Rwanda: In Brief
Changes from February 7, 2018 to May 14, 2019
This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with red strikethrough and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.
Contents
- Introduction
- Politics
- Human Rights
Regional Security- The Economy and Development
Issues - U.S. Relations and Aid
- Legislative Restrictions on Security Assistance
Outlook andIssues for Congress and Outlook
Figures
Tables
- Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Rwanda, Selected Accounts (State + USAID)
Summary
Rwanda, a small landlocked country in central Africa's Great Lakes region, has become known for its rapid development gains in the wake of the 1994 genocide, in which some 800,000 people were killed. Since then, efforts by the Rwandan Patriotic Front-led government to improve health outcomes, boost agricultural output, promote investment, and increase women's participation in politics have been lauded internationallyseen rapid development and security gains since about 800,000 people—mostly members of the ethnic Tutsi minority—were killed in the 1994 genocide. The ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) ended the genocide by seizing power in mid-1994 and has been the dominant force in Rwandan politics ever since. The Rwandan government has won donor plaudits for its efforts to improve health, boost agricultural output, encourage foreign investment, and promote women's empowerment. Yet, analysts debate whether Rwanda's authoritarian political system—and its government's periodic support for rebel movementsgroups in neighboring countries—could jeopardize this progress in the futurethe country's stability in the long-run, or undermine the case for donor support.
President Paul Kagame, in office since 2000, won reelection to a newanother seven-year term in August 2017 with nearly 99% of the vote, after a new constitution adopted in 2015 carved out an exception to term limits for him. His overwhelming margin of victory was interpreted by some observers as reflecting popular support for the president'sthe adoption of a new constitution that effectively exempted him from term limits through 2034. Kagame's overwhelming margin of victory may reflect popular support for his efforts to stabilize and transform Rwandan society, while others viewed it as the product ofas well as a political system that involves tight constraints on opposition activity and close government scrutiny of citizen behavior. In response to external criticism of Rwanda's political system and human rights record, Rwandan officials, including Kagame, have often asserted that some, Kagame has generally denied specific allegations of abusing human rights while asserting that restrictions on civil and political rights are needednecessary to prevent the return of ethnic violence.
The United States and Rwanda have cultivated close ties since the mid-1990s, underpinned by U.S. development aid and support for Rwanda's robust participation in international peacekeeping missions. Congress has helped shape U.S. engagement through the aid appropriations process,its appropriation of foreign aid and other legislative initiatives, oversight activities, and along with oversight and direct Member outreach to Rwandan officials. Over the past decade, U.S. officials, including some Members of Congress,successive Administrations and Congress have continued to hail Rwanda'ssupport U.S. partnership with Rwanda on development and peacekeeping record while voicing growing criticism of, while criticizing the government's human rights record and itsperiodic role in regional conflicts. Congress has notably placed restrictions on certain types ofenacted provisions in aid appropriations legislation restricting U.S. military aid to Rwanda if itif Rwanda is found to be supporting rebel groups in neighboring countries. The Obama Administration periodicallytemporarily applied such restrictions, and others underalong with others pursuant to separate child soldiers legislation, citing Rwandan support for rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi.
Trump Administration officials have continued to pair support for U.S.-Rwanda partnership on shared objectives with statements of concern regarding political conditions within Rwanda. U.S. interest in partnering with Rwanda on Africa-wide initiatives may increase in 2018 as President Kagame assumes the yearlong rotating chairmanship of the African Union (AU). President Trump met with President Kagame at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2018, after which There have been fewer reports of Rwandan support for rebel groups in recent years.
After meeting with President Kagame in early 2018, President Trump expressed appreciation for U.S.-Rwandan economic ties, Rwanda's contributions to peacekeeping, and Kagame's pursuit of AUAfrican Union institutional reforms.
In line with itsthe Administration's proposals to decrease foreign aid worldwide, the Administration's FY2018 aid budget request would lower annual U.S. bilateral aid to Rwanda from $159 million to $105 million (not including peacekeeping support). The Administration has also initiated an out-of-cycle review of Rwanda's eligibility for trade benefits it receives its FY2020 budget request would provide $117 million in bilateral aid to Rwanda, a 28% decrease from FY2018 levels. U.S. peacekeeping-related military assistance for Rwanda has drawn on regionally- and centrally-managed funds, and is not reflected in these totals. The Administration has also suspended Rwanda's eligibility for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, reauthorized under P.L. 114-27), in response to alleged market barriers to U.S. exports resulting from policies in the East African Community, to which Rwanda belongsof used clothing.
Introduction
Rwanda has achieved a rare degree of political stability, public safety, and economic growth in a sub-region markedplagued by armed conflict and violent power transfersconflicts and humanitarian crises. Government programs to improve health, agricultural output, private investment, and women's political participationgender equality have received international plaudits and substantial donor support. RwandaRwanda's development and security gains are particularly remarkable in the wake of the 1994 genocide, in which extremist members of the ethnic Hutu majority orchestrated a three-month killing spree targeting the minority Tutsi community and politically moderate Hutus. An estimated 800,000 people were killed.
President Paul Kagame is, along with members of the tiny indigenous Twa ethnic group and Hutus who opposed the massacres. The ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) seized power in mid-1994, stopping the genocide. Since then, President Paul Kagame has been widely viewed as the architect of Rwanda's purported development "miracle" and of its autocratic political model.1 He was reelected in 2017 following constitutional changes that exempted him from presidential term limits. Kagame's nearly 99% margin of victory may reflect a mix of popular support for his efforts to stabilize and transform Rwandan society as well as constraints on opposition activism. These include legal restrictions on civil liberties and tight controls on the flow of information, allegedly alongside more brutal tactics.
The United States and Rwanda have cultivated close ties since the late mid-1990s, underpinned by U.S. aid in support of Rwanda's ambitious socioeconomic development initiatives and participation in international peacekeeping. Over the past decade, U.S. U.S. executive branch officials and some Members of Congress have nonetheless expressed growing concern in recent yearscontinued to promote U.S.-Rwanda partnership on shared objectives, while voicing concerns regarding Rwanda's authoritarian political system and its government's history of backingperiodic support for rebel groups in neighboring countries. Congress has held multiple hearings examining these and related issues.,2 and has enacted restrictions on aid to Rwanda if it is found to be supporting rebel groups (see "U.S. Relations and Aid").
In late 2017, then Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Donald Yamamoto testified to Congress that U.S.-Rwandan relations were "close but complex," acknowledging democracy shortfalls and human rights concerns.32
In September 2017, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Ambassador Donald Yamamoto, testified before the House that the United States "has a close but complex relationship with Rwanda."3 Trump Administration officials have voiced support for continued U.S.-Rwanda partnership on shared objectives, alongside ongoing concerns regarding democracy and human rights (see "U.S. Relations and Aid," below). U.S. interest in partnering with Rwanda on Africa-wide initiatives may increase in 2018 as President Kagame assumes the rotating chairmanship of the African Union (AU). President Trump met with President Kagame at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2018, after which the Presidentand expressed appreciation for U.S.-Rwandanbilateral economic ties, Rwanda's contributions to peacekeeping operations, and Kagame's pursuit of AU institutional reforms.
In line with its broaderAfrican Union (AU) institutional reforms as then-chairman of the institution. In line with the Administration's broad proposals to decrease foreign aid worldwide, the Administrationit has advocated cuts to bilateral funding for Rwanda in FY2018, including health and development aid, though the country would remain a top U.S. aid recipient in Africa if the proposals were fully implemented. Separately, in June 2017, the Administration initiated an out-of-cycle review of Rwanda's eligibility for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act in response to protectionist policies in the East African Community (EAC), of which Rwanda is a member. The review also pertains to the AGOA eligibility of EAC members Tanzania and Uganda.
Successive Congresses have enacted foreign aid appropriations measures that restrict certain types of U.S. military aid to Rwanda if it is found to be supporting rebel groups in neighboring countries. Citing these and other legislation related to child soldiers, the Obama Administration at several points suspended some military aid in response to reports of Rwandan support for rebels in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi. The Obama Administration also increased other types of military aid in support of Rwanda's peacekeeping deployments, either by exercising a presidential authority to waive the aforementioned restrictions or else drawing on funds that were not subject to them. The full extent of the Trump Administration's approach to security assistance for Rwanda remains to be seen. (See "Legislative Restrictions.")
International perspectives on Rwanda tend to be polarized. Kagame's supporters assert that he is a visionary and that Rwanda represents an extraordinary post-conflict success story.5 To some, Rwandan voters' support for Kagame is easily explained: "he has kept them from killing each other ... [and] has also given them a sense of hope and pride."6 Others argue that restrictions on political and civil rights may ultimately undermine Rwanda's hard-won stability, and that limits on civil liberties may mask ethnic, political, and social tensions.7 Given evident constraints on free expression, some observers argue that "we simply don't know ... what Rwandans want from their political leaders."8 Some critics separately have questioned the reliability of Rwanda's development statistics—a key justification for donor aid. Critics also posit that the ruling party's reportedly extensive involvement in the economy may be stifling independent private sector growth.9 Kagame has dismissed external criticism as inaccurate, irrelevant, neocolonialist, and/or morally vacuous given the international community's failure to halt the genocide.10
 |
|
Population, growth rate: Languages: Kinyarwanda, French, English (all official) Religions: Protestant 50 Median age: 19.2 years Life expectancy: 64. Infant mortality rate: 29. Literacy: 70.5% (male 73.2%, female 68%) (2015) |
GDP growth rate: 6.2% Key exports: coffee, tea, hides, tin ore HIV/AIDS adult prevalence: 2.7% (2017) GDP growth, per capita: 8.6%, $791 Key exports / partners: coffee, tea, hides, tin ore / UAE 38%, Kenya 15%, Switzerland 10%, DRC 10%, U.S. 5%, Singapore 5% (2017)
|
International perspectives on Rwanda tend to be polarized. Supporters assert that Kagame is a visionary and that Rwanda represents an extraordinary post-conflict success story that justifies his continued tenure.4 Others argue that severe restrictions on political and civil rights may ultimately undermine Rwanda's hard-won stability, and that limits on civil liberties may be masking ethnic and social tensions.5 Some critics have also questioned the reliability of Rwanda's development statistics—a key justification for donor aid—and some posit that the ruling party's apparently extensive involvement in the economy may be stifling independent private sector growth.6 To some observers, Rwandan voters' support for Kagame is easily explained: "he has kept them from killing each other ... [and] has also given them a sense of hope and pride."7 Others argue that—given evident constraints on free expression—"we simply don't know ... what Rwandans want from their political leaders."8
President Kagame has defended Rwanda's political system as rooted in popular support, asserting that "imposing a style of democracy without understanding the context, culture or norm of a country is ignorant."9 Rwandan officials generally reject allegations of abusing human rights, while asserting that some restrictions on civil liberties are necessary to prevent ethnic tensions and violence. Kagame has also rejected some external criticism as inaccurate, irrelevant, neocolonialist, and/or morally vacuous given the international failure to halt the 1994 genocide.10
Politics
The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is the ruling party and the dominant force in Rwandan politics.11 An RPF-led coalition holds 76% of seats in the parliament's Chamber of Deputies, with remaining seats held by parties that are supportive of the RPF in practice.12 Observers, including the U.S. State Department, have raised concerns with aspects of each election conducted under RPF rule, ranging from apparent procedural irregularities and lack of transparency in vote tabulation, to media restrictions and legal challenges, threats, or criminal prosecutions targeting opposition candidates and parties.13 It is difficult to determine whether or how such factors might affect electoral outcomes.
President Kagame, leader of the RPF and a former military intelligence figure, is widely viewed as the country's preeminent decision-maker. He first won the presidency in an internal party election in 2000, and he has won reelection with over 90% of the popular vote in every subsequent contest (in 2003, 2010, and 2017). Under Kagame's leadership, the government has pursued economic development and social transformation while effectively suppressing political dissent and public discussion of ethnic identity. Some researchers have described pervasive official surveillance and involvement in citizens' daily lives, part of an apparent effort to ensure rapid implementation of development initiatives, mobilize support for the RPF, suppress criminal activity, and monitor potential opposition activity, ethnic tensions, or security threats.14
In the 2017 election, two opposition candidates together won about 1% of the vote. One was Philippe Mpayimana, an independent. The other was Frank Habineza of the Democratic Green Party, the only legally recognized party that has openly criticized the RPF and Kagame. The Green Party was participating in elections for the first time: Habineza had been denied registration as a candidate in 2010, and then spent two years in exile after his deputy was killed under unclear circumstances.15 Diane Shima Rwigara, a vocal Kagame critic and would-be first female independent presidential candidate, was denied registration as a candidate in 2017. She was also subjected to an apparent online smear campaign.16 She was arrested for tax evasion shortly after the vote, and in October, she was charged with forgery and inciting insurrection and was denied bail. A previous opposition presidential contender, Victoire Ingabire, is serving a prison sentence after being convicted of genocide denial and seeking to form an armed group, and her party has been denied legal registration.17
Kagame would have been subject to a constitutional two-term limit on the presidency in 2017, but a new constitution approved in 2015 via referendum—with a reported 98% of the vote—exempted the sitting president (Kagame), allowing him to serve a third seven-year term. He may also run for two more consecutive five-year terms, thus potentially remaining in office until 2034—although he has denied any intention to do so, stating that he is preparing Rwanda for an unspecified future leadership transition.18 The new constitution shortens the presidential term from seven to five years, but that change does not take effect until 2024. It also grants the president immunity from prosecution after he leaves office, including for treason or constitutional violations. The referendum was organized after parliamentarians voted overwhelmingly in favor of removing the term limit for Kagame. That vote, in turn, followed a petition to remove term limits that received some 3.7 million signatures—over half the electorate.19 Kagame has disavowed responsibility for the initiative.20
Some observers describe a narrowing of the RPF's political leadership from a diverse set of actors in the 1990s to an apparently small circle around the president today.21 Over the years, various high-profile figures have faced criminal charges, some on national security grounds, apparently after falling out with the president. Some have left the country, and several prominent figures have sought to mobilize external opposition movements. These include individuals formerly thought to inhabit the inner-most leadership circle of the RPF, namely, those who fought alongside Kagame in the armed wing of the RPF before it took power.22 A few prominent exiled dissidents have been violently attacked or killed in what critics portray as state-backed assassination attempts.23 The Rwandan government has repeatedly denied involvement.24
Public criticism of the government is rare; there are few independent critical media and civil society groups, and they reportedly operate with difficulty.25 Human rights advocates assert that laws and taboos prohibiting public acknowledgement of ethnic identity have been wielded as tools to silence meaningful criticism of the government, and that "years of state intimidation and interference" have weakened the capacity of civil society to operate effectively.26 Over the years, various political opponents, critics, and journalists have been criminally prosecuted or have fled the country. There have been reports of arbitrary detention and torture of Rwandans accused or suspected of supporting the exiled opposition Rwanda National Congress (RNC), Ingabire's political movement, or the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a militia founded in DRC by perpetrators of the 1994 genocide.27 U.S.-based Human Rights Watch has also accused Rwandan security forces of extra-judicially killing petty criminals, allegations which Rwanda's National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) has sought to discredit.28
Regional Security
Rwanda's military is among sub-Saharan Africa's most effective, and Rwandan troops participate in multiple U.N. and African-led peacekeeping operations on the continent. Rwandan peacekeepers are reportedly "particularly valued due to their training, discipline, the development ethos they bring to deployments," and for the number of women trained and deployed.29 Citing their country's experience during the 1994 genocide, in which the U.N. Security Council withdrew peacekeepers as massacres were spreading, Rwandan officials have sought multilateral support for robust implementation of peacekeeper mandates for the protection of civilians, including via a set of commitments known as the "Kigali Principles." Ahead of assuming the chairmanship of the AU in 2018, Kagame has pressed for institutional reforms to improve the AU's capacity to finance and sustain African-led stabilization operations, among other goals.
Rwanda also has a history of unilateral intervention in the sub-region, notably in DRC.30 Rwanda first deployed its military into DRC (then known as Zaire) in 1996 to oust genocidal Rwandan militias from cross-border safe-havens. It played a key role in backing Laurent Désiré Kabila's rebellion in DRC in 1997, though as president, Kabila later fell out with Rwanda and sought to expel Rwandan forces that had deployed to support his new government. Rwanda has since reportedly backed successive rebellions in DRC led by individuals of Rwandan descent.31 While denying specific allegations of doing so, Rwandan officials often voice potential justifications for such actions. In particular, Rwandan officials note that the DRC has failed to rein in—and indeed has, at times, collaborated with—the FDLR, a group founded by Rwandan genocide perpetrators that continues to seek the overthrow of the RPF government. Officials also sometimes point to the persecution of ethnic communities of Rwandan origin in the DRC—suggesting that they require protection. Economic interests related to resource smuggling in eastern DRC have long been reported to represent another potential motivation.32
In 2012-2013, Rwanda faced acute international criticism and cuts to donor aid, including from the United States and European countries, for providing support to a DRC-based insurgency known as the M23.33 The group had begun as a mutiny among soldiers involved in an earlier Rwandan-backed armed group that had been integrated into DRC's military. Rwandan officials denied accusations of backing the M23, blaming the conflict on DRC's institutional dysfunctions and lack of political will to confront security challenges. Rwandan support nonetheless reportedly dissipated in response to criticism, and in late 2013, the M23 was defeated by DRC military forces backed by U.N. peacekeepers.34 The M23 has since been largely inactive, apparently leaving eastern DRC without an evident Rwandan armed proxy for the first time in two decades.35
In 2015 and 2016, reports suggested Rwandan involvement in the recruitment and training of Burundian refugees to participate in a rebellion against the government of Burundi, again prompting donor criticism.36 The reports emerged after Kagame openly criticized Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza's decision to run for a third term in 2015, which stoked a violent political crisis. Rwandan officials also accused Nkurunziza's party of harboring FDLR rebels,37 and Rwanda welcomed prominent Burundian dissidents who fled their country. Burundi's government, for its part, accused Rwanda of espionage and interference in its politics.38
Reports of Rwandan involvement in regional conflicts have dwindled since 2016, suggesting that the government may fear donor or regional reactions, and/or that it has been focused on domestic issues. The government also may no longer perceive a strong external threat as emanating from eastern DRC, as the FDLR has been weakened by an internal split and by a string of Congolese-led operations targeting the group. Tensions between Rwanda and several other countries in the region, including DRC, Tanzania, and South Africa, appear to have eased in line with these trends, and in connection with a change of government in Tanzania in late 2015.39
The Economy and Development Issues
Donor aid, political stability, low corruption, and pro-investor policies have contributed to economic growth in Rwanda averaging 7.6% per year over the past decade—albeit from a very low base.40 Human development gains since the 1994 genocide have been dramatic in relative terms, notably with regard to life expectancy, child and maternal mortality, and access to healthcare.41 Rwanda nonetheless remains one of the world's poorest countries. About 75% of Rwandans are engaged in agriculture, many for subsistence, and about 39% reportedly live below the poverty line (compared to 56% as recently as 2006, and 78% in 1994).42 Rwanda has the highest population density in continental Africa, and despite fertile land, it relies on food imports.
Key foreign exchange earners include tourism and exports of coffee, tea, and minerals. The government has undertaken ambitious efforts to transform Rwanda's low-income, agrarian-based economy into one that is services-oriented and middle-income by 2020.43 These include programs to improve healthcare, expand internet access, and increase domestic energy production through hydroelectric infrastructure and the exploitation of large methane gas reserves under Lake Kivu. To achieve its economic goals, the government has sought to counter what it identifies as key constraints: low agricultural productivity and a narrow economic base, a landlocked geography, an insufficiently skilled work force, and limited infrastructure.44 The State Department has documented a number of additional constraints on foreign investors, including "limited access to affordable financing," "payment delays with government contracts," a periodic failure by immigration and tax authorities to honor incentives included in deals signed by the Rwanda Development Board, and difficulties encountered by foreign firms "in registering patents and having rules against infringement of their property rights enforced in a timely manner."45 The Department has also reported private investor complaints about "competition from state-owned and ruling party-aligned businesses." Notably, Chrystal Ventures, reportedly owned by the RPF, controls an array of domestic enterprises, while Horizon Group, affiliated with the Ministry of Defense, holds a key position in the domestic construction and logistics sectors.46
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has praised the transformation of Rwanda's economy over the past 15 years, citing the effect of strong public investment and efficient management in shifting away from agriculture and towards services and some industry. The Fund noted in 2017 that "the challenge is whether the private sector can complement the infrastructure assets put in place by the public sector and maintain economic momentum."47 The Fund has called on the government to continue efforts to raise education standards, and lower electricity and transportation costs.
Donor aid is a key source of funding for Rwanda's development initiatives. Economic growth dipped from 8.8% in 2012 to 4.6% in 2013 after several top European donors reduced or redirected budgetary support due to Rwanda's support for the M23, but has since rebounded. In response to the aid cuts, the government launched a sovereign wealth fund, Agaciro, to which it called on all Rwandans and "friends of Rwanda" to contribute, including members of the local business community.48 In 2016, the government introduced a "Made in Rwanda" policy designed to reduce the country's trade deficit by promoting consumption of domestically produced goods. In recent years, some critics have questioned the reliability of Rwanda's development statistics, in part on the grounds that political conditions and the nature of the data released by the government make them difficult to verify independently.49 Notwithstanding debates over the precise contours of poverty in Rwanda, most observers agree that development advances have been substantial.
U.S. Relations and Aid
In 1998, President Bill Clinton delivered a speech in Kigali in which he expressed remorse for not having intervened more forcefully to end mass killings in 1994, and pledged that the United States would do better in the future.50 Those remarks arguably set the tone for a relationship defined, in part, by a sense of international guilt about the genocide and admiration for the RPF's role in stopping it. U.S. support for the RPF-led government has continued across successive Administrations and across partisan lines, with executive branch officials and Members of Congress working together to provide substantial aid to buttress Rwanda's development efforts and peacekeeper deployments. Yet, over the past decade, U.S. officials, including some Members of Congress, have increasingly criticized Rwanda's involvement in regional conflicts and expressed concern with its political and human rights record—including reports of assassination plots targeting exiled dissidents. During the Obama Administration, such criticism provoked strident objections by Rwandan officials, including President Kagame.51
After meeting with President Kagame in Davos in January 2018, President Trump praised the United States' "great relationships" with Rwanda, including bilateral trade, and stated that "the job they've done is absolutely terrific."52 Previous statements by Administration officials had expressed concerns about Rwanda's respect for human rights and democracy alongside praise for the country's development progress and peacekeeping contributions. In his September 2017 congressional testimony, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Yamamoto referred to U.S.-Rwandan relations as "close but complex": he praised Rwanda's "remarkable gains" in health and development, and characterized the country as "a major contributor to regional peace and security," while asserting that "Rwanda's record in the areas of human rights and democracy, while improved in some areas, remains a concern." He called on the government "to take steps toward a democratic transition of power."53
Regarding Rwanda's 2017 presidential election, the State Department stated that "we are disturbed by irregularities observed during voting and reiterate long-standing concerns over the integrity of the vote-tabulation process."54 In response to questioning from House Africa Subcommittee Chairman Chris Smith at the September 2017 hearing, Ambassador Yamamoto affirmed that "we are unable to assess this election as free and fair."55 In an earlier message marking Rwanda's National Day, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson expressed an intention to "work with Rwanda on expanding efforts to strengthen democracy and respect for human rights."56 At his Senate confirmation hearing in December 2017, the U.S. Ambassador-designate to Rwanda described his four top policy goals as the following: continuing the United States' "development partnership" with Rwanda, promoting U.S. business and economic ties, supporting Rwanda's continued peacekeeping role, and advancing "democratic ideals."57
In 2017, the Administration initiated an out-of-cycle review of Rwanda's eligibility for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, reauthorized under P.L. 114-27) in response to allegedly protectionist policies in the East African Community (EAC), of which Rwanda is a member state.58 The review has been interpreted as an example of a broader Administration push to reexamine U.S. trade policy and achieve better terms and/or outcomes for U.S. firms.59 Ambassador Yamamoto subsequently testified that U.S. officials had also "raised concerns ... regarding harassment of political opposition leaders and [non-governmental organizations] as well as restrictions on media freedom with the context of AGOA eligibility."60 The impact of any change to Rwanda's AGOA eligibility may be largely symbolic: in 2016, U.S. imports from Rwanda totaled $25 million, of which $2 million were under AGOA.61 U.S. exports to Rwanda totaled $73 million.
U.S. bilateral aid programs in Rwanda have focused on improving health, food security, economic growth, and other development goals. During the Obama Administration, such funding for Rwanda rose slightly before falling again toward the end of the Administration, although security assistance related to peacekeeping increased under regional initiatives. The Administration also suspended certain military aid for Rwanda specifically due to Rwanda's involvement in regional conflicts (as discussed below), though this had a limited impact on the total size of the bilateral aid budget. The Trump Administration requested $105 million in bilateral aid to Rwanda for FY2018, proposing cuts to health and development funds (Table 1, below), in the context of broader proposals to decrease foreign aid worldwide.62
U.S. support for Rwanda's involvement in peacekeeping missions is provided separately from bilateral aid allocations. In addition to U.S. financial contributions to U.N. operations, the United States provides many African troop contributors to U.N. and AU-led missions with training and equipment. Under its African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP), an initiative launched in 2014, the Obama Administration provided substantial additional military aid to Rwanda.63 APRRP was conceived to help selected African countries develop relatively high-level capabilities for use in peacekeeping operations, and to complement the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, in which Rwanda also participates. The future of APRRP is uncertain, as the Trump Administration's FY2018 budget request did not include funding for it "in order to reduce duplication with existing programs."
|
The 1994 Genocide11 In April 1994, extremist members of Rwanda's ethnic Hutu majority (then estimated at 85% of the population) orchestrated the mass murder of some 800,000 people—over 10% of the population—within a three-month period.12 The victims were primarily minority Tutsis (roughly 14% of the population), along with politically moderate Hutus and ethnic Twa (<1% of the population). Hardliners coordinated killings and widespread sexual violence, distributing arms and issuing commands via FM radio to grassroots Hutu-led militia groups throughout the country, whose members targeted their neighbors (and even family members) at the local level. Decades of misrule had deepened ethnic tensions in Rwanda, producing cycles of anti-Tutsi violence prior to the genocide. Rwanda's pre-colonial kingdom was Tutsi-led, and historically pastoralist Tutsis occupied a higher social status than Hutus, who engaged in sedentary agriculture. Belgian colonial misrule solidified the ethnic divide. In the years leading up to independence in 1962, Hutus mounted a popular uprising targeting Tutsis and ultimately took control of the postcolonial government. By then, about 120,000 people, primarily Tutsis, had sought refuge in neighboring countries. By the 1980s, hundreds of thousands more Tutsi refugees had joined them. In neighboring Burundi, which has a similar ethnic composition and pre-independence history, ethnic Tutsis retained political power at independence and orchestrated anti-Hutu massacres. Some Tutsi refugees in Uganda—including now-President Kagame—joined a rebellion in that country led by Yoweri Museveni, who took power in Uganda in 1986. With Museveni's backing, Kagame and others then formed a rebel movement, the RPF, seeking a greater Tutsi stake in Rwanda's government and a right of return for refugees. In 1990, the RPF launched an offensive in Rwanda, marking the start of a civil war that Hutu extremists leveraged to spread fear and hatred of Tutsis. The Hutu-led government signed a peace accord with the RPF in 1993, but implementation lagged. When a plane carrying President Juvenal Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart was shot down over Kigali, Hutu hardliners took control, assassinating moderates in the transitional government and putting in motion a plan to exterminate the Tutsi minority.13 The U.N. Security Council voted to draw down a U.N. peacekeeping mission, removing forces that could have confronted the militias.14 The genocide ended in July 1994, when the RPF seized control of Kigali. At that point, about 2 million mostly Hutu Rwandans—including army officers, militia leaders, and extremist ideologues, along with civilians—fled to neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, then Zaire). From there, some launched attacks into Rwanda, laying the groundwork for an enduring regional crisis. Rwanda deployed troops into DRC in 1996 to pursue those who had orchestrated the genocide, and also reportedly targeted civilians on a large scale—its first foray into what would become a years-long regional and civil war in Congo.15 In November 1994, the U.N. Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), based in Arusha, Tanzania, to prosecute high-level genocide perpetrators. The ICTR, which received U.S. funding, concluded its work in 2012, having convicted 62 individuals. An appeals chamber continues to hear challenges, while a follow-on "mechanism" continues to seek the arrest and trial of three accused fugitives. The Rwandan government and survivor groups have criticized aspects of the ICTR's proceedings, including early releases granted to some convicts.16 Domestically, Rwanda organized grassroots "gacaca" trials, drawing on traditional justice mechanisms, to identify and try over a million low-level perpetrators. Rwanda continues to seek the arrest and extradition of alleged perpetrators abroad; in recent years, U.S. federal attorneys have prosecuted several Rwandans in the United States for immigration fraud, citing their involvement in the genocide.17 |
The RPF-led government has pursued rapid economic development and social transformation while effectively suppressing political dissent and public discussion of ethnic identity. President Kagame, leader of the RPF and a former military intelligence figure and rebel commander, is widely viewed as the country's preeminent decision-maker. He first ascended to the presidency in an internal party election in 2000, and has won reelection with over 90% of the popular vote in every subsequent contest (in 2003, 2010, and 2017). An RPF-led coalition holds the majority of seats in parliament; nearly all remaining seats are held by parties that refrain from directly criticizing the RPF or Kagame. The State Department has noted concerns with aspects of each election conducted under RPF rule, such as apparent procedural irregularities, a lack of transparency in vote tabulation, media restrictions, and legal challenges, threats, or criminal prosecutions targeting opposition candidates and parties.18
Public criticism of the government is rare; human rights advocates assert that "years of state intimidation and interference" have weakened the capacity of local civil society or media outlets to act as a check on state power.19 Over the years, political opponents have been jailed, fled the country, or died under murky circumstances. Laws criminalizing genocide ideology and denial, along with state security charges, have been wielded against opposition figures, journalists, and other government critics.20 Some researchers have described pervasive official surveillance and involvement in citizens' daily lives, part of an apparent effort to ensure rapid implementation of development initiatives, mobilize support for the RPF, suppress criminal activity, and monitor potential opposition activity, ethnic tensions, or security threats.21
Kagame has defended Rwanda's political system as rooted in popular support, asserting that "imposing a style of democracy without understanding the context, culture or norm of a country is ignorant."22 Rwandan officials generally reject allegations of abusing human rights, while asserting that restrictions on civil liberties are necessary to prevent ethnic violence in a fragile post-conflict setting. Some Rwandans, including journalists and civil society actors, agree.23
Kagame would have been subject to a constitutional two-term limit on the presidency in 2017, but a new constitution approved in 2015 via referendum—with a reported 98% of the vote—exempted the sitting president, allowing him to run for a third term. He won with 99% of the vote. After Kagame's current term expires, the presidential term is to be shortened to five years per the new constitution; Kagame could then run for two more consecutive terms, thus potentially remaining in office until 2034. He has denied any intention to do so, stating that he is preparing Rwanda for an unspecified future leadership transition.24
Tolerance of opposition voices seems to have increased slightly since Kagame's reelection in 2017, although a significant shift in the contours of Rwandan politics appears unlikely. Two prominent opposition figures were released from jail in 2018. Diane Rwigara, a vocal Kagame critic (and daughter of a well-known businessman and Tutsi genocide survivor) who was jailed on charges of forgery and inciting insurrection shortly after seeking to run for president in 2017, was acquitted following international advocacy on her behalf, including from some Members of Congress.25 Victoire Ingabire, who had sought to run against Kagame in 2010 and was serving a prison sentence for alleged genocide denial and seeking to form an armed group, received a presidential pardon.26 So did several other members of Ingabire's FDU-Inkingi party ("United Democratic Forces-Pillar"), which remains illegal.27 Several other FDU-Inkingi supporters remain in prison; others have been killed in unclear circumstances.28
Also in 2018, the Democratic Green party, a relatively independent opposition movement (and not affiliated with Rwigara or Ingabire), won two seats in parliament after competing for the first time in legislative elections. The Green party was not granted legal registration in time to run candidates in the 2013 legislative vote; its presidential candidate, Frank Habineza, won less than 1% in the 2017 presidential vote. The party's deputy leader was killed in unclear circumstances prior to the 2010 presidential election, soon after the party was founded in 2009.29
The RPF's political leadership appears to have narrowed from a diverse set of actors in the 1990s to an apparently small circle around the president.30 Over the years, various top RPF officials and military officers have faced criminal charges, some on national security grounds, or have fled the country. In 2010, several prominent RFP defectors formed an exiled opposition movement, the Rwandan National Congress (RNC). Some members have been the target of armed attacks or apparent assassinations in foreign countries, including several in South Africa. President Kagame has denied state involvement, while assailing the individuals in question as traitors.31
Human RightsThe State Department's 2018 human rights report on Rwanda cites forced disappearances, alleged extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, and torture by state security forces ("including asphyxiation, electric shocks, mock executions"), noting "impunity" involving civilian officials and some members of the security forces. The report also documents political prisoners, threats and violence against journalists, censorship, and "substantial interference" with freedoms of assembly and association, along with "restrictions on political participation." It further finds that "the government continued to monitor homes, movements, telephone calls, email, other private communications, and personal and institutional data," often using extrajudicial means and/or embedded informants.
Human Rights Watch has reported patterns of arbitrary detention and torture of Rwandans accused or suspected of supporting the RNC, Ingabire's political movement, or the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a militia founded in DRC by perpetrators of the genocide.32 The organization also has accused Rwandan security forces of killing petty criminals extra-judicially, allegations that Rwanda's National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) has rejected.33 Rwanda has expelled international researchers working for Human Rights Watch; in 2018, a local employee was temporarily detained incommunicado.
In 2018, the government shuttered thousands of churches and dozens of mosques, citing safety violations or other regulatory concerns, and proposed stricter registration requirements for religious groups. One expert asserted that these moves targeted non-denominational places of worship (i.e., not affiliated with Roman Catholicism or established Protestant denominations) because they "are harder to control because they don't report to a central hierarchy."34
Regional SecurityRwanda is a top peacekeeping troop contributor in Africa; U.N. officials and donors value its military professionalism and commitment to civilian protection.35 As chair of the AU in 2018, President Kagame also sought to bolster the financial sustainability of African-led stability operations. At the same time, Rwanda has a history of unilateral military intervention in DRC, and reportedly has periodically provided support to rebel groups in DRC and Burundi.36 Its reasons for doing so may reflect a mix of national security concerns (e.g., a desire to counter DRC-based armed groups led by individuals implicated in the 1994 genocide), ethnic solidarity with the Tutsi minority in Burundi and persecuted communities of Rwandan descent in DRC, and economic motivations linked to resource smuggling in DRC.37
In 2012-2013, Rwanda faced acute international criticism and cuts to donor aid—including from the United States and European countries—for providing support to a DRC-based insurgent group known as the M23.38 The M23 originated as a rebellion among members of a previous Rwandan-backed armed group, and was the latest in a series of Rwandan-backed rebellions originating among communities of Rwandan descent in eastern DRC since in the late 1990s. In 2015 and 2016, reports suggested Rwandan involvement in the recruitment and training of Burundian refugees for a rebellion against the government of Burundi, again prompting donor criticism.39
Credible reports of direct Rwandan involvement in regional conflicts have since diminished, although the country's relations with DRC remain volatile. Tensions with Burundi also have endured, with Rwanda accusing Burundian authorities of stoking ethnic tensions while Burundi has accused Rwanda of espionage and interference.40 Relations with sometimes-ally Uganda also have soured in recent years.41 Rwandan officials, including President Kagame, have openly accused Uganda of backing Rwandan armed dissidents (apparently referring to the RNC) as well as the FDLR, while Ugandan officials have accused Rwanda of espionage.42
Ongoing insecurity and illicit resource extraction in eastern DRC remain flashpoints for regional tensions and spillover of conflicts. In late 2018, U.N. DRC sanctions monitors reported that the RNC was mobilizing armed combatants in DRC's South Kivu province, with apparent Burundian support.43 Some researchers posit that Rwanda-Uganda friction is rooted in competition over access to DRC minerals; U.N. DRC sanctions investigators reported in 2018 that "gold sourced in high-risk and conflict areas [of DRC] was exported illegally to Uganda and Rwanda."44
The Economy and DevelopmentDonor aid, political stability, low corruption, and pro-investor policies have enabled high economic growth rates (4-9% annually) over the past decade. Rwanda remains one of the world's poorest countries, although it ranks higher than many other sub-Saharan African countries on the 2018 U.N. Human Development Index (at 158 out of 189 countries assessed). About 75% of Rwandans are engaged in agriculture, many for subsistence; the country is nonetheless reliant on food imports, in part due to having the highest population density in continental Africa.
The government seeks to transform the economy into one that is services-oriented and middle-income, launching programs to expand internet access, improve education, and increase domestic energy production. Key growth sectors include tourism, coffee, tea, tin mining, construction, and an emerging financial services sector.45 The government also aims to turn Rwanda into a regional trade, logistics, and conference hub. It has invested in the construction of new business class hotels and a convention center in Kigali, a planned new airport, and an expansion of the national airline RwandAir—which is pursuing U.S. federal approval for direct flights between Kigali and the United States. Much investment has been concentrated in Kigali, which has received international plaudits for its clean and safe streets.46
Rwanda was ranked 29 out of 190 on the World Bank's 2019 Doing Business report, the only low-income country and one of only two African countries (along with Mauritius) in the top 50. Rwanda's continual improvements in the annual rankings reflect its efforts to reduce bureaucratic red-tape, protect property rights, improve access to credit, expand the supply of reliable electricity, and ensure contract enforcement. The State Department has nonetheless documented various challenges for foreign investors, including "payment delays with government contracts," inconsistent adherence to incentives offered by the Rwanda Development Board, infringements on property rights, and "competition from state-owned and ruling party-aligned businesses."47
Human development gains since the genocide have been dramatic in relative terms. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), from 1990 and 2016, life expectancy increased from 48 to 66 years; the child (under five) mortality rate fell from 152 to 42 deaths per 1,000 live births; and the maternal mortality rate decreased from 1,300 to 290 deaths per 100,000 live births.48 Through a donor-backed national community-based health insurance system, Rwanda provides near-universal health coverage for basic primary care, with the cost fully or partially subsidized based on income level.49 As of 2015, about 39% of Rwandans reportedly lived below the poverty line, compared to 56% in 2006 and 78% in 1994.50 Some researchers have questioned the reliability of Rwanda's poverty statistics, noting that they are based on household-level survey data and may be subject to interference; the World Bank has rejected some of this criticism, asserting that Rwanda's official statistical methodology "is technically sound."51
U.S. Relations and AidIn 1998, President Bill Clinton delivered a speech in Kigali in which he expressed remorse for not having intervened more forcefully to end mass killings in 1994, and pledged that the United States would do better in the future.52 Those remarks arguably set the tone for a relationship defined, in part, by a sense of guilt among U.S. policymakers about the genocide and admiration for the RPF's role in stopping it. U.S. support for the RPF-led government has continued across successive Administrations and across partisan lines, with the executive branch and Congress working together to provide substantial aid to support Rwanda's development efforts and peacekeeper deployments. Yet, over the past decade, executive branch officials and some Members of Congress increasingly have criticized Rwanda's involvement in regional conflicts and expressed concern with its domestic political and human rights conditions.53
After meeting with President Kagame in Davos in January 2018, President Trump praised the United States' "great relationships" with Rwanda, including bilateral trade, and stated that "the job they've done is absolutely terrific."54 In September 2017 congressional testimony, then Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Yamamoto praised Rwanda's "remarkable gains" in health and development and characterized the country as "a major contributor to regional peace and security," while asserting that "Rwanda's record in the areas of human rights and democracy, while improved in some areas, remains a concern." He called on the government "to take steps toward a democratic transition of power."55
Regarding Rwanda's 2017 presidential election, the State Department stated that "we are disturbed by irregularities observed during voting and reiterate long-standing concerns over the integrity of the vote-tabulation process."56 In response to Member questions at the September 2017 hearing, Ambassador Yamamoto affirmed that "we are unable to assess this election as free and fair."57 At his Senate confirmation hearing in late 2017, the U.S. Ambassador-designate to Rwanda described his four top policy goals as the following: continuing the United States' "development partnership" with Rwanda, promoting U.S. business and economic ties, supporting Rwanda's continued peacekeeping role, and advancing "democratic ideals."58
President Trump suspended duty-free treatment of Rwandan apparel exports to the United States under AGOA in 2018, as noted above, citing Rwandan protectionist policies. The suspension came after the Administration initiated an out-of-cycle review of Rwanda's eligibility in 2017. In addition to concerns about trade barriers, Ambassador Yamamoto testified in 2017 that U.S. officials had also "raised concerns ... regarding harassment of political opposition leaders and [non-governmental organizations] as well as restrictions on media freedom with the context of AGOA eligibility."59 The impact may be largely symbolic: in 2017, U.S. imports from Rwanda totaled $44 million, of which $5 million were under AGOA.60 U.S. exports to Rwanda totaled $64 million that year.
U.S. bilateral aid to Rwanda aims to promote economic growth, food security, health, and military professionalism. The State Department has drawn on additional regionally- and centrally-managed funds to provide military aid to build Rwanda's peacekeeping capabilities, including under the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP) initiative, launched under President Obama in 2014. (The Trump Administration has not requested new appropriations in support of APRRP, but has continued to implement funds allocated in prior years.) APRRP was conceived to complement the State Department's Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), in which Rwanda also participates. The United States also provides humanitarian assistance for international organizations caring for Congolese and Burundian refugees in Rwanda.
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Rwanda, Selected Accounts (State + USAID)$ millions, appropriations
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Rwanda, Selected Accounts
millions of current dollars, by year of appropriation
|
FY2013 |
FY2014 |
FY2015 |
FY2016 |
FY2017 FY2018 |
|
|||||||||
|
DA |
61 |
65.0 |
54.7 |
49.8 |
46.0 |
13.7 (ESDF) |
||||||||
|
GHP (USAID + State) |
134.5 |
122.5 |
113.8 |
108.4 |
96. |
89.5
|
99.5 103.8 |
|||||||
|
IMET |
0.3 |
0,0
|
0.6 0.5 |
0.6 |
0. |
0.5 |
0. |
|||||||
|
P.L. 480 Title II ( |
6.9 |
0.0 |
0,0 |
0,0 |
0.0 |
0,0
|
- - |
|||||||
|
Sub-Total |
203.6 |
187.5 |
169.2 |
158.7 |
142. |
105.0 |
||||||||
|
161.3
|
113.6
|
Selected additional peacekeeping obligationsa
116.6 |
1.0 |
1.4 2.8 GPOI |
2. 1.2 GPOI |
2. TBD TBD - 12.3 APRRP 9.2 APRRP |
6.4 APRRP |
To be determined TBD |
Source: State Department Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2015-FY2018FY2020; State Department 653(a) estimated allocations, FY2017; State Department congressional notifications and responses to CRS queries.
Notes: This table includes only bilateral assistance funds administered by the State Department and/or USAIDMay not include all regionally- and centrally-managed funds. Totals may not sum due to rounding. DA = =Development Assistance; GHP = Global Health ProgramsFFP=Food for Peace; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; IMET = International Military Education and Training; PKO = Peacekeeping Operations; GSCF = Global Security Contingency FundGHP = Global Health Programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training. ESDF refers to a Trump Administration proposal to replacemerge DA and several other aid accounts with a consolidatedunder a new Economic SecuritySupport and Development Fund.
a. GPOI=Global Peace Operations Initiative; APRRP=Africa Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership. Funding for these programs has been drawn from Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) accounts and Development Fund.
Legislative Restrictions on Security Assistance
Successive Congresses have enacted foreign aid appropriations measures restricting certain types of U.S. military aid to Rwanda if it is found to be supporting rebel movements in neighboring countries. Citing such provisions, as well as the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (CSPA, Title IV of P.L. 110-457), the Obama Administration periodically suspended certain types of military aid—namely, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET)—in connection with reportedciting Rwandan support for rebels in DRC and, later, Burundi. U.S. military aid to buildMilitary aid in support of Rwanda's peacekeeping capacitycapabilities was exempted from such restrictions due tovia a combination of legislative provisions (e.g., §1208[f] of P.L. 113-4, the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, which excepts peacekeeping aid from child soldiers-related restrictions) and executive branch waivers. The executive-legislative branch interplay under the Obama and Trump Administrations (to date) is detailed below.
FY2012-FY2013: The Obama Administration invoked a provision of the FY2012 appropriations act (P.L. 112-74, §7043(a) of Division I), extended into FY2013 via continuing resolutions, to suspend FMF for Rwanda, citing its support for the M23 rebellion in DRC. The provision stated that FMF could be made available for Rwanda or Uganda "unless" the Secretary of State had "credible information" that either government was supporting armed groups in DRC.
FY2014: The Obama Administration continued to suspend FMF, consistent with a provision in that year's appropriations act (P.L. 113-76, §7042(l) of Division K) restricting FMF for Rwandasuch funds unless itRwanda was "taking steps to cease" support to certain armed groups in DRC. It also designated Rwanda under CSPA in connection with the M23's reported use of child soldiers, and fully applied thethat act's prohibition on various other forms of military aid, including IMET.
FY2015: The appropriations act prohibited FMF for Rwanda unless the Secretary of State certified to Congress that the government was "implementing a policy to cease" support to armed groups in DRC (P.L. 113-235, §7042[l] of Division J). The Obama Administration did not request FMF fundshad not requested FMF for Rwanda in its budget proposal, in any case, and none werewas provided. The State Department again designated Rwanda under CSPA, but the PresidentPresident Obama waived the act's aid prohibitions, citing the end of the M23 insurgency—thus allowing IMET, e.g.for example, to resume.64
FY2016: The State Department did not designate Rwanda under CSPA, and that year's appropriations act (P.L. 114-113) did not restrict security assistance for Rwanda. The Obama Administration did not request or provide FMF funds for Rwanda, in any case. IMET continued.
FY2017: The State Department againObama Administration (in mid-2016) designated Rwanda under CSPA in connection with its reported support for Burundian rebel groups' recruitment of child soldiers. The PresidentPresident Obama waived CSPA restrictions on IMET and several other types of security aid, however, and no FMF funding was requested for Rwanda or provided.6562 The appropriations act restricted certain types of IMET programs for any country in Africa's Great Lakes region unless the Secretary of State certified that it was "not facilitating or otherwise participating in destabilizing activities in a neighboring country" (P.L. 115-31, §7042(a) of Division J). The State Department obligatedprovided some IMET funds for Rwanda, but once the act passed into law, did not support activities that would have been prohibited in such a scenario.
FY2018: The Trump Administration did not designate Rwanda under CSPA. FY2017 appropriations provisions restricting IMET for Rwanda and neighboring countries have been carried over via continuing resolutions and are again included in House and Senate appropriations bills for FY2018 (Division G of H.R. 3354, and S. 1780, respectively).
Outlook and Issues for Congress
-FY2019 to date: Appropriations measures have continued to restrict certain types of IMET programs for any country in the Great Lakes region until the Secretary of State determines and reports that it is "not facilitating or otherwise participating in destabilizing activities in a neighboring country, including aiding and abetting armed groups" (most recently, P.L. 116-6 §7042(a) of Division F). The Trump Administration has not designated Rwanda under CSPA. It also has not requested or provided FMF for Rwanda.
Issues for Congress and Outlook
Congress has shaped U.S. policy and assistance to Rwanda through its authorization and appropriation of U.S. assistance, and through oversight activities and Member engagement. In 2012-2013, and again in 2015-2016, the application of legislative restrictions on U.S. security assistance—along with other donor criticism and aid suspensions—appeared to contribute to a decrease in Rwandan support for the M23 in DRC and may conceivably have dissuaded Rwanda from intervening more heavily in Burundi. Members may seek to derive lessons from this sequence of events as they consider pending appropriations bills and/or any future legislative proposals regarding U.S. aid to Rwanda. With regard to Rwanda's domestic conditions, questions remain around how the United States can best support the country's continued stability and growth, including whether continued U.S. support for Rwanda's development efforts can or should be premised on evidence of greater respect for political pluralism or individual liberties.
Author Contact Information
Footnotes
| 1. |
See, e.g., Julian Hattem, "Kagame seems set to win again in Rwanda. But is he a 'miracle man' or a nascent dictator?" Washington Post, August 2, 2017; The Economist, "Paul Kagame, Feted and Feared," July 15, 2017. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2. |
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3. |
Written statement to the HFAC Africa Subcommittee, "Rwanda: Democracy Thwarted," September 27, 2017. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4. |
Andy Kristian Agaba, "The case for Kagame's third term in Rwanda," Washington Post, August 3, 2017. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5. | Written statement to the HFAC Africa Subcommittee, "Rwanda: Democracy Thwarted," September 27, 2017. See CRS In Focus IF10149, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), by Brock R. Williams. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6. |
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 7. |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8. |
Laura Seay, "Is Rwanda's Authoritarian State Sustainable?" Washington Post, June 2, 2016. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 9. |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 10. |
See, e.g., |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 11. |
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 12. |
Rwanda has a bicameral parliament consisting of the Senate (26 seats, all either indirectly elected or appointed, with members serving eight-year terms) and the Chamber of Deputies (80 seats; 53 members directly elected by proportional representation, 24 women elected by special interest groups, and three selected by youth and disability organizations, with members serving five-year terms). See CIA World Factbook, "Rwanda." |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 13. |
See State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, "Rwanda," 2003, 2008, 2010, and 2013; and State Department press statement, "Presidential Election in Rwanda," August 5, 2017. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 14. |
See, e.g., Anjan Sundaram, Bad News: Last Journalists in a Dictatorship, Doubleday: 2016; Filip Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, Cambridge University Press: 2015. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 15. |
See, e.g., Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Allow Independent Autopsy of Opposition Politician," July 21, 2010. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 16. |
Diane Shima Rwigara, "I wanted to be Rwanda's first female president. Then fake nude photos appeared online." Washington Post, August 2, 2017. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 17. |
Human rights groups have raised due process concerns regarding Ingabire's trial without commenting on the veracity of the charges. See HRW, "Rwanda: Eight-Year Sentence for Opposition Leader," October 30, 2012. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 18. |
Jeune Afrique, "Kagame: Ce sera sans doute mon dernier mandat," May 22, 2017. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 19. |
According to Rwandan lawmakers who engaged citizens about the proposed amendments, only 10 people—out of millions consulted—opposed extending Kagame's mandate. Agence France-Presse, "Only 10 Rwandans oppose Kagame third term: report," August 11, 2015 and Ludovica Iaccino, "Rwanda Third-Term Bid: Term limits 'nothing to do with democracy' says President Kagame," International Business Times, June 22, 2015. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20. |
Stephanie Aglietti, "Rwanda counts referendum vote for extra terms for Kagame," AFP, December 18, 2015. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21. |
See, e.g., "Rwanda's Leader Must Step Down," an anonymous Op-Ed in the New York Times, December 17, 2015. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22. |
Exile-based opposition initiatives include the Rwandan National Congress (RNC), founded in 2010 by prominent RPF dissidents including the former army chief of staff Gen. Kayumba Nyamwasa, presidential chief of staff and Rwandan ambassador to the United States Theogene Rudasingwa, attorney general Gerald Gahima, and head of external intelligence Patrick Karegeya (who was subsequently killed in South Africa). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 23. |
HRW, "Rwanda: Repression Across Borders," January 28, 2014; Globe & Mail, "Rwanda's Hunted," May 2, 2014; BBC News, "Rwandan Nyamwasa Murder Plot: Four Guilty in South Africa," August 29, 2014. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 24. |
Kagame denied involvement in the murder of prominent dissident Patrick Karegeya in South Africa in January 2014, while stating, "I actually wish Rwanda did it." The Wall Street Journal, "Rwanda Leader Denies Role in Ex-Spy Chief's Death," January 23, 2014. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 25. |
U.N. Human Rights Commission, "Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association at the conclusion of his visit to the Republic of Rwanda," January 27, 2014. Civil society groups are reportedly able to operate freely only if they align with the government and its development agenda. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 26. |
HRW, "Rwanda: Events of 2016," World Report 2017. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 27. |
HRW, "'We Will Force You to Confess': Torture and Unlawful Military Detention in Rwanda," October 10, 2017. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 12.
|
|
See "U.N. Outreach Program on the Rwandan Genocide and the U.N.," at http://www.un.org. 13.
|
|
Authorship of the plane crash is disputed. Official accounts point to Hutu extremists, while some researchers and RPF defectors have asserted that RPF forces shot it down. The government and RPF reject such accounts. 14.
|
|
See Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide," The Atlantic, September 2001. In remarks in Kigali in 1998, President Bill Clinton expressed remorse and pledged that the United States would do better in the future. 15.
|
|
See U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR), Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, August 2010. 16.
|
|
See Jina Moore, "Betraying Justice for Rwanda's Genocide Survivors," The New Yorker, July 9, 2018. 17.
|
|
See, most recently, U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Massachusetts, "Rwandan Man Convicted for Immigration Fraud and Perjury in Connection with the 1994 Genocide," April 5, 2019. 18.
|
|
See State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, "Rwanda," 2003, 2008, 2010, and 2013; and press statement, "Presidential Election in Rwanda," August 5, 2017. 19.
|
|
Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Rwanda: Events of 2018," World Report 2019. See also U.N. Human Rights Commission, "Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association at the conclusion of his visit to the Republic of Rwanda," January 27, 2014. 20.
|
|
See State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, "Rwanda," 2018. 21.
|
|
See, e.g., Anjan Sundaram, Bad News: Last Journalists in a Dictatorship, Doubleday: 2016; Filip Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, Cambridge University Press: 2015. 22.
|
|
The Independent, "Kagame scoffs at critics of Rwanda's democracy model," July 23, 2017; and remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations, September 19, 2017, as reported by the official Twitter feed of the Rwandan presidency. 23.
|
|
Columbia Journalism Review, "'A fragile period': Journalism in Rwanda, 25 years after the genocide," April 4, 2019. 24.
|
|
Jeune Afrique, "Kagame: Ce sera sans doute mon dernier mandat," May 22, 2017. 25.
|
|
See CNN, "US Congressional Support Builds for Rwandan Opposition Leader," December 4, 2018. 26.
|
|
Human rights groups raised due process concerns with Ingabire's trial without directly challenging the veracity of the charges. See Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Rwanda: Eight-Year Sentence for Opposition Leader," October 30, 2012. 27.
|
|
Associated Press, "Rwanda's President to Newly Freed Prisoners: Be Careful," September 20, 2018. 28.
|
|
See CNN, "Aide to Leading Rwandan Opposition Politician Found Dead," March 11, 2019. 29.
|
|
See, e.g., HRW, "Allow Independent Autopsy of Opposition Politician," July 21, 2010. 30.
|
|
See, e.g., "Rwanda's Leader Must Step Down," an anonymous Op-Ed in the New York Times, December 17, 2015. 31.
|
|
HRW, "Rwanda: Repression Across Borders," January 28, 2014; Wall Street Journal, "Rwanda Leader Denies Role in Ex-Spy Chief's Death," January 23, 2014. 32.
|
|
HRW, "'We Will Force You to Confess': Torture and Unlawful Military Detention in Rwanda," October 10, 2017. |
The NCHR asserts that some individuals are still alive, or died of other causes, which Human Rights Watch disputes. HRW, "'All Thieves Must Be Killed': Extrajudicial Executions in Western Rwanda," July 13, 2017; and "Rwanda: Cover-Up Negates Killings," November 1, 2017. |
| 29. |
Providing for Peacekeeping, "Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Rwanda," 2015. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
Timothy Longman, interviewed in World Politics Review, "Church and Mosque Closures in Rwanda Show the Increasing Power of the State," April 12, 2018. 35.
|
|
Providing for Peacekeeping, "Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Rwanda," 2015; "Remarks by Ambassador Samantha Power at a UN Ministerial Meeting on the Future of Civilian Protection in Peace Operations," Belfer Center, May 11, 2016. Citing Rwanda's experience in 1994, in which U.N. peacekeepers withdrew as massacres were spreading, Rwandan officials have sought multilateral support for robust implementation of peacekeeper mandates for the protection of civilians, via commitments known as the "Kigali Principles." |
See CRS Report R43166, Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Relations, by |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See, e.g., Thomas Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality, Zed Books: 2007; Gérard Prunier, Africa's World War: Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe, Oxford University Press: 2008; René Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press: 2009; Jason Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters, PublicAffairs: 2011. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 32. |
See, e.g., Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, April 2001, U.N. doc. S/2001/357. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 33. |
See Testimony of then-Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson before the HFAC Africa subcommittee, hearing on "The Devastating Crisis in Eastern Congo," December 11, 2012. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 34. |
Jason Stearns, "As the M23 nears defeat, more questions than answers," Congo Siasa, October 30, 2013. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 35. |
Congo Siasa, op. cit. In early 2017, clashes were reported between ex-M23 fighters and the Congolese military, leading to speculation over whether the M23 was regrouping. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
39.
See Testimony of then-Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson before the HFAC Africa subcommittee, hearing on "The Devastating Crisis in Eastern Congo," December 11, 2012. |
Refugees International, "Asylum Betrayed: Recruitment of Burundian Refugees in Rwanda," December 14, 2015; Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, May 23, 2016, U.N. doc. S/2016/466. See also CRS Report R44018, Burundi's Political Crisis: In Brief, by |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 39. |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 41. |
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), from 1990 and 2016, life expectancy increased from 48 to 66 years; the mortality rate of children under five fell from 152 to 42 deaths per 1,000 live births; and the maternal mortality rate decreased from 1,300 deaths to 290 deaths per 100,000 live births. (WHO, World Health Statistics 2016). See also Partners in Health, "Rwanda's Rebirth: A Blueprint for health systems strengthening," February 25, 2013. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 42. |
CIA World Factbook (July 2017); and Partners in Health, "Rwanda's Rebirth," op. cit. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 43. |
Republic of Rwanda, Rwanda Vision 2020, available via the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning website. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 44. |
Rwanda 2020, op. cit. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
Institute for Security Studies (South Africa), "The Great Lakes Can't Afford More Instability," March 18, 2019; U.N. Security Council, Final report of the Group of Experts, June 8, 2018, U.N. doc. S/2018/531. 45.
|
|
"Rwanda – Market Overview," http://www.export.gov, March 28, 2019. 46.
|
|
Police reportedly systematically detain and sometimes abuse individuals engaged in begging or informal commerce; see Mail & Guardian, "The Kigali Paradox: How did Rwanda's capital become Africa's cleanest city?" March 6, 2019. |
State Department, Investment Climate Statements for 2017, "Rwanda." |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
See University of Rwanda, Management Sciences for Health, and the Rockefeller Foundation, Technical Brief: The Development of Community-Based Health Insurance in Rwanda: Experiences and Lessons, March 2016. 50.
|
|
CIA World Factbook; Partners in Health, "Rwanda's Rebirth: A blueprint for health systems strengthening," February 2013. 51.
|
|
Review of African Political Economy blog, "A Straightforward Case of Fake Statistics," April 18, 2019; World Bank factsheet, "Q&A on Rwanda Poverty Statistics," April 22, 2019. |
IMF. Rwanda: Selected Issues. IMF. Country Report No. 17/214. July 2017. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 48. |
The fund aims to raise the equivalent of $236 million by 2020. See Steven Muvunyi, "Agaciro Development Fund calls for more contributions," New Times, December 3, 2016. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 49. |
An Ansoms et al., "Statistics versus livelihoods: questioning Rwanda's pathway out of poverty," Review of African Political Economy, vol. 44: 151 (2016); and Review of African Political Economy Blog, "Rwandan Poverty Statistics: Exposing the 'Donor Darling,'" May 31, 2017. Accounts by exiled dissidents have contributed to this analysis. See, e.g., David Himbara, "Why I quit as Rwandan President Paul Kagame's economic advisor," Quartz, January 16, 2015. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
President William J. Clinton, "Remarks to the People of Rwanda," March 25, 1998, transcript as written. Clinton's remarks, in which he committed the United States and international community to "strengthen our ability to prevent and, if necessary, to stop genocide," presaged various subsequent U.S. policy initiatives to prevent and respond to the threat of "mass atrocities" abroad. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
The Obama Administration referred to Rwanda as "one of Africa's most dramatic and encouraging success stories," but expressed concerns about political conditions surrounding the 2010 presidential elections and 2015 referendum, and critiqued Kagame's decision in 2016 to run for reelection. A State Department official testified to Congress in 2015 that the Department was "troubled by the succession of what appear to be politically motivated murders of Rwandan exiles." In 2016, a State Department official raised reports that "the Rwandan government has been involved in destabilizing activities in Burundi" in congressional testimony. In 2012-2013, top officials |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
The White House, "Remarks by President Trump and President Kagame of the Republic of Rwanda After Expanded Bilateral Meeting," January 26, 2018. The meeting and remarks followed public allegations that President Trump had used a disparaging term to refer to countries in Africa in the context of debates over immigration. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Donald Yamamoto, testimony before the HFAC Africa Subcommittee, "Rwanda: Democracy Thwarted," September 27, 2017. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
State Department press release, "Presidential Election in Rwanda," August 5, 2017. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Testimony before the HFAC Africa Subcommittee, September 27, 2017, op. cit. The hearing also featured extensive discussion of reported Rwandan assassination attempts, centering around the testimony of two exiled Rwandans. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 56. |
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, press statement, "Rwanda National Day," July 1, 2017. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 57. |
Ambassador-designate Peter Vrooman, testimony before SFRC, December 19, 2017. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 58. |
The decision followed a petition by the U.S. Secondary Materials and Recycled Textiles Association asserting that an EAC ban on imports of second-hand clothes violates the terms of AGOA. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), "Request for Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Concerning an Out-of-Cycle Review of Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda Eligibility for Benefits Under the African Growth and Opportunity Act," June 20, 2017. As of December 2017, the review appeared to be ongoing, according to USTR statements. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 59. |
Africa Confidential, "The EAC's used clothes," September 8, 2017. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
59.
Ambassador-designate Peter Vrooman, testimony before SFRC, December 19, 2017. |
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Donald Yamamoto testimony, op. cit. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
U.S. International Trade Commission data, consulted January 2018. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 62. |
State Department, FY2018 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, May 23, 2017. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 63. |
Rwanda notably received two Cessna aircraft and related training, water purification and bridge building equipment and training, heavy vehicles, and rapidly deployable field hospitals. The White House, "FACT SHEET: U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa," August 6, 2014; State Department, "U.S. Peacekeeping Capacity Building Assistance," January 25, 2017. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Presidential Determination with Respect to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, September 30, 2014. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Presidential Determination with Respect to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, September 28, 2016. |