This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with red strikethrough and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.
The white collar crimes on the Supreme Court's 2015 docket consist of three Hobbs Act cases, one on insider trading (Salman v. United States), and the final and one on computer fraud (Musacchio v. United States). The Hobbs Act outlaws robbery and extortion when committed in a manner which "in any way or degree" obstructs interstate commerce. One of the Hobbs Act cases before the Court (Taylor v. United States) involves the robbery of suspected drug dealers. The second (Ocasio v. United States) consists of a kickback conspiracy between traffic cops and body shop owners. The third (McDonnell v. United States) involves a local drug manufacturer who showered a state governor and his wife with gifts in an apparent attempt to use the governor's office as a bully pulpit for one of his products.
The sex offense entries involve the sex offender registration obligations of an overseas resident (Nichols v. United States) and construction of the recidivist mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of federal law (Lockhart v. United States).
Perhaps spurred on by the result below, the Supreme Court held that stun guns used for self-defense are not necessarily beyond the guarantees of the Second Amendment right to bear arms (Caetano v. Massachusetts). The other firearms cases on the Court's docket raise interpretative issues under the Armed Career Criminal Act (Welch v. United States and Mathis v. United States) and the firearm possession disqualification triggered by a domestic violence misdemeanor (Voisine v. United States).
The trio of Fourth Amendment cases present questions on the exclusionary rule (Utah v. Strieff), the warrant requirement for sobriety tests (Birchfield v. North Dakota), and qualified official immunity in the face of use of excessive force allegations (Mullenix v. Luna).
The Court's Sixth Amendment cases this term offer a variety of issues ranging from ineffective assistance of counsel (Maryland v. Kulbicki), to speedy trial (Betterman v. Montana), to forfeiture and the right to counsel of choice (Luis v. United States), to the use of uncounseled convictions as predicate offenses (United States v. Bryant).
Capital punishment cases represent the lion's share of the Court's sentencing cases this term. However, the class also includes the matter of the retroactive application of the Miller v. Alabama prohibition on a life without parole sentence for murder by a juvenile (Montgomery v. Louisiana) and the harmless error standard in sentencing cases (United States v. Molina-Martinez).
The menu of the Court's capital punishment cases offers cases concerning jury instructions (Carr v. Kansas); jury selection (Foster v. Chatman); exclusive jury sentencing prerogatives (Hurst v. Florida); Brady violations (Wearry v. Cain); insufficient capital jury instructions (Lynch v. Arizona); appellate court judge recusals (Williams v. Pennsylvania); and the application of habeas corpus standards (White v. Wheeler).
The Prisoner Reform Litigation Act, designed to curb frivolous inmate suits, generated two of the cases on the Court's 2015 docket—one on the act's installment payment feature (Bruce v. Samuels) and the other on the required exhaustion of administrative remedies (Ross v. Blake).
As noted throughout the course of this report, its text draws heavily from previously prepared, individual legal sidebars, published and yet to published.
This report will be revised after the end of the Term.
The white collar crimes on the Supreme Court's 2015 docket consist of three Hobbs Act cases, one on insider trading, and the final and one on computer fraud.
The three Hobbs Act cases might easily be decided on narrow technical grounds. On the other hand, the Court might decide one or more of them in a way which further marks the outskirts of Congress's authority to enact criminal laws. The Hobbs Act outlaws robbery and extortion when committed in a manner which "in any way or degree" obstructs interstate commerce.1 One of the cases before the Court, Taylor v. United States, involvesinvolved the robbery of suspected drug dealers. 2 The second, Ocasio v. United States, consistsconsisted of a kickback conspiracy between traffic cops and body shop owners. 3 The third, McDonnell v. United States, involvesinvolved a local drug manufacturer who showered a state governor and his wife with gifts in an apparent attempt to use the governor's office as a bully pulpit for one of his products. 4
Question: Whether, in a federal criminal prosecution under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §1951, the Government is relieved of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the interstate commerce element by relying exclusively on evidence that the robbery or attempted robbery of a drug dealer is an inherent economic enterprise that satisfies, as a matter of law, the interstate commerce element of the offense?
The United States Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether a robbery victim's status as a suspected drug dealer is sufficient to establish federal interstate commerce jurisdiction in Taylor v. United States.5 Robbery is essentially a local crime. On the other hand, drug dealing is clearly a commercial activity, and the Hobbs Act's jurisdictional element is stated in sweeping terms.6 Moreover, the Court has already decided that the traffic in drugs affords Congress legislative authority to regulate purely local noncommercial activities.7 Is it enough that the government proved that the defendant believed he was robbing a drug dealer? Or must the government prove that the drugs that were the target of the offense moved in or affected interstate commerce?
Holding: "In order to obtain a conviction under the Hobbs Act for the robbery or attempted robbery of a drug dealer, the Government need not show that the drugs that a defendant stole or attempted to steal either traveled or were destined for transport across state lines. Rather, to satisfy the Act's commerce element, it is enough that a defendant knowingly stole or attempted to steal drugs or drug proceeds, for, as a matter of law, the market for illegal drugs is commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction. And it makes no difference ... that any actual or threatened effect on commerce in a particular case is minimal."5
The Court, in a 7-1 decision written by Justice Alito, made it clear that Taylor was more about drugs than about the Hobbs Act: "Our holding today is limited to cases in which the defendant targets drug dealers for the purpose of stealing drugs or drug proceeds. We do not resolve what the government must prove to establish Hobbs Act robbery where some other type of business or victim is targeted."6
Taylor, the petitioner in the case, was a member of a gang of inept home invaders who sought to rob drug dealers of their cash and drugs.87 The two robberies for which he was convicted netted the group a total of $40 in cash, three cell phones, a marijuana cigarette, and some jewelry.98 Federal prosecutors charged Taylor under the Hobbs Act, which condemns anyone who "in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion."109 Taylor sought to introduce evidence at his trial that the victim of the robbery dealt only in marijuana grown in-state, but the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia barred admission, holding that drug dealing affects interstate commerce as a matter of law.1110 Taylor was convicted and appealed.1211
On appeal, he questioned whether the government had satisfied the Hobbs Act's commerce element, but he faced two obstacles. Lower federal appellate courts havehad generally construed the "in any way or degree" language to mean that Congress intended to exercise the full extent of its Commerce Clause powers and that the prosecution need establish no more than a de minimis impact on interstate commerce. Second, the Supreme Court's Raich decision seems to re-enforceseemed to reenforce the government's position. The Raich opinion declared that "Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself commercial ... , if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity."
The Fourth Circuit affirmed Taylor's conviction. It concluded that "it was entirely reasonable for the jury to conclude that the robberies would have the effect of depleting the assets of an entity engaged in interstate commerce.... Because drug dealing in the aggregate necessarily affects interstate commerce, the government was simply required to prove that Taylor depleted or attempted to deplete the assets of such an operation."13
Taylor argues before the Supreme Court that the Fourth Circuit is wrong. "The Fourth Circuit's per se rule that all drug dealing affects commerce for purposes of the Hobbs Act, regardless of the circumstances of the charged offense, conflicts with the approach in the Second Circuit and the Seventh Circuit, in which the courts have held that drug dealing in and of itself is insufficient to establish that a crime affects commerce within the meaning of the Hobbs Act; there must be an additional individualized factual finding beyond a reasonable doubt supporting a legal conclusion of jurisdiction in a particular case."14
The Second Circuit has in fact declared that "[p]roof of drug trafficking is no longer regarded as automatically affecting interstate commerce; instead, even in drug cases, the jury must find such an effect as part of its verdict."1513 The Seventh Circuit on the other hand indicated that proof of an individualized impact is not necessary for prosecution under the federal drug law, but is required for Hobbs Act prosecutions.16
Perhaps the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the apparent conflict between the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits. The Fourth Circuit believes proof of an individual impact on interstate commerce is not necessary in Hobbs Act cases.17 The Seventh Circuit believes it is necessary in Hobbs Act cases, but not in federal drug law prosecutions.18 And the Second Circuit believes it is necessary in both Hobbs Act and federal drug prosecutions.19
Resolution of the apparent conflict without more would clarify the law. On the other hand, a substantial number of federal crimes have an interstate commerce element. The Supreme Court's decision would have far greater consequences if it repudiates the "de minimis" impact theory or otherwise reads Congress's Commerce Clause power narrowly.
Question: Does a conspiracy to commit extortion require that the conspirators agree to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy?
The Supreme Court has agreed to review Ocasio v. United States, a case in which the government argues that the owner of an auto body shop was at once the victim and co-conspirator in an extortion scheme involving kickbacks he paid for business referrals.20
The resolution of the Taylor case, the Court said, "require[d] no more than ... [to] graft [its] holding in Raich onto the commerce element of the Hobbs Act." In Raich, the Court had recognized "Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce."16 It also had acknowledged there that "[t]he production, possession, and distribution of controlled substances constitute a class of activities that in the aggregate substantially affect interstate commerce."17 In the eyes of the Court in Taylor, "the market for marijuana, including its intrastate aspects, is 'commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.' It therefore follows as a simple matter of logic that a robber[, like Taylor,] who affects or attempts to affect even the intrastate sale of marijuana grown within the State affects or attempts to affect commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction."18 Justice Thomas dissented. He felt that the limits of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause required a holding that the Hobbs "Act punishes a robbery only when the Government proves that the robbery itself affected interstate commerce."19 Holding: "A defendant may be convicted of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act based on proof that he reached an agreement with the owner of the property in question to obtain that property under color of official right."20Ocasio was a Baltimore police officer, who with several other officers received kickbacks for referring accident victims to the14 The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the arguments of the two circuits.15
Ocasio argued at trial and on appeal that the Hobbs Act does not outlaw obtaining property from a co-conspirator.25 His argument proceeded under alternative theories. First, he contended that a statute which punishes conspirators for obtaining the property "of another" under color of law is limited to victims who are "other" than conspirators.26 Second, he asserted that otherwise every victim would be liable as a conspirator: "The law must require that a victim under the Hobbs Act be a person outside the conspiracy because otherwise every victim's 'consent' could be considered an agreement to enter into a conspiracy with its victimizer, thereby creating a separately punishable conspiracy in every §1951(a) case."27
Ocasio claimed persuasive support from a Sixth Circuit case, U.S. v. Brock,28 which seemed to endorse his alternative theories. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, was unconvincednot convinced.29 It responded that Ocasio's "property of another" argument was undermined by the fact that the term "property of another" might easily mean the property of anyone other than one acting "under color of law."30 As for his "consent" argument, it was foreclosed by an earlier Fourth Circuit case "which underscored the proposition that mere acquiescence in an extortion scheme is not conspiratorial conduct. Rather, conduct more active thatthan mere acquiescence is necessary before a person may depart the realm of a victim and may unquestionably be subject to conviction for aiding and abetting and conspiracy."31 Therefore it is "wrong to suggest that every extortion scheme will necessarily involve a conspiracy to commit extortion."32
Ocasio reiterated his argument in his brief to the Supreme Court.33 He also added a federalism argument; a suggestion that the courts should be hesitant to assume that Congress intended to make federal crimes out of run-of-the mill state offenses.34 The contention is reminiscent of one raised in Bond v. United States.35 There, the Court concluded that Congress could not have intended the statute implementing the Chemical Weapons Treaty to apply to a minor domestic assault case.36 The Court explained that "the background principle that Congress does not normally intrude upon the police power of the States is critically important."37 A number of former United States Attorneys made the same point in an amicus brief in support of Ocasio.38 The difficulty is that, unlike the chemical weapons statute, the Hobbs Act has been long, regularly, and widely prosecuted, and Congress has yet to limit the range of activities that may be prosecuted under its terms.
Question: Under the federal bribery statute, Hobbs Act, and honest-services fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 1346, 1951, it is a felony to agree to take "official action" in exchange for money, campaign contributions, or any other thing of value. The question presented is whether "official action" is limited to exercising actual governmental power, threatening to exercise such power, or pressuring others to exercise such power, and whether the jury must be so instructed; or, if not so limited, whether the Hobbs Act and honest-services fraud statute are unconstitutional.
On September 4, 2014, a jury convicted former Virginia Governor McDonnel and his wife on corruption charges based on his activities as Governor.39 The convictions covered wire fraud, conspiracy, and Hobbs Act violations.40 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.41 On January 15, 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the lower court's definition of the term "official act" – a necessary element of the mail fraud conviction and by implication of the Hobbs Act convictions.42
The Governor, and particularly his wife, had been showered with gifts during the Governor's term in office.43 Their benefactor, a constituent, was a drug manufacturer who hoped to have one of his products approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, which would require studies of the products.44 To that end, he sought to have state university medical research and facilities to favorably test and report on the products' efficacy.
For his part, the Governor forwarded promotional material and the company's suggested research protocol to the state official with authority to approve the study.45 The Governor's name was used on invitations and he attended a promotional luncheon at the Governor's Masion on behalf of the company.46 The Governor also pitched the company's product to the official responsible for determining the products covered by the state's employee health plans.47
The wire fraud statute under which the Governor was convicted outlaws the use of wire communications as part of a scheme to defraud another of his property.48 A second statute defines the scheme to defraud element to include any scheme to defraud another of "honest services" to which he is entitled.49 The Supreme Court, however, has construed this honest services definition to encompass no more than bribery or kickbacks.50 The Court understood honest services bribery to correspond to the misconduct described in the general federal bribery statute.51 There, bribery is a corrupt quid pro quo; the exchange of something of value for a public official's commission or omission of an official act.52
The same kind of official act will upon occasion be an element of the extortion prong of a Hobbs Act violation. Among other things the Hobbs Act outlaws obstructing interstate commerce in any manner by extortion under color of law.53 The Supreme Court views this Hobbs Act extortion offense as the rough equivalent of bribery; accepting something of value for the commission or omission of an official act.54
The trial court's instruction to the jury as to what constitutes an "official act" lies at the heart of the Governor's attack on his conviction. The trial court advised the jury that
The term official action means any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such public official's official capacity. Official action as I just defined it includes those actions that have been clearly established by settled practice as part of a public official's position, even if the action was not taken pursuant to responsibilities explicitly assigned by law. In other words, official actions may include acts that a public official customarily performs, even if those actions are not described in any law, rule, or job description. And a public official need not have actual or final authority over the end result sought by a bribe payor so long as the alleged bribe payor reasonably believes that the public official had influence, power or authority over a means to the end sought by the bribe payor. In addition, official action can include actions taken in furtherance of longer-term goals, and an official action is no less official because it is one in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end. 55
The Fourth Circuit rejected the Governor's challenge. It did concede that the payor's subjective belief aspect might be "debatable," but concluded that any error was harmless. The jury would have convicted the Governor in any event.56
Before the Supreme Court, the Governor argues that the lower court's decision is contrary to Supreme Court precedent, at odds with decisions of other federal appellate courts, and would criminalize the ordinary, innocent political practices of federal, state, and local public officials.57 The government disputes each of these points.58
The Fourth Circuit claimed support from United States v. Birdsall, an early twentieth century Supreme Court case in which the Court defined expansively the official acts covered by earlier bribery statutes.59 Both sides might claim support from a later Supreme Court remark in United States v. Sun-Diamond that not every "official act" by a public servant is an "official act" for purposes of bribery; instead the term only those "decision[s] or action[s] on any question, matter ... or controversy, which may ... be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity.... "60
From the Governor's perspective his conduct involved little more than acts of political courtesy for a constituent. From the government's perspective his conduct involved the subtle acts of official direction to a junior public official. Their different points of view color how the two sides see related cases in other circuits. In the D.C. Circuit's Valdes v. United States case, where a police officer conducted an unauthorized criminal records check, the Governor sees a case in which a comparable "official act" jury instruction was declared harmfully erroneous.61 The government sees a case in which the official's actions had no relation to the official governmental action upon a "question, matter, ... or controversy."62 The Governor looks upon the Eighth Circuit's United States v. Rabbittt and the First Circuit's United States v. Urciuoli decisions as cases in which powerful legislators promoted constituent interests to state and local officials, and no extortion was found.63 For the government, it is a case where the legislators neither took nor compelled any governmental action.64
The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari, however, may involve considerations other than the opportunity to resolve a possible conflict in the circuits over the definition of official act. It may have more to do with the Court's desire to confirm or refine its historic caution in cases involving federal prosecution based on state and local political activities.
In the 1987 case of McNally v. United States, the Court it turned back mail fraud convictions built on the theory that the defendants had defrauded the citizens of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, not out of money or other property, but out of their "intangible right to honest and impartial government."65 The Court made its rationale clear: "Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials, we read [the mail fraud statute] as limited in scope to the protection of property rights. If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has."66
The government was no more successful when it took a comparable approach under the extortion branch of the Hobbs Act. In 1991, the Court overturned the conviction of McCormick, a West Virginia legislator, for soliciting and accepting campaign contributions from those whose interests he espoused legislatively.67 Again, the Court refused to read the criminal statute expansively, without a clear expression of congressional intent:
Whatever ethical considerations and appearances may indicate, to hold that legislators commit the federal crime of extortion when they act for the benefit of constituents or support legislation furthering the interests of some of their constituents, shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited and received from those beneficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment of what Congress could have meant by making it a crime to obtain property from another, with his consent, "under color of official right." To hold otherwise would open to prosecution not only conduct that has long been thought to be well within the law but also conduct that in a very real sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by private contributions or expenditures, as they have been from the beginning of the Nation. It would require statutory language more explicit than the Hobbs Act contains to justify a contrary conclusion.68
Congress then responded by enacting the section which folds honest services fraud into the mail and wire fraud statutes. Yet here too, in 2010, the Court in Skilling v. United States found the statute's breadth troubling: "[T]here is no doubt that Congress intended §1346 to reach at least bribes and kickbacks. Reading the statute to prescribe a wider range of offensive conduct, we acknowledge, would raise the due process concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine. To preserve the statute without transgressing constitutional limitations, we now hold that §1346 criminalizes only the bribe-and-kickback core of the pre-McNally case law."69
McDonnell may turn on the Court's historic reluctance to endorse federal regulation of state political practices. On the other hand, the Court may conclude that at the heart of the issue is the question of whether, a corrupter and jury may infer an intent to commit a public act once a public official knowingly accepts lavish gifts.
Question: Does the personal benefit to the insider that is necessary to establish insider trading under Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), require proof of "an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature," as the Second Circuit held in United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 15-137 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015), or is it enough that the insider and the tippee shared a close family relationship, as the Ninth Circuit held in this case?"
Insider trading is a federal crime.70 It occurs when securities trading follows from a faithless insider's disclosure, for personal benefit, of a corporation's confidential market sensitive information.71 The lower federal appellate courts are at odds over the nature of the personal benefit sufficient to satisfy that element of the offense.72
The case now under Supreme Court review, Salman v. United States, began when Maher Kara began sharing insider information with his brother Michael who, in his securities dealings, traded on the information.73 Michael later became friends with Salman to whom he conveyed some of the insider information that his brother had provided.74 Salman was ultimately convicted of insider trading and conspiracy to commit insider trading.75 Salman appealed on the grounds that the government had failed to establish that Salman knew that Maher Kara, the insider, received a personal benefit in exchange for the information that Michael Kara received and passed on to Salman.76
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. Its decision pointed to the Supreme Court's Dirks v. SEC opinion77 in which the Court had addressed the downstream liability of "tippees," like Michael Kara and Salman:
"Thus, the test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure," id. at 662, 103 S.Ct. 3255, for in that case the insider is breaching his fiduciary duty to the company's shareholders not to exploit company information for his personal benefit.[] And a tippee is equally liable if "the tippee knows or should know that there has been [such] a breach," id. at 660, 103 S.Ct. 3255 (i.e., knows of the personal benefit).
Of particular importance here, the Court then went on to define what constitutes the "personal benefit" that constitutes the breach of fiduciary duty. It would include, for example, "a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings." Id. at 663, 103 S.Ct. 3255. However, "[t]he elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend." Id. at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255 (emphasis supplied).78
In Salman's case, Maher Kara was the insider and Michael Kara was the "trading relative," as Salman was well aware.79 The insider Maher Kara's personal benefit was the benefit of knowing he was assisting his brother.80
The Ninth Circuit conceded that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had a different point of view as evidenced by its opinion in United States v. Newman.81 There, the Second Circuit declared the personal benefit element in the form of "gift to a trading relative or friend" was limited to instances that involve "a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature."82
However the Supreme Court rules, Congress is likely to be asked to reconsider the issue.
Justice Alito also responded with precedent to Ocasio's argument that the Court's conspiracy theory would eliminate the distinction between extortion (coercive corruption) and bribery (consensual corruption). Justice Alito explained that the Court had already declared in Evans that Hobbs Act "color of law" extortion is the "rough equivalent of bribery."40
Justice Thomas dissented, as he had in Evans, because that case "erred in equating common-law extortion with taking a bribe."41 Justice Breyer joined in the majority opinion, but offered a concurrence acknowledging that he finds troubling, but binding, the Evans "extortion is the rough equivalent of bribery" precedent.42 Justice Sotomayor and Chief Justice Roberts dissented because they did not believe that "a group of conspirators can agree to obtain property 'from another' in violation of the Act even if they agree only to transfer property among themselves."43
McDonnell v. United StatesHolding: Arranging a meeting or hosting an event does not qualify as an "official act" for purposes of the federal bribery statute unless it involves "the formal exercise of governmental power" with respect to some pending or anticipated "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy."44
On September 4, 2014, a jury convicted former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell and his wife on corruption charges based on his activities as governor.45 The convictions covered wire fraud, conspiracy, and Hobbs Act offenses.46 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.47 On January 15, 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the lower court's definition of the term official act—a necessary element of the mail fraud conviction and by implication of the Hobbs Act convictions.48
The governor, and his wife, had been showered with gifts during the governor's term in office.49 Their benefactor, a constituent, was a drug manufacturer who hoped to have one of his products, an antismoking substance, approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, which would require studies of the products.50 To that end, he sought to have state university medical research and facilities test and report favorably on the products' efficacy.
For his part, the governor forwarded promotional material and the company's suggested research protocol to the state official with authority to approve the study.51 The governor's name was used on invitations, and he attended a promotional luncheon at the Governor's Mansion on behalf of the company.52 The governor also pitched the company's product to the official responsible for determining the products covered by the state's employee health plans.53
The wire fraud statute under which the governor was convicted outlaws the use of wire communications as part of a scheme to defraud another of his property.54 A second statute defines the scheme to defraud element to include any scheme to defraud another of "honest services" to which he is entitled.55 The Supreme Court, however, has construed this honest services definition to encompass no more than bribery or kickbacks.56 The Court understands honest services bribery to correspond to the misconduct described in the general federal bribery statute.57 There, bribery is a corrupt quid pro quo—the exchange of something of value for a public official's commission or omission of an official act.58
The same kind of official act will upon occasion be an element of the extortion prong of a Hobbs Act violation. Among other things the Hobbs Act outlaws obstructing interstate commerce in any manner by extortion under color of law.59 The Supreme Court views this Hobbs Act extortion offense as the rough equivalent of bribery—accepting something of value for the commission or omission of an official act.60
An official act for bribery purposes is defined as "any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit."61
The prosecution argued that the governor had committed at least five qualifying official acts:"(1) arranging meetings for [Williams] with Virginia government officials, who were subordinates of the Governor, to discuss and promote Anatabloc;
"(2) hosting, and ... attending, events at the Governor's Mansion designed to encourage Virginia university researchers to initiate studies of anatabine and to promote Star Scientific's products to doctors for referral to their patients;
"(3) contacting other government officials in the [Governor's Office] as part of an effort to encourage Virginia state research universities to initiate studies of anatabine;
"(4) promoting Star Scientific's products and facilitating its relationships with Virginia government officials by allowing [Williams] to invite individuals important to Star Scientific's business to exclusive events at the Governor's Mansion; and
"(5) recommending that senior government officials in the [Governor's Office] meet with Star Scientific executives to discuss ways that the company's products could lower healthcare costs."62
The governor argued that the instructions to the jury permit it to convict him without finding that he had exercised or endeavored to influence the formal exercise of governmental power necessary to constitute an official act. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed. It found the instructions deficient on three grounds. First, the jury was not instructed that it must find "a 'question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy' involving the formal exercise of governmental power."63 Without such guidance, the jury may have "thought that a typical meeting, call, or event was itself a 'question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy'" and was enough without more to constitute an official act.64
Second, the jury was not instructed that "the 'question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy' must be more specific and focused than a broad policy objective."65 And so, the jury may have erroneously concluded, as the prosecution argued in closing, that "[w]hatever it was Governor McDonnell had done, it's all official action." 66
Finally, "the jury was not told that merely arranging a meeting or hosting an event to discuss a matter does not count as a decision or action on that matter."67 And so, the jury may have thought arranging a meeting or hosting an event did constitute an "official act," without making the additional finding that the governor agreed to take or exert pressure on other officials to take an official action.68
The Court's decision seems in line with its historic reluctance to endorse federal authorities' policing of state and local political affairs in the absence of clear congressional directive.69 The decision, however, makes no such statement. Nor does it refer to the cases that evidence that reluctance. Instead, it builds upon its "official act" precedents:
The question remains whether—as the Government argues—merely setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or calling another official qualifies as a decision or action, [as an official act]…. Although the word "decision," and especially the word "action" could be read expansively to support the Government's view, our opinion in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal. rejects that interpretation.70
Holding: "We first consider how a court should assess a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case when a jury instruction adds an element to the charged crime and the Government fails to object. We conclude that the sufficiency of the evidence should be assessed against the elements of the charged crime. We next consider whether the statute-of-limitations defense contained in 18 U.S.C. §3282(a)() (the general federal criminal statute of limitations) may be successfully raised for the first time on appeal. We conclude that's it may not be."
The U.S. Supreme Court recently upheld a computer fraud conviction over objections that the prosecution was not timely and the jury's instructions were in error in Musacchio v. United States.8371 The case presented two questions. First, may a defendant present a statute of limitation challenge for the first time on appeal?8472 Second, may a conviction be undone by a sufficiency-of-the-evidence attack on an extraneous element? The Court answered no to both questions.85
Musacchio hacked into the computer network of his former employer.8674 The portion of the Computer Fraud and Abuse statutestatute under which he was indicted outlaws accessing a computer system without authorization or in excess of authorization.8775 The indictment charged him with access without authorization.8876 The judge's instructions to the jury, however, suggested that Musacchio could only be convicted only if the government proved access both without authorization and in excess of authorization.8977 Musacchio was convicted nonetheless.9078
On appeal, he conceded that there was sufficient evidence at trial to convict for access without authority, but argued without success that there was insufficient evidence to prove access in excess of authorization.9179 He also argued to no avail that the five-year statute of limitations should have barred his prosecution, because his indictment had been filed seven years after the commission of the offense.92
The two questions had divided the lower federal appellate courts.9381 The Supreme Court took the opportunity to answer them in a single case. First, a statute of limitations bar is ordinarily a defense that must be claimed.9482 If a defendant does not object before conviction that prosecution of his case is untimely, the defense is lost.9583 It may not be raised for the first time on appeal.9684 Congress, however, is free to abrogate the general rule. It may decree that, with respect to a particular statute of limitations, prosecution of a stale charge is a fatal flaw, which may be brought to the attention of the courts at any time. Congress makes its intent clear in the language of the statute, its context, and its legislative history.9785 The Court found no such evidence in the case of the statute at issue, general criminal statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. §Section 3282.9886 Thus, the delay in bringing Musacchio's prosecution was not an issue that could be raised for the first time on appeal.99
Second, when jury instructions contain extraneous elements, only the necessary elements of the crime charged need to satisfy a sufficiency-of-the-evidence test.10088 As the Court explained, "[w]henWhen a jury finds guilt after being instructed on all elements of the charged crime plus one more element, the jury has made all the findings that due process requires."10189
The Fifth Circuit, from which the case arose, had decided it on the basis of the rule-of-the-case doctrine.10290 The doctrine states that when a court has addressed a legal issue in a particular case it will not revisit the matter at a later stage of the same case.10391 The Fifth Circuit, however, erroneously applied the rule with regard to a lower court ruling in the same case.10492 For, "the doctrine is 'something of a misnomer' when used to describe how an appellate court assesses a lower court's rulings. An appellate court's function is to revisit matter decided in the trial court."10593
The Court left unaddressed the questions of whether the result would have been different had the indictment contained extraneous elements or had the trial court's instructions on the necessary elements been in error.
The sex offense entries on the Court's docket involve the sex offender registration obligations of an overseas resident and construction of the recidivist mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of federal law.
Holding: "[T]he text and structure of §2252(b)() (2) confirm that the provision applies to prior state convictions for 'sexual abuse' and 'aggravated sexual abuse,' whether or not the convictions involved a minor or ward."10694
The U.S. Supreme Court in a 6-2 decision upheld imposition of a mandatory minimum sentencing enhancement in a child pornography case.10795 The case turned on a matter of statutory construction. The statute at issue set a 10-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for a defendant convicted of child pornography:
... if such person has a prior conviction under ... chapter 109A [sexual abuse of a child or adult], or chapter 117 [unlawful sex-related interstate travel involving a child or adult], or under section 920 of title 10 (article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice) [rape and sexual assault], or under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.... 108
Lockhart had pleaded guilty to federal child pornography charges.10997 He had earlier been convicted of first degree sexual abuse of an adult under New York state law.11098 The trial court concluded it had no choice but to assess the 10-year mandatory minimum.11199 Lockhart appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.112100 Its decision was in line with those of the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits and at odds with those of the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.113101 The question whichthat divided the appellate panels was whether the phrase "involving a minor or ward" applied to aggravated sexual abuse and sexual abuse cases or only to cases of abusive sexual conduct. Did the mandatory minimum apply to Lockhart whose crime involved sexual abuse of an adult? The Supreme Court concluded that it did.114
Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Court, examined the text of the statute first under the "last antecedent" rule of statutory construction, which suggests that "a limiting clause or phrase," such as involving a minor or ward, "should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows; in this case "abusive sexual conduct."115
The Justice then pointed out the symmetry between state and federal triggering offenses. The terms "aggravated sexual abuse," ", sexual abuse,," and "abusive sexual conduct" used to identify the state predicate offenses are the very terms used as captions for the federal predicate offenses in Chapter 109A.116104 She wrote, "If Congress had intended to limit each of the state predicates to conduct 'involving a minor or ward,' we doubt it would have followed, or thought it needed to follow, so closely the structure and language of Chapter 109A."117105
Moreover, the Justice was at a loss to "explain why Congress would have wanted to apply the mandatory minimum to individuals convicted in federal court of sexual abuse or aggravated sexual abuse involving an adult, but not to individuals convicted in state court of the same."118
The opinion seems to have captured the seriousness with which Congress viewed repeat offenders who engage in child pornography. Nevertheless, Justice Kagan's Scalia-like observation in dissent may give one pause: "Suppose a real estate agent promised to find a client 'a house, condo, or apartment in New York.' Wouldn't the potential buyer be annoyed if the agent sent him information about condos in Maryland or California?"119
It is possible that Congress may reconsider the Court's construction of the repeat offender mandatory minimum in child pornography cases. There have been a number of proposals to reduce recidivist mandatory minimums in various federal criminal statutes in the 114th Congress. Few, if any, involve child pornography.
Question: Whether 42 U.S.C. §16913(a) requires a sex offender who resides in a foreign country to update his registration in the jurisdiction where he formerly resided, a question that divides the courts of appeals.
The federal appellate courts are divided over whether an individual convicted of a crime which requires himHolding: The federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) requirement that offenders notify the "jurisdiction"(state or territory) in which they reside of any change of address does not apply to offenders who reside overseas (i.e., other than in a SORNA jurisdiction).108
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Nichols in order to resolve a conflict among the lower federal appellate courts over whether an individual required to register as a sex offender must continue to follow registration requirements when he relocates overseas. The issue is now before the Supreme Court in United States v. Nichols.120109 The Court held that he did not, although subsequent legislation imposes a related obligation.110
The federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) requires individuals convicted of federal or state qualifying sex offenses to register with each state ("jurisdiction") "(a) ... where the offender resides, ... is an employee, and ... is a student."121111 It further insists that after initial registration[s] the individual "not later than 3 business days after each change of name, residence, employment, or student status, appear in person in at least 1 jurisdiction involved pursuant to subsection (a) and inform that jurisdiction of all changes in the information required for that offender in the sex offender registry.... "122112 It is a federal crime for an individual convicted of a federal sex offense to fail to comply.123113 It is also a federal crime for an individual convicted of a state sex offense to fail to comply and subsequently travel in interstate or foreign commerce.124
In the case before the Supreme Court, Nichols was convicted of a federal qualifying sex offense and upon his release from prison registered with Kansas authorities.125115 He subsequently relocated in the Philippines without appearing or returning to appear before Kansas registration officials.126116 The Philippines deported him back to the United States, and he was indictedwhere he faced a federal indictment for failing to keep currentappear and update his Kansas registration information.117.127 He sought unsuccessfully to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that SORNA did not require him to register once he was in the Philippines.128118 He pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal.129
Nichols appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, where he contended that the SORNA's change of residency requirement does not apply when an individual changes his residency in a non-SORNA jurisdiction.130120 The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument on the basis of binding circuit precedent in which the court had concluded: "First, abandoning one's living place constitutes a change in residence under SORNA. Second, when an offender leaves a residence in a state, and then leaves the state entirely, that state remains a 'jurisdiction involved.' And third, a reporting obligation does not disappear simply because an individual manages to relocate to a non-SORNA jurisdiction before the three-day deadline for updating a registration has passed."131
A concurring member of the Nichols panel favored a position similar to that taken by the Eighth Circuit and contrary to the Tenth Circuit's precedent.132 Under the Eighth Circuit's construction an offender is only obliged to update his registration information in "at least 1 jurisdiction involved pursuant to subsection (a)" that is, in a jurisdiction where he resides, is employed, or is a student.133 In the eyes of the Eighth Circuit, the obligation is "to keep the registration current in the jurisdiction where he 'resides' not a jurisdiction where he 'resided.'"134 That would mean in Nichols' case that Kansas "was not a 'jurisdiction involved' after [Nichols] changed his residence to somewhere in the Philippines, so [he] was not required by the federal statute to update the [Kansas] registry."135
SORNA requires an offender to appear in one of "three possible jurisdictions: where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, [or] where the offender is a student."123 It defines "jurisdictions" as the several states, the various territories of the United States, and certain Indian tribes.124 The Philippines is not a SORNA jurisdiction. Moreover, Justice Alito explained, SORNA "uses only the present tense: 'resides,' 'is an employee,' 'is a student.' A person who moves from Leavenworth to Manilla no longer 'resides' (present tense) in Kansas; although he once resided in Kansas, after his move he 'resides' in the Philippines."125 Therefore, "once Nichols moved to Manila, he was no longer required to appear in Kansas to update his registration, for Kansas was no longer a 'jurisdiction'" where he resides, is an employee, or is a student.126 Congress resolved the dispute.121 The Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion by Justice Alito reversed.122
.136 The statute requires sex offenders to "provide provide information related to any foreign travel to "the appropriate official for inclusion in the sex offender registry"137 information related to any foreign travel, " ... in conformity with any time and manner requirements prescribed by the Attorney General."138 In the interim, however, the legislation will have no impact on Nichols and those similarly situated. If the Court accepts their arguments, their convictions for failure to update will be overturned. If it does not, their convictions will stand.
Perhaps spurred on by the result below, the Supreme Court held that stun guns used for self-defense are not necessarily beyond the guarantees of the Second Amendment right to bear arms. The other firearms cases on the Court's docket raise interpretative issues under the Armed Career Criminal Act and the firearm possession disqualification triggered by a domestic violence misdemeanor.
Holding: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts's reasoning for upholding stun gun ban—lack of common use of stun guns at time of Second Amendment's enactment, unusual nature of stun guns as a modern invention, and lack of ready adaptability of stun guns for use in the military—does not preclude stun guns from being protected by Second Amendment right to bear arms
.129In Caetano v. Massachusetts, in one fell swoop (and without oral argument) the United StatesU.S. Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari and issued a per curiam opinion vacating the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Court that had upheld a Massachusetts law prohibiting the possession of stun guns.139130
Massachusetts has a law that bans the possession of weapons that emit electrical currents (e.g., stun guns), which was challenged as unconstitutional under the Second Amendment by a womenwoman who had been arrested for violating that law.140131 The Massachusetts court had concluded that the Second Amendment does not encompass stun guns, and thus the statute's prohibition was lawful, because, among other things, stun guns are dangerous, unusual, and were not in common use at the time the Bill of Rights was enacted.141132 Additionally, the court concluded, the stun gun, as used by the defendant, was not used to defend herself in the home.142133
The United StatesU.S. Supreme Court vacated the Massachusetts ruling, concluding that its reasoning directly conflicted with the holdings in District of Columbia v. Heller,143134 in which the Court concluded that the Second Amendment encompasses an individual right to possess firearms for traditional, lawful purposes, and McDonald v. Chicago,144135 which applies that right to the Statesstates through the Fourteenth Amendment. For instance, theThe Court noted that Heller stated that "the Second Amendment['s protection] 'extends …... to arms …... that were not in existence at the time of the founding'" as well as to firearms that are not readily adaptable for military use.145 Additionally, the Court criticized the state court's ruling for defining "unusual"—as used in Heller to describe firearms that have historically been prohibited—as weapons that are a "modern invention."146
The United States Supreme Court's ruling is limited to the Massachusetts court's analysis, though, which, according to the Court, had run afoul of its precedent. So the Court's decision does not mean that the Second Amendment protects all electrical weapons, such as stun guns, and does little to add to, or clarify, current Second Amendment jurisprudence.
Question: Does a misdemeanor crime with the mens rea of reckless qualify as a 'misdemeanor crime of domestic violence' as defined by 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(33)(A) and 922(g)(9).
The Supreme Court recently heard Voisine v. United States,148 a decision examining the federal provision that makes it unlawful for an individual to possess a firearm or ammunition if that person has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (MCDV). A MCDV is defined as a misdemeanor offense under federal or state law that has, as an element, "the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon" committed by and against certain persons.149 The Court decided to hear one of two questions presented: whether a misdemeanor crime with a mens rea of recklessness qualifies as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" as defined by 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A) and 922(g)(9).150 The Court decided not to review the constitutionality of the provision under the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments or the Ex Post Facto Clause.151
Arguably the Justices paved the way for this case when deciding United States v. Castleman152 last term. In Castleman, the Supreme Court held that the "physical force," for the purposes of a MCDV, is the degree of force that supports a battery conviction at common law, namely "offensive touching."153 However, the Court noted that it had not resolved whether "a reckless application of force could constitute 'use' of force."154 This is now the issue before the Court when it hears Voisine.
In Voisine, the First Circuit upheld the defendants' MCDV conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), finding that their underlying convictions under Maine law qualified as predicate MCDV offenses.155 In doing so, the First Circuit analyzed whether Maine's assault statute, which includes reckless acts, categorically fits within § 922(g)(9).156 The First Circuit in United States v. Booker had earlier held that a reckless misdemeanor satisfies the federal definition of MCDV.157 In Castleman, the Supreme Court did not say Booker was wrong, but highlighted other circuit court decisions, which had determined that "recklessness is not sufficient" to satisfy the use-of-force requirement.158 In Voisine, the First Circuit expressed disagreement with these other circuit cases, stating that "[a]ll but one of the ten cases cited in Castleman ... as deciding the § 922(g)(9) mens rea issue in fact considered other statutes in other contexts ... "159 Given § 922(g)(9)'s legislative history and unique purpose in ensuring that "domestic abusers convicted of misdemeanors, in addition to felonies, are barred from possessing firearms," the First Circuit opined that the provision should be interpreted more broadly than other statutes, which do not include reckless crimes as qualifying predicate offenses.160
Section 922(g)(9), according to the First Circuit, "is meant to embrace those seemingly minor predicate acts, occurring sometimes in moments of passion, where the perpetrator consciously disregarded a risk in light of known circumstances."161 The court reviewed Maine's definition of recklessness—"A person acts recklessly with respect to a result of the person's conduct when the person consciously disregards a risk that the person's conduct will cause such a result"—and concluded that the definition involves a volitional component and a substantial amount of deliberateness and intent.162 The First Circuit found the state's definition of reckless "sufficiently volitional," such that the crime of reckless assault in Maine constitutes a predicate offense for purposes of § 922(g)(9).163
Notably, the First Circuit made clear that it was not deciding that "recklessness in the abstract is always enough to satisfy § 922(g)(9)," acknowledging that the term has not always been consistently used.164 Given the First Circuit's focus on whether Maine's mens rea requirement of recklessness satisfies the statute and the different definitions a state may employ, it will be interesting to see what definition the Court will turn to upon hearing Voisine. Will it survey the states to see how they have defined recklessness in a particular context or will the Court turn to the meaning of the term under common law? If the Court overturns the First Circuit's decision, the result could limit the types of state domestic violence convictions that qualify as predicate offenses under § 922(g)(9). As a consequence, there could be an increase in the number of persons eligible to possess a firearm, despite a misdemeanor conviction for domestic abuse, as such offenses would no longer satisfy § 922(g)(9). Were the Court to exclude crimes of domestic violence with a mens rea requirement of recklessness, Congress could pass a law including recklessness as a type of mental state that would satisfy § 922(g)(9)'s definition of MCDV.
Questions: 1. Whether the District Court was in error when it denied relief on Petitioners' §2255 motion to vacate, which alleged that a prior Florida conviction for 'sudden snatching,' did not qualify for ACCA [Armed Career Criminal Act] enhancement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §924(e).
2. Whether Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551(2015), announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases that are on collateral review. Furthermore, Petitioner ask[s] this Court to resolve the Circuit split which has developed on the question of Johnson retroactivity in the Seventh and the Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals.
Last year, the Supreme Court declared the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)'s residual category unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States.165 In January, the Court's Montgomery v. Louisiana166 decision revisited the test used to determine whether such cases should be applied retroactively. With Welch v. United States, the Court is being asked to apply the test in an ACCA case.167
Holding: "A misdemeanor conviction for recklessly assaulting a domestic relation disqualifies an individual from possessing a gun."140 Under federal law, individuals who have been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence may not possess a firearm.141 The statute defines "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" as a federal, state, or tribal misdemeanor, that has as an element "the use … of physical force" and is committed against a person with whom the defendant was living or had lived.142 In an earlier case, Castleman, the Court held that an individual convicted of knowingly or intentionally committing domestic violence may no longer be eligible to possess a firearm, but set aside the question of whether recklessly committing such an offense is also disqualifying.143 Here in Voisine, the Court decided it was.144 When federal authorities investigated Voisine for suspicion of killing of a bald eagle, they discovered he owned a rifle and had a previous state domestic abuse conviction under state law for beating his girlfriend.145 They charged him with unlawful possession of a firearm.146 Following his conviction, Voisine appealed, arguing that the state domestic violence misdemeanor conviction was not disqualifying because the state statute covered reckless domestic violence.147 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected the argument,148 as did the Supreme Court.149 Justice Kagan wrote the opinion for the seven-member majority of the Court.150 She observed that nothing in the operative "use of physical force" phrase conveys the notion that the word "'use' marks a dividing line between reckless and knowing conduct."151 The word ordinarily encompasses both. Circumstances surrounding enactment confirmed for Justice Kagan that Congress chose its words for their everyday meaning.152 "Congress enacted [the ban] in 1996 to bar those domestic abusers convicted of garden-variety assault or battery misdemeanors ... from owning guns. Then, as now, a significant majority of jurisdictions ... defined such misdemeanor offenses to include the reckless infliction of bodily harm."153 To ignore reckless abuse convictions, Justice Kagan reasoned, "would have undermined Congress's aim."154 In sum, "[t]he federal ban on firearms possession applies to any person with a prior misdemeanor conviction for the 'use ... of physical force' against a domestic relation. That language, naturally read, encompasses acts of force undertaken recklessly…."155 Moreover, "the state-law backdrop ... indicates that Congress meant just what it said."156 Justice Thomas dissented on the basis of Second Amendment right-to-bear-arms grounds and because he felt the term "'use of physical force' has a well-understood meaning applying only to intentional acts designed to cause harm."157 Justice Sotomayor joined the latter part of the dissent.158 Holding: The Supreme Court's earlier decision in Johnson v. United States, which found the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act constitutionally vague, applies retroactively to the convictions of federal prisoners who seek collateral (habeas corpus) review.159The ACCA calls for a mandatory 15-year term of imprisonment for a defendant convicted of certain firearms offenses, if the defendant has three prior serious drug or violent felony convictions.168 The qualifying serious drug and violent felony convictions fall within one of three categories.169 The first category136 Yet, the Massachusetts court erroneously found Second Amendment protection wanting because stun guns like Caetano's "were not in common use at the time of the Second Amendment's enactment."137 And in the same misguided vein, the Massachusetts court "found 'nothing in record to suggest that stun guns are readily adaptable to use in the military.'"138
Voisine v. United States139
element.170element.162 The second is made up of drug trafficking and other enumerated crimes such as burglary, arson, and extortion.171163 The third is a residual categoryclause that includes offenses "that present[] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."172 Welch was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm.173 The trial court sentenced him under the ACCA on the basis of prior Florida convictions.174
Welch argued that one of his three prior convictions did not fall within any of the qualifying offense categories.175 The government asserted that it qualified under the physical force category and the residual category. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the earlier Florida conviction came within the residual category and found it unnecessary to decide whether it also qualified under the physical force category.176 Welch filed for habeas relief, which the district court and the Eleventh Circuit denied.177 Two weeks later, the Supreme Court handed down its Johnson decision voiding the residual category.178 The Supreme Court granted Welch's petition for review of two questions: (1) whether Welch should have been granted habeas relief because his Florida prior conviction did not fall within the physical force category, in which case he would be ineligible for sentencing under the ACCA; and (2) whether the Johnson decision should be applied retroactively to Welch's case.
The question of the retroactivity of a novel Supreme Court interpretation arose earlier in the Court's term in Montgomery v. Louisiana.179 There, the Court pointed out that under the Teague doctrine, a ground-breaking Supreme Court interpretation (a "new rule") may be applied retroactively to a habeas petitioner when the new rule finds either the crime of conviction or the penalty imposed substantively unconstitutional.180 Welch argues that he is entitled to retroactive habeas relief because the Johnson Court found unconstitutional the ACCA residual category that was the basis for his prior conviction.181
The government agrees to the extent that the conviction was for an offense qualifying under the residual category, but asks the Court resolve an issue that has arisen under a conflicting decision out of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, In re Williams.182 The Williams court declined to apply Johnson retroactively because it believed that Congress could cure the vagueness defect in ACCA's residual category.183
The Court also agreed to consider whether Welch's prior Florida conviction qualified under the ACCA's physical force category. Welch contends that the "sudden snatching" statute under which he was convicted does not include the physical force element necessary to qualify under the ACCA's physical force category.184 The government argues that he was convicted under a statute that in fact has a physical force element.185 The government suggests that the case be returned to the Eleventh Circuit to address the issue.186
Regardless of how the Supreme Court resolves the issues, Congress is likely to remove the now extraneous residual category187 from the ACCA.
Question: Whether a predicate prior conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(1), must qualify as such under the elements of the offense simpliciter, without extending the modified categorical approach to separate statutory a definitional provisions that merely establish the means by which reference elements may be satisfied rather than stating alternative elements or versions of the offense.
Interpretation of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) has bedeviled the courts almost since its enactment. The ACCA sets a 15-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for defendants guilty of certain firearms offenses if they have three prior state or federal serious drug or violent felony convictions.188 It defines violent felony to include any felony "that ... (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."189 Last year in Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court found the residual clause ("or otherwise involves ... ") unconstitutionally vague.190 This year in Mathis v. United States,191 it will consider the question of when a state burglary conviction is an ACCA burglary conviction. The case turns on application of the Court's decisions in Taylor v. United States192 and Descamps v. United States.193
In its Taylor decision, the Supreme Court stated that the term "burglary" in the ACCA means generic burglary, that is, burglary as commonly understood, a crime involving "unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime."194 The statute of prior conviction determines whether a defendant was convicted of such conduct. Some statutes, however, define burglary in the alternative; proscribing some conduct which matches the generic description and some that does not. For example, some statutes include cars and boats along with buildings and structures as the location of the crime of burglary.195 In which case, the courts are said to take a "modified categorical approach" which means that a prior state burglar conviction constitutes a 'burglary' conviction (1) if the elements of the state statute corresponded to the elements of generic burglary or (2) when the state statute exhibits alternative sets of elements – one qualifying, another not – if "the charging paper and jury instructions actually required the [state] jury to find all of the elements of generic burglary in order to convict the defendant." 196
In its Descamps decision, the Supreme Court stated that recourse to the charging documents, jury instructions, and the like (the charging documents) was only permissible when the statute of prior conviction could be divided into a set of qualifying and a set of nonqualifying offenses.197 Such recourse was not permissible if the statute had a single set of elements, that is, if it was not divisible.198 For example, the statute at issue in Descamps outlawed entry into a building with intent to commit a crime.199 It implied but did not state alternative offenses – unlawful entry into a building with intent to commit a crime and lawful entry into a building with intent to commit a crime. Consequently, it was not divisible; courts could not look the charging documents to determine under which alternative Descamps had been convicted; and it did not qualify as an ACCA burglary conviction.200
Mathis was convicted of firearm possession by a felon.201 He was sentenced under the ACCA on the basis of five Iowa burglar convictions.202 The Iowa burglary statute matches the generic description, but the Iowa criminal code contains a generally applicable definition of "occupied structure" which includes cars and boats as well as buildings.203 The trial court and U.S. Court of Appeals found the Iowa statute divisible and concluded that the charging documents established that Mathis had been convicted under a set of statutory elements that corresponded to the generic description of burglary.204
Mathis's arguments before the Supreme Court are the same ones he unsuccessful urged upon the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. First, the Iowa burglary statute is not divisible.205 Therefore, the Supreme Court's precedents do not allow recourse to the charging documents.206 Like the Descamps statute, it implies rather than states alternative offenses, one of which is ACCA qualified and other of which is not.207 Second, the Court's precedents draw a distinction between the statutory elements of a prior conviction and the facts or means surrounding the conduct that lead to conviction.208 The burglary statute does not make the type of location an element.209 It encompasses both permissible locations and impermissible locations.210 It is a fact or means of committed the offense, like the lawful or unlawful means of entry in Descamps.211
The Eighth Circuit dismissed Mathis' arguments as essentially an elements/means argument, foreclosed by a statement in Descamps: "Whatever a statute lists (whether elements or means), the [chagrining] documents we approved in Taylor and Shepard ... would reflect the crime's elements."212 The Eighth Circuit acknowledged disagreement among the lower federal appellate courts over the element/means question and the question of whether a statute of prior conviction may be considered divisible by virtue of statutory provisions, or perhaps other statements of law, found elsewhere.213
The trio of Fourth Amendment cases presents questions on the exclusionary rule, the warrant requirement for sobriety tests, and qualified official immunity in the face of use of excessive force allegations.
Question: Should evidence seized incident to a lawful arrest on an outstanding warrant be suppressed because the warrant was discovered during an investigatory stop later found to be unlawful?
Welch was convicted of unlawful possession of firearm.167 The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida sentenced him under the ACCA on the basis of three state robbery convictions.168 On appeal, he contended that one of the prior convictions did not qualify as an ACCA predicate conviction, under either the residual or the elements clause.169 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the sentence on the basis of the residual clause and found it unnecessary to address the elements clause argument.170 Some years later, Welch sought collateral review under the federal statutory counterpart of habeas corpus.171 The district court denied his petition.172 No sooner had the Eleventh Circuit denied him the certificate of appeal ability necessary for further review then the Supreme Court held the residual clause unconstitutionally vague in Johnson.173 The Court granted Welch's petition for certiorari to determine whether Johnson should be applied retroactively.174 The Court ultimately concluded it should but returned the case to the Eleventh Circuit to determine whether Welch's state robbery conviction qualified for ACCA sentencing under the elements clause.175 Justice Kennedy, writing for the seven members of the majority of the Court, pointed out that the retroactivity of a decision like Johnson, which announces a novel constitutional interpretation (a new rule), is governed by the Teague doctrine.176 The doctrine is calculated, in the interests of finality, to encourage resolution of a prisoner's constitutional challenges on direct appeal rather than waiting to raise them for the first time on collateral review.177 The doctrine bars federal collateral review to announce or apply a new rule.178 There are two exceptions, one substantive and one procedural. The procedural exception exists when the new rule constitutes a "watershed" rule in criminal procedure, one that "implicat[es] the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding."179 Gideon v. Wainwright is one of the frequently cited, rarely occurring examples of the procedural exception.180 The substantive exception exists when the new rule "alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes."181 Johnson is an example of the substantive exception.182 Justice Kennedy explained that "[b]y striking down the residual clause as void for vagueness, Johnson changed the substantive reach of the Armed Career Criminal Act, altering 'the range of conduct or the class of persons that the [Act] punishes.'"183 He reasoned that "[b]efore Johnson, the Act applied to any person who possessed a firearm after three violent felony convictions, even if one or more of those convictions fell under only the residual clause. An offender in that situation faced 15 years to life in prison."184 In contrast, "[a]fter Johnson, the same person engaging in the same conduct is no longer subject to the Act…."185 The lone dissenter, Justice Thomas, argued that the case was not ready for the Supreme Court review and "undermin[ed] any principled limitation on the finality of federal convictions."186 Holding: "To determine whether a past conviction [qualifies as an ACCA predicate conviction], courts compare the elements of the crime of conviction with the elements of the 'generic' version of the [ACCA's] listed offenses—i.e., the offense as commonly understood…. [O]ur decisions have held that the prior crime qualifies as an ACCA predicate if, but only if, its elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense. The question in this case is whether the ACCA makes an exception to that rule when a defendant is convicted under a statute that lists multiple alternative means of satisfying one (or more) of its elements. We decline to find such an exception."187 The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) sets a 15-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for defendants, guilty of certain firearms offenses, who have three prior state or federal serious drug or violent felony convictions.188 The statute defines the term violent felony to include burglary.189 Burglary, in the ACCA, said the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, means generic burglary—that is, burglary as commonly understood, a crime involving "unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime."190 Conviction under a state burglary statute qualifies as an ACCA predicate conviction only when the state crime's "elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense."191 Mathis was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm.192 He was sentenced under the ACCA on the basis of five Iowa burglary convictions.193 He questioned whether his Iowa burglary convictions qualified as ACCA burglary convictions. The Iowa burglary statute matched the elements of the generic crime of "burglary": unlawful entry into a building or structure with the intent to commit a crime.194 Elsewhere, however, the Iowa criminal code provided a binding definition of the "building or structure" element to include cars, boats, and planes.195 Mathis argued that the Iowa burglary convictions were not ACCA qualifying convictions. The United States District Court and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed.196 The Supreme Court reversed.197 Whether a state burglary conviction qualifies as an ACCA burglary conviction is a matter of elements: "A crime counts as 'burglary' under the Act if its elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense," wrote Justice Kagan for the Court.198 Conversely, "if the crime of conviction covers any more conduct than the generic offense, then it is not an ACCA 'burglary.'"199 The Iowa statute "enumerates various factual means of committing a single element" when it "itemizes the various places that crime could occur as disjunctive factual scenarios rather than separate elements."200 As the Iowa Supreme Court observed, the Iowa statute sets out "'alternative methods' of committing one offense, so that a jury need not agree whether the burgled location was a building ... or vehicle."201 This makes it broader than the generic offense that does not encompass unlawful entry into a vehicle to commit a crime. "Because the elements of Iowa's burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary, Mathis's convictions under that law cannot give rise to an ACCA sentence."202 Two concurring members of the Court offered less-than-ringing endorsements of the four-Justice main opinion. Justice Kennedy wrote that the "opinion is required by its precedents," with which he disagrees.203 Those precedents, he observed, are matters of statutory construction that Congress is free to wash away by amending the ACCA.204 He declared, moreover, that "continued congressional inaction in the face of a system that each year proves more unworkable should require this Court to revisit its precedents in an appropriate case."205 Justice Thomas was only slightly more enthusiastic: "I join the Court's opinion, which faithfully applies our precedents" and which "avoids further extending its precedents."206 Justices Breyer and Ginsburg dissented because they believed the federal court should have been allowed to examine the charging documents relating to Mathis's Iowa convictions to determine if the jury there was required to find all the elements of generic burglary.207 Justice Alito in dissent would go even further and allow the federal court to examine the entire record of prior proceedings, not merely those that identify what the jury must have found.208 The trio of Fourth Amendment cases presents questions on the exclusionary rule, the warrant requirement for sobriety tests, and qualified official immunity in the face of use of excessive force allegations. Holding: The attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule "applies when an officer makes an unconstitutional investigatory stop; learns during that stop that the suspect is subject to a valid arrest warrant; and proceeds to arrest the suspect and seize incriminating evidence during a search incident to that arrest."209The national debate over policing practices stemming from the deaths of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri and Freddie Gray in Baltimore, Maryland (and other police-related deaths),214 has made its way to the Supreme Court in Utah v. Strieff—a case about evidence suppression in criminal proceedings.215 The novel question before the Court is164 The Supreme Court declared the ACCA's residual category unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States.165 Here, the Court held Johnson retroactively applicable.166
216212
The judicially created exclusionary rule requires the suppression of evidence obtained through illegal searches or seizures, as well as evidence later obtained as a result of the earlier Fourth Amendment violation—the so-called "fruit of the poisonous tree."217213 However, this rule will be applied only if a court concludes that suppression would deterdeter future police misconduct and that the potential deterrence outweighs potential costs, such as releasing a criminal into the public.218214 Therefore, not all illegally obtained evidence—and derivative evidence—will be excluded. For example, under the attenuation doctrine, a court will not suppress evidence obtained subsequent to an illegal search or seizure if "the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'"219215 To determine whether the intervening event was sufficiently independent of the illegal act to warrant the evidence's admission, courts balance three factors: (1) the temporal proximity of the illegal police activity and the discovery of evidence; (2) the intervening event; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct.220216 The Court in Strieff is reviewingreviewed whether evidence obtained from a search incident to a lawful arrest on an outstanding arrest warrant, discovered from a warrant check (the alleged intervening event) during an illegal investigatory stop, falls under the attenuation doctrine and thus should be admissible.
In Strieff, the police department in Salt Lake City, Utah, received an anonymous tip that there was ongoing drug activity at a house, after which Officer Doug Fackrell surveilled the house intermittently for approximately three hours total over a weeklong period.221217 During that time, Officer Fackrell observed short-term traffic at the house, which he believed was consistent with drug activity.222218 When the officer saw Edward Strieff leave the house, he questioned him and asked him to produce his ID.223219 Officer Fackrell then ran a warrant check and discovered that Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant for failing to pay a traffic ticket and searched his body incident to arrest.224220 The search uncovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, and Strieff subsequently was prosecuted for a drug crime.225221
At the suppression hearing, the state conceded that the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment because Officer Fackrell did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and interrogate Strieff.226222 Therefore, the dispute focused on whether the officer's discovery of the outstanding warrant sufficiently attenuated the illegal stop from the discovery of the drugs and paraphernalia.227223 The trial court concluded that it did and denied the motion to suppress.228224 The Utah Supreme Court reversed, however, concluding that only the defendant's voluntary conduct—not police conduct (here, discovering the outstanding warrant)—can attenuate evidence obtained from illegal searches and seizures.229
Neither party, however, appearsappeared to agree with the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of the attenuation doctrine, and on appeal to the Supreme Court both Utah and Strieff focusfocused on the flagrancy portion of the three-part attenuation analysis.230226 For example, Utah (with the support of the United States) argued that an arrest warrant that had been issued previously by a neutral and detached magistrate judge should erase the taint of an illegal stop (during which the warrant was discovered) so long as the stop was not "flagrant," and in this case, the state contendscontended, it was not.231227 Conversely, Strieff contendscontended that police activity is flagrant when, as in this case, an officer runs a warrant check during a stop when there is no reasonable suspicion or articulable fear for the officer's safety.232228
Notably, in response to these arguments at oral argument, the Court pondered whether there should be a subjective component (atypical inin Fourth Amendment jurisprudence233))229 to the flagrancy portion of the analysis, where a court would ask whether the officer was exploiting the system to obtain evidence of other crimes.234230 Justice Kagan asserted that this potentially could deter illegal stops because, in some jurisdictions, "[i]f you know that there is a significant possibility that somebody you stop is going to have an arrest warrant, that's another reason to stop them."235231 On the other hand, Justice Alito stressed the costs associated with ruling for Strieff, pointing out that it would be "an unusual and unprecedented result" to suppress the fruit of a lawful search, and thus a defendant ought to present "strong circumstances" to justify suppression.236 Accordingly, the rule the Court announces will likely hinge on its cost-deterrence analysis. A ruling for the government could prove to be a potential boon for law enforcement, especially in communities with large segments of the population that have outstanding warrants.
Question: Whether, in the absence of a warrant, a State may make it a crime for a person to refuse to take a chemical test to detect the presence of alcohol in the person's blood.
The Supreme Court has agreed to review and has consolidated three cases that address the Fourth Amendment question of the circumstances under which police who having made an arrest for drunk driving, may conduct a warrantless sobriety test. The three are Birchfield v. North Dakota;237 Bernard v. Minnesota;238 and Beylund v. Levi.239
Birchfield drove his car into a ditch.240 When the police arrived, Birchfield's speech was slurred; he was unsteady on his feet; and he smelled of alcohol.241 He agreed to a breathalyzer test after he was informed that if he refused he could lose his license and might be prosecuted for the failure to comply.242 When he failed the test, the officer arrested him and took him to a hospital for a blood test, which Birchfield refused to allow.243 Birchfield pleaded guilty to a class B misdemeanor for the refusal, but he reserved the right to appeal the Fourth Amendment issue.244 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.245
Bernard's truck became stuck when he tried to pull a boat out of the water.246 The police arrived in response to a complaint of public drunkenness.247 Bernard smelled of alcohol.248 He assured officers that he had not driven the truck although the keys were in his hand at the time.249 He refused to take a field sobriety test and was arrested.250 He refused to take a breathalyzer test at the police station and was criminally charged for the refusal.251 The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision not to dismiss the charges stemming from Bernard's refusal to agree to the test.252
Beylund was arrested after police saw him driving erratically.253 He agreed to a blood test after he was told the criminal penalties for the refusal and for drunk driving were the same.254 He subsequently challenged the suspension of his driver's license.255 The North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the action.256
The Fourth Amendment,257 in conjunction with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,258 prohibits unreasonable governmental searches and seizures.259 A search or seizure is not unreasonable when conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate upon a finding of probable cause.260 The Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the warrant requirement. One occurs when the subject of law enforcement attention consents to the search or seizure.261 A second consists of a search incident to a lawful arrest.262 A third occurs when evidence must be seized immediately or it will be lost.263 A fourth exception is somewhat open-ended – it exists when the Court, after balancing individual privacy interests against governmental interests does not consider a particular search unreasonable.264
States have sought to take advantage of each of these exceptions in their efforts to curb drunk driving. They have enacted implied consent statutes under which drivers are said to consent to sobriety tests as a condition for receiving a driver's license.265 States often supplemented these provisions with laws that make it a crime to refuse to consent to a sobriety test.266 Their courts have concluded that a sobriety test may be conducted incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving.267 The Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber v. California stands for the proposition that a sobriety test may be conducted in the context of a traffic accident when emergency conditions indicate that evidence of an arrested driver's blood alcohol level might otherwise be lost.268 Finally, the courts have sometimes concluded that the government's interest in highway safety outweighs individual privacy interests, particularly in the case of field sobriety tests which are less intrusive.269
The Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. McNeely signaled that the Court was inclined to reconsider the law in the area.270 There, the Court held that the dissipation of alcohol in the blood is not a per se justification for a warrantless sobriety test.271 In Birchfield and its companion cases, the Court has agreed to consider "[w]hether, in the absence of a warrant, a State may make it a crime for a person to refuse to take a chemical test to detect the presence of alcohol in the person's blood."
Birchfield and company argue that (1) the consent from implied consent statutes is not Fourth Amendment consent since it is involuntary, precludes assessment of the totality of the circumstances, and does not permit consent to be withdrawn – all trademarks of Fourth Amendment consent; (2) the "unconstitutional constraints doctrine" invalidates consent secured in exchange for surrendering a governmental benefit; (3) the cases do not qualify for the incident to arrest exception because they cannot be justified under either the officer safety or the preservation of evidence grounds upon which the exception is based; and (4) the intrusiveness of a blood test balanced against the minimal inconvenience associated with securing a warrant renders a warrantless search unreasonable.272
The States respond that (1) the fact that the implied consent statute offers a driver difficult choices does not make it coercive or his consent any less voluntary; (2) the "unconstitutional constraints doctrine" arises in the context of First and Fifth Amendment rights and is not a good fit in this Fourth Amendment context; (3) there is not "a single case anywhere in the country that holds that a warrantless breath test is not permissible under the search-incident-to-a-valid-arrest exception;" and (4) the implied consent feature is reasonable because on balance it is in the interest of highway safety, stands as an alternative to an intrusive search to which the petitioners object, and avoids physical confrontations between police and drivers unwilling to cooperate.273
The Supreme Court ultimately held, in a 5-3 decision, that the discovery of the warrant was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop that the evidence discovered incident to Strieff's arrest was admissible. Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas concluded that Officer Fackrell, in making the illegal stop, "was at most negligent," not flagrant.233 The Court rejected the notion that "this unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct."234 Rather, the Court concluded, "all the evidence suggests that the stop was an isolated instance of negligence that occurred in connection with a bona fide investigation of a suspected drug house."235 But the dissent criticized the majority for characterizing such officer behavior as "isolated instance[s] of negligence," noting that it is widespread practice in many localities to stop citizens and run warrant checks, which is especially problematic, according to Justice Sotomayor, given that outstanding warrants for minor offenses like traffic tickets are "surprisingly common."236 In another dissent, Justice Kagan echoed Justice Sotomayor's concerns, contending that the majority's ruling will increase an officer's incentive to violate the Constitution by giving law enforcement a green light to stop persons without reasonable suspicion, knowing that "[s]o long as the target is one of the many millions of people in this country with an outstanding arrest warrant, anything the officer finds in a search is fair game for use in a criminal prosecution."237 Holding: In the absence of a warrant, "a breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving," and "motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense." 238 In Birchfield, the Supreme Court consolidated three cases that address the Fourth Amendment question of the circumstances under which police who, having made an arrest for drunk driving, may conduct a warrantless sobriety test. The three are Birchfield v. North Dakota,239 Bernard v. Minnesota,240 and Beylund v. Levi.241 Birchfield drove his car into a ditch.242 When the police arrived, Birchfield's speech was slurred, he was unsteady on his feet, and he smelled of alcohol.243 He agreed to a breathalyzer test after he was informed that if he refused he could lose his license and might be prosecuted for the failure to comply.244 When he failed the test, the officer arrested him and took him to a hospital for a blood test, which Birchfield refused to allow.245 Birchfield pleaded guilty to a class B misdemeanor for the refusal, but he reserved the right to appeal the Fourth Amendment issue.246 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.247 Bernard's truck became stuck when he tried to pull a boat out of the water.248 The police arrived in response to a complaint of public drunkenness.249 Bernard smelled of alcohol.250 He assured officers that he had not driven the truck although the keys were in his hand at the time.251 He refused to take a field sobriety test and was arrested.252 He refused to take a breathalyzer test at the police station and was criminally charged for the refusal.253 The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision not to dismiss the charges stemming from Bernard's refusal to agree to the test.254 Beylund was arrested after police saw him driving erratically.255 He agreed to a blood test after he was told the criminal penalties for the refusal and for drunk driving were the same.256 He subsequently challenged the suspension of his driver's license.257 The North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the action.258 The Fourth Amendment,259 in conjunction with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,260 prohibits unreasonable governmental searches and seizures.261 A search or seizure is not unreasonable when conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate upon a finding of probable cause.262 The Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the warrant requirement. One occurs under exigent circumstances when evidence must be seized immediately or it will be lost.263 A second consists of a search incident to a lawful arrest.264 A third occurs when the subject of law enforcement attention consents to the search or seizure.265 Justice Alito, the author of the opinion for the Court, began with the exigent circumstance exception. He noted the McNeely holding "that the natural dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream does not always constitute an exigency justifying the warrantless taking of a blood sample," but stated that the existence of an exigency exception "depend[s] on all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case."266 Justice Alito then addressed the incident to arrest exception. Here too he found answers in the Court's recent pronouncements. In Riley, the Court had explained that incident to arrest claims are weighed by measuring "the degree to which they intrude upon an individual's privacy and the degree to which they are needed for the promotion of legitimate government interests."267 He concluded that under such a measure breath tests qualified for the exception, but blood tests did not. "A breath test does not 'implicate significant privacy concerns.' Blood tests are a different matter.... Blood tests are significantly more intrusive, and their reasonableness must be judged in light of the availability of the less invasive alternative for a breath test."268 Thus, "[b]ecause breath tests are significantly less intrusive than blood tests and in most cases amply serve law enforcement interests, [Justice Alito] concluded that a [warrantless] breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving."269 Turning to the consent exception, Justice Alito acknowledged that the Court's "prior opinions have referred approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply."270 Yet in his mind, the prospect of criminal penalties carried blood tests beyond that to which a motorist could reasonably be said to have implicitly consented.271 As for Birchfield, Bernard, and Beylund, Birchfield's conviction, predicated upon a refusal to submit to a warrantless, and thus unlawful, blood test, had to be reversed.272 Bernard's conviction, predicated upon a refusal to submit to a warrantless, but lawful, breath test, remained in place.273 Beylund, who submitted to a blood test in the face of threatened criminal prosecution and suffered the civil and administrative consequences, saw his case returned to state court to determine whether his consent was voluntary.274The impact of the Court's decision will depend largely on the breadth of its opinion.232
Holding: "The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.. ... [E]xcessive force cases involving car chases reveal the hazy legal backdrop against which Mullenix acted.... [W]e ... reverse the Fifth Circuit's determination that Mullenix is not entitled to qualified immunity." 274
Amidst wide-spreadwidespread concern over police use of excessive force, the Supreme Court confirmed that under existing law police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability for the use of force in performance of their duties, except in those cases in which they should have known their conduct was unlawful.275
The issue arose in the context of a Texas state trooper who fired a rifle at a car involved in a high-speed chase, killing the driver.276280 The chase began when local police tried to arrest Israel Leija at a drive-in restaurant.277281 He fled onto the Interstate with troopers in pursuit.278282 In the course of his flight, which at times reached speeds of 110 miles per hour, Leija called the police dispatcher and threatened to shoot his pursuers unless they gave up the chase.279283
In order to stop Leija, police set out tire spikes on the approach to a highway underpass in his path.280284 Trooper Mullenix, situated on the top of the underpass, decided to try to shoot out the engine of Leija's car to stop him.281285 There is some dispute over whether Mullenix heard the radio dispatch from his supervisor suggesting that he wait to see if the tire spikes did the job first.282286 As the speeding car approached, Mullenix fired six shots.283287 The car hit the spikes and rolled over a couple of times.284288 Leija was dead with four shots in his upper body.285
Leija's family sued under federal civil rights laws pleading that Mullenix had used excessive force against Leija in violation of Leija's Fourth Amendment right to be free of an unreasonable seizure.286290 Mullenix asked the court to dismiss the case before trial on qualified immunity grounds, which shield law enforcement officers and other officials for performance of their official duties under some circumstances.287291 The U.S. district court refused.288292 Mullenix appealed.289293 The three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court.290
The panel pointed out that "the doctrine of qualified immunity shields 'government officials performing discretionary functions ... from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'"291295 The test is two-fold.292296 First, did the official violate a constitutional or statutory right?293297 Second, was the constitutional or statutory right so clearly established that the official must have known that it banned his conduct?294298
As for the first step, the panelpanel distinguished two recent Supreme Court cases whichthat had found qualified immunity warranted in cases involving police shootings to terminate a high-speed chase.295299 They felt that "the real inquiry is whether the fleeing suspect posed such a threat that the use of deadly force was justifiable," and that based only on the plaintiff's facts the use of deadly force was not justified.296300 On the second step, they concluded it was clearly established that an officer may only use deadly force against a fleeing suspect only when the suspect poses a threat of immediate, serious harm to others.297
Mullenix asked for a rehearing en banc. The Fifth Circuit denieddenied the request, but seven7 members of the nineteen19 judges on the Fifth Circuit disagreed.298
The Supreme Court in an 8-1, unsigned opinion agreed with Mullenix. Without reaching the Fourth Amendment first step, the Court concluded that any Fourth Amendment right was not clearly established.299303 The standard applied by the panel of the Fifth Circuit ("was the threat sufficient to justify the use of deadly force") was too general.300304 As for the more particularized inquiry, the "excessive force cases involving car chases reveal the hazy legal backdrop against which Mullenix acted."301
Justice Scalia agreed with the result but thought the law was not clearly established for a different reason.302306 In his mind, the car-chase cases cited by the Court involve the use of deadly force in order to make an arrest.303307 He felt that Mullenix should have been seen as a question of deadly force directed at the car rather than its driver.304308
Justice Sotomayor dissented.305309 She would have held that Mullenix "violated Leija's clearly established right to be free of intrusion absent some governmental interest," when he failed to wait to see if the tire spikes would disable Leija's car.306310 She also expressed a concern that "[b]y sanctioning a 'shoot first, think latterlater' approach to policing, the Court renders the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow."307
Question: Whether the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Federal Government are separate sovereigns for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.
Luis Sanchez Vallee sold a firearm to an undercover police officer.314 A Puerto Rican grand jury indicted him for violation of Puerto Rican law,315 and a federal grand jury indicted him for violating federal law for the same sale.316 Sanchez Valle pleaded guilty to the federal charges and moved to dismiss the Puerto Rican charges on double jeopardy grounds.317 The trial court granted the motion to dismiss.318 The Puerto Rican Court of Appeals reversed and was in turn reversed by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.319 Acquired by treaty after the Spanish-American War of 1898,309Holding: The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution bars the federal government and Puerto Rico from successively prosecuting a defendant on like charges for the same conduct.313
310321 The nature of the relationship between the United StatesU.S. territory and the federal government, however, remains the subject of a long-standing legal and political dispute.311322 Based in part on statutory language providing that the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States is "in the nature of a compact,"312323 arguments have been made that any change in Puerto Rico's political status must be consented to by both parties.313324 Others argue that, under the Territory Clause,314325 the United States has plenary authority to legislate regarding Puerto Rico without first obtaining the Puerto Rican government's consent.315
A case recently accepted by the Supreme Court will consider anew the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. 326
In Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle,316327 the Court willwas called upon to decide whether defendants in a criminal case can be prosecuted under the local laws of Puerto Rico if they have been previously convicted under federal criminal law for the same offense. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall "for the same offense ... be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."317328 Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, however, if two separate sovereigns prosecute a person for the same offense, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not triggered.318329 Thus, the Supreme Court has held that state and federal prosecutions can be brought for the same offense,319330 and similarly, it has allowed dual prosecutions by the federal government and Indian tribes.320331 The Court, however, has also held that, as territories operate under power delegated to them by Congress, they are not to be treated as separate sovereigns for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.321332
The case being considered bycame to the Court comes from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, the island's highest territorial court, which held, consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent, that since Puerto Rico is not a separate sovereign, it cannot prosecute a person who has been convicted in federal court for the same crime.322333 This decisionview, however, creates a conflictconflicted with an earlier opinion by the federal appellate court with jurisdiction over Puerto Rico, the United StatesU.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which held that Puerto Rico should be treated as a state for purposes of double jeopardy, allowing a person to be prosecuted for the same crime under Puerto Rican and federal laws.323334 There iswas also a long-standing circuit split between the First Circuit decision and an opinion by the United StatesU.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on this issue.324335
Puerto Rico, in its petition to the Court for a writ of certiorari, concedesconceded that the dual sovereignty doctrine has not previously been applied to a territory, but it arguesargued that the nature of Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States changed in 1950.325336 In that year, Congress passed P.L. 81-600 (Public Law 600), which contains the "compact" language noted above and whichthat allowed Puerto Rico to "organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their own adoption," subject to congressional approval. Puerto Rico arguesargued that when Congress subsequently approved its constitution, this approval established the sovereignty of Puerto Rico in much the same way that other territories have achieved statehood.326337 Puerto Rico analogizesanalogized this legislatively created sovereignty to the sovereignty of Indian tribes, and further notes instances where Puerto Rico has been treated as a state in statutory contexts.327338
The defendants, in their response to the petition, argueargued that the passage of Public Law 600 did not change the nature of the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States, noting Congress's retention of plenary authority to review Puerto Rico's constitution before it became effective.328339 Further, the defendants argueargued, the legislative history of Public Law 600 provided that nothing in the law would change Puerto Rico's political, social, and economic relationship to the United States.329 The defendants also cautioned the Supreme Court against accepting a case that appears likely to have political implications beyond the narrow legal questions raised in the petition.330 This latter argument appears to be a caution that the Court disregarded.
If the Court finds that Puerto Rico is not a separate sovereign, then this might bring into question prior convictions in the Puerto Rico courts where an individual was prosecuted in both federal and territorial courts for the same crime. If the Court finds that Puerto Rico is a separate sovereign, this would allow future prosecutions in both the federal and territorial courts for the same crime. Oral arguments were held on January 13, 2016.
The Court, speaking through Justice Kagan, concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not permit the two entities, the federal government and Puerto Rico, to successively prosecute the defendant for essentially the same crime.341 She began with the observation that the inquiry did "not probe whether a government possesses the usual attributes, or acts in the common manner, of a sovereign…. [but] whether [the prosecuting entities] draw their authority to punish the offender from distinct sources of power."342
She explained that, for example, "the States rely on 'authority originally belonging to them before admission to the Union and preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment.'"343 By the same token, "[o]riginally … 'the [Indian] tribes were self-governing sovereign political communities,' possessing … the 'inherent power to prescribe laws for their members and to punish infractions of those laws.'"344
In the case of Puerto Rico, Justice Kagan saw the question as: "Do the prosecutorial powers belonging to Puerto Rico and the Federal Government derive from whole independent sources?" She confirmed that with Public Law 600 and with the Commonwealth's subsequent adoption of a constitution, Puerto Rico underwent a profound political change.345 The question, however, was not about the change, but about the power to make the change.346 "Congress conferred the authority to create the Puerto Rico Constitution, which in turn confers the authority to bring criminal charges. That makes Congress the original source of power for Puerto Rico's prosecutors," Justice Kagan reminded the parties.347 When "an entity's authority to enact and enforce criminal law ultimately comes from Congress," she continued, "then it cannot follow a federal prosecution with its own. That is true of Puerto Rico, because Congress authorized and approved its Constitution, from which prosecutorial power now flows."348
The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico that the Double Jeopardy Clause's dual sovereign doctrine does not permit successive federal and Puerto Rico prosecutions for the "same offense."349
Justices Ginsburg and Thomas joined in the Court's opinion, but offered a concurring opinion to reflect their view that the dual sovereign doctrine seems at odds with the spirit of the Double Jeopardy Clause.350 Justice Thomas filed an individual concurrence in which he declined to join that portion of the Court's opinion that recited its Indian law-Double Jeopardy precedents.351
Justices Breyer and Sotomayor dissented, because they believe "for Double Jeopardy Clause purposes that the criminal law of Puerto Rico and the criminal law of the Federal Government do not find their legitimacy-conferring origin in the same 'source.'"352
The Court's Sixth Amendment cases this term offer a variety of issues ranging from speedy trial, to forfeiture and the right to counsel of choice, to the use of uncounseled convictions as predicate offenses.
Holding: "Pretrial restraint of legitimate, untainted assets needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment." (Plurality).
353The Supreme Court decided in a 4-1-3 opinion that the "pretrial restraint of legitimate, untainted assets needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment."354 Justice Breyer, in an opinion joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, based his conclusion on "the nature and importance of the constitutional right taken together with the nature of the assets" in the case.331355 Justice Thomas, who concurred in the judgment, based the same conclusion "strictly on the Sixth Amendment's text and common-law backdrop."332
Sila Luis was indicted for health care fraud.333357 The indictment also identified certain of Luis's assets as property generated by the offense.334358 The government initiated a civil forfeiture proceeding based on the grand jury's probable cause finding.335359 It also secured a pre-trial freeze order covering substitute assets ("property of equivalent value" to the tainted assets) not traceable to the tainted assets, after the court found that Luis had disposed of some of the tainted assets.336360 Luis argued before both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that she needneeded to substitute assets to pay her defense attorney and that as a consequence the freeze order violated her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.337361 The Eleventh Circuit held that her arguments were foreclosed by the Supreme Court's Monsanto, Caplin & Drysdale, and Kaley decisions.338362 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the constitutional issue.339363
The Court's Caplin & Drysdale andand Monsanto cases arose under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). The CSA authorizes the confiscation of tainted property traceable to a violation of its provisions. It also authorizes the confiscation of untainted property ("substitute assets") when the tainted property is unavailable. Moreover, it states that the U.S.United States acquires title to tainted property when the forfeiture-triggering offense is committed. And most pertinent here, it authorizes pre-trial restraining orders to prevent the dissipation of tainted and untainted assets.
The Caplin & Drysdale decision declared that "[w]hatever the full extent of the Sixth Amendment's protection of one's right to retain counsel of his choosing, that protection does not go beyond the individual's right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and assistance of counsel." Thus, it held "[a] defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person's money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are the only way that that defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his choice."
The Monsanto decision held that a judicial finding of probable cause to believe assets were tainted and therefore forfeitable was all that the Constitution required for a pre-trial restraining order barring disposal of the assets, even to pay attorneys' fees. The Kaley decision held that a grand jury's finding of probable cause was enough for a restraining order without the necessity of a judicial probable cause hearing.
Luis notesnoted that each of these cases involved tainted assets and that her case involvesinvolved untainted assets. She arguesargued that therefore the untainted assets she intendsintended to use to finance her criminal defense may not be frozen as a matter of Sixth Amendment right. Five of the Justices essentially agreed.
Justice Breyer reiterated that "the Sixth Amendment grants a defendant 'a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.'"340364 He agreed with Luis that fact that her frozen assets were untainted represented a critical departure from the Court's earlier cases.341365 He offered three reasons to conclude that the restraining order offended Luis's Sixth Amendment rights. First, Luis's constitutionally protected right to her counsel of choice carried greater weight than the government's interest in forfeiture and restitution.342366 Second, as a matter of legal history, seizure of untainted property prior to conviction was virtually unheard of.343367 Third, the government's position carried to its logical conclusion could sweep away a defendant's right to the assistance of a counsel of choice.344368
Justice Thomas agreed the Sixth Amendment barred pre-trial restraint of the defendant's untainted assets, but he would stop there. He declined to "endorse the plurality's atextual balancing analysis." 345369
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito in dissent, bemoaned the fact that the plurality's "unprecedented holding rewards criminals who hurry to spend, conceal, or launder stolen property by assuring them that they may use their own funds to pay for an attorney after they have dissipated the proceeds of their crime." 346370 Justice Kagan dissented because she believed the Court was bound by its Monsanto precedent.347371
Question: Whether theHolding: The Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause does not apply once a defendant has pleaded guilty or has been found guilty after a trial.372
Betterman v. Montana presented the question of 's Speedy Trial Clause applies to the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution, protecting a criminal defendant from inordinate delay in final disposition of his case?
The Supreme Court recently heard oral argument in Betterman v. Montana, which presents the question whether the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial applies through sentencing or, instead, ends once a conviction has been obtained.348373 The Sixth Amendment states that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,"349374 which the Court has described as a "fundamental right" that is "specifically affirmed in the Constitution."350375 The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause makes the Sixth Amendment binding on the states.351376 The right to a speedy trial is enforced, in part, by the Speedy Trial Act of 1984, as amended, which sets deadlines (with statutory exceptions) for federal courts to complete various stages of a criminal prosecution.352377 Montana has a corresponding constitutional right but no comparable statutory provision.353378 The consequence of denying this Sixth Amendment right to a defendant is having the charges against the accused dismissed.354379
Brandon Betterman was charged with bail jumping after failing to appear for his sentencing hearing for a domestic assault conviction in Montana.355380 Eventually, Betterman turned himself in, after which he was sentenced for the domestic assault charges; he remained in county jail (instead of being transferred to a state penitentiary to begin serving his sentence) during the criminal proceedings for the bail jumping charge.356381 Fourteen months passed between the date on which Betterman was arraigned for, and pleaded guilty to, the bail jumping charge (April 19, 2012) and his sentencing hearing (June 27, 2013).357382 While he awaited sentencing, Betterman moved to dismiss the bail jumping charge after nine months had passed since his guilty plea, contending that the delay in sentencing violated his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment.358383 The trial court denied that motion, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed.359384
One of Betterman's principal arguments for why the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause should apply until sentencing concludes centers on the Framers' intent and the text and history of the Clause.360385 Yet with Justice Scalia no longer on the bench, it iswas hard to predict how those rationales willwould factor into the Court's analysis. According to Betterman, when the Framers penned the Bill of Rights, criminal proceedings were "unitary," and so when using the word "trial" in the Amendment's text, the Framers "adopted protections encompassing not just the petit jury stage but also the sentence and judgment that followed."361386 Montana disputes Betterman's contention, and adds that the Amendment's text, which affords a right to the "accused"—not the convicted—lends support to the conclusion that the right does not continue through sentencing.362387 The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) filed an amicus brief in support of Betterman, bringing a human-impact hook for the Court to consider. According to the NACDL, many prisoners, like Betterman, spend long periods in jail awaiting trial, but those facilities are often overcrowded and ill-equipped to handle extended stays, preventing prisoners from accessing adequate medical care and various rehabilitation programs.363388 Thus, the NACDL argues, applying the right to sentencing proceedings could reduce the amount of time in, and allegedly oppressive consequences of, state jail stays.364
If the Court were to conclude that the Sixth's Amendment's right to a speedy trial includes a defendant's sentencing phase, the result would impact both state and federal criminal justice systems. Congress might amend the Speedy Trial Act, or enact separate legislation, that would include deadlines for sentencing to ensure federal compliance with the newly construed Sixth Amendment.
Question: Whether reliance on valid uncounseled tribal-court misdemeanor convictions to prove 18 U.S.C § 117(a)'s predicate offense element violates the Constitution.
Can a five-year federal felony charge be based on tribal misdemeanor convictions for which the defendant had no attorney ("uncounseled convictions)? The federal appellate courts have come up with conflicting answers. At the heart of the matter is the fact that "reasonable decision-makers may differ in their conclusions as to whether the Sixth Amendment precludes a federal court's subsequent use of convictions that are valid because and only because they arose in a [tribal] court where the Sixth Amendment did not apply."365 The Supreme Court has agreed to review the issue in United States v. Bryant.366
The Supreme Court was unpersuaded by Betterman's arguments and unanimously held that the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause does not apply once a defendant has pleaded guilty or been found guilty after trial.390 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, noted that the Speedy Trial Clause helps protect the accused's presumption of innocence by "'prevent[ing] undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial ... and ... limit[ing] the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.'"391 But that protection, the Court clarified, "loses force upon conviction."392 Additionally, the Court reasoned that its conclusion fits with the historical understanding of the right to a speedy trial, noting that the Framers believed that "a presumptively innocent person should not languish under an unresolved charge," and thus the language chosen—guaranteeing a right to the "accused"—was purposeful and distinct from the convicted.393 Moreover, the Court added that "[t]he sole remedy for a violation of the speedy trial right—dismissal of the charges—fits the preconviction focus of the Clause" because, the Court reasoned, "it would be an unjustified windfall, in most cases, to remedy sentencing delay by vacating validly obtained convictions."394 Still, the Court noted that a defendant who experiences "inordinate delay in sentencing" possibly may be able to seek relief through the Due Process Clause—an issue that Betterman did not raise,395 but which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Sotomayor noted in separate concurrence.396
United States v. BryantHolding: Reliance on valid uncounseled tribal-court misdemeanor convictions to prove 18 U.S.C. Section 117(a)'s predicate offense element violates neither the Sixth Amendment nor the Due Process Clause.397
The federal domestic assault by an habitual offender law makes it a crime punishable by imprisonment for up to five years to commit domestic violence within Indian country or U.S. territorial jurisdiction if the offender has at least two prior federal, state, or tribal convictions for a comparable offense.367398 As a general rule, the Constitution assures indigent defendants the right to an appointed attorney in any criminal case where a term of imprisonment is imposed.368399 Indian defendants in tribal courts, however, enjoy no such constitutional assurance.369
Bryant, a tribal member and reservation resident, had been convicted in tribal court of domestic violence on a number of occasions.370401 He had been imprisoned more than once as a consequence, although always for less than a year.371402 When he was indicted under the federal domestic violence law, he asked the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana to dismiss the charges.372403 He argued that the Sixth Amendment did not permit use of his uncounseled tribal court convictions as proof of an element of the federal domestic violence offense.373404 The district court refused to dismiss.374405 The Ninth Circuit reversed.375reversed.406 It felt bound by its earlier decision in United States v. Ant decision and was unconvinced by later developments.376407 It concluded that "[b]ecause Bryant's tribal court domestic abuse convictions would have violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had they been obtained in federal or state court, using them to establish an element of the offense in a subsequent [federal] prosecution is constitutionally impermissible."377408
The Ant decision held that the Sixth Amendment barred the evidence of a defendant's uncounseled tribal court guilty plea in a parallel federal prosecution.378409 Soon thereafter, however, the Supreme Court observed in the course of its Duro v. Reina opinion that in proceedings against tribal members, a tribal court was not bound by the Bills of Rights; —and that even when reinforced by the Indian Civil Rights Act, there was no right to appointed counsel in tribal courts.379410 Still later, the Supreme Court in Nichols declared "an uncounseled [state] misdemeanor conviction[] valid ... because no prison term was imposed," and "also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent [federal] conviction."380411
The Ninth Circuit saw no incompatibility between Ant and Nichols because "even after Nichols, uncounseled convictions that resulted in imprisonment generally could not be used in subsequent prosecutions."381412 As the Ninth Circuit conceded, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits saw it differently.382413 For them, the lesson from Nichols was not why uncounseled convictions were valid, but that the reason didn't matter as long as they were valid convictions: "The ultimate question ... is whether an uncounseled conviction resulting in a tribal incarceration that involved no actual constitutional violation may be used later in federal court.... As per Nichols, then, we believe it is necessary to accord substantial weight to the fact that [the defendant's] prior convictions involved no actual constitutional violation" because the Sixth Amendment does not apply in tribal court.383
The Supreme Court agreed. Justice Ginsburg pointed out in the opinion for the Court that "Bryant's tribal-court convictions ... infringed no constitutional right because the Sixth Amendment does not apply to tribal-court proceedings."415 What counted for Sixth Amendment purposes was that Bryant enjoyed the full advantage of counsel at his subsequent federal Section 117 trial.416 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg observed, echoing sentiments expressed below, "It would be 'odd to say that conviction untainted by a violation of the Sixth Amendment triggers a violation of that same amendment when it's used in a subsequent case where the defendant's right to appointed counsel is fully respected.'"417 Bryant fared no better with his argument that the want of counsel in tribal court undermined the validity of tribal convictions, triggering a due process bar to their use in later federal criminal proceedings. Not so, said Justice Ginsburg. The panoply of statutory rights guaranteed there "sufficiently ensure the reliability of tribal-court convictions."418 Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.419 He agreed the Court's precedents dictated the result.420 He continued, however, to question the validity of those earlier pronouncements.421 Holding: Failure to anticipate that the Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis would be discredited did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.422 In its first opinion of the 2015 term, Maryland v. Kulbicki, the Court reversed per curiam and unanimously, a decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals.423 Kulbicki had been convicted of first degree murder, based in part on the testimony of a forensic expert whose testimony relied on a so-called Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis (CBLA).424 Some years later, Maryland's highest court declared Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis unreliable.425 Kulbicki filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging both the reliability of the analysis and the effectiveness of his attorney's cross-examination of the forensic expert.426 The trial court denied the petition.427 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed.428 Then, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed based upon counsel's failure to unearth and exploit a report that cast doubt on the analysis.429 The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals.430 The Sixth Amendment, made binding on the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, assures the criminally accused of the effective assistance of counsel.431 The assistance of counsel is constitutionally ineffective when counsel's "performance is deficient, meaning his errors are 'so serious' that he no longer functions as 'counsel,' and prejudicial, meaning his errors deprive the defendant of a fair trial.432The Supreme Court's decision may have implications for the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA 2013), which expanded tribal criminal jurisdiction in cases of domestic violence to include non-Indians in some instances.384414
Capital punishment cases represent the lion's share of the Court's sentencing cases this term. However, the class also includes the matter of the retroactive application of Miller v. Alabama's prohibition on a life without parole sentence for murder by a juvenile and the harmless error standard in sentencing cases.
Holding: The United States Supreme Court has "jurisdiction to decide whether the Supreme Court of Louisiana correctly refused to give retroactive effect to ... Miller."
"Miller's prohibition on mandatory life without parole for juveniles [without] the opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption" applies retroactively even in state collateral review proceedings.385436
Early in the year, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the previously announced ban on mandatory life imprisonment for juvenile crimes must apply to crimes committed before the ban.386437 The case, Montgomery v. Louisiana, has several distinctive aspects. First, it grants a 69-year -old inmate relief based on a sentence imposed for a murder that occurred when he was 17.387438 Second, it departs from a tradition under which ground breakinggroundbreaking Court decisions rarely travel back to long finalized cases. Third, it uses the so-called Teague388439 doctrine as a vehicle, even though the doctrine was heretofore only invoked to limit state prisoner access to federal habeas corpus review. Finally, its burdens fall most heavily upon the states because federal juvenile prosecutions are few, and federal murder prosecutions are even more uncommon.
If the particulars of the Court's disposal of the case were somewhat unusual, the result was probably not totally unexpected. The Court had already stated that the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause would not permit: (1) use of the death penalty for a murder committed by a juvenile;389440 (2) a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for an offense other than murder committed by a juvenile;390441 or (3) a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a murder committed by a juvenile.391
At 17 years of age in 1963, Montgomery killed a deputy sheriff.392443 He was sentenced to life in prison with no chance of parole, the only sentence available when the jury declined to vote for the death penalty.393444 He asked the Louisiana courts to toss out his sentence when its constitutional defects become apparent after Miller.394445 They refused on the ground that the Supreme Court's decisions have not been carried back to the cases of inmates like Montgomery whose appeals had long since become final.395
State prisoners may ask for review of their convictions or sentences in three stages. First, they may appeal their convictions or sentences in state court ("direct review"). Second, they may ask their state courts to overturn their convictions or sentences under a post-appeal procedure available in each of the states ("collateral review"). Finally, they may ask the federal courts to overturn their convictions or sentences under federal habeas corpus procedures.
Montgomery was at the second stage. Had he been at the third stage, the federal habeas corpus stage, he would have encountered the Teague doctrine. The doctrine, so named for the Supreme Court case in which it was first stated, Teague v. Lane, seeks finality.396447 It provides that federal habeas corpus review is not available to consider an inmate's request for a "new rule," that is, a ground breakinggroundbreaking constitutional interpretation.397448 The doctrine has two exceptions.398449 It does not apply to substantive new rules that void a previously valid crime or penalty.399450 And, it does not apply when the new rule is a "watershed" decision, one that "implicat[es] the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding."400451
The Supreme Court in Montgomery decided to apply Teague's exception to the second stage, the stage at which Montgomery found himself: "when a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give retroactive effect to that rule." In the eyes of the Court, the Miller decision is such a rule; it voided a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a murder committed by a juvenile who was denied the opportunity to prove that he was not irreparably corrupted.401452 The Court returned Montgomery's case to Louisiana with the option either to resentence him or to make him eligible for parole.402
Justice Thomas in dissent disagreed with the Court's jurisdictional assessment that the case involved a federal constitutional issue rather than a matter of state law.403454 Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, objected to "ripping Teague's first exception from its moorings, [and] converting an equitable rule governing federal habeas relief to a constitutional command governing state courts as well."404455
Congress is free to change the result. The Court's appellate jurisdiction is a matter of statute, but the statute has been amended only infrequently.
Question: When a district court incorrectly calculates a defendant's guidelines range, should an appellate court applying plain-error review presume that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights?
The Supreme Court recently heard argument on whether a federal court of appeals, when applying plain-error review, should presume—subject to rebuttal—that a defendant's substantial rights are affected when the district court incorrectly calculates the defendant's sentencing range under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.405Holding: When "the record is silent as to what the district court might have done had it considered the correct Guidelines range," as was the case here, "the court's reliance on an incorrect range in most instances will suffice to show an effect on the defendant's substantial rights" when conducting plain-error review. And when the defendant's original sentence had fallen within both the incorrect and correct Guidelines sentencing ranges, courts cannot require, as the Fifth Circuit had, defendants to provide additional evidence that the sentencing outcome would have been different.456
In United States v. Molina-Martinez, the Supreme Court addressed a circuit split concerning how to determine, under plain error review, whether a district court's application of an incorrect guidelines range affected the defendant's substantial rights.457 When imposing a sentence, the district judge first must calculate the defendant's advisory guidelines range by using the United StatesU.S. Sentencing Guidelines (the guidelines) to determine the defendant's total offense level and criminal history score.406458 The district judge must then choose a sentence after considering the guidelines range and weighing, among other things, aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §Section 3553(a).407459 If the defendant does not object to the district court's calculation at sentencing, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) limits appellate review of the sentence to plain error. To establish plain error, the defendant must show (1) that the court made an error; (2) the error was plain (i.e., obvious); and (3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, which typically means that it "affected the outcome of the district court proceedings."408460 If the defendant makes that showing, the reviewing court has the discretion to grant relief if the court also concludes that the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."409461 Conversely, if a defendant timely objects at sentencing to a guidelines error, the government has the burden of proving on appeal that the error was harmless.410462
In United States v. Molina-Martinez, defendant Saul Molina-Martinez, a Mexican citizen, was convicted of being unlawfully present in the United States after having been removed previously.411463 The district court adopted the probation office's calculation of Molina-Martinez's guidelines range of 77 to 96 months, based on a total offense level of 21 and criminal history category VI.412464 And though Molina-Martinez objected to the total offense level calculation, which the court overruled, he did not object to the criminal history score.413465 The district court then imposed a 77-month sentence—the bottom of the guidelines range.414466
Molina-Martinez appealed to the Fifth Circuit, contending that the district court plainly erred when it incorrectly calculated his criminal history score.415467 The government conceded that Molina-Martinez's criminal history score should have been category V, not VI, and with that score, the correct guidelines range would have been 70 to 87 months' imprisonment.416468 The court found this error to be "plain" but concluded, nevertheless, that Molina-Martinez had not established that the error had affected his substantial rights.417469 To do so in the Fifth Circuit, a defendant must show that "but for the district court's misapplication of the Guidelines, he would have received a lesser sentence."418470 And "[w]hen the correct and incorrect [guidelines] ranges overlap and the defendant is sentenced within the overlap," as was the case here, the Fifth Circuit requires that the defendant provide additional evidence to show that his sentence may have been different (e.g., an indication by the district judge that the guidelines range was the primary factor relied on in choosing a sentence).419471 Because the court concluded that Molina-Martinez did not meet that additional burden, it affirmed the district court's judgment.420472
Molina-Martinez petitioned for a writ of certiorari, limited to this question: when a district court incorrectly calculates a defendant's guidelines range, should an appellate court applying plain-error review presume that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights?421473 Molina-Martinez had argued to the Fifth Circuit that such a presumption should apply, but the court—in a footnote—rejected that argument as foreclosed by circuit precedent.422
In urging the Supreme Court to establish the rebuttable presumption, Martinez-Molina pointed to the Third423475 and Tenth Circuits,424476 which disagree with the Fifth Circuit and presume plain error when the district court imposes a sentence after miscalculating the defendant's guidelines range.425477 And without using the word "presumption," the Seventh426478 and Ninth Circuits427479 have also held that a sentence based on an improperly calculated guidelines range constitutes plain error and requires a remand for resentencing.428480 In arguing that those circuits are correct, Martinez-Molina relied429481 on the Supreme Court's comments in Peugh v. United States that the "federal sentencing scheme aims to achieve uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions are anchored by the Guidelines" and that empirical evidence presented "indicat[ed] that the Sentencing Guidelines have the intended effect of influencing the sentences imposed by judges."430482 It follows, sayssaid Martinez-Molina, that miscalculations resulting in an incorrect guidelines range fit into a "special category" of errors that should be presumed prejudicial431483—a premise that the Court raised and left open in United States v. Olano.432484 Conversely, the government opposed the presumption,433485 reminding the Court that it has "repeatedly cautioned that '[a]ny unwarranted extension' of the authority granted by Rule 52(b) would disturb the careful balance it strikes between judicial efficiency and the redress of injustice."434
At oral argument, the Justices seemed divided over whether the Court should adopt the presumption. For example, Justice Breyer appeared to suggest that in cases in which the defendant proves that the district court incorrectly calculated his guidelines range, the burden of proof should shift to the government "to rebut the common sense notion that of course using the wrong Guideline had an effect on the sentence."435487 Conversely, Justice Scalia asked whether sentencing policy should "establish[] a system ... that induces lawyers to make objections when objections are proper" by continuing to make the defendant's burden more stringent on appeal when he fails to raise errors in the trial court.436 Thus, the Supreme Court's decision likely will hinge on various matters of sentencing policy that will be hashed out in the months to come.
In its unanimous ruling reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Court, in an opinion crafted by Justice Kennedy, declined to adopt Molina-Martinez's requested presumption unequivocally. Instead, the Court narrowly held that "the error itself can, and most often will, be sufficient to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome outside the error."489 The Court reasoned that its holding was supported by the "Guidelines' central role in sentencing," as the "starting point" and "benchmark" for sentencing decisions, thus making sentencing calculation errors "particularly serious."490 Even so, the Court cautioned that "[t]here may be instances when, despite application of an erroneous Guidelines range, a reasonable probability of prejudice does not exist."491 Still, the Court continued, "[a]bsent unusual circumstances [a defendant] will not be required to show more" than the error, and thus the Court explicitly rejected the Fifth Circuit's unique approach.492 Indeed, the Court added, "[n]othing in the text of Rule 52(b), its rationale, or the Court's precedents supports a requirement that a defendant," in seeking plain-error review of a Guidelines error, "make some further showing of prejudice beyond the fact that the erroneous, and higher, Guidelines range set the wrong framework for the sentencing proceedings."493 The menu of the Court's capital punishment cases offers cases concerning: jury instructions; jury selection; exclusive jury sentencing prerogatives; Brady violations; appellate court judge recusals;488
Holdings: "The Eighth Amendment [does not] require ... capital-sentencing courts to instruct the jury that mitigating circumstances need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.... .. . .The [Carr's ]] joint sentencing proceedings did not render the sentencing proceedings fundamentally unfair." 437
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote his last opinion for the Court in a capital punishment case, Kansas v. Carr.438495 There, the Court reversed two decisions of the Kansas Supreme Court and held that "the Eighth Amendment [does not] require ... capital-sentencing courts to instruct the jury that mitigating circumstances need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt."439496 It also held that the Eighth Amendment did not require separate trials for two of the defendants in one of the Kansas cases.440
The defendants in one of the cases, the Carr brothers, were convicted of 4 counts of capital murder, 1 count of attempted first-degree murder, 5 counts of aggravated kidnaping, 9 counts of aggravated robbery, 20 counts of rape or attempted rape, 3 counts of aggravated criminal sodomy, 1 count each of aggravated burglary and burglary, 1 count of theft, and 1 count of cruelty to animals as part of one crime spree.441498 Reginald Carr was also convicted of kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated battery, and criminal damage to property committed on another occasion.442499 Both Reginald and Jonathan Carr were convicted of first-degree felony murder in connection with yet a third episode.443500 The defendant in the second case, Gleason, was convicted of two counts of capital murder, aggravated kidnaping, aggravated robbery, and criminal possession of a firearm.444
Defendants in both cases were sentenced to death, and in both cases the Kansas Supreme Court vacated their sentences on Eighth Amendment grounds.445502 The Kansas court's Gleason decision acknowledged an apparent conflict with U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which it thought distinguishable.446503 It found constitutionally insufficient the trial court's jury instructions that left the jury "to speculate as to the correct burden of proof for mitigating circumstances, and [under which] reasonable jurors might have believed they could not consider mitigating circumstances not proven beyond a reasonable doubt."447504 The Kansas court reiterated that view in its Carr decision, in which it also "concluded that R. Carr's Eighth Amendment right to an individualized sentencing determination was fatally impaired by [the] failure to" separate the capital sentencing proceeding of the two brothers, who were thought to have antagonistic death penalty mitigating defenses.448505
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court simply rejected the Kansas court's characterization of the jury instructions.449506 "[N]o juror would reasonably have speculated that mitigating circumstances must be proved by any particular standard, let alone beyond a reasonable doubt.... The instructions repeatedly told the jurors to consider any mitigating factor, meaning any aspect of the defendants' background or the circumstances of their offense. Jurors would not have misunderstood these instructions to prevent their consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence."450507
The Carrs' severance argument fared no better. As Justice Scalia phrased it, "[t]heThe Kansas Supreme Court agreed with the defendants that, because of the joint sentencing proceedings, one defendant's mitigating evidence put a thumb on death's scale for the other."451508 Yet, the trial court had impressed on the jury the importance of judging the defendants individually.452509 More to the point, vacating the death sentence required a showing that joint proceedings had been fundamentally unfair.453510 "Only the most extravagant speculation would lead to the conclusion that the supposedly prejudicial evidence rendered the Carr brothers' joint sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair."454511 Justice Scalia explained that the slight prospect of relatively greater or lesser culpability paled next to graphic evidence of the level of equally shared responsibility.455512 "What these defendants did – —acts of almost inconceivable cruelty and depravity – —was described in excruciating detail by [a surviving victim], who relived with the jury, for two days, the Wichita Massacre. The joint sentencing proceedings did not render the sentencing proceedings fundamentally unfair."456
Justice Sotomayor, the sole dissenting member of the Court, objected that the Court should have left the cases where they found them and deny certiorari.457514 Instead, the Court had overturned a state high court ruling, not because of a breach of any federal constitutional right, but because the state court had applied the law more generously than would have the highest federal court.458
Justice Scalia responded that had the Kansas Supreme Court decisions been grounded in state law, they would indeed have been "none of our business."459516 On the other hand, he said, "what a state court cannot do is experiment with our Federal Constitution and expect to elude this Court's review as long as victory goes to the criminal defendant. 'Turning a blind eye' in such cases 'would change the uniform '"law of the land'" into a crazy quilt.'"460
Holding: "The Kentucky Supreme Court was not unreasonable in its application of clearly established federal law when it concluded that the exclusion of Juror 638 did not violate the Sixth Amendment." Thus, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's grant of habeas relief to reverse the death sentence is overturned.461
In mid-December, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in White v. Wheeler and in doing so reversed a lower federal appellate court decision which would have sent back for re-trial a 1997 Kentucky murder case.462519 The Supreme Court, without dissent, held that Kentucky courts had been given insufficient deference in their application of Supreme Court precedents in the area of death-penalty-ambivalent prospective jurors.463
Wheeler had been convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a Louisville Kentucky couple.464521 During the questioning of prospective jurors, one initially expressed uncertainty about whether he could vote for the death penalty but ultimately stated he believed he could consider all of the penalty options.465522 The Supreme CourtCourt has held that a prospective juror must be excused if he states either that he would always or never vote for the death penalty.466523 The prosecution asked the court to excuse the prospective juror, which the court did after it had questioned him more closely.467
The Kentucky courts affirmed his conviction and sentence on appeal and denied habeas-like relief after a round of collateral review.468525 The U.S. district court denied Wheeler's petition for federal habeas corpus review, which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.469526 The Sixth Circuit weighed the statutory standard for habeas review of state convictions: "[A] writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.... "470527 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the Kentucky courts had misapplied the Supreme Court's "death qualified jury" case law.471
The Supreme Court disagreed. First, the Court explained that the statutory standard is a particularly demanding one.472529 It "erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court."473530 To overcome it, "a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement."474531 The task is even more arduous when it involves jury selection challenges. There, the decision of the state judge, who questioned and observed the prospective juror's answers, is entitled to "double deference."475
As for Supreme CourtCourt precedent, in jury selection cases, a prospective juror may be excused "where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law."476533 Moreover, "when there is ambiguity in the prospective juror's statements, the trial court is entitled to resolve it in favor of the State."477
In the eyes of the Court, the Sixth Circuit simply applied the test incorrectly. "A fairminded jurist could readily conclude that the trial judge's exchange with [the prospective juror] reflected a diligent and thoughtful voir dire; that she considered with care the juror's testimony; and that she was fair in the exercise of her broad discretion in determining whether the juror was qualified to serve in this capital case."478
The habeas standard is one of congressional creation. Congress passed it as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in an efforteffort to reduce delays in capital cases and eliminate federal-state judicial friction.479536 Congress is therefore free to change the standard. However, there have been no proposals to revisit AEDPA's standard in recent years.
Holding: "Contrary to the state postconviction court, we conclude that the prosecution's failure to disclose material evidence violated Wearry's due process rights." 480
On March 7, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a death penalty conviction because authorities had withheld material evidence favorable to the defendant. The Court's 6-2, unsigned per curiam decision in Wearry v. Cain suggests that the Court may have been influenced in part by the poor performance of the defendant's trial attorney;, by the defendant's limited mental competence;, and perhaps by suspicions of a racially discriminatory jury selection process.481
Testimony at Wearry's trial claimed that he, Sam Scott, Eric Brown, Randy Hutchison, and others had stopped the victim's car; driven the victim around, stopping periodically to beat him; and then murdered the victim by running over him with his car.482539 Scott and Brown testified against Wearry, who claimed to have been at a wedding, miles away, at the time.483540
Scott and Brown admitted their testimony conflicted with statements they had made to the police earlier.484541 More to the point, authorities failed to disclose evidence that would have undermined their credibility at trial.485542 Inmates jailed with Scott reported that he wanted to get even with Wearry for telling the police of Scott's involvement in the murder.486543 Then, in spite of the prosecutor's assurances to the jury, the police had undisclosed evidence that Brown had sought to bargain for a reduced sentence in exchange for his testimony.487544 Finally, authorities did not turn over medical records relating to Hutchison's recent knee surgery, which might have cast doubt on testimony concerning the events surrounding the murder, particularly whether Hutchison could have engaged in the physical activities attributed to him at trial.488
The Supreme Court's Brady v. Maryland decision and the casescases that follow it require the prosecution to disclose to the defendant material exculpatory evidence or evidence that materially undermines the credibility of a witness against him.489546 Its Strickland v. Washington decision and related cases guarantee defendants the assistance of competent attorneys.490547 Its Batson v. Kentucky decision and its progeny bar prosecutors from conducting jury selection in a racially discriminatory manner.491548 Finally, its Atkins v. Virginia decision precludes execution of the mentally retarded.492
The Court's Wearry opinion found that the evidence withheld "suffices to undermine confidence in Wearry's conviction" and returned the case to the Louisiana courts.493550 The opinion is interwoven with signs of the Court's want of confidence for other reasons as well, beginning with the Court's unflattering description of the work of Wearry's trial attorney. His "defense at trial rested on an alibi."494551 Yet, he failed to present impartial corroborative witnesses or to discover additional available corroborative evidence in support of the alibi.495552 In fact, "he had conducted no independent investigation into Wearry's innocence and had relied solely on evidence the State and Wearry had provided."496553 The Court explained, however, that the presence of the Brady error made it unnecessary to consider Wearry's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument.497
The Court's relatively short opinion, nevertheless, took time to observe that various members of the appellate panels below had found credible Wearry's jury selection challenges ("Finding both jury-selection claims credible, then-Justice Johnson dissented")498555 and his mental competence objections ("Justice Crichton would have ... remanded for the trial court to address [Wearry's] claim of intellectual disability under Atkins").499
Wearry's case, however, did not turn on the state of the law, but on its application.500557 Did the evidence withheld undermine judicial confidence in the verdict? The majority said it did. Justices Alito and Thomas dissented because they concluded that full disclosure to the defendant would not have changed the result.501
Holding: "[W]here a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole," the Due Process Clause "entitles the defendant to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility."559
When the prosecution raises the issue of a capital defendant's future dangerousness, the defendant is entitled to have the jury informed that the only sentencing options are death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.560 In Lynch, the Supreme Court and the Arizona courts disagreed over whether the defendant had any "possibility" of parole.
Lynch was convicted of murder.561 Murder is a capital offense under Arizona law punishable by death or life imprisonment.562 Arizona has long since abolished parole in most instances.563 However, if the jury opts for a sentence of life imprisonment, the court may sentence a defendant to release-eligibility.564 Release-eligibility makes a defendant eligible for a pardon after 25 years, or in some cases 35 years, in prison.565
Prior to sentencing, Lynch offered to waive the prospect of a release-eligible sentence and requested that the jury be informed that the only sentences available were death and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.566 The trial court refused to accept the waiver or to instruct the jury as requested.567 Lynch was sentenced to death, and the appellate court affirmed.568
The Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion.569 The prospect of clemency was not enough to make parole "possible."570 Arizona argued before the Court that "nothing prevents the legislature from creating a parole system in the future for which Lynch would have been eligible had the court sentenced him to life with the possibility of release after 25 years."571 The Court didn't buy it. It had already rejected a similar argument in Simmons.572 The prosecution had raised the issue of Lynch's future dangerousness.573 The only realistic choices left to the jury were death or imprisonment for life without possibility of parole.574 Under those facts, Lynch was entitled to have the jury so informed.575 He requested such an instruction and was refused.576 The Arizona appellate court declined to correct the error.577 That decision had to be reversed and the case returned for correction.578
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, dissented. In their view, it was the heinous nature of the defendants' crimes, not ignorance of the absence of parole, that produced the juries' death penalty verdicts, here and in the Court's earlier cases.579
Hurst v. Florida580Holding: "Florida's sentencing scheme, which required the judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance" denied the capital defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury.
Hurst was charged and convicted of first-degree murder for killing a co-workercoworker during a robbery at their place of employment.503581 He was sentenced to death and appealed.504582 During postconvictionpost-conviction proceedings, Hurst was granted a new sentencing trial.505583 At the second penalty phase proceeding, the jury returned a recommendation of death by a vote of 7-5.506584 In accordance with state law, the trial court independently weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances before sentencing Hurst to death.507585 Hurst appealed his sentence, again asserting that in light of Supreme Court precedent, the trial court committed constitutional error inasmuch as the jury had neither been unanimous in its recommendation nor required to find specific facts regarding aggravating factors.508586 The Florida Supreme Court rejected Hurst's arguments and affirmed the death sentence, holding that the Sixth Amendment does not require that the imposition of death sentences be made by the jury and that Supreme Court precedent does not require the jury to make either specific findings of aggravating circumstances or a unanimous recommendation.509587
The Sixth Amendment in relevant part provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury."510588 In a series of cases, the Court has held that given the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, judges cannot impose sentences beyond the prescribed statutory maximum unless the facts supporting such an increase are found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; these cases cover guilty pleas,511589 sentencing guidelines,512590 mandatory minimums,513591 criminal fines,514592 and capital punishment.515593 In invalidating Florida's capital sentencing scheme, the Supreme Court relied heavily on its decision in Ring v. Arizona, in which it held that "[c]apital defendants ... are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in the maximum punishment."516594
In Ring, a jury found the defendant guilty of felony murder.517595 Under Arizona law, Ring could not be sentenced to death, unless further findings were made by a judge conducting a separate sentencing hearing and only if the judge found that the aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating ones.518596 The Supreme Court held that because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as "'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense' ... the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury."519597 According to the Court, "[t]he right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years [as in Apprendi],520598 but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death."521
The Supreme Court in Hurst concluded that Florida's capital sentencing scheme is analogous to the one invalidated in Ring, as Florida requires the judge—not the jury—to make the requisite findings for imposing the death penalty.522600 The Hurst Court found that the advisory nature of Florida's jury recommendation does not comport with Sixth Amendment requirements articulated in Ring.523601 In other words, the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury make specific findings necessary to authorize a death sentence.524602
What lies in the aftermath of this decision remains unclear. While the Court invalidated the method by which Florida imposes the death penalty, it did not invalidate the death penalty itself. It appears that the Florida legislature will have to revise their procedures to make them consistent with the Hurst decision. It also appears that the Florida courts may have to decide whether the decision has retroactive applicability. If so, the state may have to conduct resentencing hearings.
Question: Whether Georgia courts erred by failing to find a Batson error during a 30-year-old capital murder trial?
Thirty years after Batson v. Kentucky,525,604 in which the Supreme Court recognized a defendant's right to object to the prosecution's peremptory challenges during jury selection on the ground that the state engaged in purposeful discrimination by attempting to exclude members of the defendant's race from the jury, the Court in Foster v. Chatman is revisitingrevisited how to analyze so-called Batson challenges.526605 In jury trials, the parties' lawyers and the presiding judge have the opportunity to examine potential jurors for suitability during a process called voir dire.527606 Based on what is learned during voir dire, the parties may strike potential jurors for cause or exercise peremptory challenges (subject to numerical limitations based on applicable state or federal law) to excuse a juror "for any reason," so long as that reason doesn't violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.528
Currently, when a defendant makes a Batson challenge, courts engage in a 3three-step inquiry: First, the defendant must make a "prima facie showing" that the prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge based on the race of a particular juror; next, the prosecution must provide a race-neutral reason for striking that juror; and finally, the court decides whether the state had purposefully discriminated.529608 In one of the Supreme Court's more recent rulingsrulings interpreting Batson, the Court left open the question whether mixed-motive analysis530609 may be applied to Batson challenges, which would allow a prosecutor to defeat a Batson challenge by proving that, despite being motivated in part by race to strike a juror, he would have struck that juror for some other, race-neutral reason,531610 as some circuits currently allow.611
Foster involved as some circuits currently allow.532 Based on questions raised at oral argument in Foster, the Court might offer some guidance on that open question.
Foster involves a Batson challenge from Timothy Tyrone Foster's 1987 capital murder trial in Georgia.533612 The potential jury pool for Foster's trial had four black individuals, and the prosecution exercised a peremptory strike against each one.534613 Foster, an African American, raised a Batson challenge based on those strikes, but the trial judge concluded that the prosecution rebutted his assertion of purposeful discrimination.535614 The court noted that the prosecutor had supplied more numerous race -neutral reasons for striking those potential jurors, including having ties to social workers (because, in the prosecution's view, they tend to "sympathize" with criminal defendants); having close relationships with people who abuse drugs and alcohol (because of Foster's own drug and alcohol problems, which allegedly played a role in the murder); giving untruthful answers during voir dire; and expressing reluctance to impose the death penalty. Foster was ultimately convicted and sentenced to death.536615
During postconviction habeas corpus proceedings in state court, Foster renewed his Batson claim, arguing that newly discovered evidence—the prosecutor's notes from jury selection—supported his allegation that the state dismissed the four black jurors based on their race.537616 On the prosecution's jury pool list, each black juror's name had been highlighted in green, and there was a corresponding note explaining that the green highlighting "Represents Blacks." Additionally, the four black jurors were ranked #1 to #4number one to number four, and were the first four names on a list labeled "Definite Nos."538617 The Superior Court of Butts County still did not find a Batson violation,539618 and the Supreme Court of Georgia declined to issue a "Certificate of Probable Cause," which would permithave permitted Foster to appeal the superior court's ruling.540
Although the parties' briefs focus heavily on the specific facts of Foster's trial—as is typical in Batson challenges—at oral argument some of the Justices raised questions that honed in on broader issues about how to resolve Batson claims. Justice Kennedy, for example, asked "how the Court should approach the Batson analysis" when, in a case like this, the prosecution presents a "laundry list" of allegedly race-neutral reasons for striking a potential juror.541620 And Justice Sotomayor piped in, asking whether an appropriate rule for these "laundry list" cases would be one in which the prosecution could defeat a Batson challenge by supplying just one legitimate race-neutral reason?542.621 Foster's lawyer remarked that, in these cases, "the Court should scrutinize the reasons very carefully" because, otherwise, the prosecution will be "encourage[d]… ... to just give as many reasons as possible and hope that one will be acceptable."543622 Justice Breyer seemed to agree with Foster's position, posing the following hypothetical:
Now, if my grandson tells me ... I don't want to do my homework tonight at 7:00 because I'm just so tired. And besides, I promised my friend I'd play basketball. And besides that, there's a great program on television. And besides that, you know ... my stomach is upset, but I want to eat spaghetti. And so he's now given me five different reasons. What do I think of those reasons?.... And so I would say my answer to my grandchild is, look, you're not too tired to do your homework. And I think any reasonable person looking at this [case] would say no, his reason was a purpose to discriminate on the basis of race. Now, tell me why I'm wrong.544
This case, indeed, illustrates "the difficulty of finding a legal test that will objectively measure the inherently subjective reasons that underlie use of a peremptory challenge."545 Based on the Justices questions, though, it is possible that the Court may offer some guidance on whether the legal test may include mixed-motive analysis. If that kind of analysis were allowed, the prosecution likely would face an easier burden at step two of a court's Batson analysis.
Yet it is also possible that there will be no ruling on the merits because of a couple procedural idiosyncrasies that turn on the interpretation of Georgia law, including whether the Court is precluded from reviewing Foster's claim at all, and if not, whether the Court ought to review the ruling of the Georgia Supreme Court or the lower court ruling from the Superior Court of Butts County, Georgia.546 Some of the Justices even suggested that before the Court rules, that the Court certify questions to the Georgia Supreme Court for clarification.547
Question: Are the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments violated by the participation of a potentially biased jurist on a multimember tribunal deciding a capital case, regardless of whether his vote is ultimately decisive?
In a 7-1, highly fact-specific ruling, the Court held that the "prosecutors were motivated in substantial part by race" when it struck two of the prospective black jurors from Foster's trial.624 In so holding, the Court reasoned that "the focus on race in the prosecution's file plainly demonstrates a concerted effort to keep black prospective jurors off the jury," and thus "[t]he contents of the prosecution's file ... plainly belie the State's claim that it exercised its strikes in a 'color-blind' manner."625 However, the Court did not dive into deeper Batson issues raised by the parties and discussed at oral argument, like how to treat cases when the prosecution produces a "laundry list" of race-neutral reasons for excluding a prospective juror or whether a court should apply mixed-motive analysis to a Batson challenge. Thus, Foster provides little guidance on modern-day Batson challenges. Holding: "[U]nder the Due Process Clause there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant's case."626The United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Pennsylvania is reviewing623
548627 Recusal is constitutionally required in the rarerare case549628 when "the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable."550629 In assessing that probability, a court makes an objective inquiry, "ask[ing] not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is 'likely' to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional 'potential for bias.'"551630 Constitutional standards for recusal differ from legislatively imposed ones,552631 yet this case raisesraised questions about whether certain statutory bases for recusal—such as previously acting in an advisory capacity in a case553632—should be construed as a floor for constitutional recusal standards, particularly when a judge's ruling implicates the death penalty and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.554
Terrance Williams was convicted of murder and sentenced to death thirty30 years ago.555634 The prosecutor handling the case sought approval from higher-ups to seek the death penalty by setting forth aggravating and mitigating circumstances in a written memorandum that made its way to then-Philadelphia District Attorney Ronald Castille.556635 In a handwritten notation on the memorandum, Castille approved the request.557636 During post-conviction proceedings in 2012, newly discovered evidence showed that the trial prosecutor had withheld exculpatory evidence that could have been presented to the sentencing jury as mitigating factors weighing against the death penalty.558637 The post-conviction court granted a stay of execution and vacated Williams's death sentence.559638 The state appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.560639 At the time, Castille was serving as the Chief Justice, prompting Williams to request that Castille recuse himself.561640 Castille declined to do so and provided no explanation behind his decision.562641 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, lifted the stay of execution and reinstated the death penalty for Williams.563
Two questions are before642
Williams appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the following two questions: (1) whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when someone who participated in the initial decision to seek the death penalty in a criminal trial later sits on a judicial panel reviewing the penalty imposed in that same criminal case; and (2) if so, whether due process is still violated, requiring vacateur, when that judge's vote was not decisive?564
Concerning the first question, Williams arguesargued that the likelihood of bias when "a judge had significant prosecutorial involvement in a criminal case" requires recusal.565 He points644 He pointed to cases involving criminal contempt hearings, in which the Supreme Court had ruled that the Due Process Clause forbids judges from playing certain dual roles.566645 For example, the Court concluded in In re Murchison that in so-called "one-man grand jury" proceedings (where a single judge plays the investigatory role of the grand jury), if the "judge-grand jury" accuses a witness of being in contempt, that same judge cannot preside over the contempt hearings.567646 The Court later elaborated in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania that when one is "part of the accusatory process, he 'cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those accused.'"568647 It follows, sayssaid Williams, that the dual role Castille allegedly played—"personally authoriz[ing] the trial prosecutor to pursue a death sentence against Mr. Williams" as district attorney, and then sitting as a judge on the panel deciding whether to vacate the death penalty—violated his due process rights.569648 Pennsylvania, on the other hand, describesdescribed Castille's prior involvement in the case as a "single administrative act," which, in its view, is insufficient to require recusal.570649 Additionally, Pennsylvania cautionscautioned that creating the rule Williams requestsrequested would result in a "dramatic expansion" of the Court's recusal precedent.571650
The second question—concerning how due process may be impacted by a judge's failure to recuse when he does not cast a decisive vote—washad been left unresolved by the Supreme Court in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie.572651 In Lavoie, unlike the case here, a judge who had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case was part of the majority in a 5-4 decision, and the Court concluded that his failure to recuse violated due process.573652 However, the Court left open the question whether due process could be violated if the judge in question did not cast a decisive vote.574653 Williams contends575contended654 that the Court should adopt the views of three concurring justices in Lavoie that whether the judge (who should have recused) cast a deciding vote is irrelevant to the Court's analysis because the judge's "mere participation in the shared enterprise of appellate decisionmaking—whether or not he ultimately wrote, or even joined, the ... opinion—pose[s] an unacceptable danger of subtly distorting the decisionmaking process."576655 However, Pennsylvania arguesargued that applying the theory that "one bad apple spoils the bunch" runs afoul of the principle that "[t]he law presumes that judges will carry out their duty to maintain impartiality."577
During oral argument the Court appeared to grapple with where to draw the line for when a judge's former involvement in a case constitutionally requires recusal. For instance, looking beyond the facts of this case, Justice Breyer asked whether the Constitution would require a legislator-turned-judge to recuse himself when a statute he voted for came before the court.578 To avoid a broad rule, the Court could choose to rule narrowly by extending the reasoning in Murchison and Mayberry and conclude only that due process forbids a person from acting as both prosecutor and judge. Whatever the outcome, it will be important for judicial behavior and decision-making as to recusal decisions656
Ultimately, in a 5-3 ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Court first held that "under the Due Process Clause there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant's case."657 As applied to the facts of this case, the Court concluded that "due process compelled [the] justice's recusal" given that Castille had participated in the decision to overturn a postconviction court's ruling that had vacated the death penalty in a case for which he had authorized the prosecuting attorney to seek the death penalty when he was a district attorney decades earlier.658 Additionally, the Court answered the question left open in Lavoie, concluding that even when a judge's vote is not dispositive, a judge's unconstitutional failure to recuse in and of itself is a structural error requiring reversal.659 In holding that such a judicial failure is "not amendable to harmless-error review," the Court reasoned that "deliberations of an appellate panel, as a general rule, are confidential," and thus "it is neither possible nor productive to inquire whether the jurist in question might have influenced the views of his or her colleagues during the decisionmaking process."660 Moreover, the Court opined that "the fact that the interested judge's vote was not dispositive may mean only that the judge was successful in persuading most members of the court to accept his or her position," and "[t]hat outcome does not lessen the unfairness to the affected party."661 Thus, the Court's ruling seemingly brings constitutional recusal standards an inch closer to one of the federal statutory standards.
The Prisoner Reform Litigation Act designed to curb frivolous inmate suits generated two of the cases on the Court's 2015 docket – —one on the act's installment payment feature and the other on the required exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Holding: "[M]onthly installment payments [to cover the costs of in forma pauperis court filings under the Prisoner Reform Litigation Act], like the initial partial payment, are to be based on a per-case basis.... [Section] 1915(b)(2) calls for simultaneous, not sequential, recoupment of multiple filing fees" 579
Early in the year, the Supreme Court resolved a split among the circuits involving federal inmate payments for court filing fees with a decision that held that the monthly assessments under the Prisoner Reform Litigation Act (PRLA) must be stacked rather than satisfied on a one-a-month basis.580663 The PRLA states in relevant part:
(b)(1) ... (a), if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee. The court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a partial payment of any court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the [the prisoner's account] ... (2) After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. The agency having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the prisoner's account to the clerk of the court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.581
Bruce, a federal inmate with several pending cases and outstanding filing fee assessments, sued to challenge his assignment to a "special management unit." 582665 He argued that collection for the filing fees for the new case should only beginbegin only after he had paid the last installment on the filing fees from his earlier cases; —that the installments should be lined up, one beginning only after the final installment of its predecessor.583666 The United States District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, from whom he sought a writ of mandamus, disagreed.584667 It explained in simple terms, the "monthly payment obligation ... applies on a per-case basis." 585
The Supreme Court in a brief unanimous opinion written by Justice Ginsburg agreed. In the eyes of the Court, "[t]he per-case approach more vigorously serves the statutory objective of containing prisoner litigation."586
Question: "Did the Fourth Circuit misapply this Court's precedents in holding, in conflict with several other federal courts of appeals, that there is a common law 'Holding: The Fourth Circuit's "special circumstances'" exception to the Prison Litigation Reform Act that relieves a n inmate of his mandatory obligation to exhaust administrative remedies when the inmate erroneously believes that he satisfied exhaustion by participating in an internal investigation?"
The Supreme Court recently heard argument's exhaustion requirement is "inconsistent" with the text and history of the act, which permits only one exception: Prisoners need not exhaust if administrative remedies are not "available."
The Supreme Court recently opined on the legality of a judicially created exception to the exhaustion requirement in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA, or the Act)587act)670 in Ross v. Blake. Congress enacted the PLRA,588671 in part, to reduce frivolous prisoner lawsuits that purportedly had been overwhelming federal courts.589672 The Actact, in relevant part, states that "[n]o action shall be brought" by inmates about prison conditions "until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."590673 In Ross, the Fourth Circuit joined the Second Circuit in concluding that an inmate may bypass the PLRA's exhaustion requirement and maintain a suit in federal court if special circumstances created a situation in which the inmate "reasonably believed that he had sufficiently exhausted his remedies."591674 Other circuits havehad concluded differently, perhaps prompting the Supreme Court's review of this case.592675
During a cell block transfer of Shaidon Blake, a Maryland inmate, a state corrections officer, Lieutenant James Madigan—with a key wrapped around his fingers—punched Blake in the face five times.593676 When Madigan struck, another state corrections officer, Lieutenant Michael Ross, was holding a handcuffed Blake against a wall and failed to intervene.594677 Blake reported the episode to senior corrections officers.595678 The Internal Investigative Unit (IIU) of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services concluded, after a year-long investigation, that Madigan used excessive force.596679 Blake did not submit an administrative complaint in accordance with Maryland's Administrative Remedy Procedure (ARP) for inmate grievances.597680 He later filed a civil-rights suit under 42 U.S.C. §Section 1983 against Madigan and Ross (among other prison personnel), alleging that the lieutenants violated his Eighth Amendment rights when Madigan struck him multiple times and Ross failed to protect him.598681 The district court granted summary judgment for Ross on the ground that Blake failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit.599682 (Madigan, however, did not raise the affirmative defense of exhaustion and was found civilly liable after a trial.600683)
Blake successfully appealed the district court's ruling for Ross to the Fourth Circuit. The court framed the question before it as whether Blake failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the PLRA.601684 A majority of the Fourth Circuit panel concluded that "special circumstances" justified Blake's failure to comply with Maryland's administrative procedures.602685 In doing so, the Fourth Circuit adopted the methodology established by the Second Circuit603686 in an earlier case, which askedasks (1) whether the inmate "was justified in believing" that his participation in another investigatory proceeding procedurally exhausted his administrative remedies; and (2) whether the inmate's participation in that other proceeding substantively exhausted his administrative remedies by giving the prison an opportunity to address the complaint internally.604687 The Fourth Circuit concluded that this two-part inquiry, by having a procedural component—which "ensures that an uncounseled inmate attempting to navigate the grievance system will not be penalized for making a reasonable, albeit flawed, attempt to comply with the relevant administrative procedures"—along with a substantive component—which "safeguards a prison from unnecessary and unexpected litigation"—is consistent with the purposes behind the PLRA's exhaustion requirement.605688 Applying that test, the majority concluded that "Blake reasonably interpreted Maryland's murky grievance procedures" and that his participation in the IIU investigation "provided the Department [of Public Safety and Correctional Services] with ample notice and opportunity to address internally the issues raised."606689
Judge Agee dissented, asserting that "[t]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement may not even be amenable to any exceptions," and, even if it was, Blake failed to satisfy the test that the majority announced.607690 Additionally, Judge Agee noted that three other circuitsother circuits have ruled that an inmate does not exhaust administrative remedies by participating in an internal investigation.608
The Supreme Court now has, presented with the opportunity to resolve the circuit split, askingasked the parties to address whether the Fourth Circuit misapplied Supreme Court precedents "in holding, in conflict with several other federal courts of appeals, that there is a common law 'special circumstances' exception to the Prison Litigation Reform Act."609692 Ross arguesargued, among other things, that the Second and Fourth Circuits' exhaustion exception conflicts with Congress's intent in enacting the PLRA as well as the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Actact and its goals.610693 Ross contendscontended that in two previous cases, Booth v. Churner611694 and Woodford v. Ngo,612695 the Supreme Court refused to uphold other judicially created exceptions to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement.613696 For instance, the Court stated in Booth that "we stress the point ... that we will not read ... exceptions into statutory exhaustion requirements where Congress has provided otherwise."614697 Additionally, Ross contendscontended that the PLRA's mandatory exhaustion requirement was designed to fix an alleged flaw in the Actact's precursor—the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 (CRIPA)—which authorized, but did not obligate, courts to require exhaustion "in the interests of justice."615698 Thus, Ross arguesargued, allowing the exception would "restore[] to courts a significant amount of the discretion expressly removed by Congress" when enacting the PLRA.616699 Blake, in his response brief, devoted little space to answering the question that the Supreme Court certified, contending, instead, that this case is really about whether administrative remedies were "available" to him.617 He contends700 He contended that there were no "available" administrative remedies for him to exhaust (as the statute requires),618701 and so he did not need to prove any exceptions to the requirement.619702 According to Blake, when the IIU is investigating a prison incident, "the prison will dismiss any other administrative grievance as procedurally improper" and thus the Court should affirm on the alternative ground that Maryland's ARP was not available to Blake or dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.620
The Court heard arguments on Tuesday, March 29, 2016. It remains to be seen whether the Court will address the circuit split. The Court may choose to leave the circuit split unresolved if it were to adopt one of Blake's arguments and either affirm on an alternate ground or determine that its writ of certiorari was improvidently granted. Alternatively, the Court may consider the question it certified and address the question of exceptions to the PLRA exhaustion requirement, which may require it to reexamine the precedents of Booth v. Churner621 and Woodford v. Ngo.622 Were the Court to affirm the Fourth Circuit's decision, and allow the judicially created exception to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, this could potentially pave the way for lower courts to employ other exceptions to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. Congress could choose to respond to any such decision legislatively, for example, by amending the PLRA to clarify that such exceptions are either prohibited or allowed by the PLRA.
In a unanimous ruling the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, concluding that the text and history of the PLRA did not allow the circuit court's "special circumstances" exception to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement.704 Focusing on the PLRA's text, the Court reasoned that the language is mandatory and does not permit a court to excuse a failure to exhaust available remedies.705 Indeed, the Court added, to date it had "reject[ed] every attempt to deviate ... from [the act's] textual mandate," including in Booth and Woodford—the cases cited by Ross.706 The Court also agreed with Ross's contention that "the history of the PLRA underscores the mandatory nature of its exhaustion regime," noting that "[i]n enacting the PLRA, Congress thus substituted an 'invigorated' exhaustion provision" for the "weak exhaustion provision" in the former CRIPA.707 And permitting the special circumstances exception, in the Court's view, would "resurrect CRIPA's scheme, in which a court could look to all particulars of a case to decide whether to excuse a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.708
Next, the Supreme Court considered Blake's contention that administrative remedies were unavailable to him—the exception written into the text of the PLRA—clarifying when administrative remedies are "unavailable."709 Under that exception, "an inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures that are 'capable of use' to obtain 'some relief for the action complained of.'"710 Thus, remedies are unavailable when (1) "it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates"; (2) when the administrative remedial scheme is "so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use," such that "no ordinary prison can discern or navigate it"; and (3) "when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation."711 Because "[t]he facts of this case raise questions about whether, given these principles, Blake had an 'available' administrative remedy to exhaust," the Court remanded the case to the lower court to evaluate that question in the first instance.712
Author Contact Information
| 1. |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2. |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3. |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4. |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5. |
Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6. |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 7. |
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8. |
See United States v. Taylor, 754 F.3d 217, 220-21 (4th Cir. 2014). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
18 U.S.C. § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Taylor, 754 F.3d at 221. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 224 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 22). Id. Id. at 2082 (Thomas, J., dissenting). | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 19. |
Needham, 604 F.3d at 678. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20. |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21. |
United States v. Ocasio, 750 F.3d 399, 401-02 (4th Cir. 2014). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22. |
See 18 U.S.C. §§ |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 23. |
18 U.S.C. § |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 24. |
18 U.S.C. § |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 25. |
Ocasio, 750 F.3d at 408. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 26. |
See id. at 409-11. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 27. |
Id. at 411. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 28. |
501 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2007). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 29. |
Ocasio, 750 F.3d at 410-11 . |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 30. |
Id. at 411. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 31. |
Id. at 411 (quoting United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985)). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 32. |
Id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 33. |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 34. |
Id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 35. |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 36. |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 37. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 39. | Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1437-38 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Id. at 1437 (Breyer, J., concurring). Id. at 1440 (Sotomayor, J., with Roberts, C.J., dissenting). McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2374 (2016). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 55. |
McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 505-506. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 56. |
Id. at 512. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 57. |
Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, McDonnell v. United States, No 15-474 (U.S. 2015). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 58. |
Brief for the United States in Opposition, McDonnell v. United States, No. 15-474 (U.S. 2015) |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 59. |
McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 507, citing United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223 (1914) which observed that "[t]o constitute [] official action, it is not necessary that it should be prescribed by statute; it was sufficient that it was governed by a lawful requirement of the department under whose authority the officer was acting. Nor was it necessary that the requirement should be prescribed by a written rule or regulation. It might also be found in an established usage which constitute the common law of the department and fixed the duties of those engaged in its activities. In numerous instances, duties not completely defined by written rules are clearly established by settled practice, and action taken in the course of their performance must be regarded as within the provisions of the above-mentioned statutes against bribery." Id. at 230-31 (internal citations omitted). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 60. | United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 407 (1999), quoting the definition of "official act" in the bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3). 18 U.S.C. §201(a)(3). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 2007). | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 62. |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 63. |
United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1028 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Urciuoli, 513 F.3d 290, 293-95 (1st Cir. 2008). | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 64. |
Rabbitt, 583 F.2d at 1028; Urciuoli, 513 F.3d at 295. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 65. | Id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 66. |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 67. |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 68. |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 69. |
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 70. |
15 U.S.C. § 78ff ("Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter . . . or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful . . . shall upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years . . . ." ); 15 U.S.C. 78j("It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. . . .); 17 C.F.R. §240.105b-1("The 'manipulative and deceptive devices' prohibited by Section 10(b) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78j) and § 240.10b–5 thereunder include, among other things, the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the share-holders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic information"). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 71. |
Id. See generally CRS Report RS21127, Federal Securities Law: Insider Trading, by [author name scrubbed]. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 72. |
Compare United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), with United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 73. |
Salman, 792 F.3d at 1089. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 74. |
Id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 75. |
Id. at 1088, 1090. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 76. |
Id. at 1090. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 77. |
463 U.S. 646 (1983). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 78. |
Salman, 792 F.3d at 1092 (footnote 4 of the Salman opinion omitted). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 79. |
Id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 80. |
Id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 81. |
Id., citing, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 82. |
Id. at 1093, quoting Newman, 773 at 452. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 83. | McDonnell, 136 U.S. at 2370; see also id. at 2370-17 (citing United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223 (1914) and United States v. Evans, 504 U.S. 255 (1992)). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
United States v. Musacchio, 590 F. App'x 359, 360-61 (5th Cir. 2014). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
18 U.S.C. § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
United States v. Musacchio, 590 F. App'x at 361. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 362-63. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
18 U.S.C. § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709, 714-15 (2016) (collecting cases showing circuit splits). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 717-18. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 716. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 717. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 717-18. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 716-18. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 715. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Musacchio, 590 F. App'x at 362-63. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Musacchio, 136 S. Ct. at 716 (quoting Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 506) (2011)). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. (quoting United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 487 n.4 (1997)). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
42 U.S.C. § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
42 U.S.C. § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
18 U.S.C. § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
United States v. Nichols, 775 F.3d 1225, 1227 (10th Cir. 2014). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 1228. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 1229 ( |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
P.L. 114-119 |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Caetano v. Massachusetts, |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch.140, §131J; Commonwealth v. Caetano, 26 N.E.3d 688, 689 (Mass. 2015). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
554 U.S. 570 (2008) . |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
561 U.S. 742 (2010). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
18 U.S.C. § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 152. |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 2282 |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
18 U.S.C. § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
18 U.S.C. § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
18 U.S.C. § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
18 U.S.C. § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
18 U.S.C. § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Welch, 136 S. Ct. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 182. |
See Respondent's Brief at 12-16, 136 S. Ct. 790 (2016) (No. 15-6418). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 183. |
806 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2015). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 184. |
See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 24-25, 136 S. Ct. 790 (2016) (No. 15-6418). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 185. |
See Respondent's Brief at 43-46, 136 S. Ct. 790 (2016) (No. 15-6418). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 186. |
See Respondent's Brief at 16, 43-46, 136 S. Ct. 790 (2016) (No. 15-6418). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 187. |
18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(2)(B)(ii). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 188. |
18 U.S.C. § 924(e). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 189. |
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 190. |
135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 191. |
136 S. Ct. 894 (No. 15-6092). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 192. |
495 U.S. 575 (1990). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 193. |
133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 194. |
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 195. |
See id. at 599-600. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 174.
|
|
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 790 (2016). 175.
|
|
Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1268 176.
|
|
Id. at 1264 (referring to Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion)). 177.
|
|
Teague, 489 U.S. at 307-8. 178.
|
|
Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264. See also Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990) ("In Teague, we defined a new rule as a rule that 'breaks new ground,' 'imposes a new obligation on the states or the Federal Government,' or was not 'dictated by precedent existing the time of the defendant's conviction became final.'"). 179.
|
|
Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264 (quoting Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495). 180.
|
|
See, e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004). 181.
|
|
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620) ("Such rules apply retroactively because they 'necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal' or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him."). 182.
|
|
Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1265. 183.
|
|
Id. 184.
|
|
Id. 185.
|
|
Id. 186.
|
|
Id. at 1269 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Today the Court holds that Johnson applies retroactively to already final sentences of federal prisoners. That holding comes at a steep price. The majority ignores an insuperable procurable procedural obstacle: when, as here, a court fails to rule on a claim not presented in a prisoner's §2255 motion, there is no error for us to reverse. The majority also misconstrues the retroactivity framework developed in Teague…."). 187.
|
|
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2247-48 (2016). 188.
|
|
18 U.S.C. §924(e). 189.
|
|
18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B). 190.
|
|
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990)). 191.
|
|
Id. 192.
|
United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 2015) |
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See, e.g., Carrie Wells, Protesters March |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532 (Utah 2015). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6:3-9:18, 12:8-12:21, 21:18-23:17, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 27 (2015) (No. 14-1373). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2011); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426-27. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963) (quoting Nardone v. United States 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)); see United States v. Smith, 715 F.3d 1110, 1115-16 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Fofana, 666 F.3d 985, 992-93 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. McKinnon, 92 F.3d 244, 247 (4th Cir. 1996). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975); United States v. Montgomery, 777 F.3d 269, 273 (5th Cir. 2015). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536 (Utah 2015). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 536-37; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d at 537. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 544-47. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Brief for Petitioner at 8-9, 29-33, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 27 (No. 14-1373); Brief for Respondent at 29 n.4, 32-39 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 27 (No. 14-1373); Transcript of Oral Argument at 57:5-57:13, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 27 (2015) (No. 14-1373). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15:17-15:23, 23:23-24:25, 28:11-28:17, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 27 (2015) (No. 14-1373); Brief for Petitioner at 8-9, 29-33 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 27 (No. 14-1373) . |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 43:1-43:15, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 27 (2015) (No. 14-1373); Brief for Respondent at 32-39, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 27 (No. 14-1373). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See, e.g., Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13:6-14:5, 25:1-25:5, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 27 (2015) (No. 14-1373). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23:1-21:8, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 27 (2015) (No. 14-1373). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 36:11-36:15, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 27 (2015) (No. 14-1373) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 233.
|
|
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016). 234.
|
|
Id. 235.
|
|
Id. 236.
|
|
Id. at 2068 (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 237.
|
|
Id. at 2074 (Kagan & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 238.
|
|
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185, 2186 (2016). |
136 S. Ct. 614 (2015) (No. 14-1468). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
136 S. Ct. 615 (No. 14-1470). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
136 S. Ct. 614 (2015) (No. 14-1507). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
State v. Birchfield, 858 N.W.2d 302, 303 (N.D. 2015). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Brief of Respondent at 10, 136 S. Ct. 614 (2015) (No. 14-1468). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 11. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 12. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Birchfield, 858 N.W.2d at 303. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 310. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
State v. Bernard. 859 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Minn. 2015). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 764-65. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 766-74. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Beylund v. Levi, 859 N.W.2d 403, 406 (N.D. 2015). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 406-07. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 407-14. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
U.S. Const. amend. IV. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
U.S. Const. amend. XIV. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2013). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See, e.g., City of Los Angeles, Ca. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2451-52 (2015); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See, e.g., |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See, e.g., |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
270.
|
Id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 272. |
Brief for Petitioner, Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 614 (2015) (No. 14-1468); Brief for Petitioner, Bernard v. Minnesota, 136 S. Ct. 615 (No. 14-1470); Brief for Petitioner, Beylund v. Levi, 136 S. Ct. 614 (2015) (No. 14-1507). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 273. |
Brief for Respondent, Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 614 (2015) (No. 14-1468); Brief for Respondent, Bernard v. Minnesota, 136 S. Ct. 615 (No. 14-1470); Brief for Respondent, Beylund v. Levi, 136 S. Ct. 614 (2015) (No. 14-1507). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 274. | Id. at 2187, 2196 (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Here, the Court lacks even the pretense of attempting to situate breath searches within the narrow and weighty law enforcement needs that have historically justified the limited use of warrantless searches. I fear that if the Court continues down this road, the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement will become nothing more than a suggestion."). Id. at 2196 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Id. at 2197. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 306-08. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 306. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 306-07. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 307. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Luna v. Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712, 717-18 (5th Cir. 2014), rev'd Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 718. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 726. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 718 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 (2014). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 1866. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Luna v. Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712, 720 (analyzing Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) and Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 720-24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 724-25. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct.305, 308 (2015). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 308-12. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 309. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 312-13 (Scalia, J., concurring). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 312. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 312-13. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 313-16 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 314-15. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 316. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Kenneth Thomas, a legislative attorney in the American Law Division, prepared this section of the report. It is available as a free | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 309. | Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1870 (2016). Id. at 1869. Id. (noting P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 25, §458 (2008)). Id. (noting 18 U.S.C. §§922(a)(1)(A), 923(a), 924(a)(1)(D), 924(a)(2)). Id. (citing App. to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Puerto Rico v. Valle (No. 15-108), at 307a-352a). Id. Puerto Rico v. Valle, 192 D.P.R. 594 (P.R. 2015), ___ P.R. Offic. Trans. ___ (translation available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/SanchezValleEnglish.pdf). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See 48 U.S.C. §§731b, 733; 8 U.S.C. § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See CRS Report R42765, Puerto Rico's Political Status and the 2012 Plebiscite: Background and Key Questions, by [author name scrubbed]. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See 48 U.S.C. § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Testimony on the Nov. 6, 2012, Referendum on the Political Status of Puerto Rico and the Admin.'s Response: |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
U.S. Const., art. IV, § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Maggie Grant et al., Report by the President's Task Force on Puerto Rico's Status (December 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2007/12/21/2007-report-by-the-president-task-force-on-puerto-rico-status.pdf#page=12. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
136 S. Ct. 28 (2015). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 2. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 724-25 (1993). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194-95 (1959). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 208-09 (2004). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 354-55 (1907). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Puerto Rico v. Valle, 192 D.P.R. 594 (P.R. 2015), translation available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/SanchezValleEnglish.pdf. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1167-68 (1st Cir. 1987). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See United States v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1151-53 (11th Cir. 1993). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Puerto Rico v. Valle, 136 S. Ct. 28 (2015) (No. 15-108). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Reply Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 136 S. Ct. 28 (2015) (No. 15-108). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
136 S. Ct. 28 (2015) (No. 15-108). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
342.
Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Vallee, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1870 (2016). |
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
United States v. Luis, Opinion of Breyer, J. at 3 (No. 14-419) (Mar. 30, 2016). | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 332. |
United States v. Luis, Opinion of Thomas, J. at 1 (No. 14-419) (Mar. 30, 2016). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 333. |
United States v. Luis, 564 Fed. Appx. 493 (11th Cir. 2014). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 334. |
Id. at 494. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 335. |
Id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 336. |
Id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 337. |
Id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 344.
|
|
Id. 345.
|
|
Id. at 1874. 346.
|
|
Id. 347.
|
|
Id. 348.
|
|
Id. at 1875. 349.
|
|
Id. at 1876-77. 350.
|
|
Id. at 1877 (Ginsburg & Thomas, JJ., concurring). 351.
|
|
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 352.
|
|
Id. at 1884-85 (Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). 353.
|
|
Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1088 (2016). 354.
|
|
Id. 355.
|
|
Id. (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, JJ., & Roberts, Ch.J.). 356.
|
|
Id. at 1096 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 357.
|
|
United States v. Luis, 564 Fed. Appx. 493 (11th Cir. 2014). 358.
|
|
Id. at 494. 359.
|
|
Id. 360.
|
|
Id. 361.
|
|
Id. |
Id., citing, United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 616 (1989); Caplin & Drysdale Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 631 (1989); and Kaley v. United States, 134 S Ct. 1090, 1105 (2014). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
373.
Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1613 (2016). |
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
U.S. Const. amend. VI. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See 18 U.S.C. §§ |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Mont. Const. art. II, § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972); United States v. Moreno, 789 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Margheim, 770 F.3d 1312, 1325 (10th Cir. 2014). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Joint Appendix at 10-15, Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015) (No. 14-1457). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See State v. Betterman, 342 P. 3d 971, 973 (Mont. 2015). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 973-74. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 973. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. 973, 981. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Brief for Petitioner at 10-11, Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015) (No. 14-1457). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 11. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Brief for Respondent at 27, Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015) (No. 14-1457). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6-10, Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015) (No. 14-1457). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 2-3. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 365. |
See United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 681 (Watford, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 605 (8th Cir. 2011)). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 366. |
136 S. Ct. 690 (No. 15-420). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 367. |
18 U.S.C. § 117. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016). 391.
|
|
Id. at 1614 (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971)). 392.
|
|
Id. 393.
|
|
See id. 394.
|
|
See id. at 1615 (internal citations omitted). 395.
|
|
Id. at 1612. 396.
|
|
Id. at 1618 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., concurring); id. (Sotomayor, J. concurring). 397.
|
|
United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1959, 1966 (2016). 398.
|
|
18 U.S.C. §117. |
See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 672-73 (9th Cir. 2014); Brief for Respondent at 3, 136 S. Ct. 690 (No. 15-420). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673; Brief for Respondent at 3, 136 S. Ct. 690 (No. 15-420). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 679. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 676-79. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 677. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1989). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 749 (1994) . |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Bryant, 769 F.3d at 677. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 678 (citing United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011) and United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011)). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 603-04. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 385. |
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732, 736 (2016). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 386. |
Id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 387. |
See id. at 725-26. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 388. |
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 389. |
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 390. |
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 391. |
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 392. |
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 393. |
Id. at 725-26. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 394. |
Id. at 726. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 395. |
Id. at 726-27. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 396. |
489 U.S. 288 (1989). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 397. |
See id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 398. |
See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 399. |
See id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 400. |
See id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 401. |
See id. at 733-37. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 402. |
See id. at 737. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 403. |
See id. at 744-50 (Thomas, J., dissenting). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 404. |
See id. at 742-43 (Scalia, J. dissenting). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 405. |
Much of the discussion here appeared earlier in a legal sidebar, CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1516, Does a Guidelines Calculation Error Always Affect a Defendant's Substantial Rights? Supreme Court to Decide. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 406. |
See Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (2013); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); United States v. Gibbs, 578 F.3d 694, 695 (7th Cir. 2009). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 407. |
See, e.g., United States v. Glosser, 623 F.3d 413, 418 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Blinkinsop, 606 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 408. |
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 409. |
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 410. |
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002); United States v. Franco-Flores, 558 F.3d 978, 980-81 (9th Cir. 2009). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 411. |
See 8 U.S.C. § 1326. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 412. |
See United States v. Molina-Martinez, 588 F. App'x 333, 334 (5th Cir. 2014); Brief of Petitioner at 2-4, Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 26 (No. 14-8913). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 413. |
Brief of Petitioner at 4, Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 26 (No. 14-8913). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 414. |
See United States v. Molina-Martinez, 588 F. App'x 333, 334 (5th Cir. 2014). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 415. |
Id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 416. |
Id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 417. |
Id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 418. |
United States v. Garcia-Carrillo, 749 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 419. |
See United States v. Molina-Martinez, 588 F. App'x 333, 335 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Mudekunye, 646 F.3d 281, 290 (5th Cir. 2011). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 420. |
See United States v. Molina-Martinez, 588 F. App'x 333, 335 (5th Cir. 2014). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 421. |
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 26 (2015) (No. 14-8913). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 422. |
United States v. Molina-Martinez, 588 F. App'x 333, 334 n.1 (5th Cir. 2014). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 423. |
United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 207-10 (3d Cir. 2001). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 424. |
United States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F.3d 1328, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 2014). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 425. |
See Brief for Petitioner, Molina-Martinez v. Unites States at 28-31, 136 S. Ct. 26 (2015) (No. 14-8913). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 426. |
See United States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1097 (7th Cir. 2014). |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 416.
|
|
Id. at 1965. 417.
|
|
Id. (quoting United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 679 (9th Cir. 2014) (Watford, J., concurring). 418.
|
|
Id. at 1966. 419.
|
|
Id. at 1967 (Thomas, J., concurring). 420.
|
|
Id. 421.
|
|
Id. 422.
|
|
Maryland v. Kulbicki, 136 S. Ct. 2, 3 (2015). 423.
|
|
Id. at 2. 424.
|
|
Kulbicki v. State, 99 A.3d 730, 731-32 (Md. 2014). 425.
|
|
Id. at 732. 426.
|
|
Id. 427.
|
|
Id. 428.
|
|
Kulbicki v. State, 53 A.3d 361 (2012). 429.
|
|
Kulbicki, 99 A.3d at 734. 430.
|
|
Kulbicki, 136 S. Ct. at 5. 431.
|
|
Id. at 2-3 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI and citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). 432.
|
|
Id. at 3 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). 433.
|
|
Id. 434.
|
|
Id. (citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993), and Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 435.
|
|
Id. It also noted that "[g]iven the uncontroversial nature of CBLA at the time of Kulbicki's trial, the effect of the judgment below is to demand that lawyers go 'looking for a needle in a haystack,' even when they have 'reason to doubt there is any needle there,'" id. at 4-5 (quoting Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 389 (2005). 436.
|
|
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732, 736 (2016). 437.
|
|
Id. 438.
|
|
See id. at 725-26. 439.
|
|
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 440.
|
|
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 441.
|
|
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 442.
|
|
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 443.
|
|
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725. 444.
|
|
Id. at 725-26. 445.
|
|
Id. at 726. 446.
|
|
Id. at 726-27. 447.
|
|
489 U.S. 288 (1989). 448.
|
|
See id. 449.
|
|
See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728. 450.
|
|
See id. 451.
|
|
See id. 452.
|
|
See id. at 733-37. 453.
|
|
See id. at 737. 454.
|
|
See id. at 744-50 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 455.
|
|
See id. at 742-43 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 456.
|
|
United States v. Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1347 (2016). 457.
|
|
Id., 136 S. Ct. at 1345. Much of the discussion which follows appeared earlier in a legal sidebar, CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1516, UPDATED: Does a Guidelines Calculation Error Always Affect a Defendant's Substantial Rights? Supreme Court to Decide, by [author name scrubbed]. 458.
|
|
See Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (2013); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); United States v. Gibbs, 578 F.3d 694, 695 (7th Cir. 2009). 459.
|
|
See, e.g., United States v. Glosser, 623 F.3d 413, 418 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Blinkinsop, 606 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 460.
|
|
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 461.
|
|
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). 462.
|
|
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002); United States v. Franco-Flores, 558 F.3d 978, 980-81 (9th Cir. 2009). 463.
|
|
See 8 U.S.C. §1326. 464.
|
|
See United States v. Molina-Martinez, 588 F. App'x 333, 334 (5th Cir. 2014); Brief of Petitioner at 2-4, Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 26 (No. 14-8913). 465.
|
|
Brief of Petitioner at 4, Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 26 (No. 14-8913). 466.
|
|
See United States v. Molina-Martinez, 588 F. App'x 333, 334 (5th Cir. 2014). 467.
|
|
Id. 468.
|
|
Id. 469.
|
|
Id. 470.
|
|
United States v. Garcia-Carrillo, 749 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 471.
|
|
See United States v. Molina-Martinez, 588 F. App'x 333, 335 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Mudekunye, 646 F.3d 281, 290 (5th Cir. 2011). 472.
|
|
See United States v. Molina-Martinez, 588 F. App'x 333, 335 (5th Cir. 2014). 473.
|
|
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 26 (2015) (No. 14-8913). 474.
|
|
United States v. Molina-Martinez, 588 F. App'x 333, 334 n.1 (5th Cir. 2014). 475.
|
|
United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 207-10 (3d Cir. 2001). 476.
|
|
United States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F.3d 1328, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 2014). 477.
|
|
See Brief for Petitioner, Molina-Martinez v. United States at 28-31, 136 S. Ct. 26 (2015) (No. 14-8913). 478.
|
|
See United States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1097 (7th Cir. 2014). |
See United States v. Vargem, 747 F.3d 724, 728-29 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Bonilla-Guizar, 729 F.3d 1179, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 2013). |
|
See Brief for Petitioner, Molina-Martinez v. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Brief for Petitioner, Molina-Martinez v. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2083-84 (2013) (emphasis added) . |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Brief for Petitioner, Molina-Martinez v. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Brief for Respondent, Molina-Martinez v. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Transcript of Oral Argument at 26:13-27:24, Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 26 (2015) (No. 14-8913). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 18:7-19:10. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 437. | Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016). See id. at 1345-46. See id. at 1346-47. See id. at 1345, 1347. Id. at 1345. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
136 S. Ct. 633 (2016). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 641-44 |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 644-46. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
State v. Carr, 331 P.3d 544, 573-74 (Kan. 2014), rev'd, Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 573. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 574. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
State v. Gleason, 329 P.3d 1102, 1133, rev'd, Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Carr, 136 S. Ct. at 640. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Gleason, 329 P.3d at 1145-48. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 1148. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
State v. Carr, 331 P.3d at 718-20. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. at 642-44. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 643-44. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 644 . |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 645. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 644. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 646. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 646-51 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 646. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 641 (Scalia, J.) . |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 641-42 (quoting Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 186 (2006)). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
White v. Wheeler, 136 S. Ct. 456 (2015). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 461-62. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 458-59. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 460 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), and their progeny). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 459. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Wheeler v. Simpson, 779 F.3d 366, 380 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)), rev'd, White v. Wheeler, 136 S. Ct. 456 (2015). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 371-74. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
White v. Wheeler, 136 S. Ct. at 458. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 460 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 425-26 (1985)). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 461 (quoting Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 7 (2007)). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 1003. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 1004-05. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 1004. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 1005. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
E.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
E.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Wearry, 136 S. Ct. at 1006-08. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 1003. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 1005. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 1006. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 1004 n.1. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 1005 n.5. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 1006-07. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at1008-12 (Alito, J., dissenting). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818, 1818 (2016) (quoting Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 39 (2001)). 560.
|
|
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994). 561.
|
|
State v. Lynch, 357 P.3d 119, 126 (2015). 562.
|
|
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§13-1105, 13-751. 563.
|
|
Lynch, 357 P.3d at 138 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §41-1604.09(I)) ("Further, parole is available only to individuals who committed a felony before January 1, 1994, and juveniles."). 564.
|
|
Lynch, 357 P.3d at 138 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-703, later renumbered as, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-751). 565.
|
|
Lynch, 136 S. Ct. at 1819 ("But under state law, the only kind of release for which Lynch would have been eligible—as the State does not contest—is executive clemency."). 566.
|
|
Lynch, 357 P.3d at 138. 567.
|
|
Id. 568.
|
|
Id. at 127, 144. 569.
|
|
Lynch, 136 S. Ct. at 1819. 570.
|
|
Id. at 1819-20. 571.
|
|
Id. at 1820. 572.
|
|
Id. at 1820 (citing Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 166 (1994)). 573.
|
|
Id. at 1819. 574.
|
|
Id. at 1819-20. 575.
|
|
Id. at 1820. 576.
|
|
Id. at 1819. 577.
|
|
Id. 578.
|
|
Id. at 1820. 579.
|
|
Id. at 1820-21 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (citing Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994); Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (2002); and Shafter v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2002)). |
Alison Smith, a legislative attorney in the American Law Division, prepared this portion of the report, which is available as a free-standing legal sidebar, CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1487, The Supreme Court Invalidates Florida's Death Penalty Procedures, by [author name scrubbed]. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Hurst v. State, 147 So.3d 435, 437 (Fla. 2014), rev'd by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 439-40. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 440. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 440-41; see also Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla. 1993). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Hurst v. State, 147 So.3d at 445. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 445-47. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
U.S. Const. amend. VI. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 589. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 591. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 592. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 609 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n. 19 (2000)). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); see also Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 621 (2016). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. at 621-22. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 622. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
604.
Foster v. Chapman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016). |
476 U.S. 79 (1986). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Foster v. Humphrey, 135 S. Ct. 2349, No. 14-8349 (May 26, 2015). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Voir Dire, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See United States v. Blanding, 250 F.3d 858, 860 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86, 89 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476-77 (2008). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Snyder, 552 U.S. at 485. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See United States v. Douglas, 525 F.3d 225, 239 (2d Cir. 2008); Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 231-35 (3d Cir. 2002); Weaver v. Bowersox, 241 F.3d 1024, 1032 (8th Cir. 2001); Wallace v. Morrison, 87 F.3d 1271, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 1996). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Foster v. State, 374 S.E.2d 188 (Ga. 1988). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 191. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 191-92. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 190. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Foster v. Humphrey, No. 1989-V-2275, Order Denying Petitioner's Request for Habeas Relief at 14-15 (Ga. Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 2013). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 15; Brief for Petitioner at 14-20, Foster v. Chatman, 135 S. Ct. 2349, No. 14-8349. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Foster v. Humphrey, No. 1989-V-2275, Order Denying Petitioner's Request for Habeas Relief at 16-17 (Ga. Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 2013). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Foster v. Humphrey, No. S14E0771, Order Denying Application for Certificate of Probable Cause (Ga. Nov. 3, 2014). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Transcript of Oral Argument at 24:3-24:7, Foster v. Chatman, 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015) (No. 14-8349). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 22:14-22:22. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 24:9-24:17. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 42:6-43-11. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Williams v. Pennsylvania, SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/williams-v-pennsylvania/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 890 (2009). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See id. at 889-90. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See 28 U.S.C. § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
U.S. Const. amend VIII. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Commonwealth v. Williams, 570 A.2d 75 (Pa. 1990). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 28 (No. 15-5040). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 5; See Respondent's Motion to Recuse Chief Justice Castille, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Williams, No. 163 EM 2012 (Pa. Oct. 1, 2012), 2015 WL 7774181, at *181A. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Commonwealth v. Williams, 105 A.3d 1234, 1236-39 (Pa. 2014). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 1237-38. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 1239. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Respondent's Motion to Recuse Chief Justice Castille, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Williams, No. 163 EM 2012 (Pa. Oct. 1, 2012), 2015 WL 7774181, at *181A. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Order, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Williams, No. 163 EM 2012 (Pa. Oct. 1, 2012), 2015 WL 7774181, at *171A. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Williams, 105 A.3d at 1245. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Williams v. Pennsylvania, SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/williams-v-pennsylvania/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Brief for Petitioner at 22, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 28 (No. 15-5040). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 22-23. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
349 U.S. 133 (1955). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971) (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Brief for Petitioner at 24-28, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 28 (No. 15-5040). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Brief for Respondent at 17, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 28 (No. 15-5040). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
475 U.S. 813 (1986). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 816-19, 824-25. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 827-28; id. at 830 (Brennan, J., concurring). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Brief for Petitioner at 35-36, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 28 (No. 15-5040). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 831 (Blackmun, J., concurring). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Brief for Respondent at 59, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 28 (No. 15-5040). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 579. | Id. at 1903. See id. at 1909. Id. at 1909 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Id. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Title VII of P.L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1995). This discussion borrows heavily from a legal sidebar CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1533, Can "Special Circumstances" Trump the Prison Litigation Reform Act's Requirement to Exhaust Administrative Remedies? , by [author name scrubbed]. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
42 U.S.C. § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See 141 Cong. Rec. S18136-87 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83 (2006) ("A centerpiece of the PLRA's effort 'to reduce the quantity . |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
42 U.S.C. § |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Blake v. Ross, 787 F.3d 693, 695, 698 (2015). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 905-06 (7th Cir. 2011); Panaro v. City of N. Las Vegas, 432 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2005); Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720 (6th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 87 (2006). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Blake v. Ross, 787 F.3d 693, 695 (4th Cir. 2015). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 695-96. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 697. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
"After conviction, the Eighth Amendment 'serves as the primary source of substantive protection . |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Blake, 787 F.3d at 696. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 698-701. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Macias v. Zank, 495 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691 (2d Cir. 2004). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Blake, 787 F.3d at 698. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 698-701. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 703-06 (Agee, J. dissenting). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Id. at 702-03. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See Ross v. Blake, SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/ross-v-blake/ (last visited Mar. 29. 2016). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Brief for Petitioner at 1-6, 20-24, Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 614 (2015) (No. 15-339). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
532 U.S. 731 (2001). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
548 U.S. 81 (2006). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Brief for Petitioner at 27-28, Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 614 (2015) (No. 15-339). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, P.L. 96-247, §7, 94 Stat. 349, 352 (1980). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Brief for Petitioner at 37, Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 614 (2015) (No. 15-339). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Respondent's Brief at 10-13, Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 614 (2015) (No. 15-339). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See, e.g., Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that "[i]f administrative remedies are |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Respondent's Brief at 15-30, Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 614 (2015) (No. 15-339). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Respondent's Brief at 15, 31-34. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 622. | Id. at 1856-57 Id. at 1857. Id. at 1857-58. Id. at 1858. Id. at 1858-62. Id. at 1859. Id. at 1859-60. |