May 20, 2015
Sudan: an OverviewUpdated January 17, 2019
Sudan
When unified (1956-2011), Sudan was Africa’s largest
nationcountry by area, and the site of its longest -running civil
war.
In 2011, after decades of fighting broadly described as a
a conflict between the predominately Muslim “Arab” Muslim north
and “African” Christian and animist south, Sudan split in
two. Mistrust between Sudan and South Sudan lingers, and
unresolved disputes still threaten to pull the two countries
back to war. The north-southsouth, Sudan split in two. The split did not
resolve other
simmering Sudanese conflicts, notably in Darfur, Blue Nile,
and Southern Kordofanin Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and
Blue Nile. Overlapping struggles between
security forces
and armed groups, among ethnic groups, and
between nomadic and farming communities have caused
nomadic and farming communities, and
among ethnic groups have caused extensive displacement and human suffering. Across the
country, social tensions, economic pressures, and political
dissent pose ongoing challenges for Sudan’s Islamist
government, which came to power through a coup in 1989.
Figure 1. Sudan Key Facts
The secession of South Sudan
and suffering. Across Sudan, economic pressures, social
tensions, and dissent present challenges for the Islamist
government of President Omar al Bashir, who came to
power in a 1989 coup. Nationwide anti-government protests
in early 2019 suggest growing pressure for regime change.
South Sudan’s secession was a major financial blow to
Sudan, which lost 75% of its oil production, two-thirds of
its export earnings, and more than half its fiscal revenues.
The cost of waging war on multiple fronts compounds
Sudan’s economic troubles and, along with allegations of
political repression, fuels domestic criticism of the
government and periodic protests. Military operations
against restive regions continue to draw international
condemnation and have prevented Sudan from improving
relations with many countries, including the United States.
U.S. sanctions limit Sudan’s access to U.S. dollars and
impede its access to international financial markets and
institutions. Sudan has taken several conspicuous steps to
repair relations with key Arab Gulf countries, which are
important sources of investment. Those relations had cooled
in recent years amid concern over Sudan’s ties to Iran and
its perceived support for the Muslim Brotherhood.
National Congress Party (NCP) formed a unity government.
Southern Sudanese voted overwhelmingly in January 2011
to secede and achieved independence in July of that year.
Background
Northern-led regimes espousing Islamist ideals have
dominated Sudan since independence, often pressing
policies to force distant provinces to conform to the center,
Khartoum, rather than accommodating local customs and
institutions. Instead of forging a common national identity,
these policies exacerbated Sudan’s racial, cultural, and
religious differences. Government attempts to Arabize and
Islamize the countryside were resisted by southerners and
other marginalized groups, sparking two related southern
insurgencies (1955-1972 and 1983-2005). Groups in other
regions rose up periodically, citing local grievances, and
some, in the central states of Southern Kordofan and Blue
Nile, joined the southern rebellion, the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).
The north-south warover half its fiscal revenues. A large
security sector budget, mismanagement, and corruption all
compound Sudan’s economic troubles, which spur periodic
protests and domestic criticism of the government. The
International Monetary Fund assesses that U.S. economic
sanctions, imposed in 1997, also undermined economic
stability and growth. Major U.S. enforcement actions for
sanctions violations in 2014-2015 significantly reduced
Sudan’s access to U.S. dollars and further impeded its
access to international financial markets and institutions.
Sudan has long sought relief from U.S. sanctions, and the
outgoing Obama Administration announced a move to ease
them in January 2017, after determining that Sudan had
taken positive steps over a six-month period in five key
areas: enhancing counterterrorism cooperation; addressing
the threat of a regional armed group, the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA); ceasing negative interference in South Sudan;
ceasing hostilities in conflict zones; and improving
humanitarian access. President Trump permanently revoked
the economic sanctions in October 2017. Some U.S.
restrictions remain, including on debt relief and based on a
state sponsor of terrorism designation—the latter is now the
focus of “Phase II” of a bilateral engagement framework.
Background
Despite Sudan’s diversity, northern-led regimes espousing
Islamist ideals have dominated government since
independence, often pressing distant provinces to conform
to the center, Khartoum, rather than accommodating local
customs and institutions. Instead of forging a national
identity, these policies exacerbated Sudan’s racial, cultural,
and religious differences. Attempts to Arabize and Islamize
the countryside were resisted by southerners and other
marginalized groups and sparked insurgencies in the south.
Groups in other regions rose up periodically, citing local
grievances. Some in the central states of Southern Kordofan
and Blue Nile joined the southern rebellion, the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).
Figure 1. Sudan Key Facts
Source: Fact information from CIA World Factbook and IMF, 2018.
The north-south wars took a heavy toll on both sides. In
2005, the government and the SPLM signed the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which enshrined
the south’s right to self-determination after a six -year
“interim period,” during which the SPLM and the ruling
National Congress Party (NCP) formed a unity government.
Southern Sudanese voted overwhelmingly in January 2011
to secede and achieved independence in July of that year.
The CPA failed to resolve several contentious issues, and
talks continuehave continued on border disputes and related security
issues, debts, and once-shared resources, such as oil. Sudan
and South Sudan signed partial deals on security and
economic cooperation in 2012, but the deployment of a
joint monitoring mission to ensure the demilitarization of
the border has been repeatedly delayed.
The proximity of rebel activity in Sudan’s “new south”
complicates border demilitarization, as does the unresolved
status of contested areas such as the disputed Abyei region.
Abyei was accorded special semi-autonomous status in the
CPA, and it has repeatedly been a flashpoint for violence. A
The
proximity of Sudanese rebel activity to the border
complicated its demilitarization after separation, as did the
unresolved status of contested areas, notably Abyei, which
was granted special semi-autonomous status in the CPA.
An official referendum for Abyei residents on whether to
retain their
special status in Sudan or join South Sudan was
slated for
2011 but has been delayed by voter eligibility disputesindefinitely delayed. The
deployment of the U.N. Interim Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
defused a violent stand-off between Sudan and South Sudan
in 2011, but local tensions
persist and still have the potential to spur a larger conflict.
Relations between Sudan and South Sudan improved in
2018. A long-delayed joint border monitoring mission is
now semi-operational, though there has been little progress
on border demarcation. Sudan surprised many by mediating
a new peace deal between warring parties in South Sudan
mid-year. If the deal holds it would allow a resumption of
oil production in fields shut by South Sudan’s civil war,
generating needed revenue for both Khartoum and Jubapotential to draw the
two Sudans back into conflict. Their armed forces have
engaged in minor clashes sporadically since separation, and
South Sudan periodically accuses Sudan of air strikes on its
territory. Those strikes reportedly target Sudanese rebels
that Khartoum accuses South Sudan of harboring.
Ongoing Conflicts
The CPA did not resolve Sudan’s long-standinglongstanding centerperiphery tensions. Khartoum has continued to respond to
responded to the political
demands of restive regions more often with
force than with
substantive reformreform, and has financed local Arab militias to
help help
counter insurgencies. These militias are widely
criticized for The militias have been linked to
indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks
against civilians. The government also continues aerial
bombings in Darfur, in violation of on civilians.
Sudan has conducted aerial attacks in Darfur in violation of
U.N. Security Council
resolution 1591 (2005), and has been accused of targeting
hospitals in both Darfur and Southern Kordofan.
www.crs.gov | 7-5700
Sudan: an Overview resolution 1591 (2005).
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Sudan
Darfur. More than a decade after the George W. Bush
Administration declared genocide in Darfur in 2004,
widespread violence still plagues the region. Fighting in
among communities, armed groups, and the military has
escalated since early 2013, causing displacement on a scale
not seen since the first years of the conflict. The 2011 Doha
Document for Peace in Darfur has not stemmed the
violence. Insecurity and government restrictions limit
access by peacekeepers and humanitarian groups to affected
communities. Attacks by armed groups against civilians,
peacekeepers, and relief workers are a major problem—
more than 60 peacekeepers have been killed in Darfur. The
credibility of the African Union-U.N. Hybrid Operation in
Darfur (UNAMID) has been questioned amid allegations
that it has self-censored its reporting on crimes against
civilians and peacekeepers, and the mission is under
pressure from Khartoum to develop an exit strategy.
In 2005, the U.N. Security Council granted the International
Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction over serious crimes
committed in Darfur. It was the first case the Council
referred to the Court. Ten years later, the ICC has yet to
commence a trial, and five ICCviolence still plagues the region. Fighting reportedly
displaced as many as 265,000 Darfuris in the first half of
2016, primarily in the Jebel Marra area, a long-time rebel
stronghold. After a major offensive, the government
declared Darfur free of rebellion in April 2016, and on June
30, 2016 it declared a unilateral ceasefire in Darfur and in
Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. U.N. monitors suggest
the military conducted aerial bombardments in Jebel Marra
into late 2016, however. Sporadic skirmishes, insecurity,
and government restrictions continue to limit access by aid
workers and peacekeepers to some areas.
Direct clashes between the military and the Darfur rebels
quieted after the 2016 offensive, but there has been little
progress in the peace process. U.N. monitors report that
significant clashes between government forces and one
rebel faction resumed in 2018; other rebels have withdrawn
to Libya to regroup. Intercommunal clashes in Darfur
continue, as do attacks by armed groups on civilians,
peacekeepers, and aid workers. In this context, there has
been debate within the U.N. Security Council over pressure
from Khartoum to end the African Union-U.N. Hybrid
Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The Council agreed in
2017 to reconfigure the mission and in 2018 authorized a
significant troop reduction (to just over 4,000 troops by
mid-2019), with UNAMID’s possible exit in June 2020.
The ICC. In 2005, the U.N. Security Council granted the
International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction over serious
crimes committed in Darfur. Over a decade later, the ICC
has yet to commence a trial, and five arrest warrants remain
outstanding, including two for the arrest of President Bashir
on charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide. Sudan’s government remains uncooperative with
the Court, and in December 2014, the ICC Prosecutor
announced that she was suspending the investigations,
expressing frustration with inaction by the Security Council
on the outstanding arrest warrantsThe ICC Prosecutor has repeatedly expressed
frustration with Security Council inaction on the arrest
warrants. Sudan remains uncooperative with the Court.
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The conflict in these
states, often referred to as “the Two Areas,” is driven by
unresolved grievances that date back to the north-south war,
when some local groups joined the SPLM’s rebellion
against the government. The rebellion. The
CPA provided for a process in
which the two states might
achieve greater autonomy within
Sudan, but the processit stalled and
the conflict reignited in
2011. South Sudan’s ruling party has denied supporting the
insurgency, although
denies supporting the rebels, known as the SPLM-North
(SPLM-N) remain linked to the SPLM by, despite their historic
relationship. The SPLM-N
(now split into two factions) and the major Darfur rebel
groups form a loose alliance, the Sudan Revolutionary
Front (SRF). Khartoum has restricted aid agencies’ access
to rebel-held areas since the onset of the conflict, and
bombings by the military and militia attacks exacerbate the
already dire humanitarian situation in these areas.
Political Challenges
In 2014, President Bashir announced that the government
would commence a National Dialogue on conflict and
political issues in the country, in preparation for the
development of a new constitution. The government is
under domestic pressure for reform—alongside the unrest
in the periphery, inflation and related economic troubles
have fueled periodic protests in urban centers, and
protestors have been killed by police on several occasions.
New rifts within the NCP have emerged as “reformists”
have criticized government policies. Press censorship and
the detention of political opponents raise questions about
the regime’s commitment to an inclusive dialogue. Major
opposition parties boycotted elections held in April 2015;
President Bashir was reelected with 94% of the vote.
The Humanitarian Situation
More than 6.6 million Sudanese are estimated to need
humanitarian aid in 2015, 4.4 million of them in Darfur.
More than 2.5 million Darfuri have been displaced
internally, and Chad continues to host almost 370,000
Darfuri refugees. Another 2 million in Southern Kordofan,
Blue Nile, and Abyei are internally displaced or severely
affected by conflict. Ethiopia and South Sudan host over
275,000 refugees from the two states. Relief agencies are
also struggling to assist more than 146,000 South Sudanese
refugees who have fled to Sudan since December 2013.
U.S. Policy and Foreign Assistance
U.S. relations with Sudan have long been turbulent. The
United States maintains various sanctions against Sudan
through Executive Orders and congressionally imposed
legal restrictions, which currently prohibit assistance to the
government or to modify loans held by Sudan. Khartoum is
also subject to economic sanctions based on debt arrears
(since 1988), support for international terrorism (since
1993), and pervasive human rights violations. Trade
sanctions were imposed in 1997. Congress has repeatedly
tightened sanctions, including in response to abuses in
Darfur. Khartoum seeks to improve the bilateral
relationship, in part to boost its international standing and
its efforts to reengage with multilateral financial
institutions. Sudan seeks relief from almost $45 billion in
external sovereign debt, much of it in arrears. Sudan owes
over $2 billion to the United States.
In the years prior to separation, Sudan ranked among the
top destinations for U.S. foreign aid globally, with more
than $1 billion allocated annually for humanitarian and
development aid and for peacekeeping support. Since South
Sudan’s independence, development aid for Sudan has been
limited. The State Department has requested $9.1 million
for FY2016 in non-emergency aid, to support civil society
and peace and conflict mitigation efforts. Humanitarian aid
has totaled $413 million to date in combined FY2014 and
FY2015 funding. The FY2016 request includes $366
million for UNAMID and $92.5 million for UNISFA.
Sudan remains designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism,
although the State Department describes Sudan as “a
generally cooperative counterterrorism partner” in its
Country Reports on Terrorism. Hamas maintains a presence
there, per the report, and elements of Al Qaeda-inspired
terrorist groups remain in the country. Sudan’s purported
role in Iranian arms smuggling to Gaza has also been of
concern. The State Department has named three Sudanese
involved in the 2008 murder of two USAID employees as
Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Sudan is designated
as a Country of Particular Concern under the International
Religious Freedom Act. A Christian woman was sentenced
to death for apostasy in 2014, drawing international
condemnation; her conviction was later overturned and she
settled in the United States with her family. For more
information, see CRS Report R43957, Sudan, by Lauren
Ploch Blanchard.
Lauren Ploch Blanchard, lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
www.crs.gov | 7-5700
IF10182have a loose alliance, the Sudan Revolutionary
Front (SRF). Khartoum has restricted aid agencies’ access
to rebel-held areas since the onset of the conflict.
Political Challenges
The government faces mounting domestic pressure as 2019
begins: protests that began over the price of bread have
spread across the country, with demonstrators demanding
an end to the regime. Elections are scheduled for 2020, and
the NCP’s plan to remove term limits from the constitution
to allow Bashir to run again now appears likely to spark
further unrest. Several prominent opposition leaders who
had joined a “National Consensus Government” (formed in
2017) have quit. The major opposition parties boycotted the
last elections, in 2015, when Bashir won 94% of the vote.
The Humanitarian Situation
Over seven million Sudanese were in need of humanitarian
aid in 2018. Almost 1.8 million Darfuris remain displaced
internally, and Chad hosts over 330,000 Darfuri refugees.
As many as 780,000 people may be displaced in Blue Nile,
Southern Kordofan, and Abyei. South Sudan and Ethiopia
host over 300,000 refugees from the Two Areas. Sudan
hosts over 900,000 refugees, most from South Sudan.
Foreign Relations
Sudan has taken conspicuous steps since 2014 to repair
relations with key Arab Gulf countries, which are important
sources of investment. Those ties had cooled amid concern
over Sudan’s ties to Iran and its perceived support for the
Muslim Brotherhood. Sudan has deployed as many as
14,000 troops, reportedly including child soldiers, to
support the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, in return for Gulf
aid. Sudan’s relations with European countries also have
improved in recent years, in part based on cooperation to
counter migrant flows through Sudan.
U.S. Policy and Foreign Assistance
U.S. relations with Sudan, turbulent for over two decades,
have improved since 2016. After a nine-month review of
Sudan’s compliance with the Obama Administration’s
“five-track engagement strategy,” the Trump
Administration announced its decision in October 2017 to
make permanent the temporary sanctions relief provided by
President Obama. President Trump has indicated support
for continued efforts to improve bilateral relations, but has
stressed that further normalization of ties will require
additional progress by Sudan, including with respect for
human rights and religious freedom, as well as compliance
with U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea.
U.S. sanctions on Sudan, some of which remain in place,
have been imposed through both Executive Orders and
congressionally enacted legal restrictions. They are based
on Sudan’s debt arrears, support for international terrorism,
and pervasive human rights violations. The State
Department continues to rank Sudan poorly on human
trafficking and has designated it as a Country of Particular
Concern under the International Religious Freedom Act.
Sudanese law permits the death penalty for apostasy and
adultery and prison sentences or flogging for blasphemy.
Sudan has been designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism
since 1993. Nonetheless, successive administrations have
described Sudan as a “cooperative” counterterrorism
partner and have praised its cooperation regarding the
Islamic State in particular. The Trump Administration has
indicated that it would consider lifting Sudan’s designation
if more progress is made on counterterrorism cooperation,
human rights and other key issues. The government’s
response to recent protests may affect that decision.
Development aid for Sudan has been extremely limited
since South Sudan’s separation. The State Department
requested $2.4 million for FY2019 in nonemergency aid, to
support civil society and conflict mitigation. U.S.
humanitarian aid totaled over $327 million in FY2018.
Lauren Ploch Blanchard,
https://crsreports.congress.gov
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Sudan
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