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On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a "more affordable and sustainable" vehicle to replace the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals. Both vehicles arewere intended to play central roles in future Marine amphibious operations.
On June 14, 2013, Marine leadership put the MPC program "on ice" due to budgetary pressures but suggested the program might be resurrected some 10 years down the road when budgetary resources might be more favorable.
In what was described as a "drastic shift," the Marines decided to "resurrect" the MPC in March 2014. The Marines designated the MPC as ACV Increment 1.1 and planned to acquire about 200 vehicles. The Marines also plan to develop ACV Increment 1.2, a tracked, fully amphibious version, and to acquire about 470 vehicles and fund an ongoing high water speed study. Although ACV Increment 1.1 is to have a swim capability, another mode of transport (ship or aircraft) would be required to get the vehicles from ship to shore.
The Marines are reportedly exploring the possibility of developing a high water speed ACV 2.0, which could accompany tanks and light armored vehicles into combat.On November 5, 2014, it was reported the Marines released a draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for ACV Increment 1.1. The Marines were looking for information from industry regarding program milestones, delivery schedules, and where in the program cost savings can be achieved.
On November 24, 2015, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems and SAIC contracts to develop ACV 1.1 prototypes for evaluation. BAE's contract was for $103.8 million and SAIC's for $121.5 million, and each company was to build 16 prototypes to be tested over the next two years. The Marines expect to down select to a single vendor in 2018. On December 7, 2015, General Dynamics Land Systems filed a protest to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) about the award of the contract to BAE and SAIC, and GAO had until March 16, 2016, to decide on the protest. In March 2016, it was reported that GAO had denied GDLS's protest, noting that "the Marine Corps' evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the evaluation scheme identified in the solicitation." The Marines reportedly stated that the protest put the ACV 1.1 program about 45 days behind schedule but anticipated that the ACV 1.1 would still be fielded on time. Both BAE and SAIC delivered their prototypes early, and Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) testing began mid- March 2017.
In early December 2017, the Marines reportedly sent the ACV 1.1 down select request for proposals to BAE and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC).The Department of Defense's FY2018 Budget RequestFY2019 budget request requests $340.5265.7 million for 26 ACV 1.1s.
Potential issues for Congress include an increase in Marine Corps end strength and force structure resulting in an increase in overall ACV requirements and the challenges and risks associated with the Marines' new MPC/ACV acquisition strategy30 ACV 1.1s.
A potential issue for Congress is how the possible adoption of the Expeditionary Advance Base Operations operational concept could affect the ACV 1.1 program.
U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 5063, United States Marine Corps: Composition and Functions, dated October 1, 1986, states:
The Marine Corps will be organized, trained and equipped to provide an amphibious and land operations capability to seize advanced naval bases and to conduct naval land campaigns.
In this regard, the Marines are required by law to have the necessary equipment to conduct amphibious operations and land operations. The ACV and MPC are considered integral systems by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Marine Corps to meet this legal requirement, as well as providing critical capabilities to execute the nation's military strategy.
On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps—with "encouragement" from DOD—cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program. The EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), which currently transports Marines from ships to shore under hostile conditions. The Marine Corps cancelled the EFV due to excessive cost growth and poor performance in operational testing. Recognizing the need to replace the AAV, the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a "more affordable and sustainable" vehicle to take the place of the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner.
In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. At present, the Marines do not have a wheeled armored fighting vehicle that can operate as a dedicated infantry carrier with Marine maneuver forces inland. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim1 capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals. Because of a perceived amphibious "redundancy," some have questioned the need for both the ACV and MPC. In June 2013, citing budgetary pressures, the Marines reportedly put the MPC program "on ice" and suggested that it might not be resurrected for about 10 years.2 Although some have questioned why the Marines cannot simply "adopt" a U.S. Army personnel carrier, Marine requirements for a personnel carrier reflect the need for this vehicle to be compatible with amphibious assault craft, as well as to have an enhanced amphibious capability, which is not necessarily an Army requirement.
With the Marines involved in decades-long land conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and proliferating anti-access technologies such as guided missiles, some analysts questioned whether the Marines would ever again be called on to conduct a large-scale amphibious assault operation. In response to these questions and the perceived need to examine the post-Iraq and Afghanistan Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy and DOD studied the requirement to conduct large-scale amphibious operations and in early 2012 released a strategic vision for how amphibious operations will be conducted in the future. The primary assertion of this study is that the Marine Corps' and Navy's amphibious capabilities serve a central role in the defense of the global interests of a maritime nation. The need to maintain an amphibious assault capability is viewed by Marine Corps leadership as establishing the requirement for the ACV and MPC (as discussed in greater detail below).
Congress is responsible for authorizing and appropriating funds for all weapon systems programs, including the ACV and the MPC. In its oversight role, Congress could be concerned about how the ACV and MPC enableenables the Marines to conduct not only amphibious operations but also operations ashore. Another possible congressional concern is to what extent a robust amphibious assault capability is a necessary component of U.S. national security. Cost is another issue of interest to Congress.
At present, the Marines use the AAV-7A1 series amphibious assault vehicle to move Marines from ship to shore. The Marines have used the AAV since 1971 and expect to continue to use it until replaced by the ACV or a similar vehicle. Over the years, the Marines claim the AAV has become increasingly difficult to operate, maintain, and sustain. As weapons technology and threat capabilities have evolved since the early 1970s, the AAV—despite upgrades—is viewed as having capabilities shortfalls in the areas of water and land mobility performance, lethality, protection, and network capability. The AAV's two-mile ship-to-shore range is viewed by many as a significant survivability issue not only for the vehicle itself but also for naval amphibious forces.
Although the AAV has some armor protection and can operate inland to a limited extent, it is not intended for use as an infantry combat vehicle. The Marines do have the LAV-25, Light Armored Vehicle-25, an eight-wheeled armored vehicle that carries a crew of three and six additional Marines. The LAV-25 is armed with a 25 mm chain gun and a 7.62 mm machine gun but is not fully amphibious as it cannot cross a surf zone and would get to the beach via some type of connector such as the Landing Craft, Air Cushioned (LCAC). The LAV-25 has been in service since 1983. According to the Marine Program Executive Office (PEO) Land Systems, the LAV is not employed as an armored personnel carrier and usually carries a four-person Marine scout/reconnaissance team in addition to its crew.3 In this regard, the MPC was viewed as necessary by Marine leadership for the transport and enhanced armor protection of Marine infantry forces.
The Marines' 2011 Request for Information (RFI)5 to industry provides an overview of the operational requirements for the ACV. These requirements include the following:
The Marine Corps' 2011 Request for Information (RFI)7 to industry provided an overview of the operational requirements for the MPC. These requirements included the following:
As previously noted, Title 10 requires the Marines to have an amphibious and land operations capability. In addition to legal requirements, U.S. national security and military strategies imply a need to be capable of conducting forced entry operations from the sea. Marine involvement in protracted land campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and the growing acquisition of anti-access technologies, such as guided missiles, by both state and nonstate actors, led some influential military thinkers to question whether the Marines would ever again be called upon to conduct large-scale amphibious assault operations.9 In a May 2010 speech, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted rogue nations and nonstate movements such as Hezbollah possessed sophisticated anti-ship guided missiles, such as the Chinese-designed C-802, which could destroy naval ships and force them to stay far off shore, thereby making an amphibious assault by Marines highly dangerous.10 These and similar pronouncements by some defense analysts led to questioning the need for dedicated amphibious assault capabilities in light of growing "anti-access" technologies and weapon systems available to both hostile nations and nonstate actors. With the proliferation of anti-ship missiles, sea mines, and anti-aircraft systems, anti-access and area denial capabilities are increasing worldwide and have become not only a strategic but also operational and tactical considerations when contemplating amphibious operations.
In early 2012, DOD published the results of studies and supporting concepts that it asserted affirmed the need for the Marine Corps to maintain an amphibious assault capability. In March 2012, the Army and Marine Corps issued Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-Marine Corps Concept, which expressed the views of the two services on how they would project and sustain military power worldwide in the face of growing challenges to access and entry.11 The two services note:
Marine Corps forces embarked on amphibious shipping are specifically designed to provide multi-domain capabilities that are employed from the sea. U.S. Army forces may also operate from the sea in some scenarios. Sea-based forces utilize littoral maneuver (via surface and/or vertical means) to exploit gaps and seams in enemy defenses, deceive adversaries, and maneuver directly to key objectives ashore.12
In April 2012, the Marine Corps published the results of an Amphibious Capabilities Working Group study on naval amphibious capability. The study, Naval Amphibious Capability in the 21st Century: Strategic Opportunity and a Vision for Change, contends the United States is a maritime nation with critical maritime interests, noting 90% of global commerce that travels by sea is most vulnerable where sea meets land in the littorals.13 The study further finds "for a maritime nation with global interests, a minimal two brigade amphibious force represents a sound investment in ensuring access for the rest of the joint force."14 Although the study did not explicitly call for the development of the ACV or MPC—the study recommendations are characterized as resource-informed, program-neutral—the ACV and MPC are used in the study for evaluating the ability to project power ashore. While large-scale, World War II-type amphibious operations might no longer be the norm, the study suggests there are other roles for the ACV and MPC. Noting that emerging battlefield capabilities could mean that small teams might now have the ability to generate effects once associated with larger forces, the Marines propose that company landing teams (CLTs) might now be a more appropriately sized force for most amphibious operations.15 CLTs are viewed as being small enough to be inserted in a single wave but large enough to provide a capable force immediately. Another alternative to large-scale amphibious operations are small-scale amphibious raids described as "an historical forte of the Marine Corps."16 These raid forces go ashore only for the duration of the operation and then return to the sea. These raids could be useful in denying terrorist sanctuary, securing potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sites, destroying pirate safe havens, or destroying threat capabilities in port.17 In this sense, Naval Amphibious Capability in the 21st Century: Strategic Opportunity and a Vision for Change might be viewed as redefining thinking about the role of amphibious operations and making an argument for the need for the ACV and MPC.
Navy and Marine Corps thinking on amphibious assault continues to evolve, most recently articulated in March 2014's Expeditionary Force 21 - Forward and Ready: Now and in the Future.18 Regarding amphibious assault operations, Expeditionary Force 21 notes:
After World War II, the Marine Corps pursued the development of the helicopter as a tactical means to avoid fixed defenses, but the "Hogaboom Board" soon recognized that vertical maneuver capabilities alone would not fully replace surface maneuver, owing to weight and volume constraints. Since then, the Naval services have sought to develop complementary means of conducting vertical and surface littoral maneuver from increased distances, and via multiple penetration points, using the sea as maneuver space to offset the range and precision of modern weapons. In recent years, we have been very successful regarding vertical maneuver capabilities, but less so in the realm of surface maneuver. The Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) has been effective but is nearing the end of its service life. Our recent attempts to field an affordable, high-speed, long-range amphibious vehicle capable of maneuver at sea and on land have not met the requirement. Fielding high-speed, long-range high-capacity system of connectors, amphibious vehicles, and boats are a critical necessity for amphibious operations.
We will continue to conduct future amphibious operations at the time and place of our choosing. We will maneuver through the littorals to positions of advantage, employ disaggregated, distributed and dispersed forces to secure entry points that allow us to rapidly build our combat power ashore and allow for the quick introduction of follow-on joint/coalition forces to maintain momentum and expand the area of operation. Mindful of limitations on resources, we need to develop a viable combination of connectors, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and boats, as well as the ships—to include the well decks or davits—that project them exploring a mix of surface maneuver options that:
- Are deployable, employable and sustainable given the power projection means available.
- Operate with reduced signature to multiple penetration points.
- In coordination with the Navy, employ low-signature landing craft and boats with increased range and speed, as well as the ability to penetrate an unimproved coastline.
- Provide the means to conduct surface maneuver from amphibious ships beyond 65 nm offshore.
- Provide the capability to maneuver through the complex terrain of the littorals.
- Provide a mechanism to identify, bypass, and if required breach shore-laid obstacle belts (explosive and non-explosive) to secure entry points.
- Provide maneuver options to extend operations within constraints of fuel resupply resources.
- Increase ability to work with space assets and develop capabilities within the cyber realm.19
Marine leadership has emphasized the need for high-speed connectors—surface and air vehicles that can transport Marines, vehicles, and equipment from ships to shore—to accomplish these goals. Instead of confronting an enemy "head on," Marine leadership envisions using high-speed connectors and associated vehicles such as the MPC to "side step the full force of an enemy, instead penetrating its seam."20 This concept of "finding" the seams is viewed as necessary to avoid confronting a growing array of "anti-access" technologies and weapon systems available to both hostile nations and nonstate actors that could pose a significant threat to connectors associated with Marine amphibious operations.
The Navy and Marines continue to refine their respective thinking on the changing nature of amphibious warfare. As the threat from long-range precision weapons continues to evolve, stand-off distances for naval vessels participating in amphibious operations could be as much as 100 nautical miles from shore. At these distances, ship-to-shore connectors22 take on a much more prominent role in amphibious operations and ACVs will no longer need to be as capable in the water, as they are expected to traverse shorter distances to shore. With this being the case, the cost of producing ACVs would likely be less than originally envisioned.
This increased dependence on connectors could prove problematic as current connectors—such as the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), Landing Craft Utility 1600, and even the Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV)—are mostly unprotected and would be vulnerable to enemy fire and need to operate outside the range of an enemy's small arms fire. Even the Navy's future Ship-to-Shore Connector (SSC)—the LCAC's replacement—is not planned to have the enhanced protection needed to operate close enough to shore to debark ACVs for a beach assault. This suggests the protection requirements for next generation connectors could play a prominent role in the development of future connectors.
Defense officials have noted the Marine Corps is "not currently organized, trained and equipped to face a peer adversary in the year 2025"9 and enemies with advanced air and shore defense will make amphibious operations even riskier. To counter this, the Navy is developing the Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) operational concept to address these concerns. EABO is described as:
Expeditionary Advance Base Operations is a naval operational concept that anticipates the requirements of the next paradigm of US Joint expeditionary operations. The concept is adversary based, cost informed and advantage focused. EABO calls for an alternative, difficult to target forward basing infrastructure that will enable US naval and joint forces to create a more resilient forward based posture to persist, partner and operate within range of adversary long range precision fires. The alternative forward posture enabled by Expeditionary Advance Bases (EABs) is designed to mitigate the growing threat posed by the abundant quantity, expanded range and enhanced precision of potential adversary weaponry--particularly ballistic and cruise missiles designed to attack critical joint fixed forward infrastructure and large platforms. EABs provide a dispersed and largely mobile forward basing infrastructure that enables a persistent alternative force capability set that is similarly designed to be difficult to target and inherently resilient. The resilient, reduced signature infrastructure of EABs, combined with naval forces designed and structured to persist and operate within the arc of adversary anti-access/aerial denial (A2AD) capabilities enables naval commanders to conduct Expeditionary Advance Base Operations to support Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), and Fleet Commanders in the fight for sea control, by exploiting the opportunities afforded by key maritime terrain, particularly in close and confined seas. EABO advances, sustains and maintains the naval and joint sensor, shooter and sustainment capabilities of dispersed forces to leverage the decisive massed capabilities of the larger joint force with enhanced situational awareness, augmented fires and logistical support. The EABO Concept enables US naval forces to exercise 21st Century naval operational art, meet new enemy A2AD threats with new capabilities and operate and thrive in and around close and confined seas.10
In terms of Marine Corps amphibious assault operations, the adoption of EABO could reportedly result in "an entirely different approach to amphibious assaults as well as new weapon systems."11 Noting that "missiles can now hit ships and landing craft while they are hundreds of miles from shore, making it far too dangerous for Marines to storm a beach with current capabilities,"12 Marine officials are reportedly exploring ways to create temporary "bubbles" where Marines can get ashore. In response to these challenges, current and planned weapons systems might need to be modified to accommodate EABO operational concepts.
Past Programmatic ActivitiesAs previously noted, in June 2013, citing budgetary pressures, the Marines reportedly put the MPC program "on ice" and suggested it might not be resurrected for about 10 years.2313 At the time of the decision, the Marines' acquisition priorities were refocused to the ACV as well as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).2414 Although the Marines refocused budgetary resources to the ACV, difficulties in developing an affordable high water speed capability for the ACV continued to confront Marine leadership.25
In what was described as a "drastic shift," the Marines decided in March 2014 to "resurrect" the MPC and designate it as ACV Increment 1.1 and initially acquire about 200 vehicles. The Marines also plan to develop ACV Increment 1.2, a tracked version, and to acquire about 470 vehicles and fund an ongoing high water speed study. Although ACV Increment 1.1 will have a swim capability, a connector will be required to get the vehicles from ship to shore.
Plans called for ACV Increment 1.1 to enter the acquisition cycle at Milestone B (Engineering and Manufacturing Development) in FY2016, award prototype contracts leading to a down select to one vendor in FY2018, and enter low-rate initial production.
On April 23, 2014, the Marines released an RFI for ACV Increment 1.1. Some of the required capabilities included:
... operate in a significant wave height of two feet and sufficient reserve buoyancy to enable safe operations; a high level of survivability and force protection; operate in four to six feet plunging surf with ship-to-shore operations and launch from amphibious ships as an objective; land mobility, operate on 30 percent improved surfaces and 70 percent unimproved surfaces; ability to integrate a .50 calibre remote weapon station (RWS) with growth potential to a dual mount 40 mm/.50 calibre RWS or a 30 mm cannon RWS; carrying capacity to include three crew and 10 embarked troops as the threshold, 13 embarked troops as the objective, carry mission essential equipment and vehicle ammunition; and the ability to integrate a command, control and communications suite provided as government furnished equipment... 28
The RFI includesincluded a requirement for industry to deliver 16 prototype vehicles nine months after contract award in April 2016 at a rate of 4 vehicles per month.2919 The Marines estimated ACV Increment 1.1 would cost about $5 million to $6 million per vehicle, about $10 million less than what the previous ACV version was expected to cost.30
On November 5, 2014, the Marines reportedly released a draft RFP for ACV Increment 1.1. The Marines were looking for information from industry regarding program milestones, delivery schedules, and where in the program cost savings could be achieved. Plans were for two companies to build 16 prototype vehicles each for testing. Companies who competed for the two contracts included BAE Systems, General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS), Lockheed Martin, and Scientific Applications International Corporation (SAIC).32
Under the provisions of the RFP, the ACV 1.1 iswas envisioned as an eight-wheeled vehicle capable of carrying 10 Marines and a crew of 3 that would cost between $4 million to $7.5 million per copy—a change from the RFI estimate of $5 million to $6 million per vehicle. In terms of mobility, the ACV 1.1 would need to be able to travel at least 3 nautical miles from ship to shore, negotiate waves up to at least 2 feet, travel 5 to 6 knots in calm seas, and be able to keep up with the M-1 Abrams tank once ashore.
Proposals were due in April 2016 and the Marines reportedly planplanned to award two EMD contracts for 16 vehicles each to be delivered in November 2016. In 2018, the Marines would then down select to one vendor and start full production.
The Marines reportedly plan to acquire 204 ACV 1.1s, to be allocated as follows:
In April 2016 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration testified that the Marines' Acquisition Objective for the ACV 1.1 remained at 204 vehicles, which would provide lift for two infantry battalions.3525 Full Operational Capability (FOC) for ACV 1.1 is planned for FY 2020.36
On November 24, 2015, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems and SAIC contracts to develop ACV 1.1 prototypes for evaluation. BAE's contract was for $103.8 million and SAIC's for $121.5 million, and each company is to build 16 prototypes. The Marines expect to down select to a single vendor in 2018. Initial operational capability (IOC) is expected by the end of 2020, and all ACV 1.1 vehicles are planned to be fielded by the summer ofsummer 2023. Plans are to equip six battalions with ACV 1.1s and 392 existing upgraded AAVs.
Both BAE and SAIC reportedly have a long history related to amphibious vehicles, as BAE built the Marines' original AAV and SAIC has built hundreds of Terrex 1 vehicles used by Singapore, and both companies had Marine Corps contracts to modernize AAVs.
It should be noted that ACV 1.1 is intended to have some amphibious capability but would rely on ship-to-shore connectors, and ACV 1.2 is intended to have greater amphibious capability, including greater water speed and the ability to self-deploy from amphibious ships.
BAE plans to team with Italian manufacturer Iveco (which owns Chrysler and Ferrari). BAE's prototype would accommodate 13 Marines and travel 11.5 miles at about 7 miles per hour (mph) in surf and 65 mph on land. BAE's version would incorporate a V hull design intended to protect passengers from underside blasts and have external fuel tanks for increased safety. BAE intends to produce its prototypes at its York, PA, facility.
SAIC plans to team with Singapore Technology Kinetics to develop its prototype based on an existing design called Terrex. SAIC's version is said to travel 7 mph in water and incorporates a V hull design as well as blast-mitigating seats. It would carry a crew of 3 and can accommodate 11 Marines. SAIC's version plans for a Common Remote Weapons System (CROWS) (.50 calibre machine gun and a 30 mm cannon), which could be operated from inside the vehicle while buttoned up, therefore not exposing crewmen to hostile fire.
On December 7, 2015, it was reported that GDLS would protest the award of the ACV 1.1 contract to BAE and SAIC, claiming the Marines asked for particular capabilities and then evaluated vendors by a different set of standards.
On March 15, 2016, GAO denied GDLS's protest, noting that "the Marine Corps' evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the evaluation scheme identified in the solicitation."4030 The Marines reportedly stated that the protest put the ACV 1.1 program about 45 days behind schedule but anticipated the ACV 1.1 would still be fielded on time.41
BAE and SAIC reportedly delivered their ACV 1.1 prototypes, with BAE delivering its first prototype in December 2016 and SAIC delivering its prototype in February 2017. This early delivery willcould supposedly result in an unspecified incentive fee award for both companies. EMD testing began the week of March 13 and iswas scheduled to last eight months with an operational assessment planned for January 2018.
In early December 2017, the Marines reportedly sent the ACV 1.1 down select request for proposals to BAE and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Plans called for operational testing to start in January 2018, with the Marines anticipating announcing a contract winner in June 2018 for the delivery of 204 ACV 1.1s over a four-year period.
According to reports, the Marines envision that the successor to ACV 1.1—the ACV 1.2—will have a threshold requirement of 12 miles from ship-to-shore. If this threshold can be achieved, it could help to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. naval vessels supporting Marine amphibious operations to enemy shore fire.
The Naval Surface Warfare Center reportedly issued a Request for Information (RFI) to industry in December 2016 seeking affordable options to upgrade ACV 1.2's lethality from ACV 1.1's Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station (CROW).
Reportedly, the Marines are exploring the possibility of developing an ACV 2.0, capable of carrying 10 to 13 Marines plus crew, high water speeds, and deployment from ships far from the coast. ACV 2.0 is planned to be capable of operating on land alongside tanks and light armored vehicles.
Budgetary InformationAccording to GAO's March 20162017 Assessments of Major Weapon Programs report, the ACV program requires $1.769934 billion to procure 204 ACV 1.1s, including $632.8 796 million in RDT&E funding and $1.111057 billion in procurement funding.
The FY2018 Presidential BudgetFY2019 presidential budget includes RDT&E and Procurement funding requests in both the Base and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budgetsthe Base Budget, as well as FY2018FY2019 requested quantities. The Marines did not request ACV OCO funding in FY2018.
|
Funding Category |
Base Budget |
Base Budget |
OCO Budget |
OCO Budget |
Total Request |
Total Request |
|
$M |
Qty |
$M |
Qty |
$M |
Qty |
|
|
RDT&E |
179.0 |
- |
- |
- |
179.0 |
- |
|
Procurement |
|
26 |
- |
- |
|
26 |
|
TOTAL |
340.5 |
26 |
- |
- |
340.5 |
26 |
Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 20182019 Budget Request, May 2017February 2018, p. 3-9.
Notes: $M = U.S. Dollars in Millions; Qty = According to DOD, the FY2019 ACV budget request will [f]und ACV 1.1 corrective actions, advanced capability improvements, Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E) and Live Fire Test & Evaluation (LFT&E) support for the down-selected contractor. Provides the design and development of the new Command and Control (C2) and Recovery variants and to modify the ACV 1.1 Personnel test vehicles into the ACV 1.2 configurations. Procures the Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) of 30 vehicles, plus procurement of related items such as production support, systems engineering/program management, Engineering Change Orders (ECOs), Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), and integrated logistics support, and Initial Spares, which support the ACV Increment 1.1 program.39 If the Navy and Marine Corps decide to adopt Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) as an operational concept, it could possibly have implications for the ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 programs.FY2018FY2019 Procurement Quantities.
Procurement Quantities.
The Trump Administration has proposed increasing the size of the Marine Corps by 12,000 Marines.47 With the additional Marines proposed by the Administration, plans call for creating 12 additional infantry battalions and a tank battalion as well as other smaller enabling units.48 If 12 additional infantry battalions are added to Marine force structure, it would seem there could be a requirement for additional ACV 1.1s and, possibly, ACV 1.2s as well. Congress might ask for Marine leadership to clarify additional requirements for ACVs should the Marine Corps grow by 12,000 Marines.
Given Marines leadership's decision to alter their vehicle modernization strategy and pursue the MPC-based ACV Increment 1.1 in lieu of the ACV-based ACV Increment 1.2, Congress might decide to examine this issue in greater detail. Potential questions include but are not limited to the following:
Author Contact Information
| 1. |
An amphibious capability generally refers to a vehicle's ability to debark from a ship offshore at a considerable distance and then move under fire to shore. A swim capability refers to a vehicle's ability to traverse limited water obstacles such as streams, rivers, and smaller bodies of inland water. |
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| 2. |
Lee Hudson, "Marines Put Marine Personnel Carrier on Shelf Due to Budget Constraints," InsideDefense, June 14, 2013. |
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| 3. |
Program Executive Office (PEO) Land Systems Marine Personnel Carrier Fact Sheet, 2010. |
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| 4. |
Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from the Amphibious Vehicle Request for Information (RFI) issued by the Marine Corps Systems Command on February 11, 2011. |
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| 5. |
The Federal Acquisition Regulation defines an RFI as "a document used to obtain price, delivery, other market information, or capabilities for planning purposes when the Government does not presently intend to issue a solicitation. [FAR 15.202(e)]." |
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| 6. |
Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from Annex A: Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) Family of Vehicles (FOV) Requirements Set to the Marine Personnel Carrier Request for Information (RFI), February 17, 2011. |
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| 7. |
The Federal Acquisition Regulation defines an RFI as "a document used to obtain price, delivery, other market information, or capabilities for planning purposes when the Government does not presently intend to issue a solicitation. [FAR 15.202(e)]." |
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| 8. |
Annex A: Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) Family of Vehicles (FOV) Requirements Set to the Marine Personnel Carrier Request for Information (RFI), February 17, 2011. |
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| 9. |
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| 10. |
Ibid. |
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| 11. |
Information in this section was taken from "Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-Marine Corps Concept," authored by the U.S. Army's Army Capabilities Integration Center and the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, March 2012. |
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| 12. |
Ibid., pp. 9-10. |
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| 13. |
Information in this section was taken from "Naval Amphibious Capability in the 21st Century: Strategic Opportunity and a Vision for Change," a report of the Amphibious Capabilities Working Group, April 27, 2012. |
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| 14. |
Ibid., p. 12. |
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| 15. |
Ibid., p. 48. |
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| 16. |
Ibid., p. 49. |
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| 17. |
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|
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From Innovation Industry Day Announcement - Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory - EABO 2019, February 2, 2018, https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=5ad0e3a3809bf73ddeda57b1bd32aaf1&tab=core&_cview=1. 11.
|
|
Eugene K. Chow, "How Marines are Rethinking the Art of the Amphibious Assault for the Next Big War," The National Interest, February 19, 2018. 12.
|
|
Ibid. |
Department of the Navy, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, "Expeditionary Force 21 - Forward and Ready: Now and in the Future," March 4, 2014. |
| 19. |
Ibid., pp. 21-22. |
|||||
| 20. |
Lara Seligman, "Glueck: Marines Will Penetrate Enemy's "Seam" with Connector Strategy," Inside Defense, June 27, 2014. |
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| 21. |
Information in this section is taken from Daniel Wasserbly, "Bridging the Gap: USMC Outlines Future Amphibious Assault Strategies, Equipment," Jane's International Defence Review, September 2014, pp. 38-39. |
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| 22. |
The Marines define a connector as surface (via water) and vertical (via air) conveyances that transport personnel, supplies, and equipment from the seabase (ships and platforms) to the objective (ashore), within the seabase (from ship to ship), or from the objective (ashore), seabasehttps://marinecorpsconceptsandprograms.com/programs/amphibious-and-prepositioning-ships/connectors, accessed February 25, 2016. |
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|
Lee Hudson, "Marines Put Marine Personnel Carrier on Shelf Due to Budget Constraints," Inside Defense, June 14, 2013. |
||||||
|
For information on the JLTV, see CRS Report RS22942, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
||||||
|
Christopher J. Castelli, "General: Marine Corps Could Shelve Development of High-Speed ACV," Inside Defense, October 25, 2013, and Jason Sherman, "Marine Corps Dials Back ACV, Capability, Defers High Water Speed Plans," Inside Defense, March 25, 2014. |
||||||
|
Information in this section is taken from Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book, Volume 2, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, Budget Activity 4, March 2014, pp. 417-421, and Lee Hudson, "Marine Corps Drastically Shifts Ground Vehicle Modernization Strategy," Inside Defense, March 14, 2014. |
||||||
|
Lee Hudson, "Marines Release Amphib Vehicle RFI, Seek Accelerated Schedule," Inside Defense, April 25, 2014. |
||||||
|
Ibid. |
||||||
|
Ibid. |
||||||
|
Lee Hudson, "Next-Generation Amphibious Vehicle Estimated to Cost $5-$6M Per Copy," Inside Defense, June 27, 2014. |
||||||
|
Information in this section is taken from Megan Eckstein, "Marines Expect ACV RFP in Spring; Will Choose 2 Winners for Prototype Production, Testing," Defense Daily, September 29, 2014, and Lee Hudson, "Marines Release Next-Gen Amphibious Vehicle Draft Request for Proposal," Inside Defense, November 6, 2014. |
||||||
|
Megan Eckstein, "Marines Expect ACV RFP in Spring; Will Choose 2 Winners for Prototype Production, Testing," Defense Daily, September 29, 2014. |
||||||
|
Information in this section is taken from Joe Gould, "Marine Amphibious Vehicle RFP Due in March," Defense News, February 16, 2015. |
||||||
|
Ibid. |
||||||
|
Statement of Lieutenant General Robert S. Walsh, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration & Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command and Mr. Thomas P. Dee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Expeditionary Programs and Logistics Management before the Subcommittee on Seapower of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Marine Corps Modernization, April 13, 2016, p. 5. |
||||||
|
Ibid. |
||||||
|
Dan Parsons, "Marine Corps Awards BAE, SAIC $225 Million Amphibious Combat Vehicle Contracts," Defense Daily, November 25, 2015; Lee Hudson, "BAE and SAIC Both Win Contracts for USMC Next-Gen Amphib Vehicle," Inside Defense, November 24, 2015; Jen |
||||||
|
Jen Judson, "General Dynamics Protests ACV Contract Awards to BAE and SAIC," Defense News, December 7, 2015, and Dan Parsons, "In ACV Protest, GD Says Marines Corps Kept Requirements Hidden" Defense Daily, December 9, 2015. |
||||||
|
Jen Judson, "GAO Denies General Dynamics' Amphibious Combat Vehicle Protest," Defense News, March 15, 2016, and Lee Hudson, "Following GAO Bid Protest, ACV 1.1 is Delayed but Will be Fielded On Time," Inside Defense, July 19, 2016. |
||||||
|
Ibid. |
||||||
|
Ibid. |
||||||
|
Lee Hudson, "BAE Systems, SAIC Will Receive Incentive Fee from Marines for Delivering Amphib Vehicles Early," Inside Defense, February 22, 2017 and "Marines Kick Off Next-Generation Amphibious Vehicle EMD Testing," Inside Defense, March 21, 2017. |
||||||
|
|
34.
Lee Hudson, "Marine Corps Sends Final Solicitation to BAE, SAIC for Next-Gen Amphib Vehicle," InsideDefense.com, December 13, 2017. |
Lee Hudson, "Marines Reveal ACV 1.2 Will Have Threshold Requirement of 12 Miles," Inside Defense, March 22, 2016. |
||||
|
Lee Hudson, "Government Seeks Affordable Lethality Options for New Amphibious Vehicle," Inside Defense, January 6, 2017. |
||||||
|
|
37.
Daniel Goure, "Why the U.S. Marines Amphibious Combat Vehicle Program Works, The National Interest, May 2, 2017. |
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Assessments of Major Weapon Programs GAO- |
||||
|
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year |
||||||
Ibid. |
Leo Shane III and Andrew Tilghman, "Trump's Military Will have More Troops and More Firepower – If He Can Find the Money," Military Times, November 20, 2016. |
|||||
| 48. | Leo Shane III and Andrew Tilghman, "Trump's Military Will have More Troops and More Firepower – If He Can Find the Money," Military Times, November 20, 2016. |