The 115^th Congress continues to debate the extent and terms of the United States' involvement in the ongoing conflict in Yemen, where fighting has continued unabated since March 2015. Lawmakers have questioned the extent to which successive Administrations have adhered to existing law relating to providing security assistance, including sales or transfers of defense goods and defense services, while upholding international human rights standards (e.g., 22 U.S.C. §2754 or 22 U.S.C. §2304). They also have proposed new legislation that would condition or prohibit the use of U.S. funds for some activities related to Yemen and extend legislative oversight over the executive branch's policy toward the warCongress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019 Updated January 28, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45046 Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019 Summary This product provides an overview of the role Congress has played in shaping U.S. policy toward the conflict in Yemen. Summary tables provide information on legislative proposals considered in the 115th and 116th Congresses. Various legislative proposals have reflected a range of in Yemen.

This product provides a summary of all legislative proposals that the 115^th Congress has considered to date regarding the conflict in Yemen. Proposed stand-alone legislation, resolutions, and amendments to wider bills [National Defense Authorization Acts for 2018 (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91) and 2019 (H.R. 5515), and defense appropriations (H.R. 3219/Division I, H.R. 6157)] have reflected a range of congressional perspectives and priorities, including with regard to

•          the authorization of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces related to the conflict;
• the extent of U.S. logistical, material, advisory, and intelligence support for the coalition led by Saudi Arabia;
• the approval, disapproval, or conditioning of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia;
• the appropriation of funds for U.S. operations in support of the Saudi-led coalition;
• the conduct of the Saudi-led coalition'’s air campaign and its adherence to international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict;
• the demand for greater humanitarian access to Yemen;
• the call for a wider government assessment of U.S. policy toward Yemen and U.S. support to parties to the conflict;
• the nature and extent of U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism and border security cooperation; and
• the role of Iran in supplying missile technology and other weapons to the forces of the Houthi movement.

This product includes legislative proposals considered during the first and second sessions of the 115^th Congress. It does not include references to Yemen in Iran sanctions legislation, which are covered in CRS The 116th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia’s conduct of the war in Yemen, where fighting has continued since March 2015. The war has exacerbated a humanitarian crisis in Yemen that began in 2011; presently, the World Food Program reports that 20 million Yemenis face hunger in the absence of sustained food assistance. The difficulty of accessing certain areas of Yemen has made it hard for governments and aid agencies to count the war’s casualties. Data collected by the U.S. and European-funded Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) suggests that 60,000 Yemenis have been killed since January 2016. The Trump Administration has opposed various congressional proposals, including initiatives to reject or condition proposed U.S. arms sales or to require an end to U.S. military support to Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen. Many in Congress have condemned the October 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel, and in general, the incident appears to have exacerbated existing congressional concerns about Saudi leaders and the pace, scope, and direction of change in the kingdom’s policies. This product includes legislative proposals considered during the 115th and 116th Congresses. It does not include references to Yemen in Iran sanctions legislation, which are covered in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions. For additional information on the war in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, please see the following CRS Products.

products. CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention.

. CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations.

. CRS Insight IN10729, Yemen: Cholera Outbreak.

Obama Administration Policy

In March 2015, Saudi Arabia established a coalition of nations (hereinafter referred to as the Saudi-led coalition) to engage in military operations in Yemen against the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous president of Yemen, the late Ali Abdullah Saleh.¹ The war in Yemen has continued unabated since then, leading, according to the United Nations, to one of the world's largest humanitarian crises.

Trump Administration Policy

Recent Congressional Action

The Senate Armed Services Committee incorporated the provisions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee-reported text of S.J.Res. 58 as Section 1266 of the version of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that it reported to the Senate on June 5, 2018 (S. 2987). The provision was modified further and passed by both the House and Senate as Section 1290 of the conference version of the FY2019 NDAA (H.R. 5515). The potential restrictions on the use of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling of coalition aircraft would not apply to certain types of operations, including missions related to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State or "related to countering the transport, assembly, or employment of ballistic missiles or components in Yemen." Under the modified version, the Administration willYemen: Cholera Outbreak. Congressional Research Service Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019 Contents Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1 Congress, the Obama Administration, and Yemen (2015-2016) ..................................................... 2 2015 ........................................................................................................................................... 2 2016 ........................................................................................................................................... 3 Analysis ..................................................................................................................................... 5 Congress, the Trump Administration, and Yemen (2017-2018) ...................................................... 6 2017 ........................................................................................................................................... 6 2018 ........................................................................................................................................... 9 Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 13 Tables Table 1. Proposed Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 116th Congress ............................ 15 Table 2. Proposed Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 115th Congress ............................ 16 Contacts Author Information....................................................................................................................... 35 Congressional Research Service Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019 Overview In March 2015, Saudi Arabia established a coalition of nations (hereinafter referred to as the Saudi-led coalition or the coalition) to engage in military operations in Yemen against the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous president of Yemen, the late Ali Abdullah Saleh.1 During 2014, the United States joined Saudi Arabia in demanding that Houthi forces reverse their campaign to occupy the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, but the rapid onset of hostilities in March 2015 forced the Obama Administration to react quickly.2 At the start of the Saudi-led intervention on March 25, 2015, the Administration announced that the United States would provide “logistical and intelligence support” to the coalition’s operations without taking “direct military action in Yemen in support of this effort.”3 Soon thereafter, a joint U.S.-Saudi planning cell was established to coordinate military and intelligence support for the campaign. At the United Nations Security Council, the United States supported the passage of Resolution 2216 (April 2015), which, among other things, required member states to impose an arms embargo against the Houthi-Saleh forces and demanded that the Houthis withdraw from all areas seized during the current conflict. Since the March 2015 Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen, Congress has taken an active role in debating and overseeing U.S. policy in the Arabian Peninsula.4 Members have considered legislative proposals seeking to: reduce Yemeni civilian casualties resulting from the coalition’s operations; improve deteriorating humanitarian conditions; end restrictions on the flow of goods and humanitarian aid; combat Iranian support for the Houthis; preserve maritime security in the Bab al Mandab Strait; and/or support continued Saudi-led coalition and U.S. efforts to counter Al Qaeda and Islamic State forces in Yemen. Beyond Yemen, many Members have appeared to view the conflict through the prism of a broader regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the U.S. effort to limit Iran’s malign regional influence. Others lawmakers have viewed the Yemen conflict as indicative of what they perceive as problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship, a concern that deepened after the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel in October 2018. Congress has considered but has not enacted proposals to curtail or condition U.S. defense sales to Saudi Arabia. Responding to the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen also appears to be reinvigorating some Members’ interest in strengthening the role of Congress in foreign policy vis-vis the executive branch. Debate in Congress over Yemen has featured bipartisan statements of interest in asserting 1 In early December 2017, the Houthi-Saleh alliance unraveled, culminating in the killing of former President Saleh on December 4, 2017. 2 According to one account, “The Obama administration agreed to support what the Saudis called Operation Decisive Storm with considerable reluctance, seeing it as an unwinnable proxy war against Iran. See, “How the War in Yemen became a Bloody Stalemate and the worst Humanitarian Crisis in the World,” New York Times Magazine, October 31, 2018. 3 Statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on the Situation in Yemen, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 25, 2015. 4 Over the last decade, Congress has periodically addressed Yemen-related issues in annual authorization and appropriations legislation. Before the 2015 Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, Members were mostly focused on: providing security assistance to Yemeni government forces to counter terrorist groups like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); addressing Yemeni detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; overseeing the issuance of visas for Yemeni nationals traveling to the United States; countering human trafficking in Yemen; and prohibiting U.S. assistance from being provided to Yemeni security forces which use child soldiers. Congressional Research Service R45046 · VERSION 19 · UPDATED 1 Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019 the prerogatives of the legislative branch to limit executive branch power, specifically using war powers legislation and the appropriations and authorization processes to curb U.S. military involvement in support of coalition operations. Congressional scrutiny of U.S. policy in Yemen also has led to legislative changes to global authorities, such as the Department of Defense’s authority to enter into and use acquisition and cross servicing agreements with partner militaries. Congress, the Obama Administration, and Yemen (2015-2016) 2015 Congressional interest in the Yemen conflict has evolved and grown gradually and was not widespread at the outset of the coalition’s March 2015 intervention in Yemen.5 In early to mid2015, congressional interest in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East centered on the Iran nuclear deal and Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.6 Several months after the March 2015 intervention, the Saudi-led coalition had not achieved a conclusive victory and what modest gains had been made on the ground were offset by mounting international criticism of growing civilian casualties from coalition air strikes. In Congress, several lawmakers began to express concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen.    In late September 2015, Representative Ted W. Lieu wrote a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocating for a halt to U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition until it instituted safeguards to prevent civilian casualties.7 In October 2015, 10 Members of Congress wrote a letter to President Obama urging him to “work with our Saudi partners to limit civilian casualties to the fullest extent possible.”8 In October 2015, Senator Markey stated that “I fear that our failure to strongly advocate diplomacy in Yemen over the past two years, coupled with our failure to urge restraint in the face of the crisis last spring, may put the viability of this critical [U.S.-Saudi] partnership at risk.”9 5 Though Yemen was not the key focus of congressional interest in the Middle East at the time, congressional committees did hold oversight hearings. For example, see “Yemen under Attack by Iranian-backed Houthis,” Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, April 14, 2015; “The U.S. Role and Strategy in the Middle East: Yemen and the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 6, 2015; and “Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen,” Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, November 17, 2016. 6 Congress did address Yemen during consideration of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 114-92). H.R. 1735, the House version of that bill, included Section 1273, a “Sense of Congress on Evacuation of United States Citizens and Nationals from Yemen.” That provision was excluded from the final version of the Act, which did contain a provision that prohibited Defense Department funds from being provided to “an entity in Yemen that is controlled by members of the Houthi movement.” 7 “Saudis Face Mounting Pressure over Civilian Deaths in Yemen Conflict,” New York Times, September 29, 2015. 8 Letter from Representative Debbie Dingell et al to President Barack Obama, October 14, 2015. Available from CRS. 9 “Senate Democrats hold up Arms Sales for Saudi war in Yemen,” Al Monitor, October 7, 2015. Congressional Research Service R45046 · VERSION 19 · UPDATED 2 Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019 By the fall of 2015, as the Obama Administration tried to balance its concern for adhering to the laws of armed conflict with its support for Gulf partners, 10 lawmakers began to express their concern over U.S. involvement in the coalition’s intervention by scrutinizing U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia.11 When the Administration informally notified Congress of a proposed sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia, some Senators sought to delay its formal notification. After the formal notification in November 2015,12 Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) leaders jointly requested that the Administration notify Congress 30 days prior to associated shipments, marking the first use of this prior notification request authority.13 At that time, no related joint resolutions of disapproval on proposed sales of PGMs to the kingdom were introduced, but the delay and additional notification request demonstrated congressional concern.14 2016 By the one-year anniversary of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, a more defined opposition15 to U.S. support for the coalition had begun to coalesce amidst repeated international documentation of human rights abuses16 and errant coalition airstrikes.17 In April 2016, legislation “As Saudis bombed Yemen, U.S. worried about Legal Blowback,” Reuters, October 10, 2016. See, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Call by Ben Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, and Jeff Prescott, Senior Director for the Middle East, NSC, on the Upcoming Visit of King Salman of Saudi Arabia, September 2, 2015. 12 Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittal No. 15-57, November 16, 2015. 13 The request marked the first time that Congress has invoked an authority it added to the Arms Export Control Act in December 2014 through an amendment included in the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-276). Section 201 of the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-276) added Section 36(i) to the AECA. Potentially applicable to any foreign military sale requiring notification pursuant to Section 36(b) of the AECA, the 36(i) mechanism requires both the chair and ranking member of either of the two committees of jurisdiction (SFRC/HFAC) to jointly request that the President provide such a “pre-shipment notification” 30 days prior to a shipment. The pre-shipment notification would inform Congress that a shipment was about to occur, but would not require or preclude Congress from taking further action to modify or block the shipment. 14 Although Congress has more than one legislative option it can use to block or modify an arms sale, one option explicitly set out in law for blocking a proposed arms sale is the use of a joint resolution of disapproval as provided for in Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). See, CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 15 In January 2016, Senator Chris Murphy called on the Administration to “suspend supporting Saudi Arabia’s military campaign in Yemen, at the very least, until we get assurances that this campaign does not distract from the fight against ISIS and Al Qaeda, and until we make some progress on the Saudi export of Wahhabism. And Congress should not sign off on any more military sales to Saudi Arabia until similar assures are granted.” See, “Chris Murphy on the Roots of Radical Extremism,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 29, 2016. 16 In April 2016, the “Saudi Arabia-led coalition” was listed alongside other parties to the conflict in Yemen in the annex of the annual report of United Nations Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict for attacks that resulted in the killing and maiming attacks of children in Yemen. In July 2016, then-U.N. Secretary General Ban Kimoon alleged that Saudi Arabia had threatened to reduce its funding for U.N. programs if the coalition was not removed from the report annex, an allegation that Saudi leaders denied. In August 2016, the Secretary General said, “After very careful consideration, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition was removed from the annexes, pending the conclusions of a review. ...I have since received information on measures taken by the coalition to prevent and end grave violations against children. We will continue our engagement to ensure that concrete measures to protect children are implemented. But I want to repeat: the content of the report stands.” See, U.N. Blacklists Saudi-led Coalition for Killing Children in Yemen, Reuters, October 5, 2017. 17 For example, see, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O’Brien Statement to the Security Council on Yemen, New York, February 16, 2016 and Press briefing note on Yemen and Honduras, Spokesperson for the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights: Rupert Colville, Geneva, Switzerland, March 4, 2016. 10 11 Congressional Research Service R45046 · VERSION 19 · UPDATED 3 Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019 was introduced that sought to place conditions on future proposed sale notifications, previously approved sales, or transfers of PGMs to Saudi Arabia.18 Proposed amendments to FY2017 defense legislation19 would have added some similar conditions on the use of funds to implement sales of PGMs or prohibited the transfer of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia.20 The PGM amendment was not considered, but the cluster munitions amendment was narrowly defeated in a June 2016 House floor vote.21 In the spring and summer of 2016, the United Nations held multiple rounds of peace talks in Kuwait aimed at brokering an end to the conflict. From April 2016 to August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition had largely spared Yemen’s capital Sanaa from aerial strikes as part of its commitment to the cessation of hostilities. When U.N.-mediated peace talks collapsed in August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition resumed bombing and the war intensified. During the summer of 2016, the Obama Administration reduced some U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s air campaign in Yemen by withdrawing U.S. personnel assigned to a joint U.S.-Saudi planning cell.22 Nevertheless, overall U.S.-Saudi cooperation continued and, in August 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale of M1A2S tanks to Saudi Arabia. In response, some lawmakers wrote to request that President Obama withdraw the proposal, citing concerns about Yemen.23 In September 2016, joint resolutions of disapproval of the proposed tank sale were introduced in the Senate (S.J.Res. 39) and House (H.J.Res. 98). On September 21, 2016, the Senate voted to table a motion to discharge the SFRC from further consideration of S.J.Res. 39 (71-27, Record Vote 145).24 During debate over the motion, many Senators argued in favor of continued U.S. support for Saudi Arabia, with Senator Lindsey Graham remarking “To those who want to vote today to suspend this aid to Saudi Arabia, people in Iran will cheer you on.”25 In the wake of an October 2016 Saudi airstrike on a funeral hall in Sanaa that killed 140 people, the Obama Administration initiated a review of U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia.26 Based on that review, it put a hold on a planned sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia and limited intelligence sharing, but maintained counterterrorism cooperation and refueling for coalition aircraft.27 In the final months of the Obama Administration, U.S. Armed Forces briefly exchanged fire with forces party to the conflict. In October 2016, Houthi-Saleh forces launched anti-ship missiles at U.S. Navy vessels on patrol off the coast of Yemen. The attacks against the U.S. ships marked the first time U.S. Armed Forces had come under direct fire in the war. The Obama Administration 18 In the 114th Congress, see, S.J.Res. 32 - A joint resolution to provide limitations on the transfer of certain United States munitions from the United States to Saudi Arabia and H.J.Res. 90, To provide limitations on the transfer of certain United States munitions from the United States to Saudi Arabia. 19 In the 114th Congress, see, S. 2943 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 which became P.L. 114-328. 20 In the 114th Congress, see H.R. 5293 - Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2017. 21 See, H.R. 5293, Recorded Vote, June 16, 2016, available at: [http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2016/roll327.xml] 22 “U.S. withdraws staff from Saudi Arabia dedicated to Yemen Planning,” Reuters, August 19, 2016. 23 See Hon. Lieu et al., Letter to President Barack Obama, August 29, 2016. 24 Congressional Record, September 21, 2016, pp. S5921-S5935. 25 op.cit., Congressional Record. 26 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by NSC Spokesperson Ned Price on Yemen, October 8, 2016. 27 “U.S. Blocks Arms Sale to Saudi Arabia amid Concerns over Yemen War,” New York Times, December 13, 2016. Congressional Research Service R45046 · VERSION 19 · UPDATED 4 Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019 responded to the attacks against U.S. naval vessels by directing the Armed Forces to fire cruise missiles against Houthi-Saleh radar installations. The Obama Administration described the U.S. strikes as self-defense and indicated that it did not want to deepen its direct involvement in the conflict.28 In August and November 2016, then Secretary of State John Kerry made several attempts to broker a peace initiative in Oman, but his efforts were rejected by the parties themselves. Leahy Law and Saudi-led Coalition Strikes in Yemen Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, prohibits the furnishing of assistance authorized by the FAA and the Arms Export Control Act to any foreign security force unit where there is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. The State Department and U.S. embassies overseas implement Leahy vetting to determine which foreign security individuals and units are eligible to receive U.S. assistance or training. In October 2016, Senator Patrick Leahy remarked that “The humanitarian crisis in Yemen has received too little attention, and it directly, or indirectly, implicates us.... The reports of civilian casualties from Saudi air attacks in densely populated areas compel us to ask if these operations, supported by the United States, violate [that law].”29 Analysis By the end of 114th Congress, the war in Yemen was becoming a more significant foreign policy issue for lawmakers. While a growing number of Members were becoming critical of the U.S. role in supporting the Saudi-led coalition amidst a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen, more lawmakers still viewed the conflict through a regional lens rather than as a localized affair.30 Amidst significant congressional opposition to the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA), some Members viewed Iran’s support for the Houthi movement and the broader conflict in Yemen as an example of Iran’s malign regional activities not directly addressed by the JCPOA. As the Houthis targeted Gulf state infrastructure on land and vessels at sea, their behavior was touted as evidence of Iran’s growing capabilities to threaten U.S. and Gulf security.31 Just as some Members considered the Yemen conflict primarily a proxy war between the Iranbacked Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, others viewed it as a test of longstanding U.S. commitments to supporting Saudi Arabian security.32 Supporters of the relationship, while acknowledging that Saudi Arabia’s conduct of the war was at times problematic, argued that to curtail U.S. arms sales or other defense support to the kingdom would weaken a vital partner that was under threat from a hostile non-state actor on its southern border. Others lawmakers charged that continued U.S. support for the coalition was not improving coalition behavior but damaging the U.S. reputation for upholding commitments to international law and human rights. Legislation seeking to limit U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia was not enacted in the 114th Congress, but marked the beginning of the broader congressional debate that has continued.33 28 Letter from the President -- War Powers Resolution, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, October 14, 2016. 29 “U.S. Support for Saudi Strikes in Yemen Raises War Crime Concerns,” Foreign Policy.com, October 15, 2016. 30 “Senate tacitly endorses US role in Yemen War,” Al Monitor, September 21, 2016. 31 Congressional Record, November 15, 2016, Pages H6202-H6208. 32 Congressional Record, September 21, 2016, Pages S5921-S5935. 33 As one analyst described this trend in 2016, “We haven’t seen this much anti-Saudi activity on the Hill in a quarter of Congressional Research Service R45046 · VERSION 19 · UPDATED 5 Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019 As the Trump Administration prepared to assume office, human rights organizations and aid groups were pressing Congress to become more attuned to the growing humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Though the Obama Administration had taken some steps, particularly in late 2016, to limit U.S.-coalition cooperation and restrict deliveries of PGMs to Saudi Arabia, nongovernmental groups deemed such action as insufficient. According to Human Rights Watch, “Whatever conditionality the Obama administration thought it had created — in holding up the transfer of precision munitions near the tail end of Obama’s term and suspending cluster munition transfers earlier — ultimately did not have meaningful impact in reining in the continued Saudiled coalition attacks on civilians.”34 Congress, the Trump Administration, and Yemen (2017-2018) 2017 From the beginning of his Administration, President Donald Trump has signaled strong support for the Saudi-led coalition’s operations in Yemen as a bulwark against Iranian regional interference. He initiated a review of U.S. policy toward Yemen, including President Obama’s October 2016 restrictions on U.S. arms sales and intelligence sharing to the coalition.35 On March 19, 2017, just prior to his visit to Saudi Arabia, President Trump notified Congress that he was proceeding with three proposed direct commercial sales of precision guided munitions technology deferred by the Obama Administration, subject to congressional review.36 In May 2017, the Administration officially notified Congress of its intention to proceed with proposed sales of precision guided munitions technologies that the Obama Administration had deferred, while announcing plans to increase training for Saudi Arabia’s air force on both targeting and the Law of Armed Conflict.37 Congress would debate another resolution of disapproval (S.J.Res. 42) of these proposed PGM sales in June 2017 (see below). After completed the policy review in July 2017, President Trump directed his Administration “to focus on ending the war and avoiding a regional conflict, mitigating the humanitarian crisis, and defending Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity and commerce in the Red Sea.”38 a century…. Criticism of Saudi Arabia has come out of the closet, and I don’t think it’s going to go back in.” “Saudi Arabia is Facing Unprecedented Scrutiny from Congress,” Washington Post, September 21, 2016. 34 “Obama Officials’ Incomplete Reckoning with Failure on Yemen,” Just Security, November 19, 2018. 35 “Trump Administration looks to resume Saudi Arms Sale criticized as Endangering Civilians in Yemen,” Washington Post, March 8, 2017; and, “Trump Administration weighs Deeper Involvement in Yemen War,” Washington Post, March 26, 2017. 36 DDTC Transmittals No. DDTC 15-132 (JDAM), No. DDTC 16-011 (FMU-152A/B bomb fuzes), No. DDTC 16-043 (Paveway II & III, Enhanced Paveway II & III, Paveway IV), May 19, 2017. 37 A November 2017 report suggests that Saudi Arabia has agreed to purchase $7 billion in precision munitions from U.S. companies in agreements that would span a decade. See, “Saudi Arabia Agrees to buy $7 billion in Precision Munitions from U.S. firms: Sources,” Reuters, November 22, 2017. To date, no new precision-guided munitions foreign military sales have been formally notified to Congress since the May 2017 notification of three direct commercial sales of precision guided munitions technology that had been deferred by the Obama Administration. 38 Letter from Department of Defense Acting General Counsel William Castle to Senators Mitch McConnell and Chuck Schumer, February 27, 2018. Congressional Research Service R45046 · VERSION 19 · UPDATED 6 Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019 U.S. Counter-Terrorism Policy in Yemen 2015-2018 Across both the Obama and Trump Administrations, the United States has sustained counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and various affiliates of the Islamic State in Yemen. Throughout the conflict in Yemen, the United States has been able to successfully target high value targets within terrorist organizations. In 2015, a U.S. strike killed then-AQAP leader Nasser al Wuhayshi. At the onset of the Trump presidency, the United States markedly increased the tempo of strikes.39 According to one report, in early 2017, President declared parts of three Yemeni provinces to be an “area of active hostilities” where looser battlefield rules apply.40 In January 2017, Ryan Owens, a Navy SEAL, died during a counterterrorism raid in which between 4 and 12 Yemeni civilians also were killed, including several children, one of whom was a U.S. citizen. The raid was the Trump Administration's first acknowledged counterterror operation. In 2018, U.S. officials claimed that one of the most high-value targets in the AQAP organization, bombmaker Ibrahim al Asiri, had been killed in a U.S. air strike. Asiri was a Saudi national who was believed to have created the explosive devices used in the 2009 Christmas Day attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253, in a 2009 attack against former Saudi Arabian intelligence chief Mohammed bin Nayef, and in the October 2010 air cargo packages destined for Jewish sites in Chicago. On January 4, 2019, the Department of Defense announced that a U.S. precision strike had killed Jamal al Badawi, one of the primary Yemeni terrorists involved in the 2000 USS Cole bombing. As President Trump entered office, the dynamics of the conflict in Yemen were changing, and the coalition launched a new offensive along Yemen’s 280-mile western coastal plain ultimately aimed at taking the strategic Houthi-held port city of Hudaydah. In early 2017, the coalition’s gradual advance toward Hudaydah, coupled with an ongoing deterioration in humanitarian conditions, sparked some Members of Congress to implore the Administration to improve aid access and negotiate a cease-fire. In March 2017, several House members wrote a letter to then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson urging him to “use all U.S. diplomatic tools to help open the Yemeni port of Hodeida [Hudaydah] to international humanitarian aid organizations.”41 A month later, another group of House Members wrote to President Trump stating that Congress should approve any new U.S. support to the coalition amidst its offensive against Hudaydah.42 On June 13, 2017, the Senate debated another resolution (S.J.Res. 42) to disapprove of three direct commercial sales of PGMs to Saudi Arabia. During Senate floor consideration over the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 42, Members once again weighed various issues, such as the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship, countering Iran, and limiting U.S. involvement in the war in Yemen. Some lawmakers suggested that U.S. arms sales and military support to the coalition had enabled alleged violations of international humanitarian law, while others argued that U.S. support to the coalition improved its effectiveness and helps minimize civilian casualties. For example, during floor debate, Senator Graham argued that “If we are worried about collateral damage in Yemen, I understand the concern. Precision weapons would help that cause, not hurt it.”43 Senator Murphy retorted, saying “What we are asking for is to hold off on selling these “2017: A Record Year for US Counterterrorism Strikes,” Long War Journal, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, January 3, 2018. See also, U.S. Department of Defense, CENTCOM Officials Provide Update on Recent Counterterrorism Strikes in Yemen, Dec. 20, 2017. 40 “Trump Administration Is Said to Be Working to Loosen Counterterrorism Rules,” New York Times, March 12, 2017. 41“Reps Lieu & Conyers lead 52 Member Letter urging Tillerson to use Diplomacy to reopen Yemen Port,” March 13, 2017. 42 U.S. Representative Mark Pocan, “Bipartisan Effort: 55 U.S. Representatives Call on Trump to Come to Congress Before Taking Military Action in Yemen,” April 11, 2017. 43 Congressional Record, June 13, 2017, Issue: Vol. 163, No. 100 — Daily Edition. 39 Congressional Research Service R45046 · VERSION 19 · UPDATED 7 Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019 precision-guided munitions until we get some clear promise--some clear assurance--from the Saudis that they are going to use these munitions only for military purposes and that they are going to start taking steps--real steps, tangible steps--to address the humanitarian crisis.”44 On June 13, 2017, the Senate voted to reject the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration (47-53, Record Vote 143), and a companion resolution was not taken up in the House (H.J.Res. 102). Representative Ro Khanna introduced a concurrent resolution (H.Con.Res. 81) pursuant to the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) in a bid to end U.S. support for the coalition’s military intervention. After consultation between House leaders and supporters of the resolution on a compromise approach, the House agreed to delay expedited consideration of the resolution until after the November 2016 election and then adopted a non-binding alternative (H.Res. 599, 366 30, 1 Present, Roll no. 623).45 In his first year in office, while President Trump sought to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, counter Iran, and increase U.S. counter-terrorism activity in Yemen, his Administration also at times took strong positions on the need for members of the coalition to improve humanitarian access, pursue a settlement to the conflict, and take measures to prevent civilian casualties. After a Houthi-fired missile with alleged Iranian origins landed deep inside Saudi Arabia in November 2017, the coalition instituted a full blockade of all of Yemen's ports, including the main port of Hudaydah, exacerbating the country's humanitarian crisis. 46 The White House issued four press statements on the conflict between November 8 and December 8, including a statement on December 6 in which President Trump called on Saudi Arabia to “completely allow food, fuel, water, and medicine to reach the Yemeni people who desperately need it. This must be done for humanitarian reasons immediately.” 47 On December 20, 2017, the Saudi-led coalition announced that it would end its blockade of Hudaydah port for a 30-day period and permit the delivery of four U.S.-funded cranes to Yemen to increase the port's capability to off-load commercial and humanitarian goods.48 The next day, 44 op.cit., Congressional Record. Congressional Record, November 13, 2017, Vol. 163, No. 185, Pages H9148-H9155. 46 On November 4, 2017, a Houthi ballistic missile (with alleged Iranian markings) landed on Saudi soil near King Khalid international airport in Riyadh. Two days later, the Saudi-led coalition closed all Yemeni ports, including Hudaydah, which is the primary point of entry for most imported food and humanitarian supplies entering Yemen. Yemen imports over 90% of its food supply. After the coalition’s imposition of total ports’ closure, food and fuel prices skyrocketed, leading international aid agencies to warn of impending famine. The total closure of all Yemeni ports lasted until November 24, 2017, when the Saudi-led coalition announced that it would begin allowing humanitarian aid to resume entering Hudaydah port—but not commercial shipments of food and fuel. The Saudi-led coalition argued that the Houthis earn hard currency by taxing fuel imports. Yemen imports 80% of its food from commercial suppliers rather than from humanitarian sources. 47 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by President Donald J. Trump on Yemen, December 06, 2017. Other statements include: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, White House Statement on IranianSupported Missile Attacks Against Saudi Arabia, November 8, 2017; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement from the Press Secretary on the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen, November 24, 2017; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary Regarding the Violence and Humanitarian Conditions in Yemen, December 08, 2017. 48 In late 2017, Senators Todd Young and Christopher Murphy placed a hold on the confirmation of the State Department’s nominee for legal advisor, Jennifer Newstead, until the Administration took certain steps to address the coalition’s blockade of Yemen. Dan De Luce and Robbie Gramer, “GOP Senator Presses Trump Administration Over Deadly Saudi Blockade in Yemen,” Foreign Policy, December 4, 2017; and, Dan De Luce, “Trump Nominee Concedes Saudi Siege of Yemen Could Be Violating U.S. Law,” Foreign Policy, December 19, 2017. On December 14, Senator Young sent a letter to President Trump thanking the President for his December 6 statement, while asserting that the 45 Congressional Research Service R45046 · VERSION 19 · UPDATED 8 Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019 the White House issued a statement welcoming “Saudi Arabia's announcement of these humanitarian actions in the face of this major conflict.” 2018 As the Saudi-led coalition intervention entered its fourth year, some in the Senate also proposed use of the War Powers Resolution as a tool for ending U.S. support for the coalition’s military intervention. On February 28, 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced S.J.Res. 54, a joint resolution to “direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress (except for those U.S. forces engaged in counterterrorism operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces).”49 Efforts in the Senate followed a late 2017 attempt in the House (see Table 1 below), in which a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove U.S. forces from Yemen was tabled in favor of a House-passed non-binding resolution. Throughout 2018, between Congress and the Trump Administration and within Congress itself, there was disagreement as to whether U.S. forces assisting the Saudi-led coalition have been introduced into active or imminent hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution. Some Members claimed that by providing support to the Saudi-led coalition, U.S. forces have been introduced into a “situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated” based on the criteria of the War Powers Resolution. The Trump Administration disagreed. In February 2018, the Acting Department of Defense General Counsel wrote to Senate leaders describing the extent of current U.S. support, and reported that “the United States provides the KSA-led coalition defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling;50 certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties.”51 On March 20, 2018, the Senate considered S.J.Res. 54 on the floor. During debate, arguments centered on a number of issues, ranging from concern over exacerbating Yemen’s humanitarian crisis to reasserting the role of Congress in authorizing the use of armed force abroad. After thenForeign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Bob Coker promised to propose new legislation coalition's blockade triggers, per the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended (22 U.S. Code §2378–1(a)), a prohibition on U.S. foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia. Newstead was confirmed by the Senate on December 19 after promising the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to consider evidence of any possible foreign government restriction of the delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance to Yemen in determining whether to apply statutory prohibitions found in 22 U.S. Code §2378-1(a). See, Senator Todd Young, Young: Law Triggered by Saudi Arabia's Actions in Yemen, December 14, 2017, and Newstead response online at: [https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/433310420171114-Young-Newstead-QFRs-Round-3-1.html]. 49 This followed the late 2017 action in the House (see discussion of (H.Con.Res. 81 and H.Res. 599, above), in which a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove U.S. forces from Yemen was tabled in favor of a Housepassed non-binding resolution. 50 In-flight refueling to the militaries of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is conducted pursuant to the terms of bilateral Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSAs) between the Department of Defense and the respective ministries of each country. ACSA agreements are governed by 10 USC 2341-2350. The agreements provide for reciprocal logistical support under a variety of circumstances, and their underlying statutory authority does not prohibit U.S. support to partner forces engaged in armed conflict. U.S. ACSA agreements with Saudi Arabia and the UAE provide for the transfer of support to third parties with the prior written consent of both the original provider and original recipient. The U.S. agreement with Saudi Arabia was signed in May 2016. The executive branch has not publicly specified what legal authority or agreement provided for refueling support to Saudi aircraft from March 2015 through May 2016. 51 Letter from Department of Defense Acting General Counsel William Castle to Senators Mitch McConnell and Chuck Schumer, February 27, 2018. Congressional Research Service R45046 · VERSION 19 · UPDATED 9 Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019 and hold hearings scrutinizing U.S. policy in Yemen, a majority of Senators voted to table a motion to discharge the Foreign Relations committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 54. Senator Robert Menendez made remarks expressing conditional support for Senator Corker’s approach, a view shared by some other Senators who voted to table the motion.52 The Foreign Relations committee held a hearing on Yemen a month later. In parallel testimony before Congress, U.S. defense officials stated that while the United States refueled Saudi aircraft and provided advice on targeting techniques, CENTCOM did not track coalition aircraft after they were refueled and did not provide advice on specific targets.53 Then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert S. Karem testified that “It's correct that we do not monitor and track all of the Saudi aircraft aloft over Yemen.” 54 During the same hearing, U.S. officials acknowledged that pressure from Congress has altered how the Administration deals with the coalition over the Yemen conflict. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield told Senator Todd Young and the SFRC that: Senator, your efforts, the efforts of your colleagues in this body and on this Committee have been exceedingly helpful in allowing the Administration to send a message from whole of government regarding the very specific concerns we have over any limitations, restrictions, constraints on the ability of both humanitarian and commercial goods specifically to include fuel to have unrestricted and expeditious entry into Yemen. And that messaging which comes from us, the Executive Branch, also comes from this body is extremely important.55 After the promised hearing, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also proposed new legislation to place conditions on U.S. assistance to the coalition. In May, the committee reported S.J.Res. 58 to the Senate; it would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that were not conducting select types of operations if certain certifications cannot be made and maintained.56 The Senate Armed Services Committee incorporated the provisions of the SFRC-reported text of S.J.Res. 58 as Section 1266 of the version of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that it reported to the Senate on June 5, 2018 (S. 2987). The provision was modified further and passed by both the House and Senate as Section 1290 of the conference version of the FY2019 NDAA (H.R. 5515).57 It was signed into law as P.L. 115-232 in mid-August, giving the Senator Menendez said, “Based upon Chairman Corker's commitments to those hearings and future markups and based upon the totality of the situation, I will vote to table the motion to discharge from the committee because I am not ready to either abandon our partners that face an existential threat from Iran run amok in Yemen, but my support is not unconditional, and I will demand responsive actions.” Congressional Record, March 20, 2018, 115th Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 164, No. 48 — Daily Edition. 53 Commander, U.S. Central Command Gen. Joseph Votel, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 18, 2018. 54 Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Karem, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 17, 2018. 55 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 17, 2018. 56 The joint resolution identified several certification criteria, although, reported as amended by the committee, it would have enabled the Secretary of State to waive the certification requirement for national security purposes if the Secretary provides an unclassified explanatory justification to the appropriate committees. The joint resolution also would have required a report on, among other things, U.S. objectives in Yemen and a detailed strategy to accomplish those objectives. 57 The potential restrictions on the use of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling of coalition aircraft would not apply to certain types of operations, including missions related to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State or “related to countering the transport, assembly, or employment of ballistic missiles or components in Yemen.” Under the modified version, the 52 Congressional Research Service R45046 · VERSION 19 · UPDATED 10 Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019 Administration until mid-September 2018 to make certain certifications. In a statement accompanying the President’s signing of P.L. 115-232 into law, President Trump objected to provisions such as Section 1290 stating the Administration’s view that such provisions “encompass only actions for which such advance certification or notification is feasible and consistent” with “[his] exclusive constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs.”58 As Congress continued to question the role of the United States in supporting coalition operations in Yemen, the pace and scale of fighting on the ground increased dramatically by the summer of 2018. On June 12, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition launched “Operation Golden Victory,” aimed at retaking the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah. As coalition forces engaged Houthi militants in and around Hudaydah, humanitarian organizations warned that if port operation ceased, famine could become widespread throughout northern Yemen. On June 12, nine Senators wrote a letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mattis saying, “We are concerned that pending military operations by the UAE and its Yemeni partners will exacerbate the humanitarian crisis by interrupting delivery of humanitarian aid and damaging critical infrastructure. We are also deeply concerned that these operations jeopardize prospects for a near-term political resolution to the conflict.”59 Several weeks later, Senator Robert Menendez, the Ranking Member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, placed a hold on a potential U.S. sale of precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In a June 28 letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mattis, Senator Menendez said, I am not confident that these weapons sales will be utilized strategically as effective leverage to push back on Iran’s actions in Yemen, assist our partners in their own selfdefense, or drive the parties toward a political settlement that saves lives and mitigates humanitarian suffering…. Even worse, I am concerned that our policies are enabling perpetuation of a conflict that has resulted in the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. 60 On August 9, the coalition conducted an airstrike that hit a bus in a market near Dahyan, Yemen, in the northern Sa’ada governorate adjacent to the Saudi border. The strike reportedly killed 51 people, 40 of whom were children. The coalition claims that its airstrike was a “legitimate military operation” and conducted in response to a Houthi missile attack on the Saudi city of Jizan a day earlier that killed a Yemeni national in the kingdom. The U.S. State Department called Administration would need to certify that the Saudi and Emirati governments are undertaking

• an urgent and good faith effort to support diplomatic efforts to end the civil war in Yemen;
• appropriate measures to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen by increasing access for Yemenis to food, fuel, medicine, and medical evacuation, including through the appropriate use of Yemen'’s Red Sea ports, including the port of Hudaydah, the airport in Sana'’a, and external border crossings with Saudi Arabia; and
• demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from military operations of the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the United Arab Emirates in Yemen, including by (1) complying with applicable agreements and laws regulating defense articles purchased or transferred from the United States, and (2) taking appropriate steps to avoid disproportionate harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure

. With specific regard to Saudi Arabia, the Administration also must certify that "the “the Government of Saudi Arabia is undertaking appropriate actions to reduce any unnecessary delays to shipments associated with secondary inspection and clearance processes other than UNVIM."” The Administration may waive the certification requirement if certain explanatory submissions are made. Reporting and strategy submission requirements also were included in the final version.

Table 1 describes proposals currently under consideration and others previously proposed and considered.