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“El Chapo” Guzmán’s Extradition: What’s Next for U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation?

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CRS INSIGHT U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation After "El Chapo" Guzmán's January 2016 Recapture January 13, 2016 (IN10326) | Related Authors June S. Beittel Clare Ribando Seelke | June S. Beittel, Analyst in Latin American Affairs (jbeittel@crs.loc.gov, 7-7613) Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American Affairs (cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229) The escape of Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán from a maximum security federal prison near Mexico City in July 2015 underscored the extent to which corruption is entrenched in Mexico's criminal justice system. Mexican marines reportedly came close to recapturing Guzmán in the northwestern Sierra Madre mountains in October 2015, and, following a vigorous intelligence-guided effort, Mexican marines recaptured Guzmán in Los Mochis, Sinaloa, on January 8, 2016. One key concern for U.S. policymakers is whether the Mexican government will be able to hold Guzmán securely in the same prison from which he escaped and then extradite him swiftly to the United States—a source of tension in U.S.-Mexican relations. Another is whether Guzmán's recapture, which was supported by U.S. intelligence, will lead to closer security cooperation moving forward. The Sinaloa Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) "El Chapo" Guzmán led the Sinaloa DTO as it became the dominant criminal syndicate in Mexico over the past two decades through co-optation of high-level Mexican officials and violent turf battles with rival groups that caused tens of thousands of deaths. Known as an innovator, Guzmán embraced novel drug trafficking techniques, such as tunnels, catapults, submarines, and semi-submersibles, to move narcotics from South America or produced in Mexico to the United States. He reportedly ordered the construction of some 170 tunnels to smuggle drugs across the U.S.-Mexico border or to evade authorities. His notoriety grew after his first escape from prison in 2001 and again following his escape in July 2015 via a one-mile underground tunnel that he claims was built by engineers that had been trained in Germany. The Sinaloa DTO now controls roughly 40% to 60% of Mexico's drug trade, according to several estimates. It is known for trafficking cocaine, but moves all types of illicit drugs, including heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana, to cities throughout the United States. It has profited from the rising demand in the United States for heroin, which is popular as a cheaper substitute for prescription opioids. Mexican heroin is produced in the tri-state area known as the "Golden Triangle" (Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua), which has been controlled by the Sinaloa DTO. Although there is not precise data available about the quantities of heroin now being moved by Sinaloa traffickers, an estimated 42 metric tons of heroin were produced in Mexico in 2014, a more than 60% increase compared to 2013, according to the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. Kingpin Strategy Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto of the nationalistic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) took office in December 2012 vowing to reduce violence in Mexico and adjust the current U.S.-Mexican security strategy to focus on violence prevention. While Mexico's public relations approach to security issues changed, most analysts assert that Peña Nieto has maintained an operational approach similar to that of former president Felipe Calderón (2006-2012). That approach, commonly referred to as the "kingpin" strategy, has focused on taking out the top and mid-level leadership of Mexico's DTOs. The February 2014 capture of "El Chapo" Guzmán proved to be a high point for this government; his subsequent escape served as perhaps one of its lowest points. According to the Mexican government, 98 of the 122 top criminal targets have been arrested or killed during law enforcement operations as of January 2016. Few have been successfully prosecuted, however, and the pace of arrests slowed significantly in 2015. The strategy has been criticized for fueling violent turf battles in which mid-level leaders have vied for power and for causing smaller crime groups to emerge across Mexico, perhaps as many as 60 to 200, many of which prey upon local populations through extortion, kidnapping, and other crimes (see CRS Report R41576, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations). Potential Extradition? U.S. policymakers are hoping that Guzmán's latest escape has changed the Peña Nieto government's initial position that he and other kingpins be tried in Mexico. Under the Calderón government, extraditions averaged more than 100 a year. When President Peña Nieto took office, extraditions fell to 54 in 2013 and 66 in 2014. While Mexico resisted pressure to extradite Guzmán to the United States (where he faces multiple charges) following his capture in 2014, the Mexican government has demonstrated more willingness to approve U.S. extradition requests in recent months. Mexico extradited 13 top drug traffickers to the United States in September 2015 and quickly initiated procedures to extradite Guzmán following his January 8 capture. The process could reportedly take from several months to a year or more, however, due to injunctions and other delaying tactics that are likely to be used by Guzmán's defense attorneys. U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation Experts are weighing in about the potential impact of Guzmán's escape and recapture on U.S.-Mexican relations. In addition to cooperation on extraditions, bilateral efforts to improve security and the rule of law in Mexico increased as a result of the Mérida Initiative, a partnership developed by the George W. Bush and Calderón governments for which the U.S. Congress provided nearly $2.5 billion from FY2008 to FY2015. Upon taking office, President Peña Nieto sought to scale back U.S. involvement in some law enforcement and intelligence-gathering operations and to reevaluate the Mérida Initiative. He prioritized economic reforms over security programs. By 2014, it became clear that Peña Nieto's economic agenda could not be successful without addressing Mexico's rule-of-law challenges. Since then, the Peña Nieto government has agreed to more than 100 Mérida Initiative projects worth $600 million. "El Chapo" Guzmán's escape and the international criticism that President Peña Nieto has received for his handling of several high-profile cases of human rights abuses allegedly involving security officials has increased pressure on his government to strengthen the country's criminal justice institutions. For these reasons, some analysts predict that bilateral security cooperation may advance further during the remaining years of the Peña Nieto government than was originally predicted. Strong cooperation is already occurring on efforts to secure Mexico's southern border and to develop a bilateral plan to combat heroin production and trafficking. Congress is likely to monitor how Mérida Initiative funding can best be used to help Mexico root out the type of corruption in the prison (and broader criminal justice) system that facilitated Guzman's escape. The notorious drug trafficking kingpin Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán is in U.S. custody, following the Mexican government's high-profile decision to extradite him to the United States on January 19, 2017, the day before President Donald J. Trump took office. According to a 2016 superseding indictment filed with the Eastern District Court of New York, Guzmán is charged with operating a continuing criminal enterprise and conducting drug-related crimes as the purported leader of the Mexican criminal syndicate commonly known as the Sinaloa Cartel. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Sinaloa Cartel has the widest reach of any transnational criminal organization into U.S. cities and is vying with another cartel to supply surging U.S. heroin demand.

Introduction

Mexico's extradition of Guzmán to the United States has been widely welcomed by U.S. officials. Some analysts viewed the extradition as the culmination of bilateral security cooperation under the Obama Administration, whereas others saw it as a goodwill gesture to President Trump. Following Guzmán's 2014 capture by Mexican marines supported by U.S. intelligence, the Mexican government was resistant to extradite Guzmán to the United States. Views appear to have shifted in light of Guzmán's brazen prison escape in 2015. By the time he was recaptured in 2016, the Mexican government proved willing to provide "extensive cooperation and assistance" to U.S. authorities to secure his extradition. Guzmán's arraignment occurred less than a week before the abrupt cancellation of a meeting scheduled for January 31, 2017, between President Trump and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto. Current tensions in U.S.-Mexican relations over trade, executive actions on immigration, and a border wall have raised questions about whether Mexico will be willing to continue cooperating with the United States on antidrug and other security efforts, which remain top concerns for many U.S. policymakers.

Guzmán, the Sinaloa Cartel, and Drug Trafficking in Mexico

Guzmán reputedly led the Sinaloa Cartel to become the dominant criminal syndicate in Mexico and to control a majority of the country's illicit drug trade. Sinaloa's prowess in cocaine trafficking catapulted the syndicate to international prominence, but the syndicate also allegedly engages in all types of drug trafficking, including heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana—often destined for cities inside the United States. Guzmán gained a reputation as an innovator among drug traffickers, embracing novel drug trafficking techniques, and was responsible for the construction of more than 200 tunnels to move narcotics across the U.S.-Mexican border and evade authorities.

It remains unclear how Guzmán's recapture and extradition may affect drug trafficking groups in Mexico. Some observers posit that Guzmán's Sinaloa Cartel has suffered in recent years from the same fragmentation that other trafficking groups in Mexico have experienced, resulting in a complex and shifting dynamic of competing criminal organizations involved in the production and movement of illicit drugs to the United States. Others maintain that Sinaloa has remained among Mexico's most cohesive criminal syndicates.

Cartel fragmentation and high-profile enforcement actions against major Mexican drug traffickers have not appeared to yield desired reductions in illicit drug production in Mexico or reduced use of Mexico as a major trafficking corridor to the United States. According to the 2016 National Drug Threat Assessment, illicit opium poppy cultivation in Mexico in 2015 had the potential to produce 70 metric tons of heroin, an increase from an estimated 42 metric tons in 2014 and 26 metric tons in 2013. As more crime groups have become involved in opium cultivation and heroin trafficking, violence has surged, particularly in Mexican states along the Pacific Coast, such as Guerrero. Drug trafficking and organized crime-related violence in the country as a whole increased slightly in 2015 and significantly in 2016, reversing downward trends since 2012.

U.S.-Mexican Extraditions

Extraditions to and from the United States and Mexico are governed by a 1978 bilateral extradition treaty. Mexican cooperation with the United States on extradition requests traditionally has been a sensitive issue. Some Mexican politicians have preferred to prosecute drug kingpins on Mexican soil. Counterdrug policy experts often view the threat of extradition to the United States as a potentially effective tool to deter traffickers, who fear conviction and long prison sentences levied by the U.S. criminal justice system. The Mexican government's willingness to approve U.S. extradition requests, however, also could be perceived as tacit recognition of problems in the security of Mexico's prisons and integrity of its criminal justice system.

Since the early 2000s, the number of individuals extradited from Mexico to the United States has increased significantly—particularly under the former administration of Felipe Calderón (2006-2012). Extraditions fell sharply after President Enrique Peña Nieto took office in 2013 but have since risen (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Individuals Extradited from Mexico to the United States

(1995-2016)

Sources: U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of State.

Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation

U.S.-Mexican security cooperation has grown closer in recent decades, but tensions in the bilateral relationship have escalated recently, possibly threatening to reverse the deepening of binational collaboration. In addition to cooperation on extraditions, U.S.-Mexican law enforcement, intelligence, and military forces have increased information-sharing and coordination on a range of security issues. Any U.S. policy changes that run counter to Mexican interests or are perceived as threatening Mexico's sovereignty, such as recent proposals regarding payment for a border wall, could cause Mexico to scale back security cooperation, including efforts to arrest and extradite drug kingpins and to combat illicit drug production and trafficking. In a joint statement released on January 27, 2017, Presidents Trump and Peña Nieto acknowledged the need for their "two nations to work together to stop drug cartels, drug trafficking and illegal guns and arms sales."

For more information, see CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond. ; CRS In Focus IF10400, Heroin Production in Mexico and U.S. Policy; and CRS Report R41576, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations.