Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

Summary

This report provides an overview of Jordanian politics and current issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations. It provides a brief discussion of Jordan's government and economy and of its cooperation with U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East.

Several issues are likely to figure in decisions by Congress and the Administration on future aid to and cooperation with Jordan. These include Jordan's continued involvement in attempting to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace and the stability of the Jordanian regime, particularly in light of ongoing conflicts in neighboring Syria and Iraq. U.S. officials may also consider potential threats to Jordan from the Islamic State organization (also known as ISIS or ISIL).

Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years. Jordan's small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan address serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan's geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of more powerful neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial relations with one another.

In order to bolster Jordan's economy and military capability, the Administration and Congress have provided significant amounts of foreign assistance to the kingdom in recent months. P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act, provides "not less than" $1.275 billion in bilateral economic and military aid for Jordan. The act also authorizes the use of Defense Department-wide funding (Operations & Maintenance) for Jordan to increase or sustain security along its borders. Section 9012 of the act further specifies that "up to $600 million from the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) may be used to provide assistance to Jordan to enhance security along its borders."

.

Overview

In order to bolster Jordan's economy and military capability, the Administration and Congress have provided significant amounts of foreign assistance to the kingdom in recent months. P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act, provides "not less than" $1.275 billion in bilateral economic and military aid for Jordan. The act also authorizes the use of Defense Department-wide funding (Operations & Maintenance) for Jordan to increase or sustain security along its borders. Section 9012 of the act further specifies that "up to $600 million from the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) may be used to provide assistance to Jordan to enhance security along its borders."

Since U.S. and coalition airstrikes against the Islamic State began in August-September 2014, the Jordanian Air Force has conducted airstrikes against Islamic State militants in Syria and Iraq. Its role increased significantly after the capture and execution of Jordanian pilot Lieutenant Moath al Kasasbeh by the Islamic State in Syria in early 2015. In the aftermath of Kasasbeh's immolation, King Abdullah II vowed to wage a "relentless" war against the Islamic State and "hit them in their own ground." Jordan increased the operational tempo of its airstrikes. Although press reports suggest that Arab contributions to counter the Islamic State have been reduced due to conflicts elsewhere (such as in Yemen), the U.S. State Department has continued to emphasize the importance of Jordan's role, noting that the kingdom is a "lead Arab partner in the C-ISIL [counter-Islamic State] coalition and an active participant in the air campaign."³ When asked earlier this month if Arab partners are continuing to strike IS targets in Syria, Special Presidential Envoy to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL Brett McGurk responded by saying: "I think the Saudis—they have their capabilities, their bandwidth is pretty stretched with Yemen. So I can't say when the last time they took a strike in Syria, but of all our partners, you have to look at how they're contributing in different ways. And the Jordanians.... I think just took a number of airstrikes just last week."⁴

According to one report, Jordan has provided a "staging ground for rebels and their foreign backers on Syria's southern front."⁵ One broad coalition of Syrian rebel groups, known as the "Southern Front," reportedly has direct ties to the Jordan-based Military Operations Center (MOC), which, according to press reports, has coordinated some rebel operations in Syria and is staffed by foreign and Jordanian officials.⁶ The Southern Front has yet to seize key southern Syrian population centers such as Dera'a city (62 miles south of Damascus) and military installations such as Suwayda Air Base. One report indicates that in the fall of 2015, Jordanian officials "vetoed any future operations against Daraa [Dera'a]" due to the ineffectiveness of the Southern Front, which "burned through money and ammunition" and lost over 200 fighters in battles with Asad regime forces.⁷

After Russia began directly intervening in Syria's civil war in the second half of 2015, King Abdullah II secured a commitment from Russian President Vladimir Putin that Russian air strikes would not target the Southern Front. However, in late December 2015, the Asad regime, backed by Russian air strikes, launched an offensive in Dera'a province in order to secure supply routes between Damascus and Dera'a city. According to one Southern Front commander, "The [Syrian] army is making progress with heavy Russian aerial bombing.... We have had over 40 raids in the last 24 hours alone."⁸ Additional reports suggest that the Asad regime and Russia are trying to dislodge the Southern Front and other militant groups from Al Sheikh Maskin, which is a town 14.6 miles north of Dera'a City. If they succeed, it would "drive a wedge between areas of rebel control in the south."⁹

Source: CRS Graphics

Jordan is a member of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG),¹² a group of countries attempting to broker a negotiated settlement to the Syria conflict. Meeting in Vienna, Austria, in late October, ISSG members agreed that "Syria's unity, independence, territorial integrity, and secular character are fundamental"; that "state institutions will remain intact" as part of any ISSG-supported settlement; and that "the rights of all Syrians, regardless of ethnicity or religious denomination, must be protected."¹³ The ISSG invited the United Nations to convene Syrian government and Syrian opposition representatives "for a political process leading to credible, inclusive, non-sectarian governance, followed by a new constitution," and elections in which members of the Syrian diaspora will be eligible to participate. On December 18, the U.N. Security Council unanimously endorsed the ISSG Vienna statements and framework in Resolution 2254.

Jordan's primary role in this process is to spearhead the ISSG's mutually agreed vetting initiative, an attempt to determine which opposition groups should be labelled as "terrorists" and therefore be excluded from any role in a political transition. To date, the group is continuing to deliberate over which Syrian groups should be placed on a terrorism list, and the kingdom is in the difficult position of balancing competing international views regarding the classification of specific Syrian groups as "moderate" or "terrorist." According to the U.S. State Department, "It's not as if Jordan hasn't done anything. It's not as if they've put no thought in this. They have. But we said at the outset that it's going to be an iterative process and it's going to require more discussions and, frankly, more debate, because not everybody still agrees on every group. That shouldn't come as a surprise to anybody. So their work continues. We're grateful to Jordan for the leadership and for making the effort."¹⁴

The continued inflow of Syrian refugees is placing tremendous strains on the Jordanian government. The United Nations (U.N.) High Commissioner for Refugees in January 2016 estimated that there were 635,324 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan, who have increased the country's population by 10%. Jordanian border authorities at times have blocked some refugees from entering the kingdom and forcibly deported others due to security concerns and/or the strains the refugee population has placed on the country's northern provinces (governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, Ar Ramtha and Zarqa).¹⁷ Rents have nearly tripled in border towns, making housing unaffordable for many Jordanians. Jordan's hospitals, schools, sanitation, and water systems are under similar strain. Some Jordanian observers are openly questioning the wisdom of continuing to accept Syrian refugees and warning that resource, budget, and demographic pressures may disrupt life in the kingdom for a decade or more. According to one Jordanian government estimate, the direct cost of the refugee crisis to the government from the beginning of the Syria conflict is expected to rise to $4.2 billion by 2016.¹⁸ The U.S. State Department estimates that, since large-scale U.S. aid to Syrian refugees began in FY2012, it has allocated more than $668 million in humanitarian assistance from global accounts to help Jordan cope with the Syrian refugee crisis.¹⁹

The Jordanian government has long described efforts to secure a lasting end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as one of its highest priorities. In 1994 Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty,²⁰ and King Abdullah II has used his country's semi-cordial official relationship with Israel to improve Jordan's standing with Western governments and international financial institutions, on which it relies heavily for external support and aid. Nevertheless, the persistence of Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a major challenge for Jordan. The issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population; more than half of all Jordanian citizens originate from either the West Bank or the area now comprising the state of Israel.

Although Jordanian officials and their Israeli counterparts maintain quiet but cordial relations, tensions over Jerusalem periodically strain diplomatic ties. In the fall of 2015, Arabs clashed with Israeli police in protest over perceived Jewish worship (see textbox) at the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif compound (Mount/Haram, which includes the Al Aqsa Mosque) in Jerusalem. Per long-standing agreement, the kingdom oversees the Muslim Waqf (endowment or trust) that administers the compound. During the episode, some Jordanian parliamentarians accused Israel of occupying the Mount/Haram in an attempt to "Judaize" the site. During an October 2015 visit to the region, Secretary of State John Kerry defused Israel-Jordan tensions to some extent by facilitating an agreement in principle between the two countries to use video cameras to monitor the Mount/Haram. The details of any joint video monitoring efforts remain unclear.

Despite disputes over Jerusalem, bilateral cooperation is ongoing in other areas, most notably on military and water issues. In the summer of 2015, multiple reports suggested that an unnamed Arab country participated in "Red Flag" training exercises alongside U.S. and Israeli pilots. One U.S. official suggested that Jordanian warplanes participated in these multinational drills and Jordanian jets even "refueled from an Israeli tanker over the Atlantic Ocean."²³

On December 9, 2013, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority signed a regional water agreement that could pave the way for the Red-Dead Canal, a multi-billion dollar project to address declining water levels in the Dead Sea. Under this December 2013 agreement, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority agreed to a water swap. Half of the water pumped from the Red Sea is to be desalinated in a plant to be constructed in Aqaba, Jordan. Some of this water is to then be used in southern Jordan. The rest is to be sold to Israel for use in the Negev Desert. In return, Israel is to sell freshwater from the Sea of Galilee to northern Jordan and sell the Palestinian Authority discounted freshwater produced by existing Israeli desalination plants on the Mediterranean. The other half of the water pumped from the Red Sea (or possibly the leftover brine from desalination) is to be channeled to the Dead Sea.

In February 2015, Israel and Jordan signed an agreement establishing a joint agency to administer the construction of the Red-Dead Canal and an associated desalination plant. In late 2015, Jordan moved ahead by issuing a "prequalification tender" to private companies and consortiums interested in contracting for phase one of the project to build a water conveyance system (pipeline) from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea.

P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act, specifies that $100 million in Economic Support Funds be set aside for water sector support for Jordan. This aid is intended to support the Red Sea-Dead Sea water project, pending completion of relevant studies and assessments.

Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues for decades. Jordan's small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan's geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its powerful neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial relations with one another.

Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of desert or semi-desert territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of Bedouin tribal background. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 brought large numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which subsequently unilaterally annexed a small Palestinian enclave west of the Jordan River known as the West Bank.²⁴ The original "East Bank" Jordanians, though probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country's political and military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the Jordanian monarchy. Jordanians of Palestinian origin comprise an estimated 55% to 70% of the population and generally tend to gravitate toward the private sector due to their general exclusion from certain public sector and military positions.²⁵

Jordan in Brief

Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy under the prestigious Hashemite family, which claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad. King Abdullah II (age 53) has ruled the country since 1999, when he succeeded to the throne upon the death of his father, the late King Hussein, after a 47-year reign. Educated largely in Britain and the United States, King Abdullah II had earlier pursued a military career, ultimately serving as commander of Jordan's Special Operations Forces with the rank of Major General. The king's son, Prince Hussein bin Abdullah (born in 1994), is the designated crown prince.²⁶

The king appoints a prime minister to head the government and the Council of Ministers (Cabinet).²⁷ On average, Jordanian governments last no more than 15 months before they are dissolved by royal decree. This seems to be done in order to bolster the king's reform credentials and to distribute patronage among a wide range of elites. The king also appoints all judges and is commander of the armed forces.

The Jordanian constitution (promulgated in 1952) empowers the king with broad executive powers. According to Article 35, "The King appoints the Prime Minister and may dismiss him or accept his resignation. He appoints the Ministers; he also dismisses them or accepts their resignation, upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister." The constitution enables the king to dissolve both houses of parliament and postpone lower house elections for two years.²⁸ The king can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism that allows provisional legislation to be issued by the Cabinet when parliament is not sitting or has been dissolved.²⁹ The king also can issue royal decrees, which are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The king commands the armed forces, declares war, and ratifies treaties. Finally, Article 195 of the Jordanian Penal Code prohibits insulting the dignity of the king (lèse-majesté) with criminal penalties of one to three years in prison.

Political parties in Jordan are extremely weak, as the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic Action Front (IAF) is the only well-organized movement. Most parties represent narrow parochial interests and are composed of prominent individuals representing a particular family or tribe.

Jordan's constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article 97, "Judges are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other than that of the law." Jordan has three main types of courts: Civil courts, special courts (some of which are military/state security courts), and religious courts. In Jordan, state security courts administered by military (and civilian) judges handle criminal cases involving espionage, bribery of public officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketeering, and "security offenses." Overall, the king may appoint and dismiss judges by decree, though in practice a palace-appointed Higher Judicial Council manages court appointments, promotions, transfers, and retirements.

Source: Created by CRS. Images derived from various media sources.

In Jordan, there is widespread dissatisfaction with the state of the economy and widespread apathy over the prospects for meaningful democratic reform. Nonetheless, public opinion seems more concerned with the deteriorating security situation in neighboring Syria and Iraq than in supporting the domestic political opposition. Moreover, although the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is the strongest opposition group, it is divided³⁰ between reformists and conservatives, and pro- and anti-monarchical factions. Youth protestors also have become active in opposition political circles, though these groups tend to be small and divided along secular-Islamist or even tribal lines.

In the spring of 2015, Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood fractured, leading to disputes over its legal status. A month after a state security court sentenced the deputy head of the organization to 18 months in prison for criticizing the United Arab Emirates in a Facebook post,³¹ another Brotherhood leader attempted to form a new organization that would be legally recognized by the state. In March 2015, Jordanian authorities licensed this new off-shoot of the Brotherhood, called the Muslim Brotherhood Association. Its parent organization, which is licensed as a charity and not an association, expelled the new group from its ranks, leaving Jordan with two competing Muslim Brotherhood political groups. According to one account, "The new, watered-down Brotherhood, licensed on March 4, is headed by former senator Abdul Majid Thneibat and comprised of liberal Brotherhood officials with ties to the government, providing Jordan what many officials have desired in private—a Brotherhood answerable to the regime that would not push for widespread reforms."³² The old and new Brotherhood organizations are now locked in legal disputes over ownership of assets. Some analysts are concerned that Brotherhood members who are legally excluded from politics could join more radical organizations that espouse violence. According to one U.S.-based analyst, "while Amman has tamed its local Brotherhood chapter, it may have complicated its fight against domestic Islamist militancy in the process."³³

Source: International Republican Institute, "IRI Poll: Jordanians Optimistic about Direction of the Country even as Concerns over Terrorism Emerge," May 27, 2015.

With few natural resources³⁴ and a small industrial base, Jordan has an economy which is heavily dependent on external aid from abroad, tourism, expatriate worker remittances,³⁵ and the service sector. Among the long-standing problems Jordan faces are poverty (14.4%), corruption, slow economic growth, and high levels of unemployment (including female unemployment), nominally around 12.5% but thought by many analysts to be in the 25%-30% range.³⁶ Youth unemployment is nearly 33%. Corruption³⁷ is pronounced in Jordan. Use of intermediaries, referred to in Arabic as "Wasta" (connections), is widespread, and many young Jordanians have grown frustrated by the lack of social and economic mobility that corruption engenders.³⁸ Each year, thousands of Jordanians go abroad in search of better jobs and opportunities. Like many poor countries, Jordan suffers from a "brain drain" of its most talented workers, and the government has struggled to develop incentives to keep its well-educated, highly skilled workers close to home.³⁹ The government is by far the largest employer, with between one-third and two-thirds of all workers on the state's payroll. According to a recent survey by Pew, 73% of Jordanians have a negative view of economic conditions in their country.⁴⁰

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Jordan's economy is slowly recovering from the downturn that spread across the region in 2011. In 2014, GDP grew 3.1%. The Economist Intelligence Unit predicts that GDP will grow 2.5% this year. However, according to the International Monetary Fund, Jordan needs a growth rate of 6% to absorb new entrants into its labor force.

(4-quarter moving average, in percent)

Source: National authorities and IMF estimates. Figure from IMF.

Due to perennially subpar economic growth, high energy/food subsidies, and a bloated public sector workforce, Jordan usually runs annual budget deficits (total public debt is $32 billion), which it partially offsets by appealing to the international community for direct budget support. In order to keep Jordan fiscally stable, the International Monetary Fund agreed to a three-year, $2 billion loan in August 2012. As part of the IMF deal, Jordan is increasing consumer electricity prices. It already has increased taxes on mobile phones and contracts. Nevertheless, economists are closely following Jordan's overall debt burden, which has somewhat improved in 2015, falling to 80% (net public debt) of GDP.

The United States has provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2015 amounted to approximately $15.833 billion.

On February 3, 2015, the Obama Administration and the Jordanian government signed a nonbinding, three-year memorandum of understanding (MOU), in which the United States pledges to provide the kingdom with $1 billion annually in total U.S. foreign assistance, subject to the approval of Congress, from FY2015 through FY2017. The new MOU followed a previous five-year agreement in which the United States had pledged to provide a total of $660 million annually from FY2009 through FY2014. During those five years, Congress actually provided Jordan with $4.753 billion in total aid, or $1.453 billion ($290.6 million annually) above what was agreed to in the five-year MOU, including more than $1 billion in FY2014. According to the Department of State, "The United States and Jordan share a commitment to promoting regional security and stability, furthering Jordan's economic development, and advancing social, political, and economic reform in Jordan. The United States recognizes Jordan's increased immediate needs resulting from regional unrest, the efforts Jordan is undertaking at the forefront of the fight against ISIL and other extremist ideology and terrorism, the influx of refugees from Syria and Iraq, the disruption of foreign energy supplies, and other unprecedented strains."⁴²

$ in millions

The United States provides economic aid to Jordan both as a cash transfer and for USAID programs in Jordan. The Jordanian government uses cash transfers to service its foreign debt. Approximately 40% to 60% of Jordan's ESF allotment may go toward the cash transfer. USAID programs in Jordan focus on a variety of sectors including democracy assistance, water preservation, and education (particularly building and renovating public schools). In the democracy sector, U.S. assistance has supported capacity-building programs for the parliament's support offices, the Jordanian Judicial Council, the Judicial Institute, and the Ministry of Justice. The International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute also have received U.S. grants to train, among other groups, some Jordanian political parties and members of parliament. In the water sector, the bulk of U.S. economic assistance is devoted to optimizing the management of scarce water resources, as Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the world. USAID is currently subsidizing several waste treatment and water distribution projects in the Jordanian cities of Amman, Mafraq, Aqaba, and Irbid.

In FY2006, Jordan was listed by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) as a Threshold country in the lower middle-income bracket. On September 12, 2006, the MCC's board of directors approved up to $25 million in Threshold Program assistance for Jordan. In September 2010, the Millennium Challenge Corporation approved a five-year, $275.1 million compact with Jordan to increase the supply of water available to households and businesses in the cities of Amman and Zarqa. The compact also is intended to help improve the efficiency of water delivery, wastewater collection, and wastewater treatment. If estimates hold true, the clean drinking water generated as a result of the MCC compact may be enough to supply almost 1 million Jordanian citizens with freshwater.

Since 2013, the Obama Administration has provided three loan guarantees to Jordan, totaling $3.75 billion.⁴³ These include:

• In September 2013, the United States announced that it was providing its first-ever loan guarantee to the Kingdom of Jordan. USAID notified Congress of its intent to obligate up to $120 million in FY2013 ESF-OCO to support a $1.25 billion, 7-year sovereign loan guarantee for Jordan.
• In February 2014, during a visit to the United States by King Abdullah II, the Obama Administration announced that it would offer Jordan an additional five-year, $1 billion loan guarantee. USAID notified Congress of its intent to obligate $72 million out of the $340 million of FY2014ESF-OCO for Jordan to support the subsidy costs for the second loan guarantee.
• In June 2015, the Administration provided its third loan guarantee to Jordan of $1.5 billion. USAID notified Congress of its intent to obligate $221 million in FY2015 ESF to support the subsidy costs of the third loan guarantee to Jordan.⁴⁴

Foreign Military Financing

U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation is a key component in bilateral relations. U.S. military assistance is primarily directed toward enabling the Jordanian military to procure and maintain conventional weapons systems. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants to Jordan enable its Air Force to maintain a modest fleet of F-16 fighters and purchase Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM). FMF grants also provide financing for Jordan's purchase of U.S. Blackhawk helicopters in order to enhance Jordan's border monitoring and counter-terror capability. In recent years, Jordan also has acquired Javelin missiles, Hellfire missiles, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, and night-vision devices.⁴⁵

Excess Defense Articles

In 1996, the United States granted Jordan Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status, a designation that, among other things, makes Jordan eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, training, and loans of equipment for cooperative research and development.⁴⁶ Since 2009, Jordan has received excess U.S. defense equipment valued at approximately $81.69 million.⁴⁷ In the last five years, Jordan has received excess U.S. defense articles, including two C-130 aircraft, HAWK MEI-23E missiles, and cargo trucks.

Defense Department Assistance

As a result of the Syrian civil war and Operation Inherent Resolve against ISIS, the United States has increased military aid to Jordan and channeled these increases through Defense Department-managed accounts. Although Jordan still receives the bulk of U.S. military aid from the FMF account, Congress has authorized defense appropriations to strengthen Jordan's border security. Currently, Congress has authorized Jordan to receive funding from three primary accounts: (1) Section 1206/10 U.S.C. 2282 Authority to Build Partner Capacity,⁴⁸ (2) the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF),⁴⁹ and (3) Department of Defense Operations & Maintenance Funds (O&M).⁵⁰ Military aid provided by these accounts is generally coordinated through a joint Defense Department (DOD)-State Department (DOS) review and approved by the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

Jordan's Request for More Munitions

When King Abdullah II visited Washington in February 2015, his government requested urgent resupply of munitions. Since then, the U.S. executive branch (via the interagency process) has worked with Jordanian interlocutors to expedite arms deliveries to Jordan. The executive branch may provide congressional oversight committees with updates on U.S. efforts to provide immediate air sustainment to the Royal Jordanian Air Force and enhance border security for the Royal Jordanian Armed Forces. Reports indicate that items provided to the Air Force have included F-16 air strike munitions, guided bomb kits, pilot survival gear, and spare parts. Reports indicate that items requested by Jordan for border security include UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, Hellfire missiles, Kevlar vests, night-vision devices, and TOW anti-tank missiles.⁵¹

Exporting U.S.-made Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to Jordan

Jordan may be seeking to acquire unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for its operations in Iraq and Syria. In early February 2015, Representative Duncan Hunter wrote a letter to President Obama suggesting that the Administration permit the export of the Predator XP to Jordan.⁵² On March 9, 23 lawmakers reportedly wrote the President asking that the Jordanian Air Force be permitted to utilize U.S. Air Force-owned MQ-1 Predator UAV assets without transferring actual UAV ownership to Jordan.⁵³ Representative Hunter reportedly wrote another letter to the President in May 2015 suggesting that the Chinese government was in talks with the Jordanian government over the possible acquisition of "weaponized unmanned systems."⁵⁴ In August 2015, some press accounts suggested that Israel may be providing Jordan with Israeli-built UAVs such as the Heron TP.⁵⁵

In December 2015, Representative Hunter published an article asserting that the State Department had denied Jordan's request to import the MQ-9 Reaper, saying "Now the Chinese are arranging the sale of their drone, the Caihong 5, a Reaper equivalent that would otherwise fall under the same constraints imposed on U.S. drones. Reportedly, Israel is also providing two of its Heron drones."⁵⁶ The State Department has explained its actions by referring to U.S. adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime,⁵⁷ noting, "We recognize that the United States cannot meet all of Jordan's requests as we will likely continue to receive requests for systems that involve technology release restrictions and/or are prohibitively expensive and could therefore distract from higher priority requests."⁵⁸ Reports also suggest that the Defense Department has delivered to Jordan four Air Tractor AT-802 aircraft to be used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) purposes.⁵⁹ These planes were originally destined for Yemen (redirected 1206 funding), and their supply to Jordan was notified to Congress in the summer of 2015.

Source: Jane's Defence Weekly

In report language accompanying P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act, conferees endorsed "expediting Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales cases and related licenses to partners in the coalition in the fight against ISIL and, not later than 60 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, is directed to submit to the Committees on Appropriations a report on the feasibility and actions required to furnish armed and unarmed unmanned aerial systems and associated technologies to such partners. The report should include a summary of actions taken to approve such systems since the initiation of military operations against ISIL, and efforts to expedite the approval of such systems, consistent with United States law and policy."

($ in millions)

Fiscal Year (FY)

Economic Assistance

Military Assistance

Totals

EconSpt

Food

Devel

PeaceCp

FMF

IMET

1991

0

0

0

1.3

56.30

1992

20.0

0

0

.6

70.60

5.0

30.0

0

0

9.0

.5

44.50

9.0

15.0

4.0

0

9.0

.8

37.80

1995

7.2

15.0

6.7

0

7.3

1.0

37.20

1996

7.2

21.0

7.9

0

1.2

237.30

112.2

2.6

4.5

1.1

30.0

1.7

152.10

150.0

0

0

1.2

1.6

227.80

1999

150.0

0

0

1.4

1.6

223.00

1999 (Wye)

50.0

0

0

0

50.0

0

100.00

2000

150.0

0

0

1.7

75.0

1.6

228.30

2000 (Wye)

50.0

0

0

0

150.0

0

2001

150.0

0

0

1.7

75.0

1.7

228.40

2002

150.0

0

0

1.6

75.0

2.0

228.60

2002 (Suppl.)

100.0

0

0

0

25.0

0

125.00

2003

250.0

0

0

1.0

198.0

2.4

451.40

2003 (Suppl.)

700.0

0

0

0

406.0

0

1,106.00

2004

250.0

0

0

2.3

206.0

2.9

461.20

2004 (Suppl.)

100.0

0

0

0

0

0

100.00

2005

250.0

0

0

1.6

206.0

3.0

460.60

2005 (Suppl.)

100.0

0

0

0

100.0

0

200.00

2006

247.5

0

0

1.6

207.9

3.0

460.00

2006 (Suppl.)

50.0

0

0

0

0

0

50.00

2007

245.0

0

0

0

206.0

3.1

454.10

2007 (Suppl.)

10.3

0

0

0

45.0

0

2008

361.4

0

0

0

298.3

2.9

662.60

2008 (Suppl.)

200.0

0

0

0

50.0

0

250.00

2009

263.5

0

0

0

235.0

3.1

501.60

2009 (Suppl.)

150.0

0

0

0

0

150.00

2010

363.0

0

0

0

300.0

3.8

666.8

2010 (Suppl.)

100.0

0

0

0

50.0

0

150.0

2011

362.0

0

0

0

299.4

3.7

665.1

2012

460.0

0

0

0

300.0

3.7

763.7

2013

564.404

0

0

0

284.829

3.608

852.841

2014

0

0

0

300.0

3.588

1,003.588

2015 est.

700.0

0

0

0

300.0

3.888

1,003.888

Notes: These figures do not include debt relief subsidy appropriations, food aid between 1999-2006, or amounts for de-mining assistance and counter-terrorism assistance.

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