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Cambodia: Background and U.S. Relations

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Cambodia:
Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

May 11, 2015January 11, 2018 (R44037)
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Summary

The United States and the Kingdom of Cambodia have been strengthening bilateral ties for several years. U.S. concerns about governmental abuses of power and human rights violations, however, have constrained the development of relations. Areas of congressional concern have included providing development assistance, promoting democracy and human rights, and supporting victims of Khmer Rouge atrocities. U.S. interests in Cambodia, one of the poorest countries in Asia, include strengthening democratic institutions and norms, encouraging civic participation in politicsMap of Cambodia

Summary

Following a gradual improvement of bilateral ties since the mid-2000s, U.S. relations with the Kingdom of Cambodia have become strained in recent years in light of Prime Minister Hun Sen's suppression of political opponents and growing embrace of China. The Trump Administration and Congress have imposed and considered further sanctions in order to pressure Hun Sen into restoring democracy and conducting free and fair national elections in 2018.

While the U.S. government has criticized Hun Sen's backtracking on democracy, it also has sought to remain engaged with Cambodia. During the past decade, U.S. interests and foreign assistance efforts in Cambodia have included strengthening democratic institutions and norms, promoting the rule of law, increasing bilateral trade and investment, supporting economic growth, reducing poverty, and improving public health. The U.S. government has supported demining and related activities in Cambodia, among the countries most heavily affected by unexploded ordnance. Military engagement has included U.S. naval port visits, U.S. military assistance and training, and joint exercises.

The United States and other countries have provided funding for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), also known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, established through a 2003 agreement between the government of Cambodia and the United Nations. Since the court commenced proceedings in 2006, it has convicted and sentenced three former Khmer Rouge leaders for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed during the period of Khmer Rouge rule (1975-1978). Cambodian and international human rights groups have advocated prosecuting midranking Khmer Rouge officials, while Hun Sen has opposed further indictments.

The Trump Administration has responded to Hun Sen's banning of the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) and other human rights abuses by declaring a visa ban on "those individuals involved in undermining democracy in Cambodia" and canceling assistance for the 2018 national elections. S.Res. 279, passed by the Senate in November 2017, urges the Department of the Treasury to consider placing senior Cambodian government officials involved in the suppression of democracy and human rights abuses on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, calls on the government of Cambodia to release opposition leader Kem Sokha, who has been detained on charges of treason, and supports free and fair elections in 2018 monitored by international observers, among other provisions. A similar resolution, H.Res. 661, is pending in the House. Congressional foreign operations appropriations measures for FY2018 (H.R. 3354 and S. 1780) would impose democracy-related conditions on some U.S. assistance to Cambodia in order to apply pressure on Hun Sen.

In recent years, China has by some measures begun to match total annual foreign aid flows from traditional major providers of official development assistance to Cambodia. China's economic support has given Hun Sen greater political room to maneuver, according to some analysts. In return, Cambodia has supported Beijing's positions on various regional issues, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

One of the poorest countries in Asia, Cambodia has performed well on some socioeconomic indicators since the United Nations brokered a peace settlement in 1991 and restored a constitutional monarchy in 1993. The Kingdom's economy has achieved an average annual growth rate of 7.5% since 1994. China, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian countries are the main sources of foreign investment. The United States is the single largest overseas market for Cambodian merchandise exports, which consist mostly of garments and footwear.

Cambodia: Background and U.S. Relations

Overview

Following a gradual improvement of ties since the mid-2000s, U.S. relations with the Kingdom of Cambodia have become strained in recent years in light of Prime Minister Hun Sen's suppression of the political opposition and his growing embrace of China. Areas of bilateral engagement have included U.S. assistance for strengthening democratic institutions and reducing poverty, demining activities, joint military exercises, and trade. Some analysts speculate that the Cambodian leader has disengaged from the United States in order to avoid diplomatic constraints on his usurpation of power.

Figure 1.Map of Cambodia

Although during the past decade, Cambodia has made progress in conducting elections, developing a civil society, and raising living standards, in late 2017, Hun Sen took what some view as extraconstitutional measures to outlaw the political opposition. Despite areas of bilateral discord, according to some analysts, the U.S. government has been reluctant to break ties with Cambodia for fear of further losing leverage or affording China greater influence.1 Some policy experts argue that due to its deepening relationship with China, Cambodia has strategic significance that warrants continued U.S. engagement. Others contend that Washington should promote U.S. interaction with democratic forces in the Kingdom rather than with the Cambodian government.2

In response to the Cambodian government's dissolution of the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) in November 2017, the Trump Administration withdrew $1.8 million in assistance to the National Election Committee (NEC). In addition, the White House announced in December 2017 that the Secretary of State would "restrict entry into the United States of those individuals involved in undermining democracy in Cambodia."3 In related developments, the European Union (EU) also suspended assistance to the NEC and the European Parliament passed a resolution calling on the European Commission to impose visa restrictions on some Cambodian officials and to freeze their assets.4

Congressional foreign operations appropriations measures for FY2018 would impose conditions on some U.S. assistance to Cambodia in order to apply pressure on Hun Sen to restore democracy and to take steps to "strengthen regional security and stability, particularly regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea.... "5 S.Res. 279, passed by the Senate on November 16, 2017, "reaffirms the commitment of the United States to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Cambodia." Among other provisions, the resolution urges the Department of the Treasury to consider placing all senior Cambodian government officials implicated in the suppression of democracy and human rights abuses on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list; calls on the Cambodian government to release opposition leader Kem Sokha, who has been detained on charges of treason; and supports free and fair elections in 2018 monitored by international observers. A similar resolution, H.Res. 661, is pending in the House.

Cambodia at a Glance

Area: 69,898 sq. miles (about the size of Missouri)

Capital: Phnom Penh

Population: 16.2 million (2017)

Government: Parliamentary under a constitutional monarchy

Next Scheduled General Election: July 2018

Economic Sectors: (percent of GDP): agriculture (27); industry (32); services (41) (2013)

Life Expectancy: 68 years [2015]

U.S. military engagement includes naval port visits, military assistance, education and training, and joint exercises related to international peacekeeping, humanitarian and disaster response, and counterterrorism. The United States also has provided assistance to Cambodia, one of the countries in the world most heavily afflicted by unexploded ordnance (UXO), for de-mining programs and victims of UXO. The Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), launched by the Obama Administration in 2009, is a foreign assistance effort through which the United States aims to promote cooperation and capacity building among Lower Mekong River countries (Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam) in several sectors. The LMI has become an element of the U.S. strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.

During the past decade, Cambodia has made fitful progress in some areas of governance and human rights, including the conduct of elections, the development of civil society, and improvements in labor conditions. Economic growth has brought prosperity to some Cambodians, particularly in urban areas, and many rural residents also have experienced improvements in their lives. Political institutions, however, remain weak and economic disparities have widened. Labor relations have shown growing signs of strain in recent years. The State Department reported that although the 2013 parliamentary elections were "mostly peaceful" and the election campaigns were "largely free of intimidation," the voting process was "fraught with irregularities." According to some experts, Prime Minister Hun Sen has flouted democratic institutions and norms but also made some political compromises in the face of domestic and international pressure.

Cambodia has entered a period of nominal political power sharing after several years of one party rule by the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). The national elections of 2013 resulted in a striking reversal of fortunes for the CPP and a boost for the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP). The election results reflected a changing electorate, one that is younger and with rising expectations and more concerned about corruption and inequality. Many analysts remain doubtful about whether Hun Sen will respect checks on his power as part of an agreement reached with the opposition in July 2014.

During the Khmer Rouge's three-year rule over Cambodia (1975-1978), nearly 2 million out of a population of 8 million Cambodians died from execution, torture, overwork, starvation, and disease. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), a court with international and Cambodian judges and prosecutors, began proceedings in 2006 to try Khmer Rouge leaders responsible for grave violations of national and international law, including crimes against humanity. The court has delivered guilty verdicts to three former high ranking officials. Cambodian and international human rights groups have advocated expanding the scope of prosecutions to include mid-ranking Khmer Rouge officials, while Prime Minister Hun Sen has opposed expanding the number of indictments.


Cambodia:
Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

Overview

The United States and the Kingdom of Cambodia have been strengthening bilateral ties for the past decade as Cambodia has emerged from its tragic past. The Obama Administration has taken gradual steps toward broadening engagement with Cambodia, although concerns remain about human rights violations and political corruption. Hillary Clinton visited Phnom Penh in October 2010, the first visit by a U.S. Secretary of State in seven years. Secretary Clinton reportedly cautioned Cambodians about becoming too dependent upon China.1 In November 2012, President Barack Obama traveled to Cambodia to attend the U.S.-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Leaders Meeting and the East Asia Summit (EAS). While in Phnom Penh, Obama, the first incumbent U.S. President to visit Cambodia, briefly met with Prime Minister Hun Sen and reportedly urged him to allow greater political freedom.2

Cambodia at a Glance

Area: 70,000 sq. miles (about the size of Missouri)

Capital: Phnom Penh

Population: 15.5 million

Government: parliamentary under a constitutional monarchy

Next General Election: 2018

Economic Sectors (percent of GDP): agriculture (35); industry (24); services (41)

Life Expectancy: 63 years

Religion: Theravada Buddhism (95% of population)

Literacy: 77% (2015) 77%

GDP per capita: $2,6003,700 (purchasing power parity) (2016)

Sources: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 2015

2017; World Bank.

U.S. interests in Cambodia, one of the poorest countries in Asia, include strengthening democratic institutions and norms, encouraging civic participation, promoting the rule of law, increasing bilateral trade and investment, supporting economic growth and public health, and reducing poverty.3 Since 2005, U.S. military cooperation with Cambodia has increased as well. Military activities include U.S. naval port visits, U.S. military assistance, education and training, and joint exercises related to international peacekeeping, humanitarian and disaster response, and counterterrorism. Angkor Sentinel, launched in 2010, is an annual bilateral exercise held in Cambodia that focuses on peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.4

Political Developments

Figure 1. Map of Cambodia

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.

Cambodia has entered a period of nominal political power sharing after several years of one-party rule. Hun Sen has been the nation's leader for thirty years, including as Prime Minister of the Vietnam-controlled Republic of Kampuchea (1985-93). During the past decade, as Deputy President of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), Hun Sen has suppressed a fragmented opposition and further consolidated his own position. The national elections of 2013 resulted in a striking reversal of fortunes for the CPP and a boost for the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP). The election results reflected a changing electorate, one that is younger, more concerned about corruption and inequality, and with rising expectations. Furthermore, Cambodian voters as a whole are becoming less impressed by Hun Sen's claims that the CPP has brought stability and prosperity to the country following the civil wars and murderous rule of the Khmer Rouge ("Red Khmer") during the 1970s and 1980s.

During the past decade, Cambodia has made fitful progress in some areas of governance and human rights, including the conduct of elections, the development of civil society, and improvements in labor conditions. Economic growth has brought prosperity to some Cambodians, particularly in urban areas, and many rural residents also have experienced improvements in their lives. However, political institutions remain weak and economic disparities have widened. A related problem is land grabbing. As the Cambodian economy has developed, up to half a million Cambodians—many of them living in squatter colonies—reportedly have been displaced as government, business, and foreign entities, sometimes in collusion, have confiscated their land and homes, sometimes forcibly, for agricultural, mining, logging, tourism, and urban development projects.5

Many analysts remain doubtful about whether Hun Sen will respect checks on his power as part of an agreement reached with the opposition in July 2014. Although democratic institutions and practices have developed, along with a stronger and more vocal civil society, the Prime Minister long has used an array of methods by which to remain politically dominant. According to some experts, Hun Sen has bolstered his political strength through a combination of "guile and force," electoral victories, legal and extra-legal political maneuvers, influence over the broadcast media and judiciary, intimidation, patronage and cronyism.6 In addition, the Cambodian leader has silenced political opponents through defamation lawsuits and his government has harassed civil society actors and organizations. Some analysts say that he is creating a political dynasty by placing his sons in prominent government and military positions.7

2013 Elections

Prior to the 2013 national elections, 27 opposition lawmakers were expelled from parliament after they became members of a new political party.8 The main opposition leader, Sam Rainsy, who had been sentenced in absentia to a total of 12 years in prison on charges widely regarded as politically motivated, was living in exile. Following international pressure, the government pardoned Sam Rainsy in July 2013. He returned to Phnom Penh less than 10 days before the national elections, although he was still declared ineligible to vote or run as a candidate.

The July 2013 general election gave the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) its lowest level of support since 1998. The CPP lost 22 seats in the National Assembly, holding onto 68 out of a total of 123 seats. The main opposition groups, unified as the Cambodian National Rescue Party, won 55 seats, a gain of 26, largely through the support of urban and younger voters. The State Department reported that although the parliamentary elections were "mostly peaceful" and the election campaigns were "largely free of intimidation," the voting process was "fraught with irregularities." The National Democratic Institute found voting irregularities in 60% of polling stations, including voters being turned away, voters lacking documentation, and other problems.9 Large public demonstrations against Hun Sen took place in Phnom Penh. Hundreds of thousands of garment workers also joined the demonstrations. Several protesting workers were killed in clashes with police in January 2014.10 The United States Congress imposed conditions on non-humanitarian foreign assistance to Cambodia, largely in response to human rights concerns. (See "U.S. Assistance," below.)

2014 Power-Sharing Agreement

The CNRP's boycott of parliament lasted for over a year. In July 2014, following protests and arrests at Phnom Penh's Freedom Park involving opposition Members that threatened to spiral out of control, an agreement on political reforms was negotiated between Hun Sen and the opposition. The terms included the sharing of parliamentary commission chairmanships and positions on the National Election Committee, as well as allowing CNRP President Sam Rainsy to take a seat in parliament and to assume the position of opposition leader. CNRP Vice-President Kem Sokha was elected Vice-President of the National Assembly. Three remaining activists who were being held in jail were released. The government also promised the CNRP a license for its own television channel. Amidst the hope of a new political era in Cambodia, the political arrangements remain fragile, and deep political divisions are likely to severely test pledges of cooperation, according to some experts. Hun Sen reportedly threatened to put an end to the new "culture of dialogue" following opposition Vice President Kem Sokha's public criticisms of the CPP.11 Some experts say that the next elections in Cambodia, the 2017 commune council or local elections, will be an indicator of whether the opposition's growing strength is likely to continue and, if so, whether Hun Sen, who wants to serve a sixth term as Premier, will accept further erosion of his power.

Modern Political History:
Norodom Sihanouk, the CCP, FUNCINPEC, and Sam Rainsy

The Kingdom of Cambodia received its independence from France in 1953. Beginning in 1969, during the Vietnam War, the United States conducted a four-year, sustained, large scale bombing campaign and incursion into Cambodia aimed at North Vietnamese soldiers. According to some historians, the American bombing helped the Cambodian communists to gain followers and military recruits in rural areas. In March 1970, the military forces of pro-American General Lon Nol overthrew the government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in a coup. A civil war followed, culminating in the defeat of Lon Nol in April 1975 by the Communist Party of Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge). During the Khmer Rouge's brutal three-year reign—which included forced depopulation of the cities and the establishment of rural communes—nearly 2 million out of a population of 8 million Cambodians died from execution, torture, overwork, starvation, and disease. In January 1979, Vietnamese forces drove the Khmer Rouge from Phnom Penh. A 13-year civil war ensued, in which Khmer Rouge, Cambodian nationalists, and royalist insurgents fought the Vietnamese-backed Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Hun Sen, a Khmer Rouge military officer who had defected from the regime in 1977 and fled to Vietnam, served as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the PRK.

Following the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989, a United Nations (U.N.)-brokered peace settlement officially ended the war. In 1993, elections were held for a 120-seat Constituent Assembly and Prince Sihanouk returned to Cambodia and was crowned as king. For a decade and a half, three major parties vied for power and influence: the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) under the leadership of Hun Sen; the royalist FUNCINPEC Party (National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia); and the opposition Sam Rainsy Party. After sharing power with FUNCINPEC since 1993, Hun Sen staged an armed takeover of government in 1997. In the face of considerable international pressure and the withholding of foreign aid, Hun Sen held new parliamentary elections in July 1998, which the CPP narrowly won. The CPP and FUNCINPEC again agreed to form a coalition government, with Hun Sen as Prime Minister and Prince Ranariddh, the second son of King Sihanouk, as President of the National Assembly. This uneasy partnership continued until 2006, when Ranariddh was ousted as the leader of FUNCINPEC, which began to decline as a major political force in Cambodia. In 2004, King Norodom Sihanouk abdicated the throne due to illness and his eldest son, Prince Sihamoni, succeed him as King. On October 15, 2012, Norodom Sihanouk died of heart failure, at the age of 89, in Beijing.

Khmer Rouge Tribunal

During the Khmer Rouge's three-year rule over Cambodia (1975-1978), it attempted to create an agrarian, communist society that involved the forced depopulation of cities, the executions of many educated and wealthy Cambodians, and the establishment of rural communes. Nearly 2 million out of a population of 8 million Cambodians died from execution, torture, overwork, starvation, and disease. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), an international tribunal established through an agreement between the government of Cambodia and the United Nations, began proceedings in 2006 to try Khmer Rouge leaders and others responsible for grave violations of national and international law.12 The ECCC has been financed through contributions by the Cambodian government and donations by foreign countries, particularly Japan, both directly to the ECCC and to a U.N.-administered international trust fund. The tribunal reportedly has been hampered by interference from the Cambodian government and the alleged corruption of Cambodian court officials, resignations by some international judges, and unexpected costs and delays.13

The U.S. government withheld assistance to the ECCC from 2006 to 2008 due to doubts about the court's independence. In 2008, the State Department announced that the court met international standards, and began providing annual contributions through the U.N. trust fund ($5.2 million in FY2014).14 Since 2010, some foreign operations appropriations acts have placed conditions upon assistance to the ECCC in order to discourage corruption and political interference within the court.15 The U.S. government also has provided financial support to the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), an archive, library, and public service center focused upon Khmer Rouge atrocities ($7.6 million between 2004 and 2014 for an endowment and core operations funding).16

ECCC prosecutors charged five former Khmer Rouge leaders with crimes against humanity and war crimes and three have been sentenced: Kaing Guek Eav (known as Comrade Duch), Pol Pot's "chief executioner" who ran the infamous Toul Sleng prison in Phnom Penh; Nuon Chea, the organization's second-in-command; former Foreign Minister Ieng Sary; Ieng Thirith (Ieng Sary's wife), Democratic Kampuchea's Minister of Social Affairs; and Khieu Samphan, the chief of state in charge of economic policies. In 2010, Kaing Guek Eav was sentenced to 35 years in jail (minus time already served), which many Cambodians considered to be too lenient. In February 2012, the court rejected Kaing's appeal and increased his term to life in prison. Ieng Sary died in March 2013, before the completion of his trial, while Ieng Thirith was declared mentally unfit for trial and freed. In August 2014, the court sentenced Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan each to life in prison for crimes against humanity in the first of three phases of trial deliberations.

Cambodian and international human rights groups have advocated expanding the scope of prosecutions to include mid-ranking Khmer Rouge officials. Prime Minister Hun Sen has opposed expanding the number of indictments, arguing that it would undermine national reconciliation and stability.17 Cambodian prosecutors of the ECCC have blocked the indictments of additional suspects recommended by international officials on the tribunal, maintaining that they were "not either senior leaders or those who were most responsible" during the Khmer Rouge period.18 Some analysts contend that Hun Sen is reluctant to widen the scope of the trials due to his former connections with Khmer Rouge military leaders.19

U.S. Assistance

Cambodia is heavily dependent upon overseas development assistance (ODA) from Japan, the United States, Australia, and Europe (totaling $500 million annually).20 It is the fifth-largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid in Southeast Asia after Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Burma, and the second-largest beneficiary per capita after Timor-Leste. The Kingdom received $70.9 million in U.S. assistance in FY2014,21 after meeting conditions imposed by Congress following the 2013 parliamentary elections.22 From 1998 to 2007, Congress prohibited direct or government-to-government assistance to Cambodia in order to pressure Prime Minister Hun Sen into fully restoring democracy, but allowed U.S. assistance to NGOs and some humanitarian programs in Cambodia to continue. Congress lifted the ban in 2007 due in part to improving democratic processes.

Major U.S. aid efforts in Cambodia, channeled largely through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), include the following aid accounts, funding levels, and program areas:23

  • Development Assistance ($26.7 million in FY2014): civil society; political parties; mass communications; trafficking in persons; food security; nutrition; early education
  • Economic Support Funds ($5.2 million in FY2014): Khmer Rouge Tribunal (ECCC)
  • Global Health Programs ($33.9 million in FY2014): HIV/AIDS; tuberculosis; malaria; maternal and child health; family planning and reproductive health; nutrition
  • International Military Education and Training ($0.45 million in FY2014): English-language; leadership training; military professionalism; human rights awareness
  • Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs ($4 million in FY2014): unexploded ordnance (UXO) and explosive remnants of war (ERW) clearance; border security

The Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), launched in 2009 by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, is a regional foreign assistance effort through which the United States aims to promote cooperation and capacity building in the areas of agriculture and food security, connectivity, education, energy security, the environment and water, and health. LMI participants are Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. The State Department provided $14.3 million for the LMI out its East Asia and Pacific (EAP) regional programs in FY2014.24 U.S. assistance through the LMI supports programs in lower Mekong countries that aim to promote civil society involvement in development decisions and provide technical assistance for the assessment of environmental and social impacts of large infrastructure projects such as hydropower projects.25

Trafficking in Persons

According to the State Department's 2014 Trafficking in Persons Report and other sources, Cambodia is a source, transit, and destination country for human trafficking. Cambodians have been victims of sex trafficking, domestic servitude, debt bondage, and forced labor in surrounding countries. The State Department has recognized the Cambodian government's positive efforts in combatting trafficking, although improvements reportedly have stalled. For three consecutive years, from 2010 to 2012, the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons placed Cambodia in the "Tier 2" category, meaning that the government does not fully comply with minimum standards in accordance with the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, but it is making significant efforts to do so. However, Cambodia's status fell to "Tier 2 Watch List" in 2013 and remained there in 2014 due to the country's inability to maintain progress.26 Countries on the Tier 2 Watch List for two consecutive years are automatically downgraded to Tier 3 in the following year unless improvements are made or the Secretary of State grants a waiver. Tier 3 countries are subject to foreign aid restrictions.27

Unexploded Ordnance

The Kingdom of Cambodia is one of the countries in the world most heavily afflicted by unexploded ordnance (UXO) or explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munitions, landmines, and other undetonated weapons. U.S. bombing during the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese invasion in 1978, and civil wars during the 1970s and 1980s all contributed to the problem of unexploded ordnance. During the Vietnam War, the United States dropped 2.7 million tons of ordnance, including an estimated 26 million bomblets, on Cambodia. An estimated one-third of the ordnance failed to explode, which continues to pose a risk to the civilian population.28 There have been roughly 64,000 UXO casualties in Cambodia since 1979, of which 19,684 people were killed and 44,630 injured.29 Cambodia, with 25,000 UXO-related amputees, has the highest number of amputees per capita in the world.30 With the help of international assistance, the Kingdom reportedly has reduced the UXO casualty rate from roughly 700 per year a decade ago to fewer than 200, including 111 casualties in 2013 (22 killed and 89 injured).31 Unexploded ordnance has prevented land from being used for agricultural use, forestry, and cattle, and has disrupted irrigation and the supply of drinking water.

Since 1995, the United States has provided over $97 million for UXO clearance and disposal, related educational efforts, and survivor assistance programs.32 U.S. assistance to Cambodia has included USAID Leahy War Victims Fund programs for prostheses, physical rehabilitation, training, and employment, and Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs assistance for demining activities (approximately $4 million per year). An estimated 2,000 square kilometers (772 square miles) remain contaminated with UXO in Cambodia.33 The Director of the Cambodian Mine Action Center said that Cambodia needs $50 million annually until 2020 to eliminate UXO in the country, although a U.S. official involved in demining efforts suggested that totally removing UXO may be unrealistic.34

Economic Conditions

Cambodia is one of the poorest countries in Asia. Although the Kingdom has experienced steady economic growth during the past decade and a half, largely driven by expansions in agriculture, construction, the garment sector, and tourism, poverty and income inequality remain high. GDP growth was estimated to be 6.8% in 2014 and is forecast to grow by 7.5% annually during the next five years.35 Continuing obstacles to faster and more balanced development and greater foreign investment include poor education and public health, low government capacity, weak legal and financial institutions, inadequate infrastructure, and official corruption.

The United States is the largest overseas market for Cambodian goods, buying about one-third of the Kingdom's exports, mostly garments and footwear.36 Apparel constitutes approximately 80% of Cambodia's total merchandise exports. There are about 500 clothing factories that employ roughly 600,000 workers in the Kingdom.37 U.S.-Cambodian trade fell by 20% between 2007 and 2009 due to the global recession, but has since rebounded. In 2014, bilateral trade was worth nearly $3.2 billion, including $2.84 billion in U.S. imports of Cambodian goods, mostly apparel, and $328 million in U.S. exports to the Kingdom. The largest U.S. export item was vehicles.38 Cambodia's other major export markets include the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Singapore, and Vietnam. Cambodia's major import partners are Thailand, Vietnam, China, and Singapore.39 Principal foreign investors in Cambodia are China, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand.40

In 1996, Cambodia and the United States signed a bilateral trade agreement (BTA), which provided for reciprocal "normal trade relations" tariff treatment. In 2006, Cambodia signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the United States. Cambodia acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in October 2004. Cambodia also is a beneficiary of Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs whereby developed countries apply lower tariffs to some Cambodian goods. As a member of ASEAN since 1999, the Kingdom is committed to reducing tariffs as part of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).41 Cambodia also is a party to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations, a proposed free trade area including the 10 nations of ASEAN and 6 other Asia-Pacific countries.

Labor Issues

In addition to low labor costs, many Cambodian garment factories have developed a global reputation for good labor practices, largely because of a U.S.-Cambodia agreement, enacted in 1999, that rewarded progress in labor conditions with increased access to the U.S. market. As part of the agreement, in 2001, the International Labor Organization (ILO) was brought in to monitor and promote good labor practices in the Kingdom. It continues to do so under the program Better Factories Cambodia with funding from the Royal Government of Cambodia, the Garment Manufacturers' Association in Cambodia, Cambodian unions, the U.S. Department of Labor, the Australian government, and other sponsors.42

Labor relations have shown some signs of strain in recent years, however, as the garment industry has developed, labor abuses have become more widespread, and tensions between workers, management, and the government have increased. In March 2015, Human Rights Watch released a report concluding that the lack of enforcement of Cambodia's labor laws for the growing number of mostly female workers producing for international brands had led to "serious labor rights abuses."43 Cambodian workers are free to form their own unions and have the right to strike, although a majority of unions are affiliated with the CPP, and independent labor leaders and strike organizers and participants sometimes have been harassed or fired by employers.44 In February 2013, an estimated 20,000 textile workers in an industrial area in southeastern Cambodia went on strike for better working conditions and higher wages. Although protests decreased in 2014 and international awareness and wages have risen, the number of union leaders dismissed has increased, according to reports.45

Cambodia and China

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has become Cambodia's largest foreign investor and economic benefactor, with cumulative commercial investments reportedly worth $10 billion and development assistance totaling over $3 billion.46 China's investments in the kingdom are concentrated in garments, agriculture, mining, and other sectors. The PRC is a major source of development assistance, largely in the form of concessional loans, grants, Chinese-built infrastructure, and investment packages. In 2013, China and Cambodia reportedly signed economic agreements that included $500 million in PRC low-interest loans and $48 million in grants. In 2014, China reportedly pledged another $500 million in aid.47 In recent years, Beijing also has provided loans and military equipment including trucks, helicopters, and aircraft to the Cambodian Armed Forces, built military training and medical facilities, and donated uniforms. In May 2014, China announced that it would provide over 400 training scholarships for Cambodian military officers.48

Domestic and foreign demand for energy and PRC investment have fueled dam construction in Cambodia and other countries along the lower Mekong and other rivers, alarming environmentalists and people who rely upon the waterways for their homes and livelihood. These hydropower projects are largely financed and constructed by Chinese banks, companies, and workers, often on terms that are unfavorable to host countries such as Cambodia, according to critics. Ownership of most Chinese dams is based upon a "build-operate-transfer" arrangement. During a period of Chinese operation, which may last from 30 to 45 years, Cambodia pays the Chinese company for power generated by the dam. Chinese firms reportedly have invested more than $1.6 billion to build six dams in the kingdom.49

Some Cambodians and foreign observers have expressed concerns about China's influence, including the quality of Chinese infrastructure projects, their adverse effects on the environment, and the lack of transparency with which such projects are carried out.50 Some aid experts argue that Chinese assistance has significantly reduced the effectiveness of other aid donors in attempting to pressure Phnom Penh to make advances in the areas of rule of law, human rights, and democracy. Some analysts contend that Beijing has influenced Cambodian foreign policy. In 2012, for example, Cambodia served a one-year rotating term as chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). At the July 2012 ASEAN Ministerial, Phnom Penh's support for China's position on territorial disputes in the South China Sea aggravated tensions within the regional organization and contributed to the first failure in ASEAN's 45-year history to issue a joint communiqué. At the same time, other analysts observe that Hun Sen seeks relations with, as well as assistance from, multiple foreign powers.

Footnotes

49.

Alessandro Marazzi Sassoon, "Khmer Rouge Prosecutors Split on Muth Case," Phnom Penh Post, December 1, 2017; Seth Mydans, "Khmer Rouge Trial, Perhaps the Last, Nears End," New York Times, June 23, 2017.

. 74.

Global Trade Atlas

Global Trade Atlas.

80. 82. Huang Panyue, "Highlights of China-Cambodia 'Golden Dragon 2016' Joint Drill," China Military, December 27, 2016.

1.

John Pomfret, "Clinton Urges Cambodia to Strike a Balance with China," Washington Post, November 1, 2010.

2.

"Human Rights Main Focus of Obama Meeting with Hun Sen, US Says," VOA Khmer, November 21, 2012.

3.

See Department of State, Daniel R. Russel, "Remarks on the U.S.-Asia Rebalance and Priorities," Phnom Penh, Cambodia, January 27, 2015, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2015/01/236764.htm; Carlyle A. Thayer, "The Tug of War over Cambodia," USNI News, February 19, 2013.

4.

Christopher McCullough, "US, Cambodia Partner for Exercise Angkor Sentinel in 2015," March 17, 2015, http://www.army.mil.

5.

David Piling and Michael Peel, "Cambodia: Wave of Discontent," Financial Times, July 28, 2014.

6.

Sebastian Strangio, "The House That Hun Sen Built," Foreign Policy, January 13, 2015; National Democratic Institute, https://www.ndi.org/cambodia.

7.

"Cambodia's Ruling Party Promotes PM Hun Sen's Sons, Top Allies," Straits Times, February 2, 2015; "Cambodia's Ruling Party Facing Leadership Dilemma," Agence France-Presse, July 25, 2013.

8.

In 2012, the Sam Rainsy Party and the Human Rights Party merged to form a single opposition party, the National Rescue Party (NRP), with Sam Rainsy as President and Kem Sokha as Vice-President.

9.

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013: Cambodia, February 27, 2014; Thomas Fuller, "Cambodian Opposition Rejects Election Results," New York Times, July 29, 2013.

10.

"Cambodia Garment Workers Killed in Clashes with Police," BBC, January 3, 2014.

11.

Meas Sokchea, "'Culture of Dialogue' at Risk," Phnom Penh Post, April 30, 2015.

12.

The tribunal has 17 Cambodian judges and prosecutors and 10 international judges and prosecutors. As a safeguard against bias, verdicts require a "super-majority"—a simple majority plus the vote of at least one international judge.

13.

See "Cambodia: Khmer Rouge Convictions 'Too Little, Too Late,'" Human Rights Watch, August 8, 2014.

14.

Between 2008 and 2014, the United States contributed over $30 million to the U.N. trust fund. The operations of the ECCC have cost $200 million since 2006.

15.

During fiscal years 2010-2013, foreign operations legislation made support to the ECCC conditional upon certification by the Secretary of State that the United Nations and the Government of Cambodia were taking credible steps to address allegations of corruption and mismanagement within the court. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76, Section 7043(c)) provided that U.S. contributions to the Khmer Rouge Tribunal should not be made available unless the Secretary of State certified that the Government of Cambodia also had provided funding. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235, Section 7043(c)) provided that funds may not be made available to the Khmer Rouge Tribunal until the Secretary of State reported that the Government of Cambodia was making financial contributions to the court and the tribunal was free of governmental interference, among other conditions.

16.

Information provided by USAID.

17.

"Expanding Khmer Rouge Trials Could Spark War: Hun Sen," The Nation, February 28, 2015.

18.

"Statement by the National Co-Prosecutor Regarding Case File 003," Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, May 10, 2011.

19.

Prak Chan Thul, "Hun Sen Hostility Puts Decade-Old U.N. Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Doubt," Reuters News, April 21, 2015.

20.

Between 30% and 40% of the central government's budget relies upon foreign aid. Department of State, Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations with Cambodia, August 29, 2014.

21.

The Department of State requested $80.5 million for aid programs in Cambodia in FY2016. Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2016, Appendix 2, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/238221.pdf

22On December 12, 2017, the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing on U.S. policy options to promote democracy and human rights in Cambodia. Some U.S. lawmakers discussed whether the U.S. government should impose restrictions on Cambodian exports in order to apply further pressure on Hun Sen. Some experts at the hearing argued that trade sanctions may not be necessary, or that they may not be as effective as imposing sanctions targeting Cambodian leaders or providing assistance to Cambodian organizations engaged in human rights, democratic activism, and elections monitoring.6 Political Developments

Many Cambodian political, economic, and social institutions that were destroyed under the rule of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, also known as the Khmer Rouge (1975-1979), have to some extent been reestablished. Since the United Nations-administered national elections in 1993, which restored a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament, the Kingdom has made fitful progress in some areas of political and social development, including conducting elections, allowing a relatively open media, and developing a civil society that remains vibrant despite the political tightening. Economic growth of 7.5% annually during the past two decades has helped to reduce poverty while many social indicators have improved. National politics remains highly personalized, however, while political, legal, and judicial institutions continue to be weak, corruption is widespread, and economic disparities have widened.7

Modern Political History of Cambodia

The Kingdom of Cambodia became independent from France in 1953. Beginning in 1969, during the Vietnam War, the United States conducted a four-year, sustained, large-scale bombing campaign and incursion into officially neutral Cambodia aimed at stopping the flow of North Vietnamese soldiers and supplies. According to some historians, the U.S. bombing helped the Communist Party of Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) gain followers and military recruits in rural areas. In March 1970, the military forces of pro-American General Lon Nol overthrew the government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in a coup. A civil war followed, culminating in Lon Nol's defeat in April 1975 by Khmer Rouge forces and the founding of "Democratic Kampuchea." The Khmer Rouge attempted to create an agrarian, communist society, a policy that included the forced depopulation of cities, establishment of rural communes, and executions of many educated and wealthy Cambodians and ethnic minorities. During its brutal three-year reign, roughly 2 million out of a population of 8 million Cambodians died from execution, torture, overwork, starvation, and disease.

In January 1979, Vietnamese forces drove the Khmer Rouge from Phnom Penh. A 13-year internecine war ensued, in which Khmer Rouge, Cambodian nationalists, and royalist insurgents fought the Vietnamese-backed Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge military officer who had defected from the regime in 1977 and fled to Vietnam, served as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the PRK. Following the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989, a United Nations (U.N.)-brokered peace settlement officially ended the war.

In 1993, the United Nations administered elections for a 120-seat Constituent Assembly while Prince Sihanouk returned to Cambodia and was crowned King. For a decade-and-a-half, three major political parties vied for power and influence: the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) under the leadership of Hun Sen; the royalist FUNCINPEC Party (National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia); and the opposition Sam Rainsy Party. After sharing power with FUNCINPEC since 1993, Hun Sen staged an armed takeover of government in 1997. In the face of considerable international pressure and the withholding of foreign aid, Hun Sen held new parliamentary elections in July 1998, which the CPP narrowly won. The CPP and FUNCINPEC again agreed to form a coalition government, with Hun Sen as Prime Minister and Prince Ranariddh, the second son of King Sihanouk, as President of the National Assembly. This uneasy partnership continued until 2006, when Ranariddh was ousted as the leader of FUNCINPEC, which began to decline as a major political force in Cambodia.

In 2004, King Norodom Sihanouk abdicated the throne due to illness and his eldest son, Prince Sihamoni, succeeded him as King. Norodom Sihanouk died of heart failure, at the age of 89, in Beijing, China, in October 2012.

Hun Sen

Hun Sen, age 65, has been the nation's leader for over 30 years, including as Premier of the Vietnam-backed Republic of Kampuchea between 1985 and 1993, and as Prime Minister after the United Nations-sponsored national elections in 1993. Although democratic institutions and practices have developed, along with a civil society, Hun Sen long often has employed undemocratic means to remain politically dominant. He has garnered some electoral support, particularly in rural areas, through Cambodia's three decades of relative political stability and economic development.8 According to some experts, Hun Sen has bolstered his political strength through a combination of "guile and force"; electoral victories; legal and extralegal political maneuvers; influence over the judiciary, broadcast media, and labor unions; patronage; cronyism; and intimidation.9 In recent years, the Cambodian leader has silenced his chief political opponents through defamation lawsuits, and his government has been accused of harassing civil society actors and organizations.

2013 and 2017 Elections

Although Hun Sen has maintained popular support, it has been diminishing, particularly since the 2008 national elections. During the past decade, Cambodian urban and young voters—nearly two-thirds of the population are under the age of 30 and half are under the age of 25—have bolstered opposition parties.10 The national elections of 2013 were viewed by some observers as relatively free, but "fraught with irregularities."11 Despite widespread problems with voter registration lists, the polls resulted in a striking reversal of fortunes for Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and a boost for the opposition CNRP, led by Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha. The CPP lost 22 seats in the National Assembly, holding 68 out of a total of 123 seats, its lowest level of support since 1998. The main opposition groups, unified as the CNRP, won 55 seats for a net gain of 26. The poll reflected a changing electorate that is younger, more urban, and more globalized. Many voters are less aware of or focused upon Cambodia's past turbulence and deprivations, more concerned about current corruption and inequality, and more demanding about government accountability and performance, according to observers.12

In July 2014, following a year of political unrest stemming from the 2013 elections, including mass demonstrations and the CNRP's boycott of parliament, the CPP and the opposition agreed to a power-sharing agreement. However, despite promises by both sides to adopt a "culture of dialogue," political rhetoric became increasingly strident. Beginning in the second half of 2015, Hun Sen and the CPP struck back at opposition politicians and activists with physical assaults, arrests, and lawsuits that many observers perceived as politically motivated.13 In November 2015, the National Assembly stripped CNRP President Sam Rainsy of his parliamentary immunity and expelled him from the legislature.

Cambodia held elections for 1,646 commune council seats in June 2017. Hun Sen's CPP won 51% of council seats (down from 62% in 2012), while the CNRP won 44% (up from 31%). Many observers predicted that the scheduled 2018 national elections would continue the trend of increasing competitiveness between the two parties.14 There were fewer reported irregularities in 2017 compared to the 2013 National Assembly elections, due in part to financial and technical assistance from Japan and the European Union that focused on improvements in the voter registration system.15 Some human rights groups, however, reported that the local elections were held in an atmosphere of intimidation against the opposition and its supporters.16 Local elections do not determine the composition of the National Assembly, the most powerful legislative body in Cambodia. Nonetheless, commune councilors elect village chiefs, who long have formed a power base for the CPP.

Constraints on Civil Society

In August 2017, Department of State Spokesperson Heather Nauert expressed U.S. government concerns about antidemocratic trends in Cambodia:

The United States Government is deeply concerned by the deterioration in Cambodia's democratic climate in recent weeks. Two months ago, Cambodia received widespread recognition for running transparent, peaceful local elections. In the past two weeks, however, the achievement has been eclipsed by troubling government actions curtailing freedom of the press and civil society's ability to operate....17

Restrictions on political and social activism and foreign NGOs began roughly one year after the CPP and the opposition CNRP agreed to share power. In July 2015, the Cambodian Parliament passed a broadly worded law on nongovernmental organizations (Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations, or LANGO), which authorizes the Foreign Ministry to halt the activities of any international NGO that fails to register with the government. In addition, Article 8 of LANGO empowers government authorities to ban any NGO that engages in activities that "jeopardize peace, stability and public order or harm the national security, national unity, culture, and traditions of the Cambodian national society."18 Critics argue that the legislation makes it easier for Hun Sen to shut down NGOs deemed critical of the government.19

In September 2017, the Cambodian Foreign Ministry expelled the National Democratic Institute (NDI), a U.S.-based NGO that has attempted to promote transparent governance and inclusive political participation in Cambodia, on the grounds that the organization was not registered with the government. Government media outlets also alleged that NDI, which received financial support from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), was involved in a conspiracy involving the opposition and U.S.-funded NGOs to overthrow the government.20 Some Cambodian human rights and environmental NGOs also were investigated or disbanded during this time.21

In September 2017, the Cambodia Daily, an English-language publication founded by a U.S. journalist and known by some observers as an opposition newspaper, was shut down by the government ostensibly because it had failed to pay taxes.22 The government also closed more than one dozen Cambodian radio stations that sold air time to Voice of America and Radio Free Asia (RFA). RFA, facing political pressure and possible tax and administrative penalties that made it "impossible" to continue operating in the Kingdom, closed its Phnom Penh office.23 In November 2017, a Cambodian court charged two journalists who had filed reports for RFA with espionage for "providing information that is destructive to national defense to a foreign state."24

Silencing the Opposition

Since late 2015, more than 25 opposition members and government critics have been arrested. In June 2016, government critic Kem Ley was killed. Although the perpetrator was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison, many Cambodian political activists doubt the killer's stated motives—he claimed that he shot Kem over an unpaid debt—and speculate that he helped carry out a political assassination.25 Since 2008, CNRP leader Sam Rainsy has faced several defamation charges regarded by many observers as politically motivated, including four since 2016, and has spent most of his time in exile. Sam resigned as president of the CNRP in February 2017. In December 2017, he was charged with treason for posting a video on social media urging security personnel not to "obey orders from any dictators if they order you to shoot and kill innocent people."26

CNRP leader Kem Sokha, who became party president in 2017, also has faced charges that many observers believe were politically motivated. In September 2017, he was arrested for treason for allegedly conspiring with the U.S. government to foment a "color revolution."27 The charge was based upon a speech that Kem gave in 2013 in which he discussed democratic change in Cambodia, and for his involvement with the Cambodian Center for Human Rights, which has received some U.S. funding.28

Suspension of Two-Party Politics

In November 2017, the Supreme Court of Cambodia made a ruling based upon recent amendments to the Law on Political Parties, thereby dissolving the CNRP for "conspiring with the United States to overthrow the government."29 The law allowed 55 opposition seats to be filled instead by third parties, with many of them going to FUNCINPEC, the royalist party that dominated opposition politics until the late 2000s. In addition, 118 CNRP members were banned from participating in politics for five years. The National Assembly also amended laws to remove CNRP commune councilors and village chiefs and replace them mostly with CPP members.30 Analysts say that these actions assure that the CPP will run virtually unopposed in the July 2018 general election. Some observers fear that Hun Sen's nullification of opposition seats could lead to large-scale political unrest, although some analysts believe that many Cambodians would hope to avoid political upheaval. According to one expert, the lack of a "strong, neutral force" in the nation's politics poses an obstacle to political compromise and democratic development in the Kingdom.31

U.S.-Cambodia Cooperation

In the past decade, U.S. foreign assistance efforts in Cambodia have included programs to strengthen democratic institutions and norms, promote the rule of law, increase bilateral trade and investment, support economic growth, reduce poverty, and improve public health.32 Other forms of bilateral cooperation have included U.S. missing-in-action (MIA) recovery and demining activities. The United States also has provided funding for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), also known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. The ECCC was established through a 2003 agreement between the government of Cambodia and the United Nations to try former Khmer Rouge leaders responsible for grave violations of national and international law, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

The strengthening of bilateral relations since the mid-2000s has included greater military engagement, including U.S. naval port visits, U.S. military assistance and training, and joint exercises. Angkor Sentinel, launched in 2010, is an annual bilateral exercise held in Cambodia that has focused on international peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and military-to-military cooperation. The Cambodian government cancelled the 2017 exercises, reportedly stating that the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) were needed for local elections and an anti-illegal-drug campaign. Some observers interpreted the unilateral action as a sign of Hun Sen's further distancing the Kingdom from the United States.33 The Cambodian government also postponed indefinitely a U.S. humanitarian mission in the Kingdom, the U.S. Navy Mobile Construction Battalion (also known as Seabees), without an explanation. Seabees have worked with RCAF since 2008 and performed more than $5 million in community service projects throughout the country.34 A U.S. Embassy spokesperson stated that other military exchanges and training programs would not be affected.35

U.S. Foreign Assistance

Cambodia has been heavily dependent upon foreign assistance since 1993. Official Development Assistance (ODA), which the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines as having "the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective" and a grant element of at least 25%, for Cambodia totaled $711 million in 2015.36 The Kingdom's reliance upon foreign assistance, while still significant, has declined during the past decade-and-a-half. ODA fell from 120% of central government expenditures in 2002 to less than a third in 2015, according to World Bank figures.37 The largest OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors are Japan, South Korea, the United States, Australia, and France (2010-2015).38 Some analysts contend that ODA for Cambodia, part of a "multibillion dollar international effort to transplant democracy in Cambodia since the early 1990s," long has kept Hun Sen's authoritarian tendencies in check, but has lost its effectiveness.39 According to one estimate, DAC nations provided $12 billion in loans and grants to Cambodia between 1992 and 2012 for development and democracy building efforts, although some experts argue that the money was misspent or that it reduced government accountability.40

The United States provided an estimated $88.5 million in foreign assistance to the Kingdom in FY2017, largely for Development Assistance (DA) and Global Health Programs (GHP) administered by the State Department and USAID. DA has focused on democracy and governance reforms, food security, and natural resource conservation. DA also has provided support to political activists and human rights organizations in Cambodia. GHP efforts have included combatting infectious diseases; promoting maternal, reproductive, and child health; and sponsoring HIV/AIDS programs.41

The Trump Administration's FY2018 foreign operations budget request would eliminate DA and reduce funding for GHP in Cambodia. These decreases largely reflect proposed across-the-board cuts to U.S. foreign assistance programs globally and in the Indo-Pacific region.42 S. 1780, the Senate FY2018 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs spending measure, would recommend $86.9 million in foreign assistance for Cambodia, only slightly less than the FY2017 level of $88.5 million.43

Congress periodically has imposed human rights conditions upon some U.S. assistance to Cambodia. From 1998 to 2007, Congress prohibited direct or government-to-government assistance to Cambodia in order to pressure Prime Minister Hun Sen into fully restoring democracy, but allowed U.S. assistance to NGOs and some humanitarian programs to continue. Congress lifted the ban in 2007 due in part to improving democratic processes, although most U.S. assistance efforts in Cambodia have continued to be channeled largely through NGOs. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2014 (P.L. 113-76) imposed political conditions upon some foreign assistance to Cambodia.44 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2017 (P.L. 115-31) withheld 25% of international security assistance to Cambodia until certain conditions related to democratic governance were met.45

FY2018 Foreign Operations Appropriations Legislation

S. 1780 and the House Consolidated Appropriations bill for FY2018 (H.R. 3354) would impose conditions or certification requirements upon some U.S. assistance to Cambodia, including that the Government of Cambodia has ceased efforts to intimidate civil society and the political opposition in Cambodia; is credibly investigating the murder of social and political activists; is supporting the conduct of free and fair elections through a nonpartisan election commission; is allowing the return of exiled opposition leaders; and is respecting freedoms of assembly, speech, and press. The Senate version would bar entry to Cambodian officials who "undermine democracy and human rights in Cambodia."46

Khmer Rouge Tribunal

The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, an international tribunal established through an agreement between the government of Cambodia and the United Nations, began proceedings in 2006 to try Khmer Rouge leaders and officials responsible for grave violations of national and international law.47 The ECCC has been financed through contributions by the Cambodian government and with donations by foreign countries, particularly Japan, both directly to the ECCC and to a U.N.-administered international trust fund. The tribunal reportedly has been hampered by interference from the Cambodian government and by the alleged corruption of Cambodian court officials, resignations by some international judges, and unexpected costs and delays.48

The U.S. government withheld assistance to the ECCC from 2006 to 2008 due to doubts about the court's independence. In 2008, the United States began providing annual contributions to the international trust fund (including $2 million and $1.5 million in FY2016 and FY2017, respectively). Since 2010, some U.S. foreign operations appropriations measures have placed conditions upon assistance to the tribunal in order to discourage corruption and political interference within the court and to ensure that the Cambodian government also was contributing to its costs.49 In addition, the U.S. government has contributed to the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), an archive, library, and public service center focused upon Khmer Rouge atrocities, providing $9.8 million to DC-Cam since 2005.50

ECCC prosecutors have charged five former Khmer Rouge leaders with crimes against humanity and war crimes. In 2012, "chief executioner" Kaing Guek Eav, who ran the infamous Toul Sleng prison in Phnom Penh, was sentenced to life in prison. Former Foreign Minister Ieng Sary died in March 2013, before the completion of his trial, while his wife, former Minister of Social Affairs Ieng Thirith was declared mentally unfit for trial. In August 2014, the court sentenced former leaders Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan each to life in prison for crimes against humanity, although both continue to face additional charges.

Cambodian and international human rights groups have advocated prosecuting midranking Khmer Rouge officials, while Hun Sen has opposed further indictments, arguing that they would undermine national stability.51 Three lower-ranking military and civilian figures face charges of genocide, but some observers say their prosecutions appear unlikely, given opposition from Hun Sen and related court costs.52 Some analysts contend that Hun Sen has been reluctant to widen the scope of the trials due to his former connections with Khmer Rouge military leaders.53

Unexploded Ordnance

Cambodia is among the world countries most heavily contaminated by unexploded ordnance (UXO), including cluster munitions, landmines, and other undetonated weapons left from U.S. bombing during the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, and civil wars during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1969, the United States launched a four-year carpet-bombing campaign, dropping 2.7 million tons of ordnance, mostly cluster munitions, on Cambodia, more than the amount that fell on Germany and Japan combined during World War II. Up to 25% of the cluster bombs failed to explode, according to some estimates.54 There have been over 64,000 UXO casualties in Cambodia since 1979, including over 19,000 deaths. An estimated 1,400 square kilometers of Cambodia, or about 0.8% of the country's land area, remains contaminated with UXO.55 Unexploded ordnance has had economic costs as well, by preventing land from being used for agricultural purposes, forestry, and cattle, and by disrupting irrigation and drinking water supplies.

With the help of international assistance, Cambodia has reduced the UXO casualty rate from roughly 250 people per year a decade ago to about 100 annually in recent years, according to the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.56 By 2016, 50% of contaminated land reportedly had been cleared. The Cambodian Mine Action Authority is finalizing plans to clear all contaminated areas by 2025. Despite progress, the migration of poor Cambodians to densely mined areas along the border with Thailand reportedly contributed to a spike in casualties in 2016.57

Between 1993 and 2016, the U.S. government contributed over $124 million for UXO clearance and disposal, related educational efforts, and survivor assistance programs in Cambodia.58 USAID's Leahy War Victims Fund has supported programs to help provide medical and rehabilitation services and prosthetics to Cambodian victims of UXO.59 The United States provided $5.5 million and $4.3 million in FY2016 and FY2017, respectively, for demining efforts.60 In November 2017, the Trump Administration reportedly decided not to provide annual demining funding in FY2018, but did not give a public explanation.61

Cambodian Debt

In 2017, the Cambodian government again pressed the United States to forgive debt that the pro-U.S. government of General Lon Nol had incurred during the early 1970s. As U.S. bombing and civil war wracked the country, the U.S. Department of Agriculture loaned the Lon Nol government $274 million on concessionary terms for American rice, wheat, oil, cotton, and other commodities. The U.S. and Cambodian governments have not come to an agreement on the debt, which has grown to $506 million, including interest and penalties. The last bilateral discussion of the debt reportedly occurred in 2011.62

The Cambodian government argues that the debt is revocable because the Lon Nol government, brought to power through a coup d'etat, was illegitimate. It also claims that some of the U.S. agricultural commodities never reached Cambodia and that Lon Nol used some of the loans for military purposes. The U.S. government reportedly has cancelled some portions for which there is a lack of documentation and waived interest on unpaid interest. It has offered to reduce the loan or reschedule payments, but only if Cambodia signs a bilateral debt agreement, which the Hun Sen government has refused to do.63 U.S. officials have stated that various forms of debt relief are unwarranted due to Cambodia's relatively low debt-to-GDP ratio and its fiscal ability to repay the debt.64

Economic Conditions

In the past decade-and-a-half, Cambodia, one of the poorest countries in Asia, has performed well on some socioeconomic indicators. The Kingdom's economy has achieved an average annual growth rate of 7.5% since 1994 and 7.1% since 2014, driven largely by foreign investment and the development of the agricultural, construction, garment, real estate, and tourism sectors.65 China, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian countries are the main sources of foreign direct investment (FDI).66 Domestic consumption also is fueling economic growth.67 Continuing obstacles to sustainable development include widespread corruption, income inequality, limited human resources, and a lack of job opportunities for Cambodia's young population.68 Rising wages and the Kingdom's advancement to "lower middle-income country" may make it less competitive as a low-skilled manufacturing base, and less eligible for foreign assistance as well as participation in the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and similar EU trade programs.69

Economic development has brought social and environmental costs. Hundreds of thousands of Cambodians reportedly have been displaced as government, business, and foreign entities, often in collusion, have confiscated their land and homes, sometimes forcibly or without proper compensation, to make way for agricultural, mining, logging, tourism, and urban development projects. Although forced relocations have continued, the number of cases reportedly has declined in recent years.70 Cambodia has one of the highest deforestation rates in the world. Illegal logging continues, due to strong demand for wood from China and Vietnam, corruption, and suppression of environmental activists.71

Cambodia's poverty rate fell from 47% in 2007 to 13.5% in 2014, although many families remain "near-poor" and vulnerable to economic downturns.72 According to the World Bank, life expectancy has risen over 15 years since 1995.73 Maternal mortality decreased from 472 per 100,000 live births in 2005 to 170 in 2014, and under-five mortality fell from 83 per 1,000 live births in 2005 to 35 in 2014.74 Less than one-third of the population, however, has access to piped water supplies, and nearly one-third of children reportedly are stunted.75

The United States is the largest single overseas market for Cambodian merchandise exports. In 2016, U.S.-Cambodian bilateral trade was worth nearly $3.18 billion, including $2.81 billion in U.S. imports of Cambodian goods, predominantly clothing and footwear.76 Cambodia's other major export markets include the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. Garment and footwear products make up about 80% of Cambodian merchandise exports, with 43% reportedly going to the EU and 29% to the United States.77 In recent years, foreign investment in the garment sector, which employs an estimated 700,000 Cambodian workers, largely has been fueled by companies from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.78 In 2012, China surpassed the United States as Cambodia's largest trading partner, although bilateral trade between Cambodia and China consists primarily of Chinese exports to Cambodia.79

Cambodia acceded to the World Trade Organization in 2004, and has made commitments to reduce tariffs and fulfill other obligations by 2018 as a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area. Cambodia also is a party to the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a trade agreement that includes the 10 ASEAN member states and 6 other Indo-Pacific countries, and which is expected to be finalized in 2018.80 The United States and Cambodia signed a bilateral trade agreement in 1996, providing for reciprocal "normal trade relations" tariff treatment, and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in 2006. The Kingdom is a beneficiary of GSP programs, including the U.S. GSP program, whereby developed countries apply lower tariffs to some categories of goods from developing countries.81

Labor relations in Cambodia have shown some signs of strain in recent years, particularly as the garment industry has developed. A garment factory monitoring system established through an agreement between the United States and Cambodia in 1999 ("Better Factories Cambodia"), managed by the International Labor Organization and funded by international donors, including the U.S. Department of Labor, has helped to protect some labor rights.82 Cambodia's National Assembly adopted a new Law on Trade Unions in 2016, which some reports say imposes greater restrictions on worker rights.83 In August 2017, the Cambodian government announced that it would adopt a national minimum wage law. Some analysts surmise that this policy was enacted to boost labor support for the CPP in the run-up to 2018 national elections.84

Cambodia and China

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has become Cambodia's largest economic benefactor at a time when major ODA donors have become increasingly critical of Hun Sen's authoritarian policies. China's economic support has lessened the influence of ODA and foreign aid conditions imposed by DAC countries and given Hun Sen more political room to maneuver, both domestically and internationally, according to some analysts.85 Although a commentary in China's Global Times warned of the risks to Chinese investments from possible domestic instability and international sanctions resulting from Hun Sen's political crackdown, the PRC government later issued a statement seemingly in full support of the Cambodian leader.86 In return, some analysts say, Cambodia has backed Beijing's positions on various regional issues, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea.87 Cambodia, which one analyst states "garner[s] a disproportionate amount of China's attention," is said to wield an "effective veto" in ASEAN on positions aimed at checking China's assertiveness in the region, and to be China's "most reliable partner in Southeast Asia."88

Chinese foreign investment is difficult to quantify. Many Chinese foreign economic projects either are not strictly commercial or do not ultimately result in Chinese ownership, and thus they are not counted as foreign direct investment. By some measures, however, China is the largest foreign investor in Cambodia, with cumulative investments of between $14 billion and $16 billion.89 According to one report, China accounted for nearly 30% of total foreign investment in 2016, while the United States constituted less than 4%.90 Major sectors for Chinese investment include agriculture, garments, hydropower, infrastructure, mining, and tourism.

Chinese development financing and assistance to Cambodia have become a dominant influence in the Kingdom's economy. Many forms of PRC foreign assistance, due to the commercial benefits accruing to China and large loan component, do not meet the OECD's criteria for ODA. Nonetheless, in recent years, China has by some measures matched total aid flows from DAC countries. According to one assessment, China has provided Cambodia about $15 billion in assistance and concessionary loans over the past two decades.91

PRC assistance to Cambodia includes concessional loans and grants, Chinese-built infrastructure, government buildings, and sports facilities, and support for public health and education. A Chinese company reportedly is developing a $3.8 billion deep-water port with a 99-year lease.92 Some observers have expressed concerns about Chinese economic projects, including their quality, effects on the environment, and lack of transparency. Cambodians have expressed mixed assessments about China's economic influence. Some have complained about being forcibly evicted from their homes and communities to make way for Chinese-backed economic projects, and about the lack of consultation during the planning stages. Some Cambodians also have said that Chinese-built roads and other infrastructure have brought tangible benefits.93

Domestic and regional demand for energy and foreign investment largely from the PRC have fueled hydropower projects in Cambodia and neighboring countries. While some Cambodians argue that hydropower has spurred development and contributed to energy security, others have complained about environmental degradation and ecological damage, loss of fish stocks, displacement of communities, and adverse effects on livelihoods due to dam construction.94 Chinese firms reportedly have invested more than $1.6 billion to build six dams in the Kingdom. A seventh hydropower project, the Lower Sesan Dam 2, a joint venture that involves Chinese, Cambodian, and Vietnamese companies, aims to become fully operational in 2018.95 Ownership of most Chinese-backed dams is based upon a "build-operate-transfer" (BOT) arrangement. Through BOT, Cambodia pays a Chinese entity to operate the dam for a period of years, and ownership of the facility eventually is transferred to Cambodia.96

Beijing also has become a principal provider of military assistance to Cambodia, extending loans and military equipment, including small arms, trucks, helicopters, and aircraft to the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. China reportedly also has provided military education and training and sponsored exchanges of senior military leaders. Some analysts see PRC-Cambodian military cooperation as a response to growing security ties between the United States and Vietnam.97 In 2016, China and Cambodia launched their first bilateral military exercise, Golden Dragon, a humanitarian assistance exercise involving roughly 400 People's Liberation Army (PLA) and RCAF soldiers.98

Author Contact Information

[author name scrubbed], Specialist in Asian Affairs ([email address scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed])

Footnotes

1.

Sebastian Strangio, "Cambodia Becomes the World's Newest One-Party State," Foreign Policy, November 17, 2017; David Hutt, "How China Came to Dominate Cambodia," The Diplomat, September 1, 2016.

2.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, "Cambodia's Descent: Policies to Support Democracy and Human Rights in Cambodia," December 12, 2017; Nicole Smolinski, "The Upcoming Cambodian Election and U.S.-Cambodian Ties under the Trump Administration: An Interview with John D. Ciorciari," National Bureau of Asian Research, June 1, 2017; John Sifton, Human Rights Watch, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Cambodia's Looming Political and Social Crisis," July 9, 2013.

3.

Department of State, Press Statement, Washington, D.C., December 6, 2017. Andrew Nachemson and Ben Sokhean, "A 'One-Party Dictatorship': World Reacts to CNRP Decision as PM Says China Will Fill Gaps Left by Sanctions," Phnom Penh Post, November 20, 2017.

4.

Sopheng Cheang, "EU Suspends Aid to Cambodian Election Commission," Washington Post, December 12, 2017; Ray Downs, "E.U. Parliament to Freeze Cambodian Officials' Assets for Human Rights Abuses," UPI, December 15, 2017.

5.

S. 1780, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2018, §1743(b); H.R. 3354, Make America Secure and Prosperous Appropriations Act, 2018, §1743(b).

6.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, "Cambodia's Descent: Policies to Support Democracy and Human Rights in Cambodia," op. cit.

7.

Sebastian Strangio, "In Cambodia, Everything is Different but Nothing Has Changed," Asian Review, October 31, 2016.

8.

Vannarith Chheang, "After Thirty Years of Hun Sen, Where Is Cambodia Now?" East Asia Forum, March 18, 2015.

9.

Sebastian Strangio, "The House That Hun Sen Built," Foreign Policy, January 13, 2015.

10.

Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, December 12, 2017; United Nations Population Fund, "Cambodia Youth Data Sheet 2015," http://cambodia.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Flyer_Cambodia_Youth_Factsheet_final_draft_%28approved%29.pdf.

11.

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013: Cambodia, February 27, 2014; Thomas Fuller, "Cambodian Opposition Rejects Election Results," New York Times, July 29, 2013.

12.

Julia Wallace, "As Demographics in Cambodia Shift, Youth Seek Political Change," New York Times, February 17, 2016.

13.

Luke Hunt, "New Jailings Expose the Farce of Cambodia's 'Culture of Dialogue'," The Diplomat, July 24, 2017.

14.

Jack Myint and Ben Black, "Cambodian Commune Elections 2017," U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, July 5, 2017.

15.

Ben Sokhean, "NEC Releases Official June 4 Election Results," Cambodia Daily, June 26, 2017.

16.

"Cambodia: Commune Elections Not Free or Fair," Human Rights Watch, June 12, 2017.

17.

Department of State, Department Press Briefing, Washington, D.C., August 23, 2017.

18.

"Cambodian Government Shuts Down Pro-Democracy US Charity and Expels Foreign Staff," Agence France Presse, August 23, 2017; Mong Palatino, "Does Cambodia Really Need a New NGO Law?" The Diplomat, July 17, 2015.

19.

Ibid.

20.

"Ananth Baliga and Niem Chheng, "PM, US's War of Words Escalates," Phnom Penh Post, September 12, 2017; Ananth Baliga, "Breaking: NDI to be Shuttered, Foreign Staff Expelled," Phnom Penh Post, August 23, 2017.

21.

National Democratic Institute, "Statement on Cambodian Government's Decision to Shut Down NDI's Office in Cambodia," August 23, 2017; Amnesty International, "Annual Report 2016/2017," February 22, 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/cambodia/report-cambodia/.

22.

Richard Paddock, "The Cambodia Daily to Close," New York Times, September 3, 2017.

23.

Ananth Baliga, Mech Dara and Niem Chheng, "RFA Shuts Down Cambodia Operations amid Media Crackdown," Phnom Penh Post, September 12, 2017.

24.

Prak Chan Thul, "Cambodian Court Charges Two Journalists with Espionage," Reuters, November 18, 2017; Niem Chheng and Shaun Turton, "CNRP May Seek Clarity on Radio Station Closures," August 31, 2017.

25.

Julia Wallace and Neou Vannarin, "A Life Sentence in Cambodia, But Kem Ley's Murder Is Far from Solved," New York Times, March 23, 2017.

26.

Mech Dara and Andrew Nachemson, "PM, Military Officials Say Rainsy Will Face 'Treason' Suit over Facebook Post," Phnom Penh Post, December 8, 2017; Prak Chan Thul, "Cambodia's Sam Rainsy to Be Sued Over 'Treasonous' Call to Soldiers: PM," Reuters, December 6, 2017.

27.

"Color revolutions" refer to democratic movements in former Soviet republics and elsewhere in the early 2000s that were fueled by civil society groups.

28.

Julia Wallace, "Cambodia Charges Opposition Leader Kem Sokha with Treason," New York Times, September 5, 2017.

29.

Joshua Berlinger, "Cambodia Court Orders Main Opposition Party to Dissolve," CNN, November 17, 2017; Sebastian Strangio, "Cambodia's Crumbling Democracy," Foreign Affairs, September 14, 2017.

30.

May Titthara, "CNRP Commune Seats Doled Out," Khmer Times, December 4, 2017; Ben Sokhean, Mech Dara and Ananth Baliga, "'Death of Democracy': CNRP Dissolved by Supreme Court Ruling," November 17, 2017.

31.

Vannarith Chheang, "Sanctions Won't Stop Cambodia's Democratic Collapse," East Asia Forum, January 9, 2018; Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Report: Cambodia," December 14, 2017.

32.

See Department of State, "U.S. Relations with Cambodia Fact Sheet," February 12, 2016, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2732.htm; Department of State, Daniel R. Russel, "Remarks on the U.S.-Asia Rebalance and Priorities," Phnom Penh, Cambodia, January 27, 2015, https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2015/01/236764.htm.

33.

Economist Intelligence Unit, "Hun Sen Loosens US Ties Ahead of Crucial Elections," April 10, 2017; "Cambodia's Decision Angkor Sentinel, GlobalSecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/angkor-sentinel.htm.

34.

Hul Reaksmey, "Cambodia Scraps US Aid Program, Accepts $150M from China," VOA, April 7, 2017; Matthew Burke, "Cambodia Kicks Out Navy Seabees with No Explanation," Stars and Stripes, April 5, 2017.

35.

"Cambodia Says China Not Behind Scrapped 'Angkor Sentinel' US Military Drill," South China Morning Post, January 17, 2017.

36.

Not including development assistance from China, which generally does not meet OECD criteria. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Official Development Assistance – Definition and Coverage," http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm.

37.

Prak Chan Thul and Matthew Tostevin, "China's Big Money Trumps U.S. Influence in Cambodia," Reuters, September 11, 2017.

38.

In order of amount of ODA in 2015. OECD DAC members constitute the world's major ODA donors. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Creditor Reporting System.

39.

Sebastian Strangio, "Cambodia Becomes the World's Newest One-Party State," op. cit.

40.

James Kynge, Leila Haddou and Michael Peel, "FT Investigation: How China Bought Its Way into Cambodia," Financial Times, September 8, 2016. See also Sebastian Strangio, Hun Sen's Cambodia, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014 and Sophal Ear, Aid Dependence in Cambodia, New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.

41.

Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2017.

42.

Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2018.

43.

See S.Rept. 115-152.

44.

P.L. 113-76, §7043(c).

45.

P.L. 115-31, §7043(c).

46.

S. 1780, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2018, §1743(b); H.R. 3354, Make America Secure and Prosperous Appropriations Act, 2018, §1743(b).

47.

The tribunal has 17 Cambodian judges and prosecutors and 10 international judges and prosecutors. As a safeguard against bias, verdicts require a "super-majority"—a simple majority plus the vote of at least one international judge.

48.

"Cambodia: Khmer Rouge Convictions 'Too Little, Too Late'," Human Rights Watch, August 8, 2014.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76, Section 7043(c)) provided that some assistance shall be withheld until the Secretary of State submitted a report regarding the effectiveness of foreign aid in Cambodia, an independent investigation into election irregularities was conducted, and all elected Members of Parliament had taken their seats. See also S.Rept. 113-81. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235, Section 7043(c)) provided that assistance for Cambodia shall be made available for programs related to democracy, human rights, and civil society, research, documentation, and education on the Khmer Rouge genocide, and basic education.

23.

For further information, see USAID, Cambodia: History, January 12, 2015, http://www.usaid.gov/cambodia/history.

24.

The Department of State requested $11.7 million for the LMI through EAP regional programs in FY2016. Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2016, op. cit.

25.

Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2016, Appendix 2; William E. Todd, U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia, "Preserving the Mekong River System," The Cambodia Herald, July 14, 2013.

26.

See foreign operations appropriations legislation: P.L. 113-76, §7043(c); P.L. 113-235, §7043(c); P.L. 114-113, §7043(c); P.L. 115-31, §7043(c).

50.

"United States Announces New Contribution to Help Preserve Cambodia's Historical Documents," USAID, April 3, 2017.

51.

"Expanding Khmer Rouge Trials Could Spark War: Hun Sen," The Nation, February 28, 2015.

52.

Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2014, June 20, 2014.

2753.

See CRS Report RL34317, Trafficking in Persons: U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]Prak Chan Thul, "Hun Sen Hostility Puts Decade-Old U.N. Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Doubt," Reuters News, April 21, 2015.

2854.

Zsombor Peter, "Cambodia Still Undecided About Signing Cluster Munitions Treaty," The and Aun Pheap, "Follow the Money," Cambodia Daily, September 9, 2013June 25, 2016; Landmine and Cluster MunitionMunitions Monitor, Cambodia, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/2492.

en-gb/reports/2017/cambodia/view-all.aspx.
2955.

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/3321"Landmine/UXO Casualties in Cambodia Down 21 Pct in 1st Four Months," Xinhuanet, June 19, 2017.

3056.

The Halo Trust, http://www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/cambodia; Vincent MacIsaac, "Development Depends on Demining," Phnom Penh Post, December 6, 2011.

31.

Casualties reportedly increased during the first half of 2014. Sean Teehan, UXO Injuries, Deaths Up in '14, Phnom Penh Post, November 3, 2014; Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/3321; Zsombor Peter, "Mine, UXO Casualties Down; Deaths Steady," The Cambodia Daily, February 14, 2013.

32.

Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, To Walk the Earth in Safety (2014): East Asia and Pacific, September 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/2014/232280.htm#cambodia.

33.

"Casualties from Wartime Ordnance Increase in Cambodia," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, August 27, 2014.

34.

"Cambodia's Landmine Casualty Toll Rises 55 Pct.," PNA (Philippines News Agency), November 1, 2014; "Interview: Clearing Cambodia of Land Mines by 2015 Was 'Unrealistic,'" Government Publications and Press Releases, February 27, 2015.

35.

Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, Cambodia, March 9, 2015.

36.

Embassy of the United States, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, http://cambodia.usembassy.gov/doing_business_in_cambodia.html.

37.

"Cambodia: Small Victory at High Price for Cambodian Garment Unions," Thai News Service, January 19, 2015; "Critical for Government to Support Garment Industry," Economist Intelligence Unit, October 1, 2014.

38Landmine and Cluster Munitions Monitor, Cambodia, op. cit.
57.

Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, To Walk the Earth in Safety 2017, December 13, 2017.

58.

Ibid.

59.

Ibid.

60.

Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs Conventional Weapons Destruction (NADR-CWD). Data from Department of State.

61.

David Boyle and Hul Reaksmey, "US Demining Cut Provokes Cambodia," VOA News, November 7, 2017; Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2018.

62.

Luke Hunt, "Hopes Fade for Cambodia Winning US Debt Relief, Analysts Say," Voice of America, February 14, 2017.

63.

David Hutt, "Cambodia, US Duel over Vietnam War Debt," Asia Times, March 28, 2017; Julia Wallace, "Cambodia Appeals to Trump to Forgive War-Era Debt," New York Times, April 2, 2017; Scot Marciel, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "An Overview of Cambodia Debt and the Need for Debt Recycling: How Can the U.S. be of Assistance?" February 14, 2008.

64.

Colin Meyn and Ben Sokhean, "US Hits Back at Government over $500 Million Debt, Democracy," Cambodia Daily, February 6, 2017; Joe Yun, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Cambodia's Small Debt: When Will the U.S. Forgive?" September 30, 2010.

65.

Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, December 12, 2017; Asian Development Bank, "Cambodia: Economy," 2017.

66.

In order of amount of FDI. Chheang Vannarith, "China and Investments It Has Made in Cambodia," Khmer Times, July 28, 2017.

67.

Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Report: Cambodia," op. cit.

68.

Central Intelligence Agency, op. cit.

69.

Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Report: Cambodia," op. cit.; Central Intelligence Agency, op. cit.

70.

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Cambodia, March 3, 2017.

71.

Abu SMG Kibria, "How Politics Is Killing Cambodia's Forests," The Diplomat, September 21, 2016.

72.

United Nations Development Programme, "Cambodia Has Region's Fastest Growth Rate in Human Development," March 22, 2017.

73.

World Bank, "The World Bank in Cambodia: Overview," October 2017, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cambodia/overview.

Ibid.

75.

Ibid.

76.
3977.

CIA, The World Factbook, 2015Roseanne Gerin, "Cambodian Garment Unions Fear Possible End of EU, US Trade Preferences," Radio Free Asia, December 1, 2017.

4078.

Embassy of the United States, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, http://cambodia.usembassy.gov/doing_business_in_cambodia.html.

41Global Trade Atlas; European Commission, "Cambodia: Trade Statistics," http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_111485.pdf.
79.

Global Trade Atlas; World Bank.

ASEAN member countries are: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The original members of ASEAN have agreed to eliminate tariffs on intra-ASEAN trade by 2015; ASEAN's newest members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) have until 2018 to eliminate import duties.

42RCEP's members ASEAN countries plus Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand.
81.

The U.S. GSP program does not apply to some items, including most textiles and footwear.

http://betterfactories.org/

.
4383.

Human Rights Watch, Cambodia: Labor Laws Fail to Protect Garment Workers, March 12, 2015, http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/11/cambodia-labor-laws-fail-protect-garment-workers-1.

44.

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013: Cambodia, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=220187&year=2013#wrapper.

45.

"Cambodia: Small Victory at High Price for Cambodian Garment Unions," Thai News Service, January 19, 2015; Taing Vida and Sean Teehan, "Labour Strikes Plunge in 2014," Phnom Penh Post, December 31, 2014.

46.

"Cambodian FM Hails China's Ties, Cooperation with ASEAN, Cambodia," PNA (Philippines News Agency), December 8, 2014.

47.

"China Pledges $548 Million in Aid to Ally Cambodia," Reuters, April 10, 2013; "Cambodian Opposition Criticizes Dependence on China Aid Money," Voice of America, November 19, 2014.

48.

Vong Sokheng, "Chinese Training for Cambodian Soldiers," Phnom Penh Post, May 12, 2014.

49.

"China Invests in Developing Hydroelectric Plants in Cambodia," RIA Oreanda-News, January 19, 2015; Grace Mang, "Guaranteeing Chinese Overseas Dams—By Whom and at What Cost?" International Rivers, February 28, 2013, http://www.internationalrivers.org/blogs/262/guaranteeing-chinese-overseas-dams-%E2%80%93-by-whom-and-at-what-cost; Denis D. Gray and Elaine Kurtenbach, "As It Dominates Dam Industry, China Criticized for Taking on Destructive Projects Others Shun," Associated Press, December 19, 2012.

50.

"Cambodian Parliament's 1st Vice-President Voices Support to Chinese Investment," Xinhua, March 4, 2015; Sok Khemara, "Cambodian Opposition Criticizes Dependence on China Aid Money," op. citDepartment of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Cambodia, op. cit.; Cambodia Passes Disputed Trade Union Law As Tension Flares," Reuters, April 4, 2016.

84.

Alex Barnes, "Cambodia's Proposed Minimum-Wage Law Likely to Reduce Industrial Unrest through 2018, Employers Likely to Receive Concessions," IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, August 25, 2017.

85.

Peter Ford, "US-Cambodia Relations at Their 'Worst Point,' As China Steps in to Fill the Void," ThinkProgress, December 14, 2017; Sebastian Strangio, "Cambodia Becomes the World's Newest One-Party State," op. cit.; Economist Intelligence Unit, "CPP Is Cementing One-Party Rule," February 22, 2017.

86.

China Supports Cambodia's Crackdown on Political Opposition," Reuters, November 20, 2017; Aun Chhengpor, "Chinese State Media Warns of Risks of Cambodia Crackdown," VOA Khmer, October 25, 2017.

87.

Economist Intelligence Unit, "Hun Sen Loosens US Ties Ahead of Crucial Elections," op. cit.

88.

"China Cashes in on Cambodian Anti-American Sentiment," Sputnik News Service, October 15, 2017; James Kynge, Leila Haddou and Michael Peel, "FT Investigation: How China Bought Its Way into Cambodia," op. cit.; Jeffrey Becker, "What Is the PLA's Role in Promoting China-Cambodia Relations?" The Diplomat, April 29, 2017.

89.

May Titthara, "China Woos Hun Sen at Beijing Dinner," Khmer Times, December 1, 2017; Chheang Vannarith, "China and Investments It Has Made in Cambodia," Khmer Times, July 28, 2017; "'Belt and Road' Initiative Will Bring Closer China-Cambodia Cooperation: HKSAR Official," Xinhua, February 27, 2017.

90.

Prak Chan Thul and Matthew Tostevin, "China's Big Money Trumps U.S. Influence in Cambodia," Reuters, September 11, 2017.

91.

Kuch Naren and Ben Pavior, "Bilateral Trade with China Jumps to $4.8 Billion," Cambodia Daily, April 12, 2017; Luke Hunt, "Analysts: Cambodia to 'Pay Price' for Siding with China," VOA, July 29, 2016.

92.

James Kynge, Leila Haddou and Michael Peel, "FT Investigation: How China Bought Its Way into Cambodia," op. cit.

93.

Ibid.; David Hutt, "How China Came to Dominate Cambodia," The Diplomat, September 1, 2016; Simon Denyer, "A Rush to Invest in Cambodia's Infrastructure Is Part of a Larger Quest to Expand Regional Influence," Washington Post, September 5, 2015.

94.

"Hydropower Dams," Open Development: Cambodia," September 2, 2015, https://opendevelopmentcambodia.net/topics/hydropower-dams; "Hydropower in China Sim Vireak, "Cambodia's Hydroelectric Question: China Power and the Environment," The Diplomat, July 30, 2014.

95.

Gregory B. Poindexter, "China Completely Finances Nearly All of Cambodia's Hydropower Projects," Hydroworld.com, October 13, 2016.

96.

Grace Mang, "Guaranteeing Chinese Overseas Dams—By Whom and at What Cost?" International Rivers, February 28, 2013.

97.

Neou Vannarin, "Analysts See Cambodia Bolstering Military Ties with China," VOA, July 21, 2015.

98.