Contents

• Overview
• Political Developments
• Hun Sen
• 2013 and 2017 Elections
• Constraints on Civil Society
• Silencing the Opposition
• Suspension of Two-Party Politics
Crackdown on Government Critics and Civil Society
• U.S. Responses
• U.S.-Cambodia Cooperation
• U.S. and Other Foreign Assistance
• Khmer Rouge Tribunal
• Unexploded Ordnance
• Cambodian Debt
• Economic Conditions
U.S. Deportations of Cambodians
• Economic Conditions
• U.S. Trade
• Cambodia and China

Summary

Following a gradual improvement of bilateral ties since the mid-2000s, U.S. relations with the Kingdom of Cambodia have become increasingly strained in recent years in light of Prime Minister Hun Sen's suppression of the political opponents and opposition and his growing embrace of China. The Trump Administration and Congress have imposed and considered further sanctions in order to pressure Hun Sen into restoring democracy and conducting free and fair national elections in 2018.

the People's Republic of China (PRC). During the previous decade, U.S. engagement with the Kingdom slowly strengthened as western countries continued to pressure Hun Sen to abide by democratic norms and institutions and as the U.S. government attempted to prevent Cambodia from falling too heavily under China's influence. Following strong performances by the opposition in the 2013 and 2017 elections, the Cambodian government banned the largest opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), in 2017. As a result, the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) ran virtually unopposed in the 2018 National Assembly election. The Trump Administration and Congress have imposed sanctions in order to pressure Hun Sen into restoring democratic rights and dropping criminal charges against opposition leaders.

While the U.S. government has criticized Hun Sen's backtracking on democracy, it also has sought to remain engaged with Cambodia. During the past decade, U.S. interests and foreign assistance efforts in Cambodia have included strengthening democratic institutions and norms, promoting the rule of law, increasing bilateral trade and investment, supporting economic growth, reducing poverty, and improving public health. The U.S. government has supported demining and related activities in Cambodia, which is among the countries most heavily affected by unexploded ordnance (UXO). Military engagement has included U.S. naval port visits, U.S. military assistance and training, and joint exercises.

The United States and other countries have provided funding for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), also known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, established through a 2003 agreement between the government of Cambodia and the United Nations. Since the court commenced proceedings in 2006, it has convicted and sentenced three former Khmer Rouge leaders for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed during the period of Khmer Rouge rule (1975-1978). Cambodian and international human rights groups have advocated prosecuting midranking Khmer Rouge officials, while Hun Sen has opposed further indictments.

The Trump Administration has responded to Hun Sen's banning of the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) and other human rights abuses by declaring a visa ban on "those individuals involved in undermining democracy in Cambodia" and canceling assistance for the 2018 national elections. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) imposes democracy-related and other conditions or certification requirements upon U.S. assistance to the government of Cambodia. S.Res. 279, passed by the Senate in November 2017, urges the Department of the Treasury to consider placing senior Cambodian government officials involved in the suppression of democracy and human rights abuses on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list; calls on the government of Cambodia to release opposition leader Kem Sokha, who has been detained on charges of treason; and supports free and fair elections in 2018 monitored by international observers, among other provisions. A similar resolution, H.Res. 661, is pending in the House.

In recent years, China has by some measuresFollowing the conclusion of two trials in November 2018, the Cambodian government announced that the ECCC's work was concluded, despite calls by some Cambodians and international human rights groups to prosecute additional Khmer Rouge officials. In recent years, PRC assistance to Cambodia, by some measures, has begun to match total annual foreign aid flows from traditional major providers of official development assistance to Cambodia. China's economic support has given Hun Sen greater political room to maneuver, according to some analysts. In return, Cambodia has supportedappeared increasingly willing to accommodate or support Beijing's positions on various regional issues, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Japan is the largest provider of Official Development Assistance and second largest source of foreign direct investment in Cambodia.

One of the poorest countries in Asia, Cambodia has performed well on some socioeconomic indicators since the United Nations brokered a peace settlement in 1991 and restored a constitutional monarchy in 1993. The Kingdom's economy has achieved an average annual growth rate of 7.57% since 19941995, driven by growth in the agricultural, construction, garment, real estate, and tourism sectors. China, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian countries are the main sources of foreign investment. The United States is the single largest overseas market for Cambodian merchandise exports, which consist mostly of garments and footwear.

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Overview

Following a gradual improvement of ties since the mid-2000s, U.S. relations with the Kingdom of Cambodia have become increasingly strained in recent years in light of Prime Minister Hun Sen's suppression of the political opposition and his growing embrace of the People's Republic of China (PRC). During the previous decade, U.S. engagement with the Kingdom slowly strengthened as western countries continued to pressure Hun Sen to abide by democratic norms and institutions and as the U.S. government attempted to prevent Cambodia from falling too heavily under China's influence.¹ Following strong performances by the opposition in the 2013 and 2017 elections, the Cambodian government banned the largest opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), in 2017. As a result, the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) ran virtually unopposed in the July 2018 National Assembly election and won all 125 seats. The Trump Administration stated that the election "failed to represent the will of the Cambodian people" and represented "the most significant setback yet to the democratic system enshrined in Cambodia's constitution.…"²

Between 1975 and 1991, Cambodia endured the four-year reign of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (also known as the Khmer Rouge) during which an estimated 2 million Cambodians died; an invasion and occupation by Vietnam; and civil war. The Paris Peace Agreement, signed by Cambodia and 18 other nations pledging to support the country's sovereignty and reconstruction on October 23, 1991, ended the Cambodian-Vietnamese War and set out a framework for a liberal democracy with periodic and genuine elections.³ Since the United Nations administered the first post-war national elections in 1993, Cambodia has made fitful progress in its political and social development, including the conduct of elections, a vibrant civil society, and a relatively open mass media.

Hun Sen, age 65, has been the nation's leader for over 30 years, including as Premier of the Vietnam-backed Republic of Kampuchea between 1985 and 1993, and as Prime Minister after the United Nations-sponsored national elections in 1993. National politics are highly personalized, with Hun Sen at the helm, while corruption is widespread and political, legal, and judicial institutions remain weak.⁴ Although democratic institutions and practices have developed since the Peace Accords, Hun Sen often has employed undemocratic means to remain in power. According to some experts, the Cambodian leader has bolstered his political strength through a combination of "guile and force"; electoral victories; legal and extralegal political maneuvers; influence over the judiciary, broadcast media, and labor unions; patronage; cronyism; and intimidation.⁵ Some scholars have described the Cambodian polity before the election as an example of "competitive authoritarianism," whereby multiparty elections are held and a civil society exists, but the national leader or political party maintains its dominance over them in undemocratic or unconstitutional ways.⁶

The Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), a union of two opposition parties led by Sam Rainsy, a long-time opposition leader, and politician and human rights activist Kem Sokha, made significant gains in the 2013 parliamentary election and 2017 local elections. Following the party's strong showing in the 2017 commune council elections, many political observers predicted that the 2018 national elections would continue the trend of increasing competitiveness between the CPP and the CNRP. Furthermore, some observers reported fewer irregularities in 2017 compared to the 2013 National Assembly election, due in part to financial and technical assistance from Japan and the European Union that focused on improvements in the voter registration system.⁷

Figure 1. Cambodia at a Glance

Area: 69,898 sq. miles (about the size of Missouri)

Capital: Phnom Penh

Population: 16.4 million (2018)

Government: Parliamentary under a constitutional monarchy

Economic Sectors: (percent of GDP): agriculture (25); industry (33); services (42) (2017)

Life Expectancy: 65 years (2018strained in recent years in light of Prime Minister Hun Sen's suppression of the political opposition and his growing embrace of China. Areas of bilateral engagement have included U.S. assistance for strengthening democratic institutions and reducing poverty, demining activities, joint military exercises, and trade. Some analysts speculate that the Cambodian leader has disengaged from the United States in order to avoid diplomatic constraints on his usurpation of power.

Figure 1. Map of Cambodia

Although Cambodia has made progress during the past decade in conducting elections, developing a civil society, and raising living standards, in late 2017, Hun Sen took what some view as extraconstitutional measures to outlaw the political opposition. Despite areas of bilateral discord, according to some analysts, the U.S. government has been reluctant to break ties with Cambodia for fear of further losing leverage or affording China greater influence.¹ Some policy experts argue that due to its deepening relationship with China, Cambodia has garnered strategic significance that warrants continued U.S. engagement. Some also contend that many Cambodians view the United States favorably, and that Washington should continue to promote U.S. interaction with democratic forces in the Kingdom.²

In response to the Cambodian government's dissolution of the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) in November 2017, the Trump Administration withdrew $1.8 million in assistance to the National Election Committee (NEC). In addition, the White House announced in December 2017 that the Secretary of State would "restrict entry into the United States of those individuals involved in undermining democracy in Cambodia."³ In related developments, the European Union (EU) also suspended assistance to the NEC, and the European Parliament passed a resolution calling on the European Commission to impose visa restrictions on some Cambodian officials and to freeze their assets.⁴

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) imposes democracy-related and other conditions or certification requirements upon U.S. assistance to the government of Cambodia. (See "U.S. and Other Foreign Assistance," below.) S. 2412, the Cambodia Accountability and Return on Investment Act of 2018, also would place democracy-related and other conditions upon U.S. assistance. S.Res. 279, passed by the Senate on November 16, 2017, "reaffirms the commitment of the United States to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Cambodia." Among other provisions, the resolution urges the Department of the Treasury to consider placing all senior Cambodian government officials implicated in the suppression of democracy and human rights abuses on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list; calls on the Cambodian government to release opposition leader Kem Sokha, who has been detained on charges of treason; and supports free and fair elections in 2018 monitored by international observers. A similar resolution, H.Res. 661, is pending in the House.

On December 12, 2017, the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing on U.S. policy options to promote democracy and human rights in Cambodia. Some U.S. lawmakers discussed whether the U.S. government should impose restrictions on Cambodian exports in order to apply further pressure on Hun Sen. Some experts at the hearing argued that trade sanctions may not be necessary, or that they may not be as effective as imposing sanctions targeting Cambodian leaders or providing assistance to Cambodian organizations engaged in human rights efforts, democratic activism, and elections monitoring.⁵ Some analysts argue that restrictions on Cambodian exports may hurt Cambodian workers and encourage Cambodia to seek even closer relations with China, while it is uncertain whether such economic sanctions would weaken Hun Sen politically. Some contend that continued engagement may help promote democratization and serve U.S. security interests in the region.⁶

Political Developments

Many Cambodian political, economic, and social institutions that were destroyed under the rule of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, also known as the Khmer Rouge (1975-1979), have to some extent been reestablished. Since the United Nations administered national elections in 1993, which restored a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament, the Kingdom has made fitful progress in some areas of political and social development, including conducting elections, allowing a relatively open media, and developing a civil society that remains vibrant despite the political tightening in recent years. Economic growth of nearly 7.5% annually during the past two decades has helped to reduce poverty while many social indicators have improved. National politics remains highly personalized, however, while political, legal, and judicial institutions continue to be weak, corruption is widespread, and economic disparities have widened.⁷

Hun Sen

Hun Sen, age 65, has been the nation's leader for over 30 years, including as Premier of the Vietnam-backed Republic of Kampuchea between 1985 and 1993, and as Prime Minister after the United Nations-sponsored national elections in 1993. Although democratic institutions and practices have developed, along with a civil society, Hun Sen often has employed undemocratic means to remain politically dominant. He has garnered some electoral support, particularly in rural areas, through Cambodia's three decades of relative political stability and economic development.⁸ According to some experts, Hun Sen has bolstered his political strength through a combination of "guile and force"; electoral victories; legal and extralegal political maneuvers; influence over the judiciary, broadcast media, and labor unions; patronage; cronyism; and intimidation.⁹ In recent years, the Cambodian leader has silenced his chief political opponents through defamation lawsuits, and his government has been accused of harassing civil society actors and organizations. Some scholars have described the Cambodian polity as an example of "competitive authoritarianism," whereby multiparty elections are held and a civil society exists, but the national leader or political party maintains its dominance over them in undemocratic or unconstitutional ways.¹⁰

2013 and 2017 Elections

Although Hun Sen has maintained popular support, it has been diminishing, particularly since the 2008 national elections. During the past decade, Cambodian urban and young voters—nearly two-thirds of the population are under the age of 30 and half are under the age of 25—have bolstered opposition parties.¹¹ The national elections of 2013 were viewed by some observers as relatively free, but "fraught with irregularities."¹² Despite widespread problems with voter registration lists, the polls resulted in a striking reversal of fortunes for Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and a boost for the opposition CNRP, led by Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha. The CPP lost 22 seats in the National Assembly, holding 68 out of a total of 123 seats, its lowest level of support since 1998. The main opposition groups, unified as the CNRP, won 55 seats for a net gain of 26. The poll reflected a changing electorate that is more urban, younger, and more globalized. Many voters are less aware of or focused upon Cambodia's past turbulence and deprivations, more concerned about current corruption and inequality, and more demanding about government accountability and performance, according to observers.¹³

Hun Sen, on the one hand, has maintained electoral support, particularly in rural areas, due in part to Cambodia's three decades of relative political stability and economic development under his regime.⁸ The CNRP's growing electoral strength, on the other hand, reflected the will of a younger and more globalized electorate that is less focused on Cambodia's past turbulence, more concerned about corruption and inequality, and more demanding about government accountability and performance, according to observers.⁹ Nearly two-thirds of the country's population are under the age of 30 and half are under the age of 25.¹⁰

In November 2017, the Supreme Court of Cambodia, at the behest of the government, made a ruling that dissolved the CNRP for "conspiring with the United States to overthrow the government."¹¹ Then-U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia William Heidt stated that Hun Sen's accusations that the United States is attempting to overthrow the government were "inaccurate, misleading, and baseless."¹² In addition, the Supreme Court banned 118 CNRP members from participating in politics for five years.¹³ The government allowed 55 opposition seats to be filled instead by third parties, with many of them going to FUNCINPEC, the royalist party that dominated opposition politics until the late 2000s. The National Assembly also amended laws to remove CNRP commune councilors and village chiefs and replace them mostly with CPP members.¹⁴

Since 2008, the government has pursued several defamation charges against former CNRP president Sam Rainsy, a move regarded by many observers as politically motivated. Sam Rainsy subsequently has spent most of his time in self-imposed exile. In December 2017, the government charged Sam Rainsy with treason for posting a video on social media urging security personnel not to "obey orders from any dictators if they order you to shoot and kill innocent people."¹⁵ Former CNRP vice-president Kem Sokha was detained between September 2017 and September 2018, awaiting trial for treason, allegedly for collaborating with the United States to foment a popular overthrow of the CPP.¹⁶ Kem was released on bail and placed under house arrest in September 2018. A U.S. Embassy spokesperson stated, "We continue to call on the government of Cambodia to drop all charges against Mr. Sokha, remove restrictions on the political rights of him and other opposition leaders, and engage opposition leaders in an urgent dialogue aimed at building genuine national reconciliation."¹⁷

In July 2014, following a year of political unrest stemming from the 2013 elections, including mass demonstrations and the CNRP's boycott of parliament, the CPP and the opposition agreed to a power-sharing agreement. However, despite promises by both sides to adopt a "culture of dialogue," political rhetoric became increasingly strident. Beginning in the second half of 2015, Hun Sen and the CPP struck back at opposition politicians and activists with physical assaults, arrests, and lawsuits that many observers perceived as politically motivated.¹⁴ In November 2015, the National Assembly stripped CNRP President Sam Rainsy of his parliamentary immunity and expelled him from the legislature.

Cambodia held elections for 1,646 commune council seats in June 2017. Hun Sen's CPP won 51% of council seats (down from 62% in 2012), while the CNRP won 44% (up from 31%). Many observers predicted at the time that the scheduled 2018 national elections would continue the trend of increasing competitiveness between the two parties.¹⁵ There were fewer reported irregularities in 2017 compared to the 2013 National Assembly elections, due in part to financial and technical assistance from Japan and the European Union that focused on improvements in the voter registration system.¹⁶ Some human rights groups reported, however, that the local elections were held in an atmosphere of intimidation against the opposition and its supporters.¹⁷ Local elections do not determine the composition of the National Assembly, the most powerful legislative body in Cambodia. Nonetheless, commune councilors elect village chiefs, who long have formed a power base for the CPP.

Constraints on Civil Society

In August 2017, Department of State Spokesperson Heather Nauert expressed U.S. government concerns about antidemocratic trends in Cambodia:

The United States Government is deeply concerned by the deterioration in Cambodia's democratic climate in recent weeks. Two months ago, Cambodia received widespread recognition for running transparent, peaceful local elections. In the past two weeks, however, the achievement has been eclipsed by troubling government actions curtailing freedom of the press and civil society's ability to operate....¹⁸

Restrictions on political and social activism and foreign NGOs began roughly one year after the CPP and the opposition CNRP agreed to share power. In July 2015, the Cambodian Parliament passed a broadly worded law on nongovernmental organizations (Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations, or LANGO), which authorizes the Foreign Ministry to halt the activities of any international NGO that fails to register with the government. In addition, Article 8 of LANGO empowers government authorities to ban any NGO that engages in activities that "jeopardize peace, stability and public order or harm the national security, national unity, culture, and traditions of the Cambodian national society."¹⁹ Critics argue that the legislation makes it easier for Hun Sen to shut down NGOs deemed critical of the government.²⁰

In September 2017, the Cambodian Foreign Ministry expelled the National Democratic Institute (NDI), a U.S.-based NGO that has attempted to promote transparent governance and inclusive political participation in Cambodia, on the grounds that the organization was not registered with the government. Government media outlets also alleged that NDI, which received financial support from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), was involved in a conspiracy involving the CNRP and U.S.-funded NGOs to overthrow the government.²¹ Some Cambodian human rights and environmental NGOs also were investigated or disbanded during this time.²²

In September 2017, the Cambodia Daily, an English-language publication founded by a U.S. journalist and known by some observers as an opposition newspaper, was shut down by the government ostensibly because it had failed to pay taxes.²³ The government also closed more than one dozen Cambodian radio stations that sold air time to Voice of America and Radio Free Asia (RFA). RFA, facing political pressure and possible tax and administrative penalties that made it "impossible" to continue operating in the Kingdom, closed its Phnom Penh office.²⁴ In November 2017, a Cambodian court charged two journalists who had filed reports for RFA with espionage for "providing information that is destructive to national defense to a foreign state."²⁵

Silencing the Opposition

Since late 2015, more than 25 opposition members and government critics have been arrested. In June 2016, government critic Kem Ley was killed. Although the perpetrator was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison, many Cambodian political activists doubt the killer's stated motives—he claimed that he shot Kem over an unpaid debt—and speculate that he helped carry out a political assassination.²⁶ Since 2008, CNRP leader Sam Rainsy has faced several defamation charges regarded by many observers as politically motivated, including four since 2016, and has spent most of his time in exile. Sam resigned as president of the CNRP in February 2017. In December 2017, he was charged with treason for posting a video on social media urging security personnel not to "obey orders from any dictators if they order you to shoot and kill innocent people."²⁷

CNRP leader Kem Sokha, who became party president in 2017, also has faced charges that many observers believe were politically motivated. In September 2017, he was arrested for treason for allegedly conspiring with the U.S. government to foment a "color revolution."²⁸ The charge was based upon a speech that Kem gave in 2013 in which he discussed democratic change in Cambodia, and for his involvement with the Cambodian Center for Human Rights, which has received some U.S. funding.²⁹

Suspension of Two-Party Politics

In November 2017, the Supreme Court of Cambodia made a ruling based upon recent amendments to the Law on Political Parties, thereby dissolving the CNRP for "conspiring with the United States to overthrow the government."³⁰ The law allowed 55 opposition seats to be filled instead by third parties, with many of them going to FUNCINPEC, the royalist party that dominated opposition politics until the late 2000s. In addition, 118 CNRP members were banned from participating in politics for five years. The National Assembly also amended laws to remove CNRP commune councilors and village chiefs and replace them mostly with CPP members.³¹

Analysts say that these actions assure that the CPP will run virtually unopposed in the July 2018 general election. Some observers fear that Hun Sen's nullification of opposition seats could lead to large-scale political unrest, although some analysts believe that many Cambodians would hope to avoid political upheaval. According to one expert, the lack of a "strong, neutral force" in the nation's politics poses an obstacle to political compromise and democratic development in the Kingdom.³²

U.S.-Cambodia Cooperation

Principal areas of bilateral cooperation include U.S. foreign assistance programs, U.S. missing-in-action (MIA) recovery efforts, and demining activities. The United States also has provided funding for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), also known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. The ECCC was established through a 2003 agreement between the government of Cambodia and the United Nations to try former Khmer Rouge leaders responsible for grave violations of national and international law, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. (See "Khmer Rouge Tribunal" below.)

The strengthening of bilateral relations since the mid-2000s has included greater military engagement, including U.S. naval port visits, U.S. military assistance and training, and joint exercises. Angkor Sentinel, launched in 2010, is an annual bilateral exercise held in Cambodia that has focused on international peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and military-to-military cooperation. The Cambodian government cancelled the 2017 exercises, stating that the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) were needed for local elections and an anti-illegal-drug campaign. Some observers interpreted the unilateral action as a sign of Hun Sen's further distancing the Kingdom from the United States.³³ The Cambodian government also postponed indefinitely a U.S. humanitarian mission in the Kingdom, the U.S. Navy Mobile Construction Battalion (also known as Seabees), without an explanation. Seabees have worked with RCAF since 2008 and performed more than $5 million in community service projects throughout the country.³⁴ A U.S. Embassy spokesperson stated that other military exchanges and training programs would not be affected.³⁵

U.S. and Other Foreign Assistance

Cambodia has been heavily dependent upon foreign assistance since 1993. Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Cambodia totaled $797 million in 2016, not including assistance from China.³⁶ The Kingdom's reliance upon foreign assistance, while still significant, has declined during the past decade-and-a-half. ODA fell from 120% of central government expenditures in 2002 to less than a third in 2015, according to World Bank figures.³⁷ The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors are Japan, South Korea, the United States, Australia, and France (2010-2016).³⁸ Some analysts contend that ODA for Cambodia, part of a "multibillion dollar international effort to transplant democracy in Cambodia since the early 1990s," long has kept Hun Sen's authoritarian tendencies in check, but has lost its effectiveness.³⁹ According to one estimate, DAC nations provided $12 billion in loans and grants to Cambodia between 1992 and 2012 for development and democracy building efforts, although some experts argue that the money was misspent or that it reduced government accountability.⁴⁰

Foreign assistance and investment from China are difficult to quantify. Many forms of Chinese foreign assistance, due to the commercial benefits accruing to China and large loan component, do not meet the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's criteria for ODA.⁴¹ Many Chinese foreign economic projects either are not strictly commercial or do not ultimately result in Chinese ownership, and thus they are not counted as foreign direct investment. For example, many Chinese-built economic projects are financed through Chinese state-backed loans, and ownership is based upon a "build-operate-transfer" (BOT) arrangement. Through BOT, the host country pays a PRC entity to build and operate a project for a period of years, and then ownership of the facility eventually is transferred to the host country. By some measures, however, China has become the leading provider of foreign aid and investment to Cambodia. (See "Cambodia and China," below.)

Ongoing U.S. foreign assistance to Cambodia, one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign assistance per capita in the East Asia-Pacific region, includes efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and civil society; reduce child and maternal mortality; combat HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases; and remove unexploded ordnance. International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs provide English language instruction and aim to expose the next generation of Cambodia's military leaders to "American ways and values."⁴² The United States provided an estimated $88.3 million in foreign assistance to the Kingdom in FY2017. The Trump Administration's FY2018 and FY2019 foreign operations budget requests would reduce annual assistance to Cambodia by nearly 75%.⁴³

Congress periodically has imposed human rights conditions upon some U.S. assistance to Cambodia. From 1998 to 2007, Congress prohibited direct or government-to-government assistance to Cambodia in order to pressure Prime Minister Hun Sen into fully restoring democracy, but allowed U.S. assistance to NGOs and some humanitarian programs to continue. Congress lifted the ban in 2007 due in part to improving democratic processes, although most U.S. assistance efforts in Cambodia have continued to be channeled largely through NGOs. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2014 (P.L. 113-76) imposed political conditions upon some foreign assistance to Cambodia.⁴⁴ The Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2017 (P.L. 115-31) withheld 25% of international security assistance to Cambodia until certain conditions related to democratic governance were met.⁴⁵

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) prohibits U.S. assistance to the government of Cambodia unless the Secretary of State certifies that the government is taking effective steps to "strengthen regional security and stability, particularly regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the enforcement of international sanctions with respect to North Korea," and to "respect the rights and responsibilities enshrined in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia as enacted in 1993." Other provisions of the bill include directing the Department of State to continue the policy of restricting the entry of "individuals involved in the undermining of democracy in Cambodia" and mandating that funds be made available for democracy efforts and Khmer language programs to "counter the influence of the People's Republic of China in Cambodia."⁴⁶

The Cambodia Accountability and Return on Investment Act of 2018 (S. 2412), introduced in February 2018, includes similar restrictions on U.S. assistance to the government of Cambodia and the issuance of visas. In addition, S. 2412 would prohibit transactions in property in the United States of Cambodian officials and family members involved in undermining democracy in Cambodia. The bill would direct U.S. officials in international financial institutions to oppose loans and other assistance to the government of Cambodia, and prohibit negotiations between the United States and Cambodia on debt relief until free and fair parliamentary elections have taken place. The bill would authorize funds for online programming that inform the people of Cambodia of China's historic role in supporting the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Khmer Rouge regime, and of the role of the international community, including the United States, in supporting the implementation of the U.N.-brokered peace settlement in 1991 and in providing foreign assistance.

Khmer Rouge Tribunal

The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, an international tribunal established through an agreement between the government of Cambodia and the United Nations, began proceedings in 2006 to try Khmer Rouge leaders and officials responsible for grave violations of national and international law.⁴⁷ The ECCC has been financed through contributions by the Cambodian government and with donations by foreign countries, particularly Japan, both directly to the ECCC and to a U.N.-administered international trust fund. The tribunal reportedly has been hampered by interference from the Cambodian government and by the alleged corruption of Cambodian court officials, resignations by some international judges, and unexpected costs and delays.⁴⁸

The U.S. government withheld assistance to the ECCC from 2006 to 2008 due to doubts about the court's independence. In 2008, the United States began providing annual contributions to the international trust fund, and it appropriated $2 million and $1.5 million in FY2016 and FY2017, respectively, for the fund. In addition, the U.S. government has contributed to the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), an archive, library, and public service center focused upon Khmer Rouge atrocities, providing $9.8 million to DC-Cam since 2005.⁴⁹ Since 2010, some U.S. foreign operations appropriations measures have placed conditions upon assistance to the tribunal in order to discourage corruption and political interference within the court and to ensure that the Cambodian government also was contributing to its costs.⁵⁰ The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) states that no assistance may be made available for the ECCC.⁵¹

ECCC prosecutors have Crackdown on Government Critics and Civil Society

Beginning in 2015 with new government restrictions on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and during the lead up to the 2018 national elections, the Cambodian government placed increasing restrictions on political and social activism, civil society, free speech, and foreign-funded democracy programs.¹⁹ During 2015-2017, more than 25 opposition members and government critics were arrested, and many fled the country.²⁰ In June 2016, government critic Kem Ley was killed under suspicious circumstances.²¹ In 2017, the Cambodian Foreign Ministry expelled the Washington, DC-based National Democratic Institute (NDI), which was engaged in democracy programs in Cambodia, on the grounds that NDI was not registered with the government. Government media outlets also alleged that NDI, which received financial support from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), was involved in a conspiracy involving the CNRP and U.S.-funded NGOs to overthrow the government.²²

In 2017, the government closed more than one dozen Cambodian radio stations that sold airtime to Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA). RFA, facing political and economic pressure from the government, closed its Phnom Penh office.²³ Authorities also ordered the Cambodia Daily, known as an opposition newspaper, to shut down in September 2017, ostensibly for failing to pay taxes. In 2018, the government made its first arrest under a lèse-majesté law, passed by the National Assembly in February 2018, which makes insulting the monarch a crime.²⁴

U.S. Responses

Congress periodically has imposed conditions upon some U.S. assistance to Cambodia in order to promote democracy and human rights in the Kingdom. From 1998 to 2007, Congress prohibited government-to-government assistance to Cambodia in order to pressure Hun Sen into fully instituting democracy, but allowed U.S. assistance to NGOs and some humanitarian programs to continue. Congress lifted the ban in 2007 due in part to improving democratic processes, although most U.S. assistance efforts in Cambodia continue to be channeled through NGOs. The FY2014 and FY2017 Consolidated Appropriations Acts placed conditions related to democratic governance upon some assistance to Cambodia.²⁵

The Administration and the 115^th Congress took numerous steps in response to Hun Sen's recent suppression of the opposition, which include the following:²⁶

• In November 2017, the Trump Administration withdrew $1.8 million in assistance to the National Election Committee (NEC).²⁷
• On December 12, 2017, the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing on U.S. policy options to promote democracy and human rights in Cambodia.
• The Senate passed S.Res. 279 on November 16, 2017, urging the Department of the Treasury to consider blocking the assets of senior Cambodian government officials implicated in the suppression of democracy and human rights abuses.²⁸
• In December 2017, the Trump Administration announced that the U.S. government would "restrict entry into the United States of those individuals involved in undermining democracy in Cambodia."²⁹ In August 2018, in response to the National Assembly election, the Administration announced that it would "expand" the restrictions.³⁰
• Pursuant to Executive Order 13818, which implemented the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Section 1261 of P.L. 114-328), in June 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Cambodian General Hing Bun Hieng, commander of Hun Sen's bodyguard unit, "for being the leader of an entity involved in serious human rights abuses."³¹ Sanctioned individuals are denied entry into the United States, and any assets that they hold in the United States are blocked.
• The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141), enacted on March 23, 2018, imposes conditions upon U.S. assistance to the Government of Cambodia related to democracy and regional security. The act mandates funds for democracy programs and "programs in the Khmer language to counter the influence of the People's Republic of China in Cambodia."³²

Other policy options include coordinating sanctions with major foreign aid donors and key signatories to the Paris Agreement, and imposing trade sanctions.³³ Some policy experts maintain that continued U.S. engagement is the most effective course for promoting democratization from within and countering PRC influence. Others contend that many Cambodians view the United States favorably, and that Washington should continue to promote U.S. interaction with democratic forces in the Kingdom.³⁴ In September 2018, Prime Minister Hun Sen, in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly, responded, "We are heartedly regretful to highlight the fact that human rights nowadays have become 'a mission to impose civilization' for some powerful nations or, perhaps, as their operating standards as the pretext for interference under the name of political right protection."³⁵

U.S.-Cambodia Cooperation

U.S.-Cambodian relations expanded after 2007, when political and human rights conditions in the Kingdom improved and the U.S. government lifted some restrictions on U.S. assistance. Principal areas of U.S. engagement have included U.S. foreign assistance programs, demining activities, limited military assistance and cooperation, U.S. missing-in-action (MIA) recovery efforts, and U.S. naval port visits. Angkor Sentinel, an annual bilateral military exercise launched in 2010 and held in Cambodia and which focuses on international peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and military-to-military cooperation, was suspended in 2017. The Cambodian government cancelled the exercise, stating that the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) were needed for other purposes. Some observers interpreted the unilateral action as a sign of Hun Sen's further distancing the Kingdom from the United States.³⁶ The Cambodian government also postponed indefinitely a U.S. humanitarian mission in the Kingdom, the U.S. Navy Mobile Construction Battalion (also known as Seabees), without an explanation. The Seabees had worked with RCAF since 2008 and performed more than $5 million in community service projects throughout the country.³⁷

U.S. and Other Foreign Assistance

Post-war Cambodia has been heavily dependent upon foreign assistance from major foreign aid donors, particularly Japan, South Korea, the United States, Australia, and France.³⁸ Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Cambodia totaled $797 million in 2016, not including assistance from China.³⁹ The Kingdom's reliance upon foreign assistance, while still significant, has declined during the past decade-and-a-half. ODA fell from 120% of central government expenditures in 2002 to less than a third in 2015, according to World Bank figures.⁴⁰

Some analysts contend that ODA for Cambodia, part of a "multibillion dollar international effort to transplant democracy in Cambodia since the early 1990s," long has kept Hun Sen's authoritarian tendencies in check, but has lost its effectiveness in doing so.⁴¹ The United States provided roughly $235 million in assistance related to good governance, democracy, and civil society between 1993 and 2018.⁴² In recent years, by some measures, assistance from China, which comes without conditions for good governance and human rights, has roughly matched the total assistance from major providers of ODA.⁴³

The United States provided an estimated $79.3 million in foreign assistance to the Kingdom in FY2018, a decrease of 10% compared to FY2017. U.S. foreign assistance to Cambodia includes efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and civil society; reduce child and maternal mortality; and combat HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs provide English language instruction and aim to expose the next generation of Cambodia's military leaders to "American ways and values."⁴⁴ U.S. demining assistance supports the removal of landmines and other unexploded ordnance (UXO). The Trump Administration's FY2019 foreign operations budget request would reduce annual assistance to Cambodia by nearly 75% compared to FY2017.

Khmer Rouge Tribunal

The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), an international tribunal established through an agreement between the government of Cambodia and the United Nations, began proceedings in 2006 to try Khmer Rouge leaders and officials responsible for grave violations of national and international law.⁴⁵ The ECCC, which has convicted three Khmer Rouge senior figures at a reported cost of $300 million, has been financed through contributions by the Cambodian government and with donations by foreign countries, particularly Japan, both directly to the ECCC and to a U.N.-administered international trust fund.⁴⁶

The U.S. government withheld assistance to the ECCC from 2006 to 2008 due to doubts about the court's independence due to alleged Cambodian government interference. In 2008, the United States began providing annual contributions to the international trust fund.⁴⁷ In addition, the U.S. government has contributed to the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), an archive, library, and public service center focused upon Khmer Rouge atrocities, providing $9.8 million to DC-Cam since 2005.⁴⁸ Since 2010, some U.S. foreign operations appropriations measures have placed conditions upon assistance to the tribunal in order to discourage corruption and political interference within the court and to ensure that the Cambodian government also was contributing to its costs.⁴⁹ The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) states that no assistance may be made available for the ECCC.⁵⁰

ECCC prosecutors charged five former Khmer Rouge leaders with crimes against humanity and war crimes. In 2012, "chief executioner" Kaing Guek Eav, who ran the infamous Toul Sleng prison in Phnom Penh, was sentenced to life in prison. Former Foreign Minister Ieng Sary died in March 2013, before the completion of his trial, while his wife, former Minister of Social Affairs Ieng Thirith, was declared mentally unfit for trial.

charged five former Khmer Rouge leaders with crimes against humanity and war crimes. In 2012, "chief executioner" Kaing Guek Eav, who ran the infamous Toul Sleng prison in Phnom Penh, was sentenced to life in prison. Former Foreign Minister Ieng Sary died in March 2013, before the completion of his trial, while his wife, former Minister of Social Affairs Ieng Thirith, was declared mentally unfit for trial. In August 2014, the court sentenced former leaders Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan each to life in prison for some crimes against humanity, although both continue to face additional charges.

and in a separate trial in November 2018, each was convicted of additional crimes, including genocide.⁵¹ Although Cambodian and international human rights groups have advocated prosecuting midrankingmid-ranking Khmer Rouge officials, while Hun Sen has opposed further indictments, arguing that they would undermine national stability.⁵² Three lower-ranking military and civilian figures face charges of genocide, but some observers say their prosecutions appear unlikely, given opposition from Hun Sen and related court costs.⁵³ Some analysts contend that Hun Sen has been reluctant to widen the scope of the trials due to his former connections with Khmer Rouge military leaders.⁵⁴

At the end of the trials of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan in November 2018, Deputy Prime Minister Sar Kheng announced that the tribunal's work was finished.⁵³

Cambodian Debt The Cambodian government has requested that the U.S. government forgive the debt that the pro-U.S. Cambodian government of General Lon Nol incurred during the early 1970s. As U.S. bombing and civil war wracked the country, the U.S. Department of Agriculture loaned the Lon Nol government $274 million on concessionary terms for American rice, wheat, oil, cotton, and other commodities. The U.S. and Cambodian governments have not come to an agreement on the debt, which has grown to over $500 million, including interest and penalties. The last bilateral discussion of the debt reportedly occurred in 2011. The Cambodian government argues that the debt is revocable because the Lon Nol government, brought to power through a coup d'état, was illegitimate. It also claims that some of the U.S. agricultural commodities never reached Cambodia and that Lon Nol used some of the loans for military purposes.54 U.S. officials have stated that various forms of debt relief are unwarranted due to Cambodia's relatively low debt-to-GDP ratio and its fiscal ability to repay the debt.55

Unexploded Ordnance

Cambodia is among the world countries most heavily contaminated by unexploded ordnance (UXO), including cluster munitions, landmines, and other undetonated weapons left from U.S. bombing during the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, and civil wars during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1969, the United States launched a four-year carpet-bombing campaign, dropping 2.7 million tons of ordnance, mostly cluster munitions, on Cambodia, more than the amount that fell on Germany and Japan combined during World War II. Up to 25% of the cluster bombs failed to explode, according to some estimates.⁵⁵56

There have been over 64,000 UXO casualties in Cambodia since 1979, including over 19,000 deaths. An estimated 1,400 square kilometers of Cambodia, or about 0.8% of the country's land area, remains contaminated with UXO.⁵⁶ Unexploded ordnance has had economic costs as well, by preventing landThe economic costs of UXO include land prevented from being used for agricultural purposes, forestry, and cattle, and by disruptingdisruptions to irrigation and drinking water supplies.

An estimated 761 square miles of the country remain contaminated with UXO.⁵⁷

With the help of international assistance, Cambodia has reduced the UXO casualty rate from roughly 250 people per year a decade ago to about 100 annually in recent years, according to the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.⁵⁷58 About 50% of contaminated land reportedly has been cleared, although many of the remaining areas are the most densely affected.⁵⁸59 The Cambodian Mine Action Authority is finalizing plans to clear all contaminated land by 2025. Despite progress, the migration of many poor Cambodians to areas that have high concentrations of UXO reportedly has contributed to a recent spike in casualties.⁵⁹60

Between 1993 and 2016, the U.S. government contributed over $124 million for UXO removal and disposal, related educational efforts, and survivor assistance programs in Cambodia.⁶⁰ USAID's Leahy War Victims Fund has supported programs to help provide medical and rehabilitation services and prosthetics to Cambodian victims of UXO.⁶¹ The United States providedCongress appropriated $5.5 million and $4.5 million in FY2016 and FY2017, respectively, for Department of State demining efforts in the Kingdom.⁶² U.S. Deportations of Cambodians $5.5 million and $4.5 million in FY2016 and FY2017, respectively, for clearance efforts.⁶² The Trump Administration reportedly decided to discontinue assistance to the government-affiliated Cambodian Mine Action Center in FY2018, but announced that it would continue supporting clearance efforts through a different organization.⁶³

Cambodian Debt

In 2017, the Cambodian government again pressed the United States to forgive debt that the pro-U.S. government of General Lon Nol had incurred during the early 1970s. As U.S. bombing and civil war wracked the country, the U.S. Department of Agriculture loaned the Lon Nol government $274 million on concessionary terms for American rice, wheat, oil, cotton, and other commodities. The U.S. and Cambodian governments have not come to an agreement on the debt, which has grown to $506 million, including interest and penalties. The last bilateral discussion of the debt reportedly occurred in 2011.⁶⁴

The Cambodian government argues that the debt is revocable because the Lon Nol government, brought to power through a coup d'état, was illegitimate. It also claims that some of the U.S. agricultural commodities never reached Cambodia and that Lon Nol used some of the loans for military purposes. The U.S. government reportedly has cancelled some portions for which there is a lack of documentation and waived interest on unpaid interest. It has offered to reduce the loan or reschedule payments, but only if Cambodia signs a bilateral debt agreement, which the Hun Sen government has refused to do.⁶⁵ U.S. officials have stated that various forms of debt relief are unwarranted due to Cambodia's relatively low debt-to-GDP ratio and its fiscal ability to repay the debt.⁶⁶

Economic Conditions

In 2018, nearly 90 U.S. residents of Cambodian descent were deported to Cambodia, compared to 29 in 2017 and 74 in 2016.⁶⁴

In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) deemed that the Cambodian government was uncooperative or hindering U.S. deportation efforts, and in violation of its international obligations, and placed Cambodia on a list of "recalcitrant countries." The U.S. government imposed limited visa restrictions upon Cambodian Foreign Ministry employees and their families pursuant to Section 243(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.⁶⁵

Economic Conditions⁶⁶

In the past decade-and-a-half, Cambodia, one of the poorest countries in Asia, has performed well on some socioeconomic indicators.⁶⁷ The Kingdom's economy, which largely was destroyed by the Khmer Rouge and subsequent conflicts, has achieved an average annual growth rate of 7.57% since 19941995 and 7.10% since 2014, driven largely by foreign investment and the development of the agricultural, construction, garment, real estate, and tourism sectors.⁶⁷68 China, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian countries are the main sources of foreign direct investment (FDI).⁶⁸ Domestic consumption also is fueling economic growth.⁶⁹ Continuing obstacles to sustainable development include widespread corruption, income inequality, limited human resources, and a lack of job opportunities for Cambodia's young population.⁷⁰ Rising wages and the Kingdom's advancement to "lower middle-income country" may make it less competitive as a low-wage manufacturing center and less eligible for foreign assistance as well as participation in preferential trade programs, such as the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and similar EU trade programs.⁷¹

investment in Cambodia.⁶⁹

Cambodia's garment industry, largely run by companies from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, forms a growing pillar of the nation's economy, employing roughly 800,000 workers and constituting about 40% of the nation's GDP.⁷⁰ Since 2000, Cambodia has risen from being the 39^th largest exporter of textiles and apparel to the 15^th largest in 2016, according to World Bank trade data.⁷¹ Garment and footwear products constitute about 80% of Cambodian merchandise exports, with 43% reportedly going to the EU and 29% to the United States.⁷²

Economic development has brought social and environmental costs. Hundreds of thousands of Cambodians reportedly have been displaced as government, business, and foreign entities, often in collusion, have confiscated their land and homes, sometimes forcibly or without proper compensation, to make way for agricultural, mining, logging, tourism, and urban development projects. Although forced relocations have continued, the number of cases reportedly has declined in recent years.⁷²73 Cambodia has one of the highest deforestation rates in the world. Illegal and illegal logging continues, due to strong demand for wood from China and Vietnam, corruption, and suppression of environmental activists.⁷³

Cambodia's poverty rate reportedly fell from 47% in 2007 to 13.5% in 2014, although many families remain "near-poor" and vulnerable to economic downturns.⁷⁴ According to the World Bank, life expectancy has risen over 15 years since 1995.⁷⁵ Maternal mortality decreased from 472 per 100,000 live births in 2005 to 170 in 2014, and under-five mortality fell from 83 per 1,000 live births in 2005 to 35 in 2014.⁷⁶ Less than one-third of the population, however, has access to piped water supplies, and nearly one-third of children reportedly are stunted.⁷⁷

The United States is the largest single overseas market for Cambodian merchandise exports. In 2017, U.S.-Cambodian74

Labor relations have shown some signs of strain in recent years, particularly as the garment industry has developed. Garment workers participated in large-scale demonstrations for higher wages in 2013-2014, which coincided with anti-government demonstrations led by the CNRP.⁷⁵ Cambodia's National Assembly adopted a new Law on Trade Unions in 2016, which some analysts say imposes greater restrictions on labor rights.⁷⁶ In August 2017, the Cambodian government announced that it would enact a national minimum wage law, which some analysts surmise was done to boost labor support for the CPP.⁷⁷

U.S. Trade In 2017, U.S.-Cambodia bilateral trade was worth nearly $3.46 billion, including $3.06 billion in Cambodian goods exported to the United States, a nearly 9% increase in exports compared to 2016.⁷⁸ Cambodia's other major export markets include the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. Garment and footwear products make up about 80% of Cambodian merchandise exports, with 43% reportedly going to the EU and 29% to the United States.⁷⁹ In recent years, foreign investment in the garment sector, which employs an estimated 700,000 Cambodian workers, largely has been fueled by companies from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.⁸⁰ In 2012, China surpassed the United States as Cambodia's largest trading partner, although bilateral trade between Cambodia and China consists primarily of Chinese exports to Cambodia.⁸¹

Cambodia acceded to the World Trade Organization in 2004, and .⁷⁸ Although China surpassed the United States as Cambodia's largest trading partner in 2012, the United States remains the largest single overseas market for Cambodian merchandise exports.⁷⁹ According to the U.S. International Trade Commission, over half of U.S. imports from Cambodia in 2017 were knitted or crocheted clothing.⁸⁰

Some Cambodian products, including handbags and travel goods, receive preferential or duty-free tariff treatment under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program.⁸¹ Some policymakers have considered suspending GSP treatment upon certain Cambodian exports to the United States worth about $400 million annually in order to pressure Hun Sen into reversing his suppression of democracy. Other experts argue that restrictions on Cambodian exports may hurt Cambodian workers and encourage Cambodia to seek even closer relations with China, while it is uncertain whether such economic sanctions would weaken Hun Sen politically.⁸²

Cambodia acceded to the World Trade Organization in 2004, and the Kingdom has made commitments to reduce tariffs and fulfill other obligations by 2018 as a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area. Cambodia also is a party to the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a trade agreementpact that includes the 10 ASEAN member states and 6 other Indo-Pacific countries, including China. Negotiations to reach a final agreement are expected to continue in 2019.⁸³ Cambodia and China The PRC that includes the 10 ASEAN member states and 6 other Indo-Pacific countries, and which is expected to be finalized in 2018.⁸² The United States and Cambodia signed a bilateral trade agreement in 1996, providing for reciprocal "normal trade relations" tariff treatment, and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in 2006.

Labor relations in Cambodia have shown some signs of strain in recent years, particularly as the garment industry has developed. A garment factory monitoring system established through an agreement between the United States and Cambodia in 1999 ("Better Factories Cambodia"), managed by the International Labor Organization and funded by international donors, including the U.S. Department of Labor, has helped to protect some labor rights.⁸³ Cambodia's National Assembly adopted a new Law on Trade Unions in 2016, which some analysts say imposes greater restrictions on worker rights.⁸⁴ In August 2017, the Cambodian government announced that it would adopt a national minimum wage law. Some analysts surmise that this policy was enacted to boost labor support for the CPP in the run-up to 2018 national elections.⁸⁵

Cambodia and China

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has become Cambodia's largest economic benefactor at a time when major ODA donors have become increasingly critical of Hun Sen's authoritarian policies. China's economic support has lessened the influence of foreign aidassistance conditions imposed by DAC countrieswestern aid donors and given Hun Sen more political room to maneuver, both domestically and internationally, according to some analysts.⁸⁶ Although a commentary in China's Global Times warned of the risks to Chinese investments of possible domestic instability and international sanctions resulting from Hun Sen's political crackdown, the PRC government later issued a statement seemingly in full support of the Cambodian leader.⁸⁷ In return, some analysts say, Cambodia has backed Beijing's positions on various regional issues, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea.⁸⁸ Cambodia, which one expert stated "garner[s] a disproportionate amount of China's attention," is said to wield an "effective veto" in ASEAN on positions aimed at checking China's assertiveness in the region, and to be China's "most reliable partner in Southeast Asia."⁸⁹

In recent years, China has by some measures matched total aid flows from DAC countries to Cambodia. 84 In return, Cambodia has appeared increasingly willing to accommodate or support Beijing's positions on various regional issues, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Cambodia is said to be the Southeast Asian country upon which China exerts the greatest influence, and to be China's "most reliable partner in Southeast Asia."⁸⁵ According to one assessment, China has provided Cambodia about $15 billion in assistance and concessionary loans over the past two decades, and around 42% of the kingdom's external debt is owed to China.⁸⁶.⁹⁰ PRC foreign assistance to Cambodia, which has included development financing and grants, Chinese-built infrastructure, government buildings, and sports facilities, as well as support for public health and education, has become a dominant influence on the Kingdom's development.⁸⁷ A PRC entity is constructing one of Cambodia's largest development projects, a $3.8 billion deep-water port on the Gulf of Thailand.⁹¹ In January 2018, PRC Premier Li Keqiang visited Phnom Penh and oversaw the signing of 19 economic and foreign aid agreements worth several billion dollars.⁹²

88

By some accounts, China is the largest foreign investor in Cambodia, with cumulative investment of between $14 billion and $16 billion.⁹³ 89 Major sectors for Chinese investment include agriculture, garments, hydropower, infrastructure, mining, and tourism. According to one report, China accounted for nearly 30% of investment capital in Cambodia in 2016, while that from the United States constituted less than 4%.⁹⁴ Major sectors for Chinese investment include agriculture, garments, hydropower, infrastructure, mining, and tourism.

Some observers90 Cambodians have expressed mixed views about China's economic influence. Some say that Chinese investments and infrastructure have brought tangible economic benefits and spurred economic development.⁹¹ Cambodian social and political activists have expressed concerns about Chinese economic projects, including their quality, effects on the environment, and lack of transparency. Cambodians have expressed mixed assessments about China's economic influence. Some have complained about being forciblyFurthermore, many Cambodians have been evicted from their homes and communities to make way for Chinese-backed economic projects, about the lack of consultation during the planning stages, and about the influx of Chinese businesses and workers. Other Cambodians have said that Chinese-built roads and other infrastructure have brought development and tangible benefits.⁹⁵

or their communities have been adversely affected by an influx of Chinese businesses, workers, and tourists.⁹²

Domestic and regional demand for energy and foreign investment largely from China have fueleddriven hydropower projects in Cambodia and neighboring countries. While some Cambodians argue that hydropower has spurred development and contributed to energy security, others have complainedChinese firms reportedly have invested roughly $2 billion in the construction of seven dams in the Kingdom.⁹³ Many experts have warned about environmental degradation and ecological damage, loss of fish stocks, displacement of communities, and adverse effects on livelihoods due to dam construction.⁹⁶ Chinese firms reportedly have invested more than $1.6 billion to build six dams in the Kingdom. A seventh hydropower project, the Lower Sesan Dam 2, a joint venture that involves PRC, Cambodian, and Vietnamese companies, aims to become fully operational in 2018.⁹⁷ Ownership of most Chinese-backed dams is based upon a BOT arrangement.⁹⁸

Beijing also unregulated hydropower projects on the Mekong River.⁹⁴ A proposed, Chinese-backed, 2,600 megawatt hydropower project, the Sambor Dam, would dwarf other dams in Cambodia. According to a government-commissioned report that reportedly was leaked in 2018, the Sambor mega dam, if built, would have devastating impacts on food security in the region, particularly in Cambodia and Vietnam. Experts say that it would block fish migrations between southern Laos and Cambodia's Tonle Sap Lake, destroy fish habitats, and prevent sediment from flowing downstream and fertilizing agricultural areas in the Mekong Delta.⁹⁵ Beijing has become a principal provider of military assistance to Cambodia, extending loans and military equipment, including small arms, tanks, trucks, helicopters, and aircraft, to the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. China reportedly also has provided military education and training and sponsored exchanges of senior military leaders. Some analysts see PRC-Cambodian military cooperation as a response to growing security ties between the United States and Vietnam.⁹⁹96 Since 2016, China and Cambodia twice have carried out Golden Dragon, a joint military exercise involving roughlyover 400 People's Liberation Army (PLA) and RCAF soldiers involved in counterterrorismcombat, counterterrorism, UXO removal, humanitarian, and disaster response exercises.¹⁰⁰97 The two countries reportedly plan a larger Golden Dragon event in 2019.⁹⁸

Author Contact Information

Footnotes

Ben Sokhean, "NEC Releases Official June 4 Election Results," Cambodia Daily, June 26, 2017; "Cambodia: Commune Elections Not Free or Fair," Human Rights Watch, June 12, 2017.

U.S. Embassy, Phnom Penh, "Opening Statement by Ambassador William A. Heidt at a Press Availability," September 12, 2017.

David Hutt, "Will Cambodia's Repressed Opposition Rise Up?" Asia Times, January 21, 2018.

22.

Ananth Baliga, Mech Dara and Niem Chheng, "RFA Shuts Down Cambodia Operations amid Media Crackdown," Phnom Penh Post, September 12, 2017.

37. 45. 48. 52. 56. 69. 83. Amanda Kaufmann, "Dams Spell Catastrophe for Cambodia, But an Alternative Exists," Southeast Asia Globe, September 5, 2018; Tom Fawthrop, "Leaked Report Warns Cambodia's Biggest Dam Could 'Literally Kill' Mekong River," The Guardian, May 16, 2018; "Study Says China-Backed Dam Would Destroy Mekong," Associated Press, May 17, 2018; .

1.	Sebastian Strangio, "Cambodia Becomes the World's Newest One-Party State," Foreign Policy, November 17, 2017; David Hutt, "How China Came to Dominate Cambodia," The Diplomat, September 1, 2016John Pomfret, "Clinton Urges Cambodia to Strike a Balance with China," Washington Post, November 1, 2010.
2.	The White House, "Statement from Press Secretary on Cambodia's Flawed Parliamentary Elections," July 29, 2018.
3.	Cambodian Information Center, http://www.cambodia.org/facts/?page=1991+Paris+Peace+Agreements#agreement.
4.	Sebastian Strangio, "In Cambodia, Everything Is Different but Nothing Has Changed," Asian Review, October 31, 2016.
5.	Sebastian Strangio, "The House That Hun Sen Built," Foreign Policy, January 13, 2015.
6.	Lee Morgenbesser, "Cambodia's Leader Just Cracked Down on the Opposition, and the Consequences Will Be Dramatic," Washington Post, February 24, 2017; Lee Morgenbesser, Beyond the Facade: Elections in Southeast Asia (Albany: State University of New York Press), 2016; Steven Levitsky and Lucas Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2010.
7.
2.	Prak Chan Thul, "U.S. Turns to Music in Bid to Woo Cambodians," Reuters, March 7, 2018; House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, "Cambodia's Descent: Policies to Support Democracy and Human Rights in Cambodia," December 12, 2017; Nicole Smolinski, "The Upcoming Cambodian Election and U.S.-Cambodian Ties under the Trump Administration: An Interview with John D. Ciorciari," National Bureau of Asian Research, June 1, 2017; John Sifton, Human Rights Watch, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Cambodia's Looming Political and Social Crisis," July 9, 2013.
3.	Department of State, Press Statement, Washington, D.C., December 6, 2017. Andrew Nachemson and Ben Sokhean, "A 'One-Party Dictatorship': World Reacts to CNRP Decision as PM Says China Will Fill Gaps Left by Sanctions," Phnom Penh Post, November 20, 2017.
4.	Sopheng Cheang, "EU Suspends Aid to Cambodian Election Commission," Washington Post, December 12, 2017; Ray Downs, "E.U. Parliament to Freeze Cambodian Officials' Assets for Human Rights Abuses," UPI, December 15, 2017.
5.	House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, "Cambodia's Descent: Policies to Support Democracy and Human Rights in Cambodia," op. cit.
6.	"The End of Cambodia's Ersatz Democracy," East Asia Forum, February 5, 2018; January 17, 2018; Kongkea Chhoeun, "Should Western Countries Impose Sanctions on Cambodia?" Asia Times, September 14, 2017.
7.	Sebastian Strangio, "In Cambodia, Everything Is Different but Nothing Has Changed," Asian Review, October 31, 2016.
8.	Vannarith Chheang, "After Thirty Years of Hun Sen, Where Is Cambodia Now?" East Asia Forum, March 18, 2015.
9.	Sebastian Strangio, "The House That Hun Sen Built," Foreign Policy, January 13, 2015.
10.	See Steven Levitsky and Lucas Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; Lee Morgenbesser, Beyond the Facade: Elections in Southeast Asia. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016; Lee Morgenbesser, "Cambodia's Leader Just Cracked Down on the Opposition, and the Consequences Will Be Dramatic," Washington Post, February 24, 2017Julia Wallace, "As Demographics in Cambodia Shift, Youth Seek Political Change," New York Times, February 17, 2016.
1110.	Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, December 12, 2017; United Nations Population Fund, "Cambodia Youth Data Sheet 2015," http://cambodia.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Flyer_Cambodia_Youth_Factsheet_final_draft_%28approved%29.pdf.
1211.	Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013: Cambodia, February 27, 2014; Thomas Fuller, "Cambodian Opposition Rejects Election Results," New York Times, July 29, 2013Joshua Berlinger, "Cambodia Court Orders Main Opposition Party to Dissolve," CNN, November 17, 2017; Sebastian Strangio, "Cambodia's Crumbling Democracy," Foreign Affairs, September 14, 2017.	12.
13.	Julia Wallace, "As Demographics in Cambodia Shift, Youth Seek Political Change," New York Times, February 17, 2016In December 2018, the national legislature passed a measure allowing opposition members to apply to have their bans lifted, subject to conditions. Andrew Nachemson, "Trick or Real? CNRP Split over Cambodia Move to Ease Politics Ban," Al Jazeera, December 13, 2018.
14.	Luke Hunt, "New Jailings Expose the Farce of Cambodia's 'Culture of Dialogue'," The Diplomat, July 24, 2017.
15.	Jack Myint and Ben Black, "Cambodian Commune Elections 2017," U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, July 5, 2017May Titthara, "CNRP Commune Seats Doled Out," Khmer Times, December 4, 2017; Ben Sokhean, Mech Dara and Ananth Baliga, "'Death of Democracy': CNRP Dissolved by Supreme Court Ruling," Phnom Penh Post, November 17, 2017.	15.
16.	Ben Sokhean, "NEC Releases Official June 4 Election Results," Cambodia Daily, June 26, 2017.
17.	"Cambodia: Commune Elections Not Free or Fair," Human Rights Watch, June 12, 2017"Statement of the Royal Government on Kem Sokha, who was arrested in flagrante delicto by the judiciary police officers in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code of the Kingdom of Cambodia," September 3, 2017, http://pressocm.gov.kh/en/archives/11871.
17.	Prak Chan Thul, "U.S. Urges Cambodia to Remove Restrictions Against Opposition Leader," U.S. News and World Report, September 11, 2018.
18.	Front Uni National Pour Un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique Et Coopératif.
19.	In July 2015, the Cambodian Parliament passed a broadly worded law on nongovernmental organizations (Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations, or LANGO), which authorizes the Foreign Ministry to halt the activities of any international NGO that fails to register with the government, and empowers government authorities to ban any NGO that engages in activities that "jeopardize peace, stability and public order or harm the national security, national unity, culture, and traditions of the Cambodian national society."
20.	Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017: Cambodia, April 20, 2018.
21.	Julia Wallace and Neou Vannarin, "A Life Sentence in Cambodia, But Kem Ley's Murder Is Far from Solved," New York Times, March 23, 2017.
18.	Department of State, Department Press Briefing, Washington, D.C., August 23, 2017.
19.	"Cambodian Government Shuts Down Pro-Democracy US Charity and Expels Foreign Staff," Agence France Presse, August 23, 2017; Mong Palatino, "Does Cambodia Really Need a New NGO Law?" The Diplomat, July 17, 2015.
20.	Ibid.
21.	"Ananth Baliga and Niem Chheng, "PM, US's War of Words Escalates," Phnom Penh Post, September 12, 2017; Ananth Baliga, "Breaking: NDI to beBe Shuttered, Foreign Staff Expelled," Phnom Penh Post, August 23, 2017.
22.	; National Democratic Institute, "Statement on Cambodian Government's Decision to Shut Down NDI's Office in Cambodia," August 23, 2017; Amnesty International, "Annual Report 2016/2017," February 22, 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/cambodia/report-cambodia/.
23.	Richard Paddock, "The Cambodia Daily to Close," New York Times, September 3.	23.
24.	Ananth Baliga, Mech Dara and Niem Chheng, "RFA Shuts Down Cambodia Operations amid Media Crackdown," Phnom Penh Post, September 12, 2017Cambodian authorities detained a teacher for posting on Facebook that the King and other members of the royal family colluded with the government to outlaw the CNRP. Eli Meixler, "Cambodia Has Made Its First Arrest Under a Repressive New Law," Time, May 14, 2018.
25.	Prak Chan Thul, "Cambodian Court Charges Two Journalists with Espionage," Reuters, November 18, 2017; Niem Chheng and Shaun Turton, "CNRP May Seek Clarity on Radio Station Closures," August 31, 2017.
26.	Julia Wallace and Neou Vannarin, "A Life Sentence in Cambodia, But Kem Ley's Murder Is Far from Solved," New York Times, March 23, 2017.
27.	Mech Dara and Andrew Nachemson, "PM, Military Officials Say Rainsy Will Face 'Treason' Suit over Facebook Post," Phnom Penh Post, December 8, 2017; Prak Chan Thul, "Cambodia's Sam Rainsy to Be Sued Over 'Treasonous' Call to Soldiers: PM," Reuters, December 6, 2017.
28.	"Color revolutions" refer to democratic movements in former Soviet republics and elsewhere in the early 2000s that were fueled by civil society groups.
29.	Julia Wallace, "Cambodia Charges Opposition Leader Kem Sokha with Treason," New York Times, September 5, 2017.
30.	Joshua Berlinger, "Cambodia Court Orders Main Opposition Party to Dissolve," CNN, November 17, 2017; Sebastian Strangio, "Cambodia's Crumbling Democracy," Foreign Affairs, September 14, 2017.
31.	May Titthara, "CNRP Commune Seats Doled Out," Khmer Times, December 4, 2017; Ben Sokhean, Mech Dara and Ananth Baliga, "'Death of Democracy': CNRP Dissolved by Supreme Court Ruling," November 17, 2017.
32.	Vannarith Chheang, "Sanctions Won't Stop Cambodia's Democratic Collapse," East Asia Forum, January 9, 2018; Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Report: Cambodia," December 14, 2017.
33.	Economist Intelligence Unit, "Hun Sen Loosens US Ties Ahead of Crucial Elections," April 10, 2017; "Cambodia's Decision Angkor Sentinel, GlobalSecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/angkor-sentinel.htm.
34P.L. 113-76 §7043(c) and P.L. 115-31 §7043(c).
26.	In addition, Members of the 115th Congress introduced the following bills that would impose restrictions on relations with Cambodia: The Cambodia Accountability and Return on Investment Act of 2018 (S. 2412); The Cambodia Democracy Act of 2018 (H.R. 5754), which passed in the House on July 25, 2018; and The Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Act, 2019 (S. 3108 and H.R. 6385).
27.	Sopheng Cheang, "EU Suspends Aid to Cambodian Election Commission," Washington Post, December 12, 2017. The European Union also suspended assistance to the NEC, and the European Parliament passed a resolution calling on the European Commission to impose visa restrictions on some Cambodian officials and to freeze their assets. Ray Downs, "E.U. Parliament to Freeze Cambodian Officials' Assets for Human Rights Abuses," UPI, December 15, 2017.
28.	A companion bill, H.Res. 661, was introduced in the House.
29.	Department of State, Press Statement, "Visa Restrictions on Individuals Responsible for Undermining Cambodian Democracy," December 6, 2017.
30.	Heather Nauert, Spokesperson, Department of State Press Briefing, August 15, 2018.
31.	Department of the Treasury, Press Release, "Treasury Sanctions Two Individuals and Five Entities Under Global Magnitsky," June 12, 2018.
32.	P.L. 115-141, §7043(b).
33.	Olivia Enos, "Holding Cambodia Accountable for Its Descent into One-Party Rule," The Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4894, August 7, 2018.
34.	Prak Chan Thul, "U.S. Turns to Music in Bid to Woo Cambodians," Reuters, March 7, 2018; Sebastian Strangio, "Cambodia Becomes the World's Newest One-Party State," Foreign Policy, November 17, 2017; Kongkea Chhoeun, "Should Western Countries Impose Sanctions on Cambodia?" Asia Times, September 14, 2017. See also House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, "Cambodia's Descent: Policies to Support Democracy and Human Rights in Cambodia," December 12, 2017.
35.	"Statement by Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia at the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly," September 28, 2018, New York, USA.
36.	Economist Intelligence Unit, "Hun Sen Loosens US Ties Ahead of Crucial Elections," April 10, 2017; "Cambodia's Decision to Nix Military Exercises with US Leaves Many Scratching Their Heads," Southeast Asia Globe, January 19, 2017; Angkor Sentinel, GlobalSecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/angkor-sentinel.htm.
Hul Reaksmey, "Cambodia Scraps US Aid Program, Accepts $150M from China," VOA, April 7, 2017; Matthew Burke, "Cambodia Kicks Out Navy Seabees with No Explanation," Stars and Stripes, April 5, 2017.
3538.	"Cambodia Says China Not Behind Scrapped 'Angkor Sentinel' US Military Drill," South China Morning Post, January 17, 2017In order of amount of ODA in 2016. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Creditor Reporting System, https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1.
3639.	Development assistance from China generally does not meet Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) criteria for ODA. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Creditor Reporting System. Ibid.
3740.	Prak Chan Thul and Matthew Tostevin, "China's Big Money Trumps U.S. Influence in Cambodia," Reuters, September 11, 2017.
3841. Sebastian Strangio, "Cambodia Becomes the World's Newest One-Party State," Foreign Policy, November 17, 2017. According to one estimate, DAC nations provided $12 billion in loans and grants to Cambodia between 1992 and 2012 for development and democracy building efforts, although some experts argue that the money was misspent or that it reduced government accountability. See.	In order of amount of ODA in 2016. DAC members constitute the world's major ODA donors. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Creditor Reporting System.
39.	Sebastian Strangio, "Cambodia Becomes the World's Newest One-Party State," op. cit.
40.	James Kynge, Leila Haddou and Michael Peel, "FT Investigation: How China Bought Its Way into Cambodia," Financial Times, September 8, 2016. See also; Sebastian Strangio, Hun Sen's Cambodia, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014 and; Sophal Ear, Aid Dependence in Cambodia, New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.
4142.	Data from USAID, Foreign Aid Explorer, "governance and civil society" assistance, https://explorer.usaid.gov/.
43.	Luke Hunt, "Analysts: Cambodia to 'Pay Price' for Siding with China," VOA, July 29, 2016. Due to the commercial benefits accruing to China and large non-concessional loan component, development financing and assistance from China largely do not meet the OECD's criteria for ODA.
44.	Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2019.
The OECD defines ODA as having "the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective" and a grant element of at least 25%. OECD, "Official Development Assistance—Definition and Coverage," http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm.
42.	Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2019. For past programming, see Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2017; Department of State, "U.S. Relations with Cambodia Fact Sheet," February 12, 2016; Daniel R. Russel, Department of State, "Remarks on the U.S.-Asia Rebalance and Priorities," Phnom Penh, Cambodia, January 27, 2015.
43.	Ibid.
44.	P.L. 113-76, §7043(c).
45.	P.L. 115-31, §7043(c).
46.	P.L. 115-141, §7043(b).
47.	The tribunal has 17 Cambodian judges and prosecutors and 10 international judges and prosecutors. As a safeguard against bias, verdicts require a "super-majority"—a simple majority plus the vote of at least one international judge.
4846.	"Cambodia: Khmer Rouge Convictions 'Too Little, Too Late'," Human Rights Watch, August 8, 2014.
49Sopheng Cheang and Grant Peck, "Verdicts on Khmer Rouge Leaders May be Tribunal's Last Gasp," WBTV, November 15, 2018.
47.	The U.S. Congress appropriated $2 million and $1.5 million to the international trust fund in FY2016 and FY2017, respectively.
"United States Announces New Contribution to Help Preserve Cambodia's Historical Documents," USAID, April 3, 2017.
5049.	See foreign operations appropriations legislation: P.L. 113-76, §7043(c); P.L. 113-235, §7043(c); P.L. 114-113, §7043(c); P.L. 115-31, §7043(c).
5150.	P.L. 115-141, §7043(b).
	51.	Sopheng Cheang, "Cambodia Says Khmer Rouge Tribunal That Convicted 3 Is Done," Miami Herald, November 18, 2018.	"Expanding Khmer Rouge Trials Could Spark War: Hun Sen," The Nation, February 28, 2015.
53.	Alessandro Marazzi Sassoon, "Khmer Rouge Prosecutors Split on Muth Case," Phnom Penh Post, December 1, 2017; Seth Mydans, "Khmer Rouge Trial, Perhaps the Last, Nears End," New York Times, June 23, 2017.
54.	Prak Chan Thul, "Hun Sen Hostility Puts Decade-Old U.N. Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Doubt," Reuters News, April 21, 2015.
55Ibid.
54.	Julia Wallace, "Cambodia Appeals to Trump to Forgive War-Era Debt," New York Times, April 2, 2017; Luke Hunt, "Hopes Fade for Cambodia Winning US Debt Relief, Analysts Say," Voice of America, February 14, 2017; Colin Meyn and Ben Sokhean, "US Hits Back at Government over $500 Million Debt, Democracy," Cambodia Daily, February 6, 2017.
55.	The U.S. government reportedly has cancelled some portions for which there is a lack of documentation and waived interest on unpaid interest. It has offered to reduce the loan or reschedule payments, but only if Cambodia signs a bilateral debt agreement, which the Hun Sen government has refused to do. See also Joe Yun, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Cambodia's Small Debt: When Will the U.S. Forgive?" September 30, 2010; and Scot Marciel, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "An Overview of Cambodia Debt and the Need for Debt Recycling: How Can the U.S. be of Assistance?" February 14, 2008.
Zsombor Peter and Aun Pheap, "Follow the Money," Cambodia Daily, June 25, 2016; Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, Cambodia, http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/cambodia/view-all.aspx.
5657.	"Landmine/UXO Casualties in Cambodia Down 21 Pct in 1st Four Months," Xinhuanet, June 19, 2017Cambodia Sees Increase in Landmine/UXO Casualties in 8 Months," Xinhua, September 27, 2018.
5758.	Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, op. cit.
5859.	Michael Hart, "Can Cambodia Meet Its Target to Remove Landmines by 2025?" Asian Correspondent, December 4, 2017.
5960.	Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, To Walk the Earth in Safety 2017, December 13, 2017.
60.	Ibid.
61.	Ibid.
62.	Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs Conventional Weapons Destruction (NADR-CWD). Data from Department of State.
63.	U.S. Has New Plan for UXO Removal in Cambodia after Cutting CMAC Funding," Phnom Penh Post, November 8, 2017; David Boyle and Hul Reaksmey, "US Demining Cut Provokes Cambodia," VOA News, November 7, 2017; Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2018.
64.	Luke Hunt, "Hopes Fade for Cambodia Winning US Debt Relief, Analysts Say," Voice of America, February 14, 2017.
65.	David Hutt, "Cambodia, US Duel over Vietnam War Debt," Asia Times, March 28, 2017; Julia Wallace, "Cambodia Appeals to Trump to Forgive War-Era Debt," New York Times, April 2, 2017; Scot Marciel, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "An Overview of Cambodia Debt and the Need for Debt Recycling: How Can the U.S. be of Assistance?" February 14, 2008.
66.	Colin Meyn and Ben Sokhean, "US Hits Back at Government over $500 Million Debt, Democracy," Cambodia Daily, February 6, 2017; Joe Yun, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Cambodia's Small Debt: When Will the U.S. Forgive?" September 30, 2010.
67.	Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, December 12, 2017; Asian Development Bank, "Cambodia: Economy," 2017.
68Anh Do, "As More Cambodian and Vietnamese Immigrants Are Targeted for Deportation, Advocates Say They 'Can't Stay Silent,'" Los Angeles Times, January 27, 2018.
64.	Charles Dunst, "Dozens More Cambodian Immigrants to Be Deported from U.S., Officials Say," New York Times, December 12, 2018; Kimberly Yam, "The U.S. Just Quietly Deported the Largest Group of Cambodians Ever," Huffington Post, April 7, 2018.
65.	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Visa Sanctions Against Two Countries Pursuant to Section 243(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act," July 10, 2018.
66.	[author name scrubbed], Specialist in Asian Affairs, contributed to this section.
67.	The World Bank in Cambodia, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cambodia/overview.
68.	Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, August 20, 2018; Asian Development Bank, "Cambodia: Economy," 2017.
In order of amount of FDI. Chheang Vannarith, "China and Investments It Has Made in Cambodia," Khmer Times, July 28, 2017.
6970.	Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Report: Cambodia," op. cit. Robin Spiess, "A Sector Too Big to Fail?" Phnom Penh Post, April 5, 2018.
7071.	Central Intelligence Agency, op. citWorld Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution, https://wits.worldbank.org/Default.aspx?lang=en.
7172.	As a beneficiary of GSP and similar programs, lower tariffs apply toward some Cambodian exports to developed countries. The U.S. GSP program does not apply to some export items, including most textiles and footwearRoseanne Gerin, "Cambodian Garment Unions Fear Possible End of EU, US Trade Preferences," Radio Free Asia, December 1, 2017.
7273.	Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 20167: Cambodia, March 3, 2017April 20, 2018.
7374.	Abu SMG Kibria, "How Politics Is Killing Cambodia's Forests," The Diplomat, September 21, 2016.
7475.	United Nations Development Programme, "Cambodia Has Region's Fastest Growth Rate in Human Development," March 22, 2017"Cambodia: Labor Unrest and Political Uncertainty," Stratfor, January 2, 2014.
7576.	World Bank, "The World Bank in Cambodia: Overview," October 2017, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cambodia/overviewDepartment of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Cambodia, March 3, 2017; Cambodia Passes Disputed Trade Union Law As Tension Flares," Reuters, April 4, 2016.
7677.	Ibid. Alex Barnes, "Cambodia's Proposed Minimum-Wage Law Likely to Reduce Industrial Unrest through 2018, Employers Likely to Receive Concessions," IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, August 25, 2017.
7778.	IbidGlobal Trade Atlas.
7879.	Global Trade Atlas; World Bank.
7980.	Roseanne Gerin, "Cambodian Garment Unions Fear Possible End of EU, US Trade Preferences," Radio Free Asia, December 1, 2017.
80.	Global Trade Atlas; European Commission, "Cambodia: Trade Statistics," http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_111485.pdf.
81.	Global Trade Atlas; World Bank.
82Knitted or crocheted articles of apparel and clothing accessories (HTS Chapter 61) in 2017 totaled $1.6 billion, or 52.3% of total U.S. imports from Cambodia. The next biggest item was non-knitted and non-crocheted articles of apparel and clothing accessories (HTS Chapter 62), worth $562 million, or 18.3% of total U.S. imports from Cambodia.
81.	In general, textiles and apparel are excluded from the GSP program.
82.	"The End of Cambodia's Ersatz Democracy," East Asia Forum, February 5, 2018.
ASEAN member countries are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. RCEP's members include ASEAN countries plus Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand.
83.	http://betterfactories.org/.
84.	Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Cambodia, op. cit.; Cambodia Passes Disputed Trade Union Law As Tension Flares," Reuters, April 4, 2016.
85.	Alex Barnes, "Cambodia's Proposed Minimum-Wage Law Likely to Reduce Industrial Unrest through 2018, Employers Likely to Receive Concessions," IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, August 25, 2017.
86 "China-Backed RCEP Trade Deal Pushed Back to 2019," Bangkok Post, November 13, 2018. For further information about RCEP, see CRS In Focus IF10342, What Is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership?, by [author name scrubbed] et al. 84.	Peter Ford, "US-Cambodia Relations at Their 'Worst Point,' As China Steps in to Fill the Void," ThinkProgress, December 14, 2017; Sebastian Strangio, "Cambodia Becomes the World's Newest One-Party State," op. cit.; Economist Intelligence Unit, "CPP Is Cementing One-Party Rule," February 22, 2017.
8785.	China Supports Cambodia's Crackdown on Political Opposition," Reuters, November 20, 2017; Aun Chhengpor, "Chinese State Media Warns of Risks of Cambodia Crackdown," VOA Khmer, October 25, 2017.
88.	Economist Intelligence Unit, "Hun Sen Loosens US Ties Ahead of Crucial Elections," op. cit.
89.	Bernhard Zand, "China Solidifies Its Influence in Southeast Asia," Der Spiegel, October 11, 2018; "China Cashes in on Cambodian Anti-American Sentiment," Sputnik News Service, October 15, 2017; James Kynge, Leila Haddou and Michael Peel, "FT Investigation: How China Bought Its Way into Cambodia," op. cit.; Jeffrey Becker, "What Is the PLA's Role in Promoting China-Cambodia Relations?" The Diplomat, April 29, 2017.
9086.	Pheakdey Heng, "Are China's Gifts a Blessing or a Curse for Cambodia," East Asia Forum, August 29, 2018; Kuch Naren and Ben Pavior, "Bilateral Trade with China Jumps to $4.8 Billion," Cambodia Daily, April 12, 2017; Luke Hunt, "Analysts: Cambodia to 'Pay Price' for Siding with China," VOA, July 29, 2016op. cit.
9187.	James Kynge, Leila Haddou and Michael Peel, "FT Investigation: How China Bought Its Way into Cambodia," op. citDarren Touch, "What Does Chinese Investment Mean for Cambodia?" The Diplomat, February 2, 2018.
9288.	Prashanth Parameswaran, "China-Cambodian Defense Ties in the Spotlight with Military Drills," The Diplomat, March 21, 2018James Kynge, Leila Haddou and Michael Peel, "FT Investigation: How China Bought Its Way into Cambodia," op. cit.
9389.	May Titthara, "China Woos Hun Sen at Beijing Dinner," Khmer Times, December 1, 2017; Chheang Vannarith, "China and Investments It Has Made in Cambodia," Khmer Times, July 28, 2017; "'Belt and Road' Initiative Will Bring Closer China-Cambodia Cooperation: HKSAR Official," Xinhua, February 27, 2017.
9490.	Prak Chan Thul and Matthew Tostevin, "China's Big Money Trumps U.S. Influence in Cambodia," Reuters, September 11, 2017.
9591.	Ibid.; David Hutt, "How China Came to Dominate Cambodia," The Diplomat, September 1, 2016; Simon Denyer, "A Rush to Invest in Cambodia's Infrastructure Is Part of a Larger Quest to Expand Regional Influence," Washington Post, September 5, 2015.
9692.	George Wright, "Anti-Chinese Sentiment on the Rise in Cambodia," The Diplomat, November 7, 2018.
93.	Many Chinese-built projects are financed through Chinese state-backed loans, and ownership is based upon a "build-operate-transfer" (BOT) arrangement. Through BOT, the host country pays a PRC entity to build and operate a project for a period of years, often as long as 40 years, and then ownership of the facility eventually is transferred to the host country.
94.	Nyshka Chandran, "Southeast Asia Is Betting on Hydropower, But There Are Risks of Economic Damage," August 9, 2018; "Environmental Experts Voice Concern about Effects of Dam Projects in Cambodia," Radio Free Asia, March 16, 2017.
95.	"Hydropower Dams," Open Development: Cambodia," September 2, 2015, https://opendevelopmentcambodia.net/topics/hydropower-dams; "Hydropower in China Sim Vireak, "Cambodia's Hydroelectric Question: China Power and the Environment," The Diplomat, July 30, 2014.
97.	Gregory B. Poindexter, "China Completely Finances Nearly All of Cambodia's Hydropower Projects," Hydroworld.com, October 13, 2016.
98.	Grace Mang, "Guaranteeing Chinese Overseas Dams—By Whom and at What Cost?" International Rivers, February 28, 2013, "Sambor Dam," https://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/sambor-dam.
9996.	Neou Vannarin, "Analysts See Cambodia Bolstering Military Ties with China," VOA, July 21, 2015.
10097.	Prashanth Parameswaran, "China-Cambodia Defense Ties in the Spotlight with Military Drills," The Diplomat, March 21, 2018; Huang Panyue, "Highlights of China-Cambodia 'Golden Dragon 2016' Joint Drill," China Military, December 27, 2016.
98.	Mech Dara, "Cambodia to Hold Larger Military Drills with Chinese Army," Phnom Penh Post, September 27, 2018.