Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
June 16October 2, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43960
Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention
Summary
This report provides material on the latest crisis in Yemen and the U.S. policy response. For
further background and analysis on Yemen, see CRS Report RL34170, Yemen: Background and
U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
Yemen’s internationally backed transition government, which replaced the regime of former
President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2012, has collapsed. In its place is an alliance comprised of the
In March 2015, Saudi Arabia and members of a coalition launched a military operation aimed at
restoring the rule of Yemeni President Abdu Rabbo Mansour Hadi, who fled Yemen on March 25,
2015, after over a year in which his government and tribal allies have gradually been supplanted
by an alliance comprised of the Houthi movement and loyalists of former president Saleh. Current President Abdu Rabbo
Mansour Hadi is now in exile in Saudi Arabia, which launched a major military operation against
the Houthi/Saleh alliance on March 25; the stated goal of this operation is to restore President
Hadi to power.
To date, after more than two months of fighting that has resulted in as many as 1,400 Yemeni
casualties and 500,000 displaced persons, Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners continue to
conduct military operations against Houthi fighters and their allies. From a military standpoint,
the Saudi-led coalition has conducted numerous air strikes in support of tribal allies and Hadi
loyalists on the ground and blockaded Yemen’s coastline and closed Yemen’s airspace in order to
prevent Iran from resupplying the Houthis.
In order to restore stability to Yemen, the Obama Administration has been supporting a United
Nations-led process in Geneva to reach a negotiated settlement between Yemen’s warring
factions. The United States reportedly continues to provide unspecified military and intelligence
support to the Saudi military efforts. As of mid-June, U.S. and international attempts to begin a
political process have accelerated, and United Nations-backed peace talks are now underway in
Geneva, Switzerland
The White House issued a statement on March 25 blaming the Houthis for causing the crisis in
Yemen. The United States recognizes President Hadi as the legitimate leader of Yemen, and
President Obama authorized “the provision of logistical and intelligence support to GCC-led
military operations.” The Administration claimed that while U.S. forces are “not taking direct
military action in Yemen in support of this effort, we are establishing a Joint Planning Cell with
Saudi Arabia to coordinate U.S. military and intelligence support.”
Although the Houthi-Saleh alliance had been gradually seizing control of Yemeni provinces and
government/military installations for more than a year, in the winter 2015, they had rapidly
outmaneuvered President Hadi, who had been under house arrest since January. Hadi eventually
escaped from his Houthi captors and fled to Aden, where he denounced the coup against him and
began to marshal the remains of the national military as well as loyal tribal militias to counter
Houthi-Saleh advances.
As of early October 2015, the Saudi-led Arab Coalition has succeeded in retaking Aden and most
of southern Yemen. What began as primarily an air campaign (referred to by the Saudis as
Operation Storm of Determination or Decisive Storm) has evolved into a conventional ground
conflict, with thousands of Arab coalition troops on the ground. Currently, the coalition and
Houthis are battling in Taiz and Marib provinces, and airstrikes continue against targets around
the capital Sana’a and other Houthi-controlled areas. As the coalition pushes northward toward
the capital and attacks Houthi territory in northernmost Yemen, the war could continue and even
intensify depending on the will of the combatants to keep pressing forward. Since hostilities
started in March 2015, an estimated 5,000 people have been killed in the fighting, including 2,355
civilians.
There is a significant terrorist presence in Yemen, and U.S. policymakers are concerned that
without a willing counterterrorism partner such as President Hadi, the United States may lack
necessary intelligence cooperation on the ground to counter groups such as Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization that has attempted
attacks against the United States on several occasions. Nevertheless, the United States reportedly
has been able to act either unilaterally or perhaps in concert with Saudi Arabian intelligence
against AQAP and its associated allies. On June 16, AQAP released a video statement
acknowledging that a recent U.S. strike had killed Nasser al Wuhayshi, AQAP’s leader and the
second-highest-ranking leader of Al Qaeda’s international terrorist network.
As recently as fall 2014, the Obama Administration had expressed cautious optimism about
Yemen’s trajectory, though the 2014-2015 takeover of Sana’a by the Houthis, a clan from the
Zaydi sect (related to Shia Islam), upended Yemen’s political transition. The State Department
reports that the United States committed more than $221.4 million in assistance to Yemen in
FY2014, in addition to $316.23 million in FY2013 and more than $353 million in FY2012.
Current annual appropriations language includes a provision that would restrict U.S. funding of
Yemen’s military were it to be controlled by a foreign terrorist organization.
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Contents
Latest Developments. ....................................................................................................................... 1
U.S. Policy and Peace NegotiationsIran’s Role ................................................................................................. 2
Terrorism...................................... 3
Terrorism .................................................................................................... 3
AQAP Leader Killed ....................................... 4
U.S. Policy.......................................................................... 4
Status of American Government Personnel and U.S. Citizens in Yemen .......................................... 4
Other Recent Congressional Action ..................... 5
Status of American Government Personnel and U.S. Citizens in Yemen ................................. 5
Recent Congressional Action ........................................... 5
Background: Government Collapse and Regional War in Yemen ......................................................... 6
Figures
Figure 1. Conflict in Yemen ................................................War in Yemen: Battle Lines as of September 2015 ............................................................. 1 2
Contacts
Author Contact Information. ............................................................................................................ 76
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Latest Developments
After more than two months of fighting that has resulted in as many as 1,400 Yemeni casualties
and 500,000 displaced persons, Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners continue to conduct
military operations against Houthi fighters and their allies. Saudi Arabia launched what it refers to
as “Operation Decisive Storm” in late March 2015 in order to restore the now-exiled President of
Yemen, Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi, to power and push Houthi rebels back from seized
territories. The Saudi military changed the name of the operation to Restoring Hope in late April.
From a military standpoint, the Saudi-led coalition has conducted numerous air strikes in support
of tribal allies and Hadi loyalists on the ground and blockaded Yemen’s coastline in order to
prevent Iran from resupplying the Houthis. As of June 2015, it would appear that Saudi efforts
have yet to reverse Houthi gains, though the situation remains fluid and victories by either side
would appear tenuous. For example, though the Saudi-led coalition has kept the southern port of
Aden from falling to the Houthis entirely, the city remains divided. Moreover, in early June,
clashes have continued along the Saudi-Yemeni border, as Saudi Patriot missile batteries
intercepted a Scud missile fired by Houthi/Saleh forces into the kingdom.
Figure 1. Conflict in Yemen
Source: http://www.stratfor.com.
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According to Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution:
After more than two months of conflict, the rebels have strengthened their grip on most of
the country. Only in the far eastern region, in Hadhramaut province, have they failed to
advance. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) controls Hadhramaut and its capital at
Mukalla, Yemen's fifth largest city. This is AQAP's largest-ever stronghold. It is carrying out
terror attacks on Houthi targets from its stronghold. Exiled president Abd Rabbu Hadi still
has control of parts of Aden, the largest port on the Arabian Sea. But even in Aden, the antiHouthi camp is not united. Some fighters are southern secessionists who want independence
for South Yemen, not a restoration of Hadi's government in Sanaa.1
From a political standpoint, President Hadi remains in exile in Saudi Arabia, and though much of
the international community considers him the legitimate head of state, the Houthis are in control
of what remains of Yemen’s government on the ground. Unless the Houthi movement can be
rolled back to its home province of Sada’a in northern Yemen, it would appear that any future
governing arrangement would come as the result of a compromise between Hadi and the Houthis.
From a humanitarian standpoint, Yemen, which under normal circumstances is an extremely
impoverished country, is experiencing severe shortages of food, water, and fuel for electricity.
Relief organizations estimate that approximately 60% of the population is without access to clean
drinking water and sanitation. According to United Nations estimates, 78% of the population is in
need of emergency aid. Saudi Arabia’s air campaign has repeatedly bombed Houthi-controlled
territory and infrastructure, causing significant collateral damage. The Saudi coalition’s naval and
air blockade, designed to thwart Iran’s resupply of the Houthis, also has exacerbated the
humanitarian crisis in Yemen by preventing aid shipments from quickly reaching the population.
The Houthis also have intercepted aid shipments intended for civilians. The U.S. State
Department has “urged all parties to allow the entry and delivery of urgently needed food,
medicine, fuel and other necessary assistance through UN and international humanitarian
organization channels to address the urgent needs of civilians impacted by the crisis.”2
U.S. Policy and Peace Negotiations
When Saudi Arabia launched Operation Decisive Storm/Restoring Hope, it initially received U.S.
political and military support. However, Saudi Arabia’s ongoing military campaign in Yemen
places the Administration in an apparent quandary. On the one hand, in the context of Saudi
unease over the potential nuclear deal with Iran and preexisting U.S.-Saudi cooperation against
terrorist groups in Yemen, U.S. officials deemed it important to publicly support Saudi military
operations against the Houthis. On the other hand, as the operation has continued over time,
Yemen has become increasingly unstable, creating opportunities for extremists such as Al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State to increase their influence. Moreover, the
conflict has enflamed Saudi-Iranian tensions, leading to confrontational statements between
respective Saudi and Iranian government officials and near maritime clashes between Saudi and
Iranian vessels in the Gulf of Aden.3
1
“A Bleeding Wound on the Saudi Border: Why Yemen Peace Talks are unlikely to make Progress,” Brookings
Markaz Blog, June 15, 2015.
2
“Saudi-led Naval Blockade leaves 20m Yemenis facing Humanitarian Disaster,” The Guardian, June 5, 2015.
3
“WFP [World Food Programme] says to Deliver Iran Aid Cargo for Yemen after Ship Docks in Djibouti,” Reuters,
(continued...)
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In order to stabilize the situation, reduce Saudi-Iranian tensions, and possibly provide Saudi
Arabia an exit strategy from Yemen, the Administration has been supporting a United Nations-led
process in Geneva to reach a negotiated settlement between Yemen’s warring factions. The joint
statement issued during the President’s recent summit with various leaders of the GCC states, said
that “With regard to Yemen, both the United States and GCC member states underscored the
imperative of collective efforts to counter Al-Qa’ida [Qaeda] in the Arabian Peninsula, and
emphasized the need to rapidly shift from military operations to a political process...”4
As of mid-June, U.S. and international efforts to begin a political process have accelerated, and
United Nations-backed peace talks are now underway in Geneva, Switzerland. The U.S. State
Department5 recently acknowledged that Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Anne
Patterson and U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Matthew Tueller led an American delegation to Oman
and Saudi Arabia where they conducted talks with various Yemeni figures, including Houthi
leaders, in order to jumpstart a U.N.-led political process.6 Shortly thereafter, the Houthis released
American Casey Coombs, a freelance journalist who had been detained by Houthi rebels for two
weeks. The United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, also has
reportedly been involved in shuttle diplomacy.
Currently, the Houthis and President Hadi have agreed to send delegates to the talks. Previously,
President Hadi and his Saudi backers had insisted that they would not participate in peace talks
until the Houthis adhered to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216, which the United
States voted in favor of back in April 2015. UNSCR 2216 demands that the “Houthis withdraw
from all areas seized during the latest conflict, relinquish arms seized from military and security
institutions, cease all actions falling exclusively within the authority of the legitimate
Government of Yemen and fully implement previous Council resolutions.”
Terrorism
As has been demonstrated in the past, when Yemen is in the throes of domestic conflict and its
military occupied, terrorist groups such as AQAP are able to seize territory in outlying provinces.
This has been the case during Operation Decisive Storm. In the early days of the conflict, AQAP
militiamen, who already had been active in the eastern province of Hadramawt, attacked
government installations, air and sea ports, and hydrocarbon facilities. AQAP seized the city of Al
Mukalla in April, and the city’s ruling body has “wrapped al Qaeda into local administration in
order to avoid infighting.”7 According to one report, “the residents of Mukalla said AQAP has
(...continued)
May 22, 2015.
4
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.- Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David Joint Statement, May
14, 2015.
5
The U.S.State Department has stated that it “welcomes the June 6 announcement that the UN-facilitated consultations
among Yemeni stakeholders will begin in Geneva on June 14. We reiterate the call of the Security Council for Yemenis
to attend these talks in good faith and without preconditions.... We further condemn the June 6 missile attack on Saudi
Arabia, in addition to other recent attacks on Saudi Arabian territory by forces affiliated with the Houthis and former
President Saleh. We recognize Saudi Arabia’s right to defend its territory, its borders, and its people.” See, U.S. State
Department, “United States Welcomes UN-facilitated Consultations on Yemen,” June 8, 2015.
6
“U.S. Met Secretly With Yemen Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2015.
7
“Al Qaeda seen assuming Policing Role in Eastern Yemen,” Reuters, May 14, 2015.
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refrained from imposing strict interpretations of Islamic law, such as banning Arabic music and
Western fashions, as the group did when it briefly established an “emirate” in the Yemeni
province of Abyan in 2011.”8 It also has renamed itself as the “Sons of Hadhramaut” perhaps in
As of early October 2015, the Saudi-led Arab Coalition has succeeded in uprooting fighters from
the northern Yemen-based, Zaydi Shiite Ansar Allah movement (Partisans of God, aka Houthi
movement)1and their allies from Aden and most of southern Yemen. What began as primarily an
air campaign (referred to by the Saudis as Operation Storm of Determination or Decisive Storm)
has evolved into a conventional ground conflict, with thousands of Arab coalition troops on the
ground. Currently, the coalition and Houthis are battling in Taiz and Marib provinces, and
airstrikes continue against targets around the capital Sana’a and other Houthi-controlled areas. As
the coalition pushes northward toward the capital and attacks Houthi territory in northernmost
Yemen, the war could continue and even intensify depending on the will of the combatants to
keep pressing forward. If the Saudi-led coalition decides to attack the capital Sana’a using ground
troops, casualties on all sides could rise significantly. Since hostilities started in March 2015, an
estimated 5,000 people have been killed in the fighting, including 2,355 civilians. A Saudi
airstrike in late September killed between 80 and 130 civilians at a wedding party, drawing
criticism from human rights groups and other observers.
The Saudi-led coalition has “liberated” Aden, and President Hadi and some of his cabinet
ministers have returned from exile in Saudi Arabia to the city. They have established a temporary
headquarters there, but the war appears far from over. The Houthis and their allies (tribal forces
aligned with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh) have managed to inflict damage on their
opponents and still occupy significant population centers and strategic areas. On September 4, 60
coalition troops from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain were killed
when a Houthi-fired missile struck an ammunition depot. To date, more than 100 Saudi soldiers
and 50 UAE troops have been killed in the war—the highest death toll for the UAE in any
military operation abroad since the country was founded in 1971.
1
The Ansar Allah movement is a predominantly Zaydi Shiite revivalist political and insurgent movement that formed
in the northern province of Sa’da in 2004 under the leadership of members of the Al Houthi family. It originally sought
an end to what it viewed as efforts to marginalize Zaydi communities and beliefs, but its goals grew in scope and
ambition in the wake of the 2011 uprising and government collapse to embrace a broader populist, anti-establishment
message. Members of its Zaydi Shiite base of support are closer in their beliefs to Sunni Muslims than most other
Shiites, and some Yemeni observers argue that the motives of the Houthi movement are evolving to include new
political and social goals that cannot be explained strictly in sectarian terms. Skeptics highlight the movement’s
ideological roots, its alleged cooperation with Iran, and the slogans prominently displayed on its banners: “God is
great! Death to America! Death to Israel! Curse the Jews! Victory to Islam!”
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Figure 1. War in Yemen: Battle Lines as of September 2015
Source: European Council on Foreign Relations
Despite the coalition’s losses, Yemen’s population faces far greater calamities. In short, Yemen,
which under normal circumstances is the least developed country in the Arab world, is facing an
unprecedented humanitarian crisis. According to the United Nations, more than half of Yemen’s
25 million people are designated as “food insecure” and depend on food assistance for their
survival.2 Six million Yemenis require immediate food assistance, and the United Nations warned
that unless food assistance reaches Yemen in large quantities, Yemen may be on the brink of
famine. To date, 1.5 million Yemenis are internally displaced persons (IDPs). Moreover, shortages
of fuel used to pump water has led to a significant deterioration in public health, as dengue fever
has broken out in Yemen’s third largest city of Taiz.
2
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Yemen: Humanitarian Snapshot as of 6
September 2015.
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United Nations’ efforts to jumpstart direct talks toward a lasting peace agreement between
Yemeni President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi and the Houthis have not succeeded, perhaps
because the Saudi-led Arab coalition may feel emboldened to continue combat operations. UN
Special Envoy for Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed has reported to the Security Council that
while there has been positive movement toward talks, the coalition’s position may be hardening.3
A joint U.S.-Saudi statement released during King Salman’s September 2015 visit to Washington,
DC, said: 4
On Yemen, the two parties stressed the urgent need to implement relevant United Nations
Security Council resolutions, including UNSCR 2216, in order to facilitate a political
solution based on the GCC Initiative and the outcomes of the National Dialogue. Both
leaders expressed concern for the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. King Salman conveyed
Saudi Arabia’s commitment to continue to assist the Yemeni people; to work with
coalition and international partners to allow for unfettered access to assistance vetted by
the UN and its partners, including fuel, to the impacted people of Yemen; and, to that
end, to work toward opening Red Sea ports to be operated under UN supervision. Both
leaders agreed to support and enable the UN-led humanitarian relief efforts.
On September 29, President Hadi addressed the United Nations General Assembly, praising Saudi
Arabia for its assistance, accusing Iran of seeking the destruction of Yemen, and calling upon
Houthi forces to stop fighting and abide by United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 2216 (April 2015), which, among other things, demands that the Houthis withdraw
from areas they have occupied.
Iran’s Role
Iran reportedly continues to support Houthi militias with weapons shipments. In late September,
coalition naval forces, which have blockaded Yemen’s ports, seized an Iranian fishing boat
carrying, according to a coalition spokesperson, “18 anti-armored concourse shells, 54 anti-tank
shells, shell-battery kits, firing guidance systems, launchers and binoculars' batteries.”5 However,
while the coalition’s naval blockade has periodically intercepted or deterred Iranian arms
shipments, it also has slowed the delivery of humanitarian aid. UNSCR 2216 authorized member
states to prevent the transfer or sale of arms to the Houthis or to former President Saleh and also
allows Yemen’s neighbors to inspect cargo suspected of carrying arms to Houthi fighters.
However, port cities still controlled by the Houthis, such as Hodeida on the Red Sea coast, have
witnessed ships filled with food and fuel sitting off-shore, as Arab coalition vessels search them
for illicit arms.6
3
Consultations on Yemen with UN Special Envoy Ould Cheikh Ahmed, What’s In Blue, September 9, 2015. What's In
Blue is a series of insights produced by Security Council Report on evolving Security Council actions.
4
Joint Statement on the Meeting between President Barack Obama and King Salman bin Abd alAziz Al Saud,
September 4, 2015.
5
“Weapons Bound for Yemen Seized on Iran Boat: Coalition,” Reuters, September 30, 2015.
6
“Arab Coalition Navy Inspections Paralyse Yemen Food Shipments,” Reuters, September 10, 2015. Reportedly, the
United States has said that commercial vessels off the coast of Yemen should only be inspected when there are
"reasonable grounds" to suspect illicit arms shipments. See, “U.S. tells U.N. it Wants to See Boost in Shipping into
War-Torn Yemen,” Reuters, September 30, 2015.
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Terrorism
As has been demonstrated in the past, when Yemen is in the throes of domestic conflict and its
military occupied, terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are able to
seize territory in outlying provinces. This has been the case during Operation Decisive Storm. In
the early days of the conflict, AQAP militiamen, who already had been active in the eastern
province of Hadramawt, attacked government installations, air and sea ports, and hydrocarbon
facilities. AQAP seized the city of Al Mukalla in April, and the city’s ruling body has “wrapped al
Qaeda into local administration in order to avoid infighting.”7 According to one report, “the
residents of Mukalla said AQAP has refrained from imposing strict interpretations of Islamic law,
such as banning Arabic music and Western fashions, as the group did when it briefly established
an “emirate” in the Yemeni province of Abyan in 2011.”8 It also has renamed itself as the “Sons
of Hadhramaut” perhaps in order to identify with the local population.
Despite the apparent end to U.S.-Yemeni counterterrorism cooperation as a result of the Houthi
takeover of the government, the United States reportedly has been able to act either unilaterally or
perhaps in concert with Saudi Arabian intelligence against AQAP and its associated allies. In
recent months, the United States has allegedly carried out several strikes against AQAP targets.
According to one report,
This indicates that the U.S. still has access to actionable intelligence on high profile
targets,
despite the increasing security vacuum in Yemen. As the US shut down their
embassy in
Yemen in February and evacuated its staff, forcing the CIA to significantly
reduce its
HUMINT capability in the country, it is likely that the Saudi intelligence,
complemented by
U.S. technical intelligence coverage, is providing the US with
information on militants'
movements and positions. The strikes also suggest that AQAP
militants are becoming more
vulnerable to precision airstrikes as the group advances in
the open desert terrain of southern
Hadramawt.9
AQAP Leader Killed
In perhaps the most significant counter-terrorism operation in Yemen in the past three to four
years, on June 16, AQAP released a video statement acknowledging that a recent U.S. strike had
killed Nasser al Wuhayshi, AQAP’s leader and the second-highest-ranking leader of Al Qaeda’s
international terrorist network. AQAP’s military commander is now Qasim al Rami has been
appointed as AQAP’s new “Emir.” According to Jane’s:
Of the four senior founding members of the group [AQAP], only Raymi [Rami] remains
operational within AQAP. The series of US UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle] strikes since
the start of the year have all but wiped out the generation within the group that was most
closely associated with Al Qaeda's central leadership, and with Bin Laden in particular. The
attrition of this generation within AQAP may have significant consequences that extend
beyond the group's inner workings, as it is seemingly facing inevitable change with the
coming to the fore of a generation that emerged after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the
US.10
Status of American Government Personnel and U.S.
Citizens in Yemen
On February 11, the U.S. State Department announced that it was “suspending” (as opposed to
terminating) Embassy operations in Sana’a and was relocating U.S. personnel elsewhere. As of
8
“Quietly, al-Qaeda offshoots expand in Yemen and Syria,” Washington Post, June 4, 2015.
Although reports suggest that the United States and its partners are still able to conduct
counterterrorism operations in Yemen, there is concern that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) and the Islamic State (IS/ISIS/ISIL) will be strengthened by the Saudi-led coalition’s
military operations against the Houthis. In late September, IS suicide bombers struck a Zaydi
mosque in Sana’a, killing 30 worshipers. IS fighters continue to produce and release videos from
Yemen depicting their battles with Houthi forces and casting themselves as defenders of Yemen’s
Sunni population. However, according to one expert, AQAP remains the dominant group, since
“Al Qaeda has invested in Yemen much more than ISIS has; they have attempted to form a local,
functioning government whereas ISIS just enforces things through violence.”10
7
“Al Qaeda seen assuming Policing Role in Eastern Yemen,” Reuters, May 14, 2015.
“Quietly, al-Qaeda offshoots expand in Yemen and Syria,” Washington Post, June 4, 2015.
9
“AQAP's Infiltration of Yemen's Sunni tribes reduces Effectiveness of Precision Airstrikes, Sustains Jihadists'
Expansion,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, May 15, 2015.
10
“Alleged US UAV strike kills AQAP leader in Yemen's Hadhramaut,” Jane’s Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor, June
16, 2015.
9
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June 2015, all U.S. government personnel have been relocated, and Ambassador to Yemen
Matthew H. Tueller is currently working out of the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. On
March 21, the United States withdrew the remaining 120 U.S. military personnel in Yemen,
including Special Operation Forces, from Al Anad Airbase in Lahij province. The withdrawal
occurred just a day after AQAP militiamen seized a town 20 miles from the airbase and terrorists
claiming affiliation with the Islamic State reportedly killed 137 people inside two Zaidi mosques
in the capital.
A group of Yemeni Americans from southeast Michigan is suing the United States government in
U.S. court in order to compel the government to evacuate 37 Yemeni Americans stranded in
Yemen. The plaintiffs are represented by the Michigan branch of the Council on AmericanIslamic Relations. In its defense, the U.S. government claims that it has been warning Americans
not to travel to Yemen for years and that an evacuation amidst the current fighting would put
American personnel at risk. According to U.S. State Department spokesperson Marie Harf,
“American citizens overseas are one of our top priorities...We've always said that. But in this
case, there's reasons we've been telling people not to go to Yemen, and in this circumstance, we
believe this was the best course of action, using third parties and other countries to evacuate our
citizens rather than sending in American assets, which, as you all know, in Yemen could be even
more of a target.”11 According to a U.S. State Department fact sheet, “As of April 28, the U.S.
Embassy in Djibouti had assisted more than 500 U.S. citizens arriving from Yemen, plus their
family members.”12
H.R. 1735, the House version of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization bill, includes
Section 1273, a “Sense of Congress on Evacuation of United States Citizens and Nationals from
Yemen.” This section finds that “over 550 Yemeni-Americans have registered as being unable to
leave Yemen after the closure of the United States Embassy in Yemen in February 2015.” It
includes a sense of Congress that the “President should exercise all available authorities as
expeditiously as possible to evacuate United States citizens and nationals from Yemen.”
Other Recent Congressional Action
The following is a summary of recent legislation concerning Yemen:
•
S. 1376, the Senate version of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization bill,
includes Section 1207, which states that no FY2016 Department of Defense
assistance to Yemen may be used to provide assistance to “an entity in Yemen
that is controlled by members of the Houthi movement.” However, this
prohibition does include a national security waiver.
•
In the House Report accompanying H.R. 2772, the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2016, lawmakers noted
that “Due to the uncertain security environment and lack of a U.S. diplomatic
presence inside the country [Yemen] to monitor assistance, there are significant
challenges to providing economic, health, and security assistance. For this
11
U.S. State Department Daily Press Briefing, June 1, 2015.
U.S. State Department, “Assistance to U.S. Citizens in Yemen,” Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesperson, May 6,
2015
12
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reason, the Committee has deferred consideration of the funding requested for
fiscal year 2016. The Committee recommendation continues to support
humanitarian assistance, as appropriate, but notes the difficult operating
environment for implementers of such programs.”
Background: Government Collapse and Regional
War in Yemen
President Abdu Rabbo Mansour Hadi fled Yemen on March 25, 2015, after over a year in which
his government and tribal allies have gradually been supplanted by an alliance comprised of the
Houthi movement and loyalists of former president Saleh. Before fleeing, President Hadi had
called on the international community and his Gulf Arab allies to intervene militarily, which
Saudi Arabia and other nations13 did on March 25, bombing Houthi-Saleh forces.
The White House issued a statement on March 25 blaming the Houthis for causing the crisis in
Yemen. The United States recognizes President Hadi as the legitimate leader of Yemen, and
President Obama authorized “the provision of logistical and intelligence support to GCC-led
military operations.” The Administration claimed that while U.S. forces are “not taking direct
military action in Yemen in support of this effort, we are establishing a Joint Planning Cell with
Saudi Arabia to coordinate U.S. military and intelligence support.”14
Although the Houthi-Saleh alliance had been gradually seizing control of Yemeni provinces and
government/military installations for more than a year, in the winter 2015, they had rapidly
outmaneuvered President Hadi, who had been under house arrest since January. Hadi eventually
escaped from his Houthi captors and fled to Aden, where he denounced the coup against him and
began to marshal the remains of the national military as well as loyal tribal militias to counter
Houthi-Saleh advances.
In mid-March, Houthi-Saleh forces engaged military units loyal to President Hadi around Aden’s
airport, and President Hadi’s headquarters were bombed. Hadi called for United Nations and
international intervention to buttress his forces, but mere days later, rapid advances of HouthiSaleh forces closed in on Yemen’s second and third largest cities, Aden and Ta’iz. Saudi Arabia
pledged to “take necessary steps” if no peaceful solution to the conflict was reached immediately.
By March 25, Hadi’s military position had become untenable, as Houthi-Saleh forces took control
of Aden’s airport and surrounding military bases.
As Houthi-Saleh forces advanced on Aden, Saudi Arabia moved its military forces close to the
border with Yemen. In 2009, the kingdom confronted the Houthis inside Yemen using mainly air
power. To date, Operation Decisive Storm/Restoring Hope has been almost exclusively conducted
using air power, though Saudi forces have not ruled out the introduction of ground forces. For the
13
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Jordan joined the Saudi-led operation. Oman
declined. Egypt has sent naval support. Saudi news sources claim that Pakistan and Sudan took part as well.
14
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on the
Situation in Yemen, March 25, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
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Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention
Saudi royal family, the Houthi ascendancy, aided by Iran, represents a challenge to the
monarchy’s legitimacy.
Author Contact Information
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jsharp@crs.loc.gov, 7-8687
Congressional Research Service
7In Yemen, Islamic State is struggling to claim Mantle of Sunnis' Champion,” Christian Science Monitor, September
29, 2015.
8
Congressional Research Service
4
Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention
U.S. Policy
The Saudi-led coalition’s war in Yemen presents the Administration with a number of challenges.
On the one hand, the Administration is supportive of the overall Saudi goal of restoring President
Hadi’s government to power. The Administration, like Saudi Arabia, does not want to see Houthi
fighters who receive nominal Iranian aid rule large swaths of Yemen.11 Moreover, the
Administration’s position is that President Hadi is the legitimate internationally-recognized
President of Yemen, and U.S. diplomacy between 2011 and 2012 was critical in transitioning
Yemen from Saleh’s rule to Hadi’s presidency. Hadi’s government was considerably more reliable
than Saleh in countering terrorism, as President Hadi permitted the United States to conduct
counterterrorism operations on Yemeni soil.
On the other hand, the Administration may question the Saudi-led coalition’s methods for
achieving the restoration of Hadi’s rule, particularly as the civilian death toll continues to climb
and the humanitarian situation devolves. Although the United States may be providing the Saudis
and other coalition partners with key logistical aid and rearmaments, it is unclear how much
leverage such support provides policymakers, particularly in the wake of the recently concluded
Iran nuclear deal, which Saudi Arabia has tepidly approved.12 Furthermore, U.S. counterterrorism
efforts in Yemen still rely on Saudi cooperation, leaving U.S. officials who wish to see a political
settlement in Yemen little room to maneuver if Saudi Arabia continues to press forward with
military operations.
For now, the Obama Administration continues to provide logistical assistance to the coalition,13
though the United States has pressed Gulf countries to assist in ameliorating Yemen’s
humanitarian crisis and called on all parties to move toward a political solution to the conflict.
The United States and Saudi Arabia continue to cooperate in countering terrorism in Yemen, as
the leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was reportedly killed in a missile strike
in June 2015.
Some lawmakers may be concerned about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen. In
late September, Representative Ted W. Lieu wrote a letter to the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff advocating for a halt to U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition until it institutes
safeguards to prevent civilian casualties.14 Other lawmakers could express U.S. displeasure with
Saudi Arabia’s conduct of military operations by delaying future U.S. arms sales to the kingdom.
Reportedly, the Administration may notify Congress of a possible U.S. arms sale to Saudi Arabia
that would restock supplies of munitions used in the conflict.15
Status of American Government Personnel and U.S. Citizens in
Yemen
On February 11, the U.S. State Department announced that it was “suspending” (as opposed to
terminating) Embassy operations in Sana’a and was relocating U.S. personnel elsewhere. As of
June 2015, all U.S. government personnel have been relocated, and Ambassador to Yemen
11
In late September 2015, two Americans held captive by Houthi fighters were released. The government of Oman
reportedly served as an intermediary and helped secure their release.
12
“Saudi Arabia Satisfied with Obama's Assurances on Iran Deal,” Reuters, September 4, 2015.
13
“Saudi-led Yemen Air War's High Civilian Toll Unsettles U.S. Officials,” Los Angeles Times, April 16, 2015.
14
“Saudis Face Mounting Pressure Over Civilian Deaths in Yemen Conflict,” New York Times, September 29, 2015.
15
“Saudi Arms Resupply Readied by U.S. as King to Visit White House,” Bloomberg News, September 3, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
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Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention
Matthew H. Tueller is currently working out of the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. On
March 21, the United States withdrew the remaining 120 U.S. military personnel in Yemen,
including Special Operation Forces, from Al Anad Airbase in Lahij province. The withdrawal
occurred just a day after AQAP militiamen seized a town 20 miles from the airbase and terrorists
claiming affiliation with the Islamic State reportedly killed 137 people inside two Zaidi mosques
in the capital.
Recent Congressional Action
The following is a summary of recent legislation concerning Yemen:
Section 1209 of H.R. 1735, the National Defense Authorization Act 2016, would
prohibit FY2016 Department of Defense funds from providing security
assistance to an entity in Yemen that is controlled by members of the Houthi
movement. The prohibition may be waived if it is important to the national
security interests of the United States
In the House Report accompanying H.R. 2772, the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2016, lawmakers noted
that “Due to the uncertain security environment and lack of a U.S. diplomatic
presence inside the country [Yemen] to monitor assistance, there are significant
challenges to providing economic, health, and security assistance. For this
reason, the Committee has deferred consideration of the funding requested for
fiscal year 2016. The Committee recommendation continues to support
humanitarian assistance, as appropriate, but notes the difficult operating
environment for implementers of such programs.”
Author Contact Information
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jsharp@crs.loc.gov, 7-8687
Congressional Research Service
6