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Defense Primer: Active Component Enlisted Recruiting

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March 25, 2019Updated January 16, 2020 Defense Primer: Active Duty Enlisted Recruiting Congressional Role The Constitution provides Congress with broad powers over the Armed Forces, including the power “To raise and support Armies” and “To provide and maintain a Navy.” In the exercise of this authority, Congress has historically shown great interest in military recruiting, which is critical to maintaining a fully manned and capable military workforce. Congress exercises a powerful influence on recruiting through its establishment of personnel endstrength levels for the Active Components and Reserve Components. Higher end-strengths generally require a greater number of new recruits, higher rates of retention among current servicemembers, or some combination of the two. Through its oversight powers, Congress monitors the performance of the executive branch in managing the size and quality of the military workforce. Congress influences the achievement of recruiting goals by the services in a number of ways:    authorizing military compensation packages that are competitive with civilian employers (e.g., basic pay, recruiting bonuses, educational and health care benefits); establishing criteria that affect eligibility for enlistment such as age, cognitive, behavioral, and citizenship standards; and funding recruiting programs that provide for dedicated recruiters, market research, advertising, and military entrance processing stations. The policy levers most commonly used to manage recruiting include varying the number of recruiters, funding for advertising, and funding for enlistment incentives. When recruiting shortfalls occur, or are anticipated, Congress may elect to apply additional resources to these mechanisms. Likewise, when recruiting is expected to be strong, Congress may elect to shift resources away from these areas. Recruiting Without a robust ability to bring new personnel into the military, the Services would lack sufficient manpower to carry out mission essential tasks in the near term. Moreover, without stable recruiting levels they would lack a sufficient pool of entry-level personnel to develop into the mid-level and upper-level leaders of the future. To maintain a healthy military force structure, each Service sets goals for new personnel accessions each fiscal year for both its Active and Reserve Components. Officer and enlisted goals are set separately. For enlisted personnel, there are both quantity and quality goals.  establishing criteria that affect eligibility for enlistment Quantity Goals Quantity goals are based on each Service’s projected need for new personnel over the course of the year to meet its congressionally authorized end-strength. This quantity goal is normally based primarily on the difference between the congressionally authorized end-strength of a specific Service and Component for a given fiscal year and the projected number of currently serving personnel it will retain through the end of the year. For example, if a given Service has an authorized Active Component end-strength of 200,000 enlisted personnel, and it projects that it will retain 175,000 of its current enlisted members through the year, it will set a goal of enlisting 25,000 new individuals for that year. The goal will also include a certain number more to account for those new enlistees who do not complete their first year of service. The actual number of new enlistees needed may also change during the year as new projections are made about the retention of currently serving enlisted personnel, or if the Service must increase or decrease the total size of its force (for example, if a Service Secretary were to exercise the authority of 10 U.S.C. 115(g)(1)(A) to increase congressionally authorized active duty end-strength for that Service by up to 2%). Table 1 lists recruit quantity goals and results for FY2016FY2018. Quality Goals Quality goals are only for new enlistees without any previous military service, also known as non-prior service (NPS) recruits. such as age, cognitive, behavioral, and citizenship standards; and Table 1 lists recruit quantity goals and results for FY2017FY2019.  funding recruiting programs that provide for dedicated Quality Goals Quality goals are only for new enlistees without any previous military service, also known as non-prior service (NPS) recruits. recruiters, market research, advertising, and military entrance processing stations. The policy levers most commonly used to manage recruiting include varying the number of recruiters, funding for advertising, and funding for enlistment incentives. When recruiting shortfalls occur, or are anticipated, Congress may elect to apply additional resources to these mechanisms. Likewise, when recruiting is expected to be strong, Congress may elect to shift resources away from these areas. Recruiting Without a robust ability to bring new personnel into the military, the Services would lack sufficient manpower to carry out mission essential tasks in the near term. Moreover, without stable recruiting levels they would lack a sufficient pool of entry-level personnel to develop into the mid-level and upper-level leaders of the future. To maintain a healthy military force structure, each Service sets goals for new personnel accessions each fiscal year for both its Active and Reserve Components. Officer and enlisted goals are set separately. For enlisted personnel, there are both quantity and quality goals. Two principal Department of Defense (DOD) quality benchmarks apply to NPS recruits. The first quality benchmark is the percentage of NPS enlistees who are high school diploma graduates (HSDG). The second quality benchmark is the percentage of scores above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT Categories IIIIA). Since FY1993, the DOD’s quality benchmarks for recruit quality have stipulated that at least 90% of NPS enlistees must be high school diploma graduates, and at least 60% must score above average on the AFQT . Supplementary ways to assess the quality of enlistment cohorts include the percentage of NPS enlistees who score well-below average on the AFQT (Category IV) and the number and types of enlistment waivers granted to enlistees for medical reasons, misconduct, or drug use. DOD regulations require that no more than 4% of an annual enlistment cohort may be Category IV (10th-30th percentile on the AFQT). In addition, no one in Category V (1st-9th percentile on the AFQT) may be admitted into the U.S. armed forces. In the case of waivers, there is no official benchmark. https://crsreports.congress.gov Defense Primer: Active Duty Enlisted Recruiting Table 2 and Table 3 list recruit quality benchmarks and results for FY2016-FY2018FY2017-FY2019. Table 1. Non-Prior Service Accessions Data (Quantity) Active Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2016-FY2018 FY2016FY2017-FY2019 FY2017 Service Goal FY2017FY2018 Achieved Percent of Goal Goal Achieved FY2018FY2019 Percent of Goal Goal Achieved Percent of Goal Army 62,500 62,682 100.3% 68,500 68,862 100.5% 76,500 69,972 91.47% Navy 30,606 30,606 100.0%5% 68,000 68,185 100.3% Navy 35,200 35,225 100.1% 39,000 39,018 100.05% Marine Corps 30,500 30,508 100.0% 0% 39,000 39,027 100.1% Marine Corps 31,994 32,059 100.2% 31,556 31,566 100.00% Air Force0% 31,461767 31,757777 100.9% 0% Air Force 31,250 31,296 100.1% 29,450 30,343 103.030% 32,300 32,421 100.4% Source: Department of Defense. Table 2. Non-Prior Service Accessions Data (Quality – High School Diploma Graduates) Active Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2016-FY2018FY2017-FY2019 Service DOD Benchmark Achieved FY2016FY2017 Achieved FY2017FY2018 Achieved FY2018FY2019 Army 90% 96.195.8% 95.8% 95.00% 93.7% Navy 90% 99.2% 98.7% 97.898.7% 97.8% 97.7% Marine Corps 90% 99.98% 99.8% 99.85% Air Force 90% 99.7% 996% 98.6% 98.65% Source: Department of Defense. Table 3. Non-Prior Service Accessions Data (Quality – Above Average AFQT Score) Active Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2016-FY2018FY2017-FY2019 Service DOD Benchmark Achieved FY2016FY2017 Achieved FY2017FY2018 Achieved FY2018FY2019 Army 60% 60.3% 60.5% 63.95% 63.9% 60.6% Navy 60% 85.5% 83.4% 75.3% 71.6% Marine Corps 60% 71.3% 71.66% 69.9% 69.94% Air Force 60% 84.982.1% 82.1% 828% 81.8% Source: Department of Defense. Relevant Statutes Title 10 U.S. Code, Chapter 31 10 U.S.C. §115 Other Resources DOD Instruction 1304.26, Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction DOD Instruction 6130.03, Medical Standards for Appointment, Enlistment or Induction in the Military Services Defense Manpower Data Center, DOD Personnel, Workforce Reports, and Publications. Lawrence Kapp, Specialist in Military Manpower Policy IF11147 https://crsreports.congress.gov Defense Primer: Active Duty Enlisted Recruiting Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11147 · VERSION 1 · NEW3 · UPDATED