February 12Updated October 23, 2019
Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies
Senior U.S. defense and intelligence officials have
identified a number of emerging technologies that could
have a disruptive impact on U.S. national security in the
years to come. These technologies include
artificial intelligence,
lethal autonomous weapons,
hypersonic weapons,
directed-energy weapons,
biotechnology, and
quantum technology.
As these technologies continue to mature, they could hold
significant implications for congressional oversight, U.S.
defense authorizations and appropriations, military concepts
of operations, and the future of war.
Artificial Intelligence
Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to a computer system
capable of human-level cognition. AI is currently being
incorporated into a number of military applications,
including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
logistics; defensive cyber operations; command and control;
and semi-autonomous and autonomous vehicles. As it
develops, AI could enable new concepts of operations, such
as swarming (i.e., cooperative behavior in which
uninhabited vehicles autonomously coordinate to achieve a
task), that could present both challenges and opportunities
for the U.S. military.
Recent news reports and analyses have highlighted the role
of AI in enabling increasingly realistic photo, audio, and
video digital forgeries, popularly known as “deep fakes.”
Adversaries could potentially deploy this AI capability as
part of their information operations in a “gray zone”
conflict. Deep fake technology could be used against the
United States and its allies to generate false news reports,
influence public discourse, erode public trust, and attempt
to blackmail diplomats. Some have suggested that AI could
be used to create full digital “patterns-of-life,” in which an
individual’s digital footprint is mapped against other
personal information, such as spending habits and job
history, to create comprehensive behavioral profiles of
servicemembers, suspected intelligence officers,
government officials, and private citizens. Similar to deep
fakes, this information could, in turn, be used for targeted
influence operations or blackmail.
To coordinate defense-wide AI efforts, the Pentagon
established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC,
pronounced “jake”) in June 2018 under the Department of
Defense’s (DOD’s) Chief Information Officer. In addition,
the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 115-
232, §1051) established a National Security Commission on
Artificial Intelligence to assess U.S. competitiveness in AI
and offer recommendations to Congress.
Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) are a class
of weapon systems capable of independently identifying a
target and employing an onboard weapon system to engage
and destroy the target with no human interaction. LAWS
without manual human control.
LAWS require computer algorithms and sensor suites to
classify an
object as hostile, make an engagement decision,
and guide a
weapon to the target. This capability would
enable the
system to operate in communications-degraded
or -denied
environments where traditional systems may not
be able to
operate.
LAWS generally do not yet exist, and some senior military and
and defense leaders have expressed concerns about the
ethics of
ever fielding such systems. For example, in 2017 testimony
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Vice
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Paul Selva
Selva stated, “I do not think it is reasonable for us to put
robots in
charge of whether or not we take a human life.”
Currently,
there are no domestic or international legal
prohibitions on
the development of LAWS; however, an
international group
of government experts has begun to
discuss the issue.
Approximately 25 countries have called
for a preemptive
ban on the systems due to ethical
considerations, while
others have called for formal
regulation. DOD Directive
3000.09 establishes department
guidelines for the
development and fielding of LAWS to
ensure that they
comply with “the law of war, applicable
treaties, weapon
system safety rules, and applicable rules of
engagement.”
Hypersonic Weapons
Hypersonic weapons—which fly at speeds of at least Mach
5—do not yet exist, but they are in development in a
number of countries, including
the United States. There are two categories of
hypersonic hypersonic
weapons:
Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) are launched from a
rocket before gliding to a target.
Hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM) are powered by
high-speed engines throughout the duration of their
flight.
In contrast to ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons do not
follow a ballistic trajectory and can maneuver en route to
their destination, making defense against them difficult.
Currently, no such defense against hypersonic weapons
exists, and experts disagree on the affordability,
technological feasibility, and utility of hypersonic missile
defense options. These options could include interceptor
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Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies
defense options. These options could include interceptor
missiles, hypervelocity projectiles, laser guns, and
electronic attack systems.
According to open-source reporting, China and Russia have
conducted successful hypersonic weapons tests in 2018 and
are and are
expected to have an operational HGV capability as early
as as
2020. The United States anticipates achieving an HGV
capability aroundis unlikely to field an operational
HGV system before 2022. Although HCM technology is less
less mature than HGV technology, reports suggest that it could
could be fielded by Russia in 20222023. Other countries—including
including France, Australia, India, and Germany—Germany, and Japan—
also have research
programs in hypersonic weapons.
Directed-Energy Weapons
DOD defines directed-energy (DE) weapons as those using
concentrated electromagnetic energy, rather than kinetic
energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy
equipment, facilities, and/or personnel.” DE weapons—
often colloquially referred to as “lasers”—could be used by
ground forces in counter rocket, artillery, and mortar (CRAM) or short-range air defense (SHORAD) missions.
They could offer low costs per shot and nearly limitless
magazines that, in contrast to existing conventional
systems, could enable an efficient and effective means of
defending against missile salvos and swarms of uninhabited
vehicles. Theoretically, DE weapons could also provide
options for boost-phase missile defenseintercept, given their speedof-light travel time; however, as in the case of hypersonic
missile defense, experts disagree on the affordability,
technological feasibility, and utility of this application.
High-powered microwave (HPM) weapons, a subset of DE
weapons, could be used as a nonkinetic means of disabling
electronics, communications systems, and improvised
explosive devices in the event of a conflict. In addition, the
U.S. military has explored using HPM in a nonlethal “heat
ray” system for crowd control; however, the system was
recalled—likely due to ethical and operational
considerations.
Biotechnology
Biotechnology leverages life sciences for technological
applications. A number of developments in biotechnology
hold potential implications for national security. As a 2018
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report notes, the
Departments of Defense, State (State), and Homeland
Security (DHS), and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI), all assess that biotechnologies, such as
the low-cost gene-editing tool CRISPR-Cas9, have the
potential to “alter genes or create DNA to modify plants,
animals, and humans. Such biotechnologies could be used
to enhance [or degrade] the performance of military
personnel. The proliferation of synthetic biology—used to
create genetic code that does not exist in nature—may
increase the number of actors that can create chemical and
biological weapons.” U.S. adversaries may be less
restrained in both researching and applying biotechnology,
particularly as it relates to human performance modification
and biological weapons.
Quantum Technology
Quantum technology, which employs the principles of
quantum physics, has not yet reached maturity; however, it
holds significant implications for the future of encryption
and stealth technologies. GAO reports that DOD, State,
DHS, and the ODNI have assessed that “quantum
communications could enable adversaries to develop secure
communications that U.S. personnel would not be able to
intercept or decrypt. Quantum computing may allow
adversaries to decrypt [unclassified, classified, or sensitive]
information, which could enable them to target U.S.
personnel and military operations.”
Quantum technology could have other military applications,
such as quantum radar systems hypothesized to be capable
of identifying the performance characteristics (e.g., radar
cross-section, speed) of objects with a greater level of
accuracy than conventional radar systems. This would
significantly ease the tracking and targeting of U.S. lowobservable, or stealth, aircraft such as the F-22, F-35, and
B-2. Similarly, advances in quantum sensing could
theoretically enable significant improvements in submarine
detection, rendering the oceans “transparent.” This could, in
turn, hold implications for the survivability of the U.S. seabased nuclear deterrent.
CRS Products
CRS Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National Security,
by Kelley M. Sayler
CRS In Focus IF11333, Deep Fakes and National Security, by
Kelley M. Sayler and Laurie A. Harris
CRS Report R45142, Information Warfare: Issues for Congress,
by Catherine A. Theohary
CRS Report R44466, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems:
Issues for Congress, by Nathan J. Lucas
CRS In Focus IF11150, Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal
Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelley M. Sayler
CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler
CRS Report R45098, U.S. Army Weapons-Related Directed
Energy (DE) Programs: Background and Potential Issues for
Congress, by Andrew Feickert
CRS Report R44175, Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched
Guided Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke
CRS Report R44824, Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9, by
Marcy E. Gallo et al.
CRS Report R45409, Quantum Information Science: Applications,
Global Research and Development, and Policy Considerations, by
Patricia Moloney Figliola
Other Resources
Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in
Weapon Systems,” May 8, 2017, https://www.esd.whs.mil/
portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf.
Government Accountability Office, National Security: LongRange Emerging Threats Facing the United States as Identified by
Federal Agencies, December 2018, https://www.gao.gov/assets/
700/695981.pdf.
Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for the Record: World Wide
Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,”
January 29, 2019, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/
2019-ATA-SFR—SSCI.pdf.Government Accountability Office, National Security: LongRange Emerging Threats Facing the United States as Identified by
Federal Agencies, December 2018, https://www.gao.gov/assets/
700/695981.pdf.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies
Kelley M. Sayler, Analyst in Advanced Technology and
Global Security
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies
IF11105
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