Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons

Summary

Background

Chronic political instability in Pakistan and Islamabad's military efforts against the Taliban and al-Qaeda have raised concerns about the security of the country's nuclear weapons. Some observers fear that Pakistan's strategic nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists or used by elements in the Pakistani government. However, U.S. officials have generally expressed confidence in the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

The collapse or near-collapse of the Pakistani government is probably the most likely scenario in which militants or terrorists could acquire Pakistani nuclear weapons. Gary Samore, then-National Security Council Coordinator for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, stated in an April 2011 interview that

The Pakistani government takes the nuclear security threat very seriously, and they've put a lot of resources into trying to make sure that their nuclear facilities and materials and weapons are well secured. There's no lack of recognition that this is a very important issue, and there's no lack of incentive on the part of the Pakistani government to maintain control. What I worry about is that, in the context of broader tensions and problems within Pakistani society and polity—and that's obviously taking place as we look at the sectarian violence and tensions between the government and the military and so forth—I worry that, in that broader context, even the best nuclear security measures might break down. You're dealing with a country that is under tremendous stress internally and externally, and that's what makes me worry. They have good programs in place; the question is whether those good programs work in the context where these broader tensions and conflicts are present.¹

Pakistani efforts to improve the security of its nuclear weapons have been ongoing and have included some cooperation with the United States; former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf told a journalist in 2009 that Islamabad has "given State Department nonproliferation experts insight into the command and control of the Pakistani arsenal and its on-site safety and security procedures."² Moreover, following the 2004 revelations of an extensive international nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan, as well as possible connections between Pakistani nuclear scientists and Al Qaeda, Islamabad has made additional efforts to improve export controls and monitor nuclear personnel. The main security challenges for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal are keeping the integrity of the command structure, ensuring physical security, and preventing illicit proliferation from insiders.

Some observers are also concerned about the risk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan. The two countries most recently came to the brink of full-scale war in 1999 and 2002, and, realizing the dangers, have developed some risk reduction measures to prevent accidental nuclear war. Nevertheless, Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for weapons and appears to be augmenting its weapons production facilities as well as deploying additional delivery vehicles—steps that will enable both quantitative and qualitative improvements in Islamabad's nuclear arsenal. Some observers have also argued that Pakistan's expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a doctrine called "full spectrum deterrence" indicate "the growing nuclearization of Pakistan's national security policy." These developments have "sparked international concerns about the safety and security" of the country's nuclear weapons, as well as raised "concerns that these weapons might be used through intentional, inadvertent, or accidental launch in a crisis or in limited warfare with India."³

A 2013 State Department report explains that India and Pakistan's governments view nuclear weapons as "vital to their security," adding that these states'

respective decisions to pursue nuclear weapons stem largely from their troubled bilateral relationship, assessments of threats posed by each other (and China in India's case), perceptions of enhanced national power or status derived from possession of such weapons, and domestic politics. The nuclear programs are popular within each country and are protected by strong institutional and domestic political constituencies. In view of these factors, international pressure over a period of decades has had little direct impact on the attitudes of India and Pakistan concerning nuclear weapons.⁵

Islamabad is expanding its nuclear arsenal and developing of new types of nuclear weapons. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Olson told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on December 16, 2015, that the United States is "concerned" about "the pace and the scope of the Pakistan's missile program, including its pursuit of nuclear systems."⁶ The Administration also worries that "a conventional conflict in Southwest Asia could escalate to include nuclear use as well as the increased security challenges that accompany growing stockpiles," he added. Similarly, Defense Intelligence Agency Director Vincent Stewart expressed concern in February 9, 2016, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee that the growth of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and Islamabad's "evolving doctrine associated with tactical nuclear weapons, increases the risk of an incident or accident."⁷

Pakistan's nuclear energy program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in a war with India that probably triggered a January 1972 political decision (just one month later) to begin a secret nuclear weapons program.⁸ Observers point to India's 1974 "peaceful" nuclear explosion as the pivotal moment that gave additional urgency to the program.⁹ During the 1970s, Pakistan began programs to produce highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium for use as fissile material for nuclear weapons. HEU and plutonium are the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. Pakistan first produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope.

Islamabad gained technology for its nuclear weapons program from many sources. This extensive assistance included uranium enrichment technology from Europe and China.¹⁰ Islamabad has received Chinese and European assistance for at least some of its plutonium program. A 2001 Defense Department report states that "China supplied Pakistan with nuclear material and expertise and has provided critical assistance in the production of Pakistan's nuclear facilities."¹¹ This assistance included help during the 1990s with a "plutonium production reactor" and ring magnets from a Chinese entity for Pakistan's enrichment program.¹² China may also have provided "nuclear weapons design information" to Pakistan.¹³ In addition, China and North Korea have supplied missiles to Pakistan. One 2013 non-governmental report argues that Pakistan has been procuring components for its enrichment program from foreign entities.¹⁴

The U.S. and other governments had information during the 1970s that Pakistan was constructing a uranium enrichment facility.^{15 16} A.Q. Khan has stated that Pakistan began enriching uranium in 1978 and produced HEU in 1983.^{17 18} Pakistan told the United States in 1984 that it would produce only low-enriched uranium (which is not used as fissile material in nuclear weapons), but a 1986 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) memorandum indicates that Islamabad had violated the pledge and added that Pakistan had "overcome the last major obstacle to nuclear weapons by producing enough high enriched uranium for one or more nuclear devices."¹⁹ Pakistan's "HEU production capacity" in 1987 was "sufficient to produce one bomb per year," according to an ACDA memorandum written the next year.²⁰ The country's main enrichment facility is a centrifuge plant located at Kahuta;²¹ Pakistan may have other enrichment sites.²²

A 1985 CIA report described a possible Pakistani plan to "build a plutonium production reactor"²³ and Pakistan has operated the 40-50 megawatt heavy-water Khushab plutonium production reactor since 1998.²⁴ Islamabad has been constructing at least three additional heavy-water reactors, which would expand considerably Pakistan's plutonium production capacity, at the same site; whether all four reactors at the site are operational is unclear, according to nongovernmental expert reports.²⁵ Additionally, Pakistan has a reprocessing plant²⁶ at the New Laboratories facility of the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) and is apparently constructing other such plants.²⁷ Sources identify 2000 and 2002 as the dates when the PINSTECH plant began operating.²⁸ Pakistan also appears to be constructing a second reprocessing plant at PINSTECH²⁹ and may be completing a reprocessing plant located at Chasma.³⁰

The United States had information during the 1970s and early 1980s that Pakistan was pursuing nuclear weapons designs, but exactly when Pakistan produced a workable nuclear explosive device is unclear.³¹ According to a 1978 State Department cable, the United States estimated that it would take Pakistan "at least" three to five years to produce a nuclear explosive device.³² A 1982 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessed that Pakistani nuclear testing would be" feasible for the first time" in late 1983 or 1984.³³ A 1985 National Intelligence Council report states that Pakistan "probably [had] a workable design for a nuclear explosive device" and was "probably ... a year or two away from a capacity to produce enough" highly enriched uranium for such a device.³⁴ According to a 1991 NIE, Pakistan had "a viable nuclear weapons design and has components that it could assemble into nuclear devices on short notice."³⁵ Islamabad attained such a capability "by the end of the 1980s," said a 1993 report to Congress, apparently from the National Security Council.³⁶

Pakistani officials have cited 1984-1985 as the period during which Pakistan acquired the capability to detonate a nuclear explosive device. A.Q. Khan stated in an interview published in May 1998 that Islamabad "attained" the capability to detonate such a device "at the end of 1984."³⁷ Similarly, Khan reportedly stated in a January 2010 speech that Pakistan "had become a nuclear power" in 1984 or 1985.³⁸ Moreover, "senior Pakistani politicians" told a Canadian parliamentary committee in June 1998 that Pakistan had "reached the nuclear 'threshold' by 1984-85."³⁹ According to former Pakistani Strategic Plans Division (SPD) official Feroz Khan, Pakistan developed a nuclear device suitable for explosive testing by the end of 1984, but it "was still a large bomb that could be delivered only by a C-130 cargo aircraft with no assurance of delivery accuracy."⁴⁰ According to former President Musharraf, Pakistan's "nuclear capability was not yet operational" in 1999, although the country had tested nuclear explosive devices during the previous year. "Merely exploding a bomb does not mean that you are operationally capable of deploying nuclear force in the field and delivering a bomb across the border over a selected target," he explained.⁴¹

President Bush's failure to certify in 1990 that Pakistan did not "possess a nuclear explosive device" led to a cut-off in military and financial aid under the Pressler Amendment.⁴² After India conducted nuclear weapon tests on May 11 and May 13, 1998, Pakistan's government responded on May 28 and May 30 with six tests in western Pakistan. Test yields were about 10 kilotons and 5 kilotons, according to seismic analysis.⁴³ The United States imposed additional sanctions after the tests, but these were lifted after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States.

According to public estimates, Pakistan has about 110-130 nuclear weapons, although it could have more.⁴⁴ Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, a scientist closely involved with the country's nuclear weapons program, stated in a 2016 interview that only China, France, Russia, and the United States have more nuclear weapons than Pakistan.⁴⁵ According to one unofficial estimate, Pakistan has produced approximately 3,000 kilograms of weapons-grade HEU and approximately 200 kilograms of plutonium for nuclear weapons.⁴⁶ Islamabad continues to produce both HEU and plutonium for nuclear weapons and is developing and deploying a variety of weapons. A 2014 press report citing Dr. Mubarakmand states that "Pakistan has over 15 types of nuclear weapons, from large weapons that can be carried on fighter jets to small ones that can be loaded onto ballistic missiles, and even smaller warheads for cruise missiles and tactical nuclear weapons."⁴⁷ Pakistan's HEU-based nuclear warheads use an implosion design with a solid core of approximately 15-20 kilograms of HEU.⁴⁸ Pakistan has also produced plutonium-based warheads,⁴⁹ which likely contain approximately 4-6 kilograms of plutonium, according to one expert estimate.⁵⁰ Pakistan has reportedly addressed issues of survivability through pursuing a second strike capability, possibly building hard and deeply buried storage and launch facilities, deploying road-mobile missiles, deploying air defenses around strategic sites, and utilizing concealment measures.

Pakistan has "aircraft and land-based missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons," according to a 2013 State Department report.⁵¹ Pakistan has two types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons: aircraft controlled by the Pakistan Air Force and surface-to-surface missiles controlled by the Pakistan Army.

Aircraft

According to former SPD official Khan, Pakistan in 1995 "had a nuclear device deliverable by fighter aircraft."⁵² Islamabad could modify F-16 fighter aircraft purchased from the United States to deliver nuclear weapons; it is widely believed that Pakistan has made the relevant modifications to its U.S.-supplied F-16s.⁵³ The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress in 2006 of a possible sale of 36 F-16s; the United States ultimately sold and delivered 18 of the aircraft.⁵⁴ Then-Assistant Secretary of State John Hillen told Congress during a July 2006 hearing that the F-16s to be transferred would not "be capable of carrying a nuclear weapon." Hillen acknowledged that Pakistan could modify the aircraft to carry nuclear weapons, but added that U.S. monitoring of the aircraft, along with U.S. "leverage," would prevent the Pakistanis from carrying out such a conversion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress on February 11, 2016, that the State Department has approved the sale of eight additional F-16s to Pakistan. Mirage V aircraft may also be used as delivery vehicles.⁵⁵

Missiles

Then-DIA Director Burgess told the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 10, 2011, that Pakistan is developing new missile systems which, when deployed and added to Islamabad's current ballistic missiles, will enable Pakistan "to strike a variety of targets at ranges of 200-2000 kilometers with both conventional and nuclear payloads."⁵⁶ Several years later, Admiral Cecil Haney, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, stated in June 2014 event that "Pakistan continues to develop and upgrade their nuclear delivery systems for a full range of platforms, including both ballistic and cruise missiles."⁵⁷

Author Contact Information

Footnotes

Peter Crail, Daniel Horner, and Daryl G. Kimball, "Pursuing the Prague Agenda: An Interview with White House Coordinator Gary Samore," Arms Control Today, May 2011.

Seymour M. Hersh, "Defending the Arsenal: In an Unstable Pakistan, Can Nuclear Warheads be Kept Safe?" The New Yorker, November 16, 2009.

Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon, A Normal Nuclear Pakistan, Stimson Center and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015.

Pakistan has signed neither the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty nor the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. However, UN Security Council Resolution 1172, which was adopted in 1998 after India and Pakistan's nuclear tests earlier that year, called upon those countries to "stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons."

Report to Congress: Update on Progress toward Regional Nuclear Nonproliferation in South Asia, submitted April 3, 2013.

"Rep. Ed Royce Holds a Hearing on U.S.-Pakistan Relations," House Committee on Foreign Affairs, December 16, 2015.

Vincent R. Stewart, Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Worldwide Threat Assessment, Armed Services Committee, February 9, 2016.

See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, April 1996, p. 37.

According to one account, the government in June 1974 gave the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission the "official go ahead" to build a nuclear weapon. (Shahid-Ur Rehman, Long Road to Chagai: Untold Story of Pakistan's Nuclear Quest, (Islamabad: Print Wise Publication), 1999. p.53).

See Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies), 2007.

U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 27.

Ibid., p. 18. "Responses to Questions Submitted by Senator Coverdell on Behalf of Senator Bennett," Department of State, August 14, 1996.

Central Intelligence Agency, Chinese Policy and Practice Regarding Sensitive Nuclear Transfers: Special National Intelligence Estimate, January 20, 1983. China transferred a complete nuclear weapon design, according to some reports. (See Nuclear Black Markets, 2007, p. 26; Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, "Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China," Washington Post, February 15, 2004; Albright, David. Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies (New York: Free Press), p. 47.)

David Albright, Andrea Stricker, and Houston Wood, Future World of Illicit Nuclear Trade: Mitigating the Threat, Institute for Science and International Security, July 29, 2013, p. 37.

For example, a 1978 memorandum from the National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation stated that Pakistan had a uranium enrichment plant "under construction," but added that Islamabad had not yet acquired certain key components., "Monthly Warning Report: Nuclear Proliferation," National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation, NFAC-5472-78, December 5, 1978.

According to a 1979 Netherlands government report, which cited "[i]information from reliable sources," Pakistan had a "pilot installation with a very small enrichment capacity." (Dutch Government Report of the Interministerial Working Party Responsible for Investigating "The Khan Affair Report." October 1979. p. 64.) According to a 1979 Australian intelligence assessment, "the acquisition by Pakistan of a nuclear explosive capability is three to five years away." (Pakistan Nuclear Developments: Action by Australia, Cabinet Minute: Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, Decision Number 9056, June 26, 1979.)

"Nuclear Bomb Was Manufactured in 1984: Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan," Islamabad Jinnah, July 19, 2010; "Pakistan: Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan Discusses Nuclear Program in TV Talk Show," Islamabad Tonight, Aaj News Television, August 31, 2009. Two non-Pakistani sources appear to at least partly corroborate this account. First, a 1981 State Department draft paper indicated that Pakistan had not "proceeded to the systematic separation of special nuclear materials, or the assembly and deployment of nuclear weapons." (Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence, National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency, to Resource Management Staff, Office of Program Assessment et al., "Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation," April 9, 1981.) Second, according to a 2008 International Atomic Energy Agency report, A.Q. Khan offered centrifuge enrichment technology to Libya in 1984—a data point apparently corroborating the 1983 date. (Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2008/39, September 12, 2008).

Khan stated in a 2009 television interview that Pakistan stopped producing its first-generation centrifuge in 1983 and started using a more advanced centrifuge. ("Pakistan: Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan Discusses Nuclear Program in TV Talk Show," 2009).

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program and U.S. Security Assistance," Memorandum for the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, June 16, 1986.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Solarz Amendment Applicability to the Pakistani Procurement Case," July 16, 1987.

This plant was completed "[b]y the end of 1980," according to Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, a scientist closely involved with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. ("A Science Odyssey: Pakistan's Nuclear Emergence Speech," delivered by Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, November 30, 1998.)

Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana, "Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal," International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006 and David Albright, "Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Infrastructure," in A New Equation: U.S. Policy toward India and Pakistan after September 11 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) May 2002. For a list of Pakistani nuclear facilities, see Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies), 2007, p. 19.

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Personnel and Organizations: A Research Paper, Central Intelligence Agency, November 1985.

A Pakistani newspaper reported in April 1998 that, according to a "top government source," the reactor had begun operating ("Pakistan's Indigenous Nuclear Reactor Starts Up," The Nation, April 13, 1998). A June 15, 2000, article cited "U.S. officials" who indicated that the reactor had begun operating two years earlier (Mark Hibbs, "After 30 Years, PAEC Fulfills Munir Khan's Plutonium Ambition," Nucleonics Week, June 15, 2000). A 2001 Department of Defense report states that the reactor "will produce plutonium," but does not say whether it was operating (U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 27).

David Albright, "Pakistan's Inventory of Weapon-Grade Uranium and Weapon-Grade Plutonium Dedicated to Nuclear Weapons," Institute for Science and International Security, October 19, 2015; David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, "Khushab Reactors Operational While New Construction Progresses," Institute for Science and International Security, February 29, 2016.

"Reprocessing" refers to the process of separating plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.

According to a 1983 State Department document, the New Laboratories facility was capable of extracting small quantities of plutonium, but large enough to "allow for expansion of reprocessing capacity." (The Pakistani Nuclear Program, Department of State, June 23, 1983).

Nuclear Fuel reported in 2000 that, according to "senior U.S. government officials," Islamabad had begun operating a "pilot-scale" reprocessing facility at PINSTECH (Hibbs, June 15, 2000). Former Pakistani Strategic Plans Division official Feroz Khan wrote that then-President Pervez Musharraf "made the decision to begin reprocessing plutonium production in 2002." (Khan, Feroz. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press), 2012, p. 395.

David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, "Pakistan's Chashma Plutonium Separation Plant: Possibly Operational," February 20, 2015. The 2001 Defense Department report states that reprocessing facilities "are under construction," but does not identify any sites (Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 27).

Construction on the facility was begun during the 1970s with French assistance, but France cancelled its assistance for the project later that decade. See also Albright and Kelleher-Vergantini, February 20, 2015.

See, for example, a 1978 Central Intelligence Agency report, ((Untitled) RE: Pakistan Strong Motivation to Develop Their Nuclear Capability, April 26, 1978), as well as The Pakistani Nuclear Program, June 23, 1983.

"Ad Hoc Scientific Committee and Related Topics," January 27, 1978.

Nuclear Proliferation Trends Through 1987, A National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-82, July 27, 1982.

The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Power and Constraints, National Intelligence Council, September 1985.

Prospects for Special Weapons Proliferation and Control, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 5- 91CV2, July 1991.

Report to Congress on Status of China, India and Pakistan Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs, 1993.

"Pakistan: Qadeer Khan Interviewed on Pakistan N-Test," The News, May 30, 1998. Khan made a similar claim in February and July 2010 interviews ("Pakistan: Dr. A.Q. Khan Condemns Nawaz Sharif for Not Testing Nuclear Bomb," Islamabad Khabrain Online, February 20, 2010; Islamabad Jinnah, July 19, 2010).

Khalid Iqbal, "Pakistan to Never Face 1971-Like Situation Again: AQ Khan," The News, January 10, 2010.

Bill Graham, M.P, Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century, Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, December 1998.

Khan, 2012, p. 189.

Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press), 2006, pp. 97-98.

The Pressler Amendment (August 1985) linked aid and military sales to two certification conditions: (1) that Pakistan not possess a nuclear explosive device; and (2) that new aid 'will reduce significantly the risk' that Pakistan will possess such a device. For background summary of sanctions legislation, see CRS Report 98-486, Nuclear Sanctions: Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and Its Application to India and Pakistan, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RS22757, U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan, by [author name scrubbed].

Seismic data showed yields less than those officially announced by Pakistan and India. See Gregory van der Vink, Jeffrey Park, Richard Allen, Terry Wallace and Christel Hennet, "False Accusations, Undetected Tests and Implications for the CTB Treaty," Arms Control Today, May 1998.

Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2015," Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. "World Nuclear Forces," SIPRI Yearbook 2015.

Shahid Javed Daskavi, "If Nuclear Program Were Under Supervision of Political Governments, God Knows What Would Have Happened: Samar Mubarakmand," Jehan Pakistan, February 5, 2016. According to a 2010 British government report, the United Kingdom's nuclear arsenal consisted of "not more than 225 warheads." (Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister, October 2010.) A 2013 non-governmental report repeated that number. (Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, "The British nuclear stockpile, 1953–2013," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69:4. pages 69-75, 2013.)

David Albright, "Pakistan's Inventory of Weapon-Grade Uranium and Weapon-Grade Plutonium Dedicated to Nuclear Weapons," Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 2015, Institute for Science and International Security, 2015.

"Going Nuclear: Plutonium and Uranium Bombs (Pt. 6)," Mainichi, August 12, 2014.

Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan's Nuclear Forces, 2007," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2007.

Then-DIA Director Burgess described Pakistan's nuclear weapons as "based primarily on highly enriched uranium" (Burgess, March 10, 2011).

Norris and Kristensen, 2011.

Report To Congress: Update on Progress toward Regional Nuclear Nonproliferation in South Asia, submitted April 3, 2013.

Khan, 2012 p. 186.

The 1993 National Security Council report indicated that Pakistan would use these aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons. See National Security Council, Report to Congress.

See Major U.S. Arms Sales and Grants to Pakistan Since 2001, June 11, 2015.

Kristensen and Norris, 2015; Salik, Naeem, The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Perspective, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2009, p. 215.

Burgess, March 10, 2011.

"Remarks to the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), Air Force Association (AFA) and Reserve Officers Association (ROA) Congressional Breakfast Seminar Series," June 18, 2014.

"Agreement Between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles." Full text on the Henry L. Stimson Center website: http://www.stimson.org/?SN=SA20060207949.

National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2013; "Pakistan Conducts 'Successful' Training Launch of Surface-To-Surface Ballistic Missile Hatf III," Inter Services Public Relations, May 8, 2014.

Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2013. Dr. Samar Mubarakmand gave the missile's range as 700 kilometers during a 2004 television interview ("Capital Talk Special," GEO-TV, May 3, 2004). A January 2008 Pakistani press release also gave the range as 700 kilometers (Inter Services Public Relations, January 25, 2008). However, a May 2010 Pakistani press release gave the range as 650 kilometers (Inter Services Public Relations, May 8, 2010).

Ibid. A November 2014 Pakistani press release gave the range as 1,500 kilometers ("ISPR: Pakistan Conducts 'Successful Training Launch' of Hatf-VI Ballistic Missile," Inter Services Public Relations, November 13, 2014).

Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2013. An April 2015 Pakistani government press release gives the range as 1,300 kilometers. ("ISPR: Pakistan 'Successfully' Conducts 'Training Launch' of Ghauri Missile System," Inter Services Public Relations, April 5, 2015).

"Revision: Alert: Pakistan Conducts 'Successful' Flight Test of Shaheen-1A Ballistic Missile," Inter Services Public Relations, December 15, 2015.

"ISPR: Pakistan Conducts 'Successful' Test-Fire of Shaheen-III Ballistic Missile," Inter Services Public Relations, March 9, 2015; "ISPR: Pakistan Conducts 'Successful Flight Test' of Shaheen-3 Surface-To-Surface Ballistic Missile," Inter Services Public Relations, December 11, 2015.

"A Conversation with Gen. Khalid Kidwai," Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015, March 23, 2015.

Inter Services Public Relations Press Release, March 11, 2011; Inter Services Public Relations Press Release, February 15, 2013.

Inter Services Public Relations Press Release, February 15, 2013.

Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2013.

"Pakistan: New Cruise Missile Capable of Carrying Nuclear Warheads," Associated Press of Pakistan, April 29, 2011.

Inter Services Public Relations Press Release, May 31, 2012.

Inter Services Public Relations Press Release, January 19, 2016.

"Remarks of the Spokesman on the Launching of the Indian Nuclear Submarine," PR. No. 288/2009, July 27, 2009.

"Remarks to the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), Air Force Association (AFA) and Reserve Officers Association (ROA) Congressional Breakfast Seminar Series," June 18, 2014.

"Naval Chief Inaugurates Naval Strategic Force Headquarters," Inter Services Public Relations, May 19, 2012.

"A Conversation with Gen. Khalid Kidwai," 2015.

Vincent R. Stewart, Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Worldwide Threat Assessment, Armed Services Committee, February 3, 2015.

"A Conversation with Gen. Khalid Kidwai," 2015.

Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2013.

Inter Services Public Relations Press Release, April 19, 2011.

Inter Services Public Relations Press Release, February 11, 2013.

Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, October 1, 2008. Cited in House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: Non–Proliferation Fourth Report of Session 2008–09, June 14, 2009. A 2009 French parliamentary report makes a similar observation. Les Enjeux Géostratégiques des Proliférations, La Commission Des Affaires Étrangères, Assemblé Nationale, November 18, 2009.

Burgess, March 10, 2011.

See for example, "Record of the Press Briefing by Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson," May 21, 2015, and Statement by Ambassador Masood Khan, Permanent Representative of Pakistan at the 2014 Session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, April 7, 2014. A January 13, 2010, statement describing a National Command Authority meeting refers to Pakistan's "policy of credible minimum deterrence."

Memorandum from Air Commodore Khalid Banuri, 2011.

Mahmud Ali Durrani, "Pakistan's Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons," Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 37, July 2004.

For an in-depth discussion of minimum deterrence, see Naeem Salik, "Minimum Deterrence and India Pakistan Nuclear Dialogue: Case Study on Pakistan," Landau Network Centro Volta South Asia Security Project Case Study, January 2006.

Memorandum from Air Commodore Khalid Banuri, Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs in the SPD, received by CRS analyst December 4, 2011.

"Tactical N-arms to Ward off War Threat, Says FO," Dawn.com, October 20, 2015.

For example, Ambassador Masood Khan, Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, stated on April 7, 2014, that "[w]e do not want an arms race in South Asia." According to a September 2013 National Command Authority statement Pakistan intends to "adhere to the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence, without entering into an arms race with any other country." (Press Release No PR133/2013-ISPR, September 5, 2013).

Report To Congress, April 3, 2013.

Memorandum from Air Commodore Khalid Banuri, Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs in the SPD, received by CRS analyst December 4, 2011.

Ibid. For details about the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement, see CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].

"A Conversation with Gen. Khalid Kidwai," 2015. Despite the name change articulated by Kidwai, a Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated on April 7, 2016, that Pakistan is "committed to credible minimum deterrence" Record of the Press Briefing by Spokesperson on April 7, 2016.

Ibid.

No PR94/2011-ISPR, April 19, 2011.

See, for example, Feroz Hassan Khan and Ryan W. French, U.S.-Pakistani Nuclear Relations: A Strategic Survey, Report, Number 2014-005, Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD Naval Postgraduate School, April 2014.

Kanti Bajpai, "No First Use in the India-Pakistan Context," Pugwash Workshop No. 279, November 2002.

Report To Congress: Update on Progress toward Regional Nuclear Nonproliferation in South Asia, submitted March 20, 2012.

"Pakistan Command Meeting Voices Concern Over Indo-US Nuclear Deal," Pakistan TV, April 12, 2006.

For details about India's reactor-grade plutonium, see International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2010: Balancing the Books: Production and Stocks, pp. 120-122. Reactor-grade plutonium can be used as fissile material in nuclear weapons; see U.S. Committee on the Internationalization of the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle; Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Policy and Global Affairs Division; National Academy of Sciences and National Research Council, Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges, 2008, p. 17.

See CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].

"Pakistan for Reducing Existing Stocks of Fissile Material: Wajid," Associated Press of Pakistan, October 19, 2010. If Hasan's estimate assumes that Indian weapons designers could build weapons which would each contain approximately 4.5 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium, then the estimate would be roughly consistent with a 2006 estimate that these reactors could produce 1,250 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium per year (see Mian et al., 2006).

Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: Indian Nuclear Forces, 2015," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2015. James N. Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, told the House Committee on Armed Services in November 2011 that " India and Pakistan are... increasing the size of their nuclear arsenals, but each is estimated to have fewer weapons than China," which had "a few hundred nuclear weapons." (Statement of Dr. James N. Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Before The House Committee On Armed Services, November 2, 2011.)

"A Conversation with Gen. Khalid Kidwai," 2015.

Dawn.com, October 20, 2015.

Gary Samore included Pakistan in a list of countries "where testing might make sense in terms of" their nuclear weapons programs (Arms Control Today, May 2011). In August 2003 responses to questions for the record from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the CIA stated that Pakistan "almost certainly would conduct nuclear testing in reaction to an Indian nuclear test." However, Dr. Rifaat Hussain of Quad-i-Azam University in Islamabad stated that it is "extremely unlikely" that, absent additional Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan will test nuclear weapons (personal email, October 6, 2011).

"A Conversation with Gen. Khalid Kidwai," 2015.

When the NCA was established in 2000, the government's announcement designated the Head of Government, or Prime Minister, as Chairperson. At that time, General Musharraf, as Chief Executive, became Chairperson and stayed in that position after becoming President in 2002. He appointed the Prime Minister as Vice Chairman. However, President Zardari returned the NCA to its original structure when, in a November 2009 re-promulgation of the 2007 NCA Ordinance, he specified that the Prime Minister would be Chairperson, removing himself from that position (this re-promulgation also abolished the position of Vice Chairman). According to Brigadier General (Ret.) Naeem Salik, the change in Chairmanship may have only a symbolic impact on nuclear policy-making, since no changes were made to the Strategic Plans Division itself. A July 2009 Supreme Court decision required that the Ordinances from the Musharraf era be made law.

Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies), 2007, p. 111; Pakistan Announcement of Nuclear-Weapons Command-and-Control Mechanism, Associated Press of Pakistan, February 3, 2000. Nuclear Black Markets, pp. 110-111, has organization charts of the NCA and SPD.

Inter Services Public Relations Press Release, November 28, 2012.

See P. Cotta-Ramusino and M. Martellini, "Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability And Nuclear Strategy In Pakistan: A Concise Report Of A Visit By Landau Network - Centro Volta," January 14, 2002. Available at http://www.pugwash.org/september11/pakistan-nuclear.htm; Kenneth N. Luongo and Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Naeem Salik, "Building Confidence in Pakistan's Nuclear Security," Arms Control Today, December 2007; Robin Walker, "Pakistan's Evolution as a Nuclear Weapons State: Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai's CCC Address, Strategic Insights, November 1, 2006.

For more information about the treaty, see CRS Report RL33865, Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].

Decision for the Establishment of a Programme of Work for the 2009 Session, Conference on Disarmament, CD/1864, May 29, 2009.

Report of Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon of Canada on Consultations on the Most Appropriate Arrangement to Negotiate a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices, CD/1299, March 24, 1995.

Draft Decision for the Establishment of a Programme of Work for the 2010 Session, Conference on Disarmament, CD/1889, July 6, 2010. Also see Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the Conference on Disarmament, August 31, 2010.

Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram, February 18, 2010.

Zia Mian and A.H. Nayyar, "Playing the Nuclear Game: Pakistan and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty," Arms Control Today, April 2010.

Akram, February 18, 2010; Ibid.

Ibid. See also Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations and Other International Organizations, "Working Paper by Pakistan: Elements of a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT)," August 21, 2015.

Akram, August 31, 2010.

Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 27.

Joby Warrick, "Pakistan Nuclear Security Questioned; Lack of Knowledge About Arsenal May Limit U.S. Options," Washington Post, November 11, 2007; Peter Wonacott, "Inside Pakistan's Drive To Guard Its A-Bombs," Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2007; David E. Sanger, "Trust Us: So, What About Those Nukes?," New York Times, November 11, 2007; Nuclear Black Markets, 2007, p. 33; Cotta-Ramusino and Martellini, 2002.

"Pakistan Refutes Saudi Funding, Weapons Claims," World Bulletin, November 9, 2013.

Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 28.

See Graham Allison, "What About the Nukes?" Newsweek Web, December 28, 2007.

Molly Moore and Kamran Khan, "Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons - Musharraf Says Arsenal Is Now Secure," Washington Post, November 11, 2001.

"Partial transcript of Pakistan President Musharraf's televised speech asking the people of Pakistan to support his course of action," September 19, 2001.

Bruce Riedel, "American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House," Center for the Advanced Study of India, Policy Paper Series, 2002.; Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC), 2004, pp. 161-162; Aziz Haniffa, "Pressure Must Also be Put on India to De-Escalate," India Abroad, June 14, 2002. Former SPD official Khan's book contests these claims (Khan, 2012. pp. 314-315).

Lavoy, 2006.

"Opinions Mixed on Pakistani Nuclear Security," Global Security Newswire, November 6, 2007.

Also see comments by David Albright in the same interview ("Pakistan in Crisis: Interview with Benazir Bhutto," CNN, November 5, 2007).

"Lieutenant General Carter Ham Holds a Defense Department Briefing," CQ Transcripts, November 7, 2007.

Also see comments by David Albright in "Pakistan in Crisis," 2007.

Remarks by Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the L.A. World Affairs Council, September 22, 2008.

Stewart, February 9, 2016.

White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest Holds White House Regular News Briefing, October 15, 2015.

Email to author, September 11, 2014.

"Sen. Bob Corker Holds A Hearing on Reviewing The Administration's Nuclear Agenda, Panel 1," Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 17, 2016.

"Pak Nukes Safely Guarded, Says Narayanan," The Press Trust of India, December 16, 2007.

Isabelle Lasserre, "Intelligence and the New Threats," Politique Internationale, January 1-March 31, 2010.

Lyubov Pronina and Ellen Pinchuk, "Russia 'Concerned' About Security of Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal," Bloomberg, March 25, 2009.

"Safety of Pakistan's Nukes a Global Concern: India," Indo-Asian News Service, May 25, 2011.

Air Commodore Khalid Banuri, Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs in the SPD, stated in a 2008 interview that Islamabad has "consistently augmented" its nuclear weapons security since 1998 (Ahmed Quraishi, "Interview: Air Commodore Khalid Banuri – 'Don't Mess With Pakistan'," January 17, 2008), http://www.globalpolitician.com/24013-pakistan.

"Pakistan Nukes Under Control: Musharraf," Agence France Presse, November 13, 2007.

"Nuclear Security Summit 2014 National Statement: Pakistan."

Adil Sultan, "In Defence of Pakistan's Nuclear Management," IISS Voices, June 26, 2015.

For information about the convention, see CRS Report RL33865, Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].

Jane Perlez, "Pakistan Army Under Scrutiny After U.S. Raid," New York Times, May 5, 2011; Zahid Hussain, Matthew Rosenberg and Jeremy Page, "After Raid, Confused Response," The Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2011; Toby Dalton and George Perkovich, "Beware Decline in Pakistani Relations," Politico, May 16, 2011.

Press Information Department, "Prime Minister Gilani's Opening Statement at the Defence Committee of the Cabinet," Pakistan Official News, May 25, 2011.

Krepon, June 12, 2008.

Michael Krepon, "Complexities of Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia," The Hindu, May 29, 2009.

"The Nomination of Dr. Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of State," Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 18 and 19, 2005. The concept of a contingency plan to take over Pakistan's nuclear assets was first written about by Seymour Hersh, "Watching the Warheads," The New Yorker, November 5, 2001.

"Strategic Assets Are Safe, Says FO," Dawn, November 12, 2007. Press reports appear to use "Foreign Office" and "Foreign Ministry" interchangeably.

"Pentagon Readies Plan for Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal," The Guardian, December 28, 2007. For a discussion of executing such a plan, see Shaun Gregory, "The Security of Nuclear Weapons in Pakistan," Pakistan Security Research Unit Brief Number 22, University of Bradford, November 18, 2007. Available at http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/Brief_22finalised.pdf.

"Pakistan Foreign Office Rejects U.S. Media Report on Nuclear Arsenal," Associated Press of Pakistan, November 9, 2009.

"Express TV Interview," January 21, 2010.

Alex Wagner, "U.S. Offers Nuclear Security Assistance to Pakistan," Arms Control Today, December 2001.

Joby Warrick, "U.S. Has Concerns Over Security of Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons," The Washington Post, November 11, 2007; David Sanger and William Broad, "U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms," The New York Times, November 17, 2007.

Mubarakmand provided some details about Pakistan's use of such codes in a 2004 interview ("Capital Talk Special," GEO-TV, May 3, 2004).

General Kidwai has stated that "if a country can make complex nuclear weapons and ballistic cruise missiles grant it that PALs is a far simpler technology" (cited in Martellini, 2008).

"A Conversation with Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage," PBS: The Charlie Rose Show, November 6, 2007.

Ben Arnoldy, "Could Taliban Get Keys to Pakistan's A-Bomb? Experts See the Islamic Fighters as Less of a Risk than Radical Insiders Gaining Access to Nuclear Materials," The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 2009.

Mariana Baabar, "Pak N-safety Plan," The News International, November 10, 2009.

Ibid.

Quraishi, January 17, 2008.

Bryan Bender, "Pakistan, US in Talks on Nuclear Security," The Boston Globe, May 5, 2009.

Abdul Mannan, "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport," in Pakistan's Nuclear Future, 2008; Martellini, 2008. Some analysts argue that spent nuclear fuel is more vulnerable when being transported.

Martellini, 2008.

For more information on Pakistani proliferation, see CRS Report RL33192, U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL32745, Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. Also see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed].

For a description of the network's activities and their implications, see R.S. Kemp, "The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes: The Gas Centrifuge, Supply-Side Controls, and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation," International Security, Spring 2014. See also Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies), 2007, and David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies, The Institute for Science and International Security, 2010.

Available at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/09/16/aq-khan-report-isi/#ixzz1Y9ZIgsQV.

Libya obtained uranium enrichment technology and nuclear weapons designs that could support a nuclear weapons program. North Korea currently has a plutonium-based nuclear weapons program and may also have a uranium-based nuclear weapons program. The United States has suspected Iran of pursuing both plutonium- and uranium-based nuclear weapons programs. Such activity has been of historic concern; a 1979 State Department memorandum stated that Libya, Iraq, or Iran "might be prepared to provide economic support" to Islamabad "in exchange for nuclear cooperation from Pakistan." (Department of State Action Memorandum, "PRC Paper on South Asia," March 23, 1979). Additionally, a 1979 memorandum from the National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation stated that Pakistan "might already have been induced to share with identified foreigners some sensitive nuclear equipment and to propose terms for possible future nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia, Libya, or Iraq." ("Monthly Warning Report – Nuclear Proliferation," NFAC – 3871-79, July 24, 1979).

The network also supplied Libya with "documents related to the design and fabrication of a nuclear explosive device," according to the IAEA (Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, GOV/2008/39, September 12, 2008). However, these documents lacked "important parts" for making a nuclear weapon, according to former IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei (The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times (New York: Metropolitan Books), 2011, p. 155) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies described the design as "95% complete" (Nuclear Black Markets, 2007, p. 79). Moreover, Khan told a former member of his network that he had "supplied the Libyans with plans for a non-working nuclear device" (Extract from the Statement of Sayed Abu Tahir Bin Bukhary, June 7, 2006, Annexure L in Plea and Sentence Agreement, State vs. Geiges, Wisser, and Krisch Engineering, September 2007). According to former SPD official Feroz Khan, "the bomb design exposed in Libya was not the one Pakistani scientists worked on and eventually tested" (Khan, 2012, p. 189).

In addition to the documents supplied to Tripoli, members of the network also had computer files containing "drawings for the components of two smaller, more advanced nuclear weapons" (David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies, The Institute for Science and International Security, 2010. p.151). However, according to former IAEA official Olli Heinonen, these "detailed designs" were not "complete sets" of weapons design information. Heinonen suggested that other members of the network could have possessed more complete nuclear weapons designs (interview with CRS analyst, August 4, 2011).

Unclassified Statement for the Record Annual Threat Assessment, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 11, 2007.

"Pakistan's Future: Building Democracy, or Fueling Extremism?" Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 25, 2007.

Nuclear Black Markets, 2007, p. 159.

"Dr. Khan Probe a 'Closed Chapter': FO Hails APHC-Singh Meeting," Dawn, May 03, 2006. Munir Ahmad, "Disgraced Pakistan A-bomb Scientist Declared Free," The Associated Press, February 6, 2009.

"Transshipment And Diversion: Are U.S. Trading Partners Doing Enough To Prevent The Spread Of Dangerous Technologies?" Hearing of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, July 22, 2010.

Report to Congress: Update on Progress toward Regional Nuclear Nonproliferation in South Asia, submitted March 20, 2012; Report to Congress: Update on Progress toward Regional Nuclear Nonproliferation in South Asia, submitted April 3, 2013.

Personal communication, November 9, 2007.

"Former IAEA Deputy Chief Voices Concern About Iran, North Korea, Pakistan," Der Spiegel, October 2, 2011.

Question #54, Pre-Hearing Questions for the Record by Senator Richard Lugar Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nomination of Ellen M. Tauscher to be Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.

Former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet wrote in his memoirs that the United States "received fragmentary information from an intelligence service" that in 1998 Osama bin Laden had "sent emissaries to establish contact" with the Khan network. Tenet, George and Harlow, Bill, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA, HarperCollins: New York, 2007. p. 261; Albright, Peddling Peril, 2010.

For a detailed discussion, see Albright, 2010.

Ibid. According to a 2005 report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, al-Qaeda "had established contact with Pakistani scientists who discussed development of nuclear devices that would require hard-to-obtain materials like uranium to create a nuclear explosion." http://www.wmd.gov/report/index.html.

Albright, 2010. Tenet, 2007.

Albright, 2010.

Details of Pakistan's nuclear-related legislation can be found in the country's reports to the UN 1540 Committee. Both can be found at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/597/46/PDF/N0459746.pdf?OpenElement.

Presentation given to Partnership for Global Security Workshop, "Meeting the Nuclear Security Challenge in Pakistan," February 21-22, 2008. http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/documents/zafar_export.pdf.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a multilateral, voluntary group of nuclear supplier states which have agreed to coordinate their exports of civilian nuclear technology and materials in order to prevent importers from using them to produce nuclear weapons. The Australia Group is a voluntary, informal, export-control arrangement through which participating countries coordinate their national export controls to limit the supply of chemicals and biological agents, as well as related equipment, technologies, and knowledge, to countries and nonstate entities suspected of pursuing chemical or biological weapons capabilities. The Missile Technology Control Regime is an informal, voluntary arrangement in which participants agree to adhere to common export policy guidelines applied to an "annex" that lists items related to the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, and unmanned air vehicles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

Communication of 30 September 2015 from the Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the Agency Concerning the Export Control Policies of the Government of Pakistan and a Statutory Regulatory Order, International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/890, November 9, 2015.

Report To Congress, April 3, 2013.

The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance of 2000 regulates the import and export of chemicals in accordance with the convention.

Building Confidence in Pakistan's Nuclear Security: Workshop Synopsis. April 30, 2007.

Asif Shahzad, "Pakistani Governor Killed by own Bodyguard," Associated Press, January 4, 2011; Salman Masood and Carlotta Gall, "Crisis Grows in Pakistan with Killing of Governor; Government Shaken amid Fears Islamists have Infiltrated Security Forces," The International Herald Tribune, January 6, 2011; Asif Shahzad and Sebastian Abbot, "Shadow over Pakistan Security Grows," Associated Press, January 12, 2011.

Burns mentioned Pakistan's participation in the Container Security Initiative and the Secure Freight Initiative. Under these programs, "the United States and Pakistan worked together to install screening and radiation detection equipment to scan U.S.-bound cargo." He also stated that the Department of Energy "is working with Pakistan on radiation source security and is in the process of finalizing an agreement to install radiation detection equipment at Pakistani ports and border crossings."

GAO Report, Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Networks Need Better Data on Proliferation Risks and Program Results, October 31, 2007.

Report To Congress, April 3, 2013.

Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority Annual Report 2014; Statement by the Leader of the Pakistan Delegation, 59^th IAEA General Conference, 14-18 September, 2015.

Unlike most International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements, Pakistan's agreements only cover certain nuclear facilities in the country. Islamabad's nuclear weapons program is not safeguarded. "Pakistan is committed to keep all its future civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards" ("Pakistan & The NSG," non-paper from the Embassy of Pakistan circulated on June 3, 2015).

Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, April 21, 2015.

See CRS Report RL33192, U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].

Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, April 21, 2015.

I.H. Qureshi, "Recollections from the Early Days of the PAEC," The Nucleus, 42 (1-2), 2005, pp. 7-11. Research Reactor Details - PARR-1.

Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2010: Securing All Nuclear Materials in Four Years, (Cambridge, MA., and Washington, DC: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative), April 2010, p. 28.

See Congressional Record S10429-S10431.

Press Information Department, "United States Congressional Delegation calls on Prime Minister Gilani," Pakistan Official News, June 7, 2011.

Ibid; "Pakistan & The NSG."

"Pakistan & The NSG."

Daniel Horner, "Pakistan, U.S. Said to Be Talking on NSG," Arms Control Today, November 2015; David E. Sanger, "U.S. Exploring Deal to Limit Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal," New York Times, October 15, 2015; Douglas Busvine, "Nuclear Club Eyes Indian Inclusion, but Risks Pakistan's Ire," Reuters, November 24, 2015.