Contents

• Introduction
• Post-Conflict Period of ARENA Rule (1994-2008)
• Funes Administration (2009-2014)
• Political Situation
• Sánchez Cerén Administration: Composition and Priorities
• Constraints Facing the Government
• Security Challenges
• Weak Criminal Justice System
• Escalating Criminality, Including Gang Violence
• Secure El Salvador
• "Extraordinary Measures" to Combat Gangs
• Military Involvement in Public Security Efforts
• Human Rights
• Confronting Recent Human Rights Violations
• Confronting Past Human Rights Violations
• Economic and Social Conditions
• Fiscal Crisis
• Social Conditions
• U.S. Relations
• U.S. Foreign Assistance
• Bilateral Assistance and the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)
State Department Assistance: Bilateral and Regional
• Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Investment Compact
• Department of Defense (DOD) Assistance
• Migration Issues
• Temporary Protected Status
• Removals (Deportations)
• Unaccompanied Alien Children
• Counternarcotics Cooperation
• Anti-Gang Efforts and U.S. Programs
• Trade and CAFTA-DR
Counternarcotics Cooperation
• Trade Relations
• Human Rights Cases: Former Salvadoran Officials Tried in the United States

Summary

Congress has long maintainedsignificant interest in El Salvador, a small Central American country that has had a large percentage of its population living in the United States since the country's civil conflict (1980-1992). During the 1980s, the U.S. government spent billions of dollars supporting the Salvadoran government's efforts against an insurgency led by the leftist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). Three decades later, the United States is working with the country's second democratically elected FMLN Administration.

Inaugurated to a five-year term in June 2014, President Salvador Sánchez Cerén, a former guerrilla commander of the FMLN, took office pledging to govern by the principles of austerity, efficiency, and transparencyis in the fourth year of his five-year presidential term. Sánchez Cerén has adopted a more conciliatory attitude toward the opposition and the private sector than his predecessor, Mauricio Funes. Nevertheless, President Sánchez Cerén's approval ratings (50% in December 2016) have been his approval ratings have been significantly lower than those of his predecessorprior presidents, as security conditions remain dire and economic growth slowed in 2016moderate.

Twenty-five years after the signing of peace accords to end the country's civil conflict, El Salvador continues to face serious security and economic challenges. Its ability to address these challenges has been hindered by polarizationPolarization between the FMLN government and the conservative Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)-dominated National Assembly has magnified those challenges. El Salvador posted a homicide rate of 104 per 100,000 in 2015—the highest in the world. In 2016, the homicide rate dropped to 81.2 per 100,000 after the government adopted tough measures to combat gangs and reform prisons. Critics maintain that those measures have caused 81.2 per 100,000 in 2016. Homicides have declined in 2017, but killings of security forces by gangs have escalated. The government's tough anti-gang measures have caused increasing human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings of gang suspects by security forces. SecurityInsecurity remains a barrier to investment, which has inhibited economic growth. El Salvador's economy grew by an estimated 2.4% in 2016, the lowest growth rate in Central America. The government is facing a fiscal crisis, as it has been unable to win legislative approval necessary to take on new loans.

The Sánchez Cerén government has maintained close cooperation with the United States that began under the Partnership for Growth (PFG) initiative (2011-2015), which was aimed at improving security and economic competitiveness The Sánchez Cerén government has maintained close cooperation with the United States. Congress has provided bilateral assistance, which totaled $67.9some $72.7 million in FY2016FY2017, as well as regional security assistance through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). Economic cooperation has been bolstered by a $277 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact that began in 2014. Foreign assistance to El Salvador is being guided by the 2015 U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which prioritizes promoting economic prosperity, improving security, and strengthening governance. It remains to be seen how the Trump Administration may seek to adjust this strategy.

Migration issues, such as how to prevent emigration by unaccompanied children from El Salvador and reintegrate deportees from the United States into Salvadoran society, figure prominently on the bilateral agenda. With support from the Inter-American Development Bank, the Salvadoran government has worked with its Guatemalan and Honduran counterparts to design and implement an Alliance for Prosperity plan to address the root causes of emigration. It also has stepped up efforts against human trafficking and alien smuggling. At the same time, the Salvadoran government has expressed concern about the Trump Administration's recent executive action on migration enforcement, which is likely to

The Trump Administration has adjusted the strategy to focus more on combating gangs and transnational crime. It requested $46.3 million in bilateral assistance for El Salvador (a 36% cut from 2017) and $263.2 million for CARSI (a 20% cut from 2017). The House Appropriations Committee's FY2018 State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 3362 (H.Rept. 115-253), which was incorporated into the House-passed full-year FY2018 Omnibus Appropriations Measure, H.R. 3354, recommends $55.2 million for El Salvador and $334.2 million for CARSI. The Senate Appropriations Committee's version of the bill, S. 1780 (S.Rept. 115-52), recommends $63.7 million for El Salvador and $299.2 million for CARSI.

Migration issues, such as how to prevent emigration by unaccompanied children and reintegrate deportees from the United States, figure prominently on the bilateral agenda. The Salvadoran government has sought to address the root causes of emigration and stepped up efforts against human trafficking and alien smuggling. At the same time, it has expressed concern about the Trump Administration's recent executive action on migration enforcement and the possible end of Temporary Protected Status for Salvadorans living in the United States, which could hasten the pace of deportations. hasten the pace of deportations.

See CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America; CRS Report R43702, Unaccompanied Children from Central America: Foreign Policy Considerations; and CRS In Focus IF10371RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues; and CRS Report R44812, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: An Overview.

---

Policy Issues for Congress.

El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations

Introduction

A small, densely populated Central American country that has deep historical, familial, and economic ties to the United States, El Salvador has long been a focus of sustained congressional interest (see Figure 1 for a map and key data on the country).¹ After a troubled history of authoritarian rule and a brutal civil war (1980-1992), El Salvador has made some strides over the past two decades in establishing a multiparty democracy.² A peace accord negotiated in 1992 brought the war to an end and assimilated the leftist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrilla movement into the political process as a political party. In 2009, Mauricio Funes, a former journalist, took office as head of the country's first FMLN government. After a razor-thin election, Salvador Sánchez Cerén, a former guerrilla commander, began his five-year term on June 1, 2014, at the helm of a second consecutive FMLN government.

El Salvador currently faces serious governance, security, and economic challenges, all of which are interrelated. Tension between the Sánchez Cerén government and a legislature dominated by the conservative Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) has escalated to near legislative paralysis andoften hindered the country's ability to address its increasingsignificant fiscal deficit, and dire security situation, and struggling economy. Insecurity and economic conditions have fueled irregular emigration—a key concern for U.S. policymakers.³ This report examines El Salvador's political, security, human rights, and economic conditions. It then analyzes selected issues in U.S.-Salvadoran relations.

Post-Conflict Period of ARENA Rule (1994-2008)

After peace accords were signed in 1992, successive ARENA governments in the 1990s-2000s sought to rebuild democracy and implement market-friendly economic reforms. ARENA proved to be a reliable U.S. ally and presided over a period of economic growth, but did not effectively address inequality, violence, and corruption. El Salvador's gross domestic product (GDP) increased from $13.1 billion to $21.4 billion between 2000 and 2008.⁴ Under ARENA, development indicators generally improved but were hurt by natural disasters, including earthquakes in 2001 and periodic hurricanes.

Corruption charges have been brought against the two most recent ARENA presidents. Francisco Flores (1999-2004) passed away in January 2016 while awaiting trial for allegedly embezzling some $15 million in donations from Taiwan that were meant for earthquake relief. In 2016, El Salvador's Attorney General recentlyattorney general charged former President Anthony ("Tony") Saca (2004-2009) and members of his administration for belonging to a corruption network that allegedly embezzled at least $246 million from state accounts.⁵ After leaving office, Saca was expelled from ARENA and began his own political party, the Grand Alliance for National Unity (GANA), which, though nominally a conservative party, often has voted with the FMLN in the legislature.

Figure 1. Map of El Salvador and Key Data on the Country

Deep scars and political polarization remain evident in El Salvador today from a war that resulted in significant human rights violations, more than 70,000 deaths, and massive emigration to the United States. El Salvador's 1993 Amnesty Law has, until recently, shielded those who committed human rights abuses during the civil conflict from prosecution. El Salvador's Supreme Courtsupreme court deemed the law unconstitutional in a historic July 2016 ruling, but it remains to be seen whether prosecutors are willing to pursueand the attorney general's office has established a unit to investigate past cases of human rights violations (see "Confronting Past Human Rights Violations").

⁶

Funes Administration (2009-2014)

Mauricio Funes, a former journalist, led the country's first FMLN government. Funes remained popular throughout his term, even as his government struggled to address the country's deeply entrenched economic and security problems and analysts from both the right and the left criticized thehis administration. The Funes government expanded crime prevention programs and community policing, but also tacitly supported and then later disavowed a failed truce between the country's largest gangs.gangs that allegedly involved some facilitators providing illicit items and favors to imprisoned gang leaders.⁷ Observers criticized Funes's inability to improve transparency, his lavish travel, and his unfair practices in awarding government contracts. Critics also maintained that Funes often provoked unnecessary conflicts with the private sector.⁶8 In 2016, Funes came under investigation by the attorney general's office on grounds of embezzling state funds. He sought and received political asylum in Nicaragua in September 2016.⁷

Political Situation

Sánchez Cerén Administration: Composition and Priorities

During the 2014 campaign, Salvador Sánchez Cerén sought to broaden his appeal beyond the FMLN base by marketing himself as a "progressive" rather than as a hard-liner. He selected Oscar Ortiz, the popular former mayor of Santa Tecla, as his vice president. Together, they promised to keep the social programs that had been popular during the Funes government.

In March 2014, Sánchez Cerén narrowly defeated ARENA's candidate, Norman Quijano, in a runoff election. Sánchez Cerén captured 50.1% of the vote, whereas Quijano received 49.9%. Prior to taking office, Sánchez Cerén and Ortiz convened dialogues with different sectors of Salvadoran society, including ARENA and the private sector.

President Sánchez Cerén's cabinet includes several holdovers from the Funes government, including the ministers of the economy, foreign affairs, public works, and social inclusion. Although several of those ministers formed good working relationships with U.S. officials and participated in the Partnership for Growth (PFG) process, it remains to be seen how those relationships will continue under the Trump Administration. The Cabinet, the cabinet also includes Communist party officials and allies of Tony Saca, some of whom have had tense relationships with the United States. Some U.S. officials were dismayed by Sánchez Cerén's decision to maintain David Múnguía Payés, the architect of the ill-fated 2012 gang truce who is under investigation forhas been accused of allowing arms trafficking, as Minister of Defense.⁸ The rest of the security Cabinet, which was restructured in January 2016, is composed of police from the FMLN ranks who have worked well with U.S. counterparts.

During his inaugural address, President Sánchez Cerén outlined the goals of his government: (1) boosting growth and addressingdefense minister.⁹ Upon taking office, President Sánchez Cerén sought to: (1) boost growth and address the country's fiscal crisis through infrastructure projects and reforms to improve the business climate, (2) investinginvest in education and health care, and (3) combattingcombat crime and violence. Sánchez Cerén stressed the importance of working with the United States and promoting trade with Latin America, Asia, and Europe. In 2014, El Salvador joined Petrocaribe, an arrangement through which Venezuela has provided subsidized oil to Caribbean and Central American countries.⁹

10

Constraints Facing the Government

President Sánchez Cerén has thus far encountered difficulty in implementing his inaugural pledges due to El Salvador's severe fiscal constraints and his party's lack of a congressional majority. (see "Fiscal Crisis," below). His government has experienced the same type of opposition to its proposals to raise taxes from the private sector and ARENA that the Funes Administration encountered. Those groups support budget cuts rather than higher taxes. A study published by El Salvador's Treasury Department in 2015 asserted that many of the country's business owners and elites, the primary opponents of tax increases, also owed back taxes to the government.

Unlike President Funes, President Sánchez Cerén is neither popular nor particularly media savvy. SomeMany observers maintain that Sánchez Cerén, who has faced health challenges early in his term, has failed to demonstrate the leadership necessary to address El Salvador's deteriorating security situation.¹⁰ The Central American University recently released a national survey in which 58.4% of respondents agreed that the general situation in the country had worsened in 2016.¹¹

El Salvador's unicameral National Assembly consists of 84 members who are elected to serve for three-year terms. The current legislature was elected on March 1, 2015. ARENA's representation in the 84-seat legislature rose from 28 to 35 seats. Smaller right-leaning parties that tend to vote with ARENA hold 7 seats. The FMLN maintained its 31 seats, and GANA maintained its 11 seats. Although neither the ARENA-led coalition nor the FMLN-GANA coalition has a simple majority, the ARENA-led coalition has enough votes to block judicial appointments and the issuing of foreign debt. Although ARENA has backed the government's initiatives to bolster public security, it has opposed most other measures. The next elections are scheduled for March 2018.

The Supreme Courtsurvey in June 2017 in which 61.1% of those polled said that President Sánchez Cerén had governed poorly.¹¹

Sánchez Cerén has had a difficult time garnering legislative support for his priorities, save those related to strengthening public security and a recent pension reform. Opposition has been particularly strong from the conservative ARENA party, which along with allied parties controls 42 of 84 seats in the legislature. ARENA has opposed many FMLN proposals to raise taxes or issue new debt, as it generally supports lower spending rather than higher taxes. In 2015, the legislature approved new taxes to increase funding for security programs.¹² In September 2017, after 18 months of debate, the government and the opposition agreed to pension reform that raises employee and employer contributions into the system. Few analysts predict that the two sides will be able to resolve the country's broader fiscal crisis as the March 2018 legislative elections approach.¹³ Many analysts predict that the FMLN, which controls 31 seats, is likely to lose some seats in those elections due to the unpopularity of the current government.

The supreme court of El Salvador is composed of 15 justices that are divided among four chambers, including a constitutional chamber. Five justices are appointed to the court every three years by a two-thirds vote in the National Assembly to serve for nine-year terms. Following the 2009 elections, the Assemblyassembly approved five new justices after difficult negotiations. Since their installation in 2009, the five justices on the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Courtsupreme court have taken actions that appeared intended to check the power of the president and the legislature, something the court has historically failed to do. In mid-2015As an example, the court prohibited the government from issuing $900 million in bonds in 2015 to fund social and security initiatives that it found were approved by the legislature in an unconstitutional manner.

Security Challenges

Weak Criminal Justice System

In recent years, much has been written about the governance problems that have made El Salvador susceptible to the influence of criminal elements and unable to guarantee citizen security. Resource constraints in the security sector have persisted. A lack of confidence in the underfunded public security forces has in turn led many to use private security firmspolice has led many companies and citizens to use private security firms and the government to deploy soldiers to perform public security functions (see "Military Involvement in Public Security Efforts"). There have also been serious concerns about corruption in the police, prisons, and judicial system. In 2016, El Salvador's ranking fell 23 places in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index to 95 out of 176 countries ranked.

Attorney General Douglas Melendez On January 5, 2016, the Legislative Assembly elected Douglas Arquímides Meléndez to serve a three-year term as El Salvador's attorney general. Meléndez, a consensus candidate who received nearly unanimous support, is a career prosecutor with experience in handling corruption cases. Since taking office, Meléndez has pursued corruption cases targeting both parties, including former President Antonio Saca and former President Mauricio Funes. Meléndez also has pursued charges against former attorney general Luis Martínez, government officials who participated in the 2012 gang truce, drug traffickers, and police officers who allegedly committed extrajudicial killings. Despite the problems that he inherited, the Salvadoran government thus far has resisted offers to have an external entity work with the attorney general's office to combat corruption and reduce impunity (as Guatemala and Honduras have done). Meléndez is receiving some support from the U.S. government and from an anticorruption capacity-building program run by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. In February 2017, Meléndez indicated that if pressure on the Attorney General's office continues and the budget does not increase, he will consider seeking help from an international entity.12 Meléndez and constitutional court judges have received death threats.

With a majority of the National Civil Police (PNC) budget devoted to salaries and benefits, there has historically been limited funding available for investing in training and equipment. The PNC has deficient wages, training, and infrastructure. It has also lacked a merit-based promotion system. Corruption, weak investigatory capacity, and an inability to prosecute officers accused of corruption and human rights abuses have also hindered police performance.

Few arrests carried out by PNC officials have been successfully prosecuted in the Salvadoran justice system. The State Department maintains that "inefficiency, corruption, political infighting, and insufficient resources" have hindered the performance of the Salvadoran judiciary.¹³ As police and prosecutors are often loathe to work together to build cases, El Salvador's criminal conviction rate is less than 5%. Delays in the judicial process and massive arrests carried out during prior anti-gang sweeps made under mano dura (heavy-handed) policing efforts have resulted in severe prison overcrowding.¹⁴ In 2015, the Salvadoran government made some advances in addressing the prisons, but prisons were still operating at 307% above capacity in 2015.¹⁵

With a majority of the national civilian police (PNC) budget devoted to salaries and benefits, there has historically been limited funding available for investing in training and equipment. The PNC has deficient wages, training, and infrastructure. It has also lacked a merit-based promotion system. Corruption, weak investigatory capacity, and an inability to prosecute officers accused of corruption and human rights abuses have also hindered police performance.

Few arrests carried out by PNC officials have been successfully prosecuted in the Salvadoran justice system. The State Department maintains that "inefficiency and corruption" have hindered the performance of the Salvadoran judiciary.¹⁴ As police and prosecutors are often loathe to work together to build cases, El Salvador's criminal conviction rate is less than 5%. Delays in the judicial process and massive arrests carried out during prior anti-gang sweeps made under mano dura (heavy-handed) policing efforts have resulted in severe prison overcrowding.¹⁵

According to a study cited by the State Department, prisons operated at roughly 346% above capacity as of mid-2016.¹⁶ In May 2016, the constitutional chamber of El Salvador's supreme court issued a declaration finding prison overcrowding to be an unconstitutional violation of inmate's human rights and ordering regular visits to the country's prisons by the health ministry. The Salvadoran government has made some advances in addressing prison overcrowding by building new facilities. Nevertheless, human rights groups maintain that sanitation and access to medical services have worsened since the government adopted more restrictive prison conditions for gang inmates in April 2016.¹⁷

Attorney General Douglas Melendez: Progress and Setbacks International observers initially praised the efforts made to investigate abuses and reduce impunity by Attorney Douglas General Meléndez, a career prosecutor elected by the national assembly to serve a three-year term in January 2016. During his first year in office, Meléndez pursued cases against three previous presidents as well as his predecessor and a prominent businessman. Meléndez has since faced criticism and received death threats for pursuing cases against politicians of all parties, corrupt security forces, and gangs. His prosecutors have been unable to secure convictions in recent high-profile cases, raising concerns about prosecutorial capacity. In August 2017, a judge dismissed the government's case against former officials accused of illicit involvement with gangs in the 2012-2013 gang truce, since it appears that they were carrying out the state policy of the Funes Administration.18 El Salvador is also the only northern triangle country that does not have an external entity supporting the attorney general's office in conducting investigations.19

Escalating Criminality, Including Gang Violence

El Salvador has been dealing with escalating homicides and generalized crime committed by gangs, drug traffickers, and other criminal groups for more than a decade. During 2015, El Salvador posted the world's highest homicide rate, an alarming 104 per 100,000 people.In 2015, El Salvador, a country with a population of 6.2 million people, posted a homicide rate of 104 per 100,000—the highest in the world. Although homicides decreased by 20% in 2016 to 81.2 per 100,000, they have recently spiked dramatically and have included targeted killings of security forces by gangs.²⁰ A recent study by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) estimated that the costs of crime and violence in El Salvador could reach 5.9% of GDP.¹⁶

21

El Salvador has the highest concentration of gang members per capita in Central America.¹⁷ As a result, gangs—namely the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18^th Street gang—are likely responsible for a higher percentage of homicides than in neighboring Honduras and Guatemala.¹⁸ Gangs reportedly killed some 60 police officers in 2015.¹⁹ are responsible for a higher percentage of homicides there than in neighboring countries. A government-facilitated truce between the country's major gangs (MS-13 or Mara Salvatrucha and the 18^th Street gang) that unraveled in 2014 appeared to lower homicides in 2012-2013, but forced disappearances reportedly increased during that period.²² Many analysts have concluded that the truce strengthened gangs' cohesion and political power. Gangs have been involved in a range of other criminal activities, as well. Those activities include extortion; money laundering; and drug, auto, and weapons smuggling. Gangs earn millions of dollars by extorting residents, bus drivers, and business owners, often in poor neighborhoods. Failure to pay often results in harassment or violent reprisals. In August 2015, El Salvador's Supreme Courtsupreme court declared that gangs, which had used grenades against government buildings, could be charged with terrorism. In July 2016, the Salvadoran government arrested more than 70 people who had allegedly laundered the gang's money through motels, brothels, and other businesses.²⁰

23 According to the police, both factions of the 18^th Street gang and MS-13 are likely working together to attack government officials.²⁴

Gang-related violence has fueled internal displacement and irregular emigration.²⁵ In 2015, the International Rescue Committee estimated that more than 320,000 people had been displaced in El Salvador. In August 2016, El Salvador's civil roundtable against forced displacement attributed more than 85% of internal displacement to gang activity. The Salvadoran government has neither publicly acknowledged the phenomenon nor developed a strategy to address the needs of those fleeing violence.²⁶ (For more information on gang-related human rights abuses, as well as extrajudicial killings of gang suspects by security forces, see "Human Rights" section below).

Drug-trafficking organizations, including Mexican groups such as the Sinaloa criminal organization, have increased their illicit activities in El Salvador, including money laundering, albeit to a lesser extent than in Honduras and Guatemala.

Secure El Salvador

Upon taking office, the government formed a National Council for Citizen Security, which designed an integrated security plan (with support from the U.S. government and the United Nations). In January 2015, the administration announced the plan: Secure El Salvador (El Salvador Seguro), estimated to cost $2 billion over five years. It includes (1) violence prevention and job creation initiatives, which account for nearly three-quarters of the funding; (2) an increased state presence in the country's 50 most violent municipalities, with the goals of improving public spaces, expanding community policing, and increasing student retention in schools; (3) improved prison infrastructure; and (4) increased services for crime victims.²¹27

The plan has been launched in 26 of the most violent municipalities. El Salvador's legislature has approved $100 million in loans to support the security plan. The Administration expected to raise $140 million per year through a special tax on telecommunications services as well as large enterprise profits, although it only collected $50.5 million between November 2015 and November 2016.²²28 Furthermore, although government figures point to lower homicide rates in those municipalities, critics question whether the government actually has prioritized social services and prevention in those areas or just more aggressive policing.²³29 Of the 20 municipalities with the highest homicide rates in 2016, 16 had implemented the plan.²⁴

"Extraordinary Measures" to Combat Gangs

In 2016, El Salvador's homicide rate dropped to 81 per 100,000—a 20% decrease from the previous year but still among the highest homicide rates in the world. Rates began dropping in April 2016 after the government started implementing "extraordinary measures" focused on moving gang leaders to maximum-security prisons, cutting off cell phone service around prisons and restricting visitors to those facilities, and conducting targeted law enforcement operations. Although the government cites its extraordinary measures as the cause of the drop in homicide rates, others maintain that a nonaggression pact announced by the gangs in response to those measures might be responsible.²⁵30 "Extraordinary Measures" to Combat Gangs In April 2016, the Sánchez Cerén government started implementing "extraordinary measures" focused on moving gang leaders to maximum-security prisons, cutting off cell phone service around prisons and restricting visitors to those facilities, and conducting targeted law enforcement operations. Even though a majority of Salvadorans believe the extraordinary measures have had little to no effect on reducing crime, the measures have garnered support from the Catholic Church and a broad spectrum of politicians.²⁶31 On February 9, 2017, the National Assembly voted to extend the measures through April 2018 as the police seek to retake gang-controlled territory, ostensibly with support from the public.

Military Involvement in Public Security Efforts

For many years, El Salvador has deployed thousands of military troops to help the police carry out public security functions. In April 2014, the Salvadoran Supreme Court upheld former president Funes's October 2009 decree that authorized the military to carry out police functions. Three battalions each made up of 200 police and elite members of the Armed Forces were sent into the streetsdeployed in 2015 to control gang violence. In April 2016, Sánchez Cerén deployedcreated the El Salvador Special Reaction Force, a 1,000-member force made up of 400 police and 600 soldiers, into rural areas to which gang members had fled. In November 2016, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala launched a tri-national anti-gang force, comprised of military and police officers, to target gangs and criminal activity on the borders.

2012 Gang Truce and Dissolution: Is a New Dialogue Possible? With support from then-Minister of Justice and Public Security David Munguía Payés, a Catholic bishop and a former legislator brokered a truce between the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs. In March 2012, Munguía Payés agreed to transfer high-ranking gang leaders in maximum-security prison to less secure prisons to facilitate intra-gang negotiations. Munguía Payés denied his role in facilitating the truce until September 2012.27 After the prison transfers, the Salvadoran government reported a dramatic decline in homicide rates. Whereas some praised the truce, many others expressed skepticism, maintaining that disappearances increased after it took effect and gangs garnered attention and political power.28 The truce began to unravel in mid-2013. By April 2014, average daily murder rates had risen and gang attacks on police had escalated. These trends worsened considerably in 2015. The Sánchez Cerén administration opposes negotiating with the gangs—directly or indirectly—and has classified them as "terrorist organizations." However, churches and some civil society groups have urged the administration to entertain a new call from the MS-13 for dialogue. In January 2017, MS-13 leaders called for dialogue with the government and, for the first time, indicated they might be willing to disband.29 By extending the extraordinary measures, as previously discussed, the government has effectively rejected that offer.

Human Rights

Confronting Recent Human Rights Violations

As the Sánchez Cerén administration has sought to combat gangs aggressively and confrontations between gangs and security forces have become more frequent, concerns regarding human rights violations have increased. Some analysts have cited high numbers of alleged gang members killed versus injured by security forces as evidence that Salvadoran police and armed forces are carrying out extrajudicial killings.³⁰ Others have reported a rise in the prevalence of vigilante groups dedicated to killing gang members.³¹ According to the U.S. Department of State's Human Rights report covering 2016, the Salvadoran attorney general's office had begun investigating 53 cases of alleged extrajudicial killings as of October 2016, 41 of which occurred in 2016.

Other serious human rights abuses identified in the State Department report include "domestic violence, discrimination, and commercial sexual exploitation of women and children, particularly among armed groups and gangs." Female gang members are expected to tolerate infidelity from their partners, but women may be murdered if they are unfaithful.³² Non-gang-affiliated women and girls have been murdered as a result of turf battles, jealousy, and revenge.

on the borders. According to U.S. estimates, roughly 8,000 of El Salvador's 17,000 active-duty armed forces personnel are involved in public security at any given time.³² Human Rights Recent Human Rights Violations

Violence and human rights abuses have been prevalent for much of El Salvador's modern history. Mass atrocities committed during the civil war (1980-1992) are just beginning to be investigated (since the supreme court overturned the 1993 amnesty law in July 2016). In addition to past crimes, many of the most serious human rights abuses in El Salvador today are related to gender and intra-familial violence, gangs and criminal groups, and the excessive use of force by security forces. The Salvadoran government's ability to address these challenges has been hindered by resource constraints, political polarization, and corruption within the criminal justice system.

Since the end of the civil war, El Salvador has had a relatively free press and civil society. Nevertheless, journalists and some non-governmental organizations focused on transparency have been harassed for reporting on corruption, police abuses, gangs, and drug trafficking.³³ Human rights defenders have also suffered extortion and attacks, including Karla Avelar, a transgender advocate who reportedly received death threats in May 2017.³⁴ Violence based on sexual identity is common in El Salvador, with 52% of transgender people having suffered death threats.³⁵

Indigenous rights and land conflicts have not been as common in El Salvador as in neighboring countries, likely because only 0.2% of the population identified as Amerindian in 2007 (the most recent year available). Although a 2014 constitutional amendment recognized indigenous rights, no laws ensure that indigenous people benefit from natural resource development that occurs on land historically held by indigenous communities. Still, land rights advocates have praised El Salvador's recent decision to ban all metal mining due to concerns about protecting communities' water sources.³⁶

Women and children are often targets of gang violence.³⁷ Gang initiations for men and women differ. Whereas men are subject to a beating, women are often forced to have sex with various members of the gang. Female gang members are expected to tolerate infidelity from their partners, but women may be murdered if they are unfaithful. Non-gang-affiliated women and girls have been murdered as a result of turf battles, jealousy, and revenge. Those who have refused to help gangs or reported crimes are particularly vulnerable, as are those who are related to or have collaborated with the police. Harassment by gangs has led thousands of youth (boys and girls) to abandon school, including some 39,000 in 2016.³⁸

Gang-related violence is part of a broader spectrum of violence in El Salvador that often affects women and children. Child abuse and spousal rape are major problems. According to a 2015 study, El Salvador had the highest rate of femicide (killing of women) in the world. Femicides have been linked to domestic disputes, gangs, and other crimes such as human trafficking.³⁹ There is a total ban on abortion, even in the case of rape or incest, and women in El Salvador have been imprisoned after suffering miscarriages that authorities have deemed illegal abortions.

In response to gang violence, the Sánchez Cerén government has adopted tough anti-gang policies. Human rights groups maintain that the policies have exacerbated human rights abuses committed by El Salvador's underpaid and ill-trained security forces. As of October 2016, El Salvador's attorney general "was investigating 53 possible cases of extrajudicial killings" by security forces, according to the State Department.⁴⁰ In June 2017, authorities arrested four police and 10 soldiers suspected of involvement in some 36 murders that occurred in 2014-2016.⁴¹ In August 2017, reporters released evidence of death squads operating within the police. Government officials have downplayed or dismissed those assertions, as well as evidence presented in recent cases before the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights.⁴² In September 2017, a judge acquitted five police whom Meléndez had charged with committing the "summary execution" in 2015 of a young man whom police claimed was a gang member.⁴³ The youth was one of eight individuals whom the El Salvador's former human rights ombudsmen and El Faro, an investigative news agency, documented as having been extra-judicially killed during what has been called the "San Blas massacre."⁴⁴

Confronting Past Human Rights Violations

Twenty years after a U.N. Commission released its report on the war in El Salvador, Amnesty International issued a statement lamenting that the perpetrators of crimes identified in that report had not been brought to justice in El Salvador and that survivors had not received reparations.³³45 In October 2013, then-President Funes signed a decree creating a program to provide reparations to the victims of the armed conflict. It is unclear how much funding has been budgeted for that program and how many people it has assisted thus far, but human rights groups have urged President Sánchez Cerén to continue supporting its provision of social benefits to victims and their families.³⁴ . In his inaugural address, President Sánchez Cerén pledged to do so and to help families who are seeking to find out what happened to their loved ones.

Although the Supreme Court overturned the 1993 Amnesty Law in July 2016, the courts and prosecutors are grappling with how to confront abuses committed during the country's civil conflict. Many remain skeptical that cases will be pursued, since government officials from all parties are implicated in the abuses. For example, a case has been filed against President Sánchez Cerén and several others for alleged kidnappings that occurred in the late 1980s.³⁵ Nevertheless, in January 2017, President Sánchez Cerén announced plans to create a national committee to investigate forced disappearances during the conflict.

Economic and Social Conditions

El Salvador achieved stability and economic growth in the 1990s following its embrace of a "neo-liberal" economic model that involved cutting government spending, privatizing state-owned enterprises, and, in 2001, adopting the U.S. dollar as its currency. Dollarization led to lower interest rates, low inflation, and easier access to capital markets but took away the government's ability to use monetary and exchange-rate adjustments to cushion the economy from external shocks. Some of the progress made during the 1990s was reversed, however, due to a series of natural disasters, including earthquakes in 2001, that wrought extensive damage to agriculture, housing, and infrastructure.

El Salvador's more moderate growth rates in the 2000s were not high enough to improve living standards among the Salvadoran people, approximately 34.9% of whom continued to live in poverty in 2015 (according to El Salvador's Ministry of the Economy). Emigration reduced unemployment and infused some households with income from remittances but caused social disruptions. The country's continuing vulnerability to natural disasters, such as hurricanes and droughts, also inhibited economic progress.

The Funes government inherited a stagnant economy attracting little foreign direct investment (FDI) and mired in debt. In March 2010, President Funes and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to a $790 million loan package. That agreement paved the way for hundreds of millions of dollars in loans from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to support antipoverty efforts, fiscal reform programs, and the creation of an export guarantee fund. Nevertheless, rather than presiding over a period of economic recovery, GDP growth averaged just 1.7% throughout the remainder of the Funes Administration.³⁶

El Salvador posted an estimated growth rate of 2.5% for 2016, the lowest rate of any country in Central America. Economists have identified a lack of public and private (domestic and foreign) investment in the economy as the primary reason for El Salvador's low growth rates. According to El Salvador's Central Bank, FDI inflows totaled $428.7 million in 2015, significantly less than the other Central American countries. Low levels of FDI have been attributed to the country's difficult business climate, public security challenges, and relatively low-skilled labor force. Moreover, a Central Bank report indicated that violence cost El Salvador 16% of its GDP in 2014, and the country tops all 138 countries evaluated in the World Economic Forum's estimates of business costs due to organized crime. Despite a drop in extortions reported to the police, business leaders assess that extortions payments have tripled since 2013; small businesses pay some 10%-20% of their income to organized crime.

Another barrier to growth in El Salvador is its lack of competitiveness in export sectors.³⁷help families who are seeking to find out what happened to their loved ones during the war. On September 27, 2017, Sánchez Cerén launched a commission to help people find out what happened to their family members who disappeared.⁴⁶ The commission will include two members whose names will be proposed by families of the missing and will be modeled after the government-sponsored national search commission that has located children who went missing during the conflict. In order for the commission to be successful, it is likely to need access to Salvadoran military records and some classified U.S. documents from the period of the conflict so that that information collected from the testimonies of survivors and witnesses can be corroborated. Some Members of Congress asked President Obama for that information to be de-classified, but it will now be up to the Trump Administration to decide whether or not to approve those types of requests.⁴⁷

After the supreme court overturned the 1993 Amnesty Law in July 2016, Attorney General Melendez created a small group of prosecutors to investigate past crimes. This group may now be receiving technical assistance from U.N. experts.⁴⁸ Private human rights attorneys have re-opened the emblematic case against 18 surviving military officers charged with involvement in the El Mozote massacre carried out by an elite Salvadoran army battalion in December 1981 in Morazán that resulted in some 900 deaths.⁴⁹ The case is before a national criminal court. Investigators have encountered difficulties, however, as the military has refused to turn over its historical records on its operations in that region.⁵⁰ Some remain skeptical that this and other emblematic cases will be solved. Parties on both the left and the right may feel vulnerable to political or legal attack about abuses that took place during the war and might prefer that the crimes of the past remain unexamined. An illustrative example of the problem confronting political actors is that shortly after the El Mozote case was re-opened against former military officers, a private party filed a case against President Sánchez Cerén and several others for alleged kidnappings that occurred in the late 1980s.⁵¹

Economic and Social Conditions

El Salvador continues to face significant economic challenges. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), El Salvador posted an economic growth rate of 2.4% in 2016, the lowest of any country in Central America. The economy is predicted to grow by an estimated 2.3% in 2017 and 2.1% in 2018. While strong remittances and low oil prices have benefitted the economy, natural disasters, including flooding in June 2017, have hindered agricultural output.⁵²

Economists have identified a lack of public and private investment in the economy as a primary reason for El Salvador's low growth rates. According to El Salvador's Central Bank, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows totaled $345 million from January to September 2016, significantly less than the $1 billion average among the other Central American countries over that period.⁵³ Low levels of FDI have been attributed to the country's difficult business climate, complicated regulations, public security challenges, and ineffective justice system.⁵⁴ El Salvador has taken steps to ease the process for businesses to obtain permits for new construction and pay taxes online, increase access to electricity, and place more staff at its ports of entry to speed up border crossings. As a result, El Salvador rose 22 spots in the World Bank's 2017 Doing Business report for 2017, ranking second highest out of the countries in Central America.⁵⁵

Despite those efforts, insecurity remains a barrier to growth in El Salvador. According to a 2016 report by El Salvador's central bank, violence cost El Salvador 15% of its GDP in 2014. El Salvador ranked last out of 137 countries evaluated in the World Economic Forum's estimates of business costs due to crime and violence.⁵⁶ Crimes against small and medium-sized businesses, which employ 55% of El Salvador's labor force, are of particular concern. According to a 2015 survey, 42% of such businesses had been victims of crimes in the past year, with extortion the most common crime reported.⁵⁷

Another barrier to growth in El Salvador is its lack of competitiveness in export sectors.⁵⁸ With a dollarized economy, El Salvador has higher labor costs than neighboring countries and Asian competitors, and it must have a high level of productivity to be competitive. According to a joint U.S.-Salvadoran analysis, the country's labor force lacks adequate education and vocational training, including English-language skills. Security challenges add to the cost of doing business in El Salvador, as doThe country also exhibits logistical and physical infrastructure deficiencies.

The Sánchez Cerén government has sought to attract foreign investment through public-private partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure development, with a revised PPP law and an investment stability law. Although in the past some FMLN leaders have been opposed to PPPs due to concerns that they would lead to the privatization of public services, there are encouraging signs of new government interest in PPPs. This interest may be occurring because the government needs private capital to fund much-needed infrastructure projects for which public resources are unavailable.

Fiscal Crisis

the current government has recognized that PPPs are the only way to obtain the amount of funding needed to develop the country's infrastructure. Despite that interest, there are only 10 active PPP projects in El Salvador worth roughly $375 million in investment.⁵⁹

The IMF and others have urged the Salvadoran government to adopt financial sector reforms, as well as to focus on structural reforms to attract investment, increase growth, and reduce the country's fiscal deficit, which is unsustainably high.³⁸60 The Salvadoran government has tended to swap short-term debt for longer-term debt rather than implement unpopular fiscal reforms. Potential reforms include raising the value-added tax and creating a property tax, implementing a hiring freeze and limiting wage increases in the public sector, and fixing the pension system. In addition, long-standing government practices in El Salvador, —including cash payments to officials, shielded budgetary accounts, and diversion of government funds, make accountability difficult and contribute to fiscal woes.

Sánchez Cerén has had a difficult time garnering legislative support for his priorities, including efforts to issue bonds or take on loans that would enable him to boost social spending and improve education and health care services. In January 2017, months-long negotiations between the government and ARENA legislators over how to resolve the country's fiscal crisis and secure a much-needed standby agreement with the IMF broke down. The FMLN government then secured legislative approval of a 2017 budget without ARENA's support that ignored the fiscal rules discussed during the negotiations (and recommended by the IMF).³⁹ Discussions have recently resumed, but the outcome is far from certain. Legislative paralysis may continue, or even worsen, as the March 2018 legislative elections approach.

—have contributed to fiscal woes. A September 2017 pension reform should help ease the financial burden on that system, but few analysts predict that the FMLN and ARENA will agree on a broader fiscal pact that would include a fiscal responsibility law and other measures.⁶¹ Potential reforms include raising the value-added tax and creating a property tax, implementing a government hiring freeze, and limiting wage increases in the public sector.

Social Conditions

El Salvador's development challenges have been exacerbated by the country's long and violent civil conflict, persistent poverty and inequality, and family disintegration. The effects of the 2009 global financial crisis and U.S. recession set back some of the progress that had been made prior to that time in reducing poverty in the country. Nevertheless, conditional cash transfers and other social programs, largely supported by loans from multilateral development banks, helped to reduce poverty between 2010 and 2015 from 47.0% to 35.9%. InequalityIncome inequality remains a challenge, although it was reduced from 2000 to 2014declined by 4% from 2006 to 2015, according to the World Bank. This reduction occurred as a result of a growth in income of the poorest 20% of the population.⁶² Nevertheless, El Salvador's slow growth rates have inhibited greater improvement in social development., according to IMF data.

Nevertheless, El Salvador's slow growth rates have inhibited greater improvement in social development. In 2014, El Salvador had an unemployment rate of 7% and an urban underemployment rate of 28.5%.⁴⁰ Enrollment in secondary education increased to 70.2% in 2014 from 58% in 2005, but few jobs are available even for those who graduate from secondary school. Despite that progress, some 240,000 young people neither study nor work.⁴¹63 Enrollment in primary education has dropped slightly from 94.4% in 2005 to 93.1% in 2014, likely due to gang-related intimidation of youth. The Salvadoran government reported that approximately 36,000 students left the educational system in 2016, and up to 15,000 of those students left due to gang violence.⁴²

64 Food insecurity, often caused by drought or other natural disasters, has become a major driver of emigration from El Salvador. Although they may eventually benefit from remittances sent by relatives living abroad, family members who are left behind are often saddled with debts owed to smugglers, an increased work burden (especially in agriculture), and emotional trauma.⁶⁵

Upon taking office, President Sánchez Cerén stated his intention to increase social spending using revenues that would be made available by reductions in energy costs that would occur as a result of the country's entrance into Petrocaribe.⁴³66 Since that time, oil prices have fallen, which has eased the country's energy costs. At the same time, economic conditions in Venezuela have deteriorated significantly and cast doubt on the future of the Petrocaribe program. The Sánchez Cerén government has been unable to increase social spending significantly or to secure large new loans (as President Funes did) to support new social programs.

U.S. Relations

U.S. relations with the FMLN governments of Mauricio Funes (2009-2014) and Salvador Sánchez Cerén have remained friendly. In March 2011, then-President Obama visited El Salvador, where he described the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) as a regional security effort "designed and led here in Central America by the respective governments."⁴⁴El Salvador have remained friendly, although they could be strained by changes in U.S. immigration policies. From 2011 to 2016, El Salvador participated in the Partnership for Growth (PFG), a foreign aid initiative involving close U.S. whole-of-government cooperation with four selected countries on mutually agreed upon objectives. In September 2014, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) signed a $277- million investment compact with the Sánchez Cerén governmentEl Salvador to develop the southern coastal region; it aims to help El Salvador take better advantage of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).⁴⁵67 El Salvador had previously completed a $461 million MCC compact in 2012.

Security, governance, and migration issues are likely willto continue to figure prominently on the bilateral agenda, particularly now that violent crime and irregular migration to the United States are trending upward and President Trump has issued an executive order to increase U.S. immigration enforcement.

President Trump has issued an executive order to increase U.S. immigration enforcement, prioritized combating and deporting gang members, rescinded the Deferred Action for Child Arrivals (DACA) program, and signaled that Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Salvadorans in the United States may not be renewed (discussed further below). The importance of combating gangs, particularly MS-13, proved to be a central focus of Attorney General Jeff Session's July 2017 visit to El Salvador.⁶⁸ Sessions announced that MS-13 is a "top priority" for U.S. law enforcement agencies that participate in the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces.⁶⁹

Congress plays a key role in appropriating bilateral and regional aid to El Salvador, and overseeing implementation of U.S. assistance programs. Congress is likely to monitor how the Salvadoran government is or is not improving the investment climate in El Salvador, dealing with gangs, preventing emigration, and combating corruption.

U.S. Foreign Assistance

Bilateral Assistance and the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)

Escalating violence in El Salvador and the ongoing political polarization in the country have inhibited bilateral efforts to improve security and bolster growth and investment. From 2011 to 2015State Department Assistance: Bilateral and Regional From 2011 to 2016, the Obama Administration implemented a Partnership for Growth (PFG) initiative in El Salvador (and only three other countries globally) thatthe PFG in El Salvador. The initiative involved close collaboration between the U.S. and Salvadoran governments on specific barriers to growth:economic growth—namely, violence and lack of competitiveness in export industries.⁴⁶ As part of that effort, U.S. law enforcement and prevention programs began to be colocatedco-located through a "place-based approach" in the same cities that the Salvadoran government prioritized in its security plan. Although both governments reported that 15 of 20 bilateral goals for economic and security programs were "on track" in the last report on the initiative that was made public, El Salvador's economic and security situations remain dire.⁴⁷

A final evaluation found "mixed and often negative" security and economic indicators still present in the country at the end of the five-year period but credited the PFG with helping El Salvador pass legislation (on taxes and access to public information), create new institutions (such as a Growth Council to foster public-private dialogue), and fulfill its MCC commitments.⁷⁰

The PFG has been replaced by the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which is designed to promote economic prosperity, improve security, and strengthen governance in El Salvador and the rest of the region.⁷¹ The objectives of the new U.S. strategy align with the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity (AFP),⁴⁸ which was proposed by the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras with implementation support from the Inter-American Development Bank.⁴⁹72 Congress has appropriated funding for the new U.S. strategy, including $67.9 million in bilateral aid for El Salvador in FY2016. The FY2016 funding included more of a focus on development issues than in prior years. Due to conditions on FY2016 aid, much of that funding is just beginning to arrive in El Salvador.⁵⁰

El Salvador also has and an estimated $72.7 million in FY2017. Assistance provided in FY2016 and FY2017 has included more of an emphasis on development than in the past and has been subject to strict conditions. El Salvador has also received regional security assistance provided through CARSIthe Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), which has supported justice sector reform, police unitsunit vetting, border security, anti-gang efforts, and violence prevention efforts, among other initiatives.⁵¹ From FY2008 to FY2016FY2017, Congress appropriated nearly $1.5more than $1.8 billion for Central America through CARSI. The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) intend to allocateallocated $73.4 million in FY2016 CARSI funding to El Salvador.⁷³ Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Assistance to El Salvador: FY2015-FY2018 $73.4 million in FY2016 CARSI funding to El Salvador.⁵²

In December 2016, President Obama signed into law a continuing resolution (P.L. 114-254) providing funds for foreign aid programs in Central America through April 28, 2017, at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of almost 0.2%. The 115^th Congress will be charged with appropriating funding for the remainder of the fiscal year. The Obama Administration had requested $88 million in bilateral aid for El Salvador for FY2017, whereas the bills advanced by the Senate and House Appropriations Committees (S. 3117 and H.R. 5912) during the second session of the 114^th Congress both would have provided $78 million for the country.

Some analysts maintain that El Salvador is well-placed to partner with the U.S. government and other donors on economic and security programs, whereas others dispute that assertion. On the one hand, El Salvador has drafted a solid security plan with help from international donors and created a multisectoral Alliance for Prosperity Consultative Group to help oversee its implementation. That group includes U.S. officials, as well as at least six Salvadoran ministries, a mayoral representative, the local chapter of Transparency International, and the private sector. On the other hand, El Salvador is the only country in the so-called "northern triangle" of Central America where violence is trending upward. El Salvador is also the only northern triangle country that does not have an external entity supporting the Attorney General's Officeattorney general's office in conducting anticorruption investigations.⁵³

75

Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Investment Compact⁵⁴

76

El Salvador signed a second $277 million compact on September 30, 2014, to focus on improving transportation infrastructure, employment opportunities, and the investment climate. The Salvadoran government committed to match that contribution with $88 million in complementary investments. Key compact projects include the following:

• Investment Climate Project ($42 million MCC funds/$50 million Salvadoran funds): seeks to help the government develop and implement regulatory improvements and to better partner with private investors to build infrastructure and provide public services.
• Human Capital Project ($100.7 million MCC funds/$15 million Salvadoran funds): supports full-day schooling; reforms to the policies and operations that govern teacher training and student assessment; and a new technical, vocational, education, and training system that is aligned with labor market demands.
• Logistical Infrastructure Project ($109.6 million MCC funds/$15.7 million Salvadoran funds): will widen the part of El Salvador's coastal highway that connects the airport and the ports of La Unión and Acajutla and improve border crossing facilities into Honduras at El Amatillo.

In response to some lingering concerns expressed by board members, the Salvadoran government designed a Priority Action Plan that was then agreed to by both governments to be completed prior to the compact's signing. The action plan required the Salvadoran government to (1) appoint a director and deputy director to a newly established financial crimes investigation unit in the police; (2) approve an asset forfeiture law; (3) approve reformed anti-money-laundering legislation that meets international standards; (4) approve reforms to the country's public-private partnership law to make it attractive to investors; and (5) issue a revised decree on how corn and bean seed are procured that is consistent with CAFTA-DR. The fifth condition was subsequently removed. The compact entered into force in September 2015.

Department of Defense (DOD) Assistance

DOD provides counternarcotics foreign assistance to train, equip, and improve the counternarcotics capabilities of relevant agencies of the Salvadoran government with its Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account appropriations. DOD assistance totaled roughly $12$6.4 million in FY2016 and an estimated 4.7 million in FY2017.

Migration Issues

The United States is home to more than 1.91.4 million Salvadoran migrantspeople born in El Salvador, some 700,000 of whom the Pew Research Center estimates to be unauthorized.⁵⁵ Salvadorans comprise the second-largest foreign-born Hispanic population in the United States (behind Mexico). In the 1980s, Salvadoran emigration was fueled by the country's civil conflict. Once that ended, family reunification, the search for economic opportunities, and periodic natural disasters fueled emigration. The movement of large numbers of poor Salvadorans to the United States has eased pressure on El Salvador's social service system and labor market while providing the country with substantial remittances that have constituted as much as 18% of the country's GDP in recent years (77 Remittances sent from those Salvadorans contribute up to 17% of El Salvador's GDP, according to the World Bank). At the same time, emigration has arguably resulted in a "brain drain" of Salvadoran professionals, divided families, and left the economy overly reliant on remittances.

The Salvadoran government has backed past efforts to enact comprehensive immigration reform in the United States. As those prospects have dimmed, the government has welcomed immigration relief provided to certain Salvadorans in the United States by President Obama's 2012 Deferred Action for Child Arrivals (DACA).⁵⁶ It remains to be seen what effects President Trump's recent executive action focusing on immigration enforcement will have on DACA recipients.⁵⁷

Temporary Protected Status

Following a series of earthquakes in El Salvador in 2001 that forced thousands of Salvadorans to leave the country and prompted a determination that the country was temporarily incapable of handling the return of its nationals, the U.S. government granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to an estimated 212,000 eligible Salvadoran migrants.⁵⁸ TPS was extended on July 8, 2016, and is currently scheduled to expire on March 9, 2018.

Removals (Deportations)

The United States first began removing (deporting) large numbers of Salvadorans, many with criminal convictions, back to the region after the passage of the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996.⁵⁹ Many contend that deportees who were members of the MS-13 and 18^th Street gangs "exported" a Los Angeles gang culture to Central America and recruited new members from among the local populations. Removals from El Salvador have risen since the mid-2000s, with a significant percentage of those removed both then and now possessing some sort of criminal record, although not necessarily gang-related. As a comparison, in FY2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) removed 6,342 Salvadorans from the United States, 42.5% of whom had criminal records.⁶⁰ In FY2015, DHS removed some 21,471 Salvadorans, 33.1% of whom had criminal records.⁶¹ Salvadoran officials are girding for increased deportations as a result of President Trump's executive action.⁶²

The United States has been working with the Salvadoran government in a joint effort to improve the removal process since 2009. El Salvador became the first country in the world to receive more complete criminal history information on U.S. gang deportees through the FBI's Criminal History Information Program (CHIP) in May 2012. The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement within DHS expanded a Criminal History Information Sharing (CHIS) program that began in Mexico to El Salvador in 2014.⁶³ The CHIS program provides a criminal history on those removed from the United States with felony records to Salvadoran law enforcement. Salvadoran police would then reciprocate by exchanging similar information with U.S. officials on deportees who have serious criminal records in El Salvador.

In 2014, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provided support to help the Salvadoran government prepare to receive larger numbers of adults, family units, and children who are removed from the United States (by air) and Mexico (by bus).

Unaccompanied Alien Children⁶⁴

Since 2011, several factors have contributed to a dramatic increase in unaccompanied alien children (UAC) immigrating from El Salvador (as well as Guatemala and Honduras) to the United States. Until recently, unaccompanied children had largely emigrated in search of opportunities (work and education) and/or to reunite with family living in the United States. Escalating crime and violence, as well as the government's inability to guarantee citizen security, have altered that tendency; 66% of the UAC from El Salvador interviewed by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in 2013 had been abused or threatened by criminal actors.⁶⁵ Some minors are also reportedly emigrating in hopes of being granted asylum in the United States, or at least being temporarily released and reunited with family pending a U.S. immigration court hearing.⁶⁶ Flows of unaccompanied minors have increased even as the journey from Central America through Mexico to the United States has become more costly and more dangerous.

In response to a 2014 surge in unaccompanied child migrants, the U.S. and Salvadoran governments sponsored public awareness campaigns to inform Central Americans of the dangers of the journey and to correct misinformation regarding U.S. immigration policies. They also increased law enforcement efforts against alien smugglers

. The U.S. government granted TPS to eligible Salvadoran migrants following a series of earthquakes in El Salvador in 2001 that forced thousands of Salvadorans to leave the country and prompted a determination that the country was temporarily incapable of handling the return of its nationals. TPS has been extended 13 times, most recently on July 8, 2016, and is currently scheduled to expire on March 9, 2018. There could be as many as 262,500 Salvadorans who benefit from TPS, many of whom have U.S. citizen children.⁷⁸ The Salvadoran government and some Members of Congress are lobbying for TPS to be extended, but the Trump Administration has signaled that future renewals may not be forthcoming.⁷⁹

U.S. removals (deportations) of unauthorized Salvadorans have risen since the mid-2000s, with a substantial percentage of those removed possessing some sort of criminal record. Many of those deported on a criminal basis have committed non-violent offenses or been convicted of immigration-related crimes. In FY2016, the U.S. government deported 20,538 Salvadorans.⁸⁰ Deportations could increase further as a result of President Donald Trump's executive actions focusing on immigration enforcement and his Administration's prioritization of enforcement actions and removals of gang members.⁸¹

Several factors such as violence, economic concerns, and a desire to reunite with families have contributed to high levels of emigration from El Salvador to the United States in recent years. Mexico and the United States have responded to these flows by stepping up immigration enforcement, working with Central American officials to combat human smuggling and alien trafficking, and calling for greater investment in the northern triangle countries. As previously discussed, Congress has provided higher levels of foreign assistance to address the root causes of migration since FY2016. Despite these efforts, the unaccompanied children from El Salvador apprehended in FY2016 on the U.S. southwest border surpassed the record high from 2014.⁸² In FY2016, there were 27,114 family units apprehended along the southwest border. In FY2017, arrivals of unaccompanied children had decreased significantly through August, but family unit arrivals had reached 23,439, which is not significantly lower than the FY2016 total.⁸³

In December 2014, the U.S. government launched an in-country refugee/parole processing program known as the Central American Minors (CAM) program for children with parents residing legally in the United States. In July 2016, the U.S. government expanded the CAM program to include additional eligible family members. According to data from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, over 10,700As of September 25, 2017, over 11,648 children and family members have sought or already received had sought relocation through the program as of December 2016. Approximately 9,916 cases representing 10,785 individuals had been filed as of December 2016, and, according to data from the State Department. Approximately 86% of these individuals were from El Salvador.⁶⁷ As of December 2, 2016, some 1,245 As of that time, some 2,464 refugees and parolees from El Salvador had departed forarrived in the United States. The Trump Administration announced the end of the CAM parole program in a Federal Register notice on August 16, 2017.⁸⁴ The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is still accepting applications for the CAM refugee program, but the Administration has set a refugee allocation for Latin America during FY2018 of 1,500.⁸⁵

On September 5, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced that the DACA policy, an Obama Administration initiative, was being rescinded. A related memorandum released by DHS that same day rescinded the 2012 memorandum that established DACA and described how DHS would "execute a wind-down of the program." President Trump and some congressional leaders have conducted further discussions on the future of the DACA program and possible legislation concerning covered persons. To date, Congress has considered, but never enacted, legislation on the DACA initiative. The government of El Salvador hopes that the roughly 25,900 Salvadorans currently benefitting from DACA continue to be protected.⁸⁶

Counternarcotics Cooperation

Although El Salvador is not a producer of illicit drugs, it does serve as a transit country for narcotics, mainly cocaine and heroin, cultivated in the Andes and destined for the United States. In September 2017, President Trump included El Salvador on the annual list of countries designated as "major" drug-producing or "drug-transit" countries for the seventh consecutive year.⁸⁷ A country's inclusion in the list, however, does not mean that its antidrug efforts are inadequate. In 2016, Salvadoran officials seized around 12.3 metric tons of cocaine, an amount roughly four times larger than the total seized in 2015.⁸⁸ The government also denied some $203.4 million in illicit revenue to crime groups, including assets seized during a major takedown of gang-affiliated money launderers ("Operation Check") in July 2016 that was carried out, in part, by U.S.-funded vetted units. During the first nine months of the year, the government arrested 1,652 suspected drug traffickers. Still, corruption continues, and a lack of resources and equipment for the police and attorney general's office, inadequate interdiction efforts, and prisons in need of reform hinder El Salvador's antidrug efforts, according to the State Department.

Trade Relations The United States is El Salvador's main trading partner, purchasing 47.2% of its exports and supplying 36.7% of its imports.⁸⁹ Salvadoran exports to the United States include apparel, electrical equipment, sugar, and coffee; its top imports from the United States are fuel oil, heavy machinery, electrical machinery, cereals, plastics, and vehicles. The United States had a trade surplus with El Salvador of $437 million for 2016 the United States.⁶⁸ Despite these programs, the numbers of UAC and family units from El Salvador apprehended in FY2016 surpassed the record high from 2014. The future of the CAM program appears uncertain under the Trump Administration.

Counternarcotics Cooperation

Although El Salvador is not a producer of illicit drugs, it does serve as a transit country for narcotics, mainly cocaine and heroin, cultivated in the Andes and destined for the United States via land and sea. In September 2016, President Obama included El Salvador on the annual list of countries designated as "major" drug-producing or "drug-transit" countries for the sixth consecutive year.⁶⁹ A country's inclusion in the list, however, does not mean that its antidrug efforts are inadequate. In 2016, Salvadoran officials seized some 12.2 metric tons of cocaine, four times the amount seized in 2015. Overall, the Salvadoran government maintains that it denied criminal organizations more than $203 million in revenue in 2016.⁷⁰ Still, corruption and inadequate training and equipment for law enforcement forces continue to hinder El Salvador's ability to control its borders and interdict drugs, according to the State Department.

U.S. assistance focuses on improving the interdiction capabilities of Salvadoran law enforcement and military agencies, particularly the joint military-police antidrug task force that was formed in 2012. It also supports the attorney general's National Electronic Monitoring Center. Recent U.S. support has been geared at helping implement El Salvador's asset forfeiture legislation and bolstering anti-money laundering efforts. In 2014, the Obama Administration named José Adán Salazar, a hotel magnate, as a major drug kingpin subject to U.S. sanctions.

Comalapa International Airport in El Salvador serves as one of two cooperative security locations (CSLs) for U.S. antidrug forces in the hemisphere. The CSL extends the reach of detection and monitoring aircraft into the eastern Pacific drug-smuggling corridors. The U.S. lease on the airport was renewed for a five-year term in August 2014. El Salvador is also the home of the U.S.-backed International Law Enforcement Academy, which provides police management and training to officials from across the region.

Anti-Gang Efforts and U.S. Programs

Since the mid-2000s, several U.S. agencies have been actively engaged on the law enforcement and preventive side of dealing with Central American gangs; many U.S. anti-gang efforts in Central America began in El Salvador. In 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) created an MS-13 Task Force to improve information-sharing and intelligence-gathering among U.S. and Central American law enforcement officials. The FBI established a vetted Transnational Anti-Gang Unit in El Salvador in 2007. In addition to arresting suspected gang members in the United States, ICE within DHS began coordinating its U.S. anti-gang efforts with its Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit activities in El Salvador.

Between FY2008 and FY2013, Congress appropriated roughly $38 million in global International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for anti-gang efforts in Central America. A regional gang adviser based in El Salvador has coordinated Central American gang programs since that time. Since FY2013, approximately $10 million in Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) funding has been assigned to continue specific anti-gang initiatives. For example, the State Department has embedded U.S. law-enforcement advisers and prosecutors with investigative units that are conducting money-laundering investigations targeting the leadership of MS-13 in El Salvador. In addition to assistance specified for anti-gang efforts, hundreds of millions more has supported broader law-enforcement and prevention efforts that have impacted the gang phenomenon.

On October 11, 2012, the Treasury Department designated the MS-13 as a significant transnational criminal organization whose assets will be targeted for economic sanctions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581.⁷¹ The Treasury Department worked with ICE to build evidence to support the designation of the MS-13 based on the gang's involvement in "drug trafficking, kidnapping, human smuggling, sex trafficking, murder," and other serious criminal offenses that threaten U.S. and Central American citizens. As of July 2016, eight individuals appear to have been designated as subject to U.S. sanctions.

Trade and CAFTA-DR⁷²

The United States is El Salvador's main trading partner, purchasing 46.7% of its exports and supplying 39.4% of its imports.⁷³ Salvadoran exports to the United States include apparel, electrical equipment, sugar, and coffee; its top imports from the United States are fuel oil, heavy machinery, and electrical machinery. The United States had a trade surplus with El Salvador of roughly $466 million in 2016.⁷⁴ Other main trade partners for El Salvador include Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico.

From the 1980s through 2006, El Salvador benefitted from preferential trade agreements, such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative and later the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) of 2000, which provided many of its exports, especially apparel and related items, duty-free entry into the U.S. market. As a result, the composition of Salvadoran exports to the United States has shifted from agricultural products, such as coffee and spices, to apparel and textiles.

On December 17, 2004, despite strong opposition from the FMLN, El Salvador became the first country in Central America to ratify the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). El Salvador was also the first country to pass the agreement's required legislative reforms, implementing CAFTA-DR on March 1, 2006. Since that time, the volume of U.S.-Salvadoran trade has tended to follow trends in growth rates in the United States, with a variety of factors inhibiting the performance of Salvadoran exports vis-à-vis the other CAFTA-DR countries. Those factors have included a continued dependence on the highly competitive apparel trade, low levels of investment, public security problems, and broader governance concerns. As a comparison, El Salvador's exports to the United States increased from $2.0 billion in 2005 (the year before the agreement took effect there) to $2.5 billion in 2016. Nicaragua's exports increased from $1.1 billion in 2005 to $3.3 billion in 2016.

President Trump has issued an executive order withdrawing the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and promised to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada. Nevertheless, many analysts are not overly concerned that President Trump will seek to renegotiate CAFTA-DR.⁷⁵ U.S. exports to CAFTA-DR countries have increased significantly over the past decade, and the United States has a trade surplus with most countries in the region.governance concerns. Since the United States enjoys a trade surplus with CAFTA-DR countries, most analysts had not predicted that the Trump Administration would seek to renegotiate the agreement, as it has with the North American Free Trade Agreement. On October 2, 2017, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer said that CAFTA-DR and a number of other U.S. free trade agreements with Latin American countries "need to be modernized, more or less."

Human Rights Cases: Former Salvadoran Officials Tried in the United States

Although the amnesty law made bringing cases against human rights abusers from the war era nearly impossible to do in El Salvador, some former Salvadoran military leaders who have resided in the United States have faced judicial proceedings regarding their immigration statuses. In recent years, the Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Unit within the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has conducted investigations focused on past human rights violations in El Salvador.⁷⁶90

• In February 2012, an immigration judge ruled that former Salvadoran Defense Minister Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova could be removed (deported) from the United States based on his role ordering the torture of Salvadoran citizens, the 1980 killings of four American churchwomen, and the 1981 killings of land reformers. That decision was upheld in March 2015, and Vides Casanova was deported to El Salvador on April 8, 2015.
• In September 2012, Colonel Inocente Orlando Montano, one of the officials named by the Spanish judge as responsible for the aforementioned Jesuit murders, pled guilty to immigration fraud. Montano had hidden his military past when applying for TPS in the United States. He was sentenced to 21 months in prison and could then face extradition to Spain.
. In August 2017, a federal judge approved a lower court ruling that Orlando Montano could be extradited to Spain to face charges for his role in the 1989 killing of six Jesuit priests, most of whom were Spanish.⁹¹
• In February 2014, a federal judge determined that a former Salvadoran defense minister, General José Guillermo García, can be removed (deported) based on his role in brutal human rights violations. The judge ruled that he "assisted or otherwise participated" in 11 violent incidents, including the 1980 killing of Archbishop Óscar Arnulfo Romero. He was deported to El Salvador in January 2016.
• In February 2017, the U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Texas filed a civil lawsuit against Arnoldo Antonio Vasquez, a Salvadoran who misrepresented his past in order to obtain U.S. citizenship. According to an investigation conducted by ICE, Vasquez failed to acknowledge his involvement as a military officer in the extrajudicial killing of 10 civilians in San Sebastian, El Salvador, in 1988.⁹²
in January 2016.

Author Contact Information

Acknowledgments

Meredith Pierce, a CRS Research Associate, assisted in updating this report.

Footnotes

Daniel Valencia Caravantes and Efren Lemus, "La Idea de Crear una CICIG para El Salvador la Mató el Silencio del Presidente" El Faro Sala Negra, May 12, 2014; Fundación Salavdoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (FUSADES), Quinto Año de Gobierno del Presidente Funes, May 2014.

23. 27. 45. 51. 58. 60. 75. ICE, "Denaturalization Lawsuit Filed Against Alleged Human Rights Abuser Originally From El Salvador Residing in North Texas," press release, February 10, 2017.

1.	For historical background on El Salvador, see Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, El Salvador: A Country Study, ed. Richard Haggerty (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1990).
2.	Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002); Diana Villiers Negroponte, Seeking Peace in El Salvador: The Struggle to Reconstruct a Nation at the End of the Cold War (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
3.	In Central America, mixed migration flows are occurring, which include economic migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons, trafficked persons, and unaccompanied children who travel the same routes and use the same modes of transportation. Also termed irregular migrants, these individuals do not have the required documentation, such as passports and visas, and may use smugglers and unauthorized border crossings.
4.	International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, accessed October 2016.
5.	"El Salvador Judge Orders Seizure of Former President's Assets," Reuters, November 5, 2016.
6.	Geoff Thale, "Tracking El Salvador's Progress in Historic Human Rights Cases," Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), October 27, 2017.
7.	"Traducing El Salvador's Truce," The Economist, August 26, 2017.
8.
7.	"Nicaragua Grants Asylum to El Salvador's Mauricio Funes," BBC News, September 6, 2016.
89.	"El Salvador's Defense Minister Investigated for Arms Trafficking," Latin News Daily Report, June 11, 2014.
910.	The future of Petrocaribe is uncertain, however, as Venezuelan oil production has declined and the country is immersed in a deep economic crisis. See CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
1011.	"Low Rating in the First Year of Government of Sanchez Cerén," Associated Press, May 26, 2015Institute for Public Opinion at the Universidad Centroamericana, Los Salvadoreños Evalúan el Tercer Año de Gobierno de Salvador Sánchez Cerén, Boletín de Prensa Año XXXI, No.3, June 2017.
1112.	"Los Salvadoreños Evalúan la Situación del País a Finales de 2016," Instituto Universitario de Opinión Publica, Boletín de Prensa Año XXXI, No. 1, January 10, 2017. Hereinafter IUPOP, 2017In late 2015, the assembly approved a 5% tax on the profits of large companies, as well as a 5% tax on telecommunications services to support citizen security programs.
1213.	"La Fiscalía Salvadoreña Pedirá Apoyo Internacional si Continúan las Presiones al Ente," Agencia EFE, February 8Eurasia Group, "El Salvador: Upgrading Trajectories to Neutral on Diminished Financing Risks," September 29, 2017.
1314.	U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices: El Salvador, March 20162017.
1415.	Mano dura approaches have involved incarcerating large numbers of youth (often those with visible tattoos) for illicit association and increasing sentences for gang membership and gang-related crimes. A mano dura law passed by El Salvador's Congress in 2003 was subsequently declared unconstitutional but was followed by a super mano dura package of reforms in July 2004. These reforms enhanced police power to search and arrest suspected gang members and stiffened penalties for convicted gang members, although they provided some protections for minors. Most youth arrested under mano dura provisions were subsequently released for lack of evidence that they committed any crime.
15.	U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), March 2016.
16.	Laura Jaitman, The Costs of Crime and Violence: New Evidence and Insights in Latin America and the Caribbean, IDB, 2017.
17.	U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment, September 2012.
18.	The 18th Street gang was formed by Mexican youth in Los Angeles in the 1960s that were not accepted into existing Hispanic gangs. MS-13 was created during the 1980s by Salvadorans in Los Angeles who had fled the country's civil conflict. Both gangs later expanded their operations to Central America after increased U.S. deportations of gang members in the mid-1990s. See CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, by [author name scrubbed].
19.	Christopher Sherman, "Gangs declare war on police as El Salvador violence rages," AP, April 13, 2016.
20For background, see Sonja Wolf, Mano Dura: the Politics of Gang Control in El Salvador (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2017). Many analysts argue that the Sánchez Cerén government has returned to a mano dura approach to policing. See Héctor Silva Ávalos, "El Salvador Violence Rising Despite 'Extraordinary' Anti-Gang Measures," Insight Crime, October 3, 2017.
16.	This draws from: U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices: El Salvador, March 2017.
17.	Carlos Martínez, "The Unbelievable Hell Inside El Salvador's Prisons," Insight Crime, December 28, 2016.
18.	With support from then-Minister of Justice and Public Security David Munguía Payés, a Catholic bishop and a former legislator brokered a truce between MS-13 and 18th Street gangs. In March 2012, Munguía Payés agreed to transfer high-ranking gang leaders in maximum-security prison to less secure prisons to facilitate intra-gang negotiations. Munguía Payés denied his role in facilitating the truce until September 2012. He admitted to his role in designing the process and said he did so with former President Funes's approval during August 2017 testimony. "Salvadoran Judge Acquits Truce Trial Defendants," Latin America Daily Briefings, August 31, 2017.
19.	Guatemala has the U.N. Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and Honduras has the OAS-sponsored Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH).
20.	David Gagne, "Insight Crime's 2016 Homicide Round-up," Insight Crime, January 16, 2017; "El Salvador: Spiraling Violence Could Be Here to Stay," Central America and Caribbean Report, October 2017.
21.	Laura Jaitman, The Costs of Crime and Violence: New Evidence and Insights in Latin America and the Caribbean, IDB, 2017.
22.	Douglas Farah, "Central America's Gangs Are All Grown Up," Foreign Policy, January 19, 2016.
Sarah Esther Maslin, "El Salvador says a Brutal Gang Laundered Money Through Motels, Brothels, and Taxis," Washington Post, July 29, 2016.
2124.	Héctor Silva Ávalos, "El Salvador Violence Rising Despite 'Extraordinary' Anti-Gang Measures," Insight Crime, October 3, 2017.
25.	Alexandra Bilak et al., 2016 Global Report on Internal Displacement, Norwegian Refugee Council, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, May 11, 2016.
26.	U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Temporary Protected Status: A Vital Piece of the Central American Protection and Prosperity Puzzle, October 2017.
See http://www.presidencia.gob.sv/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/El-Salvador-Seguro.pdf.
2228.	Gabriel García and Lourdes Quintanilla, "San Salvador Llega Tarde al Plan El Salvador Seguro," La Prensa Grafica, February 2, 2017.
2329.	For government figures, see Jonathan Laguán, 107 Homicidios en los Primeros Ocho Días de Noviembre, November 9, 2016http://www.seguridad.gob.sv/plan-el-salvador-seguro-pess/. For criticisms of the plan, see Dan Adler, "El Salvador's 'Plan Seguro' Failing to Make Communities Safe: Report," Insight Crime, March 28, 2016.
2430.	David Marroquín, "Plan El Salvador Seguro Fracasa en Municipios más Violentos," El Diario de Hoy, February 5, 2017.
2531.	Carlos Martínez, "Pandillas Caminan Hacia una Frente Común Ante Medidas Extraordinarias," El Faro, July 5, 2016IUDOP, 2017; "El Salvador: War on Mara Gangs Extended," Latin American Weekly Report, February 16, 2017.
2632.	IUDOP, 2017; "El Salvador: War on Mara Gangs Extended," Latin American Weekly Report, February 16U.S. Department of Defense, Congressional Report on Citizen Security Responsibilities in the Northern Triangle of Central America Pursuant to Section 1069 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act, July 20, 2017.
2733.	Carlos Martínez and Jose Luis Sanz, "The New Truth About the Gang Truce," Insight Crime, September 14, 2012.
28.	Douglas Farah, "Central America's Gangs Are All Grown Up," Foreign Policy, January 19, 2016.
29.	Carlos Martínez and Roberto Valencia, "MS-13 pide Diálogo al Gobierno y Pone Sobre la Mesa su Propia Desarticulación," El Faro, January 9, 2017.
30.	Roberto Valencia, "Casi que Guardia Nacional Civil," El Faro, October 3, 2016.
31.	Elijah Stevens, "Death Squads in El Salvador Kill, Face No Investigation: Report," Insight Crime, November 10, 2015.
32.	Interpeace Regional Office for Latin America, Violentas y Violentadas Relaciones de Género en las Maras Salvatrucha y Barrio 18 del Triángulo Norte de Centroamérica, Guatemala, May 15, 2013.
33Committee to Protect Journalists, "Two Salvadoran News Websites Threatened for Their Reporting," August 28, 2017.
34.	"Extorsionan a Defensora de Mujeres Trans Nominada a Premio," La Prensa Gráfica, May 12, 2017.
35.	U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: El Salvador, April 12, 2017.
36.	Sarah Sheets, "El Salvador's Mining Ban: Land Rights, Development, and Democracy in Latin America," May 2, 2017.
37.	KIND, Neither Security nor Justice: Sexual and Gender-based Violence and Gang Violence in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, May 4, 2017.
38.	"MINED Reporta Deserción de 12,000 Estudiantes," La Prensa Gráfica, August 26, 2017.
39.	Flacso et al., Mapa de Violencia no Brasil: Homicidio de Mulheres no Brasil 2015, 2015.
40.	U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: El Salvador, April 12, 2017, p. 2.
41.	James Bargent, "El Salvador Strikes Against Death Squads Led by Army, Police," Insight Crime, June 23, 2017.
42.	El Salvador Special Police Unit Committed Extrajudicial Executions: Report," Insight Crime, August 23, 2017; Parker Asmann, "El Salvador Death Squad Cases Go International," Insight Crime, September 7, 2017.
43.	"El Salvador's FGR Head Denounces Death Threats," Latin News Daily, September 26, 2017.
44.	"San Blas Massacre Case Ignores Key Evidence of Widespread Wrongdoing—El Faro," Latin America Daily Briefing, July 18, 2016.
Amnesty International, "El Salvador: No Justice 20 Years on from UN Truth Commission," press release, March 15, 2013.
3446.	Teresa Alvarado, "Organizaciones Piden al Presidente Electo Continuar con Reparación a Víctimas de la Guerra," Transparencia Activa, March 21, 2014.
35This paragraph draws from Geoff Thale, "Tracking El Salvador's Progress in Historic Human Rights Cases," WOLA, October 27, 2017.
47.	Ibid.; Office of Rep. Jim McGovern, "McGovern, Torres Lead 26 Members of Congress Calling for Obama to Declassify Records of the Disappeared in El Salvador Civil War," press release, August 25, 2016.
48.	Iliana Cornejo, "ONU fortalecerá a FGR y CSJ para resolver crímenes de Guerra," El Mundo, March 10, 2017.
49.	For historical background, see Mark Danner, "The Truth of El Mozote," The New Yorker, December 6, 1993.
50.	Cristosal, "Attorney General's Office Must Investigate What Munguía Payés [Minister of Defense] Did to Declare That Information on El Mozote Is Non-Existent," October 16, 2017.
Gabriel García, "Avanza Investigación Contra Sánchez Cerén por Secuestro," La Prensa Gráfica, February 9, 2017.
36.	Slow growth in the United States, El Salvador's top trade partner, likely weakened U.S. demand for Salvadoran exports and limited remittance flows. In addition, a tropical storm in 2011 caused more than $800 million in damage to infrastructure, and agriculture and a coffee rust outbreak in 2013/2014 reduced production in that sector.
3752.	Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: El Salvador, October 10, 2017.
53.	U.S. Department of State, El Salvador: Investment Climate Statements for 2017.
54.	Ibid.
55.	World Bank, Doing Business, http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings?region=latin-america-and-caribbean.
56.	See http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/competitiveness-rankings/.
57.	Fusades et al., Extorsiones a la Micro y Pequeña Empresa de El Salvador, June 2016.
U.S. Department of State, Partnership For Growth: El Salvador Constraints Analysis, July 2011.
3859.	See https://pppknowledgelab.org/countries/el-salvador/.	IMF, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2016 Article IV Consultation with El Salvador, June 22, 2016.
3961.	Eurasia Group, "El Salvador-IMF Agreement on Shaky Ground," JanuaryEconomist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: El Salvador, October 31, 2017.
4062.	Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos, Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples, 2014The World Bank, "El Salvador: Overview," updated October 10, 2017.
4163.	Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)WOLA, A Future at Home: Investing in Youth Opportunity in Central America, February 2016.
4264.	Agencia EFE, "Unos 15,000 Salvadoreños Dejaron Escuela en 2016 por Violencia de Pandillas," January 12, 2017.
4365.	Amadeo Cabrera et al., "El Salvador Ingreso a Acuerdo Petrocaribe," La Prensa Gráfica, June 3, 2014World Food Program et al., Food Security and Migration, August 2017.
4466.	Remarks by President Obama and President Funes of Amadeo Cabrera et al., "El Salvador in a Joint Press Conference in San Salvador, El Salvador, March 2011Ingreso a Acuerdo Petrocaribe," La Prensa Gráfica, June 3, 2014.
4567.	Established in 2004, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) provides economic assistance through a competitive selection process to developing nations that demonstrate positive performance in three areas: ruling justly, investing in people, and fostering economic freedom. In 2012, El Salvador completed their first five-year, $461-million MCC compact. U.S. and Salvadoran officials touted the MCC compact's effects on development and investment in El Salvador's northern border region. According to MCC, the compact enabled the construction or rehabilitation of 137 miles of roads and 23 bridges, which Salvadoran officials maintain has helped that area attract $57 million in private investment. U.S. and Salvadoran officials touted the MCC compact's effects on development and investment in El Salvador's northern border region. Some critics have challenged these results and asserted that roads constructed by the MCC fell apart due to design problems and a lack of maintenance. Others criticized the project for providing only limited opportunities for community input in the compact development process. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), "El Salvador: Table of Key Performance Results," November 10, 2012For background, see MCC, "El Salvador Investment Compact," https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/el-salvador-investment-compact.
4668.	U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), "Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks at The International Law Enforcement Academy Graduation," San Salvador, El Salvador, July 28, 2017.
69.	DOJ, "Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks to the International Association of Chiefs of Police," October 23, 2017.
70.	U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Performance Evaluation of the Partnership for Growth in El Salvador, July 2017, https://sv.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/ ... /Final_Evaluation_English.pdf.
71.	CRS Report R44812, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].
72.	The plan is outlined at http://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2014-11-14/northern-triangle-presidents-present-development-plan,10987.html.
73.	U.S. Department of State, Congressional Notification, State Western Hemisphere Regional: Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), El Salvador, October 14, 2016; USAID, CN #15, Congressional Notification for the Central America Regional Security Initiative, October 14, 2016.
74.	U.S. Department of State, "United States Key Deliverables for the June 15-16, 2017 Conference on Prosperity and Security in Central America," June 16, 2017; U.S. Department of State, Report to Update the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, August 8, 2017.
For background on the PFG, see https://www.mcc.gov/initiatives/initiative/partnership-for-growth. For an assessment of El Salvador's barriers to growth that was produced jointly by both governments, see https://sansalvador.usembassy.gov/pfg/analysis.html.
47.	U.S. Department of State, Partnership for Growth: El Salvador-United States Six Month Scorecard, November 2014-May 2015.
48.	The AFP is a five year, $22 billion plan focused on stimulating the productive sector, developing human capital, improving public safety, and strengthening institutions. See El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle: A Road Map, September 2014, http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=39224238.
49.	CRS In Focus IF10371, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: An Overview, by [author name scrubbed].
50.	Ibid.
51.	For background, see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
52.	U.S. Department of State, Congressional Notification, State Western Hemisphere Regional: Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), El Salvador, October 14, 2016; USAID, CN #15, Congressional Notification for the Central America Regional Security Initiative, October 14, 2016.
53.	Guatemala has the U.N.-sponsored International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and Honduras has the OAS-sponsored Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH).
5476.	See CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation, by [author name scrubbed].
5577.	Anna Brown and Eileen Patten, Statistical Portrait of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 2012, Pew Research Center, April 2014; Jeffrey Passel and D'Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14, Pew Research Center, November 18, 2014Data are from the 2016 U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey; Jeffrey S. Passel and D'vera Cohn, "Overall Number of U.S. Unauthorized Immigrants Holds Steady Since 2009," Pew Research Center, September 20, 2016.
5678. Data provided to CRS by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. These data reflect individuals with TPS as of October 12, 2017. These data include some individuals who have since adjusted to other statuses and may include individuals who have left the country or died. These data do not necessarily include all migrants from the countries who are in the United States and are eligible for the status.
79.	Hugo Martinez, "El Salvador Shares US Goal of Security in Tackling MS-13, Drug Trafficking," The Hill, September 24, 2017; "Immigrants From Honduras, Nicaragua Face US Deadline," VOA News, October 31, 2017. See CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues.
80.	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FY2016 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Report.
81.	Executive Order, "Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements," January 25, 2017; Executive Order, "Presidential Executive Order on Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing International Trafficking," February 9, 2017; U.S. Department of Justice, "3,800 Gang Members Charged in Operation Spanning United States and Central America," September 29, 2017.
82.	According to DHS, Customs and Border Protection encountered 16,404 unaccompanied children from El Salvador in FY2014 and 17,512 in FY2016. See https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2016.
83.	See https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/usbp-sw-border-apprehensions.
84.	U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), In-Country Refugee/Parole Processing for Minors in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala (Central American Minors – CAM), August 16, 2017.
85.	White House, "Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2018," September 29, 2017.
86.	USCIS, "Approximate Active DACA Recipients: Country of Birth," September 4, 2017.
87.	White House, "Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2018," September 13, 2017.
88.	U.S. Department of State, 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2017.
89.	Trade data contained in this section are from Global Trade Atlas.
90.	For an update on pending cases, see http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=199.
91.	Jonathan Drew, "Judge Clears Way for Extradition of ex-Salvadoran Colonel," Associated Press, August 21, 2017.
92.	CRS Report R43747, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA): Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed].
57.	Executive Order, "Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements," January 25, 2017.
58.	See CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues, by [author name scrubbed].
59.	IIRIRA expanded the categories of illegal immigrants subject to deportation and made it more difficult for immigrants to get relief from removal.
60.	DHS, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2004 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.
61.	DHS, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2015 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.
62.	"El Salvador: Facing up to the Trump Threat," Latin News Caribbean & Central America report, February 2017.
63.	U. S. Embassy in San Salvador, "U.S. and El Salvador Share Criminal and Migratory Information," press release, May 15, 2014.
64.	CRS Report R43628, Unaccompanied Alien Children: Potential Factors Contributing to Recent Immigration, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43702, Unaccompanied Children from Central America: Foreign Policy Considerations, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].
65.	U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Children on the Run: Unaccompanied Children Leaving Central America and Mexico and the Need for International Protection, May 2014.
66.	Julia Preston, "Hoping for Asylum, Migrants Strain U.S. Border," New York Times, April 10, 2014; Jennifer Scholtes, "CBP Chief: Policies May Be Fueling Spike in Minors Crossing Border Illegally," CQ News, April 2, 2014.
67.	DHS, Office of Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman, Recommendation on the Central American Minors (CAM) Refugee/Parole Program, December 21, 2016.
68.	State Department Data, 12/2/2016.
69.	President Barack Obama, "Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2017," September 12, 2016.
70.	U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2017.
71.	The criteria established for declaring a transnational criminal organization pursuant to Executive Order 13581 are available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/25/executive-order-blocking-property-transnational-criminal-organizations. U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Sanctions Latin American Criminal Organization," press release, October 11, 2012.
72.	See CRS In Focus IF10394, Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), by [author name scrubbed]. For historical background, see CRS Report R42468, The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA DR): Developments in Trade and Investment, by [author name scrubbed].
73.	Trade data contained in this section are from Global Trade Atlas.
74.	According to data from Global Trade Atlas and United States International Trade Commission.
75.	Alan M. Field, "U.S. Export Gains Shield Central America Trade Deal Under Trump," IHS, December 8, 2016.
76.	For an update on pending cases, see http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=199.