwide,
about 4.8 million (98% Sunni Muslim, 1% Christian) live in
the West Bank and Gaza. About 1.5 million additional
Palestinians are citizens of Israel, and 6.1 million more live
elsewhere. Of the total Palestinian population, around 5.4
million (roughly 44%) are refugees (registered in the West
Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) whose claims to
land in present-day Israel constitute a major issue of IsraeliPalestinian dispute. The U.N. Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) provides
assistance (such as health care, education, and housing) to
Palestinian refugees.
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
Note: West Bank and Gaza Strip borders remain subject to IsraeliPalestinian negotiation.
International attention to the Palestinians’ situation
increased after Israel’s military gained control over the
West Bank and Gaza in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Direct
U.S. engagement with Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza dates from the establishment of the Palestinian
Authority (PA) in 1994. In the past decade, other regional
political and security issues have taken some of the global
attention from Palestinian issues.
Timeline of Key Events Since 1993
1993-1995
Israel and the PLO mutually recognize each
other and establish the PA, which has limited
self-rule (subject to overall Israeli control) in
the Gaza Strip and specified areas of the
West Bank.
2000-2005
Clinton Administration is unable to broker an
Israel-PLO peace agreement; second
Palestinian intifada affects prospects for
Israeli-Palestinian peace, leads to tightened
Israeli security in the West Bank, and
complicates the U.S. third-party role.
2004-2005
PLO Chairman/PA President Yasser Arafat
dies; Mahmoud Abbas succeeds him.
2005
Israel unilaterally disengages from Gaza, but
remains in control of airspace and
land/maritime access points; Israeli
settlements continue to expand in the West
Bank (including East Jerusalem).
2006
Hamas wins majority in Palestinian Legislative
Council and leads new PA cabinet; Israel,
United States, and European Union confine
relations to PA President Abbas.
2007
West Bank-Gaza split: Hamas seizes control
of Gaza Strip; Abbas reorganizes PA cabinet
to lead West Bank; this remains the status
quo to date.
2007-present
Various rounds of U.S.-brokered IsraeliPalestinian peace negotiations (the last in
2013-2014) end unsuccessfully; PLO/PA
increases efforts to gain membership in or
support from international organizations.
2017-present
Trump Administration recognizes Jerusalem
as Israel’s capital, and U.S.-Palestinian
takes various actions,
including recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s
capital; U.S.-Palestinian tensions increase.
PLO/PA: Governance, Security Coordination,
Financial Concerns, and Succession
The PA held occasional elections for president and a
legislative council until the Hamas victory in the 2006
legislative elections. Since then, it has ruled by presidential
decree, and some NGOs have criticized its actions on rule
of law and civil liberties. Given the West Bank-Gaza split
in 2007, it is
unclear if and when elections will take place again.
again. Despite this uncertainty, PA leaders have publicly
contemplated holding elections sometime in 2020.
The United States and some other countries sought to
bolster the Abbas-led PA in the West Bank vis-à-vis
Hamas, including through economic and nonlethal security
assistance. However, U.S. aid shrank considerably in 2018
and ended completely in early 2019. Assistance for
Palestinians continues from European Union and Arab Gulf
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The Palestinians: Overview and Key Issues for U.S. Policy
states. Israel-PA security coordination, which has
contributed to the West Bank’s stability since the end of the
second intifada, has continued to date.
The PA faces acute financial concerns because, as of
February 2019, it has rejected monthly revenue transfers
from Israel that, when annualized, represent approximately
65% of the PA budget, in protest of some amounts withheld
by Israel (for more detail, see CRS Report R44245, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti).
The Arab League has pledged assistance to make up for
some of the PA’s resulting budgetary shortfall
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The Palestinians: Overview and Key Issues for U.S. Policy
and ended completely in early 2019. Assistance for
Palestinians continues from European Union and Arab Gulf
states. Israel-PA security coordination, which has
contributed to the West Bank’s stability since the end of the
second intifada, continues amid some Palestinian criticism.
Mahmoud Abbas’s age (b. 1935) and reports of
deteriorating health have contributed to speculation about
who might lead the PA and PLO upon the end of his tenure.
There are a number of possible successors. Majid Faraj
(arguably the adviser most trusted by Abbas), Saeb Erekat
(the PLO’s top negotiator), and Salam Fayyad (a previous
PA prime minister) have major profiles internationally, but
limited domestic popular support. Mohammed Shtayyeh
(PA prime minister since March 2019 and a close Abbas
confidant) is an internationally visible Fatah insider. Other
key Fatah figures include Mahmoud al Aloul and Jibril
Rajoub. Marwan Barghouti attracts significant popular
support, but has been imprisoned by Israel since 2002.
Muhammad Dahlan enjoys support from some Arab
states,
but was expelled from Fatah in 2011.
Fatah and Hamas have reached a number of Egypt-brokered
agreements aimed at ending the West Bank-Gaza split.
However, problems with implementation have left Hamas
in control despite PA responsibility for some civil services.
Key U.S. Policy Issues
The Trump Administration has clashed politically with
Mahmoud Abbas and the PLO/PA. After President Trump
recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in December 2017
and announced his intention to relocate the U.S. embassy
there, Abbas broke off high-level political contacts with the
United States and turned to other international actors.
Since then, the Trump Administration significantly reduced
bilateral aid to the West Bank and Gaza, discontinued
contributions to UNRWA for Palestinian refugees, closed
the PLO’s representative office in Washington, DC, and
subsumed the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem within
the U.S. embassy to Israel.
Figure 1. U.S. Bilateral Assistance to the Palestinians
Hamas and Gaza
Hamas controls Gaza through its security forces and obtains
resources from smuggling, informal “taxes,” and reported
external assistance from some Arab sources and Iran.
Hamas also maintains a presence in the West Bank and a
political bureau that conducts the movement’s worldwide
dealings. Gaza-based Ismail Haniyeh is the leader of
Hamas’s political bureau. Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader
for Gaza, came from Hamas’s military wing.
Hamas and other Gaza-based militants have engaged in
three significant conflicts with Israel (2008-2009, 2012,
2014). In each conflict, the militants launched rockets
indiscriminately toward Israel, and Israeli military strikes
largely decimated Gaza’s infrastructure. The actions on
both sides exacerbated a conundrum for third-party
countries and international organizations that seek to
rebuild Gaza’s infrastructure without bolstering Hamas.
A sharp decrease in PA and external funding to Gaza since
2017 has worsened already difficult conditions there. This
Difficult living conditions for Palestinians in Gaza persist
and are exacerbated by uncertainties regarding external
funding. This has led some international observers and
Israeli officials to
warn of a growing crisis, and some Members of Congress
Congress to call for a resumption of U.S. assistance to help alleviate
alleviate suffering. Israeli-approved cash transfers from
Qatar since
late 2018 have provided some relief for Gazans. According
To the extent that outside contributions replace funding
from the West Bank-based PA—whose actions suggest
some ambivalence over taking responsibility for Gaza—
they could undermine prospects for West Bank-Gaza unity.
According to the World Bank, Gazans’ real per capita
incomes have
fallenfell by one-third since 1994, owing largely to the West
Bank-Gaza split and to Israel’sbetween 1994 and 2017, owing
partly to Israel and Egypt’s tight controls
on goods and
people transiting Gaza’s borders.
Violence flares regularly between Gazans and Israel’s
military, periodically escalating toward larger conflict. At
the same time, Hamas is reportedly keeping options open
for a long-term cease-fire with Israel.
Fatah and Hamas have reached a number of Egypt-brokered
agreements aimed at ending the West Bank-Gaza split.
However, key provisions remain unimplemented, with
Hamas still effectively in control despite PA responsibility
for some civil services. A new Fatah-dominated PA
government established by Abbas in March 2019 may
deepen rather than ease Fatah-Hamas tensions.
Key U.S. Policy Issues
The Trump Administration has clashed politically with
Mahmoud Abbas and the PLO/PA. After President Trump
recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in December 2017
and announced his intention to relocate the U.S. embassy
there, Abbas broke off high-level political contacts with the
United States and turned to other international actors.
Since then, the Trump Administration significantly
reduced bilateral aid to the West Bank and Gaza,
discontinued contributions to UNRWA for Palestinian
refugees, closed the PLO’s representative office in
Washington, DC, and subsumed the U.S. consulate
general in Jerusalem within the U.S. embassy to Israel.
Figure 1. U.S. Bilateral Assistance to the Palestinians
However, Hamas largely refrained from involving itself in
exchanges of fire between Israel and Palestine Islamic Jihad
militants that occurred in November 2019. Some observers
have argued that this restraint might demonstrate interest by
Hamas in a years-long calm with Israel, though action
toward that end could lose Hamas support from Palestinians
who warn against abandoning armed resistance to Israel.
Sources: U.S. State Department and USAID, adapted by CRS.
Notes: All amounts are approximate. Amounts stated for FY2019
and FY2020 have been requested, with ultimate appropriation and
allocation amounts to be determinedFY2020
reflect pending appropriation amounts from the H.R. 1865 joint
explanatory statement. NADR = Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs, INCLE =
International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement, ESF =
Economic Support Fund, OCO
= Overseas Contingency Operations.
Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act in
2018 (ATCA; P.L. 115-253). Under the ATCA, as of
February February
2019 the PA refused to accept any U.S.
bilateral aid in the
West Bank and Gaza—including
nonlethal security
assistance that Israel supports—because
doing so might
subject the PLO/PA to legal liability in U.S.
courts. Apparently, U.S. aid to the Palestinians will not
resume unless Congress amends or repeals the ATCA, or
the Administration channels the aid differently.
The Trump Administration claims that it will introduce a
peace plan, but has delayed its release numerous times.
Partly due to the Administration’s lack of public opposition
to Israeli statements regarding possible unilateral
annexation of West Bank settlements, Palestinian leaders
claim that the Administration has aligned itself with Israel
to predetermine key diplomatic outcomes. The PLO may
consider discontinuing security coordination and other
Israeli-Palestinian arrangements, as it has previously
without Abbas having implemented its recommendations. courts. Section
903 of H.R. 1865 (an FY2020 appropriations bill), if
enacted in December 2019, could amend ATCA by
removing U.S. aid as a trigger for potential PLO/PA legal
liability. The amendment could lead to U.S.-PA discussions
on possibly resuming some aid (per Figure 1 for FY2020),
despite other potential liability triggers and (per the Taylor
Force Act, Title X of P.L. 115-141) possible limitations on
economic (including humanitarian and development) aid.
The Trump Administration claims that it has prepared a
peace plan, but numerous delays have led to doubts over
whether it will be released. Citing U.S. statements that may
favor Israel’s positions on a range of contested issues,
including the legality of West Bank settlements, Palestinian
leaders claim that the Administration has aligned itself with
Israel to predetermine key diplomatic outcomes.
Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
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The Palestinians: Overview and Key Issues for U.S. Policy
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