The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
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The Army’'s Optionally Manned Fighting
February 22, 2019
Vehicle (OMFV) Program: Background and
Andrew Feickert
Issues for Congress
Specialist in Military
Ground Forces
Vehicle (OMFV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Updated March 21, 2019
(R45519)
Jump to Main Text of Report
In June 2018, in part due to congressional concerns, the Army announced a new modernization
strategy and designated the Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) as the program to replace strategy and designated the Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) as the program to replace
the M-2 Bradley. In October 2018, Army leadership decided to redesignate the NGCV as the the M-2 Bradley. In October 2018, Army leadership decided to redesignate the NGCV as the
Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) and to add additional vehicle programs to what Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) and to add additional vehicle programs to what
would be called the NGCV Program.would be called the NGCV Program.
The M-2 Bradley, which has been in service since 1981, is an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) used to transport infantry on The M-2 Bradley, which has been in service since 1981, is an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) used to transport infantry on
the battlefield and provide fire support to dismounted troops and suppress or destroy enemy fighting vehicles. Updated the battlefield and provide fire support to dismounted troops and suppress or destroy enemy fighting vehicles. Updated
numerous times since its introduction, the M-2 Bradley is widely considered to have reached the technological limits of its numerous times since its introduction, the M-2 Bradley is widely considered to have reached the technological limits of its
capacity to accommodate new electronics, armor, and defense systems. Two past efforts to replace the M-2 Bradley—the capacity to accommodate new electronics, armor, and defense systems. Two past efforts to replace the M-2 Bradley—the
Future Combat System (FCS) Program and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program—were cancelled for programmatic Future Combat System (FCS) Program and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program—were cancelled for programmatic
and cost-associated reasons.and cost-associated reasons.
In late 2018, the Army established Army Futures Command (AFC), intended to establish unity of command and effort while In late 2018, the Army established Army Futures Command (AFC), intended to establish unity of command and effort while
consolidating the Armyconsolidating the Army’'s modernization process under one roof. AFC is intended to play a significant role in OMFV s modernization process under one roof. AFC is intended to play a significant role in OMFV
development and acquisition. Hoping to field the OMFV in FY2026, the Army plans to employ Section 804 Middle Tier development and acquisition. Hoping to field the OMFV in FY2026, the Army plans to employ Section 804 Middle Tier
Acquisition Authority for rapid prototyping. The Army plans to develop, in parallel, three complementary classes of Robotic Acquisition Authority for rapid prototyping. The Army plans to develop, in parallel, three complementary classes of Robotic
Combat Vehicles (RCVs) intended to accompany the OMFV into combat both to protect the OMFV and provide additional Combat Vehicles (RCVs) intended to accompany the OMFV into combat both to protect the OMFV and provide additional
fire support. For RCVs to be successfully developed, problems with autonomous ground navigation will need to be resolved fire support. For RCVs to be successfully developed, problems with autonomous ground navigation will need to be resolved
and artificial intelligence must evolve to permit the RCVs to function as intended. The Army has stated that a new and artificial intelligence must evolve to permit the RCVs to function as intended. The Army has stated that a new
congressionally-granted acquisition authoritycongressionally-granted acquisition authority - —referred to as Section 804 authorityreferred to as Section 804 authority - —might also be used in RCV development.
might also be used in RCV development.
Potential issues for Congress include the following:
How will the OMFV program avoid the same fate as the cancelled FCS and GCV programs?
What is the Army Futures Command’s (AFC’s) role in program management?
What is the relationship between the OMFV and RCVs?
What are some of the benefits and concerns regarding Section 804 authority and the OMFV?
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Contents
Why Is This Issue Important to Congress? ...................................................................................... 1
The Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) Becomes the Optionally Manned Fighting
Vehicle (OMFV) ........................................................................................................................... 1
Report Focus on OMFV ............................................................................................................ 2
Preliminary OMFV Requirements................................................................................................... 2
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 3
The Army’s Current Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) ............................................................... 3
M-2 Limitations and the Need for a Replacement .................................................................... 3
Past Attempts to Replace the M-2 Bradley IFV ........................................................................ 4
Why the FCS and GCV Programs Were Cancelled .................................................................. 4
FCS ..................................................................................................................................... 4
GCV .................................................................................................................................... 5
After the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV): The Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV)
Program ........................................................................................................................................ 5
Army Futures Command (AFC) and Cross-Functional Teams (CFTs) ........................................... 6
Army Futures Command ........................................................................................................... 6
Cross-Functional Teams (CFTs) ................................................................................................ 6
Army’s OMFV Acquisition Approach ............................................................................................ 7
Original OMFV Acquisition Plan ............................................................................................. 8
Secretary of the Army Accelerates the Program ....................................................................... 8
Potential OMFV Candidates ..................................................................................................... 9
BAE Systems ...................................................................................................................... 9
General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) ....................................................................... 10
Raytheon/Rheinmetall....................................................................................................... 10
Robotic Combat Vehicles (RCVs) and the OMFV ......................................................................... 11
Robotic Combat Vehicle–Light (RCV–L) ............................................................................... 12
Robotic Combat Vehicle–Medium (RCV–M) ......................................................................... 12
Robotic Combat Vehicle–Heavy (RCV–H) ............................................................................ 13
RCV Acquisition Approach ..................................................................................................... 13
OMFV, RCV, and Section 804 Middle Tier Acquisition Authority ............................................... 13
Concerns with Section 804 Authority ..................................................................................... 14
Potential Issues for Congress......................................................................................................... 15
How Will the OMFV Program Avoid the Same Fate as the Cancelled FCS and GCV
Programs? ............................................................................................................................ 15
Army Futures Command’s (AFC’s) Role in OMFV and RCV Program Management .......... 15
The Relationship Between the OMFV and RCVs ................................................................... 16
Section 804 Authority and the OMFV .................................................................................... 16
Figures
Figure 1. DOD Systems Acquisition Framework ............................................................................ 8
Figure 2. BAE Prototype CV-90 ...................................................................................................... 9
Figure 3. GDLS Griffin III Prototype ............................................................................................ 10
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Figure 4. Raytheon/Rheinmetall Lynx Prototype ........................................................................... 11
Figure 5. Illustrative RCV–L ......................................................................................................... 12
Figure 6. Illustrative RCV–M........................................................................................................ 12
Figure 7. Illustrative RCV–H ........................................................................................................ 13
Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................................... 17
Congressional Research Service
The Army’s OMFV Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Why Is This Issue Important to Congress?
The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) is expected to be the third attempt to s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) is expected to be the third attempt to
replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) which has been in service since the early replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) which has been in service since the early
1980s. Despite numerous upgrades since its introduction, the Army contends the M-2 is near the 1980s. Despite numerous upgrades since its introduction, the Army contends the M-2 is near the
end of its useful life and can no longer accommodate the types of upgrades needed for it to be end of its useful life and can no longer accommodate the types of upgrades needed for it to be
effective on the modern battlefield.effective on the modern battlefield.
Because the OMFV would be an important weapon system in the ArmyBecause the OMFV would be an important weapon system in the Army’'s Armored Brigade s Armored Brigade
Combat Teams (ABCTs), Congress may be concerned with how the OMFV would impact the Combat Teams (ABCTs), Congress may be concerned with how the OMFV would impact the
effectiveness of ground forces over the full spectrum of military operations. Moreover, Congress effectiveness of ground forces over the full spectrum of military operations. Moreover, Congress
might also be concerned with how much more capable the OMFV is projected to be over the M-2 might also be concerned with how much more capable the OMFV is projected to be over the M-2
to ensure that it is not a costly marginal improvement over the current system. A number of past to ensure that it is not a costly marginal improvement over the current system. A number of past
unsuccessful Army acquisition programs have served to heighten congressional oversight of unsuccessful Army acquisition programs have served to heighten congressional oversight of
Army programs, and the OMFV will likely be subject to a high degree of congressional interest. Army programs, and the OMFV will likely be subject to a high degree of congressional interest.
In addition to these primary concerns, how the Army plans to use the new congressionally-In addition to these primary concerns, how the Army plans to use the new congressionally-
granted Section 804 Middle Tier Acquisition Authority as well as overall program affordability granted Section 804 Middle Tier Acquisition Authority as well as overall program affordability
could be potential oversight issues for Congress.could be potential oversight issues for Congress.
The Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV)
Becomes the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle
(OMFV)
In June 2018, the Army established the Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) program to In June 2018, the Army established the Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) program to
replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), which has been in service since the replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), which has been in service since the
early 1980s. In October 2018, Army leadership reportedly decided to redesignate the NGCV as early 1980s. In October 2018, Army leadership reportedly decided to redesignate the NGCV as
the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) and add additional vehicle programs to what the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) and add additional vehicle programs to what
would be called the NGCV Program.would be called the NGCV Program.11 Under the new NGCV Program, the following systems are Under the new NGCV Program, the following systems are
planned for development:planned for development:
The The Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV): the M-2 Bradley IFV the M-2 Bradley IFV
replacement.
replacement.
The The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV):2 the M-113 vehicle 2 the M-113 vehicle
replacement.
replacement.
Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF):3 a light tank for Infantry Brigade Combat 3 a light tank for Infantry Brigade Combat
Teams (IBCTs).Teams (IBCTs).
Robotic Combat Vehicles (RCVs): three versions, Light, Medium, and Heavy. three versions, Light, Medium, and Heavy.
The Decisive Lethality Platform (DLP): the M-1 Abrams tank replacement. the M-1 Abrams tank replacement.
Two programs—AMPV and MPF—are in Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Prototype Two programs—AMPV and MPF—are in Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Prototype
Development, respectively. Reportedly, the AMPV and MPF programs, which were overseen by Development, respectively. Reportedly, the AMPV and MPF programs, which were overseen by
1 Ashley Tressel, “MPF, AMPV Now Part of NGCV Family of Vehicles,” InsideDefense.com, October 12, 2018.
2 For additional information on the AMPV, see CRS Report R43240, The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
(AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
3 For additional information on MPF, see CRS Report R44968, Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Mobility,
Reconnaissance, and Firepower Programs, by Andrew Feickert.
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Program Executive Office (PEO) Ground Combat Systems, will continue to be overseen by PEO Program Executive Office (PEO) Ground Combat Systems, will continue to be overseen by PEO
Ground Combat Systems, but the NGCV Cross Functional Team (CFT) will determine their Ground Combat Systems, but the NGCV Cross Functional Team (CFT) will determine their
respective operational requirements and acquisition schedule.respective operational requirements and acquisition schedule.4
4
Report Focus on OMFV
Because AMPV and MPF are discussed in earlier CRS reports and the OMFV is in the early Because AMPV and MPF are discussed in earlier CRS reports and the OMFV is in the early
stages of development, the remainder of this report focuses on the OMFV and associated RCVs. stages of development, the remainder of this report focuses on the OMFV and associated RCVs.
Because the DLP is intended to replace the ArmyBecause the DLP is intended to replace the Army’'s second major ground combat system—the M-s second major ground combat system—the M-
1 Abrams Tank—it will be addressed in a separate CRS report in the future.1 Abrams Tank—it will be addressed in a separate CRS report in the future.
Preliminary OMFV Requirements5
Requirements5 The ArmyThe Army’'s preliminary basic operational requirements for the OMFV include the following:s preliminary basic operational requirements for the OMFV include the following:
Optionally manned. It must have the ability to conduct remotely controlled It must have the ability to conduct remotely controlled
operations while the crew is off-platform.operations while the crew is off-platform.6
6
Capacity. It should eventually operate with no more than two crewmen and It should eventually operate with no more than two crewmen and
possess sufficient volume under armor to carry at least six soldiers.possess sufficient volume under armor to carry at least six soldiers.
Transportability. Two OMFVs should be transportable by one C-17 and be Two OMFVs should be transportable by one C-17 and be
ready for combat within 15 minutes.ready for combat within 15 minutes.
Dense urban terrain operations and mobility. Platforms should include the Platforms should include the
ability to super elevate weapons and simultaneously engage threats using main ability to super elevate weapons and simultaneously engage threats using main
gun and an independent weapons system.gun and an independent weapons system.
Protection. It must possess requisite protection to survive on the contemporary It must possess requisite protection to survive on the contemporary
and future battlefield.and future battlefield.
Growth. It should possess sufficient size, weight, architecture, power, and It should possess sufficient size, weight, architecture, power, and
cooling for automotive and electrical purposes to meet all platform needs and cooling for automotive and electrical purposes to meet all platform needs and
allow for preplanned product improvements.allow for preplanned product improvements.
Lethality. It should apply immediate, precise, and decisively lethal extended It should apply immediate, precise, and decisively lethal extended
range medium-caliber, directed energy, and missile fires in day/night/all-weather range medium-caliber, directed energy, and missile fires in day/night/all-weather
conditions, while moving and/or stationary against moving and/or stationary conditions, while moving and/or stationary against moving and/or stationary
targets. The platform should allow for mounted, dismount, and unmanned system targets. The platform should allow for mounted, dismount, and unmanned system
target handover.target handover.
Embedded platform training
Embedded platform training. It should have embedded training systems that It should have embedded training systems that
have interoperability with the Synthetic Training Environment.have interoperability with the Synthetic Training Environment.
Sustainability. Industry should demonstrate innovations that achieve Industry should demonstrate innovations that achieve
breakthroughs in power generation and management to obtain increased breakthroughs in power generation and management to obtain increased
operational range and fuel efficiency, increased silent watch, part and component operational range and fuel efficiency, increased silent watch, part and component
reliability, and significantly reduced sustainment burden.
4 Ashley Tressel, “MPF, AMPV Now Part of NGCV Family of Vehicles,” InsideDefense.com, October 12, 2018.
5 Bob Purtiman, “Preparing for Future Battlefield: The Next Generation Combat Vehicle,” Army News, September 17,
2018.
6 For additional information on autonomous systems, see CRS Report R45392, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and
Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress, coordinated by Andrew
Feickert
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Additional requirements include the capacity to accommodate7
reactive armor,
an Active Protection System (APS),
artificial intelligence,8 and
Directed-energy weapons9 and advanced target sensors.
Background
The Army’s Current Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)
reliability, and significantly reduced sustainment burden.
battlefield and provide fire support to dismounted troops and suppress or destroy enemy fighting battlefield and provide fire support to dismounted troops and suppress or destroy enemy fighting
vehicles. The M-2 has a crew of three—commander, gunner, and driver—and carries seven fully vehicles. The M-2 has a crew of three—commander, gunner, and driver—and carries seven fully
equipped infantry soldiers. M-2 Bradley IFVs are primarily found in the Armyequipped infantry soldiers. M-2 Bradley IFVs are primarily found in the Army’'s Armored s Armored
Brigade Combat Teams (ABCT). The first M-2 prototypes were delivered to the Army in Brigade Combat Teams (ABCT). The first M-2 prototypes were delivered to the Army in
December 1978, and the first delivery of M-2s to units started in May 1981. The M-2 Bradley has December 1978, and the first delivery of M-2s to units started in May 1981. The M-2 Bradley has
been upgraded often since 1981, and the Army reportedly announced in January 2018 that it plans been upgraded often since 1981, and the Army reportedly announced in January 2018 that it plans
to undertake an upgrade to the M-2A5 version planned for the mid-2020s.to undertake an upgrade to the M-2A5 version planned for the mid-2020s.10
10
M-2 Limitations and the Need for a Replacement
Despite numerous upgrades over its lifetime, the M-2 Bradley has what some consider a notable Despite numerous upgrades over its lifetime, the M-2 Bradley has what some consider a notable
limitation. Although the M-2 Bradley can accommodate seven fully equipped infantry soldiers, limitation. Although the M-2 Bradley can accommodate seven fully equipped infantry soldiers,
infantry squads consist of nine soldiers. As a result, infantry squads consist of nine soldiers. As a result,“"each mechanized [ABCT] infantry platoon each mechanized [ABCT] infantry platoon
has to divide three squads between four Bradleys, meaning that all the members of a squad are has to divide three squads between four Bradleys, meaning that all the members of a squad are
not able to ride in the same vehicle.not able to ride in the same vehicle.”11"11 This limitation raises both command and control and This limitation raises both command and control and
employment challenges for Bradley-mounted infantry squads and platoons.employment challenges for Bradley-mounted infantry squads and platoons.
The M-2 Bradley first saw combat in 1991 in Operation Desert Storm, where its crews were The M-2 Bradley first saw combat in 1991 in Operation Desert Storm, where its crews were
generally satisfied with its performance.generally satisfied with its performance.1212 The M-2 The M-2’'s service in 2003s service in 2003’'s Operation Iraqi Freedom s Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) was also considered satisfactory. However, reports of vehicle and crew losses attributed to
7 Project Manager NGCV, NGCV OMFV Industry Day Briefing, August 6, 2018, and David Vergun, “Next Generation
Combat Vehicle Must be Effective in Mega Cities, FORSCOM Commander Says,” Army News, November 30, 2017.
8 For additional information on Army artificial intelligence efforts, see CRS Report R45392, U.S. Ground Forces
Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress, coordinated by
Andrew Feickert.
9 For information on Army directed energy efforts, see CRS Report R45098, U.S. Army Weapons-Related Directed
Energy (DE) Programs: Background and Potential Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
10 Sebastien Roblin, “The Army’s Biggest and Baddest Troop Carrier Might Get Even Bigger,” The National Interest,”
February 4, 2018.
11 Ibid.
12 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Operation Desert Storm: Early Performance Assessment
of Bradley and Abrams,” GAO/NSIAD-92-94, January 1992.
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(OIF) was also considered satisfactory. However, reports of vehicle and crew losses attributed to mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and anti-tank rockets—despite the addition of mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and anti-tank rockets—despite the addition of
reactive reactivearmor13armor13 to the M-2—raised concerns about the survivability of the Bradley. to the M-2—raised concerns about the survivability of the Bradley.14
14
Furthermore, the M-2 Bradley is reportedly reaching the technological limits of its capacity to Furthermore, the M-2 Bradley is reportedly reaching the technological limits of its capacity to
accommodate new electronics, armor, and defense systems.accommodate new electronics, armor, and defense systems.1515 By some accounts, M-2 Bradleys By some accounts, M-2 Bradleys
during OIF routinely had to turn off certain electronic systems to gain enough power for anti-during OIF routinely had to turn off certain electronic systems to gain enough power for anti-
roadside-bomb jammers. Moreover, current efforts to mount active protection systems (APS)roadside-bomb jammers. Moreover, current efforts to mount active protection systems (APS)1616 on on
M-2 Bradleys to destroy incoming anti-tank rockets and missiles are proving difficult.M-2 Bradleys to destroy incoming anti-tank rockets and missiles are proving difficult.1717 Given its Given its
almost four decades of service, operational limitations, demonstrated combat vulnerabilities, and almost four decades of service, operational limitations, demonstrated combat vulnerabilities, and
difficulties in upgrading current models, the M-2 Bradley is arguably a candidate for replacement.difficulties in upgrading current models, the M-2 Bradley is arguably a candidate for replacement.
Past Attempts to Replace the M-2 Bradley IFV
The Army has twice attempted to replace the M-2 Bradley IFV—first as part of the Future The Army has twice attempted to replace the M-2 Bradley IFV—first as part of the Future
Combat System (FCS) Program,Combat System (FCS) Program,1818 which was cancelled by the Secretary of Defense in 2009, and which was cancelled by the Secretary of Defense in 2009, and
second with the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program,second with the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program,1919 cancelled by the Secretary of Defense cancelled by the Secretary of Defense
in 2014. These cancellations, along with a series of high-profile studies, such as the 2011 Decker-in 2014. These cancellations, along with a series of high-profile studies, such as the 2011 Decker-
Wagner Army Acquisition Review, have led many to call into question the ArmyWagner Army Acquisition Review, have led many to call into question the Army’'s ability to s ability to
develop and field ground combat systems.develop and field ground combat systems.
Why the FCS and GCV Programs Were Cancelled
FCS
FCS
Introduced in 1999 by Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, FCS was envisioned as a Introduced in 1999 by Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, FCS was envisioned as a
family of networked, manned and unmanned vehicles, and aircraft for the future battlefield. The family of networked, manned and unmanned vehicles, and aircraft for the future battlefield. The
Army believed that advanced sensor technology would result in total battlefield awareness, Army believed that advanced sensor technology would result in total battlefield awareness,
permitting the development of lesser-armored combat vehicles and the ability to engage and permitting the development of lesser-armored combat vehicles and the ability to engage and
destroy targets beyond the line-of-sight. However, a variety of factors led to the programdestroy targets beyond the line-of-sight. However, a variety of factors led to the program’s
's cancellation, including a complicated, industry-led management approach; the failure of a number cancellation, including a complicated, industry-led management approach; the failure of a number
of critical technologies to perform as envisioned; and frequently changing requirements from of critical technologies to perform as envisioned; and frequently changing requirements from
Army leadership—all of which resulted in program costs increasing by 25%.Army leadership—all of which resulted in program costs increasing by 25%.2020 After $21.4 billion already spent21 After $21.4 billion
13 Reactive armor typically consists of a layer of high explosive between two metallic armor plates. When a penetrating
weapon strikes the armor, the explosive detonates, thereby damaging the penetrator or disrupting the resulting plasma
jet generated by the penetrator.
14 Sebastien Roblin, “The Army’s M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle is Old. What Replaces it Could be Revolutionary,”
The National Interest, October 27, 2018.
15 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army Pushes Bradley Replacement; Cautious on Armed Robots,” Breaking Defense, June
27, 2018.
16 For additional information on active protection systems, see CRS Report R44598, Army and Marine Corps Active
Protection System (APS) Efforts, by Andrew Feickert.
17 Ibid.
18 For additional historical information on the Future Combat System, see CRS Report RL32888, Army Future Combat
System (FCS) “Spin-Outs” and Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew
Feickert and Nathan J. Lucas.
19 For additional historical information on the Ground Combat Vehicle, see CRS Report R41597, The Army’s Ground
Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
20 Stephen Rodriguez, “Top Ten Failed Defense Programs of the RMA Era,” War on the Rocks, December 2, 2014.
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already spent21 and the program only in the preproduction phase, then Secretary Gates and the program only in the preproduction phase, then Secretary Gates
restructured the program in 2009, effectively cancelling it.restructured the program in 2009, effectively cancelling it.22
GCV23
22
GCV23
Recognizing the need to replace the M-2 Bradley, as part of the FCS Recognizing the need to replace the M-2 Bradley, as part of the FCS “"restructuring,restructuring,”" the Army the Army
was directed by the Secretary of Defense in 2009 to develop a ground combat vehicle (GCV) that was directed by the Secretary of Defense in 2009 to develop a ground combat vehicle (GCV) that
would be relevant across the entire spectrum of Army operations, incorporating combat lessons would be relevant across the entire spectrum of Army operations, incorporating combat lessons
learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2010, the Army, in conjunction with the Pentagonlearned in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2010, the Army, in conjunction with the Pentagon’s
's acquisition office, conducted a review of the GCV program to acquisition office, conducted a review of the GCV program to“"review GCV core elements review GCV core elements
including acquisition strategy, vehicle capabilities, operational needs, program schedule, cost including acquisition strategy, vehicle capabilities, operational needs, program schedule, cost
performance, and technological specifications.performance, and technological specifications.”" This review found that the GCV relied on too This review found that the GCV relied on too
many immature technologies, had too many performance requirements, and was required by many immature technologies, had too many performance requirements, and was required by
Army leadership to have too many capabilities to make it affordable. In February 2014, the Army Army leadership to have too many capabilities to make it affordable. In February 2014, the Army
recommended terminating the GCV program and redirecting the funds toward developing a next-recommended terminating the GCV program and redirecting the funds toward developing a next-
generation platform.generation platform.2424 The cost of GCV cancellation was estimated at $1.5 billion. The cost of GCV cancellation was estimated at $1.5 billion.25
25
After the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV): The Next
Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) Program
In the aftermath of the GCV program, the Army embarked on a Future Fighting Vehicle (FFV) In the aftermath of the GCV program, the Army embarked on a Future Fighting Vehicle (FFV)
effort in 2015. Army officials—described as effort in 2015. Army officials—described as“cautious” and “"cautious" and "in no hurry to initiate an infantry in no hurry to initiate an infantry
fighting vehicle programfighting vehicle program”"—instead initiated industry studies to —instead initiated industry studies to “"understand the trade space understand the trade space
before leaping into a new program.before leaping into a new program.”26"26 In general, Army combat vehicle modernization efforts In general, Army combat vehicle modernization efforts
post-FCS have been characterized as upgrading existing platforms as opposed to developing new post-FCS have been characterized as upgrading existing platforms as opposed to developing new
systems. This was due in part to reluctance of senior Army leadership, but also to significant systems. This was due in part to reluctance of senior Army leadership, but also to significant
budgetary restrictions imposed on the Army during this period. Some in Congress, however, were budgetary restrictions imposed on the Army during this period. Some in Congress, however, were
not pleased with the slow pace of Army modernization, reportedly noting the Army was not pleased with the slow pace of Army modernization, reportedly noting the Army was
“"woefully behind on modernizationwoefully behind on modernization”" and was and was “"essentially organized and equipped as it was in the essentially organized and equipped as it was in the
1980s.1980s.”27"27 In June 2018, in part due to congressional concerns, the Army announced a new In June 2018, in part due to congressional concerns, the Army announced a new
modernization strategy and designated NGCVs as the second of its six modernization priorities.modernization strategy and designated NGCVs as the second of its six modernization priorities.28
28 Originally, the NGCV was considered the program to replace the M-2 Bradley. Development of Originally, the NGCV was considered the program to replace the M-2 Bradley. Development of
the NGCV would be managed by the Program Executive Officer (PEO) Ground Combat Systems, the NGCV would be managed by the Program Executive Officer (PEO) Ground Combat Systems,
under the Assistant Secretary of the Army (ASA), Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ALT).
21 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army
Futures Command Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132, January 2019, p. 3.
22 Stephen Rodriguez, “Top Ten Failed Defense Programs of the RMA Era,” War on the Rocks, December 2, 2014.
23 Information in this section is taken directly from CRS Report R41597, The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
24 Remarks by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel FY2015 Budget Preview, Pentagon Press Briefing Room, Monday,
February 24, 2014.
25 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army
Futures Command Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132, January 2019, p. 3.
26 Sebastian Sprenger, “Army Bides its Time in Next Steps Toward Infantry Fighting Vehicle,” InsideDefense.com,
June 10, 2015.
27 Association of the U.S. Army, “Milley: Readiness, with Needed Modernization, is a Top Priority,” March 1, 2016.
28 U.S. Army Modernization Strategy, June 6, 2018, https://www.army.mil/standto/2018-06-06.
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under the Assistant Secretary of the Army (ASA), Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ALT).
Army Futures Command (AFC) and Cross-
Functional Teams (CFTs)
Army Futures Command29
Command29 In November 2017, the Army established a Modernization Task Force to examine the options for In November 2017, the Army established a Modernization Task Force to examine the options for
establishing an Army Futures Command (AFC) that would establish unity of command and effort establishing an Army Futures Command (AFC) that would establish unity of command and effort
as the Army consolidated its modernization process under one roof. Formerly, Army as the Army consolidated its modernization process under one roof. Formerly, Army
modernization activities were primarily spread among Forces Command (FORSCOM), Training modernization activities were primarily spread among Forces Command (FORSCOM), Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Army Materiel Command (AMC), Army Test and and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Army Materiel Command (AMC), Army Test and
Evaluation Command (ATEC), and the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-8.Evaluation Command (ATEC), and the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-8.3030 Intended to be a 4-star Intended to be a 4-star
headquarters largely drawn from existing Army commands, AFC was planned to be established in headquarters largely drawn from existing Army commands, AFC was planned to be established in
an urban environment with ready access to academic, technological, and industrial expertise. On an urban environment with ready access to academic, technological, and industrial expertise. On
July 13, 2018, the Army announced that AFC would be headquartered in Austin, TX, and that it July 13, 2018, the Army announced that AFC would be headquartered in Austin, TX, and that it
had achieved initial operating capability on July 1, 2018. According to the Army, when AFC had achieved initial operating capability on July 1, 2018. According to the Army, when AFC
reaches full operating capacity in summer 2019, the headquarters will comprise approximately reaches full operating capacity in summer 2019, the headquarters will comprise approximately
500 personnel (about 100 uniformed and 400 Army civilians). Sub-organizations, many of which 500 personnel (about 100 uniformed and 400 Army civilians). Sub-organizations, many of which
currently reside within FORSCOM, TRADOC, and AMC, are to transition to AFC, but there are currently reside within FORSCOM, TRADOC, and AMC, are to transition to AFC, but there are
no plans to physically move units or personnel from these commands at the present time.no plans to physically move units or personnel from these commands at the present time.
Cross-Functional Teams (CFTs)
Army Futures Command intends to use what it calls Cross-Functional Teams (CFT) as part of its Army Futures Command intends to use what it calls Cross-Functional Teams (CFT) as part of its
mission, which includes the development of NGCV. As a means to mission, which includes the development of NGCV. As a means to“"increase the efficiency of its increase the efficiency of its
requirements and technology development efforts, the Army established cross-functional team requirements and technology development efforts, the Army established cross-functional team
pilots for modernizationpilots for modernization”" in October 2017. in October 2017.3131 These CFTs are intended to These CFTs are intended to
leverage expertise from industry and academia;leverage expertise from industry and academia;
identify ways to use experimentation, prototyping, and demonstrations; andidentify ways to use experimentation, prototyping, and demonstrations; and
Identify opportunities to improve the efficiency of requirements development and Identify opportunities to improve the efficiency of requirements development and
the overall defense systems acquisition process.the overall defense systems acquisition process.32
32The eight CFTs areThe eight CFTs are
Long Range Precision Fires at Ft. Sill, OK;Long Range Precision Fires at Ft. Sill, OK;
Next Generation Combat Vehicle at Detroit Arsenal, MI;Next Generation Combat Vehicle at Detroit Arsenal, MI;
Future Vertical Lift at Redstone Arsenal, AL;
Future Vertical Lift at Redstone Arsenal, AL;
29 Information in this section is taken directly from CRS Insight IN10889, Army Futures Command (AFC), by Andrew
Feickert.
30 The Army G-8 is the Army’s lead for matching available resources to the defense strategy and the Army plan. They
accomplish this through participation in Office of the Secretary of Defense–led defense reviews and assessments, the
programming of resources, material integration, analytical and modeling capabilities, and the management of the
Department of the Army studies and analysis. http://www.g8.army.mil/, accessed February 21, 2019.
31 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army
Futures Command Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132, January 2019, p. 7.
32 Ibid. p. 8.
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Network Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence at Aberdeen
Network Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD;Proving Ground, MD;
Assured Positioning, Navigation and Timing at Redstone Arsenal, AL;Assured Positioning, Navigation and Timing at Redstone Arsenal, AL;
Air and Missile Defense at Ft. Sill, OK;Air and Missile Defense at Ft. Sill, OK;
Soldier Lethality at Ft. Benning, GA; andSoldier Lethality at Ft. Benning, GA; and
Synthetic Training Environment in Orlando, FL.Synthetic Training Environment in Orlando, FL.33
33CFTs are to be a part of AFC. Regarding the NGCV, program acquisition authority is derived CFTs are to be a part of AFC. Regarding the NGCV, program acquisition authority is derived
from Assistant Secretary of the Army (ASA) for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ALT), from Assistant Secretary of the Army (ASA) for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ALT),
who is also the senior Army Acquisition Executive (AAE), to whom the Program Executive who is also the senior Army Acquisition Executive (AAE), to whom the Program Executive
Officers (PEOs) report. AFC is to be responsible for requirements and to support PEOs. The Officers (PEOs) report. AFC is to be responsible for requirements and to support PEOs. The
NGCV Program Manager (PM), who is subordinate to PEO Ground Combat Systems, is to NGCV Program Manager (PM), who is subordinate to PEO Ground Combat Systems, is to
remain under the control of ASA (ALT) but are to be teamed with CFTs under control of the remain under the control of ASA (ALT) but are to be teamed with CFTs under control of the
AFC.AFC.3434 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes, however The Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes, however:
Army Futures Command has not yet established policies and procedures detailing how it Army Futures Command has not yet established policies and procedures detailing how it
will execute its assigned mission, roles, and responsibilities. For example, we found that it will execute its assigned mission, roles, and responsibilities. For example, we found that it
is not yet clear how Army Futures Command will coordinate its responsibilities with
existing acquisition organizations within the Army that do not directly report to it. One
such organization is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for is not yet clear how Army Futures Command will coordinate its responsibilities with existing acquisition organizations within the Army that do not directly report to it. One such organization is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Acquisition,
Logistics and Technology [ASA (ALT)]—the civilian authority responsible for the overall Logistics and Technology [ASA (ALT)]—the civilian authority responsible for the overall
supervision of acquisition matters for the Army—and the acquisition offices it oversees.supervision of acquisition matters for the Army—and the acquisition offices it oversees.35
35
The ArmyThe Army’'s explanation of how the NGCV program is to be administered and managed, along s explanation of how the NGCV program is to be administered and managed, along
with GAOwith GAO’'s findings regarding AFC not yet having established policies and procedures, suggests s findings regarding AFC not yet having established policies and procedures, suggests
a current degree of uncertainty as to how the NGCV program will be managed.a current degree of uncertainty as to how the NGCV program will be managed.
Army’'s OMFV Acquisition Approach36
Approach36 Figure 1 depicts the Department of Defense (DOD) Systems Acquisition Framework, which depicts the Department of Defense (DOD) Systems Acquisition Framework, which
illustrates the various phases of systems development and acquisitions and is applicable to the illustrates the various phases of systems development and acquisitions and is applicable to the
procurement of Army ground combat systems.
33 Ibid.
34 U.S. Army Stand-To, Army Futures Command, March 28, 2018.
35 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army
Futures Command Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132, January 2019, p. 14.
36 For additional information on defense acquisition, see CRS Report R44010, Defense Acquisitions: How and Where
DOD Spends Its Contracting Dollars, by Moshe Schwartz, John F. Sargent Jr., and Christopher T. Mann.
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Figure 1. DOD Systems Acquisition Framework
Source:procurement of Army ground combat systems.
, accessed February 13, 2019. February 13, 2019.
Notes: Each phase of the acquisition process has specific DOD regulations and federal statutes that must be Each phase of the acquisition process has specific DOD regulations and federal statutes that must be
met. At the end of each phase, there is a Milestone Review (A, B, C) to determine if the acquisition program has met. At the end of each phase, there is a Milestone Review (A, B, C) to determine if the acquisition program has
met these required regulations and statues to continue on into the next phase.met these required regulations and statues to continue on into the next phase.
Critical Development Document (CDD): The CDD specifies the operational requirements for the system The CDD specifies the operational requirements for the system
that thatwil will deliver the capability that meets operational performance criteria specified in the Initial Capabilities deliver the capability that meets operational performance criteria specified in the Initial Capabilities
Document (ICD).Document (ICD).
Preliminary Design Review (PDR):: The PDR is a technical assessment that establishes the Allocated Baseline The PDR is a technical assessment that establishes the Allocated Baseline
of a system to ensure a system is operationally effective.of a system to ensure a system is operationally effective.
Request for Proposal (RFP): A RFP is a document that solicits proposal, often made through a bidding A RFP is a document that solicits proposal, often made through a bidding
process, by an agency or company interested in procurement of a commodity, service, or valuable asset, to process, by an agency or company interested in procurement of a commodity, service, or valuable asset, to
potential suppliers to submit business proposals.potential suppliers to submit business proposals.
Critical Design Review (CDR):: A CDR is a multi-disciplined technical review to ensure that a system can A CDR is a multi-disciplined technical review to ensure that a system can
proceed into fabrication, demonstration, and test and can meet stated performance requirements within cost, proceed into fabrication, demonstration, and test and can meet stated performance requirements within cost,
schedule, and risk.schedule, and risk.
Production Readiness Review (PRR): The PRR assesses a program to determine if the design is ready for The PRR assesses a program to determine if the design is ready for
production.production.
Original OMFV Acquisition Plan
Reportedly, the original OMFV plan called for five years of Technology Development, starting in Reportedly, the original OMFV plan called for five years of Technology Development, starting in
FY2019, and leading up to a FY2024 Milestone B decision to move the program into the FY2019, and leading up to a FY2024 Milestone B decision to move the program into the
Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase.Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase.3737 If the Engineering and Manufacturing If the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development phase proved successful, the Army planned for a Milestone C decision to move the Development phase proved successful, the Army planned for a Milestone C decision to move the
program into the Production and Deployment phase in FY2028, with the intent of equipping the program into the Production and Deployment phase in FY2028, with the intent of equipping the
first unit by FY2032.first unit by FY2032.38
38
Secretary of the Army Accelerates the Program
In April 2018, Secretary of the Army Mark Esper, noting that industry could deliver OMFV In April 2018, Secretary of the Army Mark Esper, noting that industry could deliver OMFV
prototypes by FY2021, reportedly stated he wanted to accelerate the OMFV timeline.prototypes by FY2021, reportedly stated he wanted to accelerate the OMFV timeline.3939 After After
examining a number of possible courses of action, the Army reportedly settled on a timeline that examining a number of possible courses of action, the Army reportedly settled on a timeline that
would result in an FY2026 fielding of the OMFV.would result in an FY2026 fielding of the OMFV.4040 This being the case, the Army reportedly will This being the case, the Army reportedly will
pursue a pursue a“"heavily modified off-the-shelf model meaning a mature chassis and turret integrated heavily modified off-the-shelf model meaning a mature chassis and turret integrated
37 Ashley Tressel, “How the Army Secretary Accelerated Service’s New Combat Vehicle Program,”
InsideDefense.com, November 20, 2018.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
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with new sensors.”41with new sensors."41 Unofficially, some Army officials suggested they would like to see a 50 mm Unofficially, some Army officials suggested they would like to see a 50 mm
cannon on industry-proposed vehicles.cannon on industry-proposed vehicles.4242 Under this new acquisition approach, the Army plans to Under this new acquisition approach, the Army plans to
award up to two vendors three-year Engineering and Manufacturing award up to two vendors three-year Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD) contracts in the first quarter of FY2020;Development (EMD) contracts in the first quarter of FY2020;
if EMD is successful, make a Milestone C decision to move the program into the if EMD is successful, make a Milestone C decision to move the program into the
Production and Development phase in the third quarter of FY2023; andProduction and Development phase in the third quarter of FY2023; and
Equip first units in the first quarter of FY2026.Equip first units in the first quarter of FY2026.4343
Potential OMFV Candidates
Reportedly, the Army plans eventually to award a production contract for up to 3,590 OMFVs to Reportedly, the Army plans eventually to award a production contract for up to 3,590 OMFVs to
a single vendor.a single vendor.4444 Although the Army reportedly expects five to seven vendors to compete for the Although the Army reportedly expects five to seven vendors to compete for the
OMFV EMD contract, three vendors have already showcased prospective platforms.OMFV EMD contract, three vendors have already showcased prospective platforms.45
45
BAE Systems
BAE Systems is proposing its fifth-generation CV-90. The CV-90 was first fielded in Europe in BAE Systems is proposing its fifth-generation CV-90. The CV-90 was first fielded in Europe in
the 1990s. The latest version mounts a 35 mm cannon provided by Northrop Grumman that can the 1990s. The latest version mounts a 35 mm cannon provided by Northrop Grumman that can
accommodate 50 mm munitions. The CV-90 also features the Israeli IMI Systems Iron Fist active accommodate 50 mm munitions. The CV-90 also features the Israeli IMI Systems Iron Fist active
protection system (APS), which is currently being tested on the M-2 Bradley. The CV-90 can protection system (APS), which is currently being tested on the M-2 Bradley. The CV-90 can
accommodate a three-person crew and five infantry soldiers.accommodate a three-person crew and five infantry soldiers.
Source:
Source: https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/product/cv90, accessedcv90, accessed January 31, 2019.
General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS)
January 31, 2019.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Project Manager NGCV, NGCV OMFV Industry Day Briefing, August 6, 2018, p. 9.
44 Jason Sherman, “Army Tweaking NGCV Requirements, Requests for Proposals Following Recent Industry Parlay,”
InsideDefense.com, October 5, 2018.
45 Information in this section is taken from Ashley Tressel, “Contractors Debut Possible Bradley Replacement
Vehicles,” InsideDefense.com, October 19, 2018.
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General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS)
GDLS is proposing its Griffin III technology demonstrator, which uses the British Ajax scout GDLS is proposing its Griffin III technology demonstrator, which uses the British Ajax scout
vehicle chassis. The Griffin III mounts a 50 mm cannon and can accommodate an APS and host vehicle chassis. The Griffin III mounts a 50 mm cannon and can accommodate an APS and host
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Griffin II can accommodate a two-person crew and six unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Griffin II can accommodate a two-person crew and six
infantry soldiers.infantry soldiers.
Source: Sydney J. Freedberg, Sydney J. Freedberg, “"General Dynamics Land Systems Griffin III for U.S. ArmyGeneral Dynamics Land Systems Griffin III for U.S. Army’'s Next Generation s Next Generation
Combat Vehicle (NGCV),Combat Vehicle (NGCV),”" October 8, 2018. October 8, 2018.
Raytheon/Rheinmetall
Raytheon/Rheinmetall is proposing its Lynx vehicle. It can mount a 50 mm cannon and thermal Raytheon/Rheinmetall is proposing its Lynx vehicle. It can mount a 50 mm cannon and thermal
sights, and can accommodate both APS and UAVs. Raytheon states that the Lynx can sights, and can accommodate both APS and UAVs. Raytheon states that the Lynx can
accommodate an entire nine-soldier infantry squad.46
46 https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/lynx-infantry-fighting-vehicle, accessed January 31, 2019.
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Figure 4. Raytheon/Rheinmetall Lynx Prototype
Source:accommodate an entire nine-soldier infantry squad.46
armoured_tracked_vehicles/lynx/index.php, accessed, accessed January 31, 2019. January 31, 2019.
Robotic Combat Vehicles (RCVs) and the OMFV
As part of the revised NGCV Program, the Army plans to develop three RCV variants: Light, As part of the revised NGCV Program, the Army plans to develop three RCV variants: Light,
Medium, and Heavy. The Army reportedly envisions employing RCVs as Medium, and Heavy. The Army reportedly envisions employing RCVs as“scouts” and “escorts”
"scouts" and "escorts" for manned OMFVs.for manned OMFVs.4747 RCVs could precede OMFVs into battle to deter ambushes and could be RCVs could precede OMFVs into battle to deter ambushes and could be
used to guard the flanks of OMFV formations.used to guard the flanks of OMFV formations.4848 Initially, RCVs would be controlled by operators Initially, RCVs would be controlled by operators
riding in NGCVs, but the Army hopes that improved ground navigation technology and artificial riding in NGCVs, but the Army hopes that improved ground navigation technology and artificial
intelligence will permit a single operator to control multiple RCVs.intelligence will permit a single operator to control multiple RCVs.4949 The following sections The following sections
provide a brief overview of each variant.50
47 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army Pushes Bradley Replacement; Cautious on Armed Robots,” Breaking Defense, June
27, 2018.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Information in the following sections is from The Army’s Robotic Combat Vehicle Campaign Plan, January 16,
2019, and Ashley Tressel, “Army’s Robotic Combat Vehicle to Have Three Variants,” InsideDefense.com, November
29, 2018.
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provide a brief overview of each variant.50
Robotic Combat Vehicle–Light (RCV–L)
Source: The ArmyThe Army’'s Robotic Combat Vehicle Campaign Plan, January 16, 2019.s Robotic Combat Vehicle Campaign Plan, January 16, 2019.
The RCV–L is to be less than 10 tons, with a single vehicle capable of being transported by rotary The RCV–L is to be less than 10 tons, with a single vehicle capable of being transported by rotary
wing assets. It should be able to accommodate an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) or a recoilless wing assets. It should be able to accommodate an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) or a recoilless
weapon. It is also expected to have a robust sensor package and be capable of integration with weapon. It is also expected to have a robust sensor package and be capable of integration with
UAVs. The RCV–L is considered to be UAVs. The RCV–L is considered to be“"expendable.expendable.”
"
Robotic Combat Vehicle–Medium (RCV–M)
Source: The Army’
Source: The Army's Robotic Combat Vehicle Campaign Plan, January 16, 2019.s Robotic Combat Vehicle Campaign Plan, January 16, 2019.
The RCV–M is to be between 10 to 20 tons, with a single vehicle capable of being transported by The RCV–M is to be between 10 to 20 tons, with a single vehicle capable of being transported by
a C-130 aircraft. It should be able to accommodate multiple ATGMs, a medium cannon, or a large a C-130 aircraft. It should be able to accommodate multiple ATGMs, a medium cannon, or a large
recoilless cannon. It is also expected to have a robust sensor package and be capable of recoilless cannon. It is also expected to have a robust sensor package and be capable of
integration with UAVs. The RCV–M is considered to be a integration with UAVs. The RCV–M is considered to be a“durable”"durable" system and more survivable system and more survivable
than the RCV–L.
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than the RCV–L.
Robotic Combat Vehicle–Heavy (RCV–H)
Source: The ArmyThe Army’'s Robotic Combat Vehicle Campaign Plan, January 16, 2019.s Robotic Combat Vehicle Campaign Plan, January 16, 2019.
The RC–H is to be between 20 to 30 tons, with two vehicles capable of being transported by a C-The RC–H is to be between 20 to 30 tons, with two vehicles capable of being transported by a C-
17 aircraft. It is also expected to be able to accommodate an onboard weapon system capable of 17 aircraft. It is also expected to be able to accommodate an onboard weapon system capable of
destroying enemy IFVs and tanks. It should also have a robust sensor package and be capable of destroying enemy IFVs and tanks. It should also have a robust sensor package and be capable of
integration with UAVs. The RCV–H is considered to be a integration with UAVs. The RCV–H is considered to be a“nonexpendable”"nonexpendable" system and more system and more
survivable than the other RCVs.survivable than the other RCVs.
RCV Acquisition Approach
Reportedly, the Army does not have a formal acquisition approach for the RCV, but it plans to Reportedly, the Army does not have a formal acquisition approach for the RCV, but it plans to
experiment from FY2020 to FY2023 with human interface devices and reconnaissance and experiment from FY2020 to FY2023 with human interface devices and reconnaissance and
lethality technologies.lethality technologies.5151 Reportedly, the Army plans to issue prototype contracts in November Reportedly, the Army plans to issue prototype contracts in November
2019.2019.5252 Depending on the outcome of experimentation with prototypes, the Army expects a Depending on the outcome of experimentation with prototypes, the Army expects a
procurement decision in FY2023.procurement decision in FY2023.53
53
OMFV, RCV, and Section 804 Middle Tier
Acquisition Authority
Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act forFY2016 (FY2016 (P.L. 114-92)) provides provides
authority54authority54 to the Department of Defense (DOD) to rapidly prototype and/or rapidly field to the Department of Defense (DOD) to rapidly prototype and/or rapidly field
capabilities outside the traditional acquisition system. Referred to as capabilities outside the traditional acquisition system. Referred to as“"804 Authority,804 Authority,”" it is it is
intended to deliver a prototype capability in two to five years under two distinct pathways: Rapid intended to deliver a prototype capability in two to five years under two distinct pathways: Rapid
Prototyping or Rapid Fielding. One of the benefits of using 804 Authority is that the services can Prototyping or Rapid Fielding. One of the benefits of using 804 Authority is that the services can
bypass the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Joint Capabilities Integration bypass the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Joint Capabilities Integration
51 Ashley Tressel, “Army’s Robotic Combat Vehicle to Have Three Variants,” InsideDefense.com, November 29, 2018.
52 Ashley Tressel, “RCV Prototype Award Scheduled for November,” InsideDefense.com, February 14, 2019.
53 Ashley Tressel, “Army’s Robotic Combat Vehicle to Have Three Variants,” InsideDefense.com, November 29,
2018.
54 Except as required by law.
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Development Systems (JCIDS), two oversight bodies that, according to some critics, slow the Development Systems (JCIDS), two oversight bodies that, according to some critics, slow the
acquisition process.acquisition process.5555 Under Rapid Prototyping, the objectives are to Under Rapid Prototyping, the objectives are to
field a prototype that can be demonstrated in an operational environment, andfield a prototype that can be demonstrated in an operational environment, and
Provide for residual operational capability within five years of an approved Provide for residual operational capability within five years of an approved
requirement.
requirement.Under Rapid Fielding, the objectives are toUnder Rapid Fielding, the objectives are to
begin production within six months, andbegin production within six months, and
Complete fielding within five years of an approved requirement.Complete fielding within five years of an approved requirement.
For the OMFV program, the Army reportedly plans to use Rapid Prototyping under Section 804 For the OMFV program, the Army reportedly plans to use Rapid Prototyping under Section 804
to permit the program to enter at the EMD Phase, thereby avoiding a two- to three-year Technical to permit the program to enter at the EMD Phase, thereby avoiding a two- to three-year Technical
Maturation Phase.Maturation Phase.5656 Regarding the RCV program, the Army Regarding the RCV program, the Army’'s Robotic Campaign Plan indicates s Robotic Campaign Plan indicates
that Section 804 authority is an that Section 804 authority is an“option”"option" for RCV development. for RCV development.57
57
Concerns with Section 804 Authority
While many in DOD have embraced the use of Section 804 authority, some have expressed While many in DOD have embraced the use of Section 804 authority, some have expressed
concerns. Supporters of Section 804 authority contend that provides concerns. Supporters of Section 804 authority contend that provides“"an alternative path for an alternative path for
systems that can be fielded within five years or use proven technologies to upgrade existing systems that can be fielded within five years or use proven technologies to upgrade existing
systems while bypassing typical oversight bodies that are said to slow the acquisition process.systems while bypassing typical oversight bodies that are said to slow the acquisition process.”58
"58 Critics, however, argue that Critics, however, argue that“"new rapid prototyping authorities wonnew rapid prototyping authorities won’'t eliminate the complexities t eliminate the complexities
of technology development.of technology development.”59"59 One former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, One former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, Frank Kendall, reportedly warnsTechnology, and Logistics, Frank Kendall, reportedly warns:
What determines how long a development program takes is the product. Complexity and What determines how long a development program takes is the product. Complexity and
technical difficulty drive schedule. That can't be wished away. Requirements set by
operators drive both complexity and technical difficulty. You have to begin there. It is
technical difficulty drive schedule. That can't be wished away. Requirements set by operators drive both complexity and technical difficulty. You have to begin there. It is possible to build some kinds of prototypes quickly if requirements are reduced and designs possible to build some kinds of prototypes quickly if requirements are reduced and designs
are simplified. Whether an operator will want that product is another question. It’s also
are simplified. Whether an operator will want that product is another question. It's also possible to set totally unrealistic schedules and get industry to bid on them. There is a great possible to set totally unrealistic schedules and get industry to bid on them. There is a great
deal of history that teaches us that this is a really bad idea.deal of history that teaches us that this is a really bad idea.60
60
Others contend that for this authority to work as intended, Others contend that for this authority to work as intended, “"maintaining visibility of 804 maintaining visibility of 804
prototyping would be vital to ensure the authority is properly usedprototyping would be vital to ensure the authority is properly used”" and that and that “"developing a data developing a data
collection and analytical process will enable DOD to have insight into how these projects are collection and analytical process will enable DOD to have insight into how these projects are
being managed and executed.being managed and executed.”61"61 In this regard, congressional oversight of programs employing In this regard, congressional oversight of programs employing
Section 804 authority could prove essential to ensuring a proper and prudent use of this Section 804 authority could prove essential to ensuring a proper and prudent use of this
congressionally authorized authority.
55 Tony Bertuca, “DOD Turns to Rapid Prototyping for Big Tech Gains, but Accepting New Risks,”
InsideDefense.com, August 30, 2018.
56 Ashley Tressel, “Army Releases Draft Partial RFP for OMFV,” InsideDefense.com, February 1, 2019.
57 The Army’s Robotic Combat Vehicle Campaign Plan, January 16, 2019.
58 Ashley Tressel, “Army Using Section 804 Authority for Bradley Replacement,” InsideDefense.com, October 9, 2018.
59 Tony Bertuca, “DOD Turns to Rapid Prototyping for Big Tech Gains, but Accepting New Risks,”
InsideDefense.com, August 30, 2018.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
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Potential Issues for Congress
congressionally authorized authority.
FY2020 OMFV and RCV Budget Request62
Cancelled FCS and GCV Programs?
The OMFV is expected to be the ArmyThe OMFV is expected to be the Army’'s third attempt to replace the M-2 Bradley IFV after two s third attempt to replace the M-2 Bradley IFV after two
costly previous attempts were cancelled, perhaps casting doubt on the Armycostly previous attempts were cancelled, perhaps casting doubt on the Army’'s ability to design s ability to design
and field major ground combat systems. While many factors contributed to the cancelled FCS and and field major ground combat systems. While many factors contributed to the cancelled FCS and
GCV programs, two common problems were (1) overreliance on too many immature GCV programs, two common problems were (1) overreliance on too many immature
technologies, as well as the failure of some critical technologies, and (2) frequently changing technologies, as well as the failure of some critical technologies, and (2) frequently changing
performance requirements from Army leadership, resulting in increased program costs. Although performance requirements from Army leadership, resulting in increased program costs. Although
the Army suggests that an emphasis on prototyping and the creation of the Army Futures the Army suggests that an emphasis on prototyping and the creation of the Army Futures
Command (AFC) may remedy such problems, it can be argued these remedies are, at best, too Command (AFC) may remedy such problems, it can be argued these remedies are, at best, too
general and lack specific measures necessary to ensure that past problems do not recur. To general and lack specific measures necessary to ensure that past problems do not recur. To
enhance program oversight and avoid potential problems in the OMFV program, Congress might enhance program oversight and avoid potential problems in the OMFV program, Congress might
consider requiring the Army to articulate the specific measures it will employ to mitigate consider requiring the Army to articulate the specific measures it will employ to mitigate
technological challenges and leadership-generated technological challenges and leadership-generated“"requirements creep.requirements creep.”" In terms of In terms of
requirements, it may be beneficial to have answers to the following questions:requirements, it may be beneficial to have answers to the following questions:
Who in the Army will have input into OMFV performance requirements?Who in the Army will have input into OMFV performance requirements?
Who in the Army adjudicates the inputs for OMFV performance requirements?Who in the Army adjudicates the inputs for OMFV performance requirements?
Who in the Army will be responsible for the final decision on OMFV Who in the Army will be responsible for the final decision on OMFV
performance requirements?performance requirements?
Understanding these standards could help policymakers conduct oversight in terms of overall Understanding these standards could help policymakers conduct oversight in terms of overall
OMFV program accountability, especially if requirements change over the lifecycle of the OMFV program accountability, especially if requirements change over the lifecycle of the
program.program.
Army Futures Command’'s (AFC’'s) Role in OMFV and RCV
Program Management
One of the reasons cited for the failure of the FCS program was a One of the reasons cited for the failure of the FCS program was a“"complicated program complicated program
management approach.management approach.”62"63 Program management of major defense systems typically involves a Program management of major defense systems typically involves a
number of organizations and multiple authorities and processes. Even by those standards, number of organizations and multiple authorities and processes. Even by those standards,
however, program management of the OMFV and RCV programs is arguably overly complicated however, program management of the OMFV and RCV programs is arguably overly complicated
and somewhat ill-defined (see pages 6-7). Determining AFCand somewhat ill-defined (see pages 6-7). Determining AFC’'s role in OMFV and RCV program s role in OMFV and RCV program
management, and how it will relate to the ASA (ALT) and PEO Ground Combat Systems and management, and how it will relate to the ASA (ALT) and PEO Ground Combat Systems and
other organizations, may be a work in progress; however, at some point, having a clearly other organizations, may be a work in progress; however, at some point, having a clearly
established management structure with agreed authorities and responsibilities is likely to be established management structure with agreed authorities and responsibilities is likely to be
essential for ultimate program success. Toward this end, Congress might consider examining, in essential for ultimate program success. Toward this end, Congress might consider examining, in
detail, the Armydetail, the Army’'s proposed program management structure and authorities and processes for s proposed program management structure and authorities and processes for
OMFV and RCV to help ensure that program management will be efficient and effective, and not OMFV and RCV to help ensure that program management will be efficient and effective, and not
a programmatic detriment (as it was in the case of the FCS).a programmatic detriment (as it was in the case of the FCS).
62 Stephen Rodriguez, “Top Ten Failed Defense Programs of the RMA Era,” War on the Rocks, December 2, 2014.
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The Army’s OMFV Program: Background and Issues for Congress
The Relationship Between the OMFV and RCVs
As previously noted, the Army envisions employing RCVs as As previously noted, the Army envisions employing RCVs as“scouts” and “escorts”"scouts" and "escorts" for manned for manned
OMFVs. In addition to enhancing OMFV survivability, RCVs could potentially increase the OMFVs. In addition to enhancing OMFV survivability, RCVs could potentially increase the
overall lethality of ABCTs. Army leadership has stated that the Armyoverall lethality of ABCTs. Army leadership has stated that the Army’'s first priority is replacing s first priority is replacing
the Bradley with the OMFV, that the RCV will mature on a longer timeline than the OMFV, and the Bradley with the OMFV, that the RCV will mature on a longer timeline than the OMFV, and
that the OMFV will later be joined by the RCV.that the OMFV will later be joined by the RCV.63
64
Given technological challenges, particularly autonomous ground navigation and artificial Given technological challenges, particularly autonomous ground navigation and artificial
intelligence improvement,intelligence improvement,6465 the Army the Army’'s vision for RCV may not be achievable by the planned s vision for RCV may not be achievable by the planned
FY2026 fielding date or for many years thereafter. The Army describes the OMFV and RCV as FY2026 fielding date or for many years thereafter. The Army describes the OMFV and RCV as
“complementary” systems,65"complementary" systems,66 but a more nuanced description of both the systematic and but a more nuanced description of both the systematic and
operational relationship between the two could be beneficial. While the OMFV appears to offer a operational relationship between the two could be beneficial. While the OMFV appears to offer a
significant improvement over the M-2 Bradley—given weapon systems technological advances significant improvement over the M-2 Bradley—given weapon systems technological advances
by potential adversaries—operating alone without accompanying RCVs, the OMFV may offer by potential adversaries—operating alone without accompanying RCVs, the OMFV may offer
little or marginal operational improvement over the M-2 Bradley. Recognizing the risks little or marginal operational improvement over the M-2 Bradley. Recognizing the risks
associated with a scenario where RCV fielding is significantly delayed or postponed due to associated with a scenario where RCV fielding is significantly delayed or postponed due to
technological challenges—along with a better understanding of the systematic and operational technological challenges—along with a better understanding of the systematic and operational
relationship between the OMFV and the RCV—could prove useful for policymakers. Another relationship between the OMFV and the RCV—could prove useful for policymakers. Another
potential oversight question for Congress could be what is the role of Army Futures Command potential oversight question for Congress could be what is the role of Army Futures Command
(AFC) in integrating requirements between OMFV and RCVs?(AFC) in integrating requirements between OMFV and RCVs?
Section 804 Authority and the OMFV
To some, the use of Section 804 authority offers great promise in developing and fielding To some, the use of Section 804 authority offers great promise in developing and fielding
qualifying weapon systems quickly and cost-effectively. Others note that rapid prototyping qualifying weapon systems quickly and cost-effectively. Others note that rapid prototyping
authorities under Section 804 will not eliminate the complexities of technology development and authorities under Section 804 will not eliminate the complexities of technology development and
that operational requirements also drive the complexity and technical difficulty of a project. In that operational requirements also drive the complexity and technical difficulty of a project. In
acknowledging the potential benefits that Section 804 authority could bring to the Armyacknowledging the potential benefits that Section 804 authority could bring to the Army’'s third s third
attempt to replace the M-2 Bradley, as well as the risks associated with its use over a more attempt to replace the M-2 Bradley, as well as the risks associated with its use over a more
traditional acquisition approach, policymakers might decide to examine the potential costs, traditional acquisition approach, policymakers might decide to examine the potential costs,
benefits, and risks associated with using Section 804 authority for the OMFV program.benefits, and risks associated with using Section 804 authority for the OMFV program.
63 Project Manager NGCV, NGCV OMFV Industry Day Briefing, August 6, 2018.
64 For additional information on autonomous ground navigation and artificial intelligence
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
For additional information on autonomous systems, see CRS Report R45392, , see CRS Report R45392,
U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for
Congress, coordinated by Andrew Feickert., coordinated by Andrew Feickert.
65 The Army’s Robotic Combat Vehicle Campaign Plan, January 16, 2019.
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The Army’s OMFV Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Author Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
Congressional Research Service
R45519 · VERSION 1 · NEW
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The Army G-8 is the Army's lead for matching available resources to the defense strategy and the Army plan. They accomplish this through participation in Office of the Secretary of Defense–led defense reviews and assessments, the programming of resources, material integration, analytical and modeling capabilities, and the management of the Department of the Army studies and analysis. http://www.g8.army.mil/, accessed February 21, 2019.
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Contents
- Why Is This Issue Important to Congress?
- The Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) Becomes the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV)
- Report Focus on OMFV
- Preliminary OMFV Requirements
- Background
- The Army's Current Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)
- M-2 Limitations and the Need for a Replacement
- Past Attempts to Replace the M-2 Bradley IFV
- Why the FCS and GCV Programs Were Cancelled
- FCS
- GCV
- After the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV): The Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) Program
- Army Futures Command (AFC) and Cross-Functional Teams (CFTs)
- Army Futures Command
- Cross-Functional Teams (CFTs)
- Army's OMFV Acquisition Approach
- Original OMFV Acquisition Plan
- Secretary of the Army Accelerates the Program
- Potential OMFV Candidates
- BAE Systems
- General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS)
- Raytheon/Rheinmetall
- Robotic Combat Vehicles (RCVs) and the OMFV
- Robotic Combat Vehicle–Light (RCV–L)
- Robotic Combat Vehicle–Medium (RCV–M)
- Robotic Combat Vehicle–Heavy (RCV–H)
- RCV Acquisition Approach
- OMFV, RCV, and Section 804 Middle Tier Acquisition Authority
- Concerns with Section 804 Authority
- FY2020 OMFV and RCV Budget Request
- Potential Issues for Congress
- How Will the OMFV Program Avoid the Same Fate as the Cancelled FCS and GCV Programs?
- Army Futures Command's (AFC's) Role in OMFV and RCV Program Management
- The Relationship Between the OMFV and RCVs
- Section 804 Authority and the OMFV
Summary
In June 2018, in part due to congressional concerns, the Army announced a new modernizationthe M-2 Bradley. In October 2018, Army leadership decided to redesignate the NGCV as the the M-2 Bradley. In October 2018, Army leadership decided to redesignate the NGCV as the
would be called the NGCV Program.would be called the NGCV Program.
the battlefield and provide fire support to dismounted troops and suppress or destroy enemy fighting vehicles. Updated the battlefield and provide fire support to dismounted troops and suppress or destroy enemy fighting vehicles. Updated
numerous times since its introduction, the M-2 Bradley is widely considered to have reached the technological limits of its numerous times since its introduction, the M-2 Bradley is widely considered to have reached the technological limits of its
capacity to accommodate new electronics, armor, and defense systems. Two past efforts to replace the M-2 Bradley—the capacity to accommodate new electronics, armor, and defense systems. Two past efforts to replace the M-2 Bradley—the
Future Combat System (FCS) Program and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program—were cancelled for programmatic Future Combat System (FCS) Program and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program—were cancelled for programmatic
and cost-associated reasons.and cost-associated reasons.
consolidating the Armyconsolidating the Army
development and acquisition. Hoping to field the OMFV in FY2026, the Army plans to employ Section 804 Middle Tier development and acquisition. Hoping to field the OMFV in FY2026, the Army plans to employ Section 804 Middle Tier
Acquisition Authority for rapid prototyping. The Army plans to develop, in parallel, three complementary classes of Robotic Acquisition Authority for rapid prototyping. The Army plans to develop, in parallel, three complementary classes of Robotic
Combat Vehicles (RCVs) intended to accompany the OMFV into combat both to protect the OMFV and provide additional Combat Vehicles (RCVs) intended to accompany the OMFV into combat both to protect the OMFV and provide additional
fire support. For RCVs to be successfully developed, problems with autonomous ground navigation will need to be resolved fire support. For RCVs to be successfully developed, problems with autonomous ground navigation will need to be resolved
and artificial intelligence must evolve to permit the RCVs to function as intended. The Army has stated that a new and artificial intelligence must evolve to permit the RCVs to function as intended. The Army has stated that a new
congressionally-granted acquisition authoritycongressionally-granted acquisition authority
The Army requested $378 million in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding for the OMFV program and $109 million in RDT&E funding for the RCV in its FY2020 budget request.
Potential issues for Congress include the following:
- How will the OMFV program avoid the same fate as the cancelled FCS and GCV programs?
- What is the Army Futures Command's (AFC's) role in program management?
- What is the relationship between the OMFV and RCVs?
- What are some of the benefits and concerns regarding Section 804 authority and the OMFV?
Why Is This Issue Important to Congress?
The Army'replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) which has been in service since the early replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) which has been in service since the early
1980s. Despite numerous upgrades since its introduction, the Army contends the M-2 is near the 1980s. Despite numerous upgrades since its introduction, the Army contends the M-2 is near the
end of its useful life and can no longer accommodate the types of upgrades needed for it to be end of its useful life and can no longer accommodate the types of upgrades needed for it to be
effective on the modern battlefield.effective on the modern battlefield.
Combat Teams (ABCTs), Congress may be concerned with how the OMFV would impact the Combat Teams (ABCTs), Congress may be concerned with how the OMFV would impact the
effectiveness of ground forces over the full spectrum of military operations. Moreover, Congress effectiveness of ground forces over the full spectrum of military operations. Moreover, Congress
might also be concerned with how much more capable the OMFV is projected to be over the M-2 might also be concerned with how much more capable the OMFV is projected to be over the M-2
to ensure that it is not a costly marginal improvement over the current system. A number of past to ensure that it is not a costly marginal improvement over the current system. A number of past
unsuccessful Army acquisition programs have served to heighten congressional oversight of unsuccessful Army acquisition programs have served to heighten congressional oversight of
Army programs, and the OMFV will likely be subject to a high degree of congressional interest. Army programs, and the OMFV will likely be subject to a high degree of congressional interest.
In addition to these primary concerns, how the Army plans to use the new congressionally-In addition to these primary concerns, how the Army plans to use the new congressionally-
granted Section 804 Middle Tier Acquisition Authority as well as overall program affordability granted Section 804 Middle Tier Acquisition Authority as well as overall program affordability
could be potential oversight issues for Congress.could be potential oversight issues for Congress.
Becomes the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle
(OMFV)
In June 2018, the Army established the Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) program to In June 2018, the Army established the Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) program to
replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), which has been in service since the replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), which has been in service since the
early 1980s. In October 2018, Army leadership reportedly decided to redesignate the NGCV as early 1980s. In October 2018, Army leadership reportedly decided to redesignate the NGCV as
the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) and add additional vehicle programs to what the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) and add additional vehicle programs to what
would be called the NGCV Program.would be called the NGCV Program.
planned for development:planned for development:
Development, respectively. Reportedly, the AMPV and MPF programs, which were overseen by Development, respectively. Reportedly, the AMPV and MPF programs, which were overseen by
Ground Combat Systems, but the NGCV Cross Functional Team (CFT) will determine their Ground Combat Systems, but the NGCV Cross Functional Team (CFT) will determine their
respective operational requirements and acquisition schedule.respective operational requirements and acquisition schedule.
Because AMPV and MPF are discussed in earlier CRS reports and the OMFV is in the early Because AMPV and MPF are discussed in earlier CRS reports and the OMFV is in the early
stages of development, the remainder of this report focuses on the OMFV and associated RCVs. stages of development, the remainder of this report focuses on the OMFV and associated RCVs.
Because the DLP is intended to replace the ArmyBecause the DLP is intended to replace the Army
1 Abrams Tank—it will be addressed in a separate CRS report in the future.1 Abrams Tank—it will be addressed in a separate CRS report in the future.
Requirements5 The ArmyThe Army
gun and an independent weapons system.gun and an independent weapons system.
allow for preplanned product improvements.allow for preplanned product improvements.
conditions, while moving and/or stationary against moving and/or stationary conditions, while moving and/or stationary against moving and/or stationary
targets. The platform should allow for mounted, dismount, and unmanned system targets. The platform should allow for mounted, dismount, and unmanned system
target handover.target handover.
operational range and fuel efficiency, increased silent watch, part and component operational range and fuel efficiency, increased silent watch, part and component
reliability, and significantly reduced sustainment burden.
Additional requirements include the capacity to accommodate7
- reactive armor,
- an Active Protection System (APS),
- artificial intelligence,8 and
- Directed-energy weapons9 and advanced target sensors.
battlefield and provide fire support to dismounted troops and suppress or destroy enemy fighting battlefield and provide fire support to dismounted troops and suppress or destroy enemy fighting
vehicles. The M-2 has a crew of three—commander, gunner, and driver—and carries seven fully vehicles. The M-2 has a crew of three—commander, gunner, and driver—and carries seven fully
equipped infantry soldiers. M-2 Bradley IFVs are primarily found in the Armyequipped infantry soldiers. M-2 Bradley IFVs are primarily found in the Army
Brigade Combat Teams (ABCT). The first M-2 prototypes were delivered to the Army in Brigade Combat Teams (ABCT). The first M-2 prototypes were delivered to the Army in
December 1978, and the first delivery of M-2s to units started in May 1981. The M-2 Bradley has December 1978, and the first delivery of M-2s to units started in May 1981. The M-2 Bradley has
been upgraded often since 1981, and the Army reportedly announced in January 2018 that it plans been upgraded often since 1981, and the Army reportedly announced in January 2018 that it plans
to undertake an upgrade to the M-2A5 version planned for the mid-2020s.to undertake an upgrade to the M-2A5 version planned for the mid-2020s.
Despite numerous upgrades over its lifetime, the M-2 Bradley has what some consider a notable Despite numerous upgrades over its lifetime, the M-2 Bradley has what some consider a notable
limitation. Although the M-2 Bradley can accommodate seven fully equipped infantry soldiers, limitation. Although the M-2 Bradley can accommodate seven fully equipped infantry soldiers,
infantry squads consist of nine soldiers. As a result, infantry squads consist of nine soldiers. As a result,
has to divide three squads between four Bradleys, meaning that all the members of a squad are has to divide three squads between four Bradleys, meaning that all the members of a squad are
not able to ride in the same vehicle.not able to ride in the same vehicle.
employment challenges for Bradley-mounted infantry squads and platoons.employment challenges for Bradley-mounted infantry squads and platoons.
generally satisfied with its performance.generally satisfied with its performance.
reactive reactive
accommodate new electronics, armor, and defense systems.accommodate new electronics, armor, and defense systems.
during OIF routinely had to turn off certain electronic systems to gain enough power for anti-during OIF routinely had to turn off certain electronic systems to gain enough power for anti-
roadside-bomb jammers. Moreover, current efforts to mount active protection systems (APS)roadside-bomb jammers. Moreover, current efforts to mount active protection systems (APS)
M-2 Bradleys to destroy incoming anti-tank rockets and missiles are proving difficult.M-2 Bradleys to destroy incoming anti-tank rockets and missiles are proving difficult.
almost four decades of service, operational limitations, demonstrated combat vulnerabilities, and almost four decades of service, operational limitations, demonstrated combat vulnerabilities, and
difficulties in upgrading current models, the M-2 Bradley is arguably a candidate for replacement.difficulties in upgrading current models, the M-2 Bradley is arguably a candidate for replacement.
The Army has twice attempted to replace the M-2 Bradley IFV—first as part of the Future The Army has twice attempted to replace the M-2 Bradley IFV—first as part of the Future
Combat System (FCS) Program,Combat System (FCS) Program,
second with the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program,second with the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program,
in 2014. These cancellations, along with a series of high-profile studies, such as the 2011 Decker-in 2014. These cancellations, along with a series of high-profile studies, such as the 2011 Decker-
Wagner Army Acquisition Review, have led many to call into question the ArmyWagner Army Acquisition Review, have led many to call into question the Army
develop and field ground combat systems.develop and field ground combat systems.
family of networked, manned and unmanned vehicles, and aircraft for the future battlefield. The family of networked, manned and unmanned vehicles, and aircraft for the future battlefield. The
Army believed that advanced sensor technology would result in total battlefield awareness, Army believed that advanced sensor technology would result in total battlefield awareness,
permitting the development of lesser-armored combat vehicles and the ability to engage and permitting the development of lesser-armored combat vehicles and the ability to engage and
destroy targets beyond the line-of-sight. However, a variety of factors led to the programdestroy targets beyond the line-of-sight. However, a variety of factors led to the program
's cancellation, including a complicated, industry-led management approach; the failure of a number cancellation, including a complicated, industry-led management approach; the failure of a number
of critical technologies to perform as envisioned; and frequently changing requirements from of critical technologies to perform as envisioned; and frequently changing requirements from
Army leadership—all of which resulted in program costs increasing by 25%.Army leadership—all of which resulted in program costs increasing by 25%.
restructured the program in 2009, effectively cancelling it.restructured the program in 2009, effectively cancelling it.
was directed by the Secretary of Defense in 2009 to develop a ground combat vehicle (GCV) that was directed by the Secretary of Defense in 2009 to develop a ground combat vehicle (GCV) that
would be relevant across the entire spectrum of Army operations, incorporating combat lessons would be relevant across the entire spectrum of Army operations, incorporating combat lessons
learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2010, the Army, in conjunction with the Pentagonlearned in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2010, the Army, in conjunction with the Pentagon
's acquisition office, conducted a review of the GCV program to acquisition office, conducted a review of the GCV program to
including acquisition strategy, vehicle capabilities, operational needs, program schedule, cost including acquisition strategy, vehicle capabilities, operational needs, program schedule, cost
performance, and technological specifications.performance, and technological specifications.
many immature technologies, had too many performance requirements, and was required by many immature technologies, had too many performance requirements, and was required by
Army leadership to have too many capabilities to make it affordable. In February 2014, the Army Army leadership to have too many capabilities to make it affordable. In February 2014, the Army
recommended terminating the GCV program and redirecting the funds toward developing a next-recommended terminating the GCV program and redirecting the funds toward developing a next-
generation platform.generation platform.
Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) Program
In the aftermath of the GCV program, the Army embarked on a Future Fighting Vehicle (FFV) In the aftermath of the GCV program, the Army embarked on a Future Fighting Vehicle (FFV)
effort in 2015. Army officials—described as effort in 2015. Army officials—described as
fighting vehicle programfighting vehicle program
before leaping into a new program.before leaping into a new program.
post-FCS have been characterized as upgrading existing platforms as opposed to developing new post-FCS have been characterized as upgrading existing platforms as opposed to developing new
systems. This was due in part to reluctance of senior Army leadership, but also to significant systems. This was due in part to reluctance of senior Army leadership, but also to significant
budgetary restrictions imposed on the Army during this period. Some in Congress, however, were budgetary restrictions imposed on the Army during this period. Some in Congress, however, were
not pleased with the slow pace of Army modernization, reportedly noting the Army was not pleased with the slow pace of Army modernization, reportedly noting the Army was
1980s.1980s.
modernization strategy and designated NGCVs as the second of its six modernization priorities.modernization strategy and designated NGCVs as the second of its six modernization priorities.
28 Originally, the NGCV was considered the program to replace the M-2 Bradley. Development of Originally, the NGCV was considered the program to replace the M-2 Bradley. Development of
the NGCV would be managed by the Program Executive Officer (PEO) Ground Combat Systems, the NGCV would be managed by the Program Executive Officer (PEO) Ground Combat Systems,
Functional Teams (CFTs)
Command29 In November 2017, the Army established a Modernization Task Force to examine the options for In November 2017, the Army established a Modernization Task Force to examine the options for
establishing an Army Futures Command (AFC) that would establish unity of command and effort establishing an Army Futures Command (AFC) that would establish unity of command and effort
as the Army consolidated its modernization process under one roof. Formerly, Army as the Army consolidated its modernization process under one roof. Formerly, Army
modernization activities were primarily spread among Forces Command (FORSCOM), Training modernization activities were primarily spread among Forces Command (FORSCOM), Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Army Materiel Command (AMC), Army Test and and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Army Materiel Command (AMC), Army Test and
Evaluation Command (ATEC), and the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-8.Evaluation Command (ATEC), and the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-8.
headquarters largely drawn from existing Army commands, AFC was planned to be established in headquarters largely drawn from existing Army commands, AFC was planned to be established in
an urban environment with ready access to academic, technological, and industrial expertise. On an urban environment with ready access to academic, technological, and industrial expertise. On
July 13, 2018, the Army announced that AFC would be headquartered in Austin, TX, and that it July 13, 2018, the Army announced that AFC would be headquartered in Austin, TX, and that it
had achieved initial operating capability on July 1, 2018. According to the Army, when AFC had achieved initial operating capability on July 1, 2018. According to the Army, when AFC
reaches full operating capacity in summer 2019, the headquarters will comprise approximately reaches full operating capacity in summer 2019, the headquarters will comprise approximately
500 personnel (about 100 uniformed and 400 Army civilians). Sub-organizations, many of which 500 personnel (about 100 uniformed and 400 Army civilians). Sub-organizations, many of which
currently reside within FORSCOM, TRADOC, and AMC, are to transition to AFC, but there are currently reside within FORSCOM, TRADOC, and AMC, are to transition to AFC, but there are
no plans to physically move units or personnel from these commands at the present time.no plans to physically move units or personnel from these commands at the present time.
Army Futures Command intends to use what it calls Cross-Functional Teams (CFT) as part of its Army Futures Command intends to use what it calls Cross-Functional Teams (CFT) as part of its
mission, which includes the development of NGCV. As a means to mission, which includes the development of NGCV. As a means to
requirements and technology development efforts, the Army established cross-functional team requirements and technology development efforts, the Army established cross-functional team
pilots for modernizationpilots for modernization
from Assistant Secretary of the Army (ASA) for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ALT), from Assistant Secretary of the Army (ASA) for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ALT),
who is also the senior Army Acquisition Executive (AAE), to whom the Program Executive who is also the senior Army Acquisition Executive (AAE), to whom the Program Executive
Officers (PEOs) report. AFC is to be responsible for requirements and to support PEOs. The Officers (PEOs) report. AFC is to be responsible for requirements and to support PEOs. The
NGCV Program Manager (PM), who is subordinate to PEO Ground Combat Systems, is to NGCV Program Manager (PM), who is subordinate to PEO Ground Combat Systems, is to
remain under the control of ASA (ALT) but are to be teamed with CFTs under control of the remain under the control of ASA (ALT) but are to be teamed with CFTs under control of the
AFC.AFC.
will execute its assigned mission, roles, and responsibilities. For example, we found that it will execute its assigned mission, roles, and responsibilities. For example, we found that it
Logistics and Technology [ASA (ALT)]—the civilian authority responsible for the overall Logistics and Technology [ASA (ALT)]—the civilian authority responsible for the overall
supervision of acquisition matters for the Army—and the acquisition offices it oversees.supervision of acquisition matters for the Army—and the acquisition offices it oversees.
with GAOwith GAO
a current degree of uncertainty as to how the NGCV program will be managed.a current degree of uncertainty as to how the NGCV program will be managed.
Approach36 Figure 1 depicts the Department of Defense (DOD) Systems Acquisition Framework, which depicts the Department of Defense (DOD) Systems Acquisition Framework, which
illustrates the various phases of systems development and acquisitions and is applicable to the illustrates the various phases of systems development and acquisitions and is applicable to the
Figure 1. DOD Systems Acquisition Framework Source: http://acqnotes.com/acqnote/acquisitions/acquisition-process-overview, accessed
Notes: Each phase of the acquisition process has specific DOD regulations and federal statutes that must be Each phase of the acquisition process has specific DOD regulations and federal statutes that must be
met. At the end of each phase, there is a Milestone Review (A, B, C) to determine if the acquisition program has met. At the end of each phase, there is a Milestone Review (A, B, C) to determine if the acquisition program has
met these required regulations and statues to continue on into the next phase.met these required regulations and statues to continue on into the next phase.
Critical Development Document (CDD): The CDD specifies the operational requirements for the system The CDD specifies the operational requirements for the system
that that
Document (ICD).Document (ICD).
Preliminary Design Review (PDR)
of a system to ensure a system is operationally effective.of a system to ensure a system is operationally effective.
Request for Proposal (RFP): A RFP is a document that solicits proposal, often made through a bidding A RFP is a document that solicits proposal, often made through a bidding
process, by an agency or company interested in procurement of a commodity, service, or valuable asset, to process, by an agency or company interested in procurement of a commodity, service, or valuable asset, to
potential suppliers to submit business proposals.potential suppliers to submit business proposals.
Critical Design Review (CDR)
proceed into fabrication, demonstration, and test and can meet stated performance requirements within cost, proceed into fabrication, demonstration, and test and can meet stated performance requirements within cost,
schedule, and risk.schedule, and risk.
Production Readiness Review (PRR): The PRR assesses a program to determine if the design is ready for The PRR assesses a program to determine if the design is ready for
production.production.
Reportedly, the original OMFV plan called for five years of Technology Development, starting in Reportedly, the original OMFV plan called for five years of Technology Development, starting in
FY2019, and leading up to a FY2024 Milestone B decision to move the program into the FY2019, and leading up to a FY2024 Milestone B decision to move the program into the
Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase.Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase.
Development phase proved successful, the Army planned for a Milestone C decision to move the Development phase proved successful, the Army planned for a Milestone C decision to move the
program into the Production and Deployment phase in FY2028, with the intent of equipping the program into the Production and Deployment phase in FY2028, with the intent of equipping the
first unit by FY2032.first unit by FY2032.
In April 2018, Secretary of the Army Mark Esper, noting that industry could deliver OMFV In April 2018, Secretary of the Army Mark Esper, noting that industry could deliver OMFV
prototypes by FY2021, reportedly stated he wanted to accelerate the OMFV timeline.prototypes by FY2021, reportedly stated he wanted to accelerate the OMFV timeline.
examining a number of possible courses of action, the Army reportedly settled on a timeline that examining a number of possible courses of action, the Army reportedly settled on a timeline that
would result in an FY2026 fielding of the OMFV.would result in an FY2026 fielding of the OMFV.
pursue a pursue a
cannon on industry-proposed vehicles.cannon on industry-proposed vehicles.
Reportedly, the Army plans eventually to award a production contract for up to 3,590 OMFVs to Reportedly, the Army plans eventually to award a production contract for up to 3,590 OMFVs to
a single vendor.a single vendor.
OMFV EMD contract, three vendors have already showcased prospective platforms.OMFV EMD contract, three vendors have already showcased prospective platforms.
the 1990s. The latest version mounts a 35 mm cannon provided by Northrop Grumman that can the 1990s. The latest version mounts a 35 mm cannon provided by Northrop Grumman that can
accommodate 50 mm munitions. The CV-90 also features the Israeli IMI Systems Iron Fist active accommodate 50 mm munitions. The CV-90 also features the Israeli IMI Systems Iron Fist active
protection system (APS), which is currently being tested on the M-2 Bradley. The CV-90 can protection system (APS), which is currently being tested on the M-2 Bradley. The CV-90 can
accommodate a three-person crew and five infantry soldiers.accommodate a three-person crew and five infantry soldiers.
Figure 2. BAE Prototype CV-90
vehicle chassis. The Griffin III mounts a 50 mm cannon and can accommodate an APS and host vehicle chassis. The Griffin III mounts a 50 mm cannon and can accommodate an APS and host
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Griffin II can accommodate a two-person crew and six unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Griffin II can accommodate a two-person crew and six
infantry soldiers.infantry soldiers.
Figure 3. GDLS Griffin III Prototype
Combat Vehicle (NGCV),Combat Vehicle (NGCV),
sights, and can accommodate both APS and UAVs. Raytheon states that the Lynx can sights, and can accommodate both APS and UAVs. Raytheon states that the Lynx can
Figure 4. Raytheon/Rheinmetall Lynx Prototype Source: https://www.rheinmetall-defence.com/en/rheinmetall_defence/systems_and_products/vehicle_systems/
armoured_tracked_vehicles/lynx/index.php, accessed
As part of the revised NGCV Program, the Army plans to develop three RCV variants: Light, As part of the revised NGCV Program, the Army plans to develop three RCV variants: Light,
Medium, and Heavy. The Army reportedly envisions employing RCVs as Medium, and Heavy. The Army reportedly envisions employing RCVs as
"scouts" and "escorts" for manned OMFVs.for manned OMFVs.
used to guard the flanks of OMFV formations.used to guard the flanks of OMFV formations.
riding in NGCVs, but the Army hopes that improved ground navigation technology and artificial riding in NGCVs, but the Army hopes that improved ground navigation technology and artificial
intelligence will permit a single operator to control multiple RCVs.intelligence will permit a single operator to control multiple RCVs.
Figure 5. Illustrative RCV–L
wing assets. It should be able to accommodate an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) or a recoilless wing assets. It should be able to accommodate an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) or a recoilless
weapon. It is also expected to have a robust sensor package and be capable of integration with weapon. It is also expected to have a robust sensor package and be capable of integration with
UAVs. The RCV–L is considered to be UAVs. The RCV–L is considered to be
Figure 6. Illustrative RCV–M
a C-130 aircraft. It should be able to accommodate multiple ATGMs, a medium cannon, or a large a C-130 aircraft. It should be able to accommodate multiple ATGMs, a medium cannon, or a large
recoilless cannon. It is also expected to have a robust sensor package and be capable of recoilless cannon. It is also expected to have a robust sensor package and be capable of
integration with UAVs. The RCV–M is considered to be a integration with UAVs. The RCV–M is considered to be a
Figure 7. Illustrative RCV–H
17 aircraft. It is also expected to be able to accommodate an onboard weapon system capable of 17 aircraft. It is also expected to be able to accommodate an onboard weapon system capable of
destroying enemy IFVs and tanks. It should also have a robust sensor package and be capable of destroying enemy IFVs and tanks. It should also have a robust sensor package and be capable of
integration with UAVs. The RCV–H is considered to be a integration with UAVs. The RCV–H is considered to be a
survivable than the other RCVs.survivable than the other RCVs.
Reportedly, the Army does not have a formal acquisition approach for the RCV, but it plans to Reportedly, the Army does not have a formal acquisition approach for the RCV, but it plans to
experiment from FY2020 to FY2023 with human interface devices and reconnaissance and experiment from FY2020 to FY2023 with human interface devices and reconnaissance and
lethality technologies.lethality technologies.
2019.2019.
procurement decision in FY2023.procurement decision in FY2023.
Acquisition Authority
Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
authority54
capabilities outside the traditional acquisition system. Referred to as capabilities outside the traditional acquisition system. Referred to as
intended to deliver a prototype capability in two to five years under two distinct pathways: Rapid intended to deliver a prototype capability in two to five years under two distinct pathways: Rapid
Prototyping or Rapid Fielding. One of the benefits of using 804 Authority is that the services can Prototyping or Rapid Fielding. One of the benefits of using 804 Authority is that the services can
bypass the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Joint Capabilities Integration bypass the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Joint Capabilities Integration
acquisition process.acquisition process.
to permit the program to enter at the EMD Phase, thereby avoiding a two- to three-year Technical to permit the program to enter at the EMD Phase, thereby avoiding a two- to three-year Technical
Maturation Phase.Maturation Phase.
that Section 804 authority is an that Section 804 authority is an
While many in DOD have embraced the use of Section 804 authority, some have expressed While many in DOD have embraced the use of Section 804 authority, some have expressed
concerns. Supporters of Section 804 authority contend that provides concerns. Supporters of Section 804 authority contend that provides
systems that can be fielded within five years or use proven technologies to upgrade existing systems that can be fielded within five years or use proven technologies to upgrade existing
systems while bypassing typical oversight bodies that are said to slow the acquisition process.systems while bypassing typical oversight bodies that are said to slow the acquisition process.
"58 Critics, however, argue that Critics, however, argue that
of technology development.of technology development.
Technology, and Logistics, Frank Kendall, reportedly warnsTechnology, and Logistics, Frank Kendall, reportedly warns
technical difficulty drive schedule. That can't be wished away. Requirements set by operators drive both complexity and technical difficulty. You have to begin there. It is possible to build some kinds of prototypes quickly if requirements are reduced and designs possible to build some kinds of prototypes quickly if requirements are reduced and designs
are simplified. Whether an operator will want that product is another question. It's also possible to set totally unrealistic schedules and get industry to bid on them. There is a great possible to set totally unrealistic schedules and get industry to bid on them. There is a great
deal of history that teaches us that this is a really bad idea.deal of history that teaches us that this is a really bad idea.
prototyping would be vital to ensure the authority is properly usedprototyping would be vital to ensure the authority is properly used
collection and analytical process will enable DOD to have insight into how these projects are collection and analytical process will enable DOD to have insight into how these projects are
being managed and executed.being managed and executed.
Section 804 authority could prove essential to ensuring a proper and prudent use of this Section 804 authority could prove essential to ensuring a proper and prudent use of this
The Army requested $378 million in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding for the OMFV program and $109 million in RDT&E funding for the RCV in its FY2020 budget request. In terms of the OMFV, funding is planned to be used for, among other things, maturing technological upgrades for integration into the vehicle, including nondevelopmental active protection systems (APS), the XM 913 50 mm cannon, and the 3rd Generation Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR). FY2020 funding for RCVs is planned for finishing building prototypes of surrogate platforms and conducting manned-unmanned teaming evaluations.
Potential Issues for Congress How Will the OMFV Program Avoid the Same Fate as theCancelled FCS and GCV Programs?
The OMFV is expected to be the ArmyThe OMFV is expected to be the Army
costly previous attempts were cancelled, perhaps casting doubt on the Armycostly previous attempts were cancelled, perhaps casting doubt on the Army
and field major ground combat systems. While many factors contributed to the cancelled FCS and and field major ground combat systems. While many factors contributed to the cancelled FCS and
GCV programs, two common problems were (1) overreliance on too many immature GCV programs, two common problems were (1) overreliance on too many immature
technologies, as well as the failure of some critical technologies, and (2) frequently changing technologies, as well as the failure of some critical technologies, and (2) frequently changing
performance requirements from Army leadership, resulting in increased program costs. Although performance requirements from Army leadership, resulting in increased program costs. Although
the Army suggests that an emphasis on prototyping and the creation of the Army Futures the Army suggests that an emphasis on prototyping and the creation of the Army Futures
Command (AFC) may remedy such problems, it can be argued these remedies are, at best, too Command (AFC) may remedy such problems, it can be argued these remedies are, at best, too
general and lack specific measures necessary to ensure that past problems do not recur. To general and lack specific measures necessary to ensure that past problems do not recur. To
enhance program oversight and avoid potential problems in the OMFV program, Congress might enhance program oversight and avoid potential problems in the OMFV program, Congress might
consider requiring the Army to articulate the specific measures it will employ to mitigate consider requiring the Army to articulate the specific measures it will employ to mitigate
technological challenges and leadership-generated technological challenges and leadership-generated
requirements, it may be beneficial to have answers to the following questions:requirements, it may be beneficial to have answers to the following questions:
OMFV program accountability, especially if requirements change over the lifecycle of the OMFV program accountability, especially if requirements change over the lifecycle of the
program.program.
Program Management
One of the reasons cited for the failure of the FCS program was a One of the reasons cited for the failure of the FCS program was a
management approach.management approach.
number of organizations and multiple authorities and processes. Even by those standards, number of organizations and multiple authorities and processes. Even by those standards,
however, program management of the OMFV and RCV programs is arguably overly complicated however, program management of the OMFV and RCV programs is arguably overly complicated
and somewhat ill-defined (see pages 6-7). Determining AFCand somewhat ill-defined (see pages 6-7). Determining AFC
management, and how it will relate to the ASA (ALT) and PEO Ground Combat Systems and management, and how it will relate to the ASA (ALT) and PEO Ground Combat Systems and
other organizations, may be a work in progress; however, at some point, having a clearly other organizations, may be a work in progress; however, at some point, having a clearly
established management structure with agreed authorities and responsibilities is likely to be established management structure with agreed authorities and responsibilities is likely to be
essential for ultimate program success. Toward this end, Congress might consider examining, in essential for ultimate program success. Toward this end, Congress might consider examining, in
detail, the Armydetail, the Army
OMFV and RCV to help ensure that program management will be efficient and effective, and not OMFV and RCV to help ensure that program management will be efficient and effective, and not
a programmatic detriment (as it was in the case of the FCS).a programmatic detriment (as it was in the case of the FCS).
As previously noted, the Army envisions employing RCVs as As previously noted, the Army envisions employing RCVs as
OMFVs. In addition to enhancing OMFV survivability, RCVs could potentially increase the OMFVs. In addition to enhancing OMFV survivability, RCVs could potentially increase the
overall lethality of ABCTs. Army leadership has stated that the Armyoverall lethality of ABCTs. Army leadership has stated that the Army
the Bradley with the OMFV, that the RCV will mature on a longer timeline than the OMFV, and the Bradley with the OMFV, that the RCV will mature on a longer timeline than the OMFV, and
that the OMFV will later be joined by the RCV.that the OMFV will later be joined by the RCV.
intelligence improvement,intelligence improvement,
FY2026 fielding date or for many years thereafter. The Army describes the OMFV and RCV as FY2026 fielding date or for many years thereafter. The Army describes the OMFV and RCV as
operational relationship between the two could be beneficial. While the OMFV appears to offer a operational relationship between the two could be beneficial. While the OMFV appears to offer a
significant improvement over the M-2 Bradley—given weapon systems technological advances significant improvement over the M-2 Bradley—given weapon systems technological advances
by potential adversaries—operating alone without accompanying RCVs, the OMFV may offer by potential adversaries—operating alone without accompanying RCVs, the OMFV may offer
little or marginal operational improvement over the M-2 Bradley. Recognizing the risks little or marginal operational improvement over the M-2 Bradley. Recognizing the risks
associated with a scenario where RCV fielding is significantly delayed or postponed due to associated with a scenario where RCV fielding is significantly delayed or postponed due to
technological challenges—along with a better understanding of the systematic and operational technological challenges—along with a better understanding of the systematic and operational
relationship between the OMFV and the RCV—could prove useful for policymakers. Another relationship between the OMFV and the RCV—could prove useful for policymakers. Another
potential oversight question for Congress could be what is the role of Army Futures Command potential oversight question for Congress could be what is the role of Army Futures Command
(AFC) in integrating requirements between OMFV and RCVs?(AFC) in integrating requirements between OMFV and RCVs?
To some, the use of Section 804 authority offers great promise in developing and fielding To some, the use of Section 804 authority offers great promise in developing and fielding
qualifying weapon systems quickly and cost-effectively. Others note that rapid prototyping qualifying weapon systems quickly and cost-effectively. Others note that rapid prototyping
authorities under Section 804 will not eliminate the complexities of technology development and authorities under Section 804 will not eliminate the complexities of technology development and
that operational requirements also drive the complexity and technical difficulty of a project. In that operational requirements also drive the complexity and technical difficulty of a project. In
acknowledging the potential benefits that Section 804 authority could bring to the Armyacknowledging the potential benefits that Section 804 authority could bring to the Army
attempt to replace the M-2 Bradley, as well as the risks associated with its use over a more attempt to replace the M-2 Bradley, as well as the risks associated with its use over a more
traditional acquisition approach, policymakers might decide to examine the potential costs, traditional acquisition approach, policymakers might decide to examine the potential costs,
benefits, and risks associated with using Section 804 authority for the OMFV program.benefits, and risks associated with using Section 804 authority for the OMFV program.
Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces
([email address scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed])
Footnotes
Ashley Tressel, "MPF, AMPV Now Part of NGCV Family of Vehicles," InsideDefense.com, October 12, 2018.
For additional information on the AMPV, see CRS Report R43240, The Army's Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
For additional information on MPF, see CRS Report R44968, Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Mobility, Reconnaissance, and Firepower Programs, by Andrew Feickert.
Ashley Tressel, "MPF, AMPV Now Part of NGCV Family of Vehicles," InsideDefense.com, October 12, 2018.
Bob Purtiman, "Preparing for Future Battlefield: The Next Generation Combat Vehicle," Army News, September 17, 2018.
U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for
Congress, coordinated by Andrew Feickert., coordinated by Andrew Feickert.
Project Manager NGCV, NGCV OMFV Industry Day Briefing, August 6, 2018, and David Vergun, "Next Generation Combat Vehicle Must be Effective in Mega Cities, FORSCOM Commander Says," Army News, November 30, 2017.
For additional information on Army artificial intelligence efforts, see CRS Report R45392, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress, coordinated by Andrew Feickert.
For information on Army directed energy efforts, see CRS Report R45098, U.S. Army Weapons-Related Directed Energy (DE) Programs: Background and Potential Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
Sebastien Roblin, "The Army's Biggest and Baddest Troop Carrier Might Get Even Bigger," The National Interest," February 4, 2018.
Ibid.
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), "Operation Desert Storm: Early Performance Assessment of Bradley and Abrams," GAO/NSIAD-92-94, January 1992.
Reactive armor typically consists of a layer of high explosive between two metallic armor plates. When a penetrating weapon strikes the armor, the explosive detonates, thereby damaging the penetrator or disrupting the resulting plasma jet generated by the penetrator.
Sebastien Roblin, "The Army's M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle is Old. What Replaces it Could be Revolutionary," The National Interest, October 27, 2018.
Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "Army Pushes Bradley Replacement; Cautious on Armed Robots," Breaking Defense, June 27, 2018.
For additional information on active protection systems, see CRS Report R44598, Army and Marine Corps Active Protection System (APS) Efforts, by Andrew Feickert.
Ibid.
For additional historical information on the Future Combat System, see CRS Report RL32888, Army Future Combat System (FCS) "Spin-Outs" and Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert and Nathan J. Lucas.
For additional historical information on the Ground Combat Vehicle, see CRS Report R41597, The Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
Stephen Rodriguez, "Top Ten Failed Defense Programs of the RMA Era," War on the Rocks, December 2, 2014.
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army Futures Command Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132, January 2019, p. 3.
Stephen Rodriguez, "Top Ten Failed Defense Programs of the RMA Era," War on the Rocks, December 2, 2014.
Information in this section is taken directly from CRS Report R41597, The Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
Remarks by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel FY2015 Budget Preview, Pentagon Press Briefing Room, Monday, February 24, 2014.
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army Futures Command Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132, January 2019, p. 3.
Sebastian Sprenger, "Army Bides its Time in Next Steps Toward Infantry Fighting Vehicle," InsideDefense.com, June 10, 2015.
Association of the U.S. Army, "Milley: Readiness, with Needed Modernization, is a Top Priority," March 1, 2016.
U.S. Army Modernization Strategy, June 6, 2018, https://www.army.mil/standto/2018-06-06.
Information in this section is taken directly from CRS Insight IN10889, Army Futures Command (AFC), by Andrew Feickert.
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army Futures Command Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132, January 2019, p. 7.
Ibid., p. 8.
Ibid.
U.S. Army Stand-To, Army Futures Command, March 28, 2018.
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army Futures Command Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132, January 2019, p. 14.
For additional information on defense acquisition, see CRS Report R44010, Defense Acquisitions: How and Where DOD Spends Its Contracting Dollars, by Moshe Schwartz, John F. Sargent Jr., and Christopher T. Mann.
Ashley Tressel, "How the Army Secretary Accelerated Service's New Combat Vehicle Program," InsideDefense.com, November 20, 2018.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Project Manager NGCV, NGCV OMFV Industry Day Briefing, August 6, 2018, p. 9.
Jason Sherman, "Army Tweaking NGCV Requirements, Requests for Proposals Following Recent Industry Parlay," InsideDefense.com, October 5, 2018.
Information in this section is taken from Ashley Tressel, "Contractors Debut Possible Bradley Replacement Vehicles," InsideDefense.com, October 19, 2018.
https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/lynx-infantry-fighting-vehicle, accessed January 31, 2019.
Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "Army Pushes Bradley Replacement; Cautious on Armed Robots," Breaking Defense, June 27, 2018.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Information in the following sections is from The Army's Robotic Combat Vehicle Campaign Plan, January 16, 2019, and Ashley Tressel, "Army's Robotic Combat Vehicle to Have Three Variants," InsideDefense.com, November 29, 2018.
Ashley Tressel, "Army's Robotic Combat Vehicle to Have Three Variants," InsideDefense.com, November 29, 2018.
Ashley Tressel, "RCV Prototype Award Scheduled for November," InsideDefense.com, February 14, 2019.
Ashley Tressel, "Army's Robotic Combat Vehicle to Have Three Variants," InsideDefense.com, November 29, 2018.
Except as required by law.
Tony Bertuca, "DOD Turns to Rapid Prototyping for Big Tech Gains, but Accepting New Risks," InsideDefense.com, August 30, 2018.
Ashley Tressel, "Army Releases Draft Partial RFP for OMFV," InsideDefense.com, February 1, 2019.
The Army's Robotic Combat Vehicle Campaign Plan, January 16, 2019.
Ashley Tressel, "Army Using Section 804 Authority for Bradley Replacement," InsideDefense.com, October 9, 2018.
Tony Bertuca, "DOD Turns to Rapid Prototyping for Big Tech Gains, but Accepting New Risks," InsideDefense.com, August 30, 2018.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Information in this section is taken from Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army, Justification Book of Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army RDT&E – Volume III, Budget Activity 5C, March 2019, pp. 459-466 and Ashley Tressel, "Army Projects $1B for OMFV Development over FYDP," InsideDefense.com, March 19, 2019.
Stephen Rodriguez, "Top Ten Failed Defense Programs of the RMA Era," War on the Rocks, December 2, 2014.
Project Manager NGCV, NGCV OMFV Industry Day Briefing, August 6, 2018.
For additional information on autonomous ground navigation and artificial intelligence, see CRS Report R45392, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress, coordinated by Andrew Feickert.
The Army's Robotic Combat Vehicle Campaign Plan, January 16, 2019.