The Future of Internet Governance: Should the United States Relinquish Its Authority over ICANN?

Summary

Currently, the U.S. government retains limited authority over the Internet's domain name system, primarily through the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions contract between the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). By virtue of the IANA functions contract, the NTIA exerts a legacy authority and stewardship over ICANN, and arguably has more influence over ICANN and the domain name system (DNS) than other national governments. Currently the IANA functions contract with NTIA expires on September 30, 2016. However, NTIA has the flexibility to extend the contract for any period through September 2019.

On March 14, 2014, NTIA announced the intention to transition its stewardship role and procedural authority over key Internet domain name functions to the global Internet multistakeholder community. To accomplish this transition, NTIA asked ICANN to convene interested global Internet stakeholders to develop a transition proposal. NTIA stated that it will not accept any transition proposal that would replace the NTIA role with a government-led or an intergovernmental organization solution.

For two years, Internet stakeholders have been engaged in a process to develop a transition proposal that will meet NTIA's criteria. On March 10, 2016, the ICANN Board formally accepted the multistakeholder community's transition plan and transmitted that plan to NTIA for approval. NTIA's goal is to complete its evaluation in 90 days.

Since NTIA's announcement of its intention to relinquish its authority over IANA, concerns have risen in Congress over the proposed transition. Critics worry that relinquishing U.S. authority over Internet domain names may offer opportunities for either hostile foreign governments or intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations, to gain undue influence over the Internet. On the other hand, supporters argue that this transition completes the necessary evolution of Internet domain name governance towards the private sector, and will ultimately support and strengthen the multistakeholder model of Internet governance.

Legislation has been introduced in the 113^th and 114^th Congresses which would prevent, delay, or impose conditions or additional scrutiny on the transition. In the 114^th Congress, H.R. 805/S. 1551 (the DOTCOM Act of 2015) would prohibit NTIA from relinquishing its authority until 30 legislative days after NTIA submits a report to Congress in which it certifies that the transition proposal meets certain criteria. The DOTCOM Act was passed by the House, but has not been passed by the Senate. Meanwhile, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) prevents NTIA from relinquishing its contractual control over IANA in FY2016.

The proposed transition could have a significant impact on the future of Internet governance. National governments are recognizing an increasing stake in ICANN and DNS policy decisions, especially in cases where Internet DNS policy intersects with national laws and interests related to issues such as intellectual property, cybersecurity, privacy, and Internet freedom. How ICANN and the Internet domain name system are ultimately governed may set an important precedent in future policy debates—both domestically and internationally—over how the Internet should be governed, and what role governments and intergovernmental organizations should play.

Background: The Domain Name System and the Role of the U.S. Government

The Internet is often described as a "network of networks" because it is not a single physical entity, but hundreds of thousands of interconnected networks linking hundreds of millions of computers around the world. As such, the Internet is international, decentralized, and comprised of networks and infrastructure largely owned and operated by private sector entities.¹

Computers connected to the Internet are identified by a unique Internet Protocol (IP) number that designates their specific location, thereby making it possible to send and receive messages and to access information from computers anywhere on the Internet. Domain names were created to provide users with a simple location name, rather than requiring them to use a long list of numbers. The domain name system (DNS) is the distributed set of databases residing in computers around the world that contain the address numbers, mapped to corresponding domain names. Those computers, called root servers, must be coordinated to ensure connectivity across the Internet.

The U.S. government has no statutory authority over the DNS. However, because the Internet evolved from a network infrastructure created by the Department of Defense, the U.S. government originally owned and operated (primarily through private contractors) many of the key components of the network architecture that enabled the domain name system to function.² In 1998, with the Internet expanding beyond the academic and governmental spheres, the U.S. government transitioned the management of the DNS to a newly created not-for-profit international organization based in California called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).³ ICANN employed (and continues to employ) a multistakeholder system of governance whereby policy decisions are made by a Board of Directors with input from the various stakeholder groups that comprise the Internet and the domain name system. These stakeholders include owners and operators of servers and networks around the world, domain name registrars and registries, regional IP address allocation organizations, standards organizations, Internet service providers, local and national governments, noncommercial stakeholders, business users, intellectual property interests, and others.

After the 1998 transition, the U.S. government, through the Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration or NTIA, retained a degree of authority over ICANN's management of the DNS and other unique Internet identifiers such as Internet address numbers and protocols. With respect to ICANN, the U.S. government first exercised its legacy authority through a Memorandum of Understanding (1998-2006), followed by a Joint Project Agreement (2006-2009). Currently, NTIA and ICANN are joint participants in an Affirmation of Commitments (AoC) agreement, in which both parties agree to scrutiny and evaluation by review boards. The AoC is voluntary, and either ICANN or NTIA can withdraw from the agreement at any time.⁴

Concurrently, a separate contract between the ICANN and NTIA—specifically referred to as the "IANA⁵ functions contract"—authorizes ICANN to manage the technical underpinnings of the domain name system (DNS). The IANA functions can be broadly grouped into three categories:

• 1. Number resources—the coordination and allocation of the global pool of IP numbers;
• 2. Protocol Assignments—the management of IP numbering systems in conjunction with Internet standards bodies; and
• 3. Domain names—management of the DNS authoritative root zone file.⁶

Additionally, and intertwined with the IANA functions contract, a cooperative agreement between NTIA and Verisign (the company that operates the .com and .net registries) authorizes Verisign to manage and maintain the official root zone file that is contained in the Internet's root servers⁷ which underlie the functioning of the DNS.⁸

The IANA functions contract gives the U.S. government, through NTIA, the authority to approve various technical functions such as modifying the root zone file (which would include, for example, adding additional generic top level domains (gTLDs) to the root zone). In this narrow sense, NTIA's role is strictly clerical and administrative.⁹ Policymaking—such as decisions to make changes in the root zone file—is made by ICANN through its internal policy development process. Although it has the authority to do so under the IANA functions contract, NTIA has never refused to approve any IANA related actions as directed by ICANN.

However, the IANA functions contract, while primarily administrative in nature, carries broader significance because it has conferred upon the U.S. government a "stewardship" role over ICANN and the domain name system. This stewardship role does not mean that the NTIA controls ICANN or has the authority to approve or disapprove ICANN policy decisions. Rather, the U.S. government's authority over the IANA functions has been viewed by the Internet community as a "backstop" that serves to reassure Internet users that the U.S. government is prepared and positioned to constitute a check on ICANN under extreme circumstances (such as, for example, fiscal insolvency, failure to meet operational obligations, or capture or undue influence by a single stakeholder or by outside interests).

Meanwhile, the U.S. government continues to participate in the ICANN policy development process through membership in the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), which provides advice to ICANN on issues of public policy, especially where there may be an interaction between ICANN's activities or policies and national laws or international agreements.¹⁰ However, while all governments have access to membership in the GAC, the U.S. government arguably has had more influence over ICANN and the DNS than other governments by virtue of the IANA functions contract with ICANN.

On March 14, 2014, NTIA announced its intention to transition its stewardship role and procedural authority over key domain name functions to the global Internet multistakeholder community.¹¹ NTIA's stated intention was that it would let its IANA functions contract with ICANN expire on September 30, 2015, if a satisfactory transition could be achieved. With NTIA having the option of extending the contract for up to two two-year periods through September 30, 2019, NTIA announced on August 17, 2015, that it will extend the IANA functions contract through September 30, 2016.

As a first step, NTIA asked ICANN to convene interested global Internet stakeholders to develop a proposal to achieve the transition. Specifically, NTIA expects ICANN to work collaboratively with parties directly affected by the IANA contract, including the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), the Internet Society (ISOC), the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), top level domain name operators, Verisign, and other interested global stakeholders. In October 2013, many of these groups—specifically, the Internet technical organizations responsible for coordination of the Internet infrastructure—had called for "accelerating the globalization of ICANN and IANA functions, towards an environment in which all stakeholders, including all governments, participate on an equal footing."¹²

NTIA has stated that it will not accept any transition proposal that would replace the NTIA role with a government-led or an intergovernmental organization solution. In addition, NTIA told ICANN that the transition proposal must have broad community support and address the following four principles:

• support and enhance the multistakeholder model;
• maintain the security, stability, and resilience of the Internet DNS;
• meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services; and
• maintain the openness of the Internet.

The CCWG-Accountability Work Stream 1 proposal was approved by the ICANN Board on March 10, 2016. The proposal seeks to enhance ICANN's accountability by specifying powers for the ICANN community that can be enforced when consensus cannot be reached. Specifically, CCWG-Accountability proposed the creation of a new entity, referred to as the "Empowered Community," that will act at the direction of the multistakeholder community as constituted by ICANN's Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees. Under California law, the new entity would take the form of a California unincorporated association and be given the role of Sole Designator of ICANN Board Directors. Triggered by a petitioning, consultation, and escalation process, the Empowered Community would have the power to:

• Reject ICANN Budgets, IANA Budgets or Strategic/Operating Plans.
• Reject changes to ICANN's Standard Bylaws.
• Approve changes to new Fundamental Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation and ICANN's sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of ICANN's assets. The threshold for Board approval for changing a Fundamental Bylaw is raised from two-thirds to three-fourths.
• Remove an individual ICANN Board Director.
• Recall the entire ICANN Board.
• Initiate a binding Independent Review Process on behalf of the Community.
• Reject ICANN Board decisions relating to reviews of the IANA functions, including the triggering of Post-Transition IANA separation.
• Inspect ICANN's books and records, and initiate investigatory audits.

Also proposed is a revised mission statement for the ICANN Bylaws that clarifies what ICANN does, while not changing ICANN's historic mission; an enhanced and binding Independent Review Process (IRP) with a broader scope, reaffirming the IRP's power to ensure ICANN stays within its mission; and enhancements to the Reconsideration Request process. Other recommendations include the insertion of a commitment to recognition of human rights, incorporating the reviews called for under the Affirmation of Commitments into the ICANN Bylaws, and modifying structural reviews to include considerations of supporting organizations' and advisory committees' accountability.

Finally, the proposal addressed how ICANN should consider advice from the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC). Under the proposal, GAC formal advice must be reached by full consensus,²³ at which point the Board and GAC would try to find a mutually acceptable solution. If a mutual agreement cannot be reached, the Board can choose not to follow that advice by a vote of at least 60% of Board members. The CCWG-Accountability proposal also recommended new language in the Bylaws that would prohibit ICANN from taking any action, including actions advised by GAC, that is inconsistent with the ICANN Bylaws.

A critical aspect of the CCWG-Accountability group proposal was designing "stress tests" for each solution or accountability measure that the two work streams developed. Stress tests are designed to measure the resistance of the accountability measures to various contingencies. The proposal identified 37 specific contingencies that have been consolidated into five categories of stress tests:

• Financial crisis or insolvency: ICANN becomes fiscally insolvent, and lacks resources to adequately meet obligations;
• Failure to meet operational expectations: ICANN fails to process change or delegation requests to the IANA Root Zones, or executes a change of delegation over objections of stakeholders;
• Legal/legislative action: ICANN is the subject of litigation under existing or future policies, legislation, or regulation. ICANN attempts to delegate a new TLD or redelegate a non-compliant existing TLD;
• Failure of accountability: Action by one or more Board members, the CEO, or staff is contrary to mission or bylaws. ICANN is captured by one stakeholder segment; and
• Failure of accountability to external stakeholders: ICANN modifies its structure to avoid obligation to external stakeholders. ICANN delegates, subcontracts, or abdicates obligations to a third party. ICANN merges or is acquired by an unaccountable third party.²⁴

According to the CCWG-Accountability charter, stress tests could include an analysis of potential weaknesses and risks; an analysis of existing remedies and their robustness; a definition of additional remedies or modification of existing remedies; and a description of how the proposed solutions would mitigate the risk of contingencies or protect the organization against such contingencies.²⁵

Ultimately, any proposed accountability enhancements will be tested against the following questions:

• Do they make ICANN more susceptible to "capture" (or the assertion of undue influence) by one stakeholder or group of stakeholders?
• Can any individual or group make use of the redress and review processes in a way that paralyzes the work of ICANN?
• Does any group of stakeholders have the ability to modify its internal procedures in a way that shifts how it interacts among the rest of the stakeholders within ICANN?²⁶

With the transition plan submitted to NTIA, language in the ICANN Bylaws must be formulated and modified to incorporate the proposed recommendations. Additionally, all proposed actions and recommended organizational structures must be implemented and tested.

NTIA must approve the multistakeholder community proposal in order for the transition to take place. ICANN submitted the transition proposal to NTIA on March 10, 2016. On March 11, NTIA stated that it "will now begin the process of reviewing the proposal, hopefully within 90 days, to determine whether it meets the criteria we outlined when we announced the transition."²⁷ NTIA plans to gather input from other federal agencies and to be guided by recommendations from the Government Accountability Office.²⁸ Prior to completing its review, NTIA expects ICANN and the community to adopt all the necessary Bylaw changes to implement the transition proposals. 

only if assurances are provided for the protection of the current status of legacy top-level domain names and Internet Protocol address numbers, particularly those used by the Department of Defense and the components of the United States Government for national security purposes; mechanisms are institutionalized to uphold and protect consensus-based decision making in the multi-stakeholder approach; and existing stress-testing scenarios of the accountability process of the multi-stakeholder model can be confidently shown to work transparently, securely, and efficiently to maintain a free, open, and resilient Internet.

It is also the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense should "take all necessary steps to sustain the successful stewardship and good standing of the Internet root zone servers managed by components of the Department of Defense, including active participation, review, and analysis for transition planning documents and accountability stress testing."

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) prevents NTIA from relinquishing its contractual control over IANA in FY2016. Section 539 of P.L. 114-113 states the following:

(a) None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to relinquish the responsibility of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, during fiscal year 2016, with respect to Internet domain name system functions, including responsibility with respect to the authoritative root zone file and the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority functions.

(b) Not withstanding any other law, subsection (a) of this section shall not apply in fiscal year 2017.

On February 4, 2016, Senators Cruz, Lee, and Lankford sent a letter⁴³ to ICANN's CEO Fadi Chehadé, questioning the propriety of his participation in the World Internet Conference organized by the Chinese government. On March 3, 2016, a subsequent letter⁴⁴ was sent to the Chairman of the ICANN Board questioning various ICANN activities in relation to China.

NTIA is currently evaluating the transition plan to assess whether it meets the criteria NTIA set when it announced the beginning of the transition process in 2014. Specifically, NTIA will determine whether the transition plan supports and enhances the multistakeholder model of Internet governance, that it does not replace NTIA's role with a government-led or intergovernmental solution, that it maintains the security, stability, and resiliency of the domain name system, that it meets the needs and expectations of global customers and partners of IANA services, and that it maintains the openness of the Internet.

In its evaluation, NTIA will gather input from other federal agencies and be guided by recommendations of the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The GAO recommendations were provided in the August 2015 GAO report, Structured Evaluation Could Help Assess Proposed Transition of Key Domain Name and Other Technical Functions. GAO identified two frameworks or methods of evaluation that NTIA could consider in its assessment of the transition plan. These are the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission Internal Control—Integrated Framework (COSO framework) and the International Organization for Standardization's quality management principles (ISO quality management principles).⁴⁹

Meanwhile, regardless of whether the DOTCOM Act is enacted, Congress will be given time to assess NTIA's evaluation of the transition plan and to evaluate the transition plan itself. A key issue for Congress will be whether—in the absence of NTIA's stewardship role—the plan ensures ICANN's accountability to the multistakeholder community, and whether the new organizational structures that are put in place ensure that ICANN and the domain name system cannot be unduly influenced by foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations. Another issue is whether ICANN and the multistakeholder community will be able to adequately assess, test, and implement the transition recommendations before NTIA's contract with IANA is relinquished.⁵⁰

The future of how ICANN and the DNS will be governed is highly relevant to the broader question of how the Internet should be governed. While it is true that ICANN's jurisdiction is limited to the technical underpinnings of the Internet (unique Internet identifiers such as domain names and addresses), it is also true that ICANN policy decisions (such new gTLDs) can affect other areas of Internet policy such as intellectual property, cybersecurity, privacy, and Internet freedom.

As the Internet expands and becomes more pervasive throughout the world in all aspects of modern society, the question of how it should be governed becomes more pressing, with national governments recognizing an increasing stake in ICANN policy decisions, especially in cases where Internet DNS policy intersects with national laws and interests. ICANN is viewed by many as a ground-breaking example of multistakeholder governance. While ICANN does not "control" the Internet, how it is ultimately governed may set an important precedent in future policy debates—both domestically and internationally—over how the Internet might be governed, and what role governments and intergovernmental organizations should play.

Author Contact Information

Footnotes

For more information on how the Internet is governed, see CRS Report R42351, Internet Governance and the Domain Name System: Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].

For a history of U.S. government involvement in the development of the Internet DNS, see ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC), Overview and History of the IANA Functions, August 15, 2014, pp. 6-10, available at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/sac-067-en.pdf. Also see Aaron Shull, Paul Twomey and Christopher S. Yoo, Global Commission on Internet Governance, Legal Mechanisms for Governing the Transition of Key Domain Name Functions to the Global Multi-stakeholder Community, November 2014, pp. 6-7, available at https://ourinternet-files.s3.amazonaws.com/publications/gcig_paper_no3.pdf.

For more information on ICANN, see CRS Report 97-868, Internet Domain Names: Background and Policy Issues, by [author name scrubbed].

The agreements between NTIA and ICANN are available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/docicann-agreements.

Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. See http://www.internetassignednumbersauthority.org/about.

The authoritative root zone is a globally shared set of data that functions as a central and unified directory that ensures an Internet user will connect with the website that corresponds with the domain name that he or she types into their browser.

According to the National Research Council, "The root zone file defines the DNS. For all practical purposes, a top level domain (and, therefore, all of its lower-level domains) is in the DNS if and only if it is listed in the root zone file. Therefore, presence in the root determines which DNS domains are available on the Internet." See National Research Council, Committee on Internet Navigation and the Domain Name System, Technical Alternatives and Policy Implications, Signposts on Cyberspace: The Domain Name System and Internet Navigation, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 2005, p. 97.

On August 17, 2015, NTIA announced that Verisign and ICANN had developed a proposal for removing NTIA's administrative role associated with root zone management as part of the IANA stewardship transition. See http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/root_zone_administrator_proposal-relatedtoiana_functionsste-final.pdf.

An explanation of NTIA's role in managing the authoritative root zone file is at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntias_role_root_zone_management_12162014.pdf.

For more information on the GAC, see https://gacweb.icann.org/display/gacweb/Governmental+Advisory+Committee.

NTIA, Press Release, "NTIA Announced Intent to Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions," March 14, 2014, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions.

ICANN, "Montevideo Statement on the Future of Internet Cooperation," October 7, 2013, available at https://www.icann.org/en/news/announcements/announcement-07oct13-en.htm.

Testimony of Lawrence Strickling, Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, "Preserving the Multistakeholder Model of Internet Governance," February 25, 2015, p. 11, available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=3abbe751-4440-4c5f-83bd-382b38cbdc05.

ICANN, Adopted Board Resolutions, "IANA Transition Stewardship Proposal from ICG," March 10, 2016, available at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-stewardship-transition-proposal-resolutions-exceprts-10mar16-en.pdf.

ICANN, Adopted Board Resolutions, "Proposal from CCWG on Enhancing ICANN Accountability," March 10, 2016, available at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ccwg-accountability-proposal-resolutions-exceprts-10mar16-en.pdf.

Available at http://www.icann.org/en/about/agreements/iana/transition/draft-proposal-08apr14-en.htm.

Ibid.

Information on ICG membership is available at https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/icg-members-2014-07-29-en.

Charter for the IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group, August 27, 2014, available at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/charter-icg-27aug14-en.pdf.

The CCWG Charter uses the following definition of stakeholder: "a person, group or organization that has a direct or indirect stake or interest in the organization because it can either affect the organization or be affected by it." See https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2014-11-05-en.

https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2014-08-19-en.

A formal objection by any one nation in the GAC would block "full consensus." Currently, GAC decisions are made by consensus, but the GAC could conceivably, in the future, change to a "majority rules" decisionmaking process. The accountability proposal would ensure that only a full consensus GAC decision would be considered by the ICANN Board.

Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability),"Enhancing ICANN Accountability," February 11, 2015, p. 8, available at http://singapore52.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-ccwg-accountability/presentation-ccwg-accountability-11feb15-en.

Cross Community Working Group (CCWG) Charter, November 3, 2014, p. 4, available at https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Charter.

ICANN, Response to Question for the Record submitted by Senator Klobuchar, Senate Commerce Committee Hearing, "Preserving the Multistakeholder Model of Internet Governance," February 25, 2015, available at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/chehade-to-klobuchar-06apr15-en.pdf.

NTIA Administrator Lawrence E. Strickling, Blog, "Reviewing the IANA Transition Proposal," March 11, 2016, available at https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2016/reviewing-iana-transition-proposal.

Government Accountability Office, Internet Management: Structured Evaluation Could Help Assess Proposed Transition of Key Domain Name and Other Technical Functions, GAO-15-642, August 2015, 60 p., available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672055.pdf.

NTIA Administrator Lawrence E. Strickling, Blog, "An Update on the IANA Transition," August 17, 2015, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2015/update-iana-transition.

NTIA Administrator Lawrence E. Strickling, Blog, "An Update on the IANA Transition," August 17, 2015, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2015/update-iana-transition.

Hearing before the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, "Ensuring the Security, Stability, Resilience, and Freedom of the Global Internet," April 2, 2014, available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/ensuring-security-stability-resilience-and-freedom-global-internet.

See http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/letters/20140605GAO.pdf.

Government Accountability Office, Internet Management: Structured Evaluation Could Help Assess Proposed Transition of Key Domain Name and Other Technical Functions, GAO-15-642, August 2015, 60 pages, available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672055.pdf.

House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet, Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing, "Should the Department of Commerce Relinquish Direct Oversight over ICANN?" April 10, 2014, testimony available at http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings?ID=027833A0-0028-42E2-A14B-B9C8BA2576A6.

Testimony available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings.

Testimony available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/stakeholder-perspectives-iana-transition.

Testimony available at http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings?ID=7E5AF16E-B1F8-45B8-803B-9E389A9B745E.

Testimony available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/internet-governance-progress-after-icann-53.

Testimony available at https://energycommerce.house.gov/hearings-and-votes/hearings/privatizing-internet-assigned-number-authority.

Available at http://www.cruz.senate.gov/files/documents/Letters/20150922%20Grassley%20Cruz%20Goodlatte%20Issa%20GAO%20Request%20ICANN.pdf.

Available at https://regmedia.co.uk/2015/10/16/thune-schatz-icann-oct15.pdf.

Available at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/cruz-et-al-to-chehade-04feb16-en.pdf.

Available at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/cruz-et-al-to-crocker-03mar16-en.pdf.

ICANN, "Endorsements of the IANA Globalization Process," March 18, 2014, available at https://www.icann.org/en/about/agreements/iana/globalization-endorsements-18mar14-en.pdf.

The Commerce Department's June 10, 1998 Statement of Policy stated that the U.S. government "is committed to a transition that will allow the private sector to take leadership for DNS management." Available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm.

NTIA, Press Release, "NTIA Announced Intent to Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions," March 14, 2014

Government Accountability Office, Internet Management: Structured Evaluation Could Help Assess Proposed Transition of Key Domain Name and Other Technical Functions, GAO-15-642, August 2015, pp. 41-46.

See Brett D. Schaefer and Paul Rosenzweig, The Heritage Foundation, "Privatizing the Internet Assigned Number Authority," Statement for the Record for the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, House Energy and Commerce Committee, March 17, 2016, available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/20160317/104682/HHRG-114-IF16-20160317-SD003.pdf. The authors recommend a two-year extension of the NTIA-IANA contract which would "allow ICANN to operate under the new structure for a period of time to verify that unforeseen complications and problems do not arise while retaining the ability to reassert the historical NTIA relationship if unforeseen complications arise."