Updated March 26, 2018
Burkina Faso: In Focus
Landlocked with a largely agrarian economy, Burkina Faso
remains one of the world’s poorest countries. Per-capita
gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated at $696 in
2017. Nearly 45% of the population is under the age of 14,
life expectancy is less than 56 years, and the infant
mortality rate is the seventh-highest in the world.
Burkina Faso has made progress toward strengthening
democracy and civilian control of the armed forces since a
tumultuous political transition in 2014-2015, but it faces a
range of political and security challenges. Previously, under
the rule of former President Blaise Compaoré (1987-2014),
Burkina Faso was known as a relatively stable, semiauthoritarian state that dabbled in regional conflicts without
being subsumed by them. Compaoré was ousted by a
combination of street protests and military intervention in
2014, and a similar mix of actors faced down a coup
attempt by a prominent Compaoré loyalist in 2015. The
November 2015 election of President Roch Marc Christian
Kaboré marked the country’s first democratic transfer of
power since independence from France in 1966. A former
Compaoré ally turned opposition figure, Kaboré has
struggled to respond to high popular expectations and
public demands for rapid job creation, governance reforms,
and sweeping prosecutions of former regime figures.
Over the past three years, an Islamist insurgency has
emerged in the rural north, while the capital, Ouagadougou,
has been hit by three large terrorist attacks against Western
and domestic targets. The growing threat posed by Islamist
armed groups is linked to the conflict in neighboring Mali,
where an Al Qaeda-aligned Islamist insurgency has
coalesced and expanded southward since 2015. It also
appears to be increasingly locally rooted, despite Burkina
Faso’s history of stability and religious tolerance.
Background
Compaoré’s seizure of power in a 1987 coup brought
relative stability after decades of alternating civilian and
military rule. Despite his closeness to Libya’s Muammar
Qadhafi and reported backing of various rebel groups in
neighboring states, Compaoré eventually developed a
reputation as a competent leader in a turbulent region, and
served as a mediator in several West African political
crises. Compaoré’s 27-year tenure was nonetheless roiled
by periodic street protests and army mutinies.
In October 2014, youth-led protesters stormed the National
Assembly to force the withdrawal of a bill that could have
allowed Compaoré to run again for reelection. As protests
escalated, and amid indications that a military coup might
be under way, Compaoré resigned and fled to Côte d’Ivoire.
The deputy commander of the elite Presidential Security
Regiment (RSP) proclaimed himself president, but he later
accepted the post of Prime Minister in a transitional
government led by a career diplomat, Michel Kafando.
Figure 1. Burkina Faso at a Glance
Source: CIA World Factbook and International Monetary Fund (IMF,
October 2017); 2017 estimates unless otherwise indicated.
As interim leader, Kafando sought reforms to reduce the
power of key pillars of the Compaoré regime, including the
ruling party and the RSP itself. In October 2015, RSP
commander Gen. Gilbert Diendéré attempted to overthrow
Kafando in a coup, sparking resurgent street protests and
international condemnation. Ultimately, conventional army
units surrounded the RSP’s barracks, forcing Diendéré’s
surrender and Kafando’s reinstatement. Kafando then
ordered the RSP’s dissolution and disarmament, although
the extent of implementation has been uncertain. Burkinabè
courts later brought charges against Diendéré and others in
connection with the 2015 coup attempt, but the trial has
been slow to progress. Efforts to prosecute various highlevel state crimes allegedly committed under Compaoré
have largely stalled, prompting frustration among activists.
Presidential and parliamentary elections in November 2015
marked the end of the formal transition period. Kaboré won
the presidency with 54% of the vote, and his People’s
Movement for Progress (MPP) won a slim plurality of seats
(55 out of 127) in the National Assembly, later forming a
ruling coalition with several smaller parties. The political
opposition is headed by Zéphirin Diabré, leader of the
Union for Progress and Change (UPC) party. Diabré came
in second in the 2015 elections, with 30% of the
presidential vote, and the UPC won 30 Assembly seats.
The Economy
Annual economic growth has averaged over 5% during the
past decade, according to the IMF, but has not consistently
outpaced population growth. The formal economy relies
largely on exports of cotton and gold, for which global
prices have fluctuated. The vast majority of the labor force
is engaged in agriculture, which reportedly generates onethird of GDP. Remittances from as many as 3 million
Burkinabè residing in wealthier neighboring Côte d’Ivoire
also contribute to the economy. The State Department’s
2017 Investment Climate Statement reported that Burkina
Faso “welcomes foreign investment and actively seeks to
attract foreign partners to aid in its development,” but the
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Burkina Faso: In Focus
report identified “poor access to information, a weak
judiciary, limited enforcement powers of anti-corruption
institutions, misappropriation of public funds, and the lack
of an effective separation of powers” as key challenges.
While the most recent severe food security emergency was
a 2012 regional drought in the Sahel, endemic food
insecurity affects much of the population. In 2018, high
prices for staple foods and rising insecurity in the north are
placing additional stress on poor households, according to
the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS-NET).
About 70% of the population lives in rural areas, where
access to basic services is limited.
Terrorist Threat
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—an Algerianorigin network active across North and West Africa—has
cultivated safe havens and local affiliates in neighboring
Mali for at least 15 years. AQIM and its local allies have
proven resilient, positioning themselves to leverage the
evolving, complex war in Mali to their advantage and to
withstand an ongoing French military intervention that
began in 2013. Islamist violence spared Burkina Faso prior
to 2015, but these groups since appear to have successfully
leveraged proximity and a combination of domestic factors
to expand their influence there.
In Burkina Faso’s rural, predominantly Muslim and ethnic
Fulani north, entrenched patterns of poor governance,
patronage politics, social stratification, and government
neglect may have fed grievances leveraged by jihadist
groups. Compaoré’s ouster and the decision to dissolve the
RSP may also have deprived Burkinabè authorities of
means to collect intelligence and influence regional jihadist
networks. Deeper security sector reforms have not
advanced significantly. Sectarian tensions have also
reportedly risen in recent years, despite a history of
peaceful coexistence among Burkina Faso’s Muslim
majority and Christian and animist minority communities.
The capital, Ouagadougou, experienced its first ever
terrorist attack in January 2016, when gunmen opened fire
at a hotel and coffee shop popular with foreigners—days
after the country’s new cabinet was seated following
President Kaboré’s inauguration. The assault, claimed
jointly by AQIM and its erstwhile splinter faction Al
Murabitoun, killed 30 people, including a U.S. citizen.
Around the same time, a domestic Islamist insurgency,
Ansarul Islam, emerged in northern Soum province along
the Malian border. The group, whose founder was
reportedly mentored by a key jihadist figure in central Mali,
has largely targeted local state actors, schools, and
individuals seen as collaborating with the security forces. In
February 2018, the Trump Administration designated
Ansarul Islam for sanctions under Executive Order 13224.
The January 2016 Ouagadougou attack was one in a series
of three large attacks in West African cities between late
2015 and early 2016 that signaled greater fusion between
AQIM and its Sahel-based offshoots. In early 2017,
AQIM’s Sahel “emirate,” Al Murabitoun, and two Malianled jihadist groups announced they were forming a new
coalition known as the Group for Supporting Islam and
Muslims (JNIM, after its transliterated Arabic name). In
March 2018, JNIM—which has mostly been active in
Mali—claimed a simultaneous attack on the Burkinabè
military headquarters and the French embassy in
Ouagadougou. The attack reportedly killed eight Burkinabè
soldiers and wounded about 80; eight alleged assailants
were also killed. It appeared to signal a significant
escalation in the threat facing the country.
U.S. Policy and Aid
U.S. policy has focused on encouraging Burkina Faso’s
democratic transition, improving food security, and
building counterterrorism capacity. In December 2017,
then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated (on the
occasion of Burkina Faso’s National Day) that the United
States and Burkina Faso would “continue to work together
to promote democratic principles, security, economic
opportunities, and social development.” Burkina Faso is
eligible for U.S. trade benefits under the African Growth
and Opportunity Act (AGOA, reauthorized in P.L. 114-27).
“U.S. relations with Burkina Faso are excellent, thanks
in part to strong U.S. support during the 2014-2015
political transition.” State Department Fact Sheet, “U.S.
Relations with Burkina Faso,” October 13, 2017
Bilateral aid is modest by regional standards, totaling $36.7
million in FY2017, nearly all for health and food aid
programs. Additional funding for food security initiatives
has been provided under USAID’s Sahel Regional Program,
which promotes resilience to repeated crises, and through
the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), for which Burkina
Faso was made a focus country in 2017. The Trump
Administration has proposed to decrease bilateral aid for
Burkina Faso in FY2019 to $20.3 million, nearly all of
which would be for health programs. Burkina Faso is also
developing proposals for a second U.S. Millennium
Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact, having completed
a five-year, $481 million Compact in 2014 that focused on
land tenure and management, agricultural productivity, road
infrastructure, and primary school completion for girls.
Burkina Faso has received substantial security assistance
through regional and centrally funded programs, which are
not reflected in the bilateral aid figures above. Notably,
Burkina Faso participates in the State Department-led
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and
the Africa Contingency Operations Training & Assistance
(ACOTA) program, which prepares African troops to
deploy as peacekeepers. (Burkina Faso is the largest troop
contributor to the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Mali.)
The Defense Department has also provided assistance to
Burkinabè forces under its global train-and-equip authority.
Since 2017, the Trump Administration has pledged at least
$30 million to support Burkina Faso’s participation in a
“joint force” launched by the G5 Sahel—Burkina Faso,
Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad—to counter crossborder security threats.
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
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IF10434
Burkina Faso: In FocusOctober 23, 2019
Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso has become a stark symbol of worsening
security trends in West Africa’s Sahel region, due to an
armed conflict that began in 2016. Islamist insurgents—
some of whom have ties to the conflict in neighboring Mali,
and to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State—have asserted
control over parts of the country and carried out several
large attacks in the capital. State security forces and tacitly
state-backed militia groups have been accused of severe
human rights abuses during counterterrorism operations,
including torture and extrajudicial killings.
The conflict has caused a burgeoning humanitarian
emergency, exacerbating longstanding development
challenges. Per U.N. reports, insurgent attacks and ethnic
violence had forced nearly 500,000 people to flee their
homes as of October 2019 (compared to about 80,000
reported to be displaced at the start of the year) and crippled
the health and education sectors in parts of the country.
The rising violence—some playing out along ethnic lines—
has subsumed the initial optimism of the country’s recent
democratic transition. The election of President Roch Marc
Christian Kaboré in late 2015 was the culmination of a
political transition process that began in 2014, when
protesters, backed by several military commanders, ousted
President Blaise Compaoré. A towering figure in West
African politics, Compaoré came to power in a 1987 coup;
his latest attempt to change the constitution to evade term
limits sparked the protests that unseated him. In mid-2015,
a counter-coup by elite military forces loyal to Compaoré
nearly derailed the civilian-led transitional government, but
civilian protesters and conventional army units ultimately
induced the coup leaders to stand down.
A former Compaoré ally turned opposition figure, President
Kaboré has since struggled to respond to demands for rapid
job creation, reforms, and accountability for former regime
abuses. In January 2019, the entire cabinet resigned amid
rising insurgent attacks, including kidnappings of
foreigners. Elections are due in 2020, but whether conflictaffected areas will be able to participate is uncertain.
Terrorism and Insurgency
Ouagadougou experienced its first large terrorist attack in
January 2016, when gunmen opened fire at a hotel and
coffee shop popular with foreigners, killing 30 people—
including an American. The assault was jointly claimed by
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, an Algerian-led
regional network) and an offshoot known as Al
Murabitoun. Around the same time, an Islamist insurgency
known as Ansarul Islam emerged in the north, where it has
targeted schools, state officials, and individuals accused of
collaborating with the security forces. Attacks escalated in
2017 after the merger of several Islamist armed groups
active in Mali—AQIM’s Sahel branch, along with Al
Murabitoun and two Malian-led groups—under the banner
of the Group for Supporting Islam and Muslims (JNIM
after its transliterated Arabic name).
Figure 1. Burkina Faso at a Glance
Source: CIA and IMF public databases; 2018 estimates unless noted.
While remaining active primarily in Mali, JNIM has
claimed several attacks in Burkina Faso, including deadly
simultaneous assaults on the national military headquarters
and the French embassy in Ouagadougou in March 2018.
According to U.N. terrorism sanctions monitors, JNIM and
Ansarul Islam cooperate but remain distinct. Militants have
conducted several attacks on churches, though they appear
to tolerate Christians in some areas they control. Mosques
have also been attacked. Unlike in Mali, Islamist armed
groups in Burkina Faso do not publicly claim responsibility
for most attacks, for reasons that are unclear.
The conflict has particularly affected the north and east,
with signs of spillover into the countries of coastal West
Africa to the south. In the north, Ansarul Islam and JNIM
appear to have leveraged inter-ethnic frictions, grievances
stemming from corruption, patronage politics, social
stratification, land disputes, and state neglect. The east has
emerged as a stronghold for a different AQIM splinter
faction that has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and
is known as the Islamic State-Greater Sahara. The group
notably claimed the October 2017 deadly ambush of U.S.
troops in Niger. Militants in the east appear to have sought
ties with cross-border criminal networks and exploited
grievances over restrictions on poaching and logging.
Conflict Drivers
The reasons and timing behind Burkina Faso’s vulnerability
to civil war are a matter of debate. Sectarian tensions have
reportedly risen in recent years despite a history of peaceful
coexistence, in part stemming from continued minority
Christian dominance of the civil service and political class.
Mali-based Islamist insurgents have long threatened to
attack countries, such as Burkina Faso, that contribute
troops to the U.N. peacekeeping mission there. Under
Compaoré, security officials apparently maintained
communications with Mali-based militant factions and
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Burkina Faso
participated in lucrative hostage-release negotiations.
Compaoré’s ouster and the transitional government’s
decision to dissolve his elite presidential guard after the
2015 coup attempt arguably disrupted the security
apparatus, which in any case had little prior experience in
active combat or counterterrorism.
Today, state counterinsurgency tactics may be driving
conflict dynamics in some areas. Security forces and
militias known as koglweogos (“guardians of the bush” in
the local Mooré language) have allegedly carried out
extrajudicial killings during ostensible counterterrorism
operations in the north, predominantly targeting members
of the minority ethnic Fulani (alt. Peul) community.
Ansarul Islam, like a central Mali Islamist faction to which
it reportedly has ties, was founded by a Fulani, and Fulanis
are often accused of colluding with militants. Abuses may,
in turn, erode state legitimacy and further encourage Fulani
recruitment as community members turn to armed groups
for protection and revenge.
Regional Counterterrorism Initiatives
Burkina Faso belongs to the G5 Sahel (along with Mali,
Chad, Mauritania, and Niger), an ad-hoc partnership that
has pursued joint counterterrorism efforts in border areas.
The G5 Sahel has struggled to coordinate and sustain
operations. The United States, the European Union, and
Arab Gulf states—have pledged support, but not at the scale
that G5 members have solicited. West African leaders
convened an emergency summit in September 2019 in an
effort to broaden the regional fight against Islamist
militancy and garner increased resources.
French Military Operations. Burkina Faso is within the
scope of France’s Operation Barkhane, a regional
counterterrorism mission launched in 2014 after France’s
military intervention in Mali. The U.S. Defense Department
provides logistical and intelligence support. President
Kaboré has pursued additional external counterterrorism
aid, and France has pledged to expand military cooperation
since 2018. At the same time, increased engagement by the
former colonial power has sparked criticism from some
government officials and local activists.
U.S. Hostage Rescue. In May 2019, French special
operations forces freed two French hostages that an Islamist
armed group had kidnapped in Benin and moved into
Burkina Faso. The French forces also freed two additional
hostages (an American and a South Korean) of whose
existence they had reportedly been unaware. Two French
soldiers were killed during the mission. U.S. authorities
have not disclosed the name of the American hostage or the
conditions of her kidnapping, citing privacy restrictions.
Politics
The November 2015 general elections were arguably the
most open and competitive in Burkina Faso’s history, and
produced the country’s first electoral transfer of power.
President Kaboré won 53% of the vote and his People’s
Movement for Progress (MPP) won a slim plurality in the
National Assembly (55 seats out of 127), later forming a
majority coalition with smaller parties. The MPP again
performed well in municipal polls in 2016 that were
generally assessed to be well administered, although voters
in some areas were unable to vote due to security threats.
Zéphirin Diabré came in second in the presidential race and
heads the political opposition; his Union for Progress and
Change (UPC) holds 33 seats in parliament. Ex-President
Compaoré, in exile in Côte d’Ivoire, appears to retain
influence over his former ruling Congress for Democracy
and Progress (CDP), now the third-largest party in
parliament with 18 seats.
Although political freedoms and civil liberties have
expanded in some ways since 2014, the parliament and
government enacted legislation in mid-2019 criminalizing
reports that could “demoralize” the armed forces,
potentially imposing a significant constraint on press
freedom. Islamist militants have also sharply curtailed
citizens’ rights in areas they control.
The Economy
Landlocked and with a largely agrarian workforce, Burkina
Faso is one of the world’s poorest countries. Endemic food
insecurity affects much of the population. Economic growth
has averaged nearly 6% annually over the past decade, per
International Monetary Fund (IMF) data, but has not always
outpaced population growth. The formal economy relies
largely on exports of cotton and gold, for which global
prices have fluctuated. Remittances from Burkinabè
residing in wealthier neighboring Côte d’Ivoire are a
lifeline for many. The State Department’s 2019 Investment
Climate Statement reports that Burkina Faso “welcomes
foreign investment” while identifying challenges such as
limited access to information, a weak judiciary, corruption,
and “the lack of an effective separation of powers.”
U.S. Policy and Aid
The State Department characterizes bilateral relations as
“excellent, thanks in part to strong U.S. support during the
2014-2015 political transition.” According to the
Department, U.S. policy is focused on Burkina Faso’s role
in regional security and stability, while also seeking to
promote democracy, human rights, and development.
U.S. bilateral aid appropriations totaled $46 million in
FY2018, for health programs ($29 million), Food for Peace
under P.L. 480 Title II (FFP, $16 million), and military
professionalization ($0.5 million). Burkina Faso receives
additional USAID regional and global aid that seeks to
improve food security, mitigate conflict, and counter
violent extremism. The country also has received sizable
security assistance through State Department regional and
global programs, as well as counterterrorism training and
equipment under the Department of Defense’s “global train
and equip” authority (10 U.S.C. 333), which are not
reflected in the figures above. Burkina Faso is developing
proposals for a second U.S. Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) development aid Compact, having
completed a five-year $481 million Compact in 2014 that
sought to improve land use, agricultural productivity, road
infrastructure, and primary school completion for girls.
The Trump Administration has proposed to decrease
bilateral aid for Burkina Faso to $25 million in FY2020,
partly reflecting a proposal to end FFP aid worldwide. The
FY2020 budget request would also decrease funding for
USAID’s regional programs in the Sahel and West Africa,
which have supported activities in Burkina Faso. Congress
did not adopt similar proposals in FY2018-FY2019.
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Burkina Faso
IF10434
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
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