Updated January 17, 2019
Sudan
When unified (1956-2011), Sudan was Africa’s largest
country by area, and the site of its longest-running civil
war. In 2011, after decades of fighting broadly described as
a conflict between the predominately Muslim “Arab” north
and “African” south, Sudan split in two. The split did not
resolve other conflicts, in Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and
Blue Nile. Overlapping struggles between security forces
and armed groups, nomadic and farming communities, and
among ethnic groups have caused extensive displacement
and suffering. Across Sudan, economic pressures, social
tensions, and dissent present challenges for the Islamist
government of President Omar al Bashir, who came to
power in a 1989 coup. Nationwide anti-government protests
in early 2019 suggest growing pressure for regime change.
South Sudan’s secession was a major financial blow to
Sudan, which lost 75% of its oil production, two-thirds of
export earnings, and over half its fiscal revenues. A large
security sector budget, mismanagement, and corruption all
compound Sudan’s economic troubles, which spur periodic
protests and domestic criticism of the government. The
International Monetary Fund assesses that U.S. economic
sanctions, imposed in 1997, also undermined economic
stability and growth. Major U.S. enforcement actions for
sanctions violations in 2014-2015 significantly reduced
Sudan’s access to U.S. dollars and further impeded its
access to international financial markets and institutions.
Sudan has long sought relief from U.S. sanctions, and the
outgoing Obama Administration announced a move to ease
them in January 2017, after determining that Sudan had
taken positive steps over a six-month period in five key
areas: enhancing counterterrorism cooperation; addressing
the threat of a regional armed group, the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA); ceasing negative interference in South Sudan;
ceasing hostilities in conflict zones; and improving
humanitarian access. President Trump permanently revoked
the economic sanctions in October 2017. Some U.S.
restrictions remain, including on debt relief and based on a
state sponsor of terrorism designation—the latter is now the
focus of “Phase II” of a bilateral engagement framework.
Background
Despite Sudan’s diversity, northern-led regimes espousing
Islamist ideals have dominated government since
independence, often pressing distant provinces to conform
to the center, Khartoum, rather than accommodating local
customs and institutions. Instead of forging a national
identity, these policies exacerbated Sudan’s racial, cultural,
and religious differences. Attempts to Arabize and Islamize
the countryside were resisted by southerners and other
marginalized groups and sparked insurgencies in the south.
Groups in other regions rose up periodically, citing local
grievances. Some in the central states of Southern Kordofan
and Blue Nile joined the southern rebellion, the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).
Figure 1. Sudan Key Facts
Source: Fact information from CIA World Factbook and IMF, 2018.
The north-south wars took a heavy toll on both sides. In
2005, the government and the SPLM signed the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which enshrined
the south’s right to self-determination after a six-year
“interim period,” during which the SPLM and the ruling
National Congress Party (NCP) formed a unity government.
Southern Sudanese voted overwhelmingly in January 2011
to secede and achieved independence in July of that year.
The CPA failed to resolve several contentious issues, and
talks have continued on border disputes and related security
issues, debts, and once-shared resources, such as oil. The
proximity of Sudanese rebel activity to the border
complicated its demilitarization after separation, as did the
unresolved status of contested areas, notably Abyei, which
was granted special semi-autonomous status in the CPA.
An official referendum for Abyei residents on whether to
retain their special status in Sudan or join South Sudan was
slated for 2011 but has been indefinitely delayed. The
deployment of the U.N. Interim Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
defused a violent stand-off in 2011, but local tensions
persist and still have the potential to spur a larger conflict.
Relations between Sudan and South Sudan improved in
2018. A long-delayed joint border monitoring mission is
now semi-operational, though there has been little progress
on border demarcation. Sudan surprised many by mediating
a new peace deal between warring parties in South Sudan
mid-year. If the deal holds it would allow a resumption of
oil production in fields shut by South Sudan’s civil war,
generating needed revenue for both Khartoum and Juba.
Ongoing Conflicts
The CPA did not resolve Sudan’s longstanding centerperiphery tensions. Khartoum has responded to the political
demands of restive regions more often with force than with
substantive reform and has financed local militias to help
counter insurgencies. The militias have been linked to
indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians.
Sudan has conducted aerial attacks in Darfur in violation of
U.N. Security Council resolution 1591 (2005).
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Sudan
Darfur. More than a decade after the George W. Bush
Administration declared genocide in Darfur in 2004,
violence still plagues the region. Fighting reportedly
displaced as many as 265,000 Darfuris in the first half of
2016, primarily in the Jebel Marra area, a long-time rebel
stronghold. After a major offensive, the government
declared Darfur free of rebellion in April 2016, and on June
30, 2016 it declared a unilateral ceasefire in Darfur and in
Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. U.N. monitors suggest
the military conducted aerial bombardments in Jebel Marra
into late 2016, however. Sporadic skirmishes, insecurity,
and government restrictions continue to limit access by aid
workers and peacekeepers to some areas.
Direct clashes between the military and the Darfur rebels
quieted after the 2016 offensive, but there has been little
progress in the peace process. U.N. monitors report that
significant clashes between government forces and one
rebel faction resumed in 2018; other rebels have withdrawn
to Libya to regroup. Intercommunal clashes in Darfur
continue, as do attacks by armed groups on civilians,
peacekeepers, and aid workers. In this context, there has
been debate within the U.N. Security Council over pressure
from Khartoum to end the African Union-U.N. Hybrid
Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The Council agreed in
2017 to reconfigure the mission and in 2018 authorized a
significant troop reduction (to just over 4,000 troops by
mid-2019), with UNAMID’s possible exit in June 2020.
The ICC. In 2005, the U.N. Security Council granted the
International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction over serious
crimes committed in Darfur. Over a decade later, the ICC
has yet to commence a trial, and five arrest warrants remain
outstanding, including two for the arrest of President Bashir
on charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide. The ICC Prosecutor has repeatedly expressed
frustration with Security Council inaction on the arrest
warrants. Sudan remains uncooperative with the Court.
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The conflict in these
states, often referred to as “the Two Areas,” is driven by
unresolved grievances that date back to the north-south war,
when some local groups joined the SPLM rebellion. The
CPA provided for a process in which the two states might
achieve greater autonomy within Sudan, but it stalled and
the conflict reignited in 2011. South Sudan’s ruling party
denies supporting the rebels, known as the SPLM-North
(SPLM-N), despite their historic relationship. The SPLM-N
(now split into two factions) and the major Darfur rebel
groups have a loose alliance, the Sudan Revolutionary
Front (SRF). Khartoum has restricted aid agencies’ access
to rebel-held areas since the onset of the conflict.
Political Challenges
The government faces mounting domestic pressure as 2019
begins: protests that began over the price of bread have
spread across the country, with demonstrators demanding
an end to the regime. Elections are scheduled for 2020, and
the NCP’s plan to remove term limits from the constitution
to allow Bashir to run again now appears likely to spark
further unrest. Several prominent opposition leaders who
had joined a “National Consensus Government” (formed in
2017) have quit. The major opposition parties boycotted the
last elections, in 2015, when Bashir won 94% of the vote.
The Humanitarian Situation
Over seven million Sudanese were in need of humanitarian
aid in 2018. Almost 1.8 million Darfuris remain displaced
internally, and Chad hosts over 330,000 Darfuri refugees.
As many as 780,000 people may be displaced in Blue Nile,
Southern Kordofan, and Abyei. South Sudan and Ethiopia
host over 300,000 refugees from the Two Areas. Sudan
hosts over 900,000 refugees, most from South Sudan.
Foreign Relations
Sudan has taken conspicuous steps since 2014 to repair
relations with key Arab Gulf countries, which are important
sources of investment. Those ties had cooled amid concern
over Sudan’s ties to Iran and its perceived support for the
Muslim Brotherhood. Sudan has deployed as many as
14,000 troops, reportedly including child soldiers, to
support the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, in return for Gulf
aid. Sudan’s relations with European countries also have
improved in recent years, in part based on cooperation to
counter migrant flows through Sudan.
U.S. Policy and Foreign Assistance
U.S. relations with Sudan, turbulent for over two decades,
have improved since 2016. After a nine-month review of
Sudan’s compliance with the Obama Administration’s
“five-track engagement strategy,” the Trump
Administration announced its decision in October 2017 to
make permanent the temporary sanctions relief provided by
President Obama. President Trump has indicated support
for continued efforts to improve bilateral relations, but has
stressed that further normalization of ties will require
additional progress by Sudan, including with respect for
human rights and religious freedom, as well as compliance
with U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea.
U.S. sanctions on Sudan, some of which remain in place,
have been imposed through both Executive Orders and
congressionally enacted legal restrictions. They are based
on Sudan’s debt arrears, support for international terrorism,
and pervasive human rights violations. The State
Department continues to rank Sudan poorly on human
trafficking and has designated it as a Country of Particular
Concern under the International Religious Freedom Act.
Sudanese law permits the death penalty for apostasy and
adultery and prison sentences or flogging for blasphemy.
Sudan has been designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism
since 1993. Nonetheless, successive administrations have
described Sudan as a “cooperative” counterterrorism
partner and have praised its cooperation regarding the
Islamic State in particular. The Trump Administration has
indicated that it would consider lifting Sudan’s designation
if more progress is made on counterterrorism cooperation,
human rights and other key issues. The government’s
response to recent protests may affect that decision.
Development aid for Sudan has been extremely limited
since South Sudan’s separation. The State Department
requested $2.4 million for FY2019 in nonemergency aid, to
support civil society and conflict mitigation. U.S.
humanitarian aid totaled over $327 million in FY2018.
Lauren Ploch Blanchard,
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IF10182May 28, 2019
Sudan
On April 11, 2019, Sudan’s military removed President
Omar al Bashir from office after three decades in power.
Four months of near-daily protests across the country had
shaken the government, and in early April, huge crowds
gathered in front of the military’s headquarters in Khartoum
to demand regime change. The protests, triggered by
austerity measures amid an economic crisis, were fueled by
a range of grievances against the ruling National Congress
Party (NCP) and Bashir, who took power in a 1989 coup.
The trajectory of the post-Bashir transition in Sudan is
uncertain. The protests continue as a coalition of opposition
groups and professional unions—the Forces for Freedom
and Change (FFC)—seek to negotiate a transfer of power
from the Transitional Military Council (TMC) that ousted
Bashir to a civilian-led transitional government. The
African Union has voiced support for the democratic
aspirations of the Sudanese people and condemned what it
terms a coup d’état, demanding that the military cede
authority to civilians by June 30. While the TMC and FFC
have reached agreement on some aspects of a transitional
arrangement, in which elections would be held in 2023,
they remain at odds over the role of military leaders in the
interim government. Meanwhile, the TMC has assumed de
facto authority—issuing decrees, replacing various
government officials, and conducting foreign relations.
Sudan’s military has a long history of intervention in
politics (Bashir’s 1989 coup was the country’s fourth).
Military leaders played prominent roles in Bashir’s regime,
and some observers question the TMC’s commitment to
reform. The protest leaders have sought to pursue change
peacefully, but several violent attacks on protesters by
members of the security forces have raised tensions during
the negotiations. While the TMC condemned the attacks
and blamed rogue elements, the incidents fuel concern
about splits in the security forces and about TMC leaders’
intentions. Islamists are also seen as potential spoilers.
With rampant inflation, a foreign currency shortage, and a
heavy debt burden, Sudan needs international support to
stabilize its economy. Its $1.3 billion in debt arrears to the
International Monetary Fund restrict access to international
financing, as does its designation by the United States as a
State Sponsor of Terrorism. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, and Egypt have supported the TMC politically
and financially, and by some accounts may have played a
role in facilitating Bashir’s ouster. The UAE and Saudi
Arabia have offered $3 billion in aid, but economists say it
will only provide short-term relief. The European Union
says it stands ready to assist “as soon as a civilian transition
takes place.” The United States has suspended bilateral
talks on easing sanctions and suggested that it would be
“harder” to support Sudan’s economic development without
a transition to civilian rule. Some Members of Congress
have called for U.S. pressure to ensure a swift transfer of
power to civilians in S.Res. 188 and in correspondence.
Figure 1. Sudan Key Facts
Source: Fact information from CIA World Factbook and IMF, 2018.
Background
Sudan, when unified (1956-2011), was Africa’s largest
country. In 2011, after decades of fighting often broadly
described as a conflict between the predominately Muslim
“Arab” north and non-Muslim “African” south, Sudan split
in two. The split did not resolve Sudan’s other conflicts;
overlapping struggles between security forces and rebels,
nomadic and farming communities, and among ethnic
groups have caused extensive displacement and suffering.
Northern regimes espousing Islamist ideals have dominated
government for much of Sudan’s post-independence
history, despite its diversity, pressing distant provinces to
conform to the riverine heartland, rather than
accommodating local customs and institutions. Instead of
forging a national identity, these policies exacerbated the
country’s racial, cultural, and religious differences.
Attempts to Arabize and Islamize the south sparked
insurgencies. Groups in other regions also rose up
periodically, citing local grievances. Some in the states of
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile joined the southern
rebels, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
The north-south wars took a heavy toll. In 2005, the
government and the SPLM signed the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA), which enshrined the south’s right
to self-determination after a six-year “interim period.”
Southern Sudanese voted overwhelmingly in January 2011
to secede and achieved independence in July of that year.
South Sudan’s secession was a major financial blow to
Sudan, which lost 75% of its oil production, two-thirds of
export earnings, and over half its fiscal revenues. A bloated
security sector budget, mismanagement, and corruption
have all compounded Sudan’s economic troubles. The
International Monetary Fund assesses that U.S. sanctions
also undermined economic growth. Major U.S. enforcement
actions for sanctions violations in 2014-2015 significantly
reduced Sudan’s access to U.S. dollars and further impeded
its access to international financial markets and institutions.
While disputes remain, relations between Sudan and South
Sudan have improved in recent years. Sudan surprised
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Sudan
many when it mediated a new peace deal between South
Sudan’s warring parties in 2018. The deal, if it holds, would
allow oil production in fields shut by South Sudan’s civil
war to resume, generating needed revenue for both
countries. Rebel activity along the countries’ shared border
complicates the border’s demilitarization, as does the
unresolved status of contested areas, notably Abyei, which
was granted special semi-autonomous status in the CPA.
An official referendum for Abyei residents on whether to
retain their special status in Sudan or join South Sudan was
slated for 2011 but has been delayed indefinitely. The
deployment of the U.N. Interim Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
defused a violent standoff in 2011, but local tensions still
have the potential to spur a larger conflict.
Conflicts
The CPA did not resolve longstanding center-periphery
tensions in Sudan. Successive governments have responded
to the political demands of restive regions more often with
force than reform and have financed local militias to help
counter insurgencies. Those militias have been linked to
indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians.
U.N. experts continue to document violations of an arms
embargo and ban on offensive military overflights
established in Security Council resolution 1591 (2005).
Darfur. Violence continues to plague the Darfur region of
western Sudan, where peace remains elusive. The
government launched a major offensive in early 2016 that
led to mass displacement. Fighting has diminished since
Bashir declared a ceasefire in mid-2016, with some rebels
withdrawing to Libya to regroup. U.N. monitors report that
significant clashes between government forces and one
rebel faction resumed in 2018. Sporadic skirmishes,
intercommunal violence, and attacks on peacekeepers, aid
workers, and civilians persist. Nevertheless, the African
Union-U.N. Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is
withdrawing, with plans for the last troops to leave in 2020.
In 2005, the U.N. Security Council granted the International
Criminal Court jurisdiction over serious crimes committed
in Darfur. The TMC has rejected calls to extradite Bashir to
the Hague, where he is wanted on Darfur-related charges of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The conflict in these
states, often referred to as “the Two Areas,” is driven by
unresolved grievances that date back to the north-south war,
when some local groups joined the SPLM rebellion. The
CPA set out a process by which the two states might
achieve greater autonomy within Sudan, but it stalled and
the conflict reignited in 2011. The Sudanese government
has restricted aid agencies’ access to rebel-held areas.
Humanitarian Situation
Sudan began 2019 with over 5.7 million people in need of
aid, a situation expected to worsen in the lean season midyear. Roughly 1.8 million Darfuris are displaced internally,
and Chad hosts over 330,000 Darfuri refugees. IDP
estimates for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile vary; South
Sudan and Ethiopia host over 300,000 refugees from those
areas. Over 30,000 people are displaced in Abyei. Sudan
hosts over 900,000 refugees, most from South Sudan.
Sudan’s Foreign Relations
Strategically positioned on the Red Sea, Sudan’s political
trajectory is of interest to an array of foreign actors. Egypt’s
engagement is driven by domestic political considerations
and its concerns about the flow of the Nile. Sudan’s former
ties with Iran and links to the Muslim Brotherhood under
Bashir strained its relations with key Arab Gulf countries,
which are important sources of investment. In 2014,
struggling with the loss of oil revenue and under mounting
pressure from Saudi Arabia, Sudan severed relations with
Tehran. It joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen in 2015,
reportedly deploying as many as 14,000 troops, some
underage, in return for Gulf aid. Bashir’s refusal to cut ties
with Qatar was a source of tension with the Saudis and
Emiratis. Sudanese officials worked to repair relations with
the United States, but Bashir also engaged Russia, already a
top weapons source, seeking to expand cooperation and
offering to host Russian naval facilities. Russian security
contractors have been increasingly active there.
U.S. Policy and Foreign Assistance
U.S. relations with Sudan have been turbulent for three
decades. The United States restricted aid after the 1989
coup, and in subsequent years imposed a range of sanctions
through Executive Orders and congressional measures.
Restrictions on U.S. engagement are based on Sudan’s debt
arrears, links to international terrorism, and pervasive
human rights violations. The State Department has
designated Sudan as a Country of Particular Concern under
the International Religious Freedom Act.
Sudan has long sought relief from U.S. sanctions. The
Obama Administration moved to ease them in January 2017
as part of a bilateral reengagement effort, after determining
Sudan had taken positive steps on five “tracks”: enhancing
counterterrorism cooperation; ceasing hostilities in conflict
zones; improving humanitarian access; ending negative
interference in South Sudan; and addressing the threat of a
regional armed group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).
In October 2017, the Trump Administration reported that
Sudan had sustained positive actions on the five tracks and
permanently revoked certain sanctions. Others remain in
place, and in November 2018, despite reports of backsliding
on some tracks, the Administration announced “Phase II” of
the bilateral engagement framework. Under Phase II, the
Administration would consider rescinding Sudan’s 1993
State Sponsor of Terrorism designation if the country met
the statutory criteria and made further progress on the
original tracks and other areas of longstanding U.S.
concern, including human rights, religious freedom,
outstanding terrorism-related claims, and Sudan’s relations
with North Korea. The United States has suspended Phase
II discussions as it calls for a civilian-led transition.
Development aid for Sudan is extremely limited, and debt
relief is restricted by Congress in annual appropriations.
The State Department requested $1.5 million in
nonemergency aid for FY2020, to support civil society and
consensus-building. The United States has provided over
$378 million in humanitarian aid in FY2018-FY2019.
Lauren Ploch Blanchard,
IF10182
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Sudan
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