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INSIGHTi
Resurgence of Chemical Weapons Use:
Issues for Congress
Updated September 4, 2020
With increasing numbers of incidents, the use of chemical weapons (CW) has become a growing
international concern two decades after the international community decided to ban them under the 1997
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The. Syrian government forces have used the nerve agent sarin and
chlorine bombs dozens of times since 2013 in that country’s civil war. Thechlorine bombs continue to be used by the Syrian regime on the battlefield in that country's civil war; the Islamic State used mustard gas in that conflict in 2015 and 2016. The nerve agent VX was used to assassinate the brother of the North Korean leader in a Malaysian airport in 2017. Also, an attempted assassination of a former Russian spy in the United Kingdom in March 2018 involved the Soviet-developed "Novichok" nerve agent. Prior to the Syrian civil war, major use of chemical weapons had not been seen since the 1995 terror
in northern Iraq in 2015 and 2016. North Korean agents used the nerve agent VX to assassinate Kim Jong
Nam, the half-brother of the North Korean leader, at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport in February
2017. Russian agents used the Soviet-developed “Novichok”-class nerve agent in an attempted
assassination of a former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom in March 2018. Russian
opposition figure Alexei Navalny was also poisoned with a Novichok nerve agent in August 2020.
Prior to the Syrian civil war, there had been no major use of chemical weapons since the 1995 terror
attack by the Aum Shinrikyo in Tokyo and by Iraq in the 1980s during its war with Iran. Some argueargue that
recent use and lack of accountability for such incidents undermine the international norm against
chemical weapons.
Recent CW use has posed new challenges to the
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international organization established by the CWC to verify the destruction of existing CW stocks and monitor the peaceful use of chemicals. Article X of the CWC also provides the OPCW originally established to oversee the
destruction of chemical weapons stocks under the CWC and promote the safe and peaceful use of
chemicals, now has additional challenges and responsibilities. Article X of the CWC provides the OPCW
authority to investigate and assist with reported incidents of CW use.
After the use of nerve agent on its territory, the UK called for a Special Session of the OPCW Executive
Council in June 2018 to highlight the gravity of chemical weapons use and to call for giving investigators
the mandate to attribute an attack when possible. CWC member states approved a decision that granted
the OPCW the added authority to attribute chemical attacks under investigation. In addition, the CWC
states in November 2019 adopted two decisions that amended Schedule 1 of the CWC’s Annex on
Chemicals, adding two classes of nerve agents developed during the Cold War—the Novichok class of
nerve agents as well as some carbamate compounds to the schedule, subjecting them to the CWC’s
declaration requirements and other restrictions. Use of Novichok and carbamate compounds as a weapon
was already prohibited under the CWC.
The most recent incident, the poisoning of Russian opposition figure and corruption investigator Alexei
Navalny in Tomsk, Russia, on August 20 again highlights the challenge of responding to CW use.
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN10936
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress
Congressional Research Service
2
Navalny was med-evacuated to Germany on August 22 for treatment. The German Prime Minister Angela
Merkel stated on September 2, “Alexei Navalny was the victim of an attack with a chemical nerve agent
from the Novichok group.” The White House National Security Council twitter feed stated, “We will
work with allies and the international community to hold those in Russia accountable, wherever the
evidence leads, and restrict funds for their malign activities. The Russian people have a right to express
their views peacefully without fear of retribution of any kind, and certainly not with chemical agents.”
NATO countries on September 4 strongly condemned the attack and called on Russia to cooperate with an
OPCW investigation into the matter and to disclose the Novichok program in full. Russia is a party to the
CWC.
The Director General of the OPCW Fernando Arias said on September 3 that under the CWC, “any
poisoning of an individual through the use of a nerve agent is considered a use of chemical weapons,” and
the organization would respond to any requests for assistance. Under Article 9, CWC states may request
challenge inspections at facilities in member states suspected to be in violation of the convention. To date,
the CWC challenge inspection provision has never been invoked. Articles 9 and 10 of the CWC provide
for investigations into use of chemical weapons on the territory of a CWC State Party.
The OPCW could potentially investigate the Navalny poisoning as it has done in other recent cases. The
OPCW assisted the Malaysian government in its investigation of the February 2017 use of VX there.
OPCW Technical Assistance Visit (TAV) teams also aided Iraqi security forces’ investigations and
confirmed after a June 2017 visit that a non-state actor had used sulfur mustard blister agent in northern
Iraq. At the UK government’s request, the OPCW sent a TAV team to assist with the 2018 investigation of
the Skripal poisoning in Salisbury. A second OPCW TAV returned when two other UK citizens, one
deceased, were contaminated by the nerve agent. OPCW inspectors concurred with the UK technical
analysis of Novichok use in Salisbury. The OPCW has sent multiple investigatory teams to Syria: a
Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), to verify Syrian government compliance with the CWC; a FactFinding Mission (FFM), tasked with confirming reported incidents of CW use; a UNSC-authorized Joint
Investigative Mechanism until 2017; and the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT)
established in 2018.
Recent CW use by Syria, North Korea, and Russia has triggered U.S. sanctions under the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act), which requires a
determination of use. The U.S. State Department determined that North Korea’s government ordered the
VX attack in 2017 in Malaysia. The U.S. also concurred with the UK that Russia was responsible for the
Salisbury attack in violation of the CWC in 2018. Sanctions under the CBW Act were imposed on Russia,
but waivers were invoked by the Trump Administration.
Congress may wish to consider how best to respond to the use of chemical weapons, including how future
use could be deterred, and whether U.S. forces are adequately protected. Congress may consider whether
the OPCW has adequate resources for investigations, and it may also examine the success of efforts to
curb proliferation of chemical weapons-related material and technology, such as interdictions,
international sanctions, and export-control assistance programs.
Congressional Research Service
3
Author Information
Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
IN10936 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED
authority to investigate and assist with reported incidents of CW use.
In an unprecedented event, VX nerve agent was used at Kuala Lumpur International Airport on February 13, 2017 to assassinate Kim Jong Nam, the half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un. While the OPCW assisted the Malaysian government in its investigation. The U.S. government determined that North Korea's government ordered the VX attack, and it imposed sanctions on Pyongyang under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act). North Korea is not a signatory to the CWC and maintains an active chemical weapons program.
This year, in another unprecedented event, an advanced nerve agent was used in Salisbury, UK in an attempted assassination attempt of a former Russian intelligence officer, Sergei Skripal, and his daughter. A local first responder was also exposed to the nerve agent. At the UK government's request, the OPCW sent a Technical Assistance Visit (TAV) team to assist with the investigation. A second TAV was sent to the UK in late June when two UK citizens, one now deceased, were contaminated by a nerve agent. UK Prime Minister Theresa May said that a Soviet-era nerve agent known as Novichok was used and that the likely perpetrators were affiliated with the Russian government. The OPCW inspectors, supported by a network of OPCW-affiliated laboratories, concurred with the UK technical analysis, although the OPCW report did not assign blame for the CW attack, a step beyond its mandate. The U.S. State Department concurred that Russia was responsible and is violating the CWC, while Moscow rejected the claims.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) had reportedly used mustard gas against Iraqi and coalition forces on a number of occasions in Iraq. The OPCW aided Iraqi security forces' investigations of CW use by terrorist groups, such as ISIL, on their territory. The TAV teams confirmed after a June 2017 visit that a non-state actor had used sulfur mustard blister agent in northern Iraq.
In Syria, sarin and chlorine have been used dozens of times on the battlefield and against civilian targets. OPCW and United Nations (UN) investigators have concluded least 44 CW incidents since April 2014. Humanitarian groups have documented even more attacks. The OPCW has sent two investigatory teams to Syria in response since 2013: a Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), which is responsible for verifying whether the Syrian government is in compliance with the CWC, and a Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), tasked with confirming reported incidents of CW use. Additionally, the UN Security Council (UNSC) established a Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) which, for the first time, was mandated to attribute CW incidents identified by the FFM.
Despite facing constraints in resources, time, and access, the JIM was able to attribute CW use to the Syrian Armed Forces on several occasions: three instances of chlorine-filled barrel-bombs dropped in 2015, and one case of sarin deployed on April 4, 2017 in Khan Shaykhun. The JIM also concluded that ISIL employed sulfur mustard blister agent in Syria on three occasions. Although the JIM was widely supported, Russia, Syria, and Iran—which deny Syrian use of chemical weapons—criticized the JIM as politicized and Russia blocked its renewal by the UNSC past 2017.
With the cancelation of the JIM, the United States and others felt that since investigators did not have explicit authority to assign blame, it would likely be increasingly difficult to hold violators to account and norms could further erode. In a push for greater accountability for CW use, the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons (#NoImpunity) was announced by like-minded foreign ministers in Paris in January 2018. These states—including the United States—pledged in a Declaration of Principles to cooperate to identify publicly those assisting Syria in chemical weapons production, share information to document chemical weapons use, and strengthen states' capacity to prosecute violators.
After the use of nerve agent on its territory, the United Kingdom also called for a Special Session of the OPCW Executive Council in June 2018 with the aim of highlighting the gravity of chemical weapons use and to call for giving investigators the mandate to attribute an attack when possible. With a vote of 82 to 24, States Parties decided to grant the OPCW the added authority to attribute chemical attacks under investigation. Yet, it is unclear how this may impose constraints on the FFM's capacity to identify incidents, how frequently the FFM will be able to attribute incidents, and how any attributed incident may elicit an international response to a state's possible non-compliance with the CWC.
Congress may consider how best to respond to the use of chemical weapons, including how future use could be deterred, and whether U.S. forces are adequately protected. Congress may consider whether the OPCW has adequate resources for investigations, and it may also examine the success of efforts to curb proliferation of chemical-weapons-related material and technology, such as interdictions, international sanctions, and export-control assistance programs.