The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
(AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
December 17, 2014February 25, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43240
The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is the Army’s proposed replacement for the
Vietnam-era M-113 personnel carriers, which are still in service in a variety of support capacities
in Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs). While M-113s no longer serve as infantry fighting
vehicles, five variants of the M-113 are used as command and control vehicles, general purpose
vehicles, mortar carriers, and medical treatment and evacuation vehicles. An estimated 3,000 of
these M-113 variants are currently in service with the Army.
The AMPV is intended to be a “vehicle integration” or non-developmental program (candidate
vehicles will be either existing vehicles or modified existing vehicles—not vehicles that are
specially designed and not currently in service). Some suggest that a non-developmental vehicle
might make it easier for the Army to eventually field this system to the force, as most of the
Army’s most recent developmental programs, such as the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), the
Future Combat System (FCS), the Crusader self-propelled artillery system, and the Comanche
helicopter, were cancelled before they could be fully developed and fielded.
On November 26, 2013, the Army issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the AMPV. This RFP
stipulated that the Army plans to award a five-year EMD contract in May 2014 worth $458
million to a single contractor for 29 prototypes. While the March 2013 RFP established an
Average Unit Manufacturing Cost Ceiling for each AMPV at $1.8 million, this was rescinded to
permit vendors greater flexibility. The EMD phase is scheduled to run between FY2015 and
FY2019, followed by three years of low-rate initial production (LRIP) starting in 2020. The Army
currently plans to procure 2,907 AMPVs to replace M-113s in ABCTs at an estimated program cost of $10.233 billion. The
Defense Acquisition Board was reportedly to meet on December 9, 2014, to authorize the
program to move to Milestone B—the EMD phase—but there have been no reports that this
action has occurred.
The Army’s decision to provide BAE Systems’ Bradley Fighting Vehicle to other vendors to use
as they develop their own AMPV design proposals as a means of cutting program costs has
resulted in claims of unfairness from General Dynamics Land Systems, which is developing its
proposal based on the Stryker Combat Vehicle. In late May 2014, General Dynamics Land
Systems pulled out of the AMPV program, suggesting the Army’s RFP would not allow the
company to provide a competitive solution.
The FY2015 President’s budget request for the AMPV is $92.4 million in RDT&E funding. This
$64 million increase from FY2014 provides for one Engineering, Manufacturing, and
Development (EMD) contract as well as program management support.
S. 1847 authorizes full funding for the AMPV for FY2015 but limits funding to 80% until the
Secretary of the Army provides congressional defense committees a report on the Army’s plans to
replace all M-113s at Echelons Above Brigade (EAB), as well as examining the feasibility of
using wheeled AMPV medical variants in ABCTs.
A potential issue for Congress is the continuing AMPV pure versus mixed fleet debate. This
cost of $10.233 billion. The Army also has plans to replace 1,922 M-113s at Echelons Above
Brigade (EAB), but requirements for these vehicles have not yet been established. While the
Army would like a pure fleet of AMPVs, others support a mixed fleet of wheeled and tracked
AMPV variants.
On December 23, 2014, the Army announced it had selected BAE Systems Land and Armaments
L.P. as the winner of the EMD contract. The initial award is for 52 months, valued at about $382
million. In addition, the award provides for an optional Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP)
phase. If this phase is awarded, BAE would produce an additional 289 vehicles for a total contract
value of $1.2 billion. This EMD contract does not include EAB AMPV variants.
The FY2016 President’s budget request for the AMPV is $230.2 million in RDT&E funding. This
$137.9 million increase from FY2015 funds final prototype designs and integration of
components into the AMPV chassis.
The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act authorizes full funding for the AMPV but limits
funding to 80% until the Secretary of the Army provides congressional defense committees a
report on the Army’s plans to replace all EAB M-113s, as well as examining the feasibility of
using wheeled AMPV medical variants in ABCTs.
Potential issues for Congress include the continuing AMPV pure versus mixed fleet debate and
program cost growth between FY2015 and FY2016. This report will be updated.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) ................................................................................ 1
The Army’s AMPV Requirements ................................................................................................... 1
Program Overview .......................................AMPVs at Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) .................................................................................... 2
Department of Defense (DOD) Approves AMPV Program.....Program Overview ........................................................ 3
Army Issues AMPV Request for Proposal (RFP) ............................................................................ 3
Projected AMPV Production Quantities ........................ 2
Department of Defense (DOD) Approves AMPV Program.................................................................. 3
Revised Projected AMPV Production Quantities ... 3
Army Issues AMPV Draft Request for Proposal (RFP) ......................................................................... 4
2014 Projected Total Program Costs... 3
Projected ABCT AMPV Production Quantities ............................................................................................. 4
Recent Program Activities 4
Revised Projected ABCT AMPV Production Quantities ................................................................. 4
2014 Projected Total Program Costs.............................................. 5
Army Extends Request for Proposal (RFP) Response Date ...................................................... 5
General Dynamics Protests AMPV RFP ................................................................................... 5
General Dynamics Appeals to Congress .... 5
2015 Projected Total Program Costs................................................................................................. 5
General Dynamics Decides Not to Pursue a Government Accountability Office
(GAO) Protest... 5
Recent Program Activities ...................................................................................................................... 6
Army Delays AMPV Schedule and Modifies Request for Proposals ........................................ 6
General Dynamics Pulls Out of AMPV Competition 5
Army Awards ABCT AMPV Contract to BAE............................................................................. 6
Possible Program Acceleration... 5
EMD Contract Does Not Include EAB AMPVs ......................................................................................... 6
December 2014 Milestone B Decision 5
Budgetary Issues ...................................................................................... 7
Budgetary Issues ........................................ 6
FY2016 ...................................................................................... 7
FY2015 ................................................... 6
FY2016 President’s Budget Request ................................................................................... 7
FY2015 President’s Budget Request6
Potential Issues for Congress ................................................................................... 7
Rules Committee Print 113-58, House Amendment to the Text of S. 1847 .............................. 7
Potential Issue for Congress 6
Mixed AMPV Fleet Debate ............................................................................................................ 8
Mixed AMPV Fleet Debate .............................................. 6
Total Program Cost Growth between FY2015 and FY2016 ......................................................... 8
Tables
Table 1. M-113 Distribution in ABCTs, by Variant ......................................................................... 2
Table 2. 2013 Projected ABCT AMPV Production, by Variant .................................................................. 4
Contacts
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................. 98
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Background
In early 1956, the Army began the development of an air-transportable, armored multi-purpose
vehicle family intended to provide a lightweight, amphibious armored personnel carrier for armor
and mechanized infantry units.1 Known as the M-113, it entered production in 1960 and saw
extensive wartime service in Vietnam. Considered a reliable and versatile vehicle, a number of
different variations of the M-113 were produced to fulfill such roles as a command and control
vehicle, mortar carrier, and armored ambulance, to name but a few. The Army began replacing the
M-113 infantry carrier version in the early 1980s with the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle,
but many non-infantry carrier versions of the M-113 were retained in service. According to
reports, about 3,000 M-113 variants are currently still in use.2
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV)3
According to the Army:
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is the proposed United States Army program
for replacement of the M113M-113 Family of Vehicles (FOV) to mitigate current and future
capability gaps in force protection, mobility, reliability, and interoperability by mission role
variant within the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) [now known as the Armored
Brigade Combat Team – ABCT]. The AMPV will have multiple variants tailored to specific
mission roles within HBCT. Mission roles are as follows: General Purpose, Medical
Evacuation, Medical Treatment, Mortar Carrier, and Mission Command. AMPV is a vehicle
integration program.
The Army’s AMPV Requirements4
Regarding the decision to replace remaining M-113s, the Army notes:
•
The M-113 lacks the force protection and mobility needed to operate as part of
combined arms teams within complex operational environments. For example,
“commanders will not allow them to leave Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) or
enter contested areas without extensive mission protection and route clearance.”5
•
The use of other vehicles for M-113 mission sets (casualty evacuations, for
example) reduces unit combat effectiveness.
1
Information in this section is taken from Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery, 2011-2012, 32nd Edition,
pp. 470-478.
2
Tony Bertuca, “Optimism Emerges for the AMPV Program, Though Pre-RFP Work Remains,” InsideDefense.com,
August 16, 2013.
3
From the Army’s AMPV Program website, https://contracting.tacom.army.mil/majorsys/ampv/ampv.htm, accessed
September 13, 2013.
4
Information in this section is taken from an Army briefing: “AMPV Industry Day,” April 23, 2013.
5
Ibid., p. 13.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
The majority of the Army’s M-113s are found in Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs),
where they comprise 32% of the
tracked armored vehicles organic to that organization. The 114
M-113 variants in the ABCT are
distributed as follows:
Table 1. M-113 Distribution in ABCTs, by Variant
M-113 Variant Type
Number of M-113s
M-113A3 General Purpose (GP)
19
M-1068A3 Mission Command (MCmd)
41
M-1064 Mortar Carrier (MC)
15
M-113A3 Medical Evacuation (ME)
31
M-577 Medical Treatment (MT)
8
Source: Information in this table is taken from an Army briefing: “AMPV Industry Day,” April 23, 2013, p. 13.
AMPVs at Echelons Above Brigade (EAB)6
In addition to the AMPV requirement in the ABCTs, the Army also plans on procuring an
additional 1,922 AMPVs to replace M-113s in echelons above brigade (EAB).7 The Army notes
that these AMPVs might have different requirements than the ABCT AMPVs, and the Army is
currently assessing these requirements. Currently, no contract awards have been made for EAB
AMPVs.
Program Overview8.
Program Overview6
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), in March 2012, the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD, AT&L) approved a materiel
development decision for AMPV and authorized the Army’s entry into the materiel solution
analysis phase. The Army completed the AMPV analysis of alternatives (AoA) in July 2012 and
proposed a non-developmental vehicle (the candidate vehicle will be either an existing vehicle or
a modified existing vehicle—not a vehicle that is specially designed and not in current service).
Because the AMPV is to be a non-developmental vehicle, DOD has decided that the program will
start at Milestone B, Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase and skip the
Milestone A, Technology Development Phase.
6
Information in this section is from PEO Ground Combat Systems, AMPV Program’s EMD Contract Awarded to
BAE, December 24, 2014.
7
Echelon Above Brigade (EAB) refers to Army combat units larger than brigades—generally division and corps
sized—as well as non-ABCT support brigades. Examples of EAB units that have M-113s that will be replaced with
AMPVs include Armored Division and Corps headquarters and Combat Engineer Brigades.
8
Information in this section is taken from the United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions:
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-13-294SP, March 2013, p. 133, and an Army briefing: “AMPV
Industry Day,” April 23, 2013 and Tony Bertuca, “Optimism Emerges for AMPV Program Though Pre-RFP Work
Remains,” InsideDefense.com, August 16, 2013.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
The Army plans for a full and open competition and will award one industry bidder a 42-month
EMD contract to develop all five AMPV variants. A draft Request for Proposal (RFP) released in
March 2013 stated that the EMD contract would be worth $1.46 billion, including $388 million
for 29
EMD prototypes for testing between 2014 and 2017 and $1.08 billion for 289 low-rate
initial initial
production (LRIP) models between 2018 and 2020. The Army had planned on releasing the
formal RFP in June 2013 but instead slipped the date until mid-September 2013, citing a delayed
Defense Acquisition Board review attributed in part to Department of Defense civilian furloughs.79
The EMD contract award iswas originally planned for late 2014. The Army is also planning for an
average unit
manufacturing cost (AUMC) of $1.8 million per vehicle.
6
Information in this section is taken from the United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions:
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-13-294SP, March 2013, p. 133, and an Army briefing: “AMPV
Industry Day,” April 23, 2013 and Tony Bertuca, “Optimism Emerges for AMPV Program Though Pre-RFP Work
Remains,” InsideDefense.com, August 16, 2013.
7
Tony Bertuca, “Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle RFP Scheduled for Mid-September,” InsideDefense.com,
August 9, 2013.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
manufacturing cost (AUMC) of $1.8 million per vehicle.
Department of Defense (DOD) Approves AMPV
Program8Program10
On November 26, 2013, DOD issued an acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) officially
approving the Army’s entry into the Milestone B, Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD) Phase. The ADM directed the Army to impose an Average Procurement Unit Cost less
than or equal to $3.2 million at a production rate of not less than 180 vehicles per year. In
addition, operations and sustainment costs are to be less than or equal to $400,000 per vehicle per
year. The Army is also directed to down select to a single prime contractor at the completion of
Milestone B.
Army Issues AMPV Draft Request for Proposal
(RFP)911
Also on November 26, 2013, the Army issued a new draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for the
AMPV. This latest RFP stipulates thatRFP stipulated the Army plansplanned to award a five-year EMD contract in May
2014 2014
worth $458 million to a single contractor for 29 prototypes. While the March 2013 RFP
established an Average Unit Manufacturing Cost Ceiling for each AMPV at $1.8 million, this was
rescinded to permit vendors greater flexibility. The EMD phase iswas scheduled to run between
FY2015 and FY2019, followed by three years of low-rate initial production (LRIP) starting in
2020.
Projected AMPV Production Quantities10
Under 2013 plans and projected force structure, the Army planned to start full rate production of
the AMPV in FY2020 at the rate of two to three ABCTs per year. Total vehicle production by
variant is depicted in the following table:
8
9
Tony Bertuca, “Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle RFP Scheduled for Mid-September,” InsideDefense.com,
August 9, 2013.
10
Information in this section is taken from Department of Defense, “Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Pre-Engineering
and Manufacturing Development Request for Proposals Acquisition Decision Memorandum,” November 26, 2013 and
Tony Bertuca, “DOD Officially OKs Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Program; RFP Hits the Street,”
InsideDefense.com, November 26, 2013.
911
Information in this section is taken from Solicitation, Offer, and Award: Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, Number:
W56HZV-13-R-0022, November 26, 2013 and Tony Bertuca, “DOD Officially OKs Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose
Vehicle Program; RFP Hits the Street,” InsideDefense.com, November 26, 2013.
10
Information in this section is taken from an Army briefing: “AMPV Industry Day,” April 23, 2013.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Table 2. 2013 Projected
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Projected ABCT AMPV Production Quantities12
Under 2013 plans and projected force structure, the Army planned to start full rate production of
the ABCT AMPV in FY2020 at the rate of two to three ABCTs per year. Total vehicle production
by variant is depicted in the following table:
Table 2. 2013 Projected ABCT AMPV Production, by Variant
ABCT Total
Training and Doctrine
Command and Testing
(See Notes)
Total Vehicles by
Quantity
M-113A3 General Purpose
(GP)
462
58
520
M-1068A3 Mission
Command (MCmd)
899
92
991
M-1064 Mortar Carrier
(MC)
348
36
384
M-113A3 Medical
Evacuation (ME)
736
52
788
M-577 Medical Treatment
(MT)
194
20
214
2,639
258
2,897
Variant to Be
Replaced
Totals
Source: Information in this table is taken from an Army briefing: “AMPV Industry Day,” April 23, 2013, p. 23.
Notes: Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Army command responsible for training the force,
would use AMPVs at its various schools and courses for training soldiers. Testing AMPV quantities would be
allocated to various Army and Department of Defense organizations responsible for testing vehicles.
Revised Projected ABCT AMPV Production Quantities11
Quantities13
GAO’s March 2014 Assessment of Selected Weapons Programs report notes the new production
quantity for the ABCT AMPV is 2,907 vehicles—a 10 vehicle increase over 2013 quantities. Discussions
Discussions with the AMPV Program Manager revealed the 10 extra vehicles would be used for testing
purposes.12
2014 Projected Total Program Costs13
For a 2,907 vehicle procurement, GAO estimates total program costs as follows (FY2014
dollars):
•
Research and Development: $779.9 million.
•
Procurement: $9.443 billion.
•
Estimated Total Program Cost: $10.223 billion.
11
testing purposes.14
12
Information in this section is taken from an Army briefing: “AMPV Industry Day,” April 23, 2013.
United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs,
GAO-14-340SP, March 2014, p. 129.
1214
CRS Meeting with AMPV Program Manager, May 20, 2014.
13
Ibid.
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Recent Program Activities
Army Extends Request for Proposal (RFP) Response Date14
Reports suggest the Army extended the deadline to industry to respond to the AMPV RFP from
February 24, 2014, until May 28, 2014, after General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS)—the
Stryker Combat Vehicle’s manufacturer—requested additional time. The reason why this
extension was granted was to permit GDLS to study the technical specifications of excess
Bradley Fighting Vehicles (designated Optional Exchange Vehicles [OEVs] by the Army), which
the Army has offered to vendors to use in their final AMPV production designs to “drive down”
total AMPV program costs. As the Bradley is manufactured by BAE Systems—the other
manufacturer vying for the AMPV contract—some Pentagon and Capitol Hill officials have
reportedly suggested because of the Army’s decision, BAE has an “edge” as its proposed design
is being built around a turretless Bradley, whereas GDLS has proposed both tracked and wheeled
designs based on its Stryker vehicle.
General Dynamics Protests AMPV RFP15
General Dynamics Land Systems reportedly filed a protest on February 14, 2014, with the Army
Materiel Command protesting the AMPV RFP. The basis of General Dynamics’ protest is the
program’s proposed timeline as well as the use of BAE’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle as the optional
exchange vehicle for design development. This type of protest supposedly should be resolved
within 90 days or less.
General Dynamics Appeals to Congress16
General Dynamics has reportedly been actively lobbying Congress to intervene in the AMPV
program, asking that program funding be denied until a more competitive plan is put forward by
the Army. GDLS contends the RFP is biased towards BAE’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle and
Bradley technical data have not been provided to other potential vendors and the Army has not
provided sufficient data or time for others to compete. Supposedly, GDLS was considering asking
for up to a three-year program delay so it has time to process the Bradley’s technical data and
then adjust its bid. A program delay would run counter to the Army’s efforts to accelerate the
AMPV program, an effort that has taken on increasing importance due to the recent termination
of the Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program.17
14
Tony Bertuca, “Army’s RFP Response Date for AMPV Extended After GDLS Asks for Time,” InsideDefense.com,
January 31, 2014.
15
Tony Bertuca, “General Dynamics Protests RFP for Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle,” InsideDefense.com, February
20, 2014.
16
Tony Bertuca, “General Dynamics Lobbies Congress to Upend Army’s AMPV Program,” InsideDefense.com,
February 28, 2014.
17
For additional information on the GCV see CRS Report R41597, The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
General Dynamics Decides Not to Pursue a Government
Accountability Office (GAO) Protest18
On April 14, 2014, GDLS reportedly announced it would not ask GAO to rule on the AMPV
program, noting that the company would instead continue to discuss the AMPV program with
DOD and Congress.
Army Delays AMPV Schedule and Modifies Request for
Proposals19
The Army has reportedly decided to move the award date for the AMPV System Development
contract until the second quarter of FY2015. The Army will also reportedly modify the AMPV
RFP to ensure the wider availability of Bradley Fighting Vehicle technical data.
General Dynamics Pulls Out of AMPV Competition20
On May 28, 2014, GDLS reportedly announced it would not submit an AMPV proposal,
suggesting “the requirements and other provisions of the [request for proposal] do not allow the
company to provide a competitive solution.”21 A GDLS spokesman also reportedly stated the
company would not pursue a federal court decision so it would not hinder any further
participation by the company in the AMPV program, possibly suggesting GDLS envisions a
future role in the AMPV program. Reports also suggested Navistar Defense, which had been
rumored to be considering submitting an AMPV bid, would not participate in the program.
Possible Program Acceleration22
A BAE company spokesman reportedly stated that if the company was awarded the contract, it
could accelerate the program, possibly cutting 12 months from the proposed 52-month EMD
phase. BAE further notes if the Army compressed vehicle testing—based on the AMPV’s
commonality with the Bradley and Paladin Integrated Management System (PIMS)23—BAE
might also be able to further accelerate the program schedule.
18
“General Dynamics Opts to Skip GAO Protest Over Army Vehicle Plan,” Reuters, April 15, 2014, and Tony
Bertuca, “Army Delays AMPV Schedule as GDLS Forgoes GAO Protest,” InsideDefense.com, April 15, 2014.
19
Tony Bertuca, “Army Delays AMPV Schedule as GDLS Forgoes GAO Protest,” InsideDefense.com, April 15, 2014,
and Ann Roosevelt, “General Dynamics Will Continue Talking AMPV With Army, No Further Protest,” Defense
Daily.
20
Tony Bertuca, “General Dynamics Land Systems Bows Out of the Army’s AMPV Competition,” InsideDefense.com,
May 30, 2014.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
From the BAE website: “Paladin Integrated Management System (PIMS) is the latest howitzer in the BAE Systems
M109 family of vehicles, the primary indirect fire support system for the ABCTs. It uses the existing main armament
and cab structure of a Paladin M109A6, and replaces the vehicle’s chassis components with modem components
common to the Bradley vehicle,” accessed July 8, 2014.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
December 2014 Milestone B Decision24
The Defense Acquisition Board reportedly was to consider advancing the AMPV program to
acquisition Milestone B—Engineering Manufacturing Development (EMD)—on December 9,
although there have not been press reports or a DOD statement confirming this action was taken.
BAE is reportedly the only known bidder for the AMPV program.
Budgetary Issues
FY2015
FY2015 President’s Budget Request25
The FY2015 President’s budget request for the AMPV is $92.4 million in RDT&E funding. This
$64 million increase from FY2014 provides for one Engineering, Manufacturing, and
Development (EMD) contract as well as program management support.
Rules Committee Print 113-58, House Amendment to the Text of S.
184726
S. 1847 authorizes full funding for the AMPV for FY2015 (page 1607).
SEC. 216. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR ARMORED MULTIPURPOSE VEHICLE PROGRAM.27
(a) LIMITATION.—Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise
made available for fiscal year 2015 for research, development, test, and evaluation, Army,
for the armored multi-purpose vehicle program, not more than 80 percent may be obligated
or expended until the date on which the Secretary of the Army submits to the congressional
defense committees the report under subsection (b)(1).
(b) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 2015, the Secretary of the Army shall submit to
the congressional defense committees a report on the armored multi-purpose vehicle
program.
24
Information in this section is from Tony Bertuca, “Army AMPV Scheduled for Dec. 9 Milestone B Decision,”
InsideDefense.com, December 2, 2014.
25
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States Department of
Defense Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, March 2014, p. 3-3 and U.S.
Army’s FY2015 Budget Briefing, March 4, 2014, p. 13.
26
Information in this section is taken from Rules Committee Print 113-58, House Amendment to the Text of S. 1847,
[Showing the text of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2015], December 2, 2014.
27
Ibid., pp. 68-70.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
(2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) An identification of the existing capability gaps of the M–113 family of vehicles
assigned, as of the date of the report, to units outside of combat brigades.
(B) An identification of the mission roles that are in common between—
(i) such vehicles assigned to units outside of combat brigades; and
(ii) the vehicles examined in the armor brigade combat team during the armored multipurpose vehicle analysis of alternatives.
(C) The estimated timeline and the rough order of magnitude of funding requirements
associated with complete M–113 family of vehicles divestiture within the units outside of
combat brigades and the risk associated with delaying the replacement of such vehicles.
(D) A description of the requirements for force protection, mobility, and size, weight, power,
and cooling capacity for the mission roles of M–113 family of vehicles assigned to units
outside of combat brigades.
(E) A discussion of the mission roles of the M–113 family of vehicles assigned to units
outside of combat brigades that are comparable to the mission roles of the M–113 family of
vehicles assigned to armor brigade combat teams.
(F) A discussion of whether a one-for-one replacement of the M–113 family of vehicles
assigned to units outside of combat brigades is likely.
(G) With respect to mission roles, a discussion of any substantive distinctions that exist in
the capabilities of the M–113 family of vehicles that are needed based on the level of the unit
to which the vehicle is assigned (not including combat brigades).
(H) A discussion of the relative priority of fielding among the mission roles.
(I) An assessment for the feasibility of incorporating medical wheeled variants within the
armor brigade combat teams.
Potential Issue for Congress
Mixed AMPV Fleet Debate
Some Members have expressed concerns with the Army’s current AMPV RFP. They propose the
current RFP, which stipulates the selection of a single vendor, be modified so a mixed fleet (both
tracked and wheeled) of AMPVs can be acquired. This could essentially make the AMPV
procurement a multi-vendor effort. The Members supporting this course of action contend a
mixed fleet is “sensible, sustainable, cost effective for the taxpayer, and most importantly, best for
the warfighter.”28
28
Letter to Secretary Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics, from
Rep. Mike Rogers et al., April 3, 2014.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
In December 2014, a number of Members sent letters to Army and DOD leadership requesting the
Army delay awarding the AMPV ambulance variant contract until after congressional defense
committees have had adequate time to review congressionally mandated reports.29
Other Members reportedly support continuing the pure AMPV fleet approach, noting “any
changes to the AMPV acquisition will result in delays and increase costs to the program for the
Army” and that “our priority is to ensure a timely procurement of a more survivable and more
mobile personnel carrier for our soldiers.”30
Current FY2015 legislative proposals detailed in preceding sections call for further examination
of the use of wheeled AMPV variants at both Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) as well as for
medical evacuation purposes.
The Army contends if a mixed AMPV fleet proposal is adopted, the AMPV program could be
delayed by up to three years because the current RFP would need to be pulled back and
modified.31 The Army also suggests such a change could cost the AMPV program an additional
$300 million.32
Given the level of debate as well as a variety of concerns expressed by Members, it is possible the
issue of either a pure or mixed AMPV fleet will not be resolved in the near future. If this becomes
the case, it might be possible to defer the production of the AMPV medical evacuation (ME) and
medical treatment (MT) variants as well as other variants that could fall into the Echelons Above
Brigade (EAB) category without a major program disruption. As part of a potential pure or mixed
AMPV fleet examination, Congress could ask the Army to look at a variety of development and
production scenarios which take into account different equipment fielding schedules with the
intent of minimizing both cost and operational risk.
Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
29
Tony Bertuca, “Lawmakers Push Pentagon to Delay AMPV Award,” InsideDefense.com, December 5, 2014.
Tony Bertuca, “Two More Senators Support BAE in AMPV Letter to Senate Appropriators,” InsideDefense.com,
June 27, 2014.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
30
Congressional Research Service
92014 Projected Total Program Costs15
For a 2,907 vehicle procurement, GAO estimated total program costs as follows (FY2014
dollars):
•
Research and Development: $779.9 million.
•
Procurement: $9.443 billion.
•
Estimated Total Program Cost: $10.223 billion.
2015 Projected Total Program Costs16
In its FY2016 budget request, the Army reportedly revised its total program costs for 2,907
AMPVs:
•
Research and Development: $ 1 billion.
•
Procurement: $ 11.8 billion.
•
Estimated Total Program Cost: $12.8 billion.
The Army did not provide details regarding the almost $2.6 billion dollars cost growth for the
program.
Recent Program Activities
Army Awards ABCT AMPV Contract to BAE17
On December 23, 2014, the Army announced it had selected BAE Systems Land and Armaments
L.P. as the winner of the EMD contract. The initial award is for 52 months valued at about $382
million. During this period of performance, BAE will produce 29 vehicles, which will be put
through “rigorous developmental and operational testing.” In addition, the award provides for an
optional Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) phase. If this phase is awarded, BAE would produce
an additional 289 vehicles for a total contract value of $1.2 billion.
EMD Contract Does Not Include EAB AMPVs18
The Army, in its announcement, emphasized the BAE EMD contract did not pertain to the 1,922
EAB AMPVs. As previously noted, these AMPVs might have different requirements than the
15
Ibid.
Jason Sherman, “Army Forecasts $12.8 Billion Tab for AMPV (Updated),” InsideDefense.com, February 17, 2015.
17
Information in this section is from PEO Ground Combat Systems, AMPV Program’s EMD Contract Awarded to
BAE, December 24, 2014.
18
Ibid.
16
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
ABCT AMPVs, and the Army is currently assessing these requirements. The Army did not say
when it envisioned making a contract award for EAB AMPVs.
Budgetary Issues
FY2016
FY2016 President’s Budget Request19
The FY2016 President’s budget request for the AMPV is $230.2 million in RDT&E funding. This
$137.9 million increase from FY2015 funds final prototype designs and integration of
components into the AMPV chassis.
Potential Issues for Congress
Mixed AMPV Fleet Debate
Some Members have expressed concerns with the Army’s current AMPV RFP. They propose the
current RFP, which stipulates the selection of a single vendor, be modified so a mixed fleet (both
tracked and wheeled) of AMPVs can be acquired. This could essentially make the AMPV
procurement a multi-vendor effort. The Members supporting this course of action contend a
mixed fleet is “sensible, sustainable, cost effective for the taxpayer, and most importantly, best for
the warfighter.”20
In December 2014, a number of Members sent letters to Army and DOD leadership requesting the
Army delay awarding the AMPV ambulance variant contract until after congressional defense
committees have had adequate time to review congressionally mandated reports.21
Other Members reportedly support continuing the pure AMPV fleet approach, noting “any
changes to the AMPV acquisition will result in delays and increase costs to the program for the
Army” and that “our priority is to ensure a timely procurement of a more survivable and more
mobile personnel carrier for our soldiers.”22
FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act legislative language23 calls for, among other things,
further examination of the use of wheeled AMPV variants at both Echelons Above Brigade
19
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States Department of
Defense Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, February 2015, p. 3-3.
20
Letter to Secretary Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics, from
Rep. Mike Rogers et al., April 3, 2014.
21
Tony Bertuca, “Lawmakers Push Pentagon to Delay AMPV Award,” InsideDefense.com, December 5, 2014.
22
Tony Bertuca, “Two More Senators Support BAE in AMPV Letter to Senate Appropriators,” InsideDefense.com,
June 27, 2014.
23
Rules Committee Print 113-58, House Amendment to the Text of S. 1847, [Showing the text of the Carl Levin and
Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015], December 2, 2014. Complete
(continued...)
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
(EAB) as well as for medical evacuation purposes. This study, due to Congress no later than
March 1, 2015, could have an impact the Army’s pending EAB AMPV EMD contract award.
The Army contends if a mixed AMPV fleet proposal is adopted, the overall AMPV program could
be delayed by up to three years because the current RFP would need to be pulled back and
modified.24 The Army also suggests such a change could cost the AMPV program an additional
$300 million.25
Given the level of debate as well as a variety of concerns expressed by Members, it is possible the
issue of either a pure or mixed AMPV fleet will not be resolved in the near future. If this becomes
the case, it might be possible to defer the production of the AMPV medical evacuation (ME) and
medical treatment (MT) variants as well as other variants that could fall into the Echelons Above
Brigade (EAB) category without a major program disruption. As part of a potential pure or mixed
AMPV fleet examination, Congress could ask the Army to look at a variety of development and
(...continued)
language is cited in the following passage:
SEC. 216. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR ARMORED MULTI-PURPOSE VEHICLE
PROGRAM.
(a) LIMITATION.—Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year
2015 for research, development, test, and evaluation, Army, for the armored multi-purpose vehicle program, not more
than 80 percent may be obligated or expended until the date on which the Secretary of the Army submits to the
congressional defense committees the report under subsection (b)(1).
(b) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 2015, the Secretary of the Army shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report on the armored multi-purpose vehicle program.
(2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) An identification of the existing capability gaps of the M–113 family of vehicles assigned, as of the date of the
report, to units outside of combat brigades.
(B) An identification of the mission roles that are in common between—
(i) such vehicles assigned to units outside of combat brigades; and
(ii) the vehicles examined in the armor brigade combat team during the armored multi-purpose vehicle analysis of
alternatives.
(C) The estimated timeline and the rough order of magnitude of funding requirements associated with complete M–113
family of vehicles divestiture within the units outside of combat brigades and the risk associated with delaying the
replacement of such vehicles.
(D) A description of the requirements for force protection, mobility, and size, weight, power, and cooling capacity for
the mission roles of M–113 family of vehicles assigned to units outside of combat brigades.
(E) A discussion of the mission roles of the M–113 family of vehicles assigned to units outside of combat brigades that
are comparable to the mission roles of the M–113 family of vehicles assigned to armor brigade combat teams.
(F) A discussion of whether a one-for-one replacement of the M–113 family of vehicles assigned to units outside of
combat brigades is likely.
(G) With respect to mission roles, a discussion of any substantive distinctions that exist in the capabilities of the M–113
family of vehicles that are needed based on the level of the unit to which the vehicle is assigned (not including combat
brigades).
(H) A discussion of the relative priority of fielding among the mission roles.
(I) An assessment for the feasibility of incorporating medical wheeled variants within the armor brigade combat teams.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
production scenarios which take into account different equipment fielding schedules with the
intent of minimizing both cost and operational risk.
Total Program Cost Growth between FY2015 and FY2016
As previously noted, the Army did not provide details regarding the almost $2.6 billion dollars
total cost growth for the program between FY2015 and FY2016. Congress might choose to
examine the specific circumstances that led to this total cost growth, as these details are not
evident in FY2016 budget request documentation available to the public.
Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
Congressional Research Service
8